Youth, Consumption, and Politics in the Age of Radical Change

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In his movie *Masculin—Féminin or: The Children of Marx and Coca-Cola*—a 1965 French-Swedish coproduction—Jean-Luc Godard depicts the complicated love affair of two "children of the 1960s," a young man with social interests and a young female pop vocalist, who regularly frequented Parisian coffee houses. The movie, blending fictional and documentary elements, dealt with the problem of navigating in a world in which politics involved individuals more than before and in which consumption on an unprecedented level opened up a myriad of opportunities to pursue one's life. The movie succeeded as a political commentary of its time and as a document of an age because, in a delightful manner, it pointedly gave a name to one of its time central spheres of tension. The paradigm "Marx" represented the renaissance of the political sphere, "Coca-Cola" stood for the growing importance of consumption—both images and icons of, above all, youth culture. In a handy title Godard integrated what many contemporaries had discerned as an evident characteristic of the time: that political transformations and changes within the culture of everyday life were evolving simultaneously and were merging with each other. In a report of the West German news magazine *Der Spiegel*, it was apparent that contemporaries were having a hard time coming to terms with this unfamiliar combination:

> The spectacle is confusing. Participants are a consuming and a demon-
> strating, a narcissistically self-involved and an activist engaging youth,
> Chelsea-girls and Red Guards, Rudi Dutschke and Twiggy.[1]

The reception of medially promoted youth idols—the Beatles for
instance —and the international proliferation of new patterns of expres-
sion—the consumption of music for instance—as well as students' new
forms of political protest ("1968") were considered as core elements of a
new youth culture. Increasing focus on consumption and a coinciding
increase of politicization—a relationship full of contradictions and ten-
sions—were the unmistakable characteristics of the 1960s and the 1970s.
Contemporaries of the period observed a particularly striking contradic-
tion in this situation, which would play a large part in increasing social
tensions during these two decades: on the one hand, youth were striving
towards individual self-actualization like never before (because consumer
society was presenting an unprecedented variety of possibilities towards
achieving this goal); on the other hand, the rapid expansion of consumer
choices (as touted by the industry) was developing into the guiding prin-
ciple of mainstream life. This in turn was often seen as "manipulative,"
not least by the tone-setting cliques of the future elites.

Subcultures such as the hippies embodied a protest against main-
stream society, which perpetuated the endless cycle of work and con-
sumption. At the same time, members of these subcultures were using
elements of consumer culture in the creation and promotion of their
own styles. Many of these elements were in themselves neither political
nor apolitical, but rather simply ingredients of a lifestyle revolution; as
such, however, they became loaded with definite political subtexts. The
consumer industry would then co-opt these subcultural impulses, mak-
ing them available to a much larger audience of young people. In this
way, subcultures infiltrated mass culture; but the subcultures regarded
this as a commercial appropriation of originally oppositional styles,
which destroyed their revolutionary potential. Therefore, new deviant
styles had to be developed, to stand outside the established ones. This
confrontation between mass culture and counterculture fostered an
ongoing process of innovation. This contradictory state, which is still
characteristic today, was particularly pronounced during its initial phase
of evolution and, in numerous countries, it was at the center of vehe-
ment and controversial debates. Therefore, within this tense relationship
between consumption and political interest—between overbearance by
the cultural industry and self-realization—a transnational scope of prob-
lems becomes discernable, which is suitable as a backdrop for a compre-
hensive assessment of the various societies.

This volume intends to highlight, within an international comparative framework, some of the impacts of Western and Northern European youth cultures and their developing "partial culture" (Friedrich Tenbruck) in its "golden age" (Eric Hobsbawm) beginning in the late 1950s.[2] The 1960s and 1970s are generally held as decades of generational upheaval. On the whole, this process of upheaval has been understood as an internationally pertinent phenomenon and, in particular, it has been closely associated with the emergence of a postindustrial modernity.[3] As this assumption has not yet been studied in detail, this volume aims to look more closely at the extent to which these new kinds of youth cultures impacted the various national cultures at large, how far this process reflected instances of a "change in values," and to what extent this process was international in character. The goal of this volume is to create a multifaceted picture of the European youth cultures during a secular period of transition differentiated by gender, regional manifestation, social origin, and educational status.

The idea for such a systematic study developed in the wake of a conference on the societal transformation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic during the 1960s, which took place in Copenhagen in 1998.[4] This conference was part of an international effort occurring during that year to historicize the phenomenon "1968." It became apparent that members of younger age groups had to a significant degree impacted the beginning of the "postindustrial" transformation. This was discernable not only in the essentially simultaneous emergence of student movements the world over and in the development of specific youth cultures, but also in the fact that youthfulness evolved into an ideal—particularly in terms of beauty, patterns of consumption, and political styles—for societies at large. As such, for the study of the European youth cultures between 1960 and 1980, we adopted the hypothesis that extensive societal transformation and the development of new kinds of youth cultures could be a theme of strategic and central importance for the study of recent cultural history. We thus deliberated on this topic in our conference in Copenhagen in May of 2002, organized by the German Studies Department of the University of Copenhagen and the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg. Most of the contributions to this volume were presented at the conference. Other chapters were added to broaden the volume's thematic scope at those points where we thought it specifically necessary. This volume combines contributions from colleagues from Great Britain, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States, and Germany, who all dealt with the trends of European youth cultures during the 1960s and 1970s from various perspectives. Their chapters include

the debates inherent to many larger research endeavors—above all dissertations and "second books"—as well as analyses specifically written for this publication.

The lines of inquiry will unfold in five general directions. Part I examines the interrelationship between politics and consumption by using three interpretive strategies, which are central to understanding the time period under investigation. From varying points of departure, they converge upon the theme of this volume: Arthur Marwick begins by using the guiding principle of "Cultural Revolution" to explore the long years of the 1960s; Detlef Siegfried continues by discussing how the eruption of "1968" inserted itself into the dynamic upheavals of the "Golden Years"; and then Rob Kroes uses a broader chronological framework to deconstruct the concept of "Americanization," which seemingly found its most obvious expression in the Coca-Cola logo.

Part II uses various examples to show how new styles established themselves in the contested space between social discourse and consumer practice, altering societies in their self-perceptions. Peter Wicke describes this process by investigating pop music as a central component in the construction of youth leisure; Konrad Dussel examines the driving forces and counterforces that established the dominance of English-language pop music in German media; Axel Schildt shows how the spatial and experiential territories of youth expanded over time; and Uta Poiger describes how anti-consumerism became conflated with anti-imperialism in the analyses of the West German student movement, giving rise to a new, (self-)conscious mode of consumption.

Part III covers youth-influenced political protest movements, which were particularly strong in the 1960s and 1970s. Wilfried Mausbach looks at the West German movement against the Vietnam War, and how elements of consumer society combined with elements of a counterculture to create new cultural styles, which in turn developed their own politically explosive force. In his two-country comparison, Henrik Kaare Nielsen discovers national differences in techno-critical movements against nuclear power. Steven L.B. Jensen describes how Danish youth and student movements developed in the contested space between political rebellion and lifestyle revolution, while Thomas Etzemüller analyzes the specifics of the Swedish student movement.

Part IV highlights the transformation of gender definitions (of one's self and of others) in the 1960s and 1970s, which occurred partly under the banner of "the sexual revolution." Dagmar Herzog examines the introduction of the birth-control pill in the context of a consumer society: how it was portrayed, hotly debated, and also to some degree understood as part of a larger process of revolution. Barry Doyle describes changes in the

conception of masculinity in Northern Soul, a subculture oriented towards music and dance; meanwhile, Julian Bourg shows how, in debates around pedophilia in the early 1970s, traditional sexual norms were thrown into flux by the foreshadowings of liberalism and emancipation.

Finally, Part V uses the examples of several counter- and subcultures to show how various significant trends in the development of youth cultures could be gathered and focused like light rays in a magnifying glass. Thomas Ekman Jørgensen describes the paradoxical relationship between consumerism and politics in Copenhagen's counterculture. Franz-Werner Kersting examines how the radical left attempted to undertake further reform projects which were at the same time bound up with the concept of revolutionizing society. In conclusion, Klaus Weinhauer takes the example of drug consumption, in which even a forbidden product found an enormously expanded market in consumer society, but which at the same time was restricted in its propagation—thus giving it political overtones.

Understanding Youth Culture

"Youth" and "youth culture" are terms that have been in use since the late nineteenth century, and assumptions about their meaning can vary significantly at times depending on the countries and the respective historical period. At the center of our interests are individuals roughly 14 to 25 years of age with divergent education, religion, social origin, social status, and gender. Within this diverse grouping, a mass culture was evolving in the late 1950s which was primarily defined by the young age of its proponents and by their particular tastes in music, fashion, hairstyles, political practices, etc.; this "youth culture," however, was itself very heterogeneous. Although various subcultures within this "youth culture" attempted to distance themselves from the norms of society (in part by establishing a "counterculture"), they remained connected to the larger society by various bonds: familial connections, cognitive principles, the media, and institutions such as schools and universities. It was precisely these bonds which enabled youth to contribute significantly to society's transformation. Therefore, the idea of "youth culture" is only useful when informed by this understanding of its internal diversity as well as its external interactions with society at large. However, the label "youth culture" remains appropriate for the project at hand as a convenient shorthand for this complex topic, because it succinctly signifies the core subject: young people's cultural and political preferences, which were to play a significant role in hastening social developments during the time period under scrutiny.

Whereas already during the first half of the twentieth century youthfulness and youth represented a foil for projections of political initiatives demanding renewal, these processes were reinforced even more so after the end of the Second World War. In numerous European societies, it was hoped that the younger generation would produce the desired awakening that would overcome the ceaseless alternation of war and crises which hitherto had characterized the history of Europe. During the 1960s and 1970s, this hope was apparently materializing itself when economic prosperity and political détente were becoming realities—trends that within this context were both connected to the younger members of society. The opposite point of view existed as well, manifest in concerns that the young generation could not fulfill such high expectations and would disperse in inopportune directions. Such concerns were becoming especially apparent when at the end of the 1960s the radicalization of a number of subcultures was progressively questioning the limits of the acceptable.

