

# Introduction

## The Post-Dictatorship Years From the Perspective of Leisure and Sexuality

Shortly after the collapse of Greece's dictatorial regime in July 1974, a significant segment of the Greek youth experienced a political fever. Intense debates in student assemblies and Party<sup>1</sup> congresses as well as the distribution of flyers at factory gates and university amphitheaters were integral pieces of this puzzle. Youth politics, however, did not revolve solely around manifestos and speeches at that point. According to H.Z., who was a university student in Salonica and affiliated with a Communist youth organization in the aftermath of the dictatorship, leisure featured prominently and served as a means of demarcating left-wingers. He transparently narrated that "watching progressive, high quality films, reading classics, these were among the three or four habits that distinguished [left-wing] people," adding that "we sang a lot, even with our friends in the streets" (H.Z., Interview). In general, the left-wingers under study did not construe "politics" in the narrow sense, namely confined to elections and protest, but formulated diverse ways in which they linked these with the behavior patterns they endorsed.<sup>2</sup>

Assigning weight to leisure was not specific to young Greek left-wingers in the 1970s, however. Several social and political actors in the "West," at least since the Industrial Revolution, have construed leisure as a realm where "the dominant values" of a particular society are "opposed or reinforced."<sup>3</sup> Relevant activities, such as visiting spas, lying on the seaside, or patronizing an opera house have functioned as a testing ground for a wide array of norms, which encompass sexual patterns, gender and class relations, as well as national identities.<sup>4</sup> The spread of mass consumption and the growing internationalization of leisure through developments in the media, communications, and transport in post-World War II Western Europe have further fuelled reflection on leisure and its potential impact on cultural norms.<sup>5</sup> Left-wingers of all stripes have been involved in relevant debates, endorsing, however, differing viewpoints. Some revisionist members of the British Labor Party, such as Tony Crosland and Roy Jenkins, championed the "expansion of consumption" in post-World War II Britain and placed a premium on the spread of styles of living grounded on affluence.<sup>6</sup> From the late 1950s onward in West Germany, the Social Democratic Party of Germany joined its

political opponent, the Christian Democratic Union, in promoting a “liberal consensus” centering on “free consumer choice,” which also included a tolerant attitude toward cultural imports that reshaped the leisure landscape of the Federal Republic at that point.<sup>7</sup> Communists in Western Europe, such as in Italy, also began to wrestle with the challenge that the spread of mass consumption and its impact on youth leisure posed to their cultural politics. However, according to historian Stephen Gundle, the members of the main Italian Communist Party, despite the “flexibility” that they demonstrated, “never really grasped the appeal of either mass culture or the consumer society.”<sup>8</sup>

The growing internationalization of leisure, which had also reached Greece in the 1960s, attracted extensive attention by the Greek Left as well already during that decade in the framework of its cultural politics. The establishment of the authoritarian regime, which ruled from 1967 to 1974, brought such left-wing initiatives to an abrupt end. However, youth involvement in left-wing politics, on the rise since the final years of the dictatorship, escalated after the collapse of the authoritarian regime. This study investigates the relationship between leisure and left-wing youth politics in the first post-dictatorship years, namely until the formation of the government in 1981. Since young left-wingers in the 1950s and 1960s construed leisure as interconnected with sexuality, it also surveys whether and the extent to which the Socialist and Communist youth linked both with politics in the mid-to-late 1970s. Moreover, it examines how the interaction of youth leisure and sexuality with the intensifying youth politicization was mediated by the conceptualizations of the “Greek nation” that were espoused by young Communists and Socialists; it considers whether and how the concepts of “tradition,” “modernity,” “Western,” “European,” and “American” were employed by left-wing youth organizations, in their pursuit of constructing a normative framework regulating the politicization of leisure and sexuality.<sup>9</sup> The volume probes continuities and ruptures between the 1960s and the 1970s, scrutinizing two levels: the cultural politics of the left-wing youth organizations in Greece in that period as well the leisure and sexual practices of their cadres, members, and sympathizers, analyzing the extent to which the latter were in accordance with official guidelines, set down by the Party leaderships. In dealing with those issues, it seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of the first era of postauthoritarian transformation in Greece and how this period was tracked, but, also, to an extent shaped by left-wing youth and cultural politics.

In order to illuminate such endeavors, this volume critically interrogates approaches that define leisure negatively as “non-obligated” time, namely as an escape from work as well as other categories of experience, such as work, education, and politics.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, it does not fully endorse the argument

of historian Peter Borsary that leisure “can embrace any experience which is ‘other’ than that conceived of as normal” and the “real world.”<sup>11</sup> By contrast, it seems more promising as a point of departure to probe the issue of whether and the extent to which those domains are interrelated in the rhetoric and practice in the modern world. Actually, advocates of the Left in contemporary Greece have openly and consistently striven to discern leisure patterns that would be conducive to ideological engagement. Their attitude resembled what historian Raphael Samuel mentioned in his account of the “Lost World of British Communism,” namely that “what we called Marxism ... claimed jurisdiction over every dimension of experience, every department of social life.”<sup>12</sup> Rather than being treated as synonymous with “freedom” from routine and time apart, its interconnections with politics, sexuality, and gender, as appeared in the rhetoric and practice of those militants,<sup>13</sup> need to be taken seriously into account.

My research centers on the main Socialist and Communist youth organizations in Greece in the period from 1974 to 1981, since, as especially chapter two of this book shows, right-wing youth groups did not actively engage in the shaping of leisure activities of their members in that country at that point. Moreover, while other groups, such as the scouts, sought to influence the behavior of youngsters in Greece and while it is certainly worthwhile to examine whether these groups regarded this as a political act, the case of the Left is distinct due to the fact that it aimed to stir certain forms of mass mobilization, namely various types of protest, also by encouraging specific attitudes towards leisure and sexuality. Communist organizations became legal in 1974 after twenty-seven years of clandestinity. Two very influential ones were the Communist Youth of Greece (KNE) and Rigas Feraios (RF).<sup>14</sup> The former, established in 1968, was affiliated with the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), whereas the latter, also created in 1968, was affiliated with the Communist Party of the Interior (KKE Es.); the KKE and KKE Es. had split in the same year.<sup>15</sup> The orientation of the KNE was pro-Soviet, while RF was Eurocommunist.<sup>16</sup> Especially since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but mostly in the mid–1970s, a number of Communist parties in Western Europe, such as the Spanish and the Italian, but also in other continents, as the case of the Australian Communist Party shows, became less and less influenced by the Soviet regime and embraced the doctrine of Eurocommunism. The student groups, whose members were aligned with or leaning toward the KNE and RF were the PSK (Panspoudastiki Syndikalistiki Kinisi, All-Students’ Unionist Movement) and the DA-DE (Dimokratikos Agonas-Dimokratiki Enotita, Democratic Union–Democratic Struggle), respectively; the high-school groups were called the MODNE (Mathitiki Organosi Dimokratikis Neolaias Elladas, Pupils’ Organization of the Demo-

cratic Youth in Greece) and the DIMAK (Dimokratiki Mathitiki Kinisi, Democratic Pupils' Movement), respectively.

