

# INTRODUCTION



Nestling in the Carpathian foothills, in the Polish voivodeship named after them, lies the village Lutcza, some thirty kilometers south of the regional capital Rzeszów. The climate here is determined by the surrounding mountain peaks and plateaus, with wide temperature variations, high precipitation, and ground frost on an average of 208 days per year. “In a word that characterizes the facts fairly accurately, even if it is a bit old-fashioned”:<sup>1</sup> winter comes early and stays long in the Carpathian foothills.

In the year 1881, when Lutcza and Rzeszów still belonged to the Kingdom of Galicia, thick snow had fallen by November that remained until early March. On 6 March 1882, the thaw exposed the previously snow-covered corpse of Franciszka Mních, who had been missing from the village for months. Franciszka was in her mid-thirties and unmarried. She had last been seen in late November leaving the home of her aunt Salomea Stochlińska, who lived at the edge of the village in a small cluster of houses. She had gone to fetch some milk from her aunt’s neighbor, a certain Moses Ritter.<sup>2</sup>

The Ritter family ran a farm and a *Trafik*, as tobacco stores are still called in Austria today, and enjoyed good relations with the neighbors. The villagers stored their potatoes in the Ritters’ cellar, and the local farmers liked to sit and drink together in Moses’s *Trafik* of an evening. Franciszka Mních, known as Franka, was a frequent visitor to the Ritters’ house. She had previously worked there as a maid. Since the spring, however, she had helped only occasionally on one or two days a week. It was said that Moses Ritter was like a father to her, and Gittla Ritter like a mother. But Moses’s closest friend in the village, the locals later recalled, was Franka’s cousin, Marcel Stochliński. Since he had sold his land, he earned his living doing deals at local fairs and had a reputation as a drinker. The villagers said that Marcel had learned Yiddish during his long evenings with the Ritters and their relatives and neighbors, the Felbers, and conspired with them in their secret language. They said all this later, after Franciszka had been found in a gully not far from the Ritters’ home.

Her body was terribly disfigured. A medical examination showed that she had not died of natural causes. She had received a blow to the head, and her throat had been slit. Her stomach had also been cut open with a knife. The place where she was found was apparently not the scene of the murder. But two other details consternated the onlookers most, and all agreed they pointed to Franciszka's murderer. Her braids had been cut off—they were found a few yards away in the melting snow—and a child had been growing in Franciszka's belly. It would have been some four months old at the time of the attack and had been brutally cut out.

A beastly, incomprehensible murder had occurred in Lutcza, horrifying the villagers. Their mourning for Franciszka and their fear of living next door to a brutal murderer bred fantasies with which they tried to explain the inconceivable and identify the evildoer.

The imperial-and-royal gendarmerie from the district capital Stryżów arrived in Lutcza the next day to investigate the murder.<sup>3</sup> They found the locals eager to talk. Several residents of Lutcza recounted incidents that had occurred in the last half-year that they thought might have some bearing on what had happened to Franka. Many had their own theories about why she had disappeared, though an illegitimate pregnancy would certainly have been reason enough to wish her gone. But if that was the motive, who was the father of her child? Moses Ritter was a rumored candidate. Franka's brother stated that he had never approved of his sister associating with the Ritters and had tried to deter her several times. He had even tried to persuade her to go on a pilgrimage to get away from "the Jews." Some said that Moses was oversexed; others, that he could do magic. He was said to have cursed his neighbor Mandela, who had tried to sue him, leaving him blinded. As Franka's last known movements had been to the Ritters' house, the police officers from Stryżów started their investigations there. They noted that the cellar was very clean, perhaps indicating that traces had been removed. And they found an axe that was soiled with a dark substance, which could conceivably have been blood. During their subsequent search of the Felbers' home, they found two long knives in a black covering.