Because of the divergence of European societies, this volume cannot claim an all-encompassing systematic comparison. Instead, exemplary studies intend to determine problems within the field of study so that future research efforts encounter more familiar grounds. Notwithstanding, to examine the various European societies as specifically as possible, the collection of countries studied has been limited to core states of Western and Northern Europe: Sweden, Denmark, West Germany, Great Britain, and France. Thereby, the focus has been on that part of Europe, which, in general, has been understood as the major entry point for transatlantic cultural transfer usually associated with the term "Americanization."[5] At the same time, this volume does not dogmatically stick to this regional limitation. Numerous contributions also tie in other Western European countries—at times also the United States. The Northern and Central European countries stand at the center of this volume because that is where the processes of societal transformation in question found their strongest manifestation. In these countries, a high material standard of living, extended periods of education, secularization, and postindustrial lifestyles came about first and gained acceptance. Modern youth cultures proliferated extensively in these areas early on and often were given pertinent impetus for their further development. "Post-adolescent" spaces of freedom, in which such styles could develop and be practiced for an extended period of time, had an impact on young people's social realities in Scandinavia and in the aforementioned Western European countries stronger than, for instance, in Portugal, Italy, or Ireland, where poorer material and social conditions, lower educational status, as well as more restrictive religious and family

bonds impeded the development of such spaces of freedom. However, by the end of the 1970s, these countries had closed the gap in most of these realms.[6] Processes of material improvement and "change in values" did not bypass Eastern European countries either, where youth cultures and cultural revolutions were mostly visible perhaps in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Nevertheless, in these countries, severe political restrictions as well as economic and cultural-political measures caused significant impediments, which led, compared to the evolution of Northern and Western European societies, to different developments and manifestations.[7]

Still, although there were common features in the chosen time period which distinguished Europe and in particular the Western and Northern European countries from, for instance, the United States or Japan, a uniform manifestation of trends should not be expected.[8] Various societal patterns and specific national traditions had consequences on the concrete manifestation of the youth cultures in these countries so that a distinctive picture emerged in each country, regardless of their common features.

Similarly, the keystone years 1960 through 1980 have only been drawn coarsely, intended as soft demarcations so that enough leeway could be given to do justice to each country's individual caesuras. Significant supraregional transformations already began to occur during the latter third of the 1950s, notably the expansion of the educational sector and of mass communication, an improved supply of consumer goods as well as the emergence of popular youth magazines and new mass cultures for young people.[9] By the close of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, radical changes again occurred in the economic, political and youth-cultural realms: in many countries young voters in particular gained a new kind of political representation through the emergence of "green" parties. Pollution of the environment, intensified confrontation of the superpowers, another economic crisis including rising rates of unemployment as well as a societal loss of utopias denoted the conditions of an "ice age," which found its fitting atmospheric expression in occurrences such as punk music, squatting, and sinking election turnouts.[10] In regards to the time frame at hand, it was the start of the economic crisis in 1973/74 which finally marked the end of the long 1960s. However, the effects of the 1960s continued to be felt, only gradually transforming themselves. Therefore, the general time frame of the volume at hand was deliberately extended beyond the caesura of 1973/74 into the historiographic no-man's-land of the 1970s, in an attempt to capture these subsequent transformations.

Politics

Contemporaries had already realized that the post-Second World War societal evolution of Western industrialized nations were following increasingly similar patterns. While national specifics certainly remained, the process of European integration, the gradual establishment of democratic systems in all European states, and the development of consumer societies had led to significant convergences within the economic, the political, and the cultural realms and had pushed differences vis-à-vis the United States into the background. This process of convergence proceeded across some decades and it evolved in anything but a harmonious pattern so that there were times when its future course was unpredictable. In the political sphere, the process of modernization on the one hand ensued under the dominance of the Social Democrats—for instance, in Sweden and in Denmark—on the other hand, under conservative dominance—for instance, in France. Then again, it was accompanied by—temporary—changes of governments. In West Germany, the transition from the Adenauer administration's traditionalism via the conservative modernization under Chancellor Erhard to the modernization efforts of Brandt and Schmidt's social-democratic-liberal cabinets indicated that the societal impetus for modernization was putting pressure of accommodation on all major political parties which led to new political concepts. Within the progression of societal modernization, the integration within the European Union, the complete sealing off of the Eastern Bloc, and the breadth of mass media brought about the phenomenon that Western and Northern European spaces of engagement and mental horizons were predominantly oriented towards the West, encompassing other Western European countries as well as the United States.[11] Not until the mid-1960s would this scope also extend beyond the described boundary, when countries from the "Third World" and from beyond the "Iron Curtain" were drawn into an international frame of reference, pertinent for efforts of self-definition. At the same time, the de-escalation of the Cold War facilitated an internal liberalization of Western societies. During this situation of radical changes towards a "postindustrial" society, the aforementioned "change in values" came about, which, during the 1970s and 1980s, altered a number of behavioral standards as well as the collective self-images of Europeans.[12] The expansion of the scopes of opportunity stood in a dynamic relationship to the expansion of the scopes of expectation: because social agents utilized these new opportunities, new aspirations for the future as well as new expectations for reform materialized, which impacted the specific climate of these dynamic times. This phase came to an end when

economic, ecological, and political "limits to growth" had apparently been reached.[13] Certainly, the economic crisis of the mid-1970s curbed the general euphoria for reforms, however, because the crisis denoted the material limits of the possible more clearly than before, it fostered the emergence of "postmaterialistic" attitudes, which focused less on the accumulation of consumer goods and focused instead on the improvement of the quality of life.

It was within this context that young people became considerably more interested in politics. However, this interest was expressed in diverse forms and to varying degrees, depending (not only, but above all) on the differences between the political cultures of various European nations. Therefore, election turnout and contentment with democracy (which reflected political interest, at least in part) were significantly higher in Denmark and West Germany than in France and the United Kingdom, during the time period under investigation.[14] Numerous empirical findings indicate that political interest rose with society's prosperity, the ratio of employees in the service sector, and with educational standing. At any rate, citizens' political interest grew dramatically between the late 1950s and the early 1970s. For instance, less than 30 percent of the population professed to be interested in politics in West Germany up until the year 1960. By the year 1973, this share had risen to nearly 50 percent where it would remain until the decade's end.[15] Young people showed considerably more political interest than the respective populations at large. Between the years 1963 and 1974, the share of those people who could envision themselves joining a political party rose most significantly among men up to the age of 24 years.[16] Within the younger age group, it was not just the men who set themselves apart in terms of their political interest but also those of above-average education. As part of a 1968-inquiry undertaken in West Germany, a comparison of the population at large, university-attending youths, and young people who were not enrolled determined that while 8 percent of the non-academic youths considered themselves to be "very strongly interested" in politics, 25 percent were among their enrolled age-peers, and 5 percent among the population at large. Still, as many as 17 percent of the non-academic young people considered themselves to be "strongly interested" (students 33 percent, population at large 9 percent).[17] In the year 1980, when this comparison was repeated, 25 percent of the citizenry expressed a "strong interest" in politics, 30 percent of young people, and 55 percent of students.[18] An international comparative study undertaken in 1976 asserted that 2.7 percent of the 12- to 23-year-olds interviewed in Germany, Great Britain, and France professed to be "very strongly" interested in politics, and another 8 percent

were "strongly" interested. Political interest increased with age and differed between countries: according to this study, political interest was most developed among the French youths ("strong" and "very strong" accounted for a combined 13 percent) and German youths (12 percent); significantly less interested were youths of the British Isles (7 percent). The same scenario was true of the readiness for political engagement, which was the most manifest in France and barely developed in Great Britain.[19] Additionally, discrepancies along lines of social origin and gender were dramatic: in general, the political interest of older, better educated, and male youths was more pronounced than the interest of youths with little education or that of girls. A diachronic section over the years indicates that, on the whole, young people's political interest rose until the early 1970s, decreased slightly until the close of this decade, and picked up again during the early 1980s.

Demands for more direct democracy and individuals' readiness to become active were transforming the appreciation of politics during these years. From 1958 and far into the 1960s, the political activities of young people were particulary evident in for example the British "Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" and in movements with similar objectives which ran parallel to or came about later in other European countries.[20] From the mid-1960s, the Vietnam War in particular drew a lot of the young people's protest efforts,[21] and they were also protesting against a number of specifically national issues such as the passage of the Emergency Laws in West Germany or racism in the United States, spearheaded by the Civil Rights Movement. During the course of the 1960s, various protest factions solidified and grew more radical resulting in a comprehensive critique of society such that between the years 1967 and 1969 reinforced by the proliferation of countercultural sentiments—the impression of an explosive "youth rebellion" came about.[22] By and large, the political upheaval was maintained by student protest at the universities or at institutions for secondary education, later also, albeit in different degrees, by a number of trainees and young employees. Another significant amalgamation of issues did not emerge until the environmental movement, which from the early 1970s onwards unfolded in the new form of grassroots-democratic citizen's initiatives.[23] In a number of countries, for instance in West Germany, such initiatives were associated with political elements of a wide-ranging alternative culture; in other countries such as Sweden, however, they were largely removed from such alternative cultures.[24] Roughly from the year 1969-at times in combination with such political movements, often, however, separate from them—movements of cultural upheaval had become more distinct from each other resulting in a sheer boundless colorful youth scenery, which

attracted large crowds with hardly a common denominator nor really clear-cut political maxims.[25] British and French youths, to a much larger degree than young Germans, exercised fundamental criticism of their respective forms of government. In the year 1976, while 41 percent of 17- to 18-year-olds in Great Britain and 32 percent of their French age-peers had "a lot to complain," about only 11 percent of German 17- to 18-year-olds felt the same way. Also the degree of those who considered "everything [to be] in order," was significantly higher in Germany than in France and in Great Britain.[26] A significant share of the youth culture split from their respective adult societies were congregations around distinct styles of music which often developed idiosyncratic style repertoires in terms of clothing, hair fashion, social conduct, etc.[27]