Less popular, but still ideologically influential, were the Maoist organizations. The main Maoist (or Marxist-Leninist, as they described themselves) student and pupil groups were the PPSP (Proodeytiki Panspoudastiki Syndikalistiki Parataxi, Progressive All-Students' Unionist Movement) and the PMSP (Proodeytiki Mathitiki Syndikalistiki Parataxi, Progressive Pupils' Unionist Movement), which were aligned with the OMLE (Organosi Marxiston-Leniniston Elladas, Organization of Marxist-Leninists of Greece), as well as the AASPE (Antifasistiki Antiimperialistiki Spoudastiki Parataxi Elladas, Anti-fascist Anti-imperialist Student Movement of Greece) and the AAMPE (Antifasistiki Antiimperialistiki Mathitiki Parataxi Elladas, Anti-fascist Anti-imperialist Pupils' Movement of Greece), which were affiliated with the EKKE (Epanastatiko Kommounistiko Kinima Elladas, Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece). The EKKE had been created in March 1970 by a group of Greek students based in West Berlin and appeared in Greece in 1972. Communists who endorsed China as a role model after the Chinese-Soviet split in the early 1960s founded the OMLE in the mid-1960s in Greece; similarly, PPSP was established in 1966. Their student groups were visible in student assemblies and garnered a significant percentage of votes in student elections in the mid-1970s, but fell into disarray, as did their Parties, in the late 1970s, mainly due to escalating internal strife over developments in post-Mao China. The EKKE, in tune with the party line of the Communist Party of China, chastised the Cultural Revolution. However, its biggest segment disagreed with its leadership and gradually abandoned it, accusing it of having become a "mouthpiece" of a Party that no longer represented Marxist-Leninist values. Meanwhile, the OMLE split in 1976 into the KKE(m-l) and M-L KKE. The former denounced the new leadership of the Communist Party of China as a "revisionist clique," as terrorism studies expert George Kassimeris mentions, while the latter continued to view the Chinese regime favorably.<sup>17</sup> Trotskyite Parties also operated in the 1970s Greece. The main ones were the EDE (Ergatiki Diethnistiki Enosi, Workers' Internationalist Union) and the OKDE (Organosi Kommouniston Diethniston Elladas, Communist Organization of Greek Internationalists). However, they failed to gain significant support from Greek youngsters.

Beyond the Communist Left, the Youth of PASOK (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima, Panhellenic Socialist Movement), established alongside PASOK in 1974, was also quite influential. PASOK and its Youth attracted many members of the PAK (Panellinio Apeleytherotiko Kinima, Panhellenic Liberation Movement), founded in 1968, which rallied centrist and radical left-wing militants. The members of the Youth of PASOK were entitled to participate simultaneously in the activities of the Party. Its student organiza-

tion, established in 1975, was the PASP (Panellinia Agonistiki Spoudastiki Parataxi, Panhellenic Militant Student Organization), while its high-school group was the PAMK (Panellinia Agonistiki Mathitiki Kinisi, Panhellenic Militant Pupils' Movement). The PASP has been designated to function autonomously from the Youth of PASOK. The members of the former were allowed, but not obliged, to be aligned with PASOK and its Youth. Socialist groups endorsed dependency theories that juxtaposed the industrialized "North" with the dependent "South," situating Greece in the latter, as analyzed in more detail in chapter two.

After 1978, all left-wing youth organizations suffered from a series of splinters, which resulted in the formation of a fluid network of autonomous left-wingers, mainly students, who named themselves Choros (Space).<sup>18</sup> Besides B Panelladiki, which split from RF in 1978, another constituent of Choros was the radical left-wing OPA (Organosi gia mia Proletariaki Aristera, Organization for a Proletarian Left). In addition, ex-members of the Maoist groups, the KNE, and the Youth of PASOK also joined. Most, though not all of them, described themselves as Communists. Choros never acquired a clear organizational structure, but the common points of the people who participated in it were the loud critique of centralized Party structures—which were blamed for fostering bureaucratic relations—the rejection of the *entatikopoiisi* (intensification) of university studies, as well as the challenging of dominant social norms, especially in the domain of sexuality.<sup>19</sup>

At the opposite end of the political spectrum, Center-Right or right-wing youth organizations failed to gain momentum. ONNED (Organosi Neon Neas Dimokratias, New Democracy Youth Organization), the youth group of the governing Center-Right Party, did not attract substantial support at that point, at least in comparison with the Party it was aligned with. The same was true of Centre-Right student groups, which merged in 1976 and created DAP-NDFK (Dimokratiki Ananeotiki Protoporria-Nea Dimokratiki Foititiki Kinisi, Democratic Renewal Vanguard-New Democratic Student Movement). Moreover, its activity in student assemblies and cultural societies during those years was rather limited, as shown in chapter two in more detail. It became influential, mainly among university students, only after the election of PASOK to power in 1981.<sup>20</sup> In addition, extreme rightist and fascist youth groups remained marginal during those years.

## A Social-Cultural History of the Left-Wing Youth

In wrestling with the leisure pursuits and sexual practices of young left-wingers, this book offers a social/cultural history of politics, premised on the concept of "culture." Echoing novelist and academic Raymond Williams, I

treat “culture” as “ordinary,” connected with lived experience. The book also draws upon an issue that arises in Williams’s work, namely the relationship between “culture” as a “whole way of life” and forms of signification, such as films, theatre plays and songs.<sup>21</sup> As a swelling chorus of scholars, such as historian Thomas Mergel and anthropologist David Kertzer, has aptly remarked, symbols and rituals are not merely “accessories,” but played a preponderant role in the formation of political subjects.<sup>22</sup>

Drawing on the historiography of emotions, the social/cultural history of politics embraced in this work aims to call into question one factor that has been depicted as distinguishing the “Old,” “New,” and “Far Left” in the case of Greece in the 1970s:<sup>23</sup> British historian, playwright, and journalist David Caute argues that, in general, membership of the so-called “Old Left” was “dull,” confined to “occasional demos, [and] sending small cheques to good causes.”<sup>24</sup> However, young Greek left-wingers of all directions construed their political activity as an intensely emotional experience. They came into dialogue with diffuse descriptions of these emotions in Greek society and in the broader European context.

In approaching emotions, this work draws particularly on the argument put forth by historians Peter and Carol Stearns, who claim that researchers should differentiate between “the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression,” which they call “emotionology,” and the actual emotions of the subjects they study. They aptly remark, however, that “emotionology” and “emotions” interact: the former create emotional standards, which affect the latter.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, the official texts of Greek left-wing youth groups often contained comments on the emotions that activism was expected to instill in their members, statements which tracked and helped shape the actual emotions of young Communists and Socialists in Greece. Either “disciplined” or “spontaneous,” militancy won hearts and minds.

In addition, this study indicates internal variations and underlines the interaction between the groups under examination. A recent book that has particularly propelled the heterogeneity of Communist organizations into the limelight is entitled *Le Siècle des Communismes*. This book was a response to the *Livre noir du Communisme*, which linked this ideology in a one-dimensional fashion to coercion and violence.<sup>26</sup> By contrast, *Le Siècle des Communismes* offers a significantly more nuanced understanding of communism. Its authors portray communism as a “plural” phenomenon: it is argued that people joined a Communist organization for a wide range of reasons and experienced their membership in diverse ways, depending on factors such as social class and gender.<sup>27</sup> This is certainly true for Greek left-wingers of all stripes in the 1970s.