On 11 March, Moses and Gittla Ritter and Leib and Chil Felber were arrested on suspicion of murder. They all denied having anything to do with Franka's disappearance or death. Eleven days later, the police decided to question the Ritters' neighbors, the Stochlińskis. They found Marcel behaving in an extremely odd and distracted manner. Having thus roused their suspicions, he, too, was taken in. Indeed, in Stryżów, Marcel confessed. Franka's murder had been planned by Moses Ritter, he said. Moses had "put the bun in her oven" and subsequently feared for his family's reputation. Murder seemed the last resort. He had paid Marcel fifty guilders to be his accomplice. When Franka had come to the Ritters' house on the first Sunday in Advent, Gittla had called her into the cellar to fetch some potatoes. Moses had given Marcel two shots of liquor before they went

down into the cellar with the Ritters' eldest daughters, Bajla and Chaja. There, Gittla threw a blanket over Franka's head, and Marcel and the Ritter girls held on to her so that Moses could cut her throat. When Franka started to scream, Marcel ran out of the cellar. That was all he knew. The next day he received fifty guilders as promised.

On the strength of this statement, Leib and Chil Felber were released; on 4 April, Bajla and Chaja Ritter were arrested. But by this time, Marcel Stochliński had withdrawn his testimony. The police officers had literally beaten the cellar-murder story out of him on the way from Lutcza to Stryżów.

This unexpected twist did not have any impact on the investigations or the impending prosecution. Now that Moses Ritter was the prime suspect, the bizarre injuries inflicted on Franka's body seemed to point the finger directly at him. The mysterious braid-cutting and belly-slitting could be explained by the exotic religious rites that Ritter and his family allegedly practiced.

Attempting to conduct a rational investigation, the police officers sought the opinion of experts on whether cutting off braids and slitting open stomachs were traditional aspects of the Mosaic faith. Two Israelites from Stryżów, Aron Kenner and Jakub Schutz, were consulted. They affirmed that it was common among Jews to remove the fetus from the body of a deceased mother. Cutting off the braids of dead women was also customary, they said. In preparation for the trial, due to begin in December, the public prosecutors in Stryżów commissioned an expertise from the rabbinate in the imperial capital, Vienna.

Word of the gothic tale of Lutcza now spread far beyond the foothills of the Carpathians. In the Galician capital, Lemberg, politician and writer Teofil Merunowicz took the rumors surrounding Franciszka Mnich's death as cause to issue a warning against what he saw as the source of the menace, the screenplay for the brutal mutilations, as it were. In an address to the regional diet, he claimed that the Talmud contained secret passages that called for such rituals. Consequently, he proposed to "regulate the legal situation of the Jews," citing the much-publicized views of August Rohling, a theology professor from Prague. He also referred to the "Tiszlaeszlar affair" in Hungary, concerning the disappearance of Eszter Solymosi, which was causing a stir throughout Europe. Coverage of the events in Lutcza in the newspapers of Lemberg, Krakow, Warsaw, and Vienna not only reflected the widespread public interest in the case but also generated additional, transregional interest. As the trial thus gained importance, it was transferred from the Stryżów district court to the regional court in Rzeszów.

During the hearings in December, the courtroom was consistently filled to bursting with curious onlookers and journalists from the aforementioned cities. The latter supplied their commissioning newspapers with reports on the trial's progress and vivid descriptions of the persons involved.

The expertise by the rabbi in Vienna contradicted the statements by Kenner and Schutz. Removing fetuses had once been permitted but only if it promised to

save the life of the unborn child, the rabbi explained. However, the practice had long since been prohibited due to the possibility that the mother might not be clinically dead. Basically, Mosaic doctrine forbids any intrusion into the physical integrity of the deceased, including their hair. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that Judaism is passed on through the mother, so neither Franciszka, who was a Christian, nor her unborn child, whoever the father may have been, would have been subjected to Jewish rites.

The rumor that Franka was a victim of murder by Jews acting in obedience to their religion nevertheless persisted in the courtroom. The witness Jędrzej Noster stated that during Lent rumors had circulated in Lutcza that Franka had been murdered by Jews “for the Matza.” Although this ritual-murder theory was not explicitly mentioned in the bill of indictment, it remained in the ether as an explanation for the mutilation of Franka’s neck and body. The newspapers also took up the narrative thread of the bloody ritual, though none maintained it was a credible motive. Rather, journalists wove it into their vivid portrayals of the trial to convey an impression of the lives and mindsets of the people of the Carpathian foothills to their urban readerships. The interaction between the erudite judge, the uneducated villagers, the Jews in the dock, and the urban public in the courtroom resulted in highly entertaining scenes. One of the witnesses consistently began each of his answers with a confused “Huh?,” eliciting laughter throughout the courtroom. Even the judge made an obvious distinction between the uneducated peasants questioned and those who, as the newspapers put it, “were fluently articulate” by addressing the former with the informal “du,” like children, but the latter—principally members of the Ritter family—with the more respectful “Sie.” However, to the readers of the middle-class *Czas* (Times) newspaper of Kraków, the Ritters were portrayed as somewhat alien, albeit not entirely foreign, beings who, like the rustic Christian villagers, believed in ritual murders, the evil eye, and probably ghosts and witches, too.

