

Introduction

The Naming and Origins of the Yugoslav Idea



If we wish to understand the concept of a nation and its great power, both creative and destructive, we must examine its history. And what do we find there? First of all, we find that the concept of *národnost* (nationality) is a “fruit of modern times,”¹ and that the idea of the nation was a novelty in the nineteenth century, without a historical precedent.² Previously, all that counted was belonging to a town, a village, a state, or a religion—not belonging to a nation. Political group consciousness only emerged with the notion of a sovereign political community, *communitas regni*. Almost simultaneously, we encounter the political concept of *patria* (*otadžbina* in Serbian, *Vaterland* in German), which was primarily an expression of a class-based “state patriotism” closely linked to the concept of *fidelitas* (political loyalty). Thus, although people were aware, to some extent, that they belonged to a particular nationality as early as the Middle Ages and early modernity, this nationality did not signify a political community for them, nor was it central to their political loyalty.³

In the nineteenth century, the idea of the nation was still unknown and unimaginable to most Central Europeans. Thus, in the period between 1844 and 1851, the editors of *Kmetijske in rokodelske novice* (Agriculture and Handicraft News) felt compelled to explain to their readers the difference between the words *narodno* (vernacular) and *nerodno* (awkward).⁴ People in other Central European countries had similar difficulties in understanding the concept of the nation.⁵ As things began to change across the continent and all of Europe was being reshaped and influenced by the

concept of nationhood, the Yugoslavs did not want to be left behind; they too wanted to develop and prosper.⁶

The nation is an idea that was conceived by a few national awakeners—that is, poets, philosophers, historians, and philologists—who constructed the collective spirit of their nation by employing emotionally charged language, evocative symbols, and powerful rituals to inspire the people and “to nationalize their non-national community.”⁷ As used to be said, a nation does not fully awaken from its long slumber until it can freely develop all of its potential and participate in the general competition for social progress. In a relatively short time, the idea of the nation proved to be a powerful galvanizing force that was historically unprecedented and stronger than dynastic loyalty or religious affiliation.

In the mid-nineteenth century, as the idea of the nation became increasingly dominant, there was a geopolitical reshaping of the European continent according to the new principles of nationality. Thus, the Count of Cavour argued that Italy was not just a geographical designation, as Prince Metternich used to say, but also a political fact. Austrian chancellor Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, on the other hand, resentfully said that he no longer saw Europe (“Ich sehe kein Europa mehr”).⁸

In order for the imagined kingdom of South Slavs to come into being, it first needed a name. Today, there are three theories about the origins of its name. Some believe that the name was coined in Croatia by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who was “the uncrowned king of Yugoslav intellectuals for more than half a century.”⁹ Some think it was conceived in Belgrade.¹⁰ Still others claim that “Yugoslavia” was invented by Petar II Petrović Njegoš, Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, whose epic poem *Lažni car Šćepan Mali* (The False Tsar Stephen the Little) was published in Zagreb in 1851, with an inscription on the title page that read, “in Yugoslavia.”¹¹ None of these theories, however, is correct. The name *Jugoslavija* (Yugoslavia) first appeared in an article in the newspaper *Slovenija* in Ljubljana on Friday, October 19, 1849.¹²

The author of the article declared that he was interested not in politics, but only in the literary unification of Yugoslavs within the Austro-Hungary Empire. For this reason, he referred to the language they spoke as the common Yugoslav language and said that he was not calling for arms, “but only for spiritual, literary union,” and argued for the assertion of the “one and only Yugoslav literary language.”¹³ In his opinion, the Yugoslav language and the attachment to the Yugoslav “national tree” should also be accepted by the Slovenes, who were “a small nation with many enemies” and therefore needed a strong ally, which—according to Bukovšek—they already had because they were “a branch on the great, strong Yugoslav tree”:

Our task is only to take care that this branch does not break off, lest it should dry up naturally, which would damage the whole tree. If a limb is cut off, the flesh will soon rot and decay, and the rest of the body will lose strength and hardly be able to perform its functions. If the Slovenes were to separate themselves from the rest of *Jugoslavija*, they would lose strength and in time perish, as unfortunately happened to so many neighboring peoples in Carinthia and Styria who were Germanized, and the rest of *Jugoslavija* would become weaker.¹⁴

In the mid-nineteenth century, many Slavs, hoping for Yugoslav unity, also looked to the Habsburg Empire in hopes of Yugoslav unity—first in culture, then in politics. Among the Slovenes, the most active organization in this regard was the Slovenija Society from Graz. In 1848, Matija Majar, a member of this society, wrote a paper in which he explained the necessity of unification with Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia. A good example of cooperation between the highest representatives of the Yugoslav peoples was the proclamation of Count Josip Jelačić as Ban of Croatia. He was enthroned by Patriarch Josif Rajačić and warmly congratulated by Vladika Petar II Petrović Njegoš: “Here everyone, young and old, prays to God for your health and well-being.” In his speech, Ban Jelačić told those present, “We are all one people; we have left behind both Serbs and Croats.”¹⁵ In 1849, Bishop Strossmayer wrote that the most important “task that lies before the Yugoslavs is to come together, to unite, and to unify.” In 1850, at the invitation of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Slovene, Croatian, and Serbian scholars and writers met in Vienna, where they agreed on a common literary language. Similar meetings took place in Zagreb and Ljubljana, where, in addition to literary topics, “unity to the end” was discussed.¹⁶

Celebrating a Glorious Past

The new idea of a single, permanent, and indivisible nation required the firm foundation of a homogeneous, coherent historical perspective, free from doubt and uncertainty, which signified a predestined continuity that justified and vindicated the nation for all time.¹⁷ A common name and language were a *sine qua non* in the process of nation-building, but knowledge of the glorious national past was also necessary in the creation of a common path that would lead to a bright future through modernization and progress. If a nation does not know where it has come from, it will never know where it is going. Remembering the glorious past was a way of encouraging the members of the nation to overcome the trials and tribulations in the present by looking toward a better future. This was probably




Figure 0.1. Ethnographic Map of the Yugoslavs (1918). “Serbs, Croats, Slovenes—Yugoslavs—are one people. For this reason, they seek the unification of all their lands into one free nation-state.” Unknown author and publisher. Source: private collection of the author.

what the Slovene politician Lovro Toman meant when he said: “The future is the offspring of the present and the past.”¹⁸

Through legends about famous historical events and figures from their past, members of the nation constructed a sense of self-worth in relation to members of other nations, learned to stand in solidarity with one another, and thus contributed to cultural homogenization within their nation and drew a line of demarcation between Us and Them. These legends were carefully selected for the writing of history. The awakeners of the nation created a fabulous national past by emphasizing the great, the noble, and the admirable, and leaving out all that was inglorious and shameful. The selection of historical events and personalities to be remembered by society had far-reaching significance. Although it was not made explicit, this selection showed that national leaders propagated certain political and ideological beliefs and social, political, and cultural values. They used the past as a kind of storehouse from which they selectively chose events and personalities they wanted members of their nation to either remember or forget. “Memory,” James Young wrote, “is never shaped in a vacuum; the motives of memory are never pure.”¹⁹ In 1882, the French philosopher and linguist Ernest Renan said in his much-cited lecture at Paris Sorbonne that forgetting is an important aspect of the process of nation-building. Every nation must have its history, its collective memory. However, the preference for certain historical figures and past events that members of a particular nation must know necessarily means that there are others that have been selectively consigned to collective oblivion.²⁰ “Where the service of the past has been urgently needed, truth has ever been at a discount.”²¹ In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were many enthusiasts eager to discover new information about their historical ancestors; all nations wanted to reconstruct their history and assumed that they had a glorious past. This spurred many researchers to eagerly search for forgotten information about literature, art, music, and folklore.²²

Knowledge of a nation’s history and traditions helped its members better understand themselves and their nation’s status in the international community. In this way, an active and living connection was established between the present and the past; doubts and ambiguities were effectively abandoned and hope was aroused among the nation’s members. Indeed, everything was done with the aim of making one’s nation, its culture, and its past admirable, worthy of all the hard work and care of the nation’s members, and even worthy of fighting for.²³ The nationalists constructed the national past according to their ideas and beliefs, thus determining the path of the nation’s future progress and development.²⁴ Given that the Slavic lands in the nineteenth century were “backward,” “underdevel-

oped,” and “inactive,” and that their societies were still in their “infancy” and lacked modern institutions, such as industry, railways, and educational systems, the nation’s emancipators, impressed by the zeitgeist of the “century of miracles,”²⁵ saw history as a ladder on which one moved from lower to higher stages of development.²⁶ “The Germans,” the Bohemian poet sings, “have reached their day, the English their midday, the French their afternoon, the Italians their evening, the Spaniards their night, but the Slavs stand on the threshold of the morning.”²⁷

The patriots who worked diligently and selflessly for the spiritual and physical well-being of the nation were aware of the importance of history to national identity, for it was historical consciousness, in their view, that gave legitimacy to the new political communities (nations). In their efforts, they also received ample support from academia,²⁸ which described new political groups (nations) as entities that had always existed as such. The romantic historicism that patriots resorted to in the study of their nations’ pasts provided evidence for their view that national feeling and identification existed continuously. Thus, the idealists and dreamers tended to attach great importance to the evidence they found without being critical of their sources, leading one Hungarian scholar, for example, to claim that he had “proved” that Adam was Hungarian.²⁹ Historians made it their business to interpret what was authentic folk history; ethnographers, in particular, strove to discover authentic—that is, characteristic—elements of material folk culture, ethnic traditions and customs, folk songs, and art. Thanks to the press, the facts discovered by scholars were made accessible to a wide audience, while exhibitions in galleries and museums presented these as self-evident and permanent.

