

INTRODUCTION



The human is what he eats... with this delicious play on words, I have certainly turned an object of theology into an object of gastrology ... what then is the true meaning of food and drink?¹

—Ludwig Feuerbach (1862)

Tell me what you eat and I will tell you what you are.²

—Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin, trans. Carl Vogt (1825 and 1864)

Nineteenth-century central Europe forged modern eating practices. The main inventors of these practices were women working in middle-class households and in public spaces such as inns, and it was they who laid the foundations of food industrialization. Because belonging to the middle class in nineteenth-century German-speaking central Europe hinged on social recognition, the main demand for these women's modern food came from the emerging middle classes. In chasing distinction and status, aspiring middle-class consumers provided the employment and consumption infrastructure for women to operate, and for modern eating to emerge. This book is the first synthetic study of nineteenth-century eating practices in central Europe. It integrates this geography into our understandings of the evolution of human eating habits, and frames food workers—subalterns, women, migrants, and refugees—as authors of a modern identity by treating these lands as a transnational laboratory of modernity with a global impact.

Climate change played a significant role in the history of modern eating. The early years of food modernization coincided with the last five decades of the Little Ice Age that had ruled the continent since 1550.³ The summer of 1806 was scathingly hot, dry, and lethally dull until the French invasion.⁴ In the period following the Holy Roman Empire's capitulation before Napoleon in that year, two volcanoes erupted, producing the greatest explosions in four centuries.⁵ The mystery explosion of 1809 and the Javanese Tambora in 1815 caused the "year without a summer" and the coldest decade in the historical record to that date.⁶ Agricultural production fluctuated until 1817, and then grain prices as well until 1820.⁷ Riots ensued in the 1830s, as did harvest failures in 1845,

1846, and 1847.⁸ Revolution broke out in 1848. After mid-century, the German states went from being largely rural and agricultural to being the most rapidly industrializing area in the world. The population nearly tripled over the course of the century, rising from 23 million in 1800 to 43 million in 1875 and 67 million by 1913.⁹ Literacy skyrocketed from just 15 percent in 1770 to over 90 percent in 1900, making it one of the most educated countries worldwide.¹⁰ The central European experience of industrial modernization between c.1780 and 1910 was, therefore, particularly rapid and extreme, but characterized by social insecurity.¹¹

Central Europeans were food- and status-obsessed—no surprise under these circumstances of political and climatic flux. Food imagery and dreams of the land of plenty populated the German literary sphere, with tales such as “Tischlein-deck-dich” by the Brothers Grimm, the biting ironic social commentaries of Heinrich Heine, and the romantic contemplation of a bread-giving Lotte in Goethe’s *Werther*.¹² In the nineteenth century, German lands published more cookbooks than France, which had been the undisputed center of culinary civilization in eighteenth-century Europe.¹³ German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach observed that “the human is, what he eats.”¹⁴ Carl Vogt, a 1848 revolutionary and Frankfurt parliamentarian, spent summery days of his life translating Jean-Anthelme Brillat-Savarin’s *Physiology of Taste* and relishing “the professor’s aphorisms” such as “Tell me what you eat and I will tell you what you are.”¹⁵ Johann Rottenhöfer, the royal chef to Maximilian II, took the Frenchman’s warning that “the fate of nations rises and falls with their food” literally, and he cooked for peace at the Bavarian court.¹⁶

Throughout the nineteenth century, food and identity were inextricably intertwined. You were what you ate. Food served as a charged cultural medium of everyday life, refracting political and social constellations. Nourishment served as a substance with which to negotiate social identity and meaning, to physically construct the human body, to seek out pleasure, to enact aspirationalism, and to claim social control. All these dimensions rendered the act of eating an axiomatic habitual practice with which to enact, encode, endorse, and contest the boundaries of class and belonging. Food appealed to contemporaries as a stabilizer of identity. This is where modern eating practices arose.

Modern eating consists of the use of industrialized processed foods (that is, nourishment from substitutes, vacuum-preserved and ready-made meals laced with additives such as colorings and flavor enhancements, alongside the use of nutritional supplements) in combination with the simultaneous resistance to such processed foods through the adoption of selection matrices (e.g., vegetarianism, veganism, and natural eating), political protest, and social organization, as well as legislation to curb the dangers of what contemporaries called food adulteration. Modern eating practices in industrial societies do not refer to a set diet of a specific composition. Instead, modern eating is a dynamic interaction with food industries, with migrants and cultural change, with

imported and exported ideas, skills, and goods that make consumers aware of change and reactive to this change. The modernization of eating can also involve claims to masculine rationality in industrial marketing, even if the creation of goods by women such as ready-made meals and vacuum-sealed foods predated male-led industrialization by decades. Modern eating practices are no more or less “natural” than the dietary practices that preceded them, yet the speed and scale of production—and the consumers’ awareness that they are largely alienated from production—inspires their anxiety about not knowing what the food consists of as they seek to protect their health in any industrial complex where the majority of the workforce outsources food production.

Particularly consequential in the history of food modernization in central Europe was this transnational spaces’ openness to foreign influence through cosmopolitan attitudes, migration, intellectual exchanges, and trade.¹⁷ French chefs who fled the French Revolution and sought courtly kitchens to work in migrated to German lands, where they educated working women who came to work as cooks in German middle-class households from mid-century.¹⁸ There these cooks combined contemporary French cuisine with emerging industrial changes in food chemistry and nutrition.¹⁹ Middle-class households employed women educated by French chefs, and purchased cookbooks authored by French-educated cooks. Their households embraced industrial food changes but also reacted negatively to food adulteration with calls for vegetarianism and natural eating inspired by Eastern philosophies; these reactions resulted in one of the most comprehensive modern food laws for that time in 1878.²⁰ While food workers had vacuum-packed foods and prepared ready-made meals in a vacuum since the 1780s, food industrialists appropriated their techniques from mid-century as industrial production picked up. At this point, German lands served as educational centers for students from France, Switzerland, and the United States—including Henri Nestlé and Julius Maggi—in the form of laboratories, universities, and apothecaries. These students, alongside migrants, spread their knowledge and the products based on their science worldwide.