In an article in the December 13 issue of *Czas*, the author sketched the following images of the accused for his readers: Moses Ritter was “provincial” and had an “ordinary character” but was an eloquent speaker. His wife, Gittla, had the “typical face of a Jewish alewife,” but she, too, spoke fluent Polish. One of their daughters had a stony appearance, but the other had an “engaging face” and “bright eyes.”

The jury eventually found Moses and Gittla Ritter and Marcel Stochliński guilty of jointly murdering Franciszka Mních, and they were sentenced to death by hanging. However, the Supreme Court in Vienna suspended the sentence and transferred the case to the upper regional court in Krakow. August Rohling, the theology professor mentioned above, offered his services as an expert in the new trial, but the court declined. Though convinced of the Ritters’ and Stochliński’s guilt, the Krakow public prosecutors dismissed the idea of religious motives. Nevertheless, the newspapers *Gazeta Warszawska* and *Gazeta Narodowa*, for

which Teofil Merunowicz wrote, claimed that “religious fanaticism” was behind the murder, prompting Gittla Ritter’s defense lawyer to complain that the entire Jewish religion was in the dock and under attack. The death sentence pronounced in Krakow was also suspended by the highest court. The justified doubts about the plausibility of the evidence and the quality of the forensic examinations were contested from as far afield as the German Empire. A brochure was published in Berlin, running to three editions, with the baroque title “Death in Lutcza: Documentary Description of the Murder of Franziska Mních by the Hand of Jews and the Related Court Hearings Together with Concluding Remarks,” claiming that the “mighty influence of the Jews in Austria” had resulted in the sentence being suspended twice, despite the convincing evidence against the accused.

During the third trial, which began on 17 September 1885 in Krakow, the brothers Jakub and Jan Drzewiecki spoke to the newspapers to describe why they believed that Franka had been murdered by the hand of Jews for religious purposes. Jakub was the parish priest, and Jan, the local vicar in Lutcza. Both claimed to represent the views of their congregations that the Talmud contained incitements to commit atrocities. Death sentences were pronounced on 28 September but were once again suspended by the Viennese Supreme Court, and this time orders were given for the accused to be released.

Moses and Gittla Ritter took their first steps in freedom, almost four years since Franka’s body had been found, on 3 March 1886. By that time, Marcel Stochliński had died in custody. Perhaps he took the name of Franka’s murderer with him to the grave. But the tale of the death in Lutcza endured, and the relations—sometimes harmonious, sometimes antagonistic—between Jews and Christians continued.

The present book will return to Moses Ritter and the other people of Lutcza thirteen years later. Although the village soon retreated into obscurity again, it is worth lingering a while and reflecting on the events that were described with such conviction. The questions that remain can serve as a window on the bygone Kingdom of Galicia and its inhabitants and as a framework for an investigation into antisemitism around 1900.

The first questions to ask are these: What kind of a place was Galicia? Where was it? How was it linked to Poland, Vienna, and Austria? Who wrote the laws governing the population’s coexistence, which one local politician tried to change? What standards and rules regulated interaction between the social and religious groups, in the cities Krakow, Rzeszów, and Lemberg, and in villages like Lutcza? How was the state—embodied by figures such as the gendarmerie, judges and public prosecutors—run? Was their disrespect for the Christian villagers and greater esteem for the Jews typical? Why did they nevertheless rely solely on the testimonies of Christians?