Since the present did not support the glory of the newly awakened idea of Slavic nationality, the (South) Slavs established themselves historically through a “utopian projection.”³⁰ According to this conception, the Slavs were the most glorious of all peoples in the world; this was confirmed by the most popular interpretation of the etymological origin of their name, derived from the word *slava* (glory).³¹ However, *slava* implied that the ancient Slavs were warlike and some found it unacceptable that as peace-loving a people as the Slavs would choose such a name for themselves, so another interpretation of their name was proposed, according to which the original word contained the vowel “o” (*slovo*) instead of the vowel “a” (*slava*). Slovene Catholic priest Franc Serafin Metelko held, for instance, that the ancient Slavs called their Latin neighbors Vlachs, a name denoting those who chatter or babble, derived from the verb *vlachovati*, meaning to babble, while they called their Germanic neighbors *Nemci*, viz., those who are mute or dumb, as opposed to a person who spoke the language of

the Slavs, who would have been called a *Sloven* or *Slovan* (Slav), that is, a speaking person.³²

As sources of national pride were not easily found either in the present or in the known past, the most ardent enthusiasts endeavored to find them in unknown past ages. In their emancipatory zeal, they followed in the footsteps of nationalists throughout Europe, claiming that their language was the oldest language in the world and had once been spoken by Adam and Eve. The veracity of this claim was bolstered by the “fact” that Adam, the first man, supposedly received his name when God called out, *Od-amo!* (Come here!), and when asked where his wife was, Adam replied, *Evo je!* (Here she is!).³³ After the first man and woman, there were many other famous “Slavs.” Among the most glorious were Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babylon, whose Slavic ethnicity was “confirmed” by his name, supposedly spelled *Ne bubod no tsar* (Not God, but King),³⁴ and Napoleon, the conqueror of Europe, who supposedly received his name in a manner similar to how the first woman received hers: *Na pole on* (He is in the field).³⁵ The glory that the Slavic peoples enjoyed in those ancient times, and the national pride that they felt, are illustrated by the “fact” that the city of Vienna was called Viden, according to such interpretations, because the city was then a “Vendo-Serbian village.” In those ancient times, the city of Berlin was their *brlog* (den), where they kept and fed their cattle, and what is now Leipzig was Lipiska, their altar, where they prayed and worshipped under the branching linden trees to Perun, their supreme god who rules the heavens and the thunder, “while the Germans worshipped the frog as their Mother Hulda.”³⁶

These illustrious names and the glorious past of the Slavic people made a great impression not only on the Slavs themselves, but also on many foreigners, causing the Slavs to forget that historically they were still in their “early youth,” and lulling them into dreams of instant modernization and progress. The eyes of the national emancipators were fixed on the West, which they all admired; at the same time, they were aware that their traditional society was backward and underdeveloped. Modernization was a very popular, albeit noble and difficult, goal that could not be achieved by clinging to the old traditions. By definition, it is a form of development in which traditional social norms and values are abandoned in order to achieve progress that runs counter to tradition and traditionalism.³⁷ The national emancipators were aware of the difficult task ahead of them and realized that the goal of modernization could only be achieved with the help of heroes with superhuman powers, and folklore was teeming with such figures. If Marko Kraljević had not been late for the Battle of Kosovo on that fateful day of Vidovdan, history would have taken a very different

course! If Kralj Matjaž³⁸ wakes up, woe betide anyone who does evil to the Slovenes!

The Emancipatory Power of Yugoslav Nationalism

Despite defeats at the Battle of Solferino in 1859 and the Battle of Hradec Králové (Königgrätz) in 1866, which led to the creation of the new nation-states of Italy and Germany, the Habsburg Monarchy made great efforts to turn the tide. As a result of these battles, the Habsburg Empire lost its territories on the western and northern borders, paving the way for widespread nationalist ideology in the multi-ethnic monarchy. Chancellor Count von Beust persuaded Emperor Franz Joseph to accept the Compromise that led to the creation of the Dual Monarchy. By the end of 1867, dualism was officially accepted, despite strong Slavic opposition; Slovene politicians Luka Svetec and Lovro Toman commented that dualism meant “the grave of our [national] life.”³⁹ The newly established Empire and Kingdom of the Double-Headed Black Eagle had a common ruler, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, who had power over the army, navy, foreign affairs, etc., but the Austrian government in Vienna and the Hungarian government in Budapest enjoyed roughly equal status in their respective parts of the monarchy. By drawing the border between the German and Hungarian parts of the monarchy, the Compromise divided the Slavs, separated the Czechs from the Slovaks, and left the Slovenes and Dalmatians on one side of the border and the Croats on the other. In an editorial published on October 15, 1870, Josip Jurčič, the editor of the first Slovene daily newspaper *Slovenski Narod*, explained the impact that the state structure based on dualism had on the national cohesion of the Yugoslav people in the following words:

They invented this dualism, and since then it is as if a rock had been put between us and our southern brothers; we are “cis-,” they are “trans-,” but we are both *ausland* to each other, and when we get newspapers from Croatia we have to pay a kruzher as compensation for their having come over this rock. We have become much more estranged from each other than is good for our future.⁴⁰

The statement attributed to Count von Beust, “One must press the Slavs against the wall!” (“Man muss die Slawen an die Mauer drücken!”), speaks volumes about the situation for the majority of the Slav population after the Compromise.⁴¹ Thus pressed against the wall, many Slovenes looked to the future with great pessimism. According to the weekly *Slovenski Gospodar*, most Slovene patriots closed their eyes in anticipation of this final

blow to their nationhood, and the general mood among Slovenes was best summed up by France Prešeren: “The old pillars of Slovenia lie on the ground.”⁴² Frozen to the core by the cold, iron hand of Germanization, they saw their salvation in dependence on other Slavic peoples. In such an atmosphere, Fran Levce wrote to Janko Kersnik on December 29, 1869, that the Slovenes did not need scientific literature, but only fiction and schoolbooks. “What is scientific literature good for? We have no future anyway! We will either be Prussians or Russians!”⁴³

The German-Hungarian Compromise inevitably provoked a reaction. The division of the state caused great concern among the Slavic citizens of the empire and kingdom, who formed the majority of the population. Czech historian and politician František Palacký noted that the day when dualism was proclaimed also marked the birth of Pan-Slavism, albeit in a not-so-friendly form.⁴⁴ Consequently, the increased pressure on the Slavs increased their resistance.⁴⁵ The wisdom of the proverb “What is pressed harder jumps higher” was not heeded by Chancellor von Beust and his government, who thought themselves strong enough to stop the clocks—a mistake that had long-term consequences. The conservative, Catholic newspaper *Slovenski Gospodar*, which first appeared in Maribor in 1867, assured its readers in an article entitled “Is There Still Hope?” that the titanic Slav, who was imagined to be similar to Kralj Matjaž, will make the “old Europe” tremble.

After the Compromise, Slovene deputies and members of the intelligentsia focused on their political activities and tried to find solutions to certain problems that people faced. However, they were numerically weak in the Viennese Parliament, so they looked for allies. They found natural allies in other Slavic deputies, an alliance that furthered their common aspirations for the unification of Slavic peoples and strengthened their resistance to pressure from the Germans and Hungarians.⁴⁶ However, although they considered all Yugoslavs to be their brothers, in reality the Slovenes knew very little about these brothers of theirs. How little they actually knew is best illustrated by the recollection of an Austrian officer who was a native Slovene. In 1866, while sailing on the Sava River from Zemun to Belgrade, he saw a ship with a tricolor flag but did not know whether it was a Serbian or Turkish flag. When he learned that it was a Serbian ship, his heart leapt with joy and he was happy that, for the first time in his life, he had seen a ship with a Slavic flag.⁴⁷

With the democratization of social life, the idea of the nation began to take hold among the masses and eventually mobilized the broadest strata of the population; it became a material force to which, above all, the blood spilled on the battlefields contributed. It was as if only human blood could sufficiently stimulate people’s imaginations and breathe life into the idea

of the nation. To this end, every war was desirable and useful, not only wars involving the Slavs, because the most important thing was that the people could associate the realization of their dreams with the victory of one or other of the war parties. Thus, even the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 aroused pro-Yugoslav sympathies among the South Slavs of the Dual Monarchy. When weighing up which side to support under these circumstances, the prevailing opinion among the Slovenes was that allying themselves with other Yugoslavs from the Dual Monarchy represented their only chance of securing their existence and leading a decent life in the future.

According to the historian Vasilij Melik, Slovene intellectuals in the 1870s and 1880s interpreted political events in the light of conflicts and competition between three major groups of people: Latins, Germanic peoples, and Slavs.⁴⁸ This notion was behind the newspaper *Slovenski Narod*'s interpretation of the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War as a victory of the Germans over the Latins; it also predicted a future conflict between the Germans and the Slavs, in which the Slavs would have to fight "not for domination, but for their freedom, in order to save themselves from these 'civilized' people."⁴⁹ The Prussian victory in this war came like a bolt from the blue for the vast majority of people and had unforeseen consequences for the political fabric of Europe. The defeat suffered by the French reverberated across the continent. In Austria, Pan-Germanic attitudes and the German influence were strong. There were frequent German nationalist manifestations celebrating Prussian victories, which frightened the Austrian Slavs, who feared that awakened Prussianism meant "national death" for them.⁵⁰ The idea of a common Yugoslav future as a bulwark against Prussianism seized the masses and became an active force. The Yugoslavs living within the borders of the Dual Monarchy felt the need to "stretch out their hands to one another as true brothers and *viribus unitis* strive to achieve legally what no tribe alone could even hope to accomplish."⁵¹

At the beginning of Franco-Prussian War, the conservative newspaper *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne* sided with the Germans. The day after the war began, this newspaper blamed the outbreak of the war on the "arrogant" Emperor Napoleon III, who allegedly wanted to wage war because he wanted to dominate all of Europe and who should therefore be taught a stern lesson.⁵² On the other hand, even in the first months of the war, *Slovenski Narod* took the position that a Prussian victory would also mean a victory of Austrian Germanism over Slavdom. Fearing German arrogance, Slovene and Croat politicians converged in their thinking about the political idea of Yugoslavism. At a meeting in Sisak in November 1870, they decided to work together with the aim of gathering the Yugoslavs into a single community that would unite with Hungary

by virtue of Croatian state law and remain within the Habsburg Monarchy.⁵³ However, at the final meeting in Ljubljana on December 1, 1870, the participants did not endorse this plan and, at the request of the Slovenes, refrained from adopting a state-forming resolution. As “honest Austrian citizens,” the participants adopted the resolution known as the Ljubljana Program, proclaiming the “union of the moral and material forces of the South Slavs in the field of literature, economics, and politics.” The South Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy planned to direct their efforts toward supporting their “brothers living across the border, with whom we are one and the same nation.”⁵⁴