We cannot understand the history of contemporary global eating practices without nineteenth-century Germany. Food histories trace how various power centers forged innovation and determined what and how people ate since antiquity. Within Europe, beginning in Ancient Greece and Rome, our accounts move through the Middle Ages to pause in the Italian Renaissance and then rest in Absolutist France and Imperial Britain.²¹ Pepper, the “botanic Helen of Troy,”²² “launched a thousand ships”²³ to distant shores among the Greeks. The Romans paid their soldiers in salt, rendering the contemporary word “salary.”²⁴ Vegetables and grains played a large part in medieval peasant diets, complemented by small “tame” meat (forest pigs, sheep, and goats) as distinct from “wild” meat (inherited from the Romans), fish, and cheese.²⁵ Medieval hunger was also a core ingredient on the peasant’s table, and served as a means

of subversion, or else cursed the poor with an average of one famine every ten years between the tenth and eighteenth centuries.²⁶ Meanwhile, kings fed upon sugared meat and fruits, spiced with saffron, ginger, cinnamon, expensive pepper, and the most highly prized cloves and nutmeg, boiled in milk or alcoholic drinks such as wine.²⁷ Encounters in Sicily led to the creation of pasta—lasagna, vermicelli—as early as the tenth century.²⁸ After Marco Polo's travels to China in 1271, Venice dominated the European spice trade.²⁹ Europeans used pepper “to pay for labor and goods”³⁰ just before 1492, when the hunger for spice led Columbus to cross the Atlantic in search of India,³¹ with “fantasies of absurd plenitude” on faraway shores motivating royal investment in his expedition.³² Renaissance Italian trends such as the taste for lemons, cauliflower, and Savoy cabbage traveled to the French court through marriage, along with—as legends about Caterina of Medici would have it—the use of the fork. The teenage queen’s wedding banquet consisted of countless birds like peacocks and pheasants, swans and cranes, as well as artichokes, marzipan, pastries, and cookies.³³

In the evolution of human eating habits, movement is the constant: exploration, translation, trade, imperial expansion and administration. “The promise of spice access inspired Spain’s venture across the Atlantic. Instead of pepper and cardamom, ships from the Americas brought potatoes, tomatoes, cocoa, and coffee to Europe.”³⁴ In the colonies, food functioned as a marker of identity,³⁵ while eating functioned as a “destructive” act in the tropics,³⁶ an “integration”³⁷ into a social body or an act “imaginatively shaping the matter we experience as body and self.”³⁸ Britain embraced coffee-culture as of 1650, and London became the home of dozens of coffee-houses.³⁹ By the late eighteenth century, sugar counted among the most valued commodities, motivating colonial rule and slavery.⁴⁰ Its price rose until 1840 as it was favored for sweetening tea.⁴¹ In France, cooking became simpler from 1650. Cuisine moved away from the sweet and spiced meats of previous ages, to “simple” essentials such as “bouillon, liaisons, roux, farces,”⁴² ceding by the 1750s to “natural” food, when “salt, pepper, and other spices” were no longer “used extravagantly.”⁴³ Cooking started afresh on a purportedly clean slate: nature.⁴⁴

Rightly, historians point to the significance of France in its Revolutionary Era to search for the roots of food modernity. In the hands of Antonin Carême, the King of Chefs and Chef of Kings, *haute cuisine* claimed “simplicity, elegance, and sumptuousness,”⁴⁵ used more cream and butter, constructed edible towers, and invented the four basic sauces around 1800. Thereupon, the practice to “separate sweet, salty, bitter, sour, and spicy” was “allied with the idea that cooking must respect … the natural flavor of each food.”⁴⁶ This marked the invention of what Carême and his many students named “modern *haute cuisine*,” while the revolution created the restaurant.⁴⁷ The story as yet untold, however, of the consequence of the French Revolution, is that of its migratory impact in central Europe. As mentioned, after 1789, French chefs fled eastwards to seek

alternative employment among the courts of central Europe. The revolution and subsequent restoration fundamentally altered the job opportunities for culinary workers, and major figures such as Émile Bernard, Urbain Dubois, Jules Gouffé, and Auguste Escoffier left France.⁴⁸ Émile Bernard very briefly served Napoleon III but then went on to cook for the Prussian Hohenzollerns.⁴⁹ Culinary skills and styles traveled a great deal as influences in other artistic ventures, from teachers to students. Urbain Dubois, a student of Carême with whom Bernard authored the *Cuisine Classique*, worked under Adolphe Dugléry (also a student of Carême) at the Café Anglais, and also worked at the Prussian court. Dugléry taught Auguste Escoffier, who became chef of the Savoy in London.⁵⁰ Escoffier himself then founded a cooking school, further disseminating his knowledge and practices after presumably having done so at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in London.⁵¹ Between French revolutionary fervor, Carême's *haute cuisine* in the early nineteenth century, and Escoffier's transformation of food in London around 1900, the hundreds of princely courts across central Europe provided French chefs with a temporary safe space, facilities, and funds to exercise their craft. For a time in the nineteenth century, the "culinary spirit of the age" came to rest in German lands.⁵²

Despite the rightful emphasis on Britain, France, and empires in histories of food, food historical evolutions are uncontrollably transnational, and all geographies within larger food histories function as temporary and interconnected sites in which food evolutions take place. One of the most challenging questions that food histories have debated in recent years has included whom we must credit (or blame) for food evolutions. Shall we look for imperial hegemonic influence from above and find it among priestly classes, medical authorities, and legislators?⁵³ Or shall we look to those individuals whom history rarely credits but who operated and executed changes in the day to day instead?⁵⁴ In the present volume, I trace food evolutions through the dynamic interaction of food workers and their employers, political protestors and legislators, medical authorities and the consumers who ignored their advice—to name but a few—as well as the actions of students, scientists, refugees and migrants, working women and household staff who sought social betterment for themselves while cooking up social mobility for their employers and consumers.

Food historical changes are best accounted for through geographically multipolar and socially multileveled analyses of practice. Geographically multipolar frames recognize the undeniable importance of power centers such as empires, yet treat these important structuring spaces as interconnected high-impact regions rather than "culinary hegemons"⁵⁵ with uncontested levels of control. Socially multileveled analyses, in turn, recognize that in the modern era classes are not structures, and human beings do not hold guaranteed fixed positions in societies. Thus, we should not treat their actions as interactions between statically placed individuals or impermeable groupings. By analyzing

practices from the perspective of culture in a transnational, socially multileveled and contextually multipolar manner, this monograph is able to trace change over time and space while acknowledging the structuring effects of power holders as much as the agency among individual agents, thereby integrating individual cumulative action within interconnected high-impact sites into larger narratives of change. This approach brings to light often uncredited and unrecognized actions and their unintended consequences—for example, the unintended outcome of forging modern eating practices.⁵⁶

As part of this multipolar approach, migratory patterns after mid-century highlight the global interconnections of central Europe. “Jews and other Germans”⁵⁷ migrated to the United States and took their culinary culture with them in this era. This led to a complex of strategies, practices, and even recipes on the East Coast of North America.⁵⁸ From the 1820s, food workers with access to salt and “skills as butchers and *wurst* (sausage) makers” made Cincinnati the biggest city in the West by 1850.⁵⁹ New York treasured its German butchers in mid-century, due to their “cleanliness and quality animals.”⁶⁰ Breweries, “symbols of German impact,” established themselves between 1830 and the 1870s, led by migrants who disembarked in New York City, “making it at one point the third largest German-speaking city in the world.”⁶¹ One migrant by the name of Heinz opened a ketchup factory in Pennsylvania; another named Hellmann sold mayonnaise, while Kraft sold cheese and Oscar Meyer sausages. From 1880, many Jewish Germans migrated to the Big Apple and opened kosher butcher shops; the city soon housed thousands of these.⁶² Such large-scale industries, often aided by demand for military rations in the early twentieth century, exported their goods worldwide and led to transnational food industrialization and consumption modernization beyond the Atlantic.