The “Ritter affair” provoked a huge response, spanning a wide range of opinions expressed with an equally wide range of intentions. The newspapers de-

lighted in portraying the peculiarities of village life more than in analyzing the legal aspects of the case. Neither the politician in Lemberg nor the writer in Berlin, let alone the professor in Prague or the priest in Lutcza, acknowledged the Krakow judiciary's dismissal of religious motives. But they all voiced opinions on the affair, purportedly on behalf of the Christians affected, who were not able to speak for themselves. Learned people talked for them and about them, often in mocking tones. Why did the Christian villagers, like their Jewish neighbors, have no voice of their own? Did they seek to break out of their communicative isolation? Did the sensational murder case perhaps provide an opportunity to overcome the cultural distances and differences separating the village from the city, the rural backwater from the urban center? Did the people of Lutcza, at the dawn of the twentieth century, really have no other option than to endure being patronized by the judiciary and the press? Yet despite the lack of understanding between the parties, given to speaking about each other rather than with each other, the court case marked a dialog concerning an incident in which Jews were implicated. Below, I will consider the shifts in popular perception of Jewish religious practices, of rural Christian-Jewish relations, and of national law and justice, and the political consequences those shifts had.

What impact did the commentaries from Berlin, Vienna, and Lemberg have on village life in Lutcza and the surrounding hamlets after the Ritters' release? Did the locals still gather at the Ritters' *Trafik* in the evenings, store their potatoes in the Jews' cellar, and allow their nieces to work for them as maids? How did the Ritters conduct themselves after having their religion maligned as the cause of gross atrocities? Did the accusations change the Christians' attitudes toward the Jewish neighbors they had known so long and thought they knew so well? At which point did their familiar neighbors become foreign Jews? And what role did this kind of conflict play in the campaigns of antisemitic politicians? After all, politicians respond to situations where they see a need for change, and members of parliament act on behalf of their electorate.

In more general terms, this book about antisemitism will inquire into the connections between journalism, parliamentary politics, the search for justice, and the coexistence of Christians and Jews in everyday life and in exceptional circumstances, and whether these factors were mutually influential. If it is true that the Christian population maintained close contact and neighborly relations with the local Jews while remaining isolated from and patronized by the authorities and politics, with only Catholic priests supporting their belief in medieval tales of bloodletting and magic, is it at all meaningful to speak of antisemitism in Galicia, in the sense of the modern, secular, and political phenomenon we know today?

Below, I will address these questions with respect to Galicia in the late nineteenth century and use them to develop a methodological approach to examining other similar cases in Galicia.

## Background

Galicia existed as a political entity only from 1772 to 1918, yet it was more than a brief episode in history. Over the span of just a few generations, it was the scene of tremendous political, social, and economic change. The estates-based social order was dismantled, and a civil society established; its members transformed from subjects into citizens.<sup>4</sup> Market economy and economic competition gave them new opportunities for social advancement and material improvement, but equally carried unforeseen risks of loss and ruin. Instead of relying on their village community, guild, or paternalistic manor, they were now required to show initiative and take personal responsibility, and offered new, urban, middle- and working-class models of communitization and identification. Increasing numbers migrating within the crownland, from the villages to the cities and vice versa, whether for single seasons or for longer periods, spelled the end of rural isolation.<sup>5</sup> Faster communication, thanks to the railways, telegraph, and newspapers, made life more complex, multiplying both the opportunities and the challenges for the populace. Old hurdles crumbled, but new inequalities and asynchronies arose.<sup>6</sup> The relatively new concept of the nation motivated people to forge new bonds and dissolve old ones. The lives and thinking of these few generations of Galicians was crucially shaped by the Habsburg Monarchy.<sup>7</sup> It was under Habsburg rule that they experienced nothing less than the transformation of the world.<sup>8</sup>

This groundbreaking change is clearly reflected in the shift in the political zeitgeist from the time of the founding of the Kingdom of Galicia to the time of its dissolution. Galicia was a new state created and ruled by the Habsburg Monarchy following the partitions of Poland and Lithuania, which the absolutist empires of Prussia, Austria, and Russia had conquered and carved up between them. These partition powers regarded the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, ruled by elected kings and controlled by the aristocracy, as outdated and obsolete. It was incompatible with their ideal of an enlightened state and duly consigned to history.<sup>9</sup>

Galicia ceased to exist with the end of World War I and the demise of those once-so-mighty empires. The former partition powers were now dinosaurs themselves. The divine right legitimizing their dynasties appeared hopelessly flimsy against the peoples' claims to governance of their nations and the historic mission of the proletariat.<sup>10</sup>