The Ljubljana Program, which was the first attempt to realize the Yugoslav dream, was supported by the representatives of all the Slavs of the Dual Monarchy, with the exception of Svetozar Miletić, a member of the Hungarian and Croatian parliaments and the mayor of Novi Sad, who was one of the organizers of the first assembly of the United Serbian Youth and later became president of the Association for Serb Liberation and Unification in Cetinje. Of course, the “millennial dreams” and the Ljubljana Program did not come out of nowhere; they were, rather, a by-product of the political struggles that had taken place in the second half of the nineteenth century. Much more radical in his views than his Slovene and Croatian colleagues, Miletić believed that the Ljubljana Program was an endeavor of Austro-Hungarian Slavic politicians that required of him and his people efforts “to preserve something that has no future.” Indeed, he posed the question of what the Habsburg Monarchy was at that moment. In answer to this question, he declared that “it does not exist today,” that in reality there are only “two states, one of which does not even have its own name,⁵⁵ while the other bears the name of the crown, not of the people; one is in decay, the other in decline.”⁵⁶ The assertions he made, however, did not quite correspond to the real circumstances at the time. As he stated in an article in the newspaper *Zastava* on November 22, 1870, *Trojedinica* (Triple Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia) could not and should not be the “nexus for the crystallization of southern Slavdom, the point of convergence around which people from Old and New Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia gather.”⁵⁷ In other words, for Miletić, who was, “above all,” a Serbian nationalist,⁵⁸ the unity of the Serbs from Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro came first. Therefore, he wrote, in order to achieve this unity, “we have blood, money, zeal, and commitment, but for something else [a union that included Croatian and Slovene lands] we have—nothing.”⁵⁹ Miletić was thus dissatisfied with the Ljubljana Program because he had a different idea of the unity of the South Slavs: while his Croatian and Slovene colleagues, who upheld the principle of legitimacy, looked to the West, Miletić directed his ardent revolutionary gaze to

the south.⁶⁰ As the Slovene press observed, he publicly rejected the Ljubljana Program even before he had become acquainted with its content, because, unlike other Yugoslav-oriented Croatian and Slovene politicians, he was guided by the ideal of the “Greater Serbian Crown.”⁶¹

Mobilization for the Yugoslav Idea

“Wherever I look there is deep peace, the scene of domestic and foreign politics has not been so orderly for a long time as it is now,” wrote Alois von Seiller, the Austro-Hungarian envoy to the Royal Palace in Berlin, on July 10, 1875.⁶² This idealized picture was shattered when the Herzegovinian Uprising broke out on July 9, 1875. Upon first receiving news of the uprising in Herzegovina, neither governments nor public opinion paid much attention to the event, but the Nevesinje Rifle⁶³ echoed loudly, far and wide, over the hills and mountains of Herzegovina, and “struck straight to the heart of Turkish Empire.”⁶⁴ The uprising became not only the topic of the day among the highest state dignitaries, but also the subject of numerous reports by a whole network of consulates on the Balkan Peninsula. As a result of the enormous impact it had both on the Balkan Peninsula and abroad, this peasant uprising eventually became a struggle “for the Honorable Cross and Golden Liberty,” a struggle on life and death.

Three emperors (the Austrian, German, and Russian emperors) made a concerted effort to pacify the uprising, but each of these three powerful rulers viewed the uprising of the Slav peasantry in the northwestern region of the Ottoman Empire differently—namely, in terms of his own interests. Austria-Hungary and Russia, in particular, watched further developments closely and tried to use the opportunity to realize their expansionist ambitions.

Due to the outbreak of insurgencies in Herzegovina and Bosnia, the Dual Monarchy found itself between the Scylla and Charybdis of having (too) many Yugoslavs on its territory and the creation of a large South Slav state on its borders that would emerge after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia and Montenegro.⁶⁵ The dilemma faced by the empire and the kingdom was much discussed in the press, which viewed it more or less through the lens of nationalism; this made the proper solution to the dilemma seem much easier. In the course of these discussions, the German press in Austria-Hungary hardly had a kind word to say when it came to the *ustasi* (insurgents) in Herzegovina. In the opinion of these German publications, the uprising was not a real insurrection, but only an “insurrection,” or, more precisely, a “coup of peasants evading the payment of taxes.”⁶⁶ A few days after the outbreak of the uprising, the pro-

government newspaper *Neue Freie Presse*, in an article dedicated to the Herzegovinian Uprising, spread the rumor that the insurgents had hoisted the Austrian flag. The author of the editorial wrote that he did not believe this and went on to say ironically that he did not want such “compatriots who wear cotton shirts over wool trousers and wipe their noses with their hands.” To make matters worse, the author noted that these people liked to cut off the noses of their enemies.⁶⁷ The newspaper *Laibacher Tagblatt* published an editorial entitled “Zur südslavischen Wechselseitigkeit” (On South Slavic Mutuality), in which it claimed that the uprising in the border provinces in “Turkey” only showed “the ugliest side of human nature”—namely, all the “cruelty and savagery” of the people living there.⁶⁸ In short, the Viennese press portrayed the Orthodox Herzegovinian insurgents as the most evil and primitive people, lacking any cultural sophistication.

The failure of the Ottoman authorities to quickly suppress the uprising horrified the press in Vienna and Budapest. The Herzegovinian “savages” were portrayed in all their glory in the pages of these newspapers, giving readers of the German and Hungarian press a clear picture of the “Pan-Slavistic horror, threatening and bloody-faced, in the south.”⁶⁹ Worse still, should the insurgents be victorious and the Muslim state withdraw from the Balkan Peninsula, an ungoverned territory would be left for Serbia and Montenegro, the two Orthodox principalities, to take possession of under the auspices of Russia. And such domination of the Balkans by the Slavs, argued the author of the editorial published in the *Neue Freie Presse*, would endanger Germanism in Austria. After this portrayal of the uprising, the author of the article asked his readers a rhetorical question: can Austria-Hungary afford to have the Yugoslav Kingdom on its borders?⁷⁰

The March Revolution of 1848 brought democracy to the Austrian Empire, and democracy predictably went hand in hand with nationalism. Thus, the Springtime of Nations came to the lands of the centuries-old empire. Nationalism in Austria thus diverged from the Western model and did not become a cohesive force because each of the many nations pulled in a different direction.⁷¹ The newspaper *Slovenec* illustrated the confusion that reigned in the Dual Monarchy in the mid-nineteenth century in the following words: “The Hungarians are drawn to Constantinople, the Germans to Berlin; the Slovenes sympathize with the Serbs; the Croats are repelled by the Serbs; the Czechs lean toward the Russians; and the Ruthenians inevitably want exactly the opposite of what the Poles do.”⁷²

In such a situation, it was only natural that opinions should differ on the Herzegovinian insurrection. Consequently, public demonstrations took place in the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy, and donations were collected for the “brave Turkish people.”⁷³ As a sign of their sympathy, students in Budapest wrote letters to the Sultan and his military command-

ers. They described the Sultan and his government as “noble-minded” and called the Ottoman army “defenders of European civilization.”⁷⁴ Meanwhile, the hearty Slav nationalists were fascinated by the fabulous heroism of the insurgents, “who wrote Slav history with their iron,”⁷⁵ and in their visions they saw a wonderful future for Yugoslavia. Excited by such romantic notions, the most ardent of these dreamers expected that the harvest would be reaped before the fields were even planted, and that there would be abundant fruits to reap, and they believed that in a short time the Yugoslav peoples would drive back the “Asiatic barbarians to their deserts” and that soon “the Balkan Peninsula would see the revival of the Old Classical Age.”⁷⁶

On September 3, 1875, the Gorizia newspaper *Glas* published an article, which somehow slipped past the censors, about the differing views of those in modern European diplomatic circles and local Slovene peasant politicians on the uprising in Herzegovina. The peasants still believed, said the anonymous author from the Gorizia area, that highly educated people not only had a lot of knowledge, but were also kind and righteous people. The Herzegovinian Uprising, however, proved to be a stumbling block for the German and Hungarian statesmen, who loved culture but detested the Slavs. According to the corresponded to *Glas*, their hatred of the Slavs was reportedly so great that the Slovene peasant intelligence surpassed even that of high diplomacy:

Not that he can argue any better, but he has more wisdom in his heart, and so he pities his brothers who are suffering. For him, it is no longer a question of whether it is right and whether it is the right time to chase the Turks out of Europe back to Asia, their homeland; it is only a question of who will be the ruler in the South. Therefore, any government that sympathizes with the Turks despite the uprising of the oppressed Christians will receive an indelible “black mark” from the people.⁷⁷

When the Herzegovinian Uprising took place, many spoke and wrote of “Yugoslav integration.” The Slavic press in Austria-Hungary expected Serbia and Montenegro to actively support the *ustaši* in the name of this integration. In particular, the newspaper *Slovenski Narod* was emphatic in relation to this issue, often demanding that the two principalities not only help the insurgents unselfishly and as much as possible, but also clearly profess the “Yugoslav thought and feeling” and reach out to “their brothers.”⁷⁸ The Slavic press was full of appeals to Serbia and Montenegro to show their heroism and liberate the Bosnians; the newspaper *Zastava* from Novi Sad was at the forefront of these efforts. The newspaper *Glas* from Gorizia warned Serbia, which was urged to “liberate the Yugoslavs under the Serbian flag,” and the Montenegrin prince, that they would condemn

themselves and fall from grace if they did not show compassion to their brothers and make good on the promises they had made to them from spring to autumn. Moreover, *Glas* warned that—if the insurrection were put down—they would have to wait many decades for another to break out.⁷⁹