## Defining “Youth”: Moving Beyond “Generation”

Not only left-wing militancy, but also “youth” is a culturally provincial category, according to historian Oded Heilbronner. Heilbronner argues that it is based on particular symbols and practices and does not remain static over time and in different social and cultural contexts. Prior to the nineteenth century, “‘youth’ was distinguished by its rites and rituals. In the modern era, ... it was distinguished mainly by leisure, but also by secondary education and adolescent norms and behaviour.”<sup>28</sup>

The twentieth century witnessed the emergence of what numerous historians and sociologists have labeled “youth culture.”<sup>29</sup> According to historians Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried, it was “primarily defined by the young age of its proponents and by their particular tastes in music, fashion, hairstyles, political practices etc.”<sup>30</sup> Impelling the momentum for its appearance was the increasing capacity of the youth to purchase consumer goods, which rendered them key players in the dawning era of mass consumption.<sup>31</sup> Concomitantly, a consumer market grew, which particularly targeted the youth. The creation of the miniskirt by the British fashion icon Mary Quant, in 1964, is perhaps one of the most striking success stories of that market that addressed the youth. Siegfried and Schildt claim that youth culture appeared in the post–World War II period, albeit not simultaneously throughout Western Europe: it first emerged in Scandinavian countries as well as in Western European countries, such as France and West Germany. Other European countries, such as Italy, Portugal, and Ireland, followed the path later, due to “poorer material and social conditions, lower educational status, as well as more restrictive religious and family bonds.” However, they argue that youth culture had spread throughout Western Europe by the end of the 1970s.<sup>32</sup> Its emergence in the postwar decades coincided with two more developments: demographic changes, mainly in the case of France and, beyond Europe, in the United States, usually dubbed as the “baby-boom”;<sup>33</sup> and the vast expansion of the number of university students.<sup>34</sup>

The concept of “youth culture” has drawn substantial criticism from scholars. Proponents of cultural studies, such as Stuart Hall, John Clarke, Tony Jefferson, and Brian Roberts, reject the term, which had become “most common in popular and journalistic usage” in post–World War II Britain, as obscuring class differences; they put forward that of “youth subcultures” instead. Based on the work of Antonio Gramsci, they explore “youth subcultures” as a subset of “class cultures,” but also in relation to the “dominant culture.”<sup>35</sup> Schildt and Siegfried actually offer a nuanced conceptualization of “youth culture,” which echoes some of those concerns: they stress that researchers should be mindful of two issues: its heterogeneity, especially with

regard to gender and class differences, but also its diverse links with the “larger society” through institutions, such as the educational ones.<sup>36</sup> This study aims to further problematize the concept of “youth culture”: at least in the case of the left-wing youth in the 1970s, their lifestyles<sup>37</sup> were not necessarily predicated on age-specific leisure activities; their distinctive element was sociality, namely the formation of peer groups, comprised solely or mostly of young people. The book examines the interplay among diverse types of the social relationships that those young left-wingers maintained, ranging from the peer group to the political youth organizations, surveying the specific ways in which they experienced and framed leisure activities and sexual practices. It echoes anthropologists Nicholas Long and Henrietta Moore, who suggest complex ways of analyzing sociality, and especially their argument that “the most productive way forward is not to focus on those ‘ties’ in isolation, but rather to examine the dynamic matrix in which they are continually made, sustained or dissolved.”<sup>38</sup>

Although “generation” need not necessarily be young, youth cultures in post-World War II Europe have extensively been approached through the use of this conceptual tool. Diverse specialists maintain that the first post-World War II decades witnessed the formation of a “generation,” often called the “68ers” or the “baby-boomers,” born after the end of World War II. Relevant scholarship has mostly relied on the definition offered by sociologist Karl Mannheim: according to him, “generation” is an age group “with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process,” limiting its members “to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action.”<sup>39</sup> A number of historians, such as Ronald Fraser and Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, have scrutinized the “generation of 68ers” in Italy, West Germany, France, and Northern Ireland.<sup>40</sup> They argue that this generation was radicalized, due to the eruption of the anti-Vietnam War movement and the growing influence of anti-hierarchical ideological trends,<sup>41</sup> stemming from the increasing dissatisfaction with either the Social Democrats or the pro-Soviet Communists.<sup>42</sup> Historian Konstantinos Kornetis employed another version of the concept of “generation” in the case of Greece. He delineated two age cohorts of left-wing students during the dictatorship years: people born between 1944 and 1949 and those born after 1949 until 1954. He claims that the latter, in stark contrast to the former, were influenced by “1968” at least in their lifestyle, developing, for instance, an informal clothing style.<sup>43</sup>

Nevertheless, what historian Belinda Davis argues about the “generation of 68ers,” namely that it is a concept which “must be used with great circumspection,” seems appropriate for the young Socialists and Communists in



Greece in 1974–1981 as well.<sup>44</sup> In general, young activists in Greece did not depict their collective action in the mid-to-late 1970s in terms of generation, but, rather, in terms of affiliation to a particular political group. The label of generation, however, appeared sometimes in the publications of the young left-wingers in Greece, albeit as a claim for authority: as is mentioned in the following chapters, the actors that utilized it aimed to ascribe particular characteristics to the youth of Greece.<sup>45</sup>

Apart from the emergence of distinct youth lifestyles, the twentieth century also witnessed protracted discussions about representations of the “youth.” As historians Luisa Passerini, Efi Avdela, and Richard Jobs convincingly argue, “youth” served as a metaphor for social change in twentieth-century Europe, such as the “economic miracle” in the postwar period, decolonization, the Cold War, the spread of mass consumption patterns, as well as urbanization.<sup>46</sup> Avdela and Jobs add that “youth” as a metaphor encapsulated the hopes and fears that those transformations generated in the broader society. Diverse actors, such as the educational institutions, the Church, the media, the cultural industry, and the political Parties were involved in discussions about what the “youth” represents. Even though “youth” as a metaphor did not only address “young” people, but, sometimes, entire societies, its use certainly shaped expectations about the behavioral patterns of the former. Nevertheless, young people were hardly passive recipients of such representations. In that respect, Heilbrunner has argued that the twentieth century has witnessed a veritable earthquake, namely a transition “from a culture *for* youth to a culture *of* youth.” Heilbrunner maintains that there was a shift from “a culture initiated by a ‘parent culture’ (that of mothers and fathers, the establishment, state authorities, entrepreneurs and producers of mass culture) to a culture largely invented, initiated and inspired (with a little help from the parents) by young people.”<sup>47</sup>

Defining the “youth” was certainly a major battleground in the initial post-dictatorship period in Greece. This era is important for the history of youth in Greece, since, as the book will show, the Left did not repeat some of the worries that it had raised about the comportment of the Greek youth in the preceding decades—for instance in relation to rock music, as mentioned in detail in chapters four and five. However, the post-authoritarian years did not exactly serve, either, as an era, during which the Greek society in general “no longer construed youth as a source of concern, but purely as a factor that helped bring progress and creative renovation to the political, social and cultural life of the country,” as historian Kostas Katsapis argues.<sup>48</sup> In particular, left-wing Parties and youth organizations elaborated extensively on the Greek youth, since it embodied both their hopes and concerns, which derived from the transition to democracy as well as their fears of mass con-

sumption, which had been spreading in Greece since the 1960s. Meanwhile, young Greek left-wingers were particularly innovative during those years in developing conceptualizations not only of “youth,” but also of politics and culture in general, since the initiatives, in which they participated, did not solely address issues of the youth.<sup>49</sup> Those Communist and Socialist youngsters sometimes challenged and even affected the relevant views endorsed by their “parent cultures.” They did not initiate, however, a transition from a culture for youth to a culture of youth. What actually emerged in Greece in terms of left-wing youth politics, as the 1970s progressed, was a process of diversification of the politicized youth vis-à-vis parent cultures. The meddling of political Parties was increasingly contested, albeit only by a segment of the left-wing youth in the late 1970s.

## “Americanization” and Its Limits

The history of “youth” in Western Europe since the end of World War II is connected with the impact of the spread of American cultural patterns—coined the issue of “Americanization.” This paradigm deals with practices, objects, and symbols which emanated from the United States and which are presented as having deeply transformed attitudes in other parts of the globe. It correctly stresses that since the interwar period the United States has exported technologies that help increase productivity, such as Taylorism, as well as spread consumption, such as full-service advertising agencies. These patterns and objects mainly appeared in Western Europe in the post-World War II years. The same period witnessed the widespread popularity of American popular cultural products in Europe, such as jazz, rock ‘n’ roll music, “western” movies, and pulp fiction, particularly appreciated by young people in Western Europe. The influence of American popular culture in postwar Europe was so exponential that it caused widespread reflection. Quite notably, the character Robert (Hanns Zischler), from Wim Wenders’s seminal 1976 film *Kings of the Road*, maintained that “[t]he Yanks have colonized our subconscious.” Was that true, however?