## Invention of Galicia after the Partitions (1772–1846)

The full title of the crownland was Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and the Grand Duchy of Krakow with the Duchies of Auschwitz and Zator.<sup>11</sup> Galicia and Lodomeria were the Latinized names of the medieval principalities of Halych, or Galyč, and Volodymyr, which had formerly belonged to the Kievan Rus and, in

the thirteenth century, the Hungarian crown.<sup>12</sup> However, the borders of Galicia only vaguely approximated those of the historical principalities. The name was taken as a retrospective attempt to legitimize the annexation of the new territory and as a way for Maria Theresa to assert her claim to the principalities as queen of Hungary. Joseph II, her son and co-regent, was the driving force behind Habsburg involvement in the partitions, and Galicia's first architect. But for several decades, Austrian policy on Galicia was marked by a conflict of interests: whether to integrate it into the imperial federation or to exchange it, preferably for the sorely missed region of Silesia, which Maria Theresa had lost to Frederick II of Prussia in the mid-eighteenth century.<sup>13</sup> Not only that, Austria constantly vacillated between disempowering and cooperating with Galicia's politically and economically dominant aristocratic elite, the *szlachta*.<sup>14</sup>

## Experimentation in the Poorhouse

Perceiving Galicia as backward and in a state of legal and social disorder, Joseph II deemed it a suitable site for experimentation with absolutist reforms. The monarchy decided to focus on increasing the land's productivity—in other words, exploiting it for tax revenue.<sup>15</sup> But its economy remained weak, and—along with Galician politics—dominated by the nobility throughout its existence. Beset by a combination of fruitless imperial policy and unfortunate domestic circumstances, the crownland earned the label “poorhouse of Europe.” Indeed, it was perceived in such a negative light that “Galician misery” became proverbial.<sup>16</sup> In this predominantly agrarian region, many craftsmen and small traders were struck by poverty as well as farmers and agricultural workers. Even at the time, the roots of the problem were seen to be overpopulation, outmoded farming methods, and a lack of opportunities for investment. Famines, epidemics, and emigration were the recurring phenomena with which Galicia came to be generally associated within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.<sup>17</sup>

With a more disparate historical, political, socioethnic, and economic makeup than longer-existing crownlands such as Bohemia or the so-called hereditary lands, Galicia was expected to serve primarily as a sales market and, in the case of war, a potential deployment or buffer zone for the Habsburg lands south of the Carpathian Mountains.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, the previously widely held image of Galicia as a Habsburg colony has given way to a more nuanced view in recent years.<sup>19</sup> The financial crisis known as “the Panic” and innovations in agriculture affecting many countries in the 1870s inevitably hit Galicia. In addition, Galicia struggled with poor harvests and imports of cheap grain from Hungary and low-cost products from the more industrially developed crownlands in the west of the empire.<sup>20</sup> Ultimately, then, Galicia did not benefit from the empire's customs union or economic policy.<sup>21</sup>



## The Population of Galicia

Measures introduced to increase the crownland's productivity changed the ways in which the various social and religious groups in Galicia coexisted. For one, an official complaints procedure was introduced to negotiate disputes between peasants and landowners, which raised the peasants' self-confidence.<sup>22</sup> Until well into the nineteenth century, authority figures such as manor owners, foresters, gendarmes, and mayors had commonly punished adult peasants by flogging. Consequently, there was a deep-rooted fear of authority among the peasantry, as well as a newer sense of needing to fight the reactionary Galician nobility to secure the benefits offered by Austrian rule.<sup>23</sup>

Jews often acted as financial mediators between the landowners and the serf farmers. Prohibited from owning land, Jews had specialized in crafts, trade, and financial services since the Middle Ages, and constituted an estate of their own with peculiar rights and duties.<sup>24</sup> Many leased land for cultivation, obtained licenses to serve alcohol, or worked in the lending sector.<sup>25</sup> About 10 percent of the population in Galicia were Jews, most of whom lived in small and medium-sized towns.<sup>26</sup> Imperial policies designed to induce Jews to contribute more "productively" to the economy and to force those occupied in agriculture to move away from the countryside were only half-heartedly implemented in the crownland.<sup>27</sup>

The overwhelming majority in Galicia were Christian peasants. Most inhabitants of West Galicia, bordered by the Vistula River in the west and the north, by the San in the east, and the Carpathian Mountains in the south, spoke Polish and belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. Alongside their place of origin and residence, their religion and social status as peasants were their primary identifiers.<sup>28</sup> The same applied to their counterparts in the far larger region of East Galicia, bordered by the San in the west, the Carpathian Mountains in the south, Bukovina in the southeast and the Zbruch River in the east. While Catholics and Jews predominated in the towns of West Galicia, an "ethnic triangle" formed in the more pluralist environment of East Galicia.<sup>29</sup> The majority here consisted of Ukrainian-speaking peasant members of the Uniate Church. The heirs of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, they retained their Orthodox liturgy while also recognizing the primacy of the pope.