Central Europe holds an important place in food history—the culinary spirit of the age came to rest in Germany for a long time, from 1780 to 1910. This book is the first to propose this argument. Given the exceptional scholarship on world cuisines, cuisine and empires, and culinary hegemons in past decades, how could historians have missed central Europe’s significance until now?⁶³ The answer lies in the evolution of historiographic contingencies.

Until recently, German-language scholarship on nineteenth-century food history suffered from several limitations. Most of the work occurred under the direction of Hans-Jürgen Teuteberg, often in cooperation with his associate Günter Wiegmann, who both used political events as reference points for their narratives, and often adopted either statistical or nutritional-didactic approaches.⁶⁴ These works, not quite *Annaliste* nor quite Marxist, sought direct precedents for practices of the mid-twentieth century in the late nineteenth century in conversation with scholarship on rupture, industrialization, and urbanization. They formulated histories of single goods—e.g., coffee, potatoes, sugar—in a national perspective, and produced some contributions

on regional variation.⁶⁵ This scholarship focused on agricultural production over consumption, and often passed over the period from 1800 to 1860. Neither conceptual nor social in orientation, with little attention to identity, power centers, or transnationalism, these works, at their best, provided quantitative overviews for broad stretches of time, but at their worst, they were methodologically flawed. Further, they inadequately and insufficiently historicized national borders, habits, and practices—generalizing instead on the basis of local finds across central Europe without sufficient archival grounding.⁶⁶ Without a survey work to cover the century, smaller findings and trends of more recent well-executed scholarship could not feed into larger narratives on food history nor fully determine the implications of individual phenomena.⁶⁷

The field has, however, evolved significantly in the past two decades. Works by Vera Hierholzer and Peter Lesnizcak have improved our analytic categories; they explored the legal integration of food regulation after 1860 with some work on Bavaria before unification, and the invention of tradition, contributing to our knowledge of modern food laws and rural–urban differences.⁶⁸ A PhD dissertation by Thomas Hauer productively combined statistical book histories with a cultural aesthetic analysis of French-influenced *gastrology*.⁶⁹

Historians of central European food history have produced particularly strong scholarship on the twentieth century, with some luminary contributions analyzing as far back as 1860. Ulrike Thoms and Corinna Treitel have investigated class-specific hospital, prison, and scientifically informed eating, nature as a practice, and vegetarianism as a political fringe-phenomenon from the mid-nineteenth century, drawing out long-term parallels in disciplining and rationalization among scientific communities and in workers' lives into the twentieth century.⁷⁰ Most recently, hearkening back to her earlier work on Max Rubner, Treitel has identified some of the crucial input of central European nutritional ideas of the late nineteenth century to what she calls “nutritional modernity,” informing policy by the early twentieth century. Her work further highlights the legacy of ideas of natural eating in National Socialist discourses in contemporary calls for organic foods.⁷¹ Treitel demonstrates the significance of the period from 1840 for food modernities—a finding this monograph echoes. Ongoing projects by Treitel will also add to our knowledge of the scientific, medical, and popular reception and exchange of/with oriental forms of food-related dietary and nutritional knowledge, and of health care practices such as Ayurveda between Germany and South Asia. We are now gaining a fuller picture of canteens and class-specific urban dining from the 1850s—areas that the present volume advances with further archival research.⁷²

Throughout this period of scholarly activity, the area of middle-class eating habits between 1800 and 1860 remained unplowed. By virtue of these specific developments in the field, the transnational dimensions of middle-class eating

habits in this period, as well as the place of this geographical locus in wider histories, went largely unnoticed.

The present monograph covers German-speaking central Europe through twenty archives alongside printed and digital works and takes “objects of minor aesthetic value” into account as much as records in print culture.⁷³ Sources include cookbooks, legal case files, letters, household records, handwritten recipe notebooks, hospital, military, and restaurant menus, as well as architectural remains, blueprints, and items of material culture, printed images and sketches in newspapers, journals, and cookbooks. These sources reveal information about activities by a range of agents—chefs and cooks, maids and servants, housewives and house managers, cookbook authors and civil servants—and provide awareness of the material contexts that shaped their experiences as producers, workers, and consumers.

In light of historians’ (entirely valid) concerns surrounding cookbooks as viable historical sources, this culinary genre deserves a short note.⁷⁴ At first sight, this genre of prescriptive literature may seem entirely removed from reality. Cookbooks, however, do not exist in historical isolation but sit—in the case of this study’s archival findings—within a rich and privileged nexus of social, cultural, political, and economic streams of influence. Recipes are the complex historical products of interactions between agents and various information parcels that flowed through time and space via learning and training, migration, emulation, and social exchanges of information. Cookbooks, far from being removed from reality, sit at the focal point of a host of information bases and oral exchanges, and are in communication with other texts. When they are contextually interpreted alongside a host of other documents—such as postcards, letters, notebooks, diaries, *albi amicori*, marginalia, and cover scribbles—they serve as exemplary data records. Varied ephemera and oral exchanges forged cookbooks, which, in turn, inspired more oral exchanges and forged more ephemera. Data paused within the pages in cookbooks before travelling on, and, at the same time structured, informed, and educated further practices. These sources sustain a culturally centered approach. Cookbook recipes do not record everyday practice: they record the orienting northern star that guided practice and structured cuisine, simultaneously and reciprocally shaping and being shaped by both.

As stated, the pursuit of middle-classness facilitated the development of modern eating in central Europe—yet, what was middle-classness? No other question has preoccupied historians of nineteenth-century central Europe more intensely for over forty years, and there is no consensus on what the middle class was—nor do we currently hold a single positive definition of middle-classness that reconciles all findings, applies to all central European regions, or indeed, applies to women and avoids treating political orientations as a proxy for class.⁷⁵ Differences in approach have varied so widely that, at times, different scholarly

camps engaged in conversations on the basis of entirely different criteria, with findings referring to entirely distinct social groupings. The Bielefeld School, for example, defined the middle-class citizen or *Bürger* negatively as the non-farming, non-noble 5-percent elite of the population in Prussia, while the Frankfurt School adopted a legal definition of *Bürger* as municipal citizens and public agents in the German southwest.⁷⁶ Yet, as Sperber and Habermas point out, the former definition is narrow and disregards the social middle's fluidity, while the latter largely excludes women, whose rights varied greatly by city and region. What is more, there was virtually no overlap between the social groups analyzed by these camps.⁷⁷

Why is this the case? These discussions on middle-classness have been intertwined with interrogations of Germany's "special path" (*Sonderweg*) into modernity. To paraphrase the main concern of this debate: how could a liberal middle class have democratically voted a fascistic regime into power in 1933? Was this because the German middle class simply was not liberal, as Hans-Ulrich Wehler proposed in the 1970s?⁷⁸ Of course, studies now overwhelmingly show that nineteenth-century liberalism in Germany and beyond usually served elite interests, and that it functioned as a repressive ideology to the detriment of confessional minorities, racialized others, and women.⁷⁹ We now also know that nineteenth-century liberalism did not have the power or the aim to prevent colonial expansion or religious persecution. On the contrary: imperial advocates often came from liberal camps, and liberals treated anti-Catholicism as a precondition for modernization while weaponizing sexism and homophobia around 1900.⁸⁰ These newer findings add more evidence to already established works that highlighted the perils of using political ideas as a proxy for class.⁸¹ Wehler's proposition of the *Sonderweg* was soon and soundly deconstructed by Blackbourn and Eley in 1984, whose work led to a range of varied findings on middle-classness, which this monograph now integrates into broader, global discussions.⁸²