Up to the end of the Cold War and even into the early 1990s, the concept of “Americanization” usually tended to be defined in a highly polarized and normative way. One approach, that of cultural imperialism, described the active imposition of a “false consciousness” of mass consumption on a global scale by American monopolies, assisted by local “reactionary” elements.<sup>50</sup> The other powerful story, which structured the history of “Americanization,” equated it to “economic modernization” and “political and cultural democratization.”<sup>51</sup> Despite these seemingly conflicting arguments, there was a point

in common: it was usually taken for granted that the receiving end was a passive actor, shaped by American products.<sup>52</sup> The 1990s witnessed the emergence of a different approach, which has sought to problematize the form of transfer of goods and symbols from the United States to other countries. The common aspect of this paradigm is the emphasis on the selective character of reception. American studies expert Rob Kroes has asserted that the potential freedom to “dissect patterns of traditional and organic cohesion” and to “rearrange the components” into “new wholes” has been a major element of the cultural life in the United States, which has also spread in Europe. Following a similar approach, anthropologist Kaspar Maase has gone even further to express his cautiousness toward the very concept of “Americanization”; in the late 1990s he used it in the form of “grassroots Americanization,” claiming that social groups in West Germany picked some of the “offers, which were presented with great economic and media power;” in other words, those which suited their expectations. In the 2000s, he revised his position to discard the concept and to substitute it with “cultural democratization,” which he used to describe the emerging youth identities in West Germany since the late 1950s and their impact on the “flattening of cultural hierarchies.”<sup>53</sup>

The “selective reception” approach has focused heavily on the making of youth identities and gender relations in Western Europe since the mid-1950s. The young are argued to have distinguished themselves through specific symbols and activities, which have a key aspect in common: they stemmed from American popular culture, which served as a “major vehicle” for protest against parents. Moreover, in West Germany, Austria, and Italy, these patterns helped in the formation of postfascist identities among young people, who aimed at distancing themselves from the recent history of their country and perhaps their very family and its potential fascist past. An influential cultural product was that of rock ‘n’ roll music, especially the singer Elvis Presley.<sup>54</sup> The first group to appropriate elements of his way of dancing and his outer appearance was a mainly working-class masculine subculture, which appeared in numerous different national contexts and was labeled in a variety of ways: *Halbstarcken* in West and East Germany, *Teppisti* in Italy, *Teddy-boys* in Britain, *tentimpoides* in Greece, and *Hooligans* in Austria, to name just a few.<sup>55</sup>

The impact of Hollywood movies appears to have been the same, according to relevant research. In the case of Britain, cultural studies expert Jackie Stacey argues that their consumption served as a means of making of an “American” feminine identity, which was “exciting, sexual, pleasurable and in some ways transgressive.” Female Hollywood actors, such as Marilyn Monroe, were a major source of inspiration for young West German women. Monroe, according to historian Karin Schmidlechner, was a role model for

Austrian girls as well, functioning as a symbol of overcoming the “ascetic morality,” which lambasted sexual relations before marriage and stigmatized behaviors and clothing styles, which did not conceal feminine sexuality.<sup>56</sup>

Still, Schildt and Siegfried have raised the concern whether it was not solely American cultural products that shaped youth cultures in Western Europe in the 1960s–1980s.<sup>57</sup> In what follows I argue that “Americanization,” even if conceptualized as “selective reception,” hardly furnishes a complete explanatory package for the examination of youth cultures in 1970s Western Europe. For sure, the appropriation of American cultural products played a key role in the construction of youth identities in Western Europe in the 1970s, including Greece. Still, the variety of flows within Europe, as well as the non-Western transfers that shaped the young left-wingers under study, may require us to avoid defining them simply as “Americanized.” The leisure patterns of a significant segment of the post-dictatorship Greek left-wing youth was predicated on representations of the USSR as a role model society, a phenomenon I would like to name “Sovietism.” The latter gained momentum from 1974 onwards, due to the intensification of contacts between Greek political groups and Soviet institutions in several domains, such as youth travel, as analyzed in chapter three. The Sovietism that a segment of the Greek left-wing youth developed in the 1970s was largely a grassroots and, to an extent, selective trend: not even the young pro-Soviet Communists in Greece received uncritically the prerogatives of the cultural politics of the Eastern European and the Soviet regime. Cultural patterns from Western Europe, especially in cinema, were also an important ingredient of left-wing youth cultures in Greece in the 1970s. In addition, similar to what happened in other European countries, such as Sweden,<sup>58</sup> the “invention of tradition” was a key aspect of the tastes of young left-wingers in Greece since the 1960s and certainly in the early and mid-1970s, particularly in the domain of music.<sup>59</sup> Still, performances of what young Socialists and Communists in Greece construed as quintessentially “authentic Greek culture” sometimes involved the appropriation and resignification of cultural imports stemming from other regions of the globe. The term “glocal,” especially as employed by sociologist Robert Robertson, according to whom “homogenizing and heterogenizing tendencies [manifest in transnational flows] are mutually implicative,” is particularly appropriate to describe the latter tendency.<sup>60</sup>

## Rebels With a Sexual Cause?

Regardless whether they can be labeled “Americanization,” significant cultural transformations occurred in postwar Europe. Historian Arthur Mar-

wick, focusing on Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, has discerned a process of “cultural revolution,” which unfolded during an epoch he dubs “the Long Sixties.” He sets out a linear development of this “revolution” from the late 1950s (c. 1958) until the early 1970s (c. 1974). He insists, however, that many of the transformations have continued to the present. Marwick points to “multiculturalism,” “individualism,” and “permissiveness” as key elements in this progressive subversion of conservative modes of thinking and acting. He defines this permissiveness as “a new frankness, openness and indeed honesty in personal relations and modes of expression,” the first signs of which arose in the late 1950s and which emerged in full force in the late 1960s, an era when “there was more sex, in more variations and, crucially, there was less guilt, less fear and less furtiveness.” However, he goes on to argue that “more frequent intimate contact with men created in some women a very strong reaction against unrestricted male licentiousness in its predatory, arrogant and inconsiderate aspects”; as a result, the Feminist<sup>61</sup> movement of the 1970s appeared, which helped to establish divorce, abortion, and contraception, which again Marwick regards as “elements in the liberalization projects of the sixties.”<sup>62</sup> Historian Konrad Jarausch reached a similar conclusion in his work on “recivilizing Germans”: he claimed that, although the late 1960s youth revolt in West Germany petered out rapidly, it helped unleash a liberalization of “social values,” including “greater tolerance for unconventional lifestyles” and a “veritable ‘sexual revolution,’” which lasted throughout the 1970s.<sup>63</sup>

A dawning “sexual openness,” sometimes labeled as “sexual revolution,” has been the leitmotiv of many historical and sociological works about the United States and Western and Eastern Europe since the 1960s.<sup>64</sup> The growing disconnection of sexuality from procreation through primarily the contraceptive and secondarily the “morning after pill,” the legitimization of premarital flirting, especially through the close body contact of young men and women in wild rock dance or during holidays, as well as the “saturation” of the visual landscape with “nude and semi-nude images,” including sexually explicit advertisements and the introduction of the miniskirt, have been outlined as factors leading to “sexual emancipation.”<sup>65</sup> The rise of actors, such as the “New Left” in the late 1960s, who addressed sexuality as an explicitly political issue, was yet another facet of this openness. The “Make Love Not War” slogan is testament to the belief shared by its advocates that “sexual liberation” was “politically significant.”<sup>66</sup> However, an increasing number of scholars maintain that changes in sexual behavior from the 1960s onward were far less “sweeping” than has been hitherto acknowledged.<sup>67</sup> Historian Dagmar Herzog claims that a “sexual revolution” occurred in West Germany in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Nevertheless, she is quite steadfast in

denying that the first six decades of the twentieth century were marked by an uninterrupted hegemony of conservative sexual norms. By contrast, she has put forth the compelling argument that the National Socialist regime, while denigrating “Jewish” sex, tolerated premarital sex for its supporters more than the Adenauer government and the Churches did in West Germany during the 1950s.<sup>68</sup> In addition, the “sexual revolution” or “liberalization” argument, in the case of Marwick, has been criticized for one more reason: it often presents the sexual patterns of young people from the 1960s onward in an undifferentiated manner—the abovementioned work of historians Josie McLellan and Dagmar Herzog is a notable exception. Numerous scholars argue that individuals of differing gender in Western Europe appear to have experienced transformations in sexual norms and practices since the interwar period in diverse ways and certainly not always as emancipatory.<sup>69</sup>