Under the Habsburgs, the Eastern rite Uniate Christians were renamed Greek Catholics, to bring them up to a par with Roman Catholics.<sup>30</sup> Christians and Jews typically regarded each other as "the others."<sup>31</sup> The divergence between their occupations, languages, and religious beliefs informed social life and kept the two collectives separate. Yet they were financially co-reliant and shared a long tradition of living alongside and with one another. The occasional conflicts that arose between them remained embedded in the context of familiarity based on frequent local contact. This was determined by the economic functions and status associated with the respective ethnic groups within the community.<sup>32</sup>

The aptly titled work “Symbiosis and Ambivalence” by Rosa Lehmann, based on a historical and anthropological case study of the small Galician town of Jaśliska, paints an incisive picture of interethnic relations in Galicia.<sup>33</sup> Here, the term symbiosis does not connote entirely harmonious cooperation. Rather, it describes the space between the tension-laden contact, characterized by dependence and patronage, between wealthy Jews and poor peasants, whose symbiosis was rendered additionally ambivalent by cultural divergence. Focusing more closely than on a general notion of “growing antisemitism,” Lehmann’s work sheds light on a relationship between Jews and Christians which, though dynamic, remained generally stable beyond World War I and the interwar period. The first sections of this introduction also offer examples of the various business, neighborly, and emotional ties that linked Jews and Christians, as well as the cultural potential for otherness, such as allowed the Ritters, for instance, to so abruptly become “the Jews.”<sup>34</sup> In the second half of the nineteenth century, major changes in Galicia’s political and economic framework fundamentally altered the circumstances in which Jews and Christians interacted.

## **Galician Slaughter, Springtime of the Peoples and Neo-Absolutism: The End of Serfdom and the Rise of Market Economy**

The year 1848 brought radical changes to Galicia and the entire Habsburg Monarchy. The first significant sign of turbulence occurred in 1846 with the outbreak of a Polish national uprising in the Free City of Krakow, auguring the “springtime of the peoples.”<sup>35</sup> Planned by insurgent nobles—émigrés living in Paris—the uprising started under the assumption that the peasants would take part and fight the military with their scythes and picks, as they had during the Kościuszko Uprising of 1794.<sup>36</sup> But the peasantry associated “Polish” rule with serfdom and bondage, and feared a regression to the harder times before the Josephine reforms.<sup>37</sup> The internal conflict was further aggravated by the Catholic sobriety movement, whose fight against liquor and taverns polarized rural life.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, the sobriety movement can be regarded as an early example of a socially divisive political campaign that aroused class resentment to promote its cause. Meanwhile, the imperial authorities, then still staffed by Germans anxious to avoid deposition by the Poles, sought to harness the peasants’ anger at the nobility to their own ends.<sup>39</sup> They offered to pay peasants to help their armed forces quash the Polish uprising and search manors for weapons.<sup>40</sup>

The result was a witch hunt on aristocrats and the families of estate owners, which ended in large-scale pillaging and arson. Up to a thousand people lost their lives in an orgy of violence by men, women, and children, targeting around four hundred manors. It was only after three days of violence that the military intervened in a bid to take control of the situation.<sup>41</sup>

The authorities' sanctioning and even rewarding of peasant violence gave rise to rumors that the emperor himself had decreed a three-day murder campaign against the nobility.<sup>42</sup> Bulletins were said to have circulated offering rewards for the heads, hands, or ears of insurgent landowners. For the nobility, the events of February 1846 were so traumatic that they came to be remembered as the "Galician slaughter."<sup>43</sup> Their shock at the peasants' brutality was compounded by the belief that government officials had incited them to act in this way. In the nobility's paternalistic view, the peasants would not have turned against them of their own volition.<sup>44</sup>

By the peasantry, in contrast, the "ruckus" was remembered as a sign of the power they possessed to defend the rights of their class.<sup>45</sup> They composed poems and songs to immortalize the events, which articulated their confidence and signaled their ability to could cause another bloodbath if their rights were ignored.<sup>46</sup> After the slaughter and the revolution of 1848, Austria abolished serfdom. But the memory of 1846, and concern that recently gained liberties might be revoked at any time, remained a prominent feature of peasant communication for several decades.