Although the "long 1960s" had provided hitherto unknown opportunities for self-realization, processes of diversification, de-traditionalization, and individualization, these opportunities were realized within a flexible framework, impacted by origin of class and social stratum, by gender, by affiliation with certain social milieus, by experiences of war and migration, etc. Certainly, this framework was flexible within certain limits, but was not, however, arbitrarily variable. Indeed, the extreme class differences of the first half of the century had diminished in large areas; differences had become slighter due to the overall increase in quality of life. Still, lifestyles were still largely determined by social origin.[28] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, traditionalist attitudes were very common—not in the least, because societies were evolving increasingly and faster from their fundamental norms, thereby impeding societal transformation, sometimes dramatically. At the same time, however, they fell under increasing pressure. The rise of the extreme right-wing Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (established in 1964) in West Germany since the year 1966 and the British National Front (established in 1966) since the year 1972 signaled that not insignificant sections of the populations who stood against political and cultural westernization, increased immigration, and the rapid transformation of moral norms became radicalized—in particular during the latter half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. During the course of the 1970s, revolutionary-nationalistic movements also attracted young people. From the point of view of the predominantly leftist young intellectuals, these developments indicated a threat for the democratic foundations of European societies, in particular because they appeared to coincide with the continuation of fascist dictatorships in Spain and Portugal as well as the Greek Obrist putsch under Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos of 1967. However, it was not just the Far Right that garnered success in mobilizing individuals for their causes under these conditions. A counter-reac-

tion was developing during the 1960s within the moderate conservative
camp as well that was forced to accommodate due to these rapid trans-
formations, which it did more or less quickly. In a number of countries
this strategy was quite successful and led to conservative majorities and
changes of government, as for instance in Denmark in 1968, in the
United States in 1969, and in Great Britain in 1970.[29] This political and
cultural counter-reaction against a significantly increased pressure for
modernization also became discernable in the enduring force by which
de Gaulle's authoritarian regime maintained its position in France.

The Rise of Consumer Culture

Whereas the material, political, and cultural opportunities of the West-
ern and Northern European societies were relatively restricted during the
1950s and were being questioned after their enormous expansion as of
the mid-1970s, the decade in-between provided societies with appar-
ently boundless possibilities so that contemporaries already spoke of the
"golden years."[30] These years stood in stark contrast to the previous era
because since the late-1950s the evidence of the postwar situation—
which had severely imprinted the Central European countries—dimin-
ished and the fundamental patterns of political culture and lifestyles
began to change radically,[31] as drives of prosperity and liberalization
began to progressively overlay the deep-seated underlying patterns of
European societies, in particular those affected by National-Socialistic
policies of expansion and extermination as well as by war, exile, and
banishment. In terms of economics, contemporaries benefited from a
boom as of the latter third of the 1950s, manifested in qualitatively
expanded safeguards—provision of food and shelter, secure old-age pen-
sions, and full employment. Because the economic circumstances had by
and large been stabilized, contemporaries had additional means at their
disposal, which could be utilized for interests that were not essential for
the assurance of one's existence. In most European countries, not only
did the weekly hours of work decrease and weekends expand due to the
free Saturday, but the numbers of vacation days also increased: in Ger-
many and in Denmark by six days between the years 1958 and 1973, in
France by as much as ten days on average.[32] The increasing budget
for leisure activities was accompanied by an explosion of opportunities
for the use of leisure time: television, increased mobility, and tourism
served as the material basis.[33] Moreover, working conditions were trans-
forming and the service sector was significantly gaining ground vis-à-vis
the industrial sector and, above all, in relation towards the agricultural
sector.

During the 1950s and 1960s, mass consumption took hold in the Western and Northern European countries after a roughly twenty-year lag in relation to the United States.[34] Once the essential means for livelihood had been safeguarded and citizens' financial means could be allocated for non-essential goods and services, the relative expenses for food decreased while the relative expenses for transportation, communication, and leisure rose, as did the expenses for rent and housing.[35] In West Germany between the years 1960 and 1970, the number of privately owned automobiles tripled from 4.5 million to 14 million; by the year 1980, there were 23 million privately-owned cars. In Great Britain, in France, and in Sweden, there were roughly twice as many cars in 1970 as in the year 1960 and by 1980, this number had increased further, even though by a lesser ratio than in West Germany.[36]

The socially underprivileged classes also benefited from this economic boom. Above all it was their increased purchasing power that contributed to the dramatically increased distribution rates of high-quality consumer goods and which led to a convergence of standards of living. In West German working-class households, the ownership of automobiles rose from 22 percent in 1962 to 66 percent in 1973, the ownership of television sets rose from 41 to 92 percent, of record players from 18 to 46 percent, and of telephones from 22 to 34 percent.[37]

The impact of such material improvement on European social cultures becomes apparent across the underlying conditions of consumption and the construction of lifestyles.[38] The materialization of 1960s' and 1970s' consumer society included improved methods of mass production and a broad range of goods, increasing international competition that resulted in falling prices, improved federal welfare measures that took the burden of individual households, a normative image of the citizen as an independently acting individual, and finally the competitive interaction with State Socialism, in which the weapon of "mass consumption" also played an increasingly important role.[39] Consumption no longer focused on the safeguarding of basic survival such as shelter, clothing, or food, but on, strictly speaking, dispensable things and possessions which could be arbitrarily combined: the nicer apartment, the more palatable food, the different clothes. It was the combination of excess and arbitrary selection that determined the distinct lifestyles— and that also revealed the "slight differences." The generational differences became very obvious in the different patterns of consumption, where young people certainly functioned as trendsetters. For among older people, frugality and thrift as well as an "ideology of saving up," which had been authoritative for a long time, still served as normative patterns of behavior. Consumer society was inevitably defined by a "cul-

ture of waste," which quickly—and in its stereotypical form—began to determine young people's standards of behavior.[40] Contemporary interpretations such as the one by the British publicist Peter Laurie highlight this phenomenon:

> The distinctive fact about teenagers' behaviour is economic: they spend a lot of money on clothes, records, concerts, make-up, magazines: all things that give immediate pleasure and little lasting use.[41]

Whereas older people were evaluating new consumer goods based on interpretative schemes which had evolved in times of war and times of crises, younger people were attaching their own interpretations which were "unspoiled" by any historical baggage. Beyond the purely material process of purchasing specific consumer goods, of interest is the extent to which these patterns helped shape the evolution and perception of following youth generations with respect to themselves and their perception of others. Materialism provided youths of the time with the potential for dissociation from constraints and for expansion of social and imaginary ties and scope of experiences. Consumer goods appeared to contribute to ideals such as social balance and justice; individualism and participation were becoming a reality.[42] Thus, the reception of mass media and increased motorization, for instance, facilitated a considerable increased mobility, an improved incorporation into communicative networks, and a cultural approximation of rural and urban age peers. Increased sizes of apartments afforded young people with separate spaces in which they could arrange themselves—unbothered by parents or siblings—according to their taste, could listen to their choice of music and pursue their hobbies. The increased use of cosmetics by girls and young women was a process of emancipation—it underscored their physical attractiveness and made them grow up earlier.[43] The emergence of new and diverse styles of fashion, often initiated by young rising stars of the fashion industry such as Mary Quant or Yves Saint-Laurent, contributed to soften considerable social discrepancies and promote an individualistic sense of life.[44] In addition, for some distinct subcultures, the consumption of drugs, which had been practiced mainly by young people since the latter half of the 1960s, became an essential element of their respective lifestyles, not the least because it triggered unconciliatory responses from older generations and from the state authorities.[45] While there existed dominant trends within this spectrum, there were no norms. The diversity of consumer goods at people's disposal afforded them with boundless varieties of combinations, which individuals utilized to distinguish themselves from others and to define their own iden-

tity. The creation of distinct styles evolved progressively more and more independently from parental oversight, from public institutions, or from youth organizations; instead they evolved among age peers—the importance of peer groups increased dramatically. In West Germany, for instance, the share of young people who considered themselves to be part of an informal group of peers—a clique—rose from 16.2 percent in the year 1962 to 56.9 percent in the year 1983.[46]

The emergence and spread of pop music played a central role for the formation of independent youth cultures.[47] Adding to the explosion of new styles from bands to electronically amplified music, as well as their distribution by radio, record, and television, was the development of new kinds of technology, from the portable battery-powered radio to the introduction of the music cassette in 1965, which further promoted mobility and significantly facilitated the independent production and reproduction of pop music. Finally, the introduction and proliferation of home stereo systems as a means for the superior enjoyment of music established new quality standards for the reception of music.[48] By noting to such devices as well as varieties of music, their respective clubs and concerts and their respective trends in clothes and haircuts, one could delineate boundaries of styles and social distinctions. To a considerable degree within this realm, young people's generational awareness developed and they separated themselves from the older generations. Numerous pieces of evidence indicate that the industry did by no means deal with their focus group in an arbitrarily "manipulative" manner. Rather, in a ceaselessly renewing spiral, the industry adopted cultural elements that had developed within youth subcultures, distributed them in modified shapes and in return influenced the taste of the masses.[49] At the same time, young recipients adopted such elements independently and combined them in a process of *bricolage* to suit very individual styles. By 1976, listening to music was the primary leisure activity of German, British, and French 17- to 23-year olds. Roughly 70 percent cited this as their primary hobby—listening to music ranked even higher than television and social outings.[50] However, pop culture, which had been establishing itself during the 1960s, did not evolve into a true mass culture until during the course of the 1970s, in particular during the 1970s' latter half when numerous styles coexisted and the disco wave was celebrating its breakthrough as a new mass trend.[51] Whereas pop music's important impulses had particularly originated in Great Britain in the early 1960s and since 1967 to a larger degree in the United States, as of the early 1970s, national styles progressively increased in European countries. These national styles were, on the whole, modifications of

existing styles, however, with thoroughly independent profiles, which in part linked up with previously existing national traditions.[52]