The Serbian government's attitude toward the uprising caused strong discontent even among its leaders. Some of them—those around Miroslav Hubmajer—expressed their feelings publicly, threatening that Serbia would not get any part of Bosnia, and if Montenegro could not get all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “they would like to divide it in such a way that Montenegro would get what is below the Neretva, and Croatia would get the rest.”⁸⁰

Austria-Hungary Thwarts the Yugoslav Idea

When reporting on the insurgents in Herzegovina and Bosnia, the pages of the Slavic press in the Dual Monarchy, as well as in Serbia and Montenegro, were full of statements about “Slavic brothers” and “Slavic togetherness,” and they also made frequent use of the word *sloga* (concord). Journalists liked to tell unpleasant cautionary tales from history about Slavic disunity and division and urged readers to change in this regard. In the newspaper *Slovenski Narod*, the author Karel Slanc advised Yugoslavs to learn the lessons from the many bad experiences of the past, both distant and recent, and to finally get wise. Taking into account the basic arithmetic whereby four times one equals four—that is, a whole—while four times zero equals zero, the Slavs should strive for unification. Even if this unification would be of no use to the Yugoslavs, they should strive for it, for the unification of divided tribes into nations was then the last word of modern times, and they should not allow themselves to fall behind.⁸¹ In these appeals, it was repeatedly emphasized that only united would they have a chance to exist among the great nations surrounding them: “The Germans see themselves as one body, one soul; may we Slovenes, especially we Slovenes who are exposed to the greatest danger, do the same and feel and act as one body, one soul. Each to his own, and our defense will be strong!”⁸² The liberal *Slovenski Narod* and *Soča* even went so far as to invoke Yugoslav unity and proclaim that no barrier in language, religion, grammar, time, or space should separate them from each other.⁸³

Differing views on the future of Yugoslavia soon became apparent. Lofty claims about Slavic unity were readily repeated in many public discussions, but although everyone repeated the same words and told the same stories, in their hearts they each prayed to their own gods. Romantic nationalists in

Serbia and Montenegro longed for the fulfillment of their long-cherished dreams, believing that the long-awaited and longed-for “certain hour” of liberation and unification of “all Serbs” had finally arrived.⁸⁴ But in Croatia, too, many dreamed of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or at least part of their territories. While radical Serbs hoped for the restoration of Tsar Dušan’s empire, the Croats gathered around Ante Starčević believed that the uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia would lead to the resurrection of Greater Croatia.⁸⁵

Great hopes and dreams about the resurrection of the glorious past proved to be more deeply rooted than ideas about unity, and ultimately the general attitude in the Yugoslav area surrounding Bosnia-Herzegovina depended more on memories of historical figures such as Tsar Dušan the Mighty and King Zvonimir than on the mythical narrative about King Svatoopluk. For example, when Mihailo Ljubibratić, one of Ilija Garašanin’s⁸⁶ most trusted confidants,⁸⁷ came to Herzegovina as a volunteer, Prince Nikola lost more sleep over him than over the “Turks” because of his connections with secret societies in Serbia and the fact that he was an outspoken opponent of both the Russians and the Montenegrins.⁸⁸ The Montenegrin prince did not stand idly by and watch what this “Herzegovinian Stephen the Little”⁸⁹ was up to; rather, he sent Vojvoda⁹⁰ Peko Pavlović to Herzegovina to arrest him and pacify the insurrection. This “old Turk-fighter” did so in his own way. He captured Vojvoda Ljubibratić, confiscated his weapons, money, and personal property, and marched him across the border to Dubrovnik with his hands tied behind his back.⁹¹ On the way to Linz, in March 1876, the Austrian authorities led him through Sinj, Split, Šibenik, Zadar, and Trieste. In all these cities, the prisoner Ljubibratić was met with enthusiastic cheers from the local (Slavic) citizens, who greeted their hero by waving flags and singing patriotic songs.⁹² In Trieste, the Slovenes presented him with a silver-plated laurel wreath with the inscription, “To the national hero, glorious freedom fighter Vojvoda M. Ljubibratić.”⁹³

Many Croats supported the insurrection until the Bosnian insurgents swore allegiance to the Serbian ruling dynasty and the Herzegovinian insurgents proclaimed the Montenegrin dynasty as their rulers. In fact, they were instigated to do so from abroad. This proclamation proved to be a turning point in relations between Serbs and Croats, for the Croats suddenly became “open enemies,” hostile to the Serbian cause and cold in relation to the Bosnian insurrection. During this period, Zagreb newspapers published a statement by Croatian academic youths claiming that the Bosnian Uprising had nothing to do with Serbia and the Serbs and that Bosnia was in fact Croatian, “a jewel in the crown of Croatian King Zvonimir,” without making any mention of the Serbs.⁹⁴ Vasa Pelagić emphasized that the Croatian intelligentsia committed a “great mistake” in

doing this because they “degraded the science that advised them not to worship the crown of Zvonimir, as the Hungarian disciples bow to the crown of St. Stephen and the hand of the Sultan, but rather to justice and freedom, truth, equality and human brotherhood.” Calling the insurgents Croats is absolutely inappropriate, Pelagić said, because of the nearly two hundred thousand insurgents who fled Bosnia and Herzegovina, “none called themselves Croats, only Serbs.” As Pelagić goes on to point out, the Catholics from these provinces did not consider themselves Croats either, but mostly referred to themselves as Šokci, Christians, Latins. And, more importantly, all these “rebellious people did not give a penny, a chicken or a basket for all the kingdoms and crowns of the ‘great’ Zvonimir and the ‘mighty’ Dušan; but they sacrificed their homes and their households and risked their lives and the lives of their families because they longed for justice and freedom, for happiness and progress.”⁹⁵

Unlike the Serbian and Croat newspapers, the Slovene press, which viewed the uprising from a broad Yugoslav perspective, could not take a clear stand on resolving the question of the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One moment, they advocated that it would be best to join the Orthodox Principalities, and the next they pleaded for the Austro-Hungarian occupation of these two provinces.⁹⁶ Thus, on July 28, 1875, the newspaper *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne* demanded, “The Slavs in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be freed from the Turkish yoke, and then Peter or Paul should take possession of them!”⁹⁷ On several occasions, they tried to convince the Austro-Hungarian government that it was in its interest to send its army to support the military intervention of Serbia and Montenegro, with the aim of driving the “Turks” out of Europe. In their “unbiased” interpretation, which few outside the Slovene territories accepted,⁹⁸

a new independent Yugoslav state would be the best neighbor of Austria, because it would be a well-organized state, like Serbia; there would be no obstacle to the opening of its markets to Austrian industry; Austria would be a teacher, educating her little sister in all matters of statehood. And the Austrian Slavs—as soon as their legitimate national claims were satisfied—would also be satisfied in their old homeland.⁹⁹

Slovene newspapers kept emphasizing the positive effects that the expansion of Austria-Hungarian into Yugoslav territories would yield, although it was obvious that this argument was flawed in many ways. It seems that the real motivation for this argument was not so much to convince the public to agree to the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rather to boost the self-confidence of the Slovene people by showing that their German and Hungarian compatriots feared a strong Yugoslav nation. According to editor Josip Jurčič, this state of affairs was due to the fact that

both Germans and Hungarians were used to believing that when two (nations) live in one country, one must always be a hammer and the other an anvil. To save this view from the censor's scissors, he referred to an article published in the *Kölnische Zeitung* on August 4, 1875:

The Germans and Hungarians have long known that Slavdom threatens them not from without but from within, and that the external Pan-Slavism would not be weakened by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while *Deutschtum* and especially *Ungarentum* would give way to Slavdom within the monarchy. This is the point to be reckoned with, but it is consistently evaded by the official press.¹⁰⁰

The Austrian authorities in the Slovene lands quickly understood which way the wind was blowing, and as soon as the insurrection broke out in Herzegovina, they imposed strict censorship on the Slovene press with the aim of slaying the Pan-Slavic dragon before his claws grew larger and his fangs became deadly. At first, they repeatedly confiscated newspapers that expressed sympathy for the insurgents or called on the public for financial support, while the government in Vienna also put pressure on the provincial authorities not to collect donations for the fugitive relatives of the *ustaši*. Without this state pressure, many more volunteers would probably have come forward to help the insurgents.¹⁰¹

The authorities confiscated newspapers that published articles about the *ustaši* and their struggle and were critical of the Dual Monarchy's official state policy on the uprising, Serbia and Montenegro's position, and otherwise contradicted the official policy of the government in Vienna on the Eastern Question. There were no formal legal grounds for such confiscations, but they were carried out for political reasons, with the aim of preventing the further development of a consciousness of Slavic mutuality.¹⁰² Newspapers were also confiscated if they were critical of "German Turks in Ljubljana," which railed against Yugoslavia in "true drunkard fashion," thus "inciting one nation against another."¹⁰³ The censors were particularly harsh on *Slovenski Narod* and its editor-in-chief Josip Jurčič. At his request, a court hearing was held on November 4, 1875, after the confiscation of issues 206, 207, and 209, in which eight articles about the "Yugoslav insurrection" had appeared. According to Josip Jurčič, it was not incitement when the articles in question claimed that Austria-Hungary had a "not strict but rather neutral attitude" toward the *ustaši*, as this information had already been published in Croat, Dalmatian, and other newspapers that had not been seized. Likewise, Jurčič continued, it did not constitute agitation against the government to claim in an article that "Austria-Hungary is against any form of strengthening of the Yugoslav idea" when this was done by quoting statements from the newspapers *Neue Freie Presse* from

Vienna and *Pester Lloyd* from Budapest, which, in his opinion, took a very hard and firm stance against the strengthening of the Yugoslav idea. He asked the court: “Why should a Slovene journalist be charged if he only informs about it?” Finally, Jurčič disapproved of the prosecution’s claim that criminal intent was particularly clear because *Slovenski Narod* represented the idea of “uniting all Yugoslav peoples in one state.” Jurčič confirmed that the journalists of *Slovenski Narod* did indeed desire the unification of Austrian Yugoslavs, but added that they “never wrote or thought that now was the time to unite ourselves with the Bulgarians and all the other non-Austrian Yugoslavs because we know very well that this is unattainable under the present circumstances.”¹⁰⁴