Indeed, “sexual revolution” may become a catch-all concept, lacking analytical utility, unless one probes the precise changes to sexual patterns that occurred in a particular context and era, the actors that spearheaded them, and the diverse ways in which individuals of differing backgrounds experienced them. What transpired in Greece was no copycat of sexual transformations that occurred elsewhere in Western Europe and North America at that point: quite tellingly, the use of the contraceptive pill never gained momentum in Greece. More importantly, this process was neither a story of steady liberalization, initiated by the Left, nor a process that can be conceptualized in a triumphalist and uniform manner as “cultural” or “sexual revolution”; rather, it contained multiple and contradictory sexual transformations, dependent not only on gender, but a wide array of factors, such as ideological differences, geographical origin, and class.<sup>70</sup>

## The Party’s Over?

The Sixties have not only been described as the beginning of an era of substantial cultural transformations, but also one of intense political activity. Toward the end of the decade, protests erupted in various areas around the world. Militants, comprising students, but also workers, acted in close contact with each other, a phenomenon that has been described as “global Sixties” or “1968 as a global or transnational phenomenon.”<sup>71</sup> However, various scholars argue that the left-wing political fever that was related to “1968” vanished in the mid-1970s, giving way to “individualistic” tendencies and the emergence of “neoliberalism.” Historian Gerd-Rainer Horn best exemplifies this argument. He treats “1968” not as a moment, but as a period lasting ten years, from 1966 to 1976. This era was largely followed

by the “decline of participatory democracy” and the “deradicalization” of “personal/political itineraries.”<sup>72</sup> Historian Gerd Koenen, who was an activist in the 1970s, draws almost the same boundaries, discerning a “red decade” in West Germany, lasting from 1967 to 1977.<sup>73</sup> What followed in the late 1970s, according to political scientist Claus Leggewie, was the prevalence of neo-liberalism; the “New Right” has substituted the struggle of the “New Left” against the “authoritarian” state, heralding a period of “depoliticized individualization.”<sup>74</sup>

Some other scholars working on Western Europe take a similar though not identical approach. Their point is that individualization and privatization need not necessarily lead away from radical politics. Such an argument is repeated in the historiography of the cultural politics of the Communist Parties in postwar Western Europe, especially in the work by Gundle about the PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano, Italian Communist Party). Gundle claims that the attempt by the PCI and its youth organization, the FGCI (Federazione Giovanile Comunista Italiana, Italian Communist Youth Federation), to establish “a new pattern of hegemony founded on frugality and collective solidarity” in postwar Italy had little if any prospect of success in the context of the triumph of mass consumption. On the contrary, youth cultures that combined “postcollective individualism with a rejection of pre-existing political mediations,” such as the naturists and alternative medicine centers, proved much more influential during the 1970s.<sup>75</sup>

By contrast, an absolutely fundamental contention of this volume is that the left-wing collective action that intensified after the collapse of the dictatorship in Greece in 1974 endured not only until the late 1970s, but until the early-to-mid 1980s. The issue whether this perpetuation of collective action beyond the late 1970s is a Greek exception needs further scrutiny, but the case study of Greece shows that narratives that depict that point as the beginning of an era of depoliticization in Western Europe should be approached with caution. In any case, left-wing Parties and their youth organizations featured prominently in mass mobilization in Greece during those years. The case study of Greece shows that Eurocommunist and pro-Soviet groups were among the most popular ones in the Greek youth. Their influence, however, is no Greek exception: Communism in Western Europe in the 1970s was a palette that featured various shades of red, some of which did not fade during that decade. While the relatively well-researched “Far Left” largely withered away toward the end of the 1970s in Western Europe, this is not necessarily true of pro-Soviet and Eurocommunist Parties and youth organizations in the same region in general. Their significant and enduring support during this decade is manifest in the case of the pro-Soviet Communist Party and its youth wing in the aftermath of dictatorship in Portugal.<sup>76</sup> David Gouard

also demonstrates that in the period from 1974 to 1978 the reluctantly Eurocommunist French Communist Party (PCF) continued to be very strong in a number of working-class districts in Paris, which was also coined as the “Red Belt,” until the mid-1980s.<sup>77</sup> With regard to Italy, the membership of the youth organization of the Italian Communist Party, the FGCI, had plummeted in the 1960s: from 240,000 in 1961 to 66,451 in 1970.<sup>78</sup> However, by 1976 it had risen rapidly to 142,790 with 47,641 new members joining in 1975–1976; by 1978 it had fallen to 113,505, but still the figure was almost double in comparison with that of 1970.<sup>79</sup> Meanwhile, the Eurocommunist youth groups, either by themselves or together with the Communist Parties with which they were aligned, organized festivals and established cultural societies in various northern or southern European countries, such as Spain, Italy, Greece, and France in this period. Such evidence suggests something of a *Eurocommunist moment*, at least in the mid-1970s. Similar to left-wing radicals of other stripes, the advocates of the Eurocommunist and the pro-Soviet Communist Left were conveyors of ideas and cultural patterns that transgressed national borders. Transnational links among them were quite strong. Pro-Soviet Communists in Greece and Portugal were in close contact with their role-model regime in the USSR. In the same way, an aspect of the Eurocommunist moment of the 1970s was the close contact among Eurocommunist groups, mainly the Italian, Greek, and Spanish Eurocommunists.

In arguing that left-wing Parties played a preponderant role in youth politics in Greece, this book resonates to an extent with a main argument of Greek political scientists, such as Giannis Voulgaris, Ilias Nikolakopoulos and Christos Lyrintzis, who have conducted research on the post-dictatorship period.<sup>80</sup> Those scholars also argue that mass mobilization in post-dictatorship Greece in general was controlled—or, as Voulgaris puts it, “colonized”—by political Parties.<sup>81</sup> Nevertheless, while this volume acknowledges the dominant role that political Parties played in the political life of Greece at that point, it simultaneously demonstrates that their prevalence was not uncontested: subjects of protest emerged in the late 1970s in Greece, as shown in detail in chapters five and six, which were not linked with any Parties, including left-wing ones, and which loudly criticized the ways in which those Parties operated. Thus, radical mobilization in post-1974 Greece should not necessarily be linked with the activities of left-wing Parties and youth organizations. Moreover, the left-wing Parties and their youth organizations were malleable entities, which became to a lesser or greater extent involved in experimentations concerning the relationship between the “individual” and political collectivities that occurred in Greece in the late 1970s. Such reformulations were particularly manifest in the domain of leisure: Communist and Socialist youth groups began to praise or at least



tolerate the heterogeneity in the leisure pursuits of their members at the end of the decade. This was the first time this happened at the level of cultural politics in the history of the Greek Left.