A central characteristic of consumer societies is the existence of mass media, and of those increasingly sophisticated institutions which are responsible for loading consumer goods with signified meanings, and also for promoting the widespread dissemination of these meanings. Young intellectuals during the 1960s and 1970s specifically targeted the consumer goods industry, the advertising industry, advertisements in the mass media, and, thus, consumer society as a whole. Although they hardly drew on the Christian conservative *Kulturkritik*,[53] they did link up with the *Konsumkritik* of the Frankfurt school, which—based on a Marxist-inspired analysis of totalitarian tendencies—had been developed in American exile during the 1940s and had influenced the American social sciences significantly in the 1950s, via the highly acclaimed critical works of authors such as David Riesman, Vance Packard, and John Kenneth Galbraith. This criticism of the alienating effect of the "externally-led" individual by the presence by advertisements, media, and consumption gained footing on the European continent.[54] The "New Left" in all countries adopted this critique and made it more popular. During the 1960s, above all Theodor W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse provided the theoretical inventory for the *Konsumkritik* of the Left—the latter, moreover, allied himself with students and evolved into a theoretical figurehead of the student movement in many countries. Their perception was that consumption did not contribute to the individual's emancipation, but on the contrary led to the individual's absorption into a conformist mass society and to the citizenry's depoliticization. General contemporary perception, however, contrasts significantly with this impression: consumer society did not limit the individual's agency, but on the contrary expanded it. Moreover, consumer expansion progressed hand in hand with increasing political interest.

Such ambiguities also became discernable in the practice of youth cultures that were critical of consumption. Among them, there were a number of such subcultures that adopted elements of the consumer society into their repertoire of conduct. This was even the case when youths such as American hippies or their European manifestations elevated defiant rejection of consumption to a core element of their agenda. Not only were specific kinds of pop music and the consumption of drugs parts of their stylistic repertoire but these youths also attended cinemas and pop concerts, purchased records and home stereo systems, buttons, posters, and jeans, traveled, used specific brands of automobiles, etc. Thereby, it became evident that there was no easy return to asceticism, but rather a differentiation of consumption. In these cases, consumption was pro-

vided with an "alternative" claim and thus remained compatible with the fundamental *Konsumkritik*. Inclinations towards American indigenous peoples, towards Far-East Asian religions, and in general the interest in the "Third World" as well as the romanticizing of the simple life were heaped together within this counter-movement against society's apparent addiction to consumption.[55]

Already during the 1970s, a tendency was making inroads that advocated critical consumption, not in the least, because the boundaries of the ecologically sustainable had become progressively apparent within this counter-movement. In the United States, a movement of "consumerism" had formed around the lawyer Ralph Nader that exposed self-interested advertisements of the industry, drew the attention to the unsafety of automobiles, organized boycotts of specific goods and services, and initiated actions for the protection of the environment.[56] This movement's impact was also felt in Europe and, consequently, the issues of consumer rights and consumer protection gained public interest, magazines dealing with these issues were published, and—in some European countries even more so than in the United States—an environmental movement, which was no youth movement per se, but dominated by young people, came about. The trend of politically motivated selective consumption was reinforced by the economic crisis in the years 1973/74, which also had a substantial impact on young people's lives.

Education

The significance of the influence of youth within the European societies of the 1960s and 1970s can in part be understood in the postwar "baby boom." The 1960s and 1970s were thus certainly socially affected by large youth generations. By the mid-1960s, Europe as a whole experienced a demographic decline, however, which had rather different longterm consequences on national developments. In Denmark and in France, the birthrates had already been declining since the beginning of the 1950s; in Great Britain and in West Germany, a significant drop was being recorded during the mid-1960s; and in Sweden, such a phenomenon was noted at the beginning of the 1950s and then again at the beginning of the 1970s. Roughly until the year 1980, the total number of births had considerably decreased, then subsequently slightly increased in some areas or remained stable at a low level.[57] Within the respective national public forums a gradually growing discourse was taking place, drawing increasing attention to the consequences of a gradu-

ally aging society (also due to the decline of the death rate). From the close of the 1950s until the years 1979/80, the share of those younger than 15 years old and the 15- to 29-year-olds averaged roughly 22 percent for the former, and together roughly 44 percent. In the years 1970/71, French (49 percent) and Danish populations (47 percent) were especially young; while West German (43 percent) and Swedish populations (44 percent) were relatively old.[58] Yet in this process, the respective demographic developments differed extremely from one another. For instance, in West Germany and in Great Britain, the share of those younger than 15 years old had increased during the course of the 1960s (even though, by the close of the 1970s it had diminished again), whereas in Denmark, Sweden, and France an uninterrupted decline was being recorded. Comparable fluctuations and dis-synchronicities could be observed for young adults aged between 15 and 29 years old: whereas their share in West Germany had declined until the years 1970/71 and was rising until the close of the 1970s, the development in Sweden and Denmark was the exact opposite. There, the 15- to 29-year-olds' demographic share rose until the years 1970/71 and then declined again until the years 1979/80. For Great Britain, a continuous increase was recorded. On the whole, the "long 1960s" were characterized in particular by the fact that European societies perceived themselves as young societies. Thus, the "growing 'visibility' of youth"[59] was not necessarily tied to demographic trends, but also to the fact that young people functioned as trendsetters of the general change in values (*Wertewandel*).

Still, the baby boom had consequences for European societies insofar as the generations coming of age "over-saturated" the existing educational institutions, not to mention the Cold War's political pressure, which demanded a rise in educational standards, and finally, prospering economies that were providing the necessary material basis for the expansion of the educational sector. Whereas the all-encompassing provisioning of elementary schools in Western and Northern European countries had already been secured during the first half of the twentieth century, access to secondary schools and, in turn, to the universities was opened wide during the 1960s and 1970s. In this realm, the starting positions in Great Britain were by far the best. Already during the first half of the 1950s, 34.3 percent of the 10- to 19-year-olds attended a secondary school, ten years later there were 43.4 percent, and by the first half of the 1970s, 51.1 percent.[60] In France, their share increased from 29.3 percent during the first half of the 1960s to 45.9 percent during the first half of the 1970s. In Denmark during the same time span, their share increased from 18.5 to 31.4 percent, in West Germany from 18.3 to 30 percent. Yet, such numbers hold only limited comparative value

because the national educational systems differed from one another, notably even in terms of what was understood as secondary education. For example, the Scandinavian countries introduced a new schooling standard in the 1960s in which children spent nine years together in comprehensive school, with the subsequent option of attending three years in a school preparatory to university entrance; meanwhile, German children spent four years together in elementary school, with the subsequent option of nine years in *Gymnasium*. Nevertheless, the massive expansion of secondary education, which is clearly discernable in these figures, not only led to an improved level of education but also to the expansion of universities. In West Germany, the number of university students quadrupled from roughly 212,000 in 1960 to 818,000 in 1980; in France, this increase was even more pronounced from 211,000 to 864,000; in Great Britain from 130,000 to 340,000; and in Denmark from 10,800 to 49,100. The largest rates of increase were generally recorded during the 1960s. By the mid-1970s, the share of university students among 20- to 24-year-olds represented 10 percent in Great Britain, nearly 19 percent in the Netherlands, more than 19 percent in Sweden, 22 percent in Denmark, and almost 23 percent in France.[61] If one defined tertiary education more loosely and also included those who were studying at institutions that were training prospective teachers, the share was even higher: in 1978, the Federal Republic of Germany counted approximately 25 percent, Denmark and the Netherlands 28 percent, and Sweden nearly 36 percent. Altogether in Europe, the share of students in this age group rose at large from 7 percent during the year 1960, to 14 percent during the year 1970, and to 24 percent during the year 1978. Because of the increasing prevalence of advanced education, the younger age-groups were becoming more and more dominated by students attending school and university. Their share among the 5- to 24-year-olds was between two-thirds and four-fifths in the various countries of the European Community at the beginning of the 1980s.[62] Women in particular benefited from this expansion of the educational sector. 1980, the share of female university students generally represented 50 percent in the selected countries, with only the Federal Republic of Germany (41 percent), the Netherlands (40 percent), and Great Britain (37 percent) deviating from this ratio. The goal of also providing new opportunities for the classes that typically enjoy little formal education was only reached in part. Certainly, their opportunities for advancement increased positively; however, children from socially less-privileged classes remained under-represented among the students as well as among the leading elites of the European societies. In France for instance, only 15 percent of working-class daughters obtained a high-school diploma,

whereas 72 percent of "upper-class" daughters acquired such a diploma, which was obligatory for admission to university.[63]

Sexual Liberation

One of the most striking characteristics of this age of radical change was that the variety of possible lifestyles for young people expanded dramatically. On the whole, the binding force of traditional social milieus—which had been determined by regional and familial bonds as well as by membership in social classes and affiliation with religious confessions—was slacking off. Next to traditional paradigms, in particular during the 1970s, new social milieus, which distinguished themselves through alternative styles of living, evolved.[64] Whereas children and youths during the first half of the twentieth century had grown up within larger families, often within a three-generation household, family sizes decreased thereafter. The share of households with five or more persons reduced between the years 1960 and 1980 from 14 to 8 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Great Britain from 16 to 11 percent, in France from 20 to 12 percent, and in Sweden from 13 to 6 percent.[65] The share of smaller families and one-person households increased. Moreover, until the beginning of the 1980s, young people in most of European countries progressively moved out of their parental homes earlier; only afterwards did this trend turn around again. In contrast to the 1960s, cohabitation of unmarried partners was establishing itself as a generally accepted style of living during the course of the 1970s, in particular for young people. The Nordic countries were avant–garde in terms of actually practicing this style of living: in 1975, in Sweden and in Denmark as many as 29 and 30 percent respectively of 20- to 24-year-old women lived in nonmarital partnership. Other West European societies followed by a significant time lag and exhibited this phenomenon to a lesser degree. Whereas during the year 1972, for instance, only 1 percent of young women in West Germany lived with their partners without being married, by the year 1982, this share increased to 14 percent; in France, the share rose from 4 to 12 percent between the years 1975 and 1982; and in Great Britain, between the years 1975 and 1980 an increase from 4 percent to 6 percent was recorded.[66] Apartment-sharing communities, propagated by specific groups, predominantly young "counterculture," in West Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and the Netherlands as an alternative to conventional family structures played a central role for a certain period, remaining a more or less pragmatic form of living during the course of the 1970s particularly suitable for specific periods of

individuals' lives such as the university years.[67] The diversification of lifestyles is a good indication that in many societal spheres accepted and relatively firmly established patterns of behavior were losing their inevitable obligation. The norms themselves were not dissolving in principle however, they were complemented with alternative options of behavior so that individuals had more choices than before and could combine different elements resulting in relatively unique styles.