In defense of *Slovenski Narod*, Karel Slanc, a writer and jurist, reacted by arguing that a national idea can grow into a strong tree only when the people are united. A dialect extended only a few miles, he argued, and nations could not be distinguished from one another by such dialects, since they denoted only “differences between two villages.” That, he concluded, was as easy to understand as two times four equals eight. And if the prosecutor banned the *Slovenski Narod* on such grounds, he would “give mathematics a resounding slap in the face, and if an answer is needed, a glance at united Germany and Italy, at Bismarck and Cavour, will suffice.”¹⁰⁵

A Volunteer in the Service of the World Revolution

After the outbreak of the insurrections in Herzegovina and Bosnia, committees were formed in all the bordering areas to help the insurgents and their families. Committees were formed in Belgrade, Cetinje, Zagreb, Kostajnica, Sisak, Stara Gradiška, Nova Gradiška, Zadar, Šibenik, Split, Dubrovnik, Herceg Novi, Metković, and Trieste, but also in Rome, Vienna, Prague, Paris, and London. As documented by Knjaz Nikola, these committees succeeded in collecting a considerable amount of relief. The committee in Trieste alone spent 104,967 forints on grain, while in Montenegro 28,877 forints was spent on grain.¹⁰⁶

Slovenski Narod and its editor-in-chief Jurčič advocated the establishment of such a committee in Ljubljana and repeatedly called on the Slovene public to show their Slav solidarity in reality as well. Such appeals to the people to contribute by paying a national tax were made many times, but a great appeal on August 3, 1875, for the collection of relief supplies for the insurgents and their families was probably the most important of all. According to the authors of this public appeal, the Slovenes should show themselves to the insurgents as true “brothers in heart,” just as the Austrian Germans did in the Franco-Prussian War. Therefore, Slovene

reading clubs should organize *veselice* (fêtes) with the aim of collecting financial aid. This appeal was quickly challenged by the regional authorities in Carniola (Kranjska). On the same day that the appeal was published, the praesidium of the regional administration in Carniola banned this edition of *Slovenski Narod* and issued a written instruction to the district administration and the magistrate in Ljubljana that the collection of any donations and contributions for the insurgents and their families was strictly forbidden.¹⁰⁷

The regional authorities offered no explanation for this decision. They probably feared the possible consequences that such an action could have, that is, increased national consciousness of the Slovene people and the strengthening of the radical political demands of the Slovene nation.¹⁰⁸ However, the ban did not achieve its goal; on the contrary, fundraising continued and there were ways of circumventing the ban. As the *Slovenski Narod* informed its readers at the end of July and the newspaper *Slovenec* at the beginning of the next month, the ban on collecting money for the Herzegovinian insurgents did not prohibit anyone from sending money to charity committees in Dalmatia and Croatia.¹⁰⁹ The ban on collecting contributions for the insurgents and their families was strongly condemned by the Slovene press. Five days after the ban was announced, the *Slovenski Narod* published an article entitled “Insurrection in Herzegovina and the German Liberal Ministry.” The author of the article urged readers to continue collecting relief supplies and sending their contributions, arguing that it was a Christian act to sympathize with the sufferings of “our unfortunate brothers” who were fighting bloodily “for the honorable cross and golden freedom.” The author concluded his plea with the following words:

Such an act of humanity cannot be forbidden by the government in Ljubljana, because it was not forbidden by the government in Zadar or by that in Zagreb.

Slovenes, let us be Christians, human beings, and Slavs!¹¹⁰

Austria-Hungary officially took a neutral position toward the insurrection that broke out in the two provinces on its southeastern borders. This fact provided the pretext for a ban on the sending of humanitarian aid and a ban on the export of arms. Along the long border, however, where many “loyal subjects of His Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty” wore caps embroidered in golden letters with the initials of Prince Nikola of Montenegro, it was impossible to order or implement measures that would prevent the import of arms and ammunition into Herzegovina.¹¹¹ Old and new, real and alleged, “Turkish” bloody killings provoked indignation and popular solidarity among the Yugoslav people: “All, rich and poor, joyfully



Figure 0.2. Miroslav Hubmajer as an insurgent in Herzegovina. Published in the *Humoristische Blätter*, October 10, 1875. Drawn by Karel Klíč. Source: private collection of the author.

and wholeheartedly opened their purses.”¹¹² Gunpowder and weapons were smuggled out of Ljubljana with the same aim.¹¹³

The Slovene newspapers, like the rest of the Slavic press in Austria-Hungary, were not content with expressions of sympathy for the Herzegovinian insurgents, but called upon all Slavs, especially the Yugoslavs from Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Montenegro, to help their “brothers” in distress with all their hearts. “If a brother has to defend himself with a rifle,” they wrote, “he cannot continue to occupy himself with matters of peace.”¹¹⁴ The newspapers called on Yugoslav youth—who showed such enthusiasm for Pan-Slavism in many speeches and at many meetings—to follow the example of Polish and Italian students and express their passionate enthusiasm, to take up their sharp swords and ride Marko Kraljević’s piebald horse named Šarac: “This is how we create the Yugoslav state!”¹¹⁵ And those who were most carried away by the greatness of the moment sang the song, “From the Balkans to Triglav Mountain, Mother Slavia calling, calling . . .”¹¹⁶

Miroslav Hubmajer (Friedrich Hubmayer), a typographer and former Austrian artillery sergeant, was the first to answer the call of Mother Slavia. His German work colleagues in Ljubljana accused him of constantly openly displaying his (Slovene) nationalism.¹¹⁷ Hubmajer set out to join Vojvoda Ljubibratić and his comrades at the Duži monastery near Trebinje, only three weeks after the Nevesinje Rifle had been fired.¹¹⁸ Small and large groups of volunteers from Serbia, Vojvodina, Bohemia, Carniola (Kranjska), Italy, France, Germany, Poland, Russia, Greece, and other regions traveled to Ljubljana and Zagreb to join Hubmajer.¹¹⁹

The exact number of volunteers remains unknown, as does the duration of their presence. However, if one takes into account the letter published by the newspaper *Zastava*, their number was anything but small: in Dubrovnik alone, on December 3, 1875, 284 French volunteers, 390 Italians, 53 Englishmen, 2 Americans, 1 Swede, 83 Greeks, and 22 Germans were all waiting to join the insurgents in Herzegovina.¹²⁰ Interestingly, although there was a large number of foreign volunteers, Vasa Pelagić complained that the Slavic peoples (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Carniolans, and Croats) sent “altogether scarcely a hundred volunteers to help” before the Serbian-Turkish and Russo-Turkish wars, and claimed that the help they sent in money amounted to barely 20,000 ducats. Pelagić believed that his claims, which were not true, clearly showed that “the sympathy and ‘mutuality’ of the Slavs stood on very weak legs,” and he pointed out that the desire for Pan-Slavic unification and a Pan-Slavic empire was “even weaker.”¹²¹

The Swiss citizen in Ottoman medical and diplomatic service Josef Koetschet noted that while the insurrection was taking place in the surrounding provinces, Dubrovnik looked like a city that was “in open warfare.”¹²² Moreover, according to the report of the *Zastava* newspaper’s special correspon-

dent from Sutorina, published in February 1876, Italian volunteers were arriving in the city on a daily basis. At the sight of “these honest people, the most zealous freedom fighters for Serbian liberation,” the correspondent thought of Serbian youth: “While other people are shedding their blood for us, our young men are courting women.” Therefore, the journalist advised Serbian women, “if you are patriots,” to preserve their national dignity and “give these cowards an apron and a spinning wheel.”¹²³

In the eyes of Miroslav Hubmajer, the Herzegovinian insurgents showed “no drill and no discipline,” because “nobody obeyed the commanders.”¹²⁴ Moreover, some commanders saw the insurgency as an opportunity for personal enrichment. As a certain Bjelopavlić told Knjaz Nikola, “the priest Žarko and his company took loot and plunder from the insurgents, converted it into money and sent it home, and they did the same with the donations they received from various committees in Serbia.”¹²⁵ Disappointed, Hubmajer left Herzegovina for Bosnia, where he tried to create a “foreign legion,” as Petar Karadorđević noted in his diary, composed only of “Carniolans and Catholics.”¹²⁶ He intended to launch an insurrection along the Austro-Hungarian border, liberate parts of Bosnian territory, abandon minor cross-border gun battles, and advance with his troops through determined military strikes to the lower reaches of the Neretva River to unite with Vojvoda Ljubibratić’s forces.¹²⁷ Hubmajer’s disappointment with the *rayah* of Bosnia-Herzegovina perhaps resulted from the fact that he was convinced that illiterate peasants took up arms as convinced supporters of Pan-Slavism or the world revolution. “The people of Herzegovina have revolted against their oppressors,” argued the Belgrade newspaper *Istok*, “and the poor do not think of any kingdoms and other nonsense, but of how to protect their livelihood and property to some extent, but now that it has come to the fore that kingdoms and kings are at stake, this will only incite them more against their oppressors.”¹²⁸

The high principles of Slavic mutuality that Hubmajer himself espoused and embraced when he joined the uprising did not match the expectations of the peasants who went into battle to gain some measure of freedom for themselves and more equitable conditions for their agricultural production. The gap between his ideals and expectations and the harsh reality of the insurgency was a great disappointment to Hubmajer and, eventually, distanced him from the local insurgents.

