

# Introduction

In the last few years the words colony and protectorate dominate discussions and writings on the current state of Greece, as the famous country remains locked into an unprecedented (in peacetime) crisis. Since 2010 the collapse of the Greek economy has meant record unemployment and financial dependency, perhaps for years to come; this catastrophe has triggered a rhetoric that talks about loss of sovereignty since the country has become a ‘debt colony’ and a ‘protectorate’. In the nineteenth century, Ionians invented a word for the period of British rule and called it *xenokratia* – xenocracy.<sup>1</sup> Chiotis, Ionian historian and author of a book titled *History of the Ionian State* wrote in 1877:

‘Ionian liberals compared the acts of the Ionian government to the works of a malicious xenocracy’ and ‘the attitude of English in [our] country seemed to them as a xenocracy established through violation of a treaty for the destruction of the Greek State’.<sup>2</sup> The word xenocracy appeared probably for the first time in an article of the radical newspaper *Anagenissis* [Regeneration], where Ionians and the Ionian ‘people’ were called to set aside their differences and fight united as brothers to paralyse the destructive force of xenocracy and its instruments’.<sup>3</sup> In fact the term ‘western xenocracy’ was so ingrained in the politics of the time that the Ionian Parliament in 1850, the first following the liberal reforms of high commissioner Seaton that extended the franchise, castigated western xenocracy when they declared 25 March – Greek Independence day – a national holiday for Ionians.<sup>4</sup>

This was the first period in Greek history when colonialism, protection, dependency and foreign rule were notions that went beyond the metaphorical and polemic ways in which the words are used today, and this is where the beginnings of Greek dependency and its colonial (or ‘colonial’) condition can be traced. The semi-colonial state that formed under British protection in the Ionian Islands – the Seven Islands or *Eptanisa* as Greeks call them – and the involvement of the Great Powers in the 1821 revolution against the Ottoman Empire that created an independent Greek Kingdom hardly makes sense without

understanding French, Russian and especially British involvement in the Ionian Islands.<sup>5</sup>

The book *Xenocracy* shows how a protectorate state that was created by Britain under conditions of colonial rule gradually became ungovernable due to the political and economic contradictions of British colonialism. The modernizing attempts of British and Ionian officials created state institutions but failed because of deficits in public finances, conflicting interests among Ionians, and the oscillations of British colonial officials between autocratic and liberal forms of rule. From the 1840s onwards a liberal middle class became hegemonic in politics, commerce and the public sphere of Ionian societies. Some of those liberal Ionians, the more radical, demanded the unification of the islands with Greece, which was achieved in 1864; this was a case of decolonization that set a precedent in British and imperial politics in the Mediterranean, especially in the case of Cyprus in the twentieth century. As the book shows, the Ionian State depended on colonial administrative categories, an expensive bureaucracy and increased military spending, a fiscal administration and on enforcing, or being seen as able to enforce, public order to exercise power effectively. The liberal discourse of progress and 'enlightened' rule explains the infrastructure and public works project that in theory would render British rule benevolent and even acceptable to Ionians. The contradictions and asymmetries of the Ionian State protectorate reached an impasse in the 1850s; a crisis of legitimacy forced decolonization and the cession of the islands to Greece, on the occasion of the change of dynasty after the expulsion of King Otto in 1862. Decolonization of the islands in 1864 owed much to the ten-year constitutional struggle of the radicals and other liberals and to a lesser extent the rather timid mobilization of the Ionian people against British rule; nevertheless, the decision to cede the Ionian Islands to Greece was a decision made by the British in their own time and on their own terms, notwithstanding the political developments in Greece and the overthrow of King Otto in 1862.

The book delves into the history of the Ionian State and society to raise central issues and inform current debates on the history of British colonialism: economic development under colonial rule, and the transformation of local economies to accommodate British interests; the perception of modernity and its impact on colonized societies; law, colonialism and the function of a colonial state; and the formation of a bourgeoisie in colonial societies through commerce, education, bourgeois virtues and a civil society. The book argues that the making of the Ionian bourgeoisie coincided with the formation of the Ionian State and civil society; in fact antagonisms but also negotiation between Ionians

and foreigners often took place within the state in those clearly stratified Mediterranean island societies. During the fifty years of British rule the Ionian State failed to change the basic institutions of the rural economy and tackle the constant indebtedness of peasants; such was, after all, the typical colonial approach of non-intervention, avoiding jeopardizing the much-needed support of local elites. The progressively deteriorating fiscal condition of the Ionian State stalled any public works projects; only a few were completed in the early years of the protectorate but even these were abandoned later. The arrival of a new generation of liberal Ionians in commerce, politics and state administration created a public sphere and substituted the old political class when they rose to prominence through the new media of newspapers, and in spaces such as commercial and voluntary associations.

There were a few British at the top levels, but it was mostly Ionians who administered and ran the colonial Ionian State; these officials introduced liberal reforms that shaped this hybrid semi-colonial polity.<sup>6</sup> The history of the Ionian State offers another perspective to the history of liberal modernity, characterized by bureaucratic practices, statecraft, commerce, consumption patterns and the rise of civil society,<sup>7</sup> which has not been studied in the colonial context of the British Mediterranean. The only exception is the study of British–Ionian colonial encounter drawing on concepts from historical anthropology and social history.<sup>8</sup> Civil society was the work of Ionian merchants, intellectuals, lawyers, civil servants and some British colonial officers who followed liberal values and principles. Ionians created a public sphere of political parties and groups, philanthropic and literary societies, clubs and social events. A study of the ways in which the Ionian State was organized under colonial rule, and the power relations exercised on the islands by the British and Ionians alike, can tell us about the ability of British colonial rule to adapt but also to coerce indigenous populations to achieve the most effective and costless rule possible.