One social movement that particularly contributed to transforming social realities was the "new women's movement," which developed within as well as outside of the student movement and specifically mobilized young women.[68] In contrast to the theoretical castles in the air of numerous luminaries of the student movement, the conflict between the sexes was, as Ulrike Meinhof put it,

> not imagined by reading: those who have families know [this conflict of the sexes] by heart, with the difference that, for the first time, it has been made clear that this private matter is no private matter at all.[69]

As a matter of fact, the new self-understanding of women, which initially intended to tackle all political problems with the "child question" in mind and which by these means demanded the transformation of societal standards, changed Western society more lastingly than the ideology-prone group fights of male revolutionaries. Political protests against traditional stipulations by proponents of the Rødstrømperne in Denmark, the Grupp 8 in Sweden, or the Women's Liberation in Great Britain went beyond achievements of a detached avant-garde; they were part and parcel of larger social and mental processes of transformation, which the relationship of the sexes had been undergoing since the late 1950s. The share of working women rose, not in the least because of the economy's need for labor, from 26.4 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany during the year 1950 to 36.5 percent in 1961 and to 40.9 percent in 1970—particularly in the service sector.[70] In the Scandinavian countries, this share rose much faster—due especially to federal initiatives. There, the imperfect equalization of the sexes was considered to be a deplorable state of affairs and the caring welfare states established schemes of legislative mechanisms and institutions, which facilitated the ability to enter gainful employment for women, such as adequate child care facilities and all-day schools, individualized taxation and generous regulations for receiving leaves. They were also advanced with respect to legislating sexual liberation—for instance, Sweden introduced sex education in 1955 and Denmark legalized pornography in 1967—without, however, necessarily leading to the capsizing of the citizenry's sexual

norms in their day-to-day lives. Whereas in West Germany, women represented 37.8 percent of the gainfully employed persons in 1960, their share declined during the next decade to 36.6 percent in 1970 and then rose again to 38.1 percent in 1980. In Denmark, this share increased uninterrupted from a much smaller initial position of 30.9 percent during the year 1960 to 39.4 percent in 1970 and 44.5 percent in 1980.[71] These developments unfurled hand-in-hand with a transformation of consciousness. Whereas still as many as three-fourths of all West German men and women were of the opinion that women belonged into the home in the middle of the 1960s, one decade later, this had changed: in the 1970s, only 42 percent of men and 35 percent of women held on to the traditional gender roles.[72]

The protest against traditional gender roles became ignited, not least by the question of abortion. Already during the 1960s, the introduction of the "pill" had revolutionized a mechanism that until then had significantly defined the relationship of the sexes: sexuality could now be separated from reproduction more safely and women's fertility could be better controlled, thereby altering the self-image and the perception of, in particular, young, unmarried women.[73] The legalization of abortion, which had been prohibited in most of Western European countries, would additionally contribute to the process of progressively separating sexuality and reproduction and, thus, of further transferring these realms to individual control. A campaign of French women in 1971, which targeted the prohibition of abortion, also triggered a wave of protests in other European countries. During the course of the 1970s, a widespread network of initiatives against prohibition developed, usually organized by women's houses and women's centers and not necessarily inspired by feminism. In the wake of the "bloodless revolution" that traditional gender roles were experiencing, homosexual relations were also gradually more accepted.[74] The debate concerning sexual relations between adults and children, which was occurring throughout a number of European countries, possibly indicates most obviously how far the aversion against patronizing concepts of education and the conviction of each subject's autonomy reached.[75]

Mass Media

Mass media influencing norms of consumption and political-cultural norms, assumed a magnitude that can hardly be overestimated. The breakthrough of the television is one distinctive characteristic of the "long 1960s," which facilitated the general goals of democratization as

well as the improved participation of the citizenry. In terms of the provision with television sets, Great Britain led the pack, already in the 1950s; by 1960, more than 10 million television sets had been reported—so that the rate of increase in the subsequent decade was smaller than in most of the other European countries—and in 1970, practically 16 million television sets were found in British homes.[76] The rest of Europe followed with a considerable time lag. In West Germany, the provision of households with television sets rose from 17.6 percent to 80.3 percent between the years 1960 and 1974.[77] Even more substantial than the rates of increase in West Germany—where the absolute number of households with television sets had a little more than tripled during the course of the 1960s—were those of Sweden, where the number increased more then fourfold; and in France, more than five times as many television sets were in homes in 1970 than ten years before—even though by 1967, the share of French households with television sets had amounted to only 53.5 percent (West Germany 58.7 percent).[78] Until the year 1980, the number of reported television sets further increased in all countries, although by considerably smaller rates.

Young people were not the main recipients of television programs; they watched less television than children or adults. On the one hand, this situation came about because activities outside of their homes were rather important to people of this age, but also on the other hand, because attractive programs for young people were few and far between. Young people watched news broadcasts and music shows that in particular and increasingly drew them to the small screens. Again, Great Britain was setting the example early on with shows such as *Six Five Special* (1957), *Oh Boy!* (1958), or *Ready, Steady, Go!* (1963). In France, *Salut Les Copains* (1959) followed with a small time lag. In West Germany, the *Beat Club* appeared on the small screen in 1965; a show that would evolve with the concept of an "authentic English Beat-show"—as the *New Musical Express* surmised at the beginning of the year 1968—into "the best of the bunch" and that would actually outperform the British competition.[79] In 1968, every show reached 75 million viewers. A number of television shows thereafter tried to combine pop and politics, but most of them did not survive past 1971.[80]

To a much larger extent than on television, pop music was present on the radio, in particular, on the programs of the American and British armed forces radio stations—AFN or BFBS—and, also very importantly, on pirate stations.[81] The latter's steep rise began during the year 1960 with the Dutch Radio Veronica, which broadcast also in German as of the year 1963, and with Radio Nord, the station that was located offshore of the Swedish coastline. In the following years, there were addi-

tional stations offshore of the Danish coastline.[82] During the year 1964, Radio Caroline and Radio London started their programs, which were exclusively based on pop music and financed through commercials. Radio Caroline broadcast daily between 6 AM and 6 PM and its broadcasts could be received in Southern England, in the south of Scandinavia, and on the European continent as far as the northwest of Germany. In May 1964, Radio Atlanta appeared as the second British pirate station. Both stations reached approximately 7 million listeners daily. One month later, in June 1964, "Screaming Lord" David Sutch, who had created quite a sensation because of his spectacular appearances at the Hamburg "Star Club," established a third British pirate station in the mouth of the River Thames. As of the summer of that year, the European Council intended to put a stop to this—not in the least also commercial—success resulting out of a boom of establishing pirate stations. For these private stations were serious competition for the publicly owned stations, above all with regard to the young audience, which held promises for the future and were setting future fashions. On 22 January 1965, seven member states of the European Council signed a European agreement on the prevention of radio broadcasts outside of national territories. During the month of August in 1966, the British Government—against the resistance of the conservative opposition—introduced a draft bill against pirate stations, of which ten existed in Europe broadcasting predominantly pop music, some of them twenty-four hours daily. In December 1966, the BBC announced that it would soon counter this tremendous competition with an own pop station, BBC Radio 1, which aired as of the fall of 1967. Within this period of time, the passage of a law in the British House of Commons dealt the decisive blow against the pirate stations, becoming effective on 15 August 1967, by declaring the provision of the ships and the broadcast of commercials illegal.

Meanwhile, pirate stations had shown the broadcast of pop music to be commercially successful precisely because there was such a large interest on the listener's side. Nonetheless, Radio Luxembourg remained among young people by far the most popular station.[83] A 1971 study of young radio listeners in North Rhine-Westphalia, West Germany's most populous state, concluded that 90 percent of all questioned had listened to Radio Luxembourg at least once in a while, a much larger share than all other stations could claim.[84] Responding to the question of which station they would chose if they could receive only one, two-thirds responded in favor of Radio Luxembourg.