In analyses beyond central Europe, scholars cannot agree either on what middle-classness is,⁸³ but, after the publication of more structural accounts of class-belonging and interrogations based on cultural approaches to social groupings between the 1980s and 1990s, more recent scholarship has productively read the language of food to analyze power relations, hierarchies, and identities to account for middle-class identities.⁸⁴ Building on this work by reading food habits and practices⁸⁵ for their identity-specific semiotic value,⁸⁶ I propose that middle-class identity depended on social recognition. The aspiring middle class used property,⁸⁷ legal status,⁸⁸ their level of education,⁸⁹ and consumption,⁹⁰ among other material arguments, to make their case to lay claim to the social recognition of middle-class identity and belonging in the social middle. Middle-classness does not refer to a stable structure or a discrete social grouping but to an individualistic identity held for individual or kinship

benefit; it functioned as a form of social and cultural capital, with exchange and access value for and to political and economic capital. The aims of middle-class individuals centered on individual or family-specific social mobility, survival, and the maintenance of status rather than revolution. Middle-classness was not a deterministic predictor for political orientation or behavior but a self-identity evident from a range of utterances and behaviors designed to assert one's belonging in the social middle. Central to forging one's middle-classness through foodways in the nineteenth century was aspirational consumption in imitation of superiors, control over subalterns, and establishing distinction from the latter.⁹¹ Middle-classness was, thus, shaped by constant comparison with superiors, peers, and inferiors in a century of evolving social relations, creating dynamics of imitation, mimesis, and attempts at subaltern behavioral regulation and distinction.⁹² Recipe exchanges and food gifts sealed social networks, for example, while contemporaries used royal courts as stylistic points of orientation.

Hinging class-belonging to social recognition accommodates the fluidity and openness so characteristic of the modern era as well as the constant effort people exerted to *become* and/or *stay* middle class in a period of change. If individuals were able to convince their superiors, peers, and inferiors that they were middle class, they were middle class. This recognition was conditional and temporary, and had to be constantly renewed and renegotiated.⁹³ Jürgen Osterhammel recently proposed that “[p]eople were bourgeois ... if they *considered* themselves bourgeois and gave this belief practical expression in the way they led their life.”⁹⁴ The great value in this analytic view lies in its emphasis on the subject's self-perception—an imperative dimension—and the execution of this belief. Yet, what if a society does not recognize certain self-identity claims or applies a different set of criteria under different circumstances or, indeed, to different members or subsections of society?⁹⁵ Identities—whiteness, blackness, femininity, masculinity, nationality, confession—are economically constructed, socially negotiated, culturally claimed, and politically contested as well as time-specific, among other variables.⁹⁶ Identity claims for middle-classness, too, were in constant negotiation within an uncertain and unstable economic system, wherein gendered, racial, and confessional lines actively undercut subjects' claims to self-definition, even excluding them from accruing the necessary arguments for social mobility.

The approach to defining middle-classness as a modern identity constructed by a range of agents who crafted it using a range of arguments for the purpose of social recognition synthesizes our vast knowledge of German middle-class scholarship—the field of *Bürgertumsforschung*—while avoiding its original Habermasian undertones and its problematic assumptions of successful, symmetric modernization, or Germany's aberration from allegedly more successful models impermeable to Fascism.⁹⁷ This approach allows for the

fluidity, the effort, and the need for constant argumentation that the middle class experienced in this era of change. It also accounts for the anxiety connected to unstable and temporary identifications in the modern period.

If identity is the location of a human being within the world's temporal social fabric, then class identity was—and is—a matter of survival in the modern period. The phenomena identified in central Europe are not exclusive to this geography. Status inflects and refracts social and political experience. Economic ease provides security and comfort.⁹⁸ The aspirationalism here identified, the anxiety, hope of social survival, and work toward belonging characterizes the condition of those who aspired to rise in status in modernity worldwide within globalized modern economies broadly construed. The dynamics of food modernization and middle-class social recognition described in this book find parallels in rapidly evolving economies where “middle-classness” stands for a desirable identity and code for safety, personal achievement, and comfort, such as in the United States, India, Japan, and South Korea.⁹⁹ Evident in these histories is that, for the production of modern inequalities, class remains an elemental category.

My analysis of German middle-classness, therefore, connects *Bürgertumsforschung* with comparative analyses of the global middle classes. Whereas analyses in the 1970s relied on Habermasian ideal models of modernization based on Britain and France, most recent scholarship would suggest that there has never been an English middle class, and that far from serving as a helpful term for analyzing political behavior in the two great empires of the nineteenth century, both in the *Grande Nation* and the British Isles, the term “bourgeois” served as an insult rather than as a signifier for a recognized social grouping.¹⁰⁰ Rather than indicating a failed modernization within central Europe, most recent scholarship therefore confirms that its modernization was, indeed, a heightened form of the norm rather than an aberration.

Scholars have rightly problematized metanarrative claims of progress¹⁰¹ and the abuse of claims to modernization as part of political programs intended to break with the past and construct new futures, both colonial and genocidal, over past centuries—often, at tremendous human cost.¹⁰² This may inspire scholarly hesitance or, indeed, alarm at the very notion of modernity. Yet, historians of central Europe bear the obligation to engage with questions of modernization, and their interrogations have produced a host of valuable works that identify continuities in violence, from the French Revolution to the Holocaust, and examine modernization as a destructive force—or, at the very least, as a deeply ambivalent one that firmly places responsibility on the shoulders of all those who espouse its language.¹⁰³ At this stage of our own history, the parameters of earlier conversations surrounding the nature of modernity have shifted, and we may recognize human destruction and Fascism not as exceptions to the modern condition but as reoccurring phenomena within a globally interconnected, ever-changing world where crises inspire fear concerning limited resources.