## The Making of the British Mediterranean

The book avoids a rigid distinction between colony and independent state when studying the impact of British rule on the islands, but raises the broader implications this ‘case’ has for the history of colonialism. Schematically, there were two types of colonies in the British Empire, those with ‘responsible government’, such as Canada and Australia, whose white European settlers enjoyed representative institutions and a large degree of autonomy over legislation; in the other type of colonies,

such as Ceylon, the West Indies and West Africa, British governments in London exercised full authority over legislation and administration, even where a legislative council of appointed locals existed, albeit in a largely decorative role.<sup>9</sup> The Ionian Islands belonged to wartime conquests or acquisitions, what has been called the ‘dependent Empire’.<sup>10</sup> While the Ionian State was born in conditions that resembled a crown colony, it ended being closer to the type ‘responsible government’. Whichever category of colony we chose, however, the concept of ‘informal empire’, which explains how British influence presided over a number of territories that at some point became colonies and whose subordinate position was defined by the ‘imperialism of free trade’,<sup>11</sup> is suitable only to an extent, since the Ionian Islands did not transform into a colony. The definition of the protectorate as ‘polities in which indigenous authorities and occupying forces share sovereignty and authority’ reflects the political and social organization of the Ionian Islands during the period of British rule;<sup>12</sup> the case study of the Ionian State offers also a comparative vantage point to the history of French colonial Mediterranean, in Tunisia for example.<sup>13</sup>

Throughout the history of the British Empire, forms of rule adapted to local conditions with improvisation and ingenuity, but were met with varied success.<sup>14</sup> In 1815, the Treaty of Paris presented British imperial administration in the Ionian Islands with a new set of problems, equivalent to the capture of Ceylon in 1796 and the challenge of setting up a colonial government entirely separate from the East India Company in India.<sup>15</sup> The fifty years that followed the Napoleonic wars buttressed the foundation of an ‘Anglo-Mediterranean order’ and coincided with the heyday of liberal imperialism under the Pax Britannica,<sup>16</sup> a regime that extended to parts of the world previously under absolutist and despotic rulers; the Ionian Islands, Gibraltar, Malta and Sicily (for a few years) were some of the Mediterranean outposts of British rule that, together with Cyprus and Alexandria later in the century, formed a field of experimentation in colonial practices. The transition from despotism to more liberal forms of rule in the colonies – and in areas such as the Ionian Islands – was far from even or rapid. Ionian societies became a colonial ‘laboratory’, where colonial schemes in administration and social and economic organization were applied in more daring and controversial ways than those reserved for straightforward colonies.

The period 1780–1830, the ‘dawn of the Second British Empire’, also saw the ‘massive expansion of British dominion, of techniques of governance and exploitation’, and historiography has generally followed this periodization.<sup>17</sup> High commissioners and the imperial administration

experimented with forms of rule to facilitate imperial policies but also to minimize and/or accommodate local pressures and above all avoid conflicts.<sup>18</sup> Colonial governors and other officials often had no other guide than their experience and they trusted it more than reports from their predecessors or even their superiors; as a result, places such as the Ionian Islands became ground for experimenting with forms of government and colonial institutions. Colonial officers drew on their personal experience from appointments on the colonial circuit, such as administering Upper Canada, Ceylon or India, and on their networks and personal connections from before their term in the Ionian Islands. This partly explains the despotism and the hierarchies that colonial governors imposed in those 'European societies, in Malta, Canada and the Ionian Isles',<sup>19</sup> although these three areas are rarely used within the same historiographical context; the observation however reflects the colonial circuit that many governors followed. Colonial officials wrote about how they reached crucial decisions on thorny issues and how experience shaped their policies. The changes introduced by British and Ionian colonial officers followed the same liberal modernizing project behind regulatory practices in West European and colonial cities.<sup>20</sup> Ionian liberals pursued the same agenda and aimed primarily at improving British protection and not uniting with the Kingdom of Greece, a political aim that only achieved some coherence and prominence in the 1850s; besides the issue of union, Ionians innovated in public policy with the tacit approval or endorsement of British colonial officials.

The project to organize the state under autocratic rule behind a facade of a representative assembly laid the foundations for the failure of the British protectorate, but also exposed the contradictions of the Treaty of Paris in 1815. The pledge of high commissioners to improve living conditions and moral standards that would legitimize British colonial rule remained an empty promise, especially after 1840; the Ionian economy adjusted to British requirements but the Ionian State fell into deficit under the heavy costs of protection, extravagant spending on salaries, and financial mismanagement. Despite the various versions of rule tried by different commissioners and their Ionian counterparts, ranging from autocratic to liberal, depending on the ideas and disposition of each commissioner, increasingly local pressures became insurmountable. This was a progressively failing protection, which in the end was not desired by the majority of Ionians of different classes and occupations, even in Corfu, which got the most out of the protectorate. The British had failed to win the tolerance – if not the support – of Ionians, and the prospect of a new king and dynasty in Greece in 1863

impelled the British to cede the islands and secure their influence over Greece, as a united territory. Despite these failures of the Ionian State, other forms of indirect rule such as the protectorate, or colonial rule in all but name, were applied later in the nineteenth century in Cyprus (1878) and Egypt (1882). The Ionian Islands case therefore allows for an alternative reading of nineteenth-century British colonialism in the Mediterranean.

## The Ionian State and Colonial Governmentality

The Protectorate of the ‘United States of the Ionian Islands’ was only nominally independent; according to the Ionian Islands constitutional charter of 1817 the islands were placed under the ‘exclusive and immediate protection of HM King of Great Britain’. This phrase symbolically and constitutionally relegated Ionians to semi-colonialism, the condition that best describes the experience of a protectorate and the British–Ionian colonial encounter. Herzfeld came up with the term ‘crypto-colonialism’ and identified the ‘paradox’ that Greece is both spiritual ancestor of Europe and political pariah in the European present.<sup>21</sup> The historical if not the intellectual origins of this paradox can be found in the British colonial rule over the Ionian Islands. The tension between the esteemed ancestor status and the corrupt and politically immature pariah (or ‘history’s spoiled children’ as one famous historian from the Ionian Islands called Greeks),<sup>22</sup> emerged for the first time in the Ionian Islands. In the nineteenth century, French and later British colonial officials struggled with Greek political identities and national aspirations. The outbreak of the Greek Revolution complicated Ionian allegiances and shaped their Greek national identity, but it was in the British protectorate that Ionian Greeks came to represent the ‘other’ that had to be governed, modernized, and occasionally punished for being, well, Greek – which in many a colonizer’s mind meant undisciplined, politically immature and potentially troublesome.