Again, such experimentation was no Greek exception: For instance, through their cultural politics, the Italian Eurocommunists growingly accepted and made an effort to cater to a broad range of youth lifestyles.<sup>82</sup> Eurocommunist Parties in general also tried, albeit often cautiously, to bring substantial changes to their apparatus, allowing some initiatives developed by their members to function with a degree of autonomy from Party structures. In doing so, they responded to the spread of dual militancy during those years, namely simultaneous participation in a left-wing Party, but also in novel protest groups, such as Feminist initiatives, which did not follow the line of that Party. This condition was not atypical for some female members of RF in Greece, but also of the French Communist Party in the mid-to-late 1970s.<sup>83</sup> Mass mobilization may have been an actual condition or an unrealized goal of diverse subjects of protest in the late-1970s in Western Europe. Nevertheless, one way or another, the experimentation on patterns of collective action, in which broad segments of the Left in Western Europe engaged in the 1970s, is underestimated by approaches that view the 1970s as the beginning of an era characterized by a “retreat into the private” or, in a teleological fashion, as a preliminary stage of “depoliticized individualization” that emerged in full force in the subsequent decades. The energy that left-wingers expended on formulating novel relationships between the “individual” and the “collective” should be seriously considered in its own right. Even if such initiatives failed to become hegemonic, they were not marginal phenomena either: they mobilized numerous activists in various Western European countries, often in collaboration with one another.

## Notes

1. When the term Party refers to any political organization, it will henceforth appear with a capital P; when indicating a gathering of people for the purposes of socializing, I will use a small p.
2. About the idea that researchers should not conceptualize politics in such a “narrow sense,” but, rather, explore the exact way in which the subjects under study construe this term, see, for instance: Jenny Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Relations. Bringing the Political Back In* (London, 1999), p. 2.
3. See, for instance: Joffre Dumazedier, “Leisure,” in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, D.L. Sills, ed., vol. 9 (New York, 1979), p. 251.
4. About leisure in relation to class and gender norms, see, for instance: John K. Walton, “Consuming the Beach: Seaside Resorts and Cultures of Tourism in England and Spain from the 1840s to the 1930s,” in *Being Elsewhere: Tourism, Consumer Cul-*

- ture, and Identity in Modern Europe and North America*, ed. Shelley Baranowski and Ellen Furlough (Ann Arbor, MI, 2004), pp. 272–98; Douglas P. Mackaman, “The Tactics of Retreat: Spa Vacations and Bourgeois Identity in Nineteenth-Century France,” in Baranowski and Furlough, *Being Elsewhere*, pp. 35–62.
5. Peter Borsay, *A History of Leisure* (Houndmills, UK, 2006), p. 16. Borsay refers to an “internationalization” of leisure that has occurred from this point onward. I have added “growing,” since such transnational cultural transfers had existed already in the preceding decades, albeit not in such intensity.
  6. Frank C. Mort, “Competing Domains: Democratic Subjects and Consuming Subjects in Britain and the United States since 1945,” in *The Making of the Consumer: Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World*, ed. F. Trentmann (Oxford, 2006), p. 236.
  7. Uta Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels, Cold War and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, CA, 2000), pp. 111–14.
  8. Stephen Gundle, *Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, 1943–1991* (Durham, NC, 2000), p. 9.
  9. This study focuses on the activity of Greek left-wing organizations in Greece. It outlines some main aspects of their activity among Greek migrants who resided elsewhere in Western Europe during those years, especially when these affected the political landscape in Greece. However, a detailed exploration of Greek left-wing migrants would also require an extensive analysis of the political condition of the countries where those migrants lived, for which just a single monograph would not suffice.
  10. For instance: Dumazedier, “Leisure,” p. 250.
  11. Borsay, *A History of Leisure*, pp. 1–8.
  12. Raphael Samuel, “The Lost World of British Communism,” *New Left Review* I, no. 154 (1985): p. 40.
  13. I employ the term “militant” in my work to refer to ideologically engaged and vigorously active youngsters. I would like to make clear that I do not mean that they were involved in violent acts, as the term may also imply. I use the terms “militant” and “activist” interchangeably, referring to the same people.
  14. RF was created as PAOS RF (Panellinia Antidiktatoriki Organosi Foititon, Panhellenic Antidictatorial Student Organization). Its name changed in 1974 to PON RF (Panelladiki Organosi Neolaias Rigas Feraios, Panhellenic Youth Organization Rigas Feraios) and in 1976 to EKON RF (Elliniki Kommounistikí Neolaia Rigas Feraios, Greek Communist Youth Rigas Feraios). What was made clear in 1976 was the Communist orientation of the organization, on the one hand, and its distance from the Soviet Bloc on the other, as the precedence of the nation (“Greek”) over “Communist” revealed. The latter was common pattern for Western European Communist Parties that were critical of the USSR. In fact, the name of the Italian Communist Party functioned as a model.
  15. RF leaned toward KKE Es. from 1968 onward, while in 1974 it proclaimed itself the youth organization of the latter.
  16. Eurocommunism, according to Tony Judt, was given official currency by the secretary-general of the Spanish Communists, Santiago Carillo, in his 1977 essay *Eurocommunism and the State*. For relevant bibliography, see Annie Kriegel, *Eurocommu-*

- nism: A New Kind of Communism?* (Stanford, CA, 1978); Stephen Hellman, *Italian Communism in Transition: The Rise and Fall of the Historic Compromise in Turin, 1975–1980* (Oxford, 1988); Gundle, *Between Hollywood and Moscow*; Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London, 2007), pp. 495–96, 550; Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1997), pp. 572–93.
17. George Kassimeris, “Junta by Another Name? The 1974 *Metapolitefsi* and the Greek Extra-parliamentary Left,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 4 (2005): pp. 752–55.
  18. I choose to refer to Choros “participants” instead of “members” in order to indicate the difference between the loose structures of Choros in comparison to those of the youth organizations of left-wing parties. Choros participants are also mentioned as “autonomous young left-wingers.”
  19. See, for instance, a flyer produced by autonomous young left-wingers in the Department of Mathematics in the University of Salonica in the late 1980s. The flyer was titled “Schedio apofasis tis sygkentrosis tou G Mathimatikou” and was signed by the “Kakoi Foitites tou G Mathimatikou.” I have found this document in the personal collection of Nikos Samanidis.
  20. Kassimeris, “Junta by Another Name?,” pp. 745–62; Giannis Voulgaris, *I Ellada tis Metapolitefsis, 1974–1990: Statheri Dimokratia Simademeni apo ti Metapolemiki Istoría* (Athens, 2002), pp. 25–141.
  21. Raymond Williams, “Culture is Ordinary,” in *Conviction*, ed. Norman McKenzie (London, 1958), pp. 74–92. An outline of the approach of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies toward “culture” can be found in: Hugh Mackay, introduction to *Consumption and Everyday Life*, ed. Hugh Mackay (Milton Keynes, UK, 1997), p. 7. However, in contrast to what Williams argues, I do not wish to examine whether popular culture was “bad” or not and whether it “degraded” the “actual lives” of the subjects under study. Anthropologist Evelyn Payne Hatcher also deals with the relationship between forms of signification and lived experience and suggests that art is treated as “culture,” namely situated in its cultural context. In this vein, she encourages scholars to probe questions, such as “where the art was made . . . what its use was . . . and what it meant to the people who made use of it.” See Evelyn Payne Hatcher, *Art as Culture: An Introduction to the Anthropology of Art* (Westport, CT, 1999), pp. 1–20.
  22. Thomas Mergel, “Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002), pp. 574–606; David I. Kertzer, *Politics and Symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the Fall of Communism* (New Haven, CT, 1996).
  23. I believe that the terms “New” and “Old Left” are rather normative, signifying what a number of activists and some scholars view as “novel” and “parochial” protest patterns, respectively. Although I acknowledge that there were marked differences in the rhetoric and practice of those left-wing actors, I wish to avoid such negative and positive associations and, thus, put those terms in quotation marks.
  24. David Caute, *The Year of the Barricades* (New York, 1988), p. 22.
  25. Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards,” *The American Historical Review* 90, no. 4 (1985): pp. 813–36.