Scholarship has long determined that modernity is neither scientifically neutral nor politically unambiguous. Thanks to this work, no urgency remains to undermine claims to the contrary. Yet, there is persistent value in examining how industrialization transformed and continues to transform human lives across the world.¹⁰⁴ The present study aims to do this, hinging modernity to the speed and scale of transnationally driven change, as well as to human awareness and reactivity to these global changes.¹⁰⁵

Modernity is growing older and provides a longer spectrum for our prisms to reveal the long continuity of flux of our age. In the twentieth century, “modern” came “to distinguish our perception of our lives and times from all that has gone before, from history as a whole, as such. Modern architecture, modern music, modern philosophy, modern science—all these define themselves not *out of* the past, indeed scarcely *against* the past, but in independence of the past.” There the “modern mind” grew “indifferent to history because history, conceived as a continuous nourishing tradition” had become “useless to it.”¹⁰⁶ The nineteenth century, with its many “tremors of social and political disintegration, proved one of the most fertile breeding grounds” for attempts at, and claims to, an “a-historical culture. Its great intellectual innovators … all broke, more or less deliberately, their ties to the historical outlook central to the nineteenth century liberal culture in which they had been reared.”¹⁰⁷ Moderns around 1900 already provided “evidence of a critical approach to modernity, centering on aesthetic, ethical or psychological priorities, and questioning certain modernist ideas.”¹⁰⁸ Postmodernism in this sense is profoundly modernist, because modernists too sought to break away from the past, break free of history, pass beyond the immediate aims of what they defined as an “exhausted”¹⁰⁹ paradigmatic (historic) system “engendered by the Industrial Revolution, and in which the market economy prevails.”¹¹⁰ There is a cyclical nature to this aim, already as old as modernity itself, to interrogate, explode, and reform the alleged “progress guided by scientific and technological rationality, or the program of emancipation envisaged by individuals inspired by Enlightenment optimism.”¹¹¹ Perhaps, therefore, “no mode of modernism” by any name “can ever be definitive,”¹¹² for we humans will always strive, and yet, feel profound “uncertainty and disorientation”¹¹³ as we experiment with models of the future. Within this context, food modernity in central Europe displayed many an “attempt by modern men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves at home in it.”¹¹⁴ Food modernity, with its legislative, economic, climatic, social and cultural as well as medical and scientific dimensions “cuts across physical and social space.”¹¹⁵

In this work, I adopt a transnational and more socially inclusive adaptation of Berman’s speed-and-scale definition of modernity, and a more explicitly global contextualization of what I will call the heightened modernity argument

pioneered by Peukert and the birth of modernity proposition of Schorske.¹¹⁶ First, my transnationally social and cultural rereading of Berman explains the heightened speed and scale of food change in the nineteenth century as being overwhelmingly due to the activities of women, migrants, and household workers operating within understudied spaces (e.g., kitchens, households) to establish the socially multileveled composition of central Europe's scientific and economic modernization of the food industry. Second, I integrate the exceptionally insightful scholarship on central Europe's birth of a heightened modernity into a global frame, expand its chronological focus, and extend its historic dimensions. Historians adapting Peukert's heightened modernity argument about Weimar have productively exploited fin-de-siècle central Europe as a "laboratory" for modernity after 1890.¹¹⁷ Scholarship building on Schorske's proposition of the central European birth of modernity, in turn, correctly identify this region as an often deeply ambiguous fountain-head of modern global transformations with high impact in the twentieth century.¹¹⁸ These scholars working on German lands and Habsburg after 1890 collectively demonstrate how moderns seek to break with their past; they are critical and reflexive, and yet, they turn to the past to construct their visions of the future—be that through Byzantine aesthetics in Klimtian art, or Greek mythology and biblical references to describe the modern psyche. I point out that this region's impact was not exclusive to art and psychology, politics, war and genocide, but was also operant in economics, science, technology, medicine, social transformations, and cultural production.¹¹⁹ I further highlight that their selected period of examination c. 1860/1890–1910/40 misses the crucial feminine, migratory, socially subaltern preparatory phase of economic, social, cultural, technological, scientific, and industrial modernization. By extending the analysis back to 1780, I include important actors and identify their participation in global food-modernizing processes preceding and actively pre-empting industrial food production. The longer chronology also makes the discursive and socially excluding dynamics of the period after 1860 evident, and prevents the analysis from replicating the contemporary claims that, for example, food modernization was the post-1850 achievement of "white men."¹²⁰ Here, too, my approach is informed by contestations of scholarship beyond Europe. Because the gap between worldwide and European food histories has widened in recent years, discussions of "the modern" and its ownership can provide ground to examine its multidimensionality.¹²¹

Modernity is an era, an experiential condition, an idea(l), and a product. It is a specific historical era characterized by rapid change in which interlocutors reflexively determine their own positionality in time. In central Europe, they did this with reference to antiquity during the birth of the disciplines of history and *Altertumsforschung*, formulating classically informed political participatory ideals during the Enlightenments, exchanging ideas across empires, and exploring and expanding throughout the era of democratization.¹²² Modernity

is an anxious experiential condition, in so far as economic, technological, scientific, and medical changes during scientific revolutions and industrialization fundamentally reshaped labor relations and the operant criteria for access to resources and their distribution, thereby radically reorganizing the criteria for survival and restructuring the parameters of lived experience for human subjects in globalizing economies.¹²³ Awash with ideational exchanges, imports and exports, and migratory movements, this avid change inspired a longing for greater personal economic stability. This longing represented raw and potent political fuel—for example, after the Viennese stock market crash of 1873. Modernity is an idea(l) in so far as, in the hands of self-identified modernizers, the concept has served as a metonym for the world itself, reciprocally defining moderns as its only qualified custodians, often at a high cost for women, minorities, and colonial subjects.¹²⁴ Finally, modernity is a hybrid product in so far as modernizers inscribed select modernities onto a range of commodities—from singular spaces and goods to reality accounts and political programs. These products materialized the self-evidence of modern inequalities, be that in a packaged dry biscuit, via carefully masculinized laboratorial space, or with the attribution of chemical innovation to industry.

While some scholars have studied food practices as a site where modernity has been negotiated,¹²⁵ few scholars have exploited the opportunities in historically examining “food modernism”¹²⁶ or “food modernization”¹²⁷ in a global and transnational manner. Some historians have analyzed “modern food” and concluded somewhat cautiously that it was and is “plural,”¹²⁸ but sociologists still employ the idea of “food modernity” as the opposite of “food tradition”¹²⁹—even though historians point out that traditions are often modern inventions rather than longer-lived local customs.¹³⁰

I propose that central European food modernization was a long, measurable process that began in households and permeated wider social consumption habits and production patterns (modernity as an era of change). Consumers dynamically wrestled with food changes, fundamentally reorganizing their relationship to food production and consumption as they came to depend on an economically transformed industrial complex for essential provision (modernity as an experiential condition). Etymologically explicit claims to food modernity emerged around 1850, weaponized as industrial and scientific claims of ownership of modernity as a heightened form of being human via the liberally informed branding of industrial foods as modern goods. Their enthusiastic materializations of food modernity rewrote the historic record of food chemical innovation, discursively effacing the food science of agents and spaces that had laid the foundations for industrial production (modernity as an idea—in this case, a whitened and masculinized liberal economic ideal). Industry successfully synonymized modern food with industrial products (modernity embedded in a product).

By analyzing middle-class identity and modernization via a history of food, this book shows how individuals constructed modern identities through foodways, how central Europe fits into worldwide food histories, and synthesizes the scholarship on *Bürgertumsforschung* into global histories of middle-classness.¹³¹ Food is power, and tracing food's movements and transformations through time unearths wide-scale power allocations and distributions while acknowledging individual levels of action. After many calls to move "the pendulum forward" and to explore central Europe transnationally with an eye to climatic changes and modernization, this study of central European food modernity and middle-class identity aims to provide fresh footing for discussions in our own changing global era.