The logic of colonial rule, what Partha Chatterjee calls ‘the rule of colonial difference’, distinguished the colonizers from the colonized, was based on the power of the metropole over its subject peoples, and underpinned colonial governmentality in the British Empire.<sup>23</sup> Colonial governmentality is the notion that encapsulates the sophisticated system of surveillance and bureaucracy that the Ionian State developed. Ionians became involved in this system of government as state employees, beneficiaries or adversaries to state policies and practices. In its early days the Ionian State employed practices and strategies

of government that resembled distant British colonial outposts of the long eighteenth century, where the colonial was formed largely independently from the metropolitan imperial centre and was rather performative, especially in colonial frontiers, rather than rigidly institutional.<sup>24</sup> The Ionian Islands colonial ‘frontier’, seen under the notion of governmentality explains how in the nineteenth century rationality became the main organizing principle that shaped relations between government and the people, transforming the ‘art of government’.<sup>25</sup> No other ‘method’ was more instrumental in the expansion of state knowledge about its territory and population than the engineering of social statistics by government bureaucracies, that often resembled a mechanism for profiling and labelling people; ‘nowhere was this more apparent than in the colonial world, where ... European observers and administrators succumbed to the false allure of objectivity’.<sup>26</sup>

The case of Ionian governmentality forces us to think comparatively about the heuristic value of the notion. India has become the focus of a number of recent works on colonial governmentality.<sup>27</sup> Historians have looked at the application of ideas on social and economic organization to understand the impact of British rule on nineteenth- and twentieth-century India. The liberal project that drove regulatory practices in West European (particularly British) and colonial cities was also in the minds of those who introduced changes in the Ionian Islands between the 1830s and 1860s – state officials and British commissioners who created commercial, legal and urban governance institutions, literary societies and philanthropic associations. The concept of colonial governmentality explains how the Ionian State promoted attempts to control and regulate people’s daily lives to conform to aspects of European modernity.

## The Ionian Islands and the History of the Greek State

All states, mighty empires as well as little-remembered kingdoms, come and go,<sup>28</sup> and their histories remind us of their ephemeral life regardless of their ostensible invincibility. The republican waves that the French Revolution unleashed reached the shores of the islands in 1797; foreign intervention created the Septinsular Republic, an autonomous state under Russian–Ottoman Protection, essentially the first Greek State. The Ionian State created expectations among Greeks everywhere and contributed to the emergence of national consciousness; it even helped move towards the Greek war of independence. Commissioners Maitland and, after him, Adam implemented the shift in British foreign

policy from the state of neutrality in 1821 towards the Greek war of independence to the official recognition of the actions of Greek insurgents as constituting a state at war; the proximity of the Ionian Islands to the war zone increased the importance the islands held for the Greek Revolution. Years before the outbreak of the 1821 revolution, the Ionian Islands State proved that an independent state in the Mediterranean was a real possibility, not just an imagined project.

This book offers a decentralized reading of the history of the Greek State. Conventional historical accounts begin with the revolution and the war of independence from the Ottoman Empire (1821–28) that led to dependence on Russia, France and Britain,<sup>29</sup> as the narrative goes, Greeks became more independent than they had even been under Ottoman rule, but the state that emerged still fell short of what utopian revolutionaries such as Rigas Fereos (Velestinlis) had envisioned.<sup>30</sup> As this book argues, this process of informal dependency started before the Greek Revolution in the Ionian Islands, little known for their history but well visited for their beauty. Greece emerged – in chronological order – first with the Septinsular or Ionian Republic (1800–1807), a state created under Ottoman and Russian protection, the periods of French Republic (1797–99) and Imperial rule (1807–14, mostly for Corfu), and as the British Protectorate of the United States of the Ionian Islands (between 1814 and 1864). *Xenocracy* explains how this Greek State formed in the nineteenth century under semi-colonial conditions between 1797 and 1864, and especially during the period of British protection, 1815–64 and therefore seeks to contribute to our knowledge on the socio-historical process of modern state formation in South-eastern Europe.<sup>31</sup>

The formation of Greek states in the nineteenth century – the Septinsular Republic, the Ionian State, the Greek Kingdom, the Principality of Samos and the Cretan Republic – belongs to a tradition or rather practice of empires granting autonomy to borderlands regions out of necessity and diplomatic pragmatism. Within the Ottoman Empire this flexibility is exemplified in the Republic of Ragusa, for centuries under Ottoman suzerainty and subject to a tribute tax but practically independent, and the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which in the eighteenth century were granted to members of the Phanariot Greek Orthodox elite to administer.<sup>32</sup> These states emerged on the periphery of Europe and at the intersection of European states with the Ottoman Empire. The creation of a state in a region that managed to secede from the Ottoman Empire as post-revolution Greece did, with the heavy influence of Russia, Britain and France, was a bright exception, not the norm at the time.



This book's narrative de-centres the dominant Atheno-centric view of the history of the Greek State that considers 1821 as the beginning of Greek state formation. Historians of art and literature are comfortable enough to date the beginnings of modern Greek art and literature to the period of Venetian rule in Crete and the Ionian Islands (in the works of Cornaro, Theotokopoulos, Solomos and others); other historians however are reluctant to think beyond the conventional view of the state born out of the revolution, and trace the origins of the nineteenth-century Greek State not just in the post-revolution and post-Ottoman Greece but in the legacy of Venetian rule and the British protectorate in Ionian societies. The Ionian State was part of the post-Napoleonic wars European order; this order was disrupted by the Greek war of independence. The book compares the two states in order to highlight the different trajectories and the alternative state-formation projects that were under way in the first half of the nineteenth century. Comparing the Ionian State and the Greek Kingdom economies and societies shows how the two converged towards the formation of a national economy and the development of legal systems; it also shows the class antagonisms and the legacy of Venetian and Ottoman institutions and forms of rule. In many ways this is an argument for writing the history of the Greek State by looking at the regions that gradually constituted it.