Besides radio stations and the few youth shows on television, youth magazines evolved into important mediators of consumer culture and

political standards within the young generation during the course of the 1960s. In West Germany, the magazine *Bravo*, which had been serving, above all, the younger audience since 1956 and which focused almost exclusively on pop music, stars, and the problems of teenagers, dominated the market, whereas the older and more intellectual youth were targeted by *Twen* between the years 1959 and 1971. As of the year 1964, the magazine *Konkret*, which was affiliated most closely with the student movement and the *Außerparlamentarische Opposition* (extra parliamentary opposition), had been evolving into a political lifestyle magazine. In France, this market developed a bit later in 1962 with the hugely successful magazine *Salut les Copains*. The following year saw the appearance of *Nous les Garçons et les Filles*, closely associated with the Communist Party, which combined pop culture and politics. Similar magazines also appeared in Italy (*Nuova Generazione*) and in the Federal Republic of Germany (*Elan*). The Catholic Church in France and in West Germany attempted to keep up with youth culture's contemporary developments by relaunching their respective youth magazines. Pure music magazines such as *Melody Maker*, and later *Pop* or *Popfoto*, served the increasing market of pop music consumers. Around about 1968, music magazines began to appear that also assumed a political stance such as the West German magazine *Sounds*. An entirely separate market developed through the emergence of numerous underground magazines, which popped up all over the place during the latter half of the 1960s. Among them were magazines such as the *International Times*, *Oz* (both from Great Britain), *Hotcha* (Switzerland), *Päng* (West Germany), or *Superlove* (Denmark), some of which had large circulations.[85] However, the variety of youth-oriented print-media outlets, which were flooding the magazine market during the 1960s and 1970s, should not obscure the fact that a considerable share of the target group rarely picked up such periodicals. In the year 1976, 63 percent of the British, 45 percent of the French, and 27 percent of the West German 12- to 23-year-olds declared they had never read youth magazines. On a regular basis, youth magazines were read only by 17 percent of German youths, 5 percent of British youths, and 4 percent of French youths.[86]

Travel

Following the end of the Second World War, exchange relations between European countries increased considerably, in part a result of the Cold War and in part by the process of European integration. In the economic sphere, these trends were fostered by the proliferation of mass con-

sumption and of mass culture, which initially originated from the United States. During the course of the 1950s, opinion polls in West Germany ascertained that three-fourths of the West German population had never been to a foreign country. And 70 percent of the German men who had been abroad, had been there during times of war—a great number of them as soldiers of the *Wehrmacht*. Only 26 percent had been outside their native country for work–related reasons or because of tourism.[87] This scenario was to undergo fundamental changes during the 1960s and 1970s—propelled by the young generation—with, however, significant national differences. By the year 1976, 76 percent of West German, 67 percent of French, and 56 percent of British youths had traveled to foreign countries. Thirty-two percent of young West Germans had been to France and 15 percent had been to Great Britain. In Great Britain, this ratio was rather similar—32 percent had been to France and 12 percent to West Germany—whereas in France, it was more evenly distributed—24 percent had been to West Germany and 20 percent to Great Britain.[88]

Since the end of the 1950s, student exchanges increased as well. Whereas in 1960, 117,000 foreign students were enrolled in European universities, in 1973, they rose to 279,000.[89] For instance, roughly 7,000 West German students were enrolled in universities in other European countries during the 1960s, while some 11,000 students from those countries were attending West German universities.[90] In particular, the 1963 established and well-endowed Deutsch-französisches Jugendwerk—one core element of the institutionally promoted European integration—increased the rapid growth of international youth encounters. In 1975, the Nordic Council introduced an initiative to improve inter-Scandinavian student exchanges. In the following year, roughly half of all foreign students enrolled in Danish universities were from the other Scandinavian countries. During this time, the political focus on Western Europe was also impacted on the level of day-to-day experiences.[91] London and Paris became the most popular destinations among West German youths. Above all, the expansion of English education in schools, but also the attendance of British-language schools tremendously fostered communicative abilities. The share of those West Germans who could communicate fairly well in English rose from 13 percent to 20 percent between the years 1958 and 1966 and to 30 percent by 1975, with considerably higher shares among young people amounting to 37 percent in 1966 and 55 percent in 1975. However, until the year 1990, this share rose only by a little bit to 60 percent.[92] In 1976, 53 percent of the 17- to 18-year-old Germans declared themselves able to read an English newspaper, a feat that also 33 percent of

their French age peers felt capable of. However, only 19 percent of Germans felt they had comparable knowledge of French, compared to 27 percent of the British. Finally, German-language news reports hardly reached French youth (10 percent) or British youth (8 percent).[93]

Whether travel to foreign countries and improved knowledge of foreign languages contributed to the decline of intercultural prejudices is still contested. At any rate, a causal connection of these phenomena cannot be assumed. However, it can be said that the mutual perceptions of the various national populations improved during the course of the 1960s and 1970s. For instance, at the end of the 1960s, West German prejudices were without exception more positive than at the end of the 1950s, manifest particular in their attitudes towards the French and the Russians, although less pronounced vis-à-vis the Americans.[94] This already indicates that the apparent "openness" towards American cultural imports, particularly by young people, does not (by extension) imply an unconditional "Americanization" of West German culture. Between the polar extremes of cultural "Americanization" and political "anti-Americanism" there developed a great many hybrid styles in everyday culture, mixing various elements of various Western and specifically national traditions.

Concluding Remarks

Our succinct *tour d'horizon* of Western and Northern European youth cultures of the 1960s and 1970s indicates that the tense relationship between a rising focus on consumption and a rising politicalization provides a fruitful analytical approach for the investigation of this age's specific signature. The simultaneity of these two developments was one of its central characteristics, heuristically combining the political, social, and cultural realms. Moreover, this combination may provide clues for the understanding of the various lifestyles' diverse and distinguishing characteristics.

So far, it has been largely sociological research which has put forward (and also partly challenged) the claim that generational procession was a major factor in the "value shift" from materialistic to more postmaterialistic values. This particular research has generally focused on time frames which begin in the early 1970s. Similar time frames are treated by those sociological studies which have examined the process of transformation from the more stable and fixed sociocultural milieus of the classical modern period to more unstable and fluctuating social milieus marked by subcultural influences. A historiographic assessment of these

sociological theses—as this volume attempts by focusing on the rela-
tionship of politics and consumption—practically confirms the assump-
tions of a considerable societal transformation, which has been advanced
and strongly imprinted by the young generation. Nevertheless, there is
still plenty of research to be done. In particular, there is a lack of studies
that assess and specify these sociological theses, which are mainly based
on quantitative research, by expanding their quantitative data's time
frame through the inclusion of the "long 1960s" as well as by the inclu-
sion of qualitative data. For such studies, there are a variety of available
sources, among them, for instance, numerous contemporary studies of
the empirical social sciences, which need to be analyzed anew, based on
the current knowledge of the longterm developments. Studies which
deal within a national or international comparative framework with the
processes of transformation within socially, politically, or culturally
marked milieus, should be very worthwhile. Not in the least to discern
such longterm processes of transformation, it makes a lot of sense to
even go beyond the periodical limits of the "long 1960s."

Based on previous and current research, a number of future paths for
research become apparent. So far, only a few studies have dealt empiri-
cally with the question in which relationship cultural changes "from
above"—initiated by the media and the cultural industry—and those
"from below"—initiated by young people as instigators of this develop-
ment —related to one another. Part of this question is also how public
discourses on and about youth related to young people's perception of
themselves. Moreover, it still needs to be studied how and why the evo-
lution of specific styles and subcultures occurred, based on which deter-
mining factors, under which temporal conditions, and by which means
these processes of material improvement were culturally realized.
Whereas the "Americanization" of European youth cultures drew a sig-
nificant amount of attention during the previous years, it has been
hardly studied to what extent specifically Western European and
national cultural trends blended with this impetus for "Americaniza-
tion" or to what extent they could establish themselves as independent
cultural spheres or—as the case may be—even as realms of opposition.
European youth cultures also provide a rather worthwhile research cor-
pus for the question of how the relationship of the public and the private
spheres changed without apparently destabilizing the democratic pat-
terns of the European societies—actually, it resulted in very much the
opposite. And finally, regardless of the impetus to historicize nearly
everything that has to do with "1968," it is still not satisfactorily
explained how cultural liberalization and political radicalization related
to one another.

Notes

1. *Der Spiegel* 20 (1967), 41, 156.

2. For recent studies that focus on transforming youth cultures within the given time frame, see Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties, Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974* (Oxford, 1998); Bill Osgerby, *Youth in Britain since 1945* (Oxford, 1998); Niels Martinov, *Ungdomsoprøret i Danmark. Et portræt af årene, der rystede musikken, billedkunsten, teatret, litteraturen, filmen og familien* (Copenhagen, 2000); Detlef Siegfried, "Vom Teenager zur Pop-Revolution. Politisierungstendenzen in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur 1959 bis 1968," in *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften,* ed. Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried, and Karl Christian Lammers (Hamburg, 2000), 582–623; Thomas Etzemüller, *Ein 'Riß' in der Geschichte? Gesellschaftswandel und 68er-Bewegungen in Schweden und Westdeutschland* (Konstanz, 2004).

3. Alain Touraine, *La Société post-industrielle* (Paris, 1969); Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York, 1973); Claus Leggewie, "A Laboratory of Postindustrial Society. Reassessing the 1960s in Germany," in *1968. The World Transformed,* ed. Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker (Washington D.C., Cambridge, 1998), 277–94.

4. The results of this conference are documented in Schildt, Siegfried, and Lammers, *Dynamische Zeiten.*

5. R. Kroes, W. Rydell, and F. J. Bosscher, eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions. American Mass Culture in Europe* (Amsterdam, 1993); Kaspar Maase, *Bravo Amerika. Erkundigungen zur Jugendkultur der Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren* (Hamburg, 1992); Rolf Lundén and Erik Åsard, eds., *Networks of Americanization. Aspects of the American Influence in Sweden* (Uppsala, 1992); Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marßolek, and Adelheid von Saldern, eds., *Amerikanisierung. Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 1996); Tom O'Dell, *Culture Unbound. Americanization and Everyday Life in Sweden* (Lund, 1997); Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1999). See also Rob Kroes's contribution in this volume, ch. 3.

6. Compare Victor Scardigli, *L'Europe des modes de vie* (Paris, 1987).

7. For the differences and commonalities, see these works which present East and West Germany on a comparative basis, which is especially fruitful in this context: Michael Rauhut, *Beat in der Grauzone. DDR-Rock 1964 bis 1972—Politik und Alltag* (Berlin, 1993); Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 2000).