Notes

1. Feuerbach, "Das Geheimnis des Opfers," 5.
2. Brillat-Savarin, *Physiologie des Geschmacks*, xv.
3. Bryson and Murray, *Climates of Hunger*, 75–76.
4. Burgdorf, *Ein Weltbild verliert seine Welt*.
5. Wood, *Tambora*, 36–37.
6. Ibid., 39; Stommel, *Volcano Weather*.
7. Bass, "Hungerkrisen," 153; Wood, *Tambora*, 222–24.
8. Bass, "Hungerkrisen," 163; Bass, "The Crisis in Prussia," 208.
9. Kocka, "Problems of Working-Class Formation," 292 and 296.
10. Belgum, *Popularizing the Nation*, 5; Retallack, *Germany's Second Reich*, 11.
11. Berman, *All That Is Solid*.
12. Goethe, *Die Leiden des Jungen Werther*, 23; Heine, *Aus den Memoiren*; Heine, *Der Salon*; Heine, *Ideen*; Heine, *Sämmtliche Werke*.
13. Four-hundred cookbooks were published in the German states between 1800 and 1828 (14.3 per year); a further 935 books were added to this list between 1828 and 1887 (on average, 15.8 per year). Hauer, "Rumohr," 67, 60.
14. Feuerbach "Das Geheimnis des Opfers," 5.
15. Brillat-Savarin, *Physiologie du goût*, viii; Brillat-Savarin, *Physiologie des Geschmacks*, xv.
16. Rottenhöfer, *Neue vollständige theoretisch-praktische Anweisung*, 2nd edn, 8.
17. Cosmopolitanism refers to the original Greek meaning of the word for cities and city inhabitants. Gelbin and Gilman, "Introduction," in *Cosmopolitanism and the Jews*, ed. Gelbin and Gilman, 9; Miller and Ury, "Cosmopolitanism: The End of Jewishness," in Miller and Ury, eds, *Cosmopolitanism*. Miller and Ury provide an excellent overview of the history of the term, from Fichte and Kant to Arendt and Derrida through Marx and Engels. For an overview of the evolution of cosmopolitanism between 1750 and the nineteenth century, see Fillafer and Osterhammel, "Cosmopolitanism and the German Enlightenment," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History*, 120–38.
18. Kreklau, "When 'Germany' Became the New 'France'?" 46.
19. Corinna Treitel, "Nutritional Modernity: The German Case," *Osiris* 35 (1 August 2020): 183–203.

20. Households are permeable productive spaces. On the household as a workplace in agrarian society, see Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 39–73; Frevert, *Women in German History*, 22–30. I avoid the terms “domestic sphere” and “private sphere.” On the development of the idea of “privacy” and private spaces, see Duby, *A History of Private Life*; and Pardailhé-Galabrun, *The Birth of Intimacy*. On breaking down the public/private dichotomy in examining women’s lives, see Craig, Beachy, and Owens, “Introduction.” On the context of the political/economic dimension of family unions, see Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 260–65; Fuchs and Thompson, *Women in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, 3. For an excellent survey, see Gray, *Productive Men, Reproductive Women*, 215, 277, 291.
21. Albala, “The Historical Models,” 24–26.
22. Shaffer, *Pepper*, 1.
23. Turner, *Spice*, 3.
24. Shaffer, *Pepper*, 4.
25. Montanari, “Production, Structures and Food Systems.”
26. Camporesi, *Bread of Dreams*; Montanari and Brombert, *Medieval Tastes*; Bynum, “Fast, Feast, and Flesh”; Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast*.
27. Schivelbusch, *Tastes of Paradise*, 4; Shaffer, *Pepper*, 22, 27; Montanari, “Production, Structures and Food Systems.”
28. Jurafsky, *The Language of Food*, 134.
29. Shaffer, *Pepper*, 21, 30.
30. Ibid., 26.
31. Turner, *Spice*, 3.
32. Schivelbusch, *Tastes of Paradise*, 11; Freedman, *Out of the East*, 23.
33. Downie, *A Taste of Paris*, 77.
34. Standage, *An Edible History of Humanity*, x. On cooking and the use of fire as a definition of humanness, see Wrangham, *Catching Fire*.
35. Earle, “If You Eat Their Food.”
36. Igou, “Dangerous Appetites.”
37. Dawdy, “A Wild Taste.”
38. Tompkins, *Racial Indigestion*.
39. Ellis, *The Coffee House*, 25, 106.
40. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power*.
41. Teuteberg and Flandrin, “Transformation of the European Diet,” 447.
42. Trubek, *Haute Cuisine*, 7; liaisons were “a type of thickening designed to give body to sauces; typically eggs and cream or animal blood,” 137; and for a register in culinary vocabulary, see 136–37.
43. Ibid., 7.
44. Spary, *Eating the Enlightenment*.
45. Trubek, *Haute Cuisine*, 7.
46. Montanari and Brombert, *Medieval Tastes*, 15.
47. Spang, *The Invention of the Restaurant*, xiii–xiv; Peterson, *Acquired Taste*; Trubek, *Haute Cuisine*; Parkhurst Ferguson, *Accounting for Taste*; Kelly, *Cooking for Kings*.
48. Lair, “The Ceremony of Dining,” 156; Sitwell, *A History of Food*.
49. Lair, “The Ceremony of Dining,” 156.
50. Neirinck and Poulain, *Histoire de la cuisine*, 70. Also Lair, “The Ceremony of Dining,” 156.
51. Hauer, “Rumohr,” 65, 66.
52. Kreklau, “When ‘Germany’ Became the New ‘France.’” In his monograph (first edition 1967), Wiegelmann erroneously conceptualized French culinary influence as an exceptional phenomenon in central European cuisine. Wiegelmann, *Alltags- und Festspeisen*, 218–23.
53. Laudan, *Cuisine and Empire*.

54. Carney, *Black Rice*.

55. Mennell, *All Manners of Food*.

56. This builds upon copious work on South Asia, Latin America, the US South and Atlantic, in which scholars have demonstrated the causal impact of subaltern food workers on wide-scale culinary shifts. Some key works along these lines include Carney, *Black Rice*; Carney and Rosomoff, *In the Shadow of Slavery*; Edelson, “Beyond Black Rice”; Dawdy, “A Wild Taste.” Similar works include Albala, *Three World Cuisines*.

57. Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans*.

58. Roberts, *Salted and Cured*, 27.

59. Ibid., 29.

60. Ibid., 32.

61. Ibid., 95.

62. Ibid., 33.

63. Fernández-Armesto, *Near a Thousand Tables*; Laudan, *Cuisine and Empire*, 248–50, 308, 311; Standage, *An Edible History of Humanity*; Mennell, *All Manners of Food*. In addition, see the anthologies Flandrin, Montanari, and Sonnenfeld, *Food: A Culinary History*; Erdkamp et al., *A Cultural History of Food*; De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*.