The Ionian State functioned for fifty years under British-protected colonial rule, but it succumbed to the contradictions of colonial liberalism and local radicalism. Successive forms of foreign domination truncated the liberalism on which Ionian aspirations were founded – a romantic if not utopian political project. The British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands has been regarded as a 'transitional' system of peripheral significance.<sup>33</sup> Historians, even accomplished ones, fail to avoid the cardinal sin of the profession and consider transitional what at the time seemed indefinite; such was the case with the Ionian State until the early 1860s, when the change of dynasty in Greece offered an opportunity for the handing over of the Ionian Islands to the Greek Kingdom. The Ionian State dissolved in 1864 after the ousting of the first king of Greece, Otto – an event that triggered the chain reaction for a change of monarchy. Greece passed under British financial and political clout for nearly a century, as the Ionian islands' societies started the long but smooth road towards integration with the 'motherland', and the peculiar life of this Mediterranean state ended in the name of national unification.

## The Ionian colonial bourgeoisie

The Ionian bourgeoisie emerged during the nineteenth century through commercial prosperity (defined broadly in gains from trade), university education abroad (mostly in law, medicine, philosophy and, less so, the sciences) and an awareness of national consciousness. It was the petite bourgeoisie who assumed the role of avant-garde in the fight for the unionist-nationalist cause. In all accounts, particularly those by Greek scholars who have been most keen to study the unionist movement, one can find numerous references to the class identity of unionists and their enemies. The object of these studies, however, is usually more the struggle for union rather than the class in which unionists belonged. The book looks at the language and the discourses available at the time, especially in the way people defined themselves and other social strata, by drawing on these available discourses. A discursive approach to class ‘assumes that there is no pre-given relationship between class as structural fact and class as social identity’.<sup>34</sup> Class identities did not spring up once industrial capitalism had been established or, in our case, once commercial capitalism was advancing; in the Ionian Islands class identities evolved out of conflicts of interest, negotiation, and the formation of hegemonic relations of power as they played out in the field of state authority.

As the book shows, it was the Ionian bourgeoisie’s relationship with the state (complementary or antagonistic) and their educational and social background that produced the distinct characteristics of what is often termed a liberal middle class. The meaning of middle class-ness differs according to national and linguistic contexts, however, recent approaches to study the middle class draw cases from various regions around the world contributing and pointing towards a global history of middle classes.<sup>35</sup> Despite local and regional particularities there is little doubt that the nineteenth century saw the ‘rise of the bourgeoisie’ and increased the importance of the middle ranks in society; in Corfu and other Ionian cities bourgeois were particularly aware of that and often compared themselves to other ‘civilized’ parts of the world that shared a similar worldview, habitus and hierarchies.

This book shows how the Ionian bourgeoisie formed in the 1830s–40s as a result of the education they received, their liberal aspirations to form a state under the rule of law, and the advances in the commercial economy that heightened class antagonisms; and, above all, it was the result of contradictions in the constitution of the semi-colonial state. The process of class formation can be seen in the adoption of a liberal

philosophy, encapsulated in the issue of free trading of grain and the deregulation of the grain market. Liberalism has always been, after all, the philosophy of the commercial bourgeoisie par excellence, and even if liberalism and the bourgeois worldview were not always identical, they were certainly compatible in the rest of nineteenth-century Europe as well.<sup>36</sup>

The formation of the Ionian bourgeoisie was a process, not an end result or a fixed condition; Ionians, a few British, and other foreigners on the islands who worked for the state or became merchants, lawyers or agents of foreign companies, formed a liberal, semi-colonial bourgeoisie that was split on a number of issues, one of which was the issue of union with the Greek Kingdom. This dynamic definition of the bourgeoisie as a project as well as a class identity explains the contradictions in Ionian class politics during the period of British rule. Modernity in the Ionian State was an aspiration, as well as a condition, expressed by Ionians and British, who were involved in state-building for almost fifty years (more if we include the years of the Septinsular Republic, important as they were for the fermentation of Ionian governmentality). Many Ionians participated in international commercial and intellectual networks during their period of studies abroad, and they were experienced administrators. Besides these unifying elements, the rise of the Ionian bourgeoisie in politics and society reflected their economic standing; but it was not an even process because of the previous history of each island and the gradual realization that they shared collective fortunes. Class was an identity linked with the religious, national and local identities that Ionians fashioned in their newly created public sphere. For these reasons the book does not propose a blueprint of (British) colonial modernity against which the Ionian middle classes will be judged, but exposes the contradictions inherent in any colonial project and traces the actions of protagonists who had the economic, educational and symbolic capital to participate in and create a public sphere.

Middle-class Ionians used the available discourses of nation, society and class to assert their identity against other classes as well as the British and Ionian State authorities. The transportation system of steamships, which connected the islands' ports with Trieste, Livorno, and other cities, ensured the steady flow of people, products, ideas and fashions. Beliefs, values, modes of political discourse and agency but also lifestyle distinguished the Ionian State middle classes from other classes and from Ionian elite groups of previous decades; it also distinguished them from the Greek bourgeoisie in the Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks in major Ottoman cities.<sup>37</sup> This book is part of a project to integrate the history of the Ionian Islands with the post-revolution

Kingdom of Greece during the period 1833–1862 and examine how two Greek states and their bourgeoisies formed in parallel before they merged. Once the Ionian Islands became part of Greece in 1864, many Ionians settled in Athens and germinated Athenian society with their ideas; and they excelled in politics, the university and public administration.<sup>38</sup> It was thus educational and broadly social capital, as well as economic, that enabled Ionians to produce but also consume a colonial modernity much earlier than other parts of the empire, such as India for example.<sup>39</sup>

The response of middle-class Ionians to the British colonial project was diverse; educated, informed about European – mostly Italian, but also French and British – ideas of economic and social organization, middle-class Ionians adapted the colonial project to their realities and agendas. Against the backdrop of British-inspired discourses of a corrupt Venetian-Ionian past, middle-class Ionians willingly adopted this image to fuel their own ambitious rise in politics and the Ionian public sphere. Through this contrast a distinctive Ionian ‘middle class-ness’ emerged. Many Ionians joined the Greek Kingdom integration project with ambivalence in the 1840s but with enthusiasm in the 1850s. After fifty years in the Ionian State (1815–64) a fragmented middle class emerged, navigating its way through various forms of state control, its Venetian past, its British colonial present and its Greek future. The Ionian bourgeoisie, especially the most liberal and radical amongst them, managed to empower themselves against both the (initially) superior Ionians of the previous generation, many of whom collaborated with the British until the end, but also against the lower classes. The age of reform, which began after Venetian rule ended with the integration of the islands with the Greek Kingdom, began a new trajectory for these island – but far from insular – societies.