The European press published pieces about Hubmajer that sounded like fairy tales, with him being called a hero, a fearless insurrectionary leader,¹²⁹ a skilled strategist who inflicted heavy losses on the “Turks.” For example, it was claimed that he caused two thousand Ottoman *askeri* (members of the military) to flee.¹³⁰ He showed the greatest heroism during the siege of the fortress in the village of Drijen, when he led a small group of fel-

low insurgents and challenged the enemy commander Ahmet Begović to a duel, during which Begović shot at Hubmajer while he was standing still.¹³¹ Since the troops in the fortress refused to engage in open combat, Hubmajer took some dynamite under cover of darkness on the fourth day of the siege with the intention of destroying the fortress. Late at night, he approached the fortress, sought an embrasure, and threw the dynamite into it. But no sooner had he lit the fuse with a match than one of the guards threw the dynamite back outside, where it fell beside Hubmajer. He began to run while the guards shot at him “like crazy.”¹³²

According to *Neue Freie Presse*, when the insurgent commander Hubmajer returned to Ljubljana for a short time in early November 1875, he was greeted by the Ljubljana population like a “triumphant general.” On the evening of Wednesday, November 10, sixty-one members of the local nationalist intelligentsia gathered in the Glass Hall of the Ljubljana National Reading Room. On this occasion, many speeches and toasts were made. However, the correspondent for *Neue Freie Presse* did not share the enthusiasm with which the people of Ljubljana greeted Hubmajer. On the contrary, he pointed out that Hubmajer was a reservist in the Austrian army, and Austria was not at war with the Ottoman Empire; moreover, Hubmajer had not even officially announced his leave.¹³³ On November 17, the conservative newspaper *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne* reacted angrily to what it called the product of “Jews and Slavs haters,” calling it a juicy bone for hungry journalists and correspondents of “Turkish” newspapers.¹³⁴ In this sense, the German newspapers, going after the rabbit of Slavic mutuality, released the wolf of passionate anti-Germanism. Josip Jurčič summed this up in his editorial for the liberal newspaper *Slovenski Narod*: “We just do not want to become Germans, just not that (sure, we do not want to become Hungarians or Gypsies either). We are fighting to the death against Germanization.”¹³⁵

Three days after the banquet in Ljubljana, the academic youth and students in Zagreb hosted another gala dinner in honor of Hubmajer. About 180 students and other guests greeted the hero who was ready to lay down his life for his Slav brothers to “free them from the clutches of the bloodthirsty Turks.” A toast was raised to the Yugoslavs who were fighting for their freedom, as the Italians and Germans had recently done for themselves, and Hubmajer said that the Herzegovinians fought for the freedom of all people.¹³⁶

From Villain to National Hero

As soon as the insurrection broke out in Herzegovina, Knez Milan and Knjaz Nikola arbitrarily divided the spheres of interest between them-

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selves: one took Bosnia, the other Herzegovina. Similarly, there were attempts at dominance over the insurgency by some members of the Main Committee in Zagreb, who held the view that Bosnia was a “Croatian country.” This struggle for dominance over the insurgency led to disagreements between the members of the committee in Belgrade and that in Zagreb.¹³⁷ However, another pretender soon laid claim to Bosnia—the deposed Prince Petar Mrkonjić.¹³⁸ Barely a quarter of Bosnian territory had been liberated and Bosnia already had two rulers: Prince Milan Obrenović and the pretender Petar Karađorđević.¹³⁹ Within the insurgency, there were clear signs of discord, the “daughter of the devilish serpent.”¹⁴⁰ Petar Karađorđević’s invasion of Bosnia was greeted with enthusiasm in the insurgent camps, but his advance received little attention in Cetinje and left an “unpleasant impression” in Belgrade. The Serbian government sent a battalion of its standing army to the border to prevent volunteers from Serbia from joining his *četa* and ordered Captain Djoko Vljaković to leave Bosnia with his troops.¹⁴¹

When the insurgents retreated to their winter quarters around December 15, 1875, the command was so fragmented that it was difficult to even count the troops and leaders.¹⁴² In this situation, it was clear that without organization, the insurgency had no chance of success, especially in military operations. In order to unite all the insurgents for a “fraternal agreement,” an assembly was convened in a school in the village of Jamnica, near the border, on December 16 and 17, 1875. The meeting was attended by about eighty representatives from all over Bosnia, from Bihać to the Drina, who gathered to decide whether the war should continue during the winter. After long negotiations, they decided to continue the war until Ottoman rule was brought to an end and to reject reforms that they considered incomplete and unfeasible. The representatives of the insurgents agreed that it was necessary to suppress all factional hatred and to act together. They also approved the launching of an attack on Turska Kostajnica. A proposal to appoint a new insurrectionary council as a provisional government was unanimously approved, and Miroslav Hubmajer, better known as Crni Miro (Black Miro), was elected commander-in-chief “because of his boldness and courage, which guaranteed triumph.”¹⁴³

One issue facing the Jamnica Assembly was the necessity of making a black-or-white decision regarding Petar Mrkonjić and his movement. According to the newspaper articles of the time, Petar Karađorđević wanted the insurgents to declare him their leader and Serbian prince.¹⁴⁴ But despite a fairly strong *četa* of volunteers accompanying him to Bosnia, his demands were not looked upon favorably. The newspaper *Zastava* of Novi Sad, for example, called Petar Mrkonjić a *probisvet* (villain) and referred to his supporters as *smuljivci* (troublemakers) who were “conspiring against Serbian unity.”¹⁴⁵ It was clear to the people on the Bosnian committees

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that if they accepted Petar Karadorđević, they would have to sever relations not only with Milan Obrenović himself, but also with the Principality of Serbia, which was under his rule at the time. The insurgents were powerless without the support of the Principality of Serbia, so it was unanimously decided at the Jambina Assembly that the presence of the pretender Petar would hinder the uprising and national liberation. They asked him to leave the uprising within eight days, “because we are not interested in any dynasties here, we are fighting for freedom”; otherwise, there would be drastic consequences.¹⁴⁶

The power struggle between the Obrenović and Petrović dynasties from the beginning of the Herzegovinian Uprising until June 1876 had significant consequences for the uprising, as well as for the Yugoslav cause in general; moreover, mutual relations between Serbia and Montenegro were not excellent.¹⁴⁷ The very idea that Serbia could claim Herzegovina for itself seemed not only “absurd but also insulting” to Montenegro. Such public insolence on the part of Serbia was outrageous and an insult to the Shkodra Montenegrins, especially since they were already “soaked in blood” in Herzegovina.¹⁴⁸ In Montenegro, an insurgent leader or soldier or volunteer who spoke, acted, or thought in any way other than on the assumption that Herzegovina must join Montenegro was considered a traitor and could be tried as such.¹⁴⁹

Herzegovina became a bone of contention between Belgrade and Cetinje, as Prince Milan wanted to annex this region together with Bosnia to the Principality of Serbia, while Prince Nikola was also interested in Herzegovina.¹⁵⁰ As *Laibacher Zeitung* reported on November 12, 1875, the political rancor between Serbia and Montenegro spread to the Herzegovinian insurgency and gave rise to a “sharp disagreement” between the leaders of the insurgents. Namely, while the supporters of the Serbian party were upset that the fighters from Cetinje only came to the aid of those insurgent leaders who explicitly supported Prince Nikola, those who sympathized with Montenegro complained that the Serbian aid committees only supported insurgent leaders who fought for the interests of the Principality of Serbia.¹⁵¹

In the wake of the May coup of 1903, the Karadorđević dynasty was restored to the Serbian throne; the crown on the head of the former insurgent leader King Petar I shed new light on past events, including Mrkonjić's guerrilla war in Bosnia. It suddenly became clear that he was “the most suitable person to take general command of all the insurgents.”¹⁵² Official propagandists praised King Petar's courage and his enduring allegiance to the free Western world, which he proved by fighting under the name Pierre Kara in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, when he was awarded the Legion of Honor. His freedom-loving nature and his willingness to

make sacrifices were demonstrated in 1875 when, under the name of Petar Mrkonjić, he participated in the organization of the Bosnian Uprising, in which he took an active part, and as proof of his truly democratic nature, the propagandists made it known that in his youth he translated *On Liberty* by John Stuart Mill into the Serbian language.¹⁵³

Historians described the accession of King Petar as the beginning of “a new era in the history of our nation”¹⁵⁴ and him as “the greatest ruler of the Serbian nation, far greater than Dušan the Mighty.”¹⁵⁵ Under his scepter, from the sea of blood that had been spilled, there emerged an “enlarged, liberated kingdom in which the Slovene nation, together with the Croat and Serb nations, forms a state greater than even the wildest poetic imagination could have imagined.”¹⁵⁶ On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the national liberation and unification of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the Belgrade newspaper *Politika* informed its readers that “Petar Mrkonjić had taken over the leadership of the insurgents,” while Miroslav Hubmajer, distinguished by his “extraordinary heroism” in Bosnia-Herzegovina, “became vojvoda of a četa among his Serb and Bosnian brothers.”¹⁵⁷

The story of Vojvoda Mrkonjić was no longer the story of a troublemaker who obstructed national liberation for selfish reasons and whom “Turkey supported with her money,”¹⁵⁸ and after he ascended the Serbian throne, many fictional accounts and legends were spun about him.¹⁵⁹ In these romantic stories, Petar Mrkonjić was portrayed as the only person of esteem and importance in the entire Bosnian insurgency. The tradition of the “Serbian Uprising in Bosnia 1875–78” began to be cultivated upon the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the uprising, when the Western Bosnia region was declared Krajina Petra Mrkonjića (Petar Mrkonjić’s Borderland). The first monument dedicated to King Petar was officially unveiled in Dobrinje on November 8, 1924.¹⁶⁰ In this context, a new story was concocted, testifying to the Herculean effort that King Petar the Great exhibited in the struggle for the liberation of the nation, demonstrating his selflessness, his love for the fatherland, and his personal bravery. For the permanent exhibition in the Museum of Vrbas Banate in Banja Luka, the then director of the museum and painter Spiridon Bocarić painted several figurative compositions and portraits, among which the dignified figure of the insurgent leader Petar Mrkonjić stands out. Over the years, such testimonies grew and became more and more poignant. The drama of the story was also heightened by anti-heroes in the form of secret agents sent by Prince Milan and his government, who allegedly plotted against Petar Mrkonjić and instigated conflict and discord among his men, with the aim of ruining his reputation and wiping him off the face of the earth.¹⁶¹