8. Hartmut Kaelble, *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft. Eine Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas 1880–1980* (Munich, 1987); Kaelble, "Europäische Vielfalt und der Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft," in *Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Vergleich,* ed. Stefan Hradil and Stefan Immerfall (Opladen, 1997), 27–70.

9. Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau. Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn, 1993); Marwick, *The Sixties*; Schildt, Siegfried, and Lammers, eds., *Dynamische Zeiten.* For West Germany, compare also Ulrich Herbert, ed., *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980* (Göttingen, 2002).

10. On the 1970s in Great Britain, see George McKay, *Senseless Acts of Beauty: Cultures of Resistance Since the Sixties* (London, 1996); for West Germany, see the contributions in *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 44 (2004). "*Eiszeit*" was the title of a song released in 1980 by the West German band Ideal.

11. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?* Also, see Axel Schildt, "Sind die Westdeutschen amerikanisiert worden? Zur zeitgeschichtlichen Erforschung kulturellen Transfers und seiner gesellschaftlichen Folgen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 50 (2000): 3–10.

12. Ronald Inglehart, *Kultureller Umbruch. Wertewandel in der westlichen Welt* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1989); Helmut Klages, ed., *Werte und Wandel. Ergebnisse und Methoden einer Forschungstradition* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1992); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernisierung und Postmodernisierung. Kultureller, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Wandel in 43 Gesellschaften* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1998).

13. Donella H. Meadows and Dennis L. Meadows, eds., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for The Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York, 1972).

14. On this issue, compare studies dealing with European societies' different "political cultures." For Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston, 1965); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited. An Analytic Study* (Boston, 1980); for a focus on EU-nations see Peter Reichel, ed., *Politische Kultur in Westeuropa. Bürger und Staaten in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1984); Oscar W. Gabriel, "Politische Einstellungen und politische Kultur," in *Die EG-Staaten im Vergleich. Strukturen, Prozesse, Politikinhalte,* ed. Oscar W. Gabriel (Opladen, 1992), 95–131.

15. Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, eds., *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1968–1973* (Allensbach and Bonn, 1974), 213; Thomas Gensike, "Sozialer Wandel durch Modernisierung, Individualisierung und Wertewandel," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 42 (11 October 1996): 12.

16. From 28 percent to 42 percent, while the average percentage for the population at large rose only from 11 percent to 12 percent (Roland Ermrich, *Basisdaten zur sozioökonomischen Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* [Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1974], 594).

17. Rudolf Wildenmann and Max Kaase, *"Die unruhige Generation." Eine Untersuchung zu Politik und Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik* (Mannheim, 1968), 34f.

18. Walter Jaide and Hans-Joachim Veen, *Bilanz der Jugendforschung. Ergebnisse empirischer Analysen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1975 bis 1987* (Paderborn, 1989), 197.

19. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, ed., *Jugend in Europa. Ihre Eingliederung in die Welt der Erwachsenen. Eine vergleichende Analyse zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien,* vol. 2 (Hamburg, 1977), 77. Also, compare the overview in Henk Dekker, "Political Socialization in Europe," in *Politics and the European Younger Generation. Political Socialization in Eastern, Central, and Western Europe,* ed. Henk Dekker and Rüdiger Meynberg (Oldenburg, 1991), 318–50.

20. Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy* (Oxford and New York, 2003).

21. For the movement against the Vietnam War, see Wilfried Mausbach's contribution in this volume, ch. 8.

22. See Detlef Siegfried's contribution in this volume on the issue of youth rebellion, ch. 2.

23. See Henrik Kaare Nielsen's contribution in this volume, ch. 9.

24. Etzemüller, "Gesellschaftlicher Umbruch," 207f. For an examination of the Swedish student movement see Thomas Etzemüller's chapter in this book, ch. 11.

25. Thomas Ekman Jørgensen's and Steven L.B. Jensen's contributions in this volume, ch. 15 and 10, present impressive examples of local countercultures from different perspectives.

26. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, *Jugend in Europa,* vol. 2, 80.

27. Barry Doyle's chapter in this volume, ch. 14, presents an instructive example of such a subculture.

28. Pierre Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1987; originally published in French in 1979).

29. For the United States, see Mary Brennan, *Turning Right in the Sixties. The Conservative Capture of the GOP* (Chapel Hill and London, 1995); for Great Britain see Dominik Geppert, *Thatchers konservative Revolution. Der Richtungswandel der britischen Tories 1975–1979* (Munich, 2002).

30. Noelle and Neumann, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung*, 209. On the role of youth in this cultural revolution of the 1960's see Arthur Marwick's chapter, ch. 1, in this book.

31. Klaus Naumann, ed., *Nachkrieg in Deutschland* (Hamburg, 2001). Compare also Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories. The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley, 2001).

32. Roland Ermrich, *Basisdaten*, 322.

33. Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten. Freizeit, Massenmedien und "Zeitgeist" in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre* (Hamburg, 1995); Hartmut Kaelble, "Europäische Besonderheiten des Massenkonsums 1950–1990," in *Europäische Konsumgeschichte. Zur Gesellschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des Konsums (18. bis 20. Jahrhundert),* ed. Hannes Siegrist, Hartmut Kaelble, and Jürgen Kocka (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1997), 169–203.

34. For a seminal contemporary analysis, compare George Katona, *The Mass Consumption Society* (New York, 1964); Jean Baudrillard, *La société de consommation. Ses mythes. Ses structures* (Paris, 1970).

35. Hartmut Kaelble, ed., *Der Boom 1948–1973. Gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Europa* (Opladen, 1992); Sabine Haustein, "Westeuropäische Annäherungen durch Konsum seit 1945," in *Gesellschaften im Vergleich. Forschungen aus Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften,* ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Jürgen Schriewer (2nd rev. ed., Frankfurt am Main, 1999), 353–90. For the significance of the improved provision of goods of the material culture, see Wolfgang Ruppert, ed., *Fahrrad, Auto, Fernsehschrank. Zur Kulturgeschichte der Alltagsdinge* (Frankfurt am Main, 1993).

36. B.R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics Europe 1750–1993* (4th ed., London, 1998), 735ff.

37. Roland Ermrich, *Basisdaten*, 559. For pertinent statistics on the development of the time period's social culture in Europe, see Alexander Szalai, ed., *The Use of Time. Daily Activities of Urban and Suburban Populations in Twelve Countries* (The Hague, 1972); Statistisches Amt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, ed., *Sozialindikatoren für die Europäische Gemeinschaft 1960–1975* (Luxembourg, 1980); Michel Gyory and Gabriele Glas, *Statistiken der Filmindustrie in Europa* (Bruxelles, 1992).

38. Already the Dutch sociologist Ernest Zahn studied the connection of rising material prosperity and the transformation of lifestyles in Europe. See Ernest Zahn, *Soziologie der Prosperität. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Zeichen des Wohlstandes* (2nd ed. Munich, 1964; originally published in 1960). Also, compare Axel Schildt, "Europa als visionäre Idee und gesellschaftliche Realität. Der westdeutsche Europadiskurs in den 50er Jahren," in *Das europäische Projekt zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts,* ed. Wilfried Loth (Opladen, 2001), 99–117.

39. Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood, *The World of Goods. Towards an Anthropology of Consumption* (New York, 1979); Michael Wildt, *Am Beginn der "Konsumge-*

sellschaft." Mangelerfahrung, Lebenshaltung, Wohlstandshoffnung in Westdeutschland in den fünfziger Jahren (Hamburg, 1994); Siegrist, Kaelble, and Kocka, *Europäische Konsumgeschichte*; Arnold Sywottek, "From Starvation to Excess? Trends in the Consumer Society from the 1940s to the 1970s," in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton, N.J, 2001), 341–58. For the history of pertinent terminology, consult Ulrich Wyrwa, "Consumption, Konsum, Konsumgesellschaft. Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte," in *Europäische Konsumgeschichte*, ed. Siegrist, Kaelble, and Kocka, 747–62.

40. Jürgen Reulecke of the University of Siegen (Germany) drew attention to this phenomenon at the conference in Copenhagen.

41. Peter Laurie, *The Teenage Revolution* (London, 1965), 9, cited in Osgerby, *Youth in Britain*, 37.

42. For the significance of material culture in the 1960s, see Wolfgang Ruppert, ed., *Um 1968. Die Repräsentation der Dinge* (Marburg, 1998).

43. For aspects of gender in the history of consumer cultures, compare Victoria de Grazia, with Ellen Furlough, ed., *The Sex of Things. Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective* (Berkeley, 1996); Erica Carter, *How German Is She? Postwar West-German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor, 1997).

44. Compare Marwick, *The Sixties*, 404ff; for a sketch on France compare Dominique Veillon, "Corps, beauté, mode et modes de vie: du 'plaire au plaisir' à travers les magazines féminins (1958–1975)," in *Les Années 68. Le temps de la contestation,* ed. Geneviève Dreyfus-Armand et al. (Brussels, 2000), 161–77. Also, see Paul Yonnet, *Jeux, modes et masses. La société française et le moderne 1945–1985* (Paris, 1985), 295ff.

45. This topic is discussed by Klaus Weinhauer in this volume, ch. 17.

46. Klaus R. Allerbeck and Wendy J. Hoag, *Jugend ohne Zukunft? Einstellungen, Umwelt, Lebensperspektiven* (Munich, 1985), 38ff.

47. See Peter Wicke's contribution in this volume, ch. 4.

48. On home stereo systems, consult Stefan Gauss, "Das Erlebnis des Hörens. Die Stereoanlage als kulturelle Erfahrung," in *Um 1968,* ed. Ruppert, 65–94.