## Chapters and Sources

The challenges that historians face when paying attention to the ‘circuit of ideas and people, colonizers and colonized’,<sup>40</sup> are addressed here by showing the impact of colonial rule on both Ionians and British during the formation of the Ionian State. The pages that follow interrogate critically the sources produced by British and Ionian officials, intellectuals, the Ionian bourgeoisie as well as the ‘common people’, all filtered through the Ionian State bureaucracy, to discuss the most important aspects of economic and social transformation in the semi-colonial state until it dissolved in 1864 into the Greek Kingdom, taking

it deeper under the British hegemonic influence, which lasted until the 1940s.

Chapter 1 demonstrates the crucial years following the end of Venetian rule in 1797 and the various forms of rule and occupation that shaped the Ionian Islands' politics and society and laid the foundations for Ionian governmentality that developed during the period of the Ionian State. The importance of the constitutions of 1800 and 1803, and the economic and diplomatic developments of the time, are discussed because they form the basis for the idiosyncratic federal state that followed during the period of the protectorate.

The first few years of the transition from an occupied territory to an area of the Protectorate and the United States of the Ionian Islands were crucial. Chapter 2 discusses the first two challenges the British administration and Maitland personally faced; the plague outbreak in Corfu and Kefalonia of 1816 and the uprising in Lefkada in 1819, which in turn stalled the establishment of an Ionian militia. When the Greek Revolution broke out in 1821, martial law was also imposed to prevent Ionians from breaking Ionian neutrality – part of the British policy on the issue – and thwart any rebellions on the islands. The chapter shows how efficient the Ionian State mechanism was in battling disease, disarming the population and suppressing even the slightest threat to tranquillity on the islands; in these tasks Ionians in positions of authority were quick to offer their services.

Chapter 3 shows the ways in which the tenacious class structure of the Ionian Islands under British rule 'produced' the institutional and in particular legal framework that is so important in any process of state formation. Law reform was among the priorities of many colonial powers in search of legitimacy, efficient bureaucratic administration and ordering practices for the control of the population. In the Ionian protectorate the project of legitimization failed when nationalism and the radical unionists prevailed, but the construction of an efficient, even if expensive, bureaucracy was quite successful. High commissioner Maitland based his ideas about legal reform and governance on his previous experience as a colonial administrator, and saw similarities between the 'tribes' of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Maltese society and the Ionian Islands, where Maitland ended his career in British colonial office. British officials drew comparisons between Ionians and other subjects of the empire, and portrayed Ionians as the 'Mediterranean Irish'.

Chapter 4 shows how Ionian State officials conducted population registers for colonial administrative purposes but also held a meticulous record of petitions to the local and central authorities that reveal

the language, concerns, requests, pleas, demands and motivations of Ionians of all classes. After 1827, population registers were constructed annually for the Blue Books of Statistics. This collection of knowledge formed the backbone of colonial policy in the Ionian Islands, and in the empire as a whole. The 'Blue Books' were compiled in all colonies of the British Empire with the aim to provide imperial officials with the knowledge that they considered important for optimal government. These books recorded population, revenue, trade, shipping, currency, public works, legislation, civil servants, enumeration of schools, prisons, hospitals and lunatic asylums, in an impressive attempt to impose colonial uniformity on vastly different societies. These series were published and evaluated by Parliament, and were intended to provide an imperial compass; British commissioners took into account the wealth of information to be found in the registers. The detailed accounts submitted to the Colonial Office accompanied the colonial statistics, and from the early 1840s onwards indicate a more systematic approach to Ionian administration and closer cooperation between the Colonial Office and the commissioner in Corfu.<sup>41</sup> Information was collected by Ionian staff on the islands, and by the bureaucrats of the British Empire in the Colonial Office. Sometimes with accuracy and sometimes in approximation, officers collected information about the population and the economy of the colonies as well as 'grey areas' such as the protectorate of the Ionian Islands, which until about the 1860s enjoyed a special – even if peculiar and occasionally embarrassing – status in this transitional period of the British Empire. This is the reason why the Ionian Islands have escaped strict categorization, since they formed neither a colony nor an independent state.

The 'Blue Books' were part of the imperial knowledge accumulated through measuring, recording and classifying population in 'statistics'; the ability to use this information for colonial projects of control and development is what distinguished the modern state from previous forms of record keeping and measurement. Venetians compiled 'cadastral' sources for centuries, but the Venetian *Proveditore* or Governor never used these sources to achieve the sophisticated level of colonial governance of nineteenth-century colonial rule. Ionians quickly adopted measurement and the detailed record keeping of population, land, production, climate, customs and geography in a fine example of local governmentality.<sup>42</sup> Later in the nineteenth century, colonial statistics informed Parliament and shaped colonial policy. Historians have demonstrated the importance of census and statistics for colonial governmentality in settler colonies, the tropics and South Asia, but not for European lands.<sup>43</sup> Statistics were part of a technology of domination,

and as such developed in most colonial regimes, especially in India, one of the ‘investigative modalities’ that were crucial to the operation of colonial power, together with the historiographical, the observational/travel, the survey, the enumerative, museological and surveillance.<sup>44</sup> In the Ionian Islands one could add to these modalities the juridical, given the importance that all commissioners paid to the introduction of codes and the modernization of legislation in Ionian societies. British colonial officials regarded the islands as a colony, and applied a homogenizing model borrowed from the colonies that aimed at improving the quality of administration. This attitude made perfect sense from an administrative point of view, especially for the period until 1849 and the Seaton reforms, which allowed free press, extended the franchise by a few thousand people, and paved the way for radical unionist politics. British officials calculated people, production and trade, the ‘population’ and the ‘economy’, for the Ionian Islands, using the same methodology used for Caribbean islands and other colonies, although the historical trajectory of Ionian economic and social structures was worlds apart from those in the Caribbean or the dominion of Canada.