26. Stephane Courtois et al., *Le Livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, répression* (Paris, 1997).
27. Bernard Pudal et al., introduction to *Le Siècle des Communismes*, ed. Bernard Pudal et al. (Paris, 2000).
28. Oded Heilbronner, "From a Culture *for* Youth to a Culture *of* Youth: Recent Trends in the Historiography of Western Youth Cultures," *Contemporary European History* 17, no. 4 (2008): p. 577. Two other illuminating reviews of the state-of-the-art in the scholarly analysis of youth cultures are: Paolo Capuzzo, "Youth Cultures and Consumption in Contemporary Europe," *Contemporary European History* 10 (2001): pp. 155–70; Nikos Demertzis and Giannis Stavrakakis, "I erevna gia ti neolaia- synoptiki anadromi," in *Neolaia, o astathmitos paragontas*, ed. Nikos Demertzis et al. (Athens, 2008), pp. 15–29.
29. A comprehensive presentation of the sociology of youth cultures is offered in: Mike Brake, *The Sociology of Youth Culture and Youth Subcultures: Sex and Drugs and Rock 'n' Roll?* (London, 1985).
30. Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried, "Introduction: Youth, Consumption, and Politics in the Age of Radical Change," in *Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Culture in Changing European Societies, 1960–1980*, ed. Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (New York, 2007), p. 5.
31. Schildt and Siegfried, *Between Marx and Coca-Cola*; Richard I Jobs, *Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World War* (Stanford, CA, 2007).
32. Schildt and Siegfried, "Introduction: Youth, Consumption," p. 6.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 18. See also: Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974* (Oxford, 1998), p. 42, 45, 256. For the "baby-boom" and the generation of "baby-boomers" in France, see Jean-François Sirinelli, "La France des sixties revisitée," *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire* 69 (2004), pp. 111–24. However, Schildt and Siegfried point out that the "baby boom" did not appear throughout Western Europe: as they note, the 15- to 29-year-olds' demographic share increased until the years 1970–71 and then declined again until the years 1979–80 in Sweden and Denmark; exactly the opposite development occurred in West Germany. The number of newborn babies did not boom in post-war Greece, either. In fact, the fertility rate fell from 2.6 children in 1950 to 2.3 in 1975. See Schildt and Siegfried, "Introduction. Youth, Consumption," p. 18. David H. Close, *Greece since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society* (London, 2002), p. 59.
34. Schildt and Siegfried, "Introduction: Youth, Consumption," pp. 17–20.
35. For instance, John Clarke et al. "Subcultures, Cultures and Class" in *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain*, ed. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (London, 2006), pp 3–59
36. Schildt and Siegfried, "Introduction: Youth, Consumption," p. 5.
37. This term, when employed in Greek, often denotes only poshy lifestyles. I wish to clarify that I do not endorse such a link in my work.
38. Nicholas J. Long and Henrietta L. Moore, "Introduction: Sociality's New Directions," in *Sociality: New Directions*, ed. Nicholas J. Long and Henrietta L. Moore (New York, 2012), pp. 4, 7.

39. See Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, by Karl Mannheim (New York, 1952), pp. 290–91.
40. Ronald Fraser et al., *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt* (London, 1988); Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, *Die 68er Bewegung: Deutschland-Westeuropa-USA* (Munich, 2001).
41. In referring to such trends, Gilcher-Holtey mentions the contributors to the *New Left Review* in the UK, *Socialisme ou Barbarie* in France, *Das Argument* in West Germany, and *Quaderni Rossi* in Italy. See Gilcher-Holtey, *Die 68er Bewegung*, pp. 11–14.
42. Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 136–42.
43. Kostis Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship. Student Resistance, Cultural Politics, and the "Long 1960s" in Greece* (New York, 2013).
44. Belinda Davis, "Violence and Memory of the Nazi past in 1960s-70s West German Protest," in *Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955–1975*, ed. Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis (Oxford, 2006), pp. 210–37. For one more critical interrogation of the concept of "generation" with regard to protests that erupted in the late 1960s, see Maud Anne Bracke, "One-dimensional Conflict? Recent Scholarship on 1968 and the Limitations of the Generation Concept," *Journal of Contemporary History* 47, no. 3 (2012): pp. 638–46.
45. Since the young Socialists and Communists in Greece did not utilize the term "generation," in order to define their political identity at that point, it would not be fruitful to approach them by employing even a nuanced understanding of that term, as historian Anna von der Goltz did with regard to the "1968ers," namely as "diverse, nevertheless entangled generations." See Anna von der Goltz, "Generational Belonging and the '68ers' in Europe," in *"Talkin' 'bout my generation": Conflicts of generation building and Europe's "1968,"* ed. Anna von der Goltz (Göttingen, 2011), p. 79.
46. Luisa Passerini, "Youth as a Metaphor for Social Change: Fascist Italy and America in the 1950s," in *A History of Young People in the West*, ed. Giovanni Levi and Jean-Claude Schmitt, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA, 1997), pp. 281–340; Efi Avdela, "'Corrupting and Uncontrollable Activities': Moral Panic about Youth in Post-Civil-War Greece," *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 1 (2008): pp. 25–44; Jobs, *Riding the New Wave*.
47. Heilbronner, "From a Culture for Youth," p. 577.
48. He argues this in the following very important work: Kostas Katsapis, *To "provlima neolaia." Monternoi Neoi, paradosi kai amfisvitisi sti Metapolemiki Ellada, 1964-1974* (Athens, 2013), p. 585.
49. Actually, in addressing the activity of the subjects in question, the most accurate way to conceptualise it would be through the term "left-wing (youth) politics." The parenthesis demonstrates that their interests were linked with, but not necessarily confined to the youth. While taking this point seriously into account, I avoided the use of the parenthesis in the title of the book in order to make it more cogent.
50. For example, see Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945–1958* (Cambridge, MA, 1992).
51. For example, Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media are American* (London, 1977).

52. However, it would be very schematic to argue that until the 1990s all historians of Americanization treated Europeans as passive recipients of American patterns. For example, Volker Berghahn did not portray this process as a slavish adherence to American models. He mentions, for instance, that some West German businessmen dismissed managerial training and the very term “manager.” See Volker R. Berghahn, *The Americanization of West German Industry, 1945–1973* (Leamington Spa, 1986).
53. About works exploring the selective reception of the American popular culture by youngsters in Western Europe, see, for instance: Rob Kroes, “American Mass Culture and European Youth Culture,” in Schildt and Siegfried, *Between Marx and Coca Cola*, pp. 82–105; Kaspar Maase, “Establishing Cultural Democracy: Youth, ‘Americanization’ and the Irresistible Rise of Popular Culture,” in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–68*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton, NJ, 2001), pp. 428–50; Kaspar Maase, *BRAVO Amerika. Erkundungen zur Jugendkultur der Bundesrepublik in den fünfzig Jahren* (Hamburg, 1992); Poiger, *Jazz, Rock and Rebels*; Mike-Frank G. Epitropoulos and Victor Roudometof, “Youth Culture and Lifestyle in Modern Greece,” in *American Culture in Europe: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Mike-Frank G. Epitropoulos and Victor Roudometof (Westport, CT, 1998), pp. 119–44.
54. See Maase, “Establishing Cultural Democracy,” pp. 428–50. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock and Rebels*.
55. Maase, “Establishing Cultural Democracy,” pp. 428–50. Other works dealing with that phenomenon are: Clarke et al., “Subcultures”; Simonetta Piccone Stella, “Rebels Without a Cause’: Male Youth in Italy around 1960,” *History Workshop Journal* 38, no. 1 (1994): pp. 157–78.
56. Jackie Stacey, *Star Gazing: Hollywood Cinema and Female Spectatorship* (London, 1994), p. 204; Karin M. Schmidlechner, “Austrian Youth in the 1950s,” in *Power and the People: A Social History of Central European Politics, 1945–56*, ed. Eleonore Breuning, Jill Lewis, and Gareth Pritchard (Manchester, 2005), pp. 182–99.
57. Schildt and Siegfried, “Introduction: Youth, Consumption,” p. 28.
58. Thomas E. Jørgensen, *Transformations and Crises: The Left and the Nation in Denmark and Sweden 1956–1980* (Oxford, New York, 2008), pp. 138–45.
59. In analyzing the practice of left-leaning students in the early 1970s, Kornetis has appropriated the concept of “invented traditions” introduced by Hobsbawm and Ranger. For its original use, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1992). For its use by Kornetis, see *Children of the Dictatorship*, pp. 196–99.
60. Roland Robertson, “Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity” in *Global Modernities*, ed. Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson (London, 1995), pp. 25–44. “Local” has been construed in diverse ways in scholarly works based on the concept of glocalization. It has been equated with the “national” or the “regional” level or even linked with particular cities. I focus on the contextualization of transnationally circulating flows in the urban settings of Athens and Salonica and how these transfers are often embedded in a left-wing patriotic narrative.
61. As historians Efi Avdela and Angelika Psarra have also remarked, that movement was not a uniform one, including the one that appeared in Greece. Thus, with regard to