64. Many thanks to Alice Weinreb for drawing my attention to this early on.

65. Books written by Teuteberg and Wiegelmann together: *Der Wandel der Nahrungsgewohnheiten; Unsere Tägliche Kost*; and *Nahrungsgewohnheiten*. Books written by Teuteberg alone: *Die Revolution am Esstisch*; *Durchbruch zum modernen Massenkonsum*; and *Die Rolle des Fleischextrakts*.

66. This monograph corrects three main errors in their conclusions. First, Teuteberg proposed that middle-class cuisine set the food trends for wider society, but it was the courts that took on this role. Second, Wiegelmann proposed that middle-class cuisine was simple around 1800 and had grown more complex by 1900; the opposite is the case because food modernization led to agricultural monoculturalism. Third, Wiegelmann argued that spice did not play a significant role in central European cuisine (in contrast to Slavic cuisines), yet spices were crucial for survival and persisted in usage beyond mid-century. Teuteberg, “Stadien der Ernährungsgeschichte,” 309; Teuteberg and Wiegelmann, *Der Wandel*, 296, 298; Teuteberg and Wiegelmann, *Nahrungsgewohnheiten*; and Wiegelmann, “Regionale Unterschiede.”

67. See the survey work by Heinzelmann, which covers the period 1800–1860 only briefly. Heinzelmann, *Beyond Bratwurst*.

68. Hierholzer, *Nahrung nach Norm*; Lesniczak, *Alte Landschaftsküchen*.

69. Hauer, “Rumohr.”

70. Thoms, “Krankenhauskost”; Thoms, “Industrial Canteens”; Teuteberg, *Die Revolution am Esstisch*; Treitel, “Food Science/Food Politics”; further, Treitel, *Eating Nature*; Thoms, “The Technopolitics of Food.” See also contributions in Neswald, Smith, and Thoms, eds, *Setting Nutritional Standards*.

71. Treitel, “Nutritional Modernity”; and Treitel, “Triumph of the Till.” See also Treitel, “How Vegetarians, Naturopaths, Scientists, and Physicians Unmade the Protein Standard in Modern Germany.”

72. On the empire, see Teuteberg, “Wie ernährten sich Arbeiter?”; and Teuteberg, “The Rising Popularity of Dining Out.”

73. Marchand, *Porcelain*, 4.

74. Henry, *A History of Cookbooks*; Pennell and DiMeo, *Reading and Writing Recipe Books*.

75. The idea of liberalism defining the middle class and its actions characterizes Langewiesche’s analyses. See Langewiesche, “Liberalism”; Mommsen, “Der deutsche Liberalismus”; and Mommsen, *Bürgerliche Kultur*. Mommsen’s approach analyzes history and social grouping through high culture in ways that fuse generationally specific attitudes and experiences with

social class, leading to an interpretation of class conflict, where others might see generational conflict, paired with a definition of culture that makes it specific to elites to justify his analysis. While Mommsen cites Jakob Burckhardt (*Bürgerliche Kultur*, p. 11) as his starting point for defining culture as the “sum of all mental developments, which occur spontaneously and do not claim universality or normativity” and engages with Benedict Anderson to define the nation as an “imagined community” (*Bürgerliche Kultur*, p. 59); in practice, his analysis covers museum art and its connections to propaganda in ways that exclude women and understudy “culture” when it leaves the museum. On liberalism as proxy, see Eley, “Liberalism, Europe,” 296. On women’s experiences around 1800, see Trepp, *Sanfte Männlichkeit*; Hull, *Sexuality, State*.

76. Kocka, “The European Pattern,” 4 and 33; Sperber, “*Bürger, Bürgertum, Bürgerlichkeit, Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*.”

77. Sperber, “*Bürger, Bürgertum*,” 274, 276, 283; Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 18. See also Lepsius, “Zur Soziologie”; and Lepsius, “Das Bildungsbürgertum als ständische Vergesellschaftung,” 9–18. Cited in Sperber, “*Bürger, Bürgertum*,” 275; further Jarausch, “The German Professions,” 17–18. On women’s ambiguous place in the literature on the middle class, see Koselleck and Schreiner, “Einleitung.”

78. Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich*.

79. Clark and Kaiser, *Culture Wars*; Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*; Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*.

80. Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism*; Blackbourn, *Marpingen*; Gross, *The War against Catholicism*; Domeier, *Der Eulenburg Skandal*, 215; Fout, “Sexual Politics in Wilhelmine Germany,” 421; Krekau, “Neither Gendered nor a Room.”

81. This was established in the following works: Calhoun, *Roots of Radicalism*; Gould, *Insurgent Identities*; Finn, *After Chartist*; Haggard, *Persistence of Victorian Liberalism*.

82. Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities of German History*. A pioneering survey work in comparing the middle classes worldwide is Motadel, Dejung, and Osterhammel, *The Global Bourgeoisie*.

83. The scholarship is vast and has moved through familiar historiographic stages since the 1960s, including neo-Marxian, cultural, and post-structural stages, to name a few, to now propose that middle-classness encompassed the globe in studies of resource allocation through ties forged by exploration and empire. This is illustrated in Edward P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*; Jerrold Seigel, *Modernity and Bourgeois Life*: 25; Motadel, Dejung, and Osterhammel, eds., *The Global Bourgeoisie*.

84. Lett, *In Pursuit of Status*; Jones, *Children as Treasures*.

85. On food as a “language,” “code of communication,” and on “the grammar of food,” see Montanari, *Food Is Culture*, viii–ix, 133, and 99–103, respectively. Albala, *Food in Early Modern Europe*; Albala, “The Historical Models.” On difference, see Derrida, *Of Grammatology*. Derrida’s idea can be applied to exploring the socially prescribed meaning of items of material culture.

86. Habits and practices likely still provide the best indicators of class identity within the current scholarship. Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, xi; Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 165–66.

87. Sperber, *Property and Civil Society*; Sabean, *Property, Production*.

88. Beachy, *The Soul of Commerce*.

89. Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature*. In addition, see Koselleck, “Einleitung,” 11–46, esp. 13–15, cited in Sperber, “*Bürger, Bürgertum*.”