Following the abolishment of serfdom, the formerly dependent peasants were able to buy the land they had hitherto only tilled.<sup>47</sup> Market economy having replaced feudal economy, peasants needed to learn to work profitably and competitively. The monarchy hoped this land "distribution" among newly emancipated peasants would bring the country's economy into line with the other crownlands. Moreover, the Galician governor Franz Stadion, Count von Warthausen, advised the young emperor Franz Joseph in this way to weaken the Polish nobility, who had once again demonstrated their seditiousness with the attempted uprising of 1846, and reward the peasants, who had proven their loyalty.<sup>48</sup> Yet while the reforms succeeded in cementing the Galician peasants' bond with the Habsburg Empire, they did nothing to relieve their financial plight.<sup>49</sup> There was simply too little land to be distributed among too many people. Meanwhile, the nobility was generously compensated for the loss of land and cheap labor they suffered and permitted to retain some of their privileges. The right to manufacture, sell, and serve alcohol, known as propination, was still conceded only to the gentry. Members of other classes needed to pay for a concession to work in this field.<sup>50</sup> Another bone of contention was the *Servituten*, regulations governing access to formerly communal forests and fields.<sup>51</sup> A special tribunal was set up to negotiate disputes over the issue but almost always ruled in favor of the landowners and against the villagers and so failed to build the peasants' confidence in the new economic order.<sup>52</sup> The tribunal's hearing a tremendous thirty thousand cases illustrates the huge potential for conflict that Galicia's economic reorganization generated. As the monetary economy, primarily run by Jews, gained precedence, an increasing number of Jews left the towns and sought work in the country.<sup>53</sup> Though still prohibited from acquiring land, they were no longer subject to re-

strictions on manual occupations. A conflict arose between the worlds of agriculture and finance, which was frequently perceived as a Christian-Jewish conflict.

In consequence of the upheavals of 1848, Austria introduced structural changes that altered relations between the imperial government and its provinces. Bukovina, which had been ceded to Austria from the Ottoman Empire, was formally detached from Galicia and made a separate kingdom in 1849.<sup>54</sup> The Free City of Krakow became a Grand Duchy, incorporated into Galicia, to diminish its importance and potential for sedition. Having lost its status as a free trade area at the intersection of three empires, Krakow's economy slumped. As a form of redress, in 1854 the government of West Galicia was relocated to Krakow, while the East Galician government was based in the provincial capital, Lemberg.<sup>55</sup> Although this administrative division lasted only until the introduction of the constitution in 1867, it cemented an image of Galicia as bipartite. As the empire was federalized, the possibility of formally dividing Galicia into a "Polish" western territory and a "Ruthenian" eastern territory was frequently discussed.<sup>56</sup>

## National "Emancipation"

In 1848, the year of revolutions, the Galician Ukrainians—or Ruthenians—also rose against the paternalism of the Polish nobility to assert their rights as a nation.<sup>57</sup> They launched a campaign to promote the Ukrainian language, which ran in parallel to a debate on whether the Greek Catholic, Ukrainian-speaking inhabitants of Galicia were part of the Russian or the Ukrainian nation. "Russophile" and "Ukrainophile" were watchwords of the time, carrying not only cultural and national but also political connotations—of orientation toward religion and the clergy on the one hand and toward the "nation" on the other.<sup>58</sup> In this way, groups that had previously been excluded from political participation moved into the foreground of debate. Not least because of their sheer size, they could no longer be overlooked as a factor in political developments.