Chapter 5 argues that the ambiguous state of Ionian independence manifested itself most vividly in the political economy of the Ionian State and especially in the relationship between merchants and the state. Responding to the call by Cooper and Stoler for more complex engagement with colonial institutions and the work that colonial states do beyond the political aspects of decision making on the economy, including the creation of racial and economic categories, this chapter looks at the categories of inclusion and exclusion in the labour economies. ‘Labour’ and ‘trade’, however, were not entities with fixed meanings across time and space in the British Empire, but can serve as key concepts in understanding the political economy of colonialism at the time and for the Ionian Islands. It is more productive and historically accurate to focus on the forms of power that specific institutions projected and reproduced in the ‘field’ of economy as much as anywhere else.

Chapter 6 shows the ways in which the finances of the Ionian State were crucial for Ionian attitudes to the protectorate, which did not have control over its own finances but was constrained by the semi-colonial relation with the British Empire. The revenues of the Ionian State from import and export duties determined the capability of Ionian governments to pay for public works and promote the modernization project that British commissioners and Ionian liberals shared. The Ionian budget was a high priority in both Corfu and London since, according to British principles, colonies and dependencies had to pay for their expenses, including those incurred by the British army. The case of the Ionian

Islands shows the fiscal impact and the limits of development in regions under colonial rule or, in the case of the Ionian State, semi-colonies.

Chapter 7 conducts an investigation of Ionian public works and estimates the amounts spent, since this project was at the heart of colonial modernity. Public works of infrastructure and communication integrated the islands' rural population into urban markets, transferring even more power to the commercial – administrative – military hubs of Corfu, Zante and Argostoli. British and Ionian officials designed and ordered the construction of a dense and efficient road network in Corfu and Kefalonia. They also redesigned and attempted to modernize and impose order on Ionian cities, with impressive results for both their architecture and their functionality. Ionian State governments oversaw the integration of new and old groups in Ionian cities, the arrival of the Parga refugees, the Maltese colonial migrants and the coexistence of Christians and Jews in Corfu. The Ionian Islands were far from united, coherent or politically and socially stable. Ionians developed distinct and often competing regional, insular, identities as well as a common identity as Greek Orthodox subjects since Venetian times; the cities of Zante and Corfu were more diverse because of Catholic and Jewish populations, foreign merchants, officers and soldiers who settled during the period of Venetian rule, and Maltese workers and Parga refugees who enriched Corfu urban society in the 1810s. The most important aspect of Ionian identity however was not regional or 'national' but was based on class and defined by the strong division between town and country. Class differences were a direct result of the islands' mode of production, the cash crops that since the sixteenth century integrated the Ionian economy with the European mercantilist system. A Venetian colonial administration with the indispensable help of Ionians produced a system that allowed for abuse of power, unaccountable allocation of resources to *rentiers* (such as tax farmers) and surplus extraction from the semi-impooverished and chronically indebted farmers of the cash crops olive oil and currants. By the time the British took over in the 1810s the 'state' was fragmented, inefficient, poor, and badly in need of reform and modernization.

Chapter 8 demonstrates how the Ionian State promoted the islands' development through the necessary institutional framework and what is in today's jargon called 'structural reforms' in the Ionian economy. In the 1820s, the government also strived to promote agriculture, recognizing that increased exports would mean increased revenues. Parliament passed the first act promoting economic policy in April 1823.<sup>45</sup> This was the first of a series of measures adopted to promote agriculture but also 'arts' and 'commerce'. The resolution created a



parliamentary committee, which pledged to enquire about obstacles that were hindering agricultural progress, consider what measures could be taken to alleviate these obstacles, and investigate where land could be cultivated or improved. Other duties included suggestions for the consolidation of landed property. The resolution also called for the publication, in both Italian and Greek, of the committee's conclusions introducing a new mode of governance that was accountable, transparent and, in theory at least, open to deliberation. Projects such as the savings bank and the societies for the improvement of agriculture were part of the same concept seeking to improve Ionian economies but also societies; this process also included regularization and control of the key professions and occupations of the cities, such as doctors and porters, but also of fishermen. These groups and individuals promoted their interests in a negotiation with the state through petitions, an invaluable source for historians to understand how Ionians perceived their condition and their relationship with the state authorities. By the end of the period, Ionian officials were skilled enough to devise projects of colonial governmentality in education, agriculture and prison reform, to mention only some of their contributions to public policy examined in the book. None of these reforms, however, was enough to quench the thirst of the more 'radical' Ionians for unification and an end to 'xenocracy' in the Ionian Islands. Chapter 9 looks at how the British-Ionian state and the Ionian and British elite introduced practices that strove to regulate economic and social life. This ideology coincided with practices followed in Britain during the same period. The model of social organization adopted as well as the practices to implement it were the same, namely the ones followed by the British bourgeoisie. The increasing use of police force in the towns to remove the pariahs of Ionian society pushed them further towards its fringes, and shows the unwillingness and inability to improve the conditions of poverty through philanthropy, and the necessity to introduce more stringent measures. The question of poverty in the Ionian Islands during the period would have to consider the deterioration of living conditions for the majority of the population. The increase in the number of the urban poor reflected the recognition of beggars and vagabonds as a social problem, and was primarily the result of the worsening economic condition on the islands and the difficulties of securing a living by relying on agricultural production; it was also the result of the more systematic recording of poverty. The Ionian State and the urban elite responded in different but complementary ways to the problem of poverty as it became more visible in Ionian towns. Ionian liberals, with the assistance of the state, consolidated their

exercise of power in the public sphere with regulations, discourses and practices of social control. The coercive means of criminalizing begging, confinement and hard labour for anyone over twelve years old was the joint project of the state and the Ionian liberal bourgeoisie to achieve social control through philanthropy but also through force. Philanthropy emerged as a voluntary institution of bourgeois activism. In Corfu and the other Ionian islands, the agenda of philanthropy was far wider than simply distributing aid to the poor, and was founded on the principle and practice of voluntary organization by merchants, lawyers, state officials and military officers. These groups played a pivotal role at a moment of crisis and social upheaval caused by the outbreak of cholera in the suburbs of Corfu in 1855.