If his high Pan-Slavic ideals alienated Black Miro from the Herzegovinian and Bosnian peasants, his political naivety left him helpless when,

during his participation in the Herzegovinian and Bosnian uprisings, he found himself in the midst of a fierce dynastic rivalry, especially after he took the leading role in the Bosnian uprising. Black Miro was famous as a hero and military leader not only among the *ustaši*, but also far beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. His heroism saved him from enemy bullets, but it could not protect him from the intrigues of his rivals. To better portray the life and deeds of the future King Petar I, these schemers painted Miroslav Hubmajer, who had been his rival for the post of commander-in-chief of the *ustaši* at Javnica Assembly, in much darker colors. Years after he had left Bosnia, some of them suddenly realized that Hubmajer had actually come to Bosnia-Herzegovina to join the *ustaši* as a volunteer only to prepare the ground for the Austro-Hungarian occupation of these two provinces.¹⁶² Unfortunately, these authors failed to explain why Hubmajer continued his activities by joining the ranks of the Serbian artillery during the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876–77¹⁶³ and later participated in the Kresna Uprising, which took place in Pirin Macedonia in 1878–79.¹⁶⁴

When the nation-state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was officially renamed Yugoslavia, historians began to “definitively” assess the merits of the individuals who had distinguished themselves in the process. In accordance with methodological Piedmontism,¹⁶⁵ Hubmajer received no recognition or praise for all the years and sacrifices he made as a volunteer. On the contrary, a history professor and former member of the revolutionary movement Young Bosnia blamed Hubmajer for the failed march on Turska Kostajnica. According to Vaso Čubrilović, this failure showed “how things turn out when serious matters are conducted by frivolous men.”¹⁶⁶ He probably assumed that his ignorant readers would believe everything he claimed, including his demotion of Black Miro two decades after his death. In fact, Čubrilović wrote that Hubmajer joined the Serbian army as a volunteer in the war against the Ottoman Empire a few months later and received the military rank “that best suited him, namely sergeant.”¹⁶⁷ However, Čubrilović’s claim is not correct. As the correspondent from the Principality of Serbia wrote to *Slovenski Narod* on October 17, 1876, the Russian general Mikhail Chernyaev appointed Hubmajer a lieutenant at his own risk “because of his abilities.”¹⁶⁸ In Chernyaev’s military unit, Hubmajer was eventually promoted to artillery major. But when the Serbian army suffered defeat in the war and the Serbian state faced bankruptcy, most officers—and especially foreign officers, including Hubmajer—were dismissed.¹⁶⁹

Vladimir Ćorović, the author of the influential *Istorija Jugoslavije* (History of Yugoslavia), went even further than Čubrilović. Although Yugoslavia as a state and political entity was a more recent creation, he argued that the ideology of Yugoslavism that led to the founding of Yugoslavia

preceded it in time. Guided by this principle, he strove to give a truthful account of the fate of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, highlighting particular moments in the history of the South Slav peoples that showed that political borders were not real barriers between the various “tribes,” that they actually “had contacts, close ties, and common actions, which shows that people had some awareness of their commonality, or that these far-sighted individuals had long expected this.”¹⁷⁰ Of course, Čorović also paid attention to the Bosnian Uprising in his comprehensive study. He describes Miroslav Hubmajer passionately following his dream of helping his unfortunate Yugoslav tribesmen against their oppressors, disregarding the essential facts of Yugoslav political reality. Historians who favored the Karađorđević dynasty attributed a deeper meaning to the events of the past and believed that they led to the true dynasty coming to power at the right time; thus, Čorović portrayed Hubmajer not as a proponent of close relations and reciprocity between the various Yugoslav “tribes,” but rather as an anti-hero. According to him, the Jajce Assembly elected Hubmajer as the supreme vojvoda instead of Petar Mrkonjić because its members were “divided and confused.” Under these circumstances, he claimed, the assembly failed to elect a worthy vojvoda and chose a man “whose abilities are not worth mentioning.” In Čorović’s opinion, Hubmajer was not only “unsuited for the task entrusted to him,” but later in life ended up “as an Austrian confidant in Sarajevo.”¹⁷¹

Reading history backwards and interpreting past events and personalities through his own ideological lens was the most convenient way for Čorović to support his point of view. In order to construct a credible history, he did not even shy away from sacrificing certain historical figures and events that did not fit into his picture by bricking them up in the foundations of his construction, following the example of the builders of the Škoda Castle. Apparently, he believed that human sacrifices, even if they were only symbolic, would strengthen the stability and permanence of his vision of Yugoslavia and its ruling dynasty.

These sacrifices, however, were not merely symbolic. This is evident from a letter written by Hubmajer’s daughter Olga, in which she complains that Hubmajer’s widow was deprived of the pension she had received from the Austrian government immediately after the liberation in 1918. Without this income, Hubmajer’s family could not even mark his grave properly.¹⁷² Hubmajer’s story is a good illustration of how far some Yugoslav historians were willing to go to pursue their particular political interests. As we have seen, they did irreparable damage to what they claimed to be advocating. To buttress their point, they did not even shy away from throwing the baby out with the bathwater, as they did when they portrayed King Petar as a worthy freedom fighter. In order to portray Petar Karađorđević in bright

colors, they blackened Hubmajer, a hero who had the potential to become a unifying figure for all Yugoslavs. Hubmajer cut an ideal figure for a common Yugoslav hero. He was a man of a hundred talents, of appealing appearance, fluent in foreign languages, the only Slovene who had a name in the European and American press in the mid-nineteenth century, and above all, he was willing to take the greatest risk in his struggle for the Yugoslav idea in Herzegovina, Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Among the historical personalities, no other has done that.

Nationality is full of latent antinomies, that is, potential conflicts between its principles.¹⁷³ This is undoubtedly true of the nationalism of the nation with the three names. As we have seen from the cases of the uprisings in Herzegovina and Bosnia, when people rose up against the adversities suffered under the “Turkish yoke,” intolerance and narrow-mindedness often came to the fore, with disastrous consequences for national unity. Thus, Svetozar Miletić quoted in *Zastava* the words of a Serbian deputy—“Brotherhood to the brothers, but war to the Turks!”¹⁷⁴—which not only incited Serbs to “brotherhood” but also slammed the door in the face of a rather weak sense of national unity among Christians and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the *ustasi* directed their actions against the land holdings of the local beys, the Muslims countered by destroying Christian villages.¹⁷⁵ The attacks on the “Turks”—that is, the Slavic population professing Islam—acts of arson and looting of property, were justified as acts of revenge for five centuries of subjugation of the Christian masses and deepened the rift between the Slavic peoples in these two provinces. Particularly destructive was the so-called “Turkish custom” of the *ustasi*, who used to cut off the heads and noses of dead and wounded “Turks” as proof of their bravery in battle.¹⁷⁶

Notes

1. Kollár, 1839, 58.
2. Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983, 7.
3. Suppan, 1999, 25.
4. See, for example, Jezernik, 2008, 27–28; 2013, 30.
5. See, for example, Fishman, 1972, 6; Iggers, 1986, 136–38; Kořalka, 1991, 218; Deák, 1992, 14; see also Namier, 1944, 107.
6. L. S., 1866, 323.
7. Mitrović, 1918, 23.
8. Doering-Manteuffel, 2010, 101.
9. Borovnjak, 1936, 24.
10. See, for example, Šišić, 1937, 82; Vilder, 1957, 84.

11. See, for example, Stojković, 1850, 144; Novak, 1930, xxvii; Kostelski, 1952, 305.
12. Bukovšek, 1849, 333. Bukovšek was *Slovenija's* correspondent from Prague. In Czech, *Slavija* connotes the land of all Slavs, and *Jiho-Slavija* the land of South Slavs. Bukovšek simply replaced Czech *Jiho* with South Slavic *Jugo*.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Pavlowitch, 2002, 47.
16. Borovnjak, 1936, 22–23.
17. Schultze, 2002, 119.
18. Toman, 1862, 9.
19. Young, 1993, 2.
20. Renan, 1882, 7–8.
21. Plumb, 1969, 32; cf. Čolović, 2008, 119–32.
22. Jászi, 1929, 259.
23. Jezernik, 2013, 25.
24. This view is still present among some nationalists and conservative thinkers. In Radule Knežević's view (2012, 338), national identity is not an immutable fact that is passively handed down from generation to generation. Knežević argues that national identity is not a constant, but rather a set of interconnected tendencies that usually go in different directions. For that reason, each generation must decide which of them to embrace and develop.
25. Jezernik, 2013, 11.
26. Berend, 2003, 1.
27. Evans, 1878, 32.
28. See, for example, Jászi, 1929, 264–65; Bartulović, 2013, 140.
29. Jan van Gorp, for instance, tried to prove that the Dutch language, especially the dialect spoken in Antwerp, was the language of Adam in its purest form. Therefore, the biblical names have meaning only in Dutch. For example, he derived the etymology of the name Adam from *bat* (hatred) and *dam* (dam or dyke), since Adam had to resist Satan's hatred just as a dam resists the waves of the ocean (Goropii Becani, 1569, 539).
30. Schultze, 2002, 119.
31. Kollár, 1824, 37; 1830, 19–20; 1839, 9, 59; cf. Gardner Wilkinson, 1848, I, 11,
32. Metelko, 1849, 13.
33. Gardner Wilkinson, 1848, I, 10–11.
34. Skene, 1853, I, 61; Creagh, 1876, I, 110–11.
35. Golovin, 1854, II, 161.
36. Nenadović, 1889, 134.
37. Smith, 1999, 708; see also Lewellen, 1992, 152–54.
38. Kralj Matjaž (King Matjaž) is a legendary king in Central Europe, who, over time, gradually became associated with the real King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary (1458–90).
39. Bohinjec, 1918, 1.
40. J–, 1870, 1.
41. Komitet vystavki, 1867, 370; Clementis, 1943, 47–48.
42. *Slovenski Gospodar*, July 11, 1867.
43. Prijatelj, 1940, 48.
44. Prelog, 1931, 35.
45. Hribar, 1929, 189.
46. Tuma, 1912, 228.
47. *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne*, March 21, 1866.