49. Detlef Siegfried, "Modkultur, kulturindustri og venstrefløjen i Vesttyskland 1958–1973," *Den Jyske Historiker* 101 (2003): 68–94. More on the development of the music industry can be found in R. Serge Denisoff, *Solid Gold. The Popular Record Industry* (New Brunswick, 1975); for Great Britain see Michael Cable, *The Pop Industry Inside Out* (London, 1977).

50. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, *Jugend in Europa*, vol. 2, 47.

51. Imports of records could serve as indicators: in West Germany, they amounted to $27 million in 1970, $90 million in 1975, and $346.9 million in 1980 (in France for the same years: $25.3 million, $66.6 million, and $206.5 million; in Great Britain $28.3 million, $98 million, and $313.2 million). Compare Marianne Beisheim et al., *Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? Thesen und Daten zur gesellschaftlichen und politischen Denationalisierung* (Baden-Baden, 1999), 98.

52. For such national counter-reactions, compare Victoria de Grazia, "Amerikanisierung und wechselnde Leitbilder der Konsum-Moderne (*consumer-modernity*) in Europa," in *Europäische Konsumgeschichte,* ed. Siegrist, Kaelble, and Kocka, 109–38.

53. Which lamented the dissolution of traditional systems of maintaining orderliness, which in many instances had still been setting the tone during the previous decade, and which had also raised its voice loudly and clearly during the 1960s. See Michael Ermath, "'Amerikanisierung' und deutsche Kulturkritik 1945–1965. Metastasen der Moderne und hermeneutische Hybris," in *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in*

Deutschland 1945–1970, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1997), 315–34.

54. David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd. A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven, 1950); Vance Packard, *Hidden Persuaders* (New York, 1957); John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (New York, 1958). On the increasing proliferation of societal-critical ideas, compare the essay by Michel Trebitsch, "Voyages autour de la révolution. Les circulations de la pensée critique de 1956 à 1968," in *Les Annèes 68*, ed. Dreyfus-Armand, 69–88.

55. See Uta G. Poiger's and Franz-Werner Kersting's contributions ch. 7 and 16 in this volume for more information on these topics.

56. David A. Aaker and George S. Day, eds., *Consumerism. Search for the Consumer Interest* (New York, 1982; originally published in 1971).

57. Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds., *The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The Revised Proceedings of a Conference on the Princeton European Fertility Project* (Princeton, 1986); Wolfram Fischer, ed., *Europäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte vom Ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart, 1987), 23; Beisheim et al., *Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung?*, 492ff.; Charlotte Höhn, "Bevölkerungsentwicklung und demographische Herausforderung," in *Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften*, ed. Hradil and Immerfall, 71–96.

58. Statistisches Bundesamt, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1959* (Stuttgart and Mainz, 1959), 21*; ibid., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1973*, 29*; ibid., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1981*, 635f.

59. Osgerby, *Youth in Britain*, 17ff.

60. Fischer, *Europäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, 75ff.; Gerold Ambrosius and William H. Hubbard, *Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Europas im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1986), 102ff.

61. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics*, 894ff.; Fischer, *Europäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, 79ff.

62. Stefan Hradil, "Sozialstruktur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel," in *Die EG-Staaten im Vergleich*, ed. Gabriel, 50–94, here 73.

63. Gérard Mauger, "France," in *International Handbook of Adolescence,* ed. Klaus Hurrelmann (Westport, Conn., 1994), 146–59, here 149.

64. Michael Vester et al., *Soziale Milieus im gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel. Zwischen Integration und Ausgrenzung* (completely revised, expanded, and updated edition, Frankfurt am Main, 2001).

65. For these figures as well as the following, see François Höpflinger, "Haushalts- und Familienstrukturen im intereuropäischen Vergleich," in *Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften*, ed. Hradil and Immerfall, 97–138.

66. Höpflinger, "Haushalts- und Familienstrukturen," 105; Beisheim et al., *Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung?*, 482ff. Also, see Sibylle Meyer and Eva Schulze, "Nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaften—Alternativen zur Ehe? Eine internationale Datenübersicht," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 35 (1983): 725–34.

67. In the year 1979, 18 percent of Westgerman students lived in apartment-sharing communities. Compare Michael Mitterauer, *Sozialgeschichte der Jugend* (Frankfurt am Main, 1986), 114. Also see Gudrun Cyprian, *Sozialisation in Wohngemeinschaften* (Stuttgart, 1978); Ernst Haider, *Wohngemeinschaften in Österreich. Daten und Tendenzen einer gegenkulturellen "Institution"* (Frankfurt am Main, 1984).

68. For Denmark, compare Drude Dahlerup, *Rødstrømperne. Den danske rødstrømpebevægelses udvikling, nytænkning og gennemslag 1970–85,* 2 vol. (Copenhagen, 1998); for West Germany and France with an emphasis on the 1970s, see Kristina Schulz,

Der lange Atem der Provokation. Die Frauenbewegung in der Bundesrepublik und in Frankreich (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 2002); for Sweden, see Elisabeth Elgán, ed., *Kvinnorörelsen och '68 — aspekter och vittnesbörd* (Huddinge: Samtidshistoriska institutet, Södertörns högskolan, 2001). For a more international comparative scope, consult Drude Dahlerup, ed., *The New Women's Movement. Feminism and Political Power in Europe and the USA* (London, 1986).

69. Ulrike Meinhof, *Die Würde des Menschen ist antastbar. Aufsätze und Polemiken* (West Berlin, 1980), 150.

70. Ute Frevert, "Umbruch der Geschlechterverhältnisse? Die 60er Jahre als geschlechterpolitischer Experimentierraum," in *Dynamische Zeiten*, ed. Schildt, Siegfried, and Lammers, 642–60, here 643f. For a more detailed analysis, see Christine von Oertzen, *Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am Zuverdienen. Geschlechterpolitik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Westdeutschland 1948–1969* (Göttingen, 1999).

71. Gabriel, *Die EG-Staaten im Vergleich*, 499.

72. Ute Frevert, "Frauen auf dem Weg zur Gleichberechtigung—Hindernisse, Umleitungen, Einbahnstraßen," in *Zäsuren nach 1945. Essays zur Periodisierung der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte,* ed. Martin Broszat (Munich, 1990), 113–31, here 122f.

73. For this topic, see Dagmar Herzog's contribution in this volume, ch. 12.

74. Christina Florin and Bengt Nilsson, "'Something in the nature of a bloodless revolution …' How new gender relations became gender equality policy in Sweden in the nineteen sixties and seventies," in *State Policy and Gender System in the Two German States and Sweden 1945–1989,* ed. Rolf Torstendahl (Uppsala, 1999), 11–77.

75. Julian Bourg explores this topic in ch. 13 of this volume.

76. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics*, 775ff.

77. Ermrich, *Basisdaten*, 576.

78. Marwick, *The Sixties*, 369.

79. *New Musical Express*, 3 February 1968.

80. Detlef Siegfried, "Draht zum Westen. Populäre Jugendkultur in den Medien 1963 bis 1971," in *Buch, Buchhandel und Rundfunk: 1968 und die Folgen*, ed. Monika Estermann and Edgar Lersch (Wiesbaden, 2003), 83–109.

81. For this topic, compare Konrad Dussel's contribution in this volume, ch. 5.

82. For a detailed chronicle of pirate stations, see *Fc-Archiv* 31, 3 August 1967. Also, compare Paul Harris, *When Pirates Ruled the Waves* (London, 1968).

83. Richard Nichols, *Radio Luxemburg: The Station of the Stars* (London, 1983).

84. Infratest, *Der jugendliche Radiohörer. Nordrhein-Westfalen 1971* (Munich, 1971), 40f.

85. Christoph Schubert, "Alternative Literaturszene in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Literaturbetrieb in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ein kritisches Handbuch,* ed. Heinz Ludwig Arnold (Munich, 1981), 126–41; Elisabeth Nelson, *The British Counter-Culture 1966–73: A Study of the Underground Press* (New York, 1989); Richard Neville, *Hippie Hippie Shake: The Dreams, the Trips, the Trials, the Love-Ins, the Screw Ups … The Sixties* (London, 1995); Marwick, *The Sixties*, 102ff.; Steven Llewellyn Bjerregaard Jensen and Thomas Ekman Jørgensen, "Studenteroprøret i Danmark 1968. Forudsætninger og konsekvenser" (unpublished manuscript, Copenhagen: 1999), 125ff.

86. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, *Jugend in Europa*, vol. 2, 44.

87. Kaelble, "Europäische Vielfalt und der Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft," 55f.

88. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, *Jugend in Europa*, vol. 2, 86. See also Axel Schildt's contribution in this volume, ch. 6.

89. Martin Kirsch, "Entwicklung der Erfahrungsräume von Europäern im Bereich des höheren Bildungswesens seit 1918," in *Gesellschaften im Vergleich*, ed. Kaelble and Schriewer, 391–429, here 413.

90. Kaelble, "Europäische Vielfalt und der Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft," 50.

91. Compare Jürgen Reulecke, ed., *Rückkehr in die Ferne. Die deutsche Jugend in der Nachkriegszeit und das Ausland* (Weinheim and Munich, 1997).

92. *Emnid-Informationen*, no. 32 (1966); Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, *Jugend in Europa,* vol. 3 (Hamburg, 1977), 96f. The penultimate figure refers to 16- to 21-year-olds; the last figure refers to 16- to 19-year-olds. For the figure in 1990, see Heiner Timmermann and Eva Wessela, eds., *Jugendforschung in Deutschland. Eine Zwischenbilanz* (Opladen, 1999), 154. In France, the population's knowledge of English increased between the years 1969 and 1987 from 10 percent to 20.1 percent. Knowledge of French among the West German population in 1969 amounted to 10 percent and in 1987 to 6.9 percent, and among the British it amounted to 15 percent in 1969 and to 20 percent in 1987; in Beisheim et al., *Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung?*, 103.

93. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, *Jugend in Europa*, vol. 2, 84.

94. *Emnid-Informationen*, no. 2 (1969).