The meaning of 'middle class-ness' differs according to national and linguistic contexts, however recent approaches to the study of the middle class draw cases from various regions around the world contributing and pointing towards a global history of middle classes.<sup>46</sup> During the period of transition from the Ottoman and Venetian context to the Greek State, merchants (and less so intellectuals) were often regarded as the diaspora bourgeoisie who contributed in various ways to the formation of modern Greece, and who gradually during the nineteenth century transferred their economic and political power to the Greek State. Greek historians and political scientists have underestimated the agency and the role of the Greek bourgeoisie in its own making;<sup>47</sup> instead they opted for other factors, following mostly an old-fashioned dependency theory approach and tools drawn from political science and anthropology: comprador capitalism, foreign influence, clientelism and political patronage.<sup>48</sup> The Greek (and Ionian) urban world was so fragmented, especially in the nineteenth century, that a Greek national bourgeoisie sounds implausible and unconvincing, just like elsewhere in Europe, where bourgeoisies were distinguished by their local identities and civic pride.<sup>49</sup> What distinguished some Ionians as a bourgeoisie was not only their commercial-economic, financial and shipping activities (as a conventional definition of a colonial bourgeoisie would suggest), although these were undoubtedly present; but, as Chapter 10 specifically and the book show, it was the educational and social background that produced the distinct characteristics of a liberal middle class and defined the relationship between the Ionian bourgeoisie and the state (complementary or antagonistic). In the Ionian Islands case, the term 'bourgeoisie' in the broader sense than the strict Marxist definition of class reflecting the capitalist relations of production is more appropriate, because it avoids the tripartite definition of upper, middle and lower class; many Ionian bourgeoisie were upper class and many upper class Ionians did

not share the worldview that could be found among the bourgeoisie in other European and Mediterranean cities. On the other hand, given the peculiarities of each island, it is also fair to speak about the Ionian middle classes to describe the formation of a class of lawyers, merchants, politicians and after 1848 journalists as well as civil servants with conflicting aspirations about their state and society's fortunes; at the same time these same people shared lifestyle, dress, language, social norms, a common education and above all their attitude towards British rule over their country – what liberal and radical Ionians called *xenokratia* or 'xenocracy'. It was this attitude that ultimately drove some of them apart, dividing them into reformists and radical unionists.

This structure of chapters reflects, and aspires to capture, some of the key moments and developments in the process of state and class formation in the Ionian State. Rather than follow a strict chronological sequence it follows a thematic order that does highlight the changes during the terms of different high commissioners, as they undoubtedly mattered. The politics of the bourgeoisie were inextricably linked with the building and development of the colonial state to the extent that the bourgeoisie formed the state and at the same time they were shaped by it. The various sources that are used in each chapter – government documents, newspapers, publications, contemporary accounts of travellers and officials, but also the petitions of Ionians of different classes – show the negotiation and conflicts that emerged in the process of class and state formation. The overwhelming presence of British colonial power should not mask the agency of different groups of Ionians, most active among them, the middle class, who embraced ideas of liberalism, state and social reform, national integration and unification with Greece, and thus broke away from their traditional Venetian-era structures and their British colonial present, looking into a Greek future, for better or for worse for them.

## Notes

- 1 The first book to use the term was published at the end of the nineteenth century by G. Filaretos, *Xenokratia kai Vasileia stin Ellada* (Xenocracy and Monarchy in Greece), in 1897. The term was also used in one reference for the history of education in the Ionian Islands; E. Yotopoulou-Sicilianou, 'I Eptanisiaki paideia sta chronia tis ksenokratias', *Kerkyraika Chronika* XV, 1970, 101–121.
- 2 P. Chiotis, *Istoria tou Ioniou Kratous*, vol. B, p. 26 and 35–36.
- 3 *Anagenensis*, No 12, 25/6/1849.
- 4 *Fileleftheros*, No. 30, 19/3/1851.

- 5 For the role of Russia in the making of modern Greece see Lucien J. Frary, *Russia and the making of modern Greek identity, 1821–1844*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- 6 The concept of semi-colonialism is rarely used in cases other than China but it is probably more appropriate in cases of state projects such as protectorates. Hobson went into more speculative detail than Lenin and anticipated a joint invasion of China by the financiers of the great powers; Jurgen Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis', in Wolfgang Mommsen (ed.), *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, 290–314.
- 7 Simon Gunn and James Vernon (eds), *The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity in Imperial Britain*. Berkeley: University of California, 2011, 12.
- 8 Thomas W. Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity and Power in the British Mediterranean*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002.
- 9 David Sutherland, *Managing the British Empire: The Crown Agents, 1833–1914*. Royal Historical Society: Boydell Press, 2004, 1.
- 10 Andrew Porter, 'Introduction', in A. Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. 3*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 4.
- 11 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 6 (1953): 1–15.
- 12 Heather Streets-Salter and Trevor Getz, *Empires and Colonies in the Modern World. A Global Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 5.
- 13 Julia A. Clancy Smith, *Mediterraneans. North Africa and Europe in an age of migration, c. 1800–1900*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011.
- 14 Porter, 'Introduction', 18. Darwin writes that 'coercion and collaboration were two sides of the same coin', and one needs to pay close attention to the conditions on which British expansion aiming at trade or dominion depended. In any case, 'this was almost never possible without some form of alliance or understanding with the rulers and peoples who claimed or controlled the area concerned'; J. Darwin, *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain*. London: Bloomsbury Press, 2012, 8, 228.
- 15 Helen Taft Manning, *British Colonial Government after the American Revolution, 1782–1820*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1933.
- 16 Robert Holland, *Blue-Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean since 1800*. London: Allen Lane, 2012.
- 17 C.A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830*. London and New York: Longman, 1989, 2.
- 18 R. Hyam, 'The Primacy of Geopolitics: The Dynamics of British Imperial Policy, 1793–1863', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 27(2) (1999): 27–52.
- 19 Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, 8.
- 20 Patrick Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City*. London: Verso, 2003.
- 21 Michael Herzfeld, 'The Absent Presence: Discourses of Crypto-Colonialism', *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101(4) (2002): 899–926. For another critique, see Gourgouris, *Dream Nation*.
- 22 K. Kostis, *Ta kakomathimena paidia tis istorias*.