48. Melik, 1997, 17–18; cf. Ušeničnik, 1914b, 290.
49. *Slovenski Narod*, October 18, 1870.
50. *Slovenski Narod*, October 8, 1870.
51. *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne*, December 7, 1870.
52. *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne*, July 20, 1870.
53. Radojčić, 1928, 94.
54. Lončar, 1912, 353–54.
55. The Austrian Empire was officially referred to as “the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrat (Imperial Council).”
56. *Zastava*, December 4, 1870; see also Milutinović, 1931, 6.
57. M-ć, 1870, 1.
58. Milutinović, 1931, 15–16.
59. *Zastava*, December 4, 1870.
60. Radojčić, 1928, 92, 101.
61. *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne*, December 21, 1870.
62. Wertheimer, 1913, II, 248.
63. The uprising of the Christian Orthodox population in the Nevesinje region, known as *Nevesinjska puška* (Nevesinje Rifle) was a revolt against the oppression in the Ottoman Empire. It broke out in the summer of 1875 and spread from Herzegovina into Bosnia, where it lasted until 1878.
64. Srbin Bosanac, 1897, 6.
65. See, for example, Jakšić, 1941, 2.
66. *Laibacher Zeitung*, August 22, 1875.
67. *Neue Freie Presse*, July 23, 1875.
68. *Laibacher Tagblatt*, October 5, 1875.
69. *Slovenski Narod*, August 11, 1875.
70. *Neue Freie Presse*, July 23, 1875.
71. Jezernik, 2013, 19.
72. *Slovenec*, January 27, 1877.
73. Ruffner, 1877, 292.
74. Pelagić, 1880, 73.
75. *Slovenski Narod*, July 28, 1875.
76. *Glas*, May 7, 1875.
77. *Glas*, September 3, 1875.
78. *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne*, July 28, 1875.
79. *Glas*, July 30, 1875.
80. Ekmečić, 1973a, 144.
81. S-c, 1875, 1.
82. Ω, 1875a, 1.
83. J. V-v, 1875, 2; V-v, 1875, 1.
84. Milutinović, 1953, 58.
85. Biankini, 1925, 12–13.
86. Ilija Garašanin was prime minister of Serbia in 1852–53 and 1861–67. In 1844, he wrote *Načertanije* (The Draft), a nineteenth-century declaration of the Serbian nation and its vital interests in “Serbian” Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the root of the aspirations for a Greater Serbia.
87. Vukčević, 1950, 115, 130; Vego, 1953, 27.
88. Vukčević, *ibid.*; Buha, 2003, 189.
89. Kos, 2006, 67.
90. In Serbia, *vojvoda* (duke) was the highest military rank.

91. Stillman, 1877, 11; 1901, II, 111; Jakšič, 1928, 110; Buha, 2003, 189–90, 195; Musa, 2018, 186.
92. Novak, 1925, 122–23.
93. Ljubibratić and Kruševac, 1958, 275.
94. Ruffner, 1877, 292; Pelagić, 1880, 85.
95. Pelagić, *ibid.*
96. Luković, 1977, 97.
97. *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne*, July 28, 1875.
98. One of the few non-Slovenes who subscribed to this idea was Arthur John Evans, a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* who observed the uprisings in Herzegovina and Bosnia from the perspective of an English patriot. In his *Illyrian Letters*, he reported that it did not require “a prophet’s eye to perceive that Austria can only exist as a Slavonic power.” According to him, Austria’s “destiny” to expand southwards and consolidate herself as “a strong South Slavonic power,” thus creating “a bulwark against our rival in the East” (Evans, 1878, 67).
99. Ω, 1875b, 1.
100. Jurčič, 1878, 1.
101. Luković, 1977, 45–46.
102. *Ibid.*, 84, 91.
103. *Slovenski Tednik*, October 10, 1875.
104. *Slovenski Narod*, November 7, 1875.
105. S–c, 1875, 1.
106. Petrović Njegoš, 1988, 306.
107. Luković, 1977, 124.
108. *Ibid.*, 125–26.
109. *Slovenski Narod*, July 30, 1875.
110. Dr. K–č–, 1875, 1.
111. Evans, 1878, 69.
112. Biankini, 1925, 11.
113. Vošnjak, 1912, 59.
114. *Slovenski Narod*, September 30, 1875.
115. *Glas*, July 30, 1875.
116. Toman, 1926, 10.
117. Fischer, 1983, 94.
118. *Edinost*, March 11, 1876.
119. See, for example, Hubmajer, 1875b, 5; Ruffner, 1877, 25–26; Koetschet, 1905, 12; Biankini, 1925, 18; Novak, 1925, 115; Vuković, 1925, 79, 87, 175; Stillman, 1877, 16, 19; Bersa, 1941, 271–72; Vego, 1953, 36; Tejchman, 1985, 112.
120. Novak, 1925, 119.
121. Pelagić, 1880, 77.
122. Koetschet, 1905, 24.
123. *Zastava*, February 24, 1876.
124. Grujić, 1956, 118; cf. Vuković, 1925, 75; Petrović Njegoš, 1988, 298.
125. Vuković, 1925, 75–76.
126. Mrkonjić, 1983, 64.
127. Grujić, 1956, 196, 205, 211; Ekmečić, 1973, 150.
128. P. U., 1875, 3; cf. Proroković-Nevesinjac, 1902, x–xi; Dedijer, 1967, 53; see also Evans, 1877, 336.
129. See, for example, Holeček, 1878, 59.
130. *Slovenski Narod*, April 16, 1938.

131. Holeček, 1878, 59–60.
132. Hubmajer, 1875, 4; Aléšovec, 1878, 18; Vošnjak, 1912, 58; see also Grujić, 1956, 69; Luković, 1962, 123.
133. *Neue Freie Presse*, November 14, 1875.
134. *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne*, November 17, 1875.
135. Jurčić, 1876, 1.
136. *Zastava*, November 22, 1875; *Novice gospodarske, obrtniške in narodne*, November 24, 1875.
137. Slipičević et al., 1952, 127.
138. This name was primarily intended to refer to the swarthy complexion of his face, that is, to serve the same purpose as the name Karadžorđe (meaning “Black George”), and to paint the picture of a man who fought relentlessly against the “Turks,” like Petar (Pero) Mrkonjić, a famous hero from the coastal area who appeared in epic poetry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was “indispensable in guerrilla warfare.” According to Ferdo Šišić (1937, 215), Petar Karadžorđević chose this name after reading the *Serbian Folk Songs* collected by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić.
139. Jelenić, 1923, 172; Petrović, 1924, 13; Jovanović, 1926, 284; Milutinović, 1953, 59; cf. Mrkonjić, 1983, 30–31.
140. Vuković, 1925, 37.
141. *Ibid.*, 79–80, 175.
142. Yriarte, 1876, 301–2.
143. *Zastava*, December 22, 1875; *Soča*, December 23, 1875; Krasić, 1884, 87; Ivić, 1918, 48; Petrović, 1924, 15; Čubrilović, 1930, 140–41; Slipičević et al., 1952, 128; Ekmečić, 1973, 144–46; Mrkonjić, 1983, 55–57.
144. *Zastava*, September 15, 1875; *Glas*, December 24, 1875; cf. Ivić, 1918, 46; Čubrilović, 1930, 140; Ćorović, 1933, 527.
145. *Zastava*, September 15, 1875.
146. *Slovenski Narod*, January 12, 1876; *Zastava*, January 23, 1876; January 27, 1876; see also Ivić, 1918, 49; Čubrilović, 1930, 135; Ekmečić, 1973, 144–46.
147. Jovanović, 1977, 206.
148. Vuković, 1925, 67.
149. *Ibid.*, 147; Jovanović, 1977, 207.
150. Wertheimer, 1913, II, 252; Vuković, 1925, 84, 170; Seton-Watson, 1931, 14; Radonić, 1938, 221; Milutinović, 1953, 38, 48; Luković, 1977, 58.
151. *Laibacher Zeitung*, November 12, 1875.
152. Ivić, 1918, 47.
153. See, for example, Petrovitch, 1915, 154; Dimnik, 1924, 22–23; Pavlović, 1924, 51; Milevoj, 1935, 31; Šišić, 1937, 214–15.
154. Radonić, 1938, 190.
155. Ivić, 1918, 20.
156. Pavlović, 1924, 52.
157. Milanović, 1938, 12.
158. *Slovenski Tednik*, October 10, 1875.
159. See, for example, Dimnik, 1922, 78–80.
160. Teinović, 2006, 5.
161. Ivić, 1918, 35, 47–48, 51; Vukićević, 1923, 14; Petrović, 1924, 14–15; Toman, 1926, 10; Mrkonjić, 1983, 51–52, 58–59.
162. See, for example, Krasić, 1884, 86; Ivić, 1918, 49–50; Karanović, 1921, 41.
163. *Slovenski Narod*, October 24, 1876; *Jutro*, March 4, 1910; see also Krasić, 1884, 89; Čubrilović, 1930, 141.

164. Prijatelj, 1966, 402; Kermavner, 1966, 628–30; Luković, 1977, 202; Doinov, 1979, 159–64.
165. Jezernik, 2021.
166. Čubrilović, 1930, 141. On September 6, 1930, the Zagreb newspaper *Novosti* published a similarly disparaging opinion piece: “Hubmayer was defeated by the Turks, he was incompetent, and besides, the whole affair with Hubmayer turned out to be an Austrian diplomatic intrigue.”
167. *Ibid.*
168. *Slovenski Narod*, October 24, 1876.
169. *Jutro*, March 4, 1910.
170. Čorović, 1933, 1.
171. *Ibid.*, 527.
172. Hubmajer, 1926, 1.
173. Hertz, 1944, 22.
174. Miletić, 1876, 1.
175. Tepić, 1988, 431.
176. Stillman, 1877, 48; Holeček, 1878, 99–100; Vuković, 1925, 211; Mrkonjić, 1983, 52, 58; Tepić, 1988, 398; Buha, 2003, 243.