- the women's liberation movement of the 1970s, I try to outline its varying tendencies as far as possible below. See Efi Avdela and Angelika Psarra, "Xanagrafontas to parelthon: Synchrones diadromes tis istorias ton gynaikon," in *Siopires Istorias: Gynaiques kai Fylo stin istoriki afgisi*, ed. Efi Avdela and Angelika Psarra (Athens, 1997), p. 81.
62. Marwick, *The Sixties*, pp. 16–20, 680–82. Marwick did not confine the scope of these changes to the "youth," but he argued that they also influenced older in age people as well.
  63. Konrad Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995* (Oxford, 2008), p. 180.
  64. For the case of Eastern Europe, see Josie McLellan, *Love in the Time of Communism: Intimacy and Sexuality in the GDR* (Cambridge, 2011).
  65. Peter N. Stearns, *Sexuality in World History* (Abingdon, UK, 2009), pp. 133–64; Lorenz Durrer, "Born to be Wild: Rockmusik und Protestkultur in der 1960er Jahren," in *Handbuch 1968 zur Kultur- und Mediengeschichte der Studentenbewegung*, ed. Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth (Stuttgart, 2007); Dagmar Herzog, "Between Coitus and Commodification: Young West German Women and the Impact of the Pill," in Schildt and Siegfried, *Between Marx and Coca Cola*, p. 261.
  66. Dagmar Herzog, *Sexuality in Europe: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge, 2011), p. 146.
  67. Stearns, *Sexuality*; Simon Szreter and Kate Fisher, *Sex Before the Sexual Revolution: Intimate Life in England 1918–1963* (Cambridge, 2010).
  68. Herzog, "Between Coitus," p. 263.
  69. Scott Gunther, *The Elastic Closet: A History of Homosexuality in France: 1942–present* (London, 2009); Matt Houlbrook, *Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis, 1918–1957* (Chicago, 2005); Julia Paulus, Eva-Maria Silies, and Kerstin Wolff, eds., *Zeitgeschichte als Geschlechtergeschichte: Neue Perspektiven auf die Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt/M., 2012).
  70. This is true not only of Greece, but of Europe in the 1970s in general. A detailed presentation of the politicization of sexuality in diverse contexts across Europe during the 1970s, which shows that this decade was not necessarily marked by a growing spread of sexual freedom, may be found in the special issue entitled "The Personal is Political": Sexuality, Gender, and the Left in Europe during the 1970s," which is co-edited by Nikolaos Papadogiannis and Sebastian Gehrig and was published in the *European Review of History—Revue européenne d'histoire* 22, no. 1 (2015).
  71. Caroline Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, introduction to *1968: The World Transformed*, ed. Caroline Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker (Washington DC, 1998), pp. 1–27; Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties* (Princeton, NJ, 2011); Hans Righart, "Moderate Versions of the 'Global Sixties': A Comparison of Great Britain and the Netherlands," *Journal of Area Studies* 13 (1998): pp. 82–96.
  72. Horn, *The Spirit*, pp. 232–34.
  73. Gerd Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt: Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967–1977* (Frankfurt/M., 2002). For a counter-argument, depicting the 1970s in West Germany as a "Social Democratic Decade," see Bernd Faulenbach, "Die Siebziger-

- jahre—ein sozialdemokratisches Jahrzehnt?," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 44 (2004): pp. 1–37.
74. Claus Leggewie, "A Laboratory of Postindustrial Society: Reassessing the 1960s in Germany," in Fink, Gassert, and Junker, 1968, pp. 277–94. Similarly, Kristin Ross, an expert in comparative literature, has argued that several former radical left-wingers in France in the late 1970s "refashioned" the protests of the late 1960s as a "purely spiritual . . . revolution." Such a representation functioned as "the harbinger of the 1980s, an era marked by "the return to the individual" and the "triumph of market democracies." This is a trend which Ross maintains that has accommodated the prevalence of a narrative that she calls "the long march of democratic individualism." See Kristin Ross, *May '68 and its Afterlives* (London, 2002).
  75. Gundle, *Between Hollywood and Moscow*, pp. 157, 163.
  76. A valuable primary source is the partly digitalized archive of the Portuguese Communist newspaper *O Militante*. Researchers can access online volumes for the years 1974 and 1975. See <http://www.pcp.pt/publica/militant/> (last accessed 15 August 2012).
  77. David Gouard, "La 'Banlieue Rouge' face au renouvellement des générations. Une sociologie politique des cites Maurice Thorez et Youri Gagarine à Ivry-sur-Seine" (PhD diss., University of Montpellier 1, 2011).
  78. These figures appear in Horn, *The Spirit*, p. 142.
  79. Massimo Ilardi and Aris Accornero, *Il Partito Comunista Italiano, Struttura e storia dell'organizzazione 1921/1979* (Milan, 1982), p. 255; Roberto Guerzoni, "La Presenza del PCI e della FGCI: ampiezza, limiti e problem," in *La Crisi della società italiana e gli ornamenti delle nuove generazioni. Atti del Convegno tenuto a Roma il 7–9 ottobre 1977*, pp. 179–80, Personal Collection of Donald Sassoon.
  80. Dimitris A. Sotiropoulos, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Christos Lyrintzis, "Eisagogi: I poioutita kai I leitourgia tis Tritis Ellinikis Dimokratias," in *Koinonia kai Politiki. Opsei tis G' Ellinikis Dimokratias, 1974–1994*, ed. Christos Lyrintzis, Ilias Nikolakopoulos, Dimitris A. Sotiropoulos (Athens, 1996), pp. 19–42.
  81. Voulgaris, *I Ellada tis Metapolitefsis*, p. 215. A much more simplistic and normative version of this argument gained traction in public debates that occurred after Greece received a bailout from the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in 2010. Those discussions often revolved around the issue whether developments in postauthoritarian Greece were to blame for the crisis ensuing in that country. Diverse actors, such as right-wing liberals, asserted that those transformations heralded a surge of Party politics revolving around "clientelism," which brought Greece to this critical condition. For a liberal critique of the postauthoritarian transformations in Greece, see <http://e-drasis.blogspot.gr/> (last accessed 18 December 2013). Nevertheless, such claims did not reign unchallenged. Socialist and Communist subjects rejected them, asserting that, in the environment of the crisis, democracy's achievements since the collapse of the dictatorial regime in 1974 were called into question. See "I politiki katastasi stin Ellada," Central Committee Document, First Congress of SYRIZA, 2012.
  82. Gundle, *Between Hollywood and Moscow*, pp. 156–57.
  83. Jane Jenson, "The French Communist Party and Feminism," *The Socialist Register* 17 (1980): pp. 121–47.