- 23 Catherine Hall (ed.), *Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000, 7.
- 24 Kathleen Wilson, 'Rethinking the Colonial State: Family, Gender, and Governmentality in Eighteenth-Century British Frontiers', *American Historical Review* 116(5) (2011): 1294–1322.
- 25 Historians influenced by Foucault, 'use the term liberalism to capture a new mentality and method of government that emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Far from being wedded to a particular set of ideas or the ideology of a political party, this mentality was the product of new forms of knowledge and expertise. In turn, they produced and justified new techniques of rule over those subjects deemed capable of self-government (the informed, industrious, healthy, and self-improving individual) as well as those others found incapable of it. Some have claimed that it is possible to identify eras of liberal government that stretch from the late eighteenth century through to the late twentieth. As a political technology that extends far beyond the realm of politics and the work of the state, liberalism here is a diffuse rationality, generated by many actors from multiple sources and evident in a panoply of everyday practices and material environments. It is seemingly everywhere and nowhere'. Gunn and Vernon, *The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity*, 9.
- 26 Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014, 29.
- 27 See David Scott, 'Colonial Governmentality', *Social Text* 43 (1995): 191–220; Peter Pels, 'The Anthropology of Colonialism: Culture, History, and the Emergence of Western Governmentality', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26 (1997): 163–83; U. Kalpagam, 'Colonial Governmentality and the Public Sphere in India', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 15(1) (2002): 35–58; Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom*.
- 28 Norman Davis, *Vanished Kingdoms: The Rise and Fall of States and Nations*. London: Penguin, 2011.
- 29 Thomas W. Gallant, *Modern Greece*. London and New York: Arnold, 2001; Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Modern Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 2002; John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Modern Greece: A History since 1821*. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010; Κωστής, *Τα κακομαθημένα παιδιά της ιστορίας*.
- 30 P.M. Kitromilides, 'An Enlightenment Perspective on Balkan Cultural Pluralism: The Republican Vision of Rhigas Velesinlis', *History of Political Thought* 24 (2003): 465–79.
- 31 Tassos Anastasiadis, Nathalie Clayer (eds), *Society, Politics and State Formation in Southeastern Europe during the 19th Century*. Athens: Alpha Bank Historical Archives, 2011.
- 32 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008, 8–9. Christine Phylliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011.

- 33 John Petropoulos, 'Introduction', in N. Diamantouros et al. (eds), *Hellenism and the Greek War of Liberation (1821–1830)*. Thessaloniki: Insitute for Balkan Studies, 1976.
- 34 S.A. Smith, *Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and Labour in Shanghai, 1895–1927*, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2002, 9.
- 35 A.R. López and B. Weinstein (eds), *The Making of the Middle Class: Toward a Transnational History*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012.
- 36 A. Mitchell, 'Bourgeois Liberalism and Public Health: A Franco-German Comparison', in J. Kocka and A. Mitchell (eds), *Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. Oxford: Berg, 1993, 350.
- 37 Haris Exertzoglou, 'The Cultural Uses of Consumption: Negotiating Class, Gender and Nation in Ottoman Urban Centers during the 19th Century', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35(1) (2003): 77–101.
- 38 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, 'Ioannis A. Valaoritis: The Life of a Typical Greek Nineteenth-Century Bourgeois?', in P. Carabott (ed.), *Greek Society in the Making, 1863–1913: Realities, Symbols and Visions*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, 55–69.
- 39 Sanjay Joshi, *The Middle Class in Colonial India*. New Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- 40 F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler, 'Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda', in Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, 34.
- 41 M. Paximadopoulos-Stavrianou, *Politeiografika Ionion Nison epi Agglikis Kyriarchias 1815–1864. Oi etisies ektheseis tis Armosteias pros to Ypourgeoio ton Apoikion*, Vol. I. Athens: Etaireia Kefalliniakon Istorikon Erevnon, 1997.
- 42 One such example is the book by E. Theotoky, *Details Sur Corfou*, Corfu, 1826.
- 43 Pels, 'The Anthropology of Colonialism'.
- 44 B.S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- 45 Risoluzione del II parlamento (12 April 1823).
- 46 López and Weinstein, *The Making of the Middle Class*.
- 47 Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece, the Modern Sequel*. Γ.Β. Δερετλής, *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Κράτους* [History of the Greek State], Athens, 2006.
- 48 Diamantouros, *I aparches sygkrotisis sychronou kratous stin Ellada*. The 'failure' of the Greek bourgeoisie to live up to its expected role and reputation is an argument that has returned forcefully as the Greek crisis has deepened. This argument, despite its ambivalent empirical foundation, raises the question of whether there was ever a Greek national bourgeoisie – or middle class, as it is sometimes called – and whether this is another fictitious concept introduced by analysts and (some) historians.
- 49 There is only one work that has stressed this aspect of the Greek bourgeoisie and has opened an avenue in Greek social history that has not been taken up: Yannitsiotis [Yannis Yannitsiotis, 'Social History in Greece: New Perspectives', *East Central Europe* 34–35 (2007–8): 1–2, 101–30].