Durkheimian Studies

First, we return to the question of ‘revelation’ that has never been taken as an object of research. There has always been reluctance to take it seriously. However, Durkheim changed his thematic and theoretical perspectives from 1897, focusing on religious facts. Second, we explain how to treat revelation as a ‘thing’, as an object of research, insisting on the exegetical method by positioning ourselves prior to the emergence of ‘revelation’ (1895) to identify the paths that were decisive for Durkheim. All the articles in the special issue follow this approach. Third, we show how Durkheim went about ‘treating religious facts as things’, via the comparative method: by comparing the objectification of religion in other disciplines (history, law, psychology, philosophy), to arrive at a sociological synthesis; by comparing religious facts (and especially sacrifice) within different religions. The six articles in the special issue demonstrate the importance of the comparative method in social science. They ought to be compared with each other.

In his 1887 report about the positivist science of morals in Germany, Durkheim referred to two books: Der Zweck im Recht by Rudolf von Jhering and Die socialetische Bedeutung von Recht, Unrecht und Strafe by Georg von Jellinek. Despite the absence of commentary from Durkheim about this 1878 book from the ‘young’ Jellinek (later known as a master of public law), the analysis of this dissertation (rejected by the University of Vienna) shows that it contained a claim for a social-science-inspired understanding of crime and penalty and had some points of contact with Durkheim's argumentation, notably about the importance of religious feelings in the social reaction against crimes. The article proposes to deepen this comparison between Jellinek's and Durkheim's books with an investigation about their indirect sources.

There is an immediate chronological link between Durkheim's criminology courses on crime and punishment, taught between 1892 and 1894, and his first course in religious sociology (1894–1895). Both are included in the cycles of ‘General Physics of Law and Morals’. Beyond this observation, the emphasis here is on six points that intellectually connect the two fields of study, always analyzed separately by the commentators of his work. Crime is in itself a means of revealing social solidarity, and the religion that carries it. The penalty is at the articulation between criminal law and religion. The evolution of penalty marks the progressive elimination of the religious substance of modern criminal laws. Durkheim outlines a theory of the sacred by reflecting on the respect and authority of the law. There are also suggestive digressions that link the tattoos of criminals to the institution of totemism. Finally, his typology of crimes is an opportunity to transform religion into an ‘explanatory variable’, rather than a ‘variable to be explained’.

Gaston Richard was not only among the first to be informed of the ‘revelation’ that Durkheim announced about his reading of William Robertson Smith in 1895. Among all the Durkheimians, Richard was alone in publicly declaring himself on the matter. The radical nature of his witness went far beyond the fact of calling into question the date as well as the subject of this ‘revelation’. For Richard, the constitution of Durkheim's religious sociology was ultimately ‘only a moment from a more ample study’ about obligation. The originality of his analysis derives as much from the fact of having seen the main source of Durkheim's inspiration in the neo-criticism of Charles Renouvier (parts 1 and 2) as from having criticized Durkheim's state-sociology, which was, if not the conclusion, then at least its political translation (part 3).

This article examines how the counter-revolutionary writer Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821) theorizes the notion of sacrifice. For de Maistre sacrifice understood as punishment is foundational to all societies. Durkheim used many of this author's works without citing them. At the time Durkheim was teaching his criminal sociology course on punishment and responsibility as well as preparing his course on religion dealing with ‘revelation’. It is possible to explain his interests by the fact that de Maistre appears in Durkheim's core readings for theoretical ‘juncture’ that featured authors concerned with the articulation between questions of penal law and of religious phenomena. This provides additional evidence that for Durkheim religion is at the origin of the definition of the crime and of the establishment of the punishment.

This article examines Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss's Essay on the nature and function of sacrifice, published in the second volume of L'Année sociologique edited by Durkheim. By focussing on the comparative method used by Hubert and Mauss to compare the civilisations of ancient India and Israel, we can trace how Durkheim gradually elaborated upon the sociology of religions and the subject of sacrifice. Two sociological concepts are used to analyse this intellectual exchange. First, the notion of ‘configuration’, following Norbert Elias, that is understood as a space of mutual dependence and interaction in which authors, journals, disciplines and academic institutions participate. Second, the notion of ‘a conversational space’, borrowed from Erving Goffman, that formed among Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Henri Hubert and Sylvain Lévi. We contend that the writing and thinking of sacrifice in Hubert and Mauss's essay was marked by the different backgrounds to which these four scholars belonged—three Jews and one Christian—while at the same time they were committed in the name of justice and equality to the defence of Captain Dreyfus, seen as an ‘expiatory victim’.

What was the nature of the ‘revelation’ and of the appreciation of William Robertson Smith that, in 1907, Émile Durkheim dated to 1895? This article tracks new developments in his thought after 1895, including an emphasis on creative effervescence. But there was also continuity, involving a search for origins that used the ethnology of a living culture to identify early human socioreligious life with totemism in Australia. It is this continuity, at the core of his thought after 1895, which helps to bring out the nature of his ‘revelation’ and of his homage to Robertson Smith. It also highlights a problem with his start from an already complex Australian world, yet without a suitable evolutionary perspective available to him. However, a modern re-reading can reinstate Durkheim's interest in origins, in a story of hominin/human evolution over millions of years.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi uses self-reflexive symbols. He called himself Watchman and weaved a campaign around it. This article sees Modi's campaign alongside Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: emergence of Modi's Watchman image as a totem, emergence of a clan of believers, collective effervescence, coming of a civilising hero, and Modi becoming a great god. The totem and the clan ‘disappeared’ on the last day of the elections. Only the great god remained to resurrect in millions of banners in public spaces saying: ‘Thank you, PM Modi’. This journey of this Dionysian election campaign with emotive symbols and meticulously planned spectacles built an illusion of a society with religion in its elementary form replacing the modern society for the election period.