90. Kaschuba, “German Bürgerlichkeit”; Kaschuba, *Lebenswelt und Kultur*; Breckman, “Disciplining Consumption.”

91. On subalternity, see Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”

92. Reinhart Koselleck and Lothar Gall are right to highlight the heterogeneity of the German language’s vocabulary denoting the middle class—a veritable host of terms—*Bürger*,

Bürgertum, Bürgerstand, Bürgerschaft (Koselleck's term), *Bürgerlich(keit), Mittlere Stände, gebildete Stände, Bildungsbürgertum, Mittlere/Mittel Classe/Klasse*, to name a few major examples. Gall, "Bürgertum und Bürgerliche Gesellschaft," 5–6. Koselleck's proposed term of "*Bürgerschaft*" to encompass this variety of terms has partly inspired this book to acknowledge the long-term roots of middle-class formation from the early modern period through to the present. However, Koselleck used the "*Begriff*" that is, the etymological existence of various terms semiotically and semantically approximate to middle-classness, as a proxy to determine middle-class social existence and impact; Koselleck and Schreiner, "Einleitung." While this method produces a coherent, somewhat historicist analysis, it presses the point of class mobilization and its capacity to act as an agent ("*Handlungseinheit*," Koselleck and Schreiner, "Einleitung," 14) to the point of teleological determinism. My cultural and social analytic method more accurately approximates inclusion within the middle class. My manner of positively ascribing the term middle-class to all those who gained social recognition powerfully encompasses the fluidity of this social grouping, avoids over-reliance on German linguistic singularities, and sidesteps the logical fallacy that linguistic terms and social realities map neatly onto one another. Further, my approach does not presuppose ideological unity or unity of action, though it acknowledges the value of Koselleck's proposed term "*Bürgerschaft*" as a more time-independent analytic grouping that allows for longer chronologies of exploration. (Koselleck and Schreiner, "Einleitung," 11–14). On the terminological shift from "*Stand*" to "*Klasse*," see Gall, "Bürgertum und Bürgerliche Gesellschaft," 79–81. See also Gall, *Bürgertum in Deutschland*.

93. This approach differs from Kaschuba's cultural habitus approach to *Bürgertum*, which renders *Bürgerlichkeit* a "symbolic practice." Kaschuba, "German Bürgerlichkeit," 393, 396–97. This view suffers, in my view, from a remnant assumption that sociology (the study of modern, Western societies) differs or must differ significantly from anthropology (the study of non-Western, "premodern" groups); the anthropologically informed approach adopted here subsumes a variety of phenomena (political, economic, social, and scientific) under a cultural heading in ways that differ significantly from Kaschuba's. Kaschuba's observation that the nineteenth century represents a "key transitional phase" (*Übergangszeit*) in German history, however, is undeniably accurate. Kaschuba, *Lebenswelt und Kultur*, 5.
94. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, 761.
95. Kaplan, *The Making of the Jewish Middle Class*; Lässig, *Jüdische Wege ins Bürgertum*.
96. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category"; Jackson, *Becoming Human*.
97. Habermas, *Structural Transformation*, 57–66, 27–44, 43, 236.
98. This may not be true when economic ease provides a template for political persecution; findings here apply to systems not paired to authoritarian regimes claiming to operate under the banner of socialism.
99. Colonial and postimperial contexts see the development of class disparities alongside resistance to or collaboration with empire; neocolonialism may influence attitudes toward industrial working conditions, perceptions of social changes, and the moral codes of conformity, Westernization, and potential democratization implicit within or apparently following on from them. Pernau, *Ashraf into Middle Classes*; Parker, "Asymmetric Globality." The term "middle class" can serve as code for social acceptance. Moskowitz, "Aren't We All?"; Bledstein and Johnston, *Middling Sorts*. By contrast, in leftist authoritarian contexts middle-classness functions as a category of persecution: Fitzpatrick, "Ascribing Class"; Cliver, *Red Silk*; Smith, "The Missing or Forgotten."
100. Cummins, "Where Is the Middle Class?"; Maza, *The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie*; Wahrman, *Imagining the Middle Class*.
101. Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne*.
102. Note such formulations in Moses, "Genocide and Modernity," 181, 184; Levene, *Genocide*, 10; Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 392, 394; Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, 11; Dikötter,

Mao's Great Famine, x; Becker, *Hungry Ghost*, 271–73, also 285, 309–10; Osterhammel, *Colonialism*, 11–12; also Moses, “The Holocaust.” Osterhammel’s and Wolfe’s works both aim for comparative and synthetic approaches to genocide.

103. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*; Sternhell, *Neither Right Nor Left*; Peukert, *The Weimar Republic*; Bauman, *Modernity*; Fritzsche, “Nazi Modern.”

104. Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*.

105. Berman, *All That Is Solid*.

106. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*, xvii.

107. *Ibid.*, xviii.

108. Rider, *Modernity*, 6.

109. Berman, *All That Is Solid*, 10.

110. Löwy and Sayre, *Romanticism*, 18.

111. Le Rider, *Modernity*, 6.

112. Berman, *All That Is Solid*, 6.

113. Le Rider, *Modernity*, 294.

114. Berman, *All That Is Solid*, 5.

115. *Ibid.*, 6.

116. While I credit Peukert and Schorske, I recognize they in turn engaged with scholarship on Fascism, the Holocaust, and the French Revolution by Zygmunt Baumann, Richard L. Rubinstein, and the Frankfurt School, among others, who in turn engaged with Weber, Elias, and early modern political science. This scholarship too reflects modernity’s reflexivity. Bauman, *Modernity*, 9, 12. Also: Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*.

117. I provide a wider chronology and more explicitly global frame for the brilliant insights pioneered by Peukert and since developed in the following: Peukert, *Weimar Republic*, 88; Repp, *Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity*; Jenkins, *Provincial Modernity*; Umbach, *German Cities*, 5; Beachy, *Gay Berlin*.

118. Initiated by Schorske, various scholars examining central Europe have developed his line of thinking. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*; Kern, *Culture of Time and Space*; Dijkstra, *Idols of Perversity*; Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*; Rider, *Modernity*.

119. I am certainly not the first to execute this. See, e.g., Johnston, *Networks of Modernity*.

120. “Essen und Trinken,” *Fränkischer Kurier* (Nürnberg, 18 October 1877), 44.

121. Helstosky, *Routledge History of Food*, xii.

122. Friedrich Schiller did this, for example. Harloe, *Winckelmann*; Crane, *Collecting*; Outram, *The Enlightenment*; Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment*; Premo, *The Enlightenment on Trial*.

123. Jacob, *Scientific Revolution*; Jacob, *The First Knowledge Economy*; Tresch, *Romantic Machine*; Brose, *Politics of Technological Change*; Johnston, *Networks of Modernity*; Brophy, *Capitalism, Politics*; Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*; Kern, *Culture of Time and Space*.

124. Löwy and Sayre, *Romanticism*.

125. Veit, *Modern Food, Moral Food*.

126. “Food modernism” refers to artistic styles in cuisine and poetry. Gladwin, *Gastro-Modernism*, 192.

127. Older “food modernization” discourses problematized the alleged stagnation of production due to low levels of technologization as relying on metanarratives of progress, while “food modernization” in contemporary scholarly studies acknowledges aims and pitfalls of change, including environmental degradation, health risks, and human exploitation. For a deeply methodologically flawed and outdated structural analysis of food modernization, see McInntosh, *Sociologies of Food*, Chapter 3. For a more novel approach, see Charlebois, *Food Safety*.

128. Cohen, Kideckel, and Zeide, *Acquired Tastes*, 10.

129. E.g., Oxfeld, *Bitter and Sweet*; Sebastia, *Eating Traditional Food*.
130. Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*. For an account of the invention of a traditional cuisine, see Lesnyczak, *Alte Landschaftsküchen*.
131. Peterson, *Acquired Taste*. On modern identity regimes, see Wahrman, *Making of the Modern Self*.