The three largest religious groups in Galicia made up the following percentages of the population: Roman Catholics around 45 percent, Greek Catholics around 42 percent, and Jews around 11 percent.<sup>59</sup> However, over the course of the latter nineteenth century, attributions of estate and religion became subordinate to national and linguistic identifiers.<sup>60</sup> Consequently, in this and other cross-class nations, peasant integration and Jewish "assimilation" occurred in tandem.<sup>61</sup> Conversely, each nation asserted itself by excluding the others and engaging in ongoing fights for their "vested rights."<sup>62</sup> After 1848, a wave of national struggles engulfed all of Central and Southeastern Europe.<sup>63</sup> Cities, regions, and population groups were claimed by various national movements, who symbolized their entitlement by giving them names in their own language. In the springtime of the peoples, both historic and young nations called for self-determination and for their language to replace or be added to German in education and adminis-

tration.<sup>64</sup> This demand challenged the authority and very self-conception of the Prussian and Austrian states.

In regions with mixed-national populations where many Germans lived, such as the Sudetenland, Silesia, East Prussia, and Transylvania, the contest with the central power inevitably involved a regional conflict between the coexisting nationalities over status and influence. Galicia was characterized by a Polish-Ukrainian dualism. Neither national group fought for keeping German as the official language. They were more concerned with the relative importance of the Ukrainian or Polish language in public life. For the Austrian empire, however—an entity conceived of as a “German state”—the use of German in the administration and education of a region earmarked for civilizing by means of “German culture” was of crucial importance. The Galician Jews, whose bourgeois elites mostly identified with German culture, were caught between these regional Galician and supraregional Central European levels of conflict.

## The Blurring of the “German Frontier”

Belief in having a mission to civilize central Europe with “German culture” was an integral part of German nationalism. It was one of the issues deliberated on in St. Paul’s Church in Frankfurt.<sup>65</sup> Urban Galicians also identified with German culture and harbored fantasies of bringing it to less civilized colonies. Germans formed a diaspora nationality, living in enclaves or urban centers, in many regions of Eastern and Central Europe. Many held high-ranking positions<sup>66</sup> working for the Prussian or Austrian state, each of which had established systems of governance using German as the official language. A significant number of these German upper classes in Central Europe were Jewish.<sup>67</sup> Until well into the nineteenth century, many of them were convinced of the legitimacy of the German civilizing mission, including in the religious sphere.<sup>68</sup> In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, many Austrian officials and, increasingly, Jews became integrated and “assimilated” into the local non-German national communities. The children of the generation who had brought German culture to the frontier, then, were themselves Hungarians, Poles, Croats, or Czechs.<sup>69</sup> After decades of working in the education or administrative system of Hungary, Galicia, or Croatia, for instance, or resettling in one of the many multilingual towns in the empire, an individual’s linguistic and national orientation might take a complete change in direction.

## The Jewish National Dilemma in Central Europe

Within this multinational space encompassing a range of nationalisms, Jewish assimilation to the nation could never be satisfactory to all. Jews developed independent concepts of nation, which stood in competition with non-Jewish na-

tional identifiers while essentially validating the national order of the world. The Jewish dilemma arose from the diversity of Jewish designs in combination with the tendency to seek uniform categories.<sup>70</sup> Attempts to find them in Central Europe were bound to end in frustration not only with the categories but—by extension—with one’s very understanding of the world. Central and Eastern European Jews no longer necessarily identified as German but with a range of different nations. Factors of language and parentage pointed individuals toward secular and ethnic self-definitions of Jewishness. These could potentially be ascribed and appeal to all Jews, despite the many visible variations of Jewishness, which became evident as migration from the peripheries to the capitals increased. At the same time, Jews set up their own interest groups to take an active role in international politics. Educated, middle-class Jews, some in high-ranking offices of their nation-states, worked toward helping disenfranchised orthodox Jews in Romania, Russia, and Galicia. The contrast between acculturated, successful Jews and impoverished, “foreign,” and nonconformist Eastern European Jews, and the supranational assistance provided by the former to the latter, was most visible in the capital cities of the Central European empires with “Slavic-Jewish” peripheries, Berlin and Vienna.

This was where fears of the demise of German culture and foreign domination by Jews and Slavs were most frequently voiced. Here, politicians and journalists popularized anti-liberal, antisemitic notions, interweaving envy of Jewish social climbers, fears of being superseded by competition “from below,” and skepticism regarding Jewish loyalty to the nation.<sup>71</sup> Even more than in Berlin, such ideas resonated strongly in Vienna, where Germans formed a minority within a state that was incrementally shedding its German character.<sup>72</sup>

## **The Austro-Hungarian Compromise and the December Constitution of 1867**

Austria’s “compromise” (German: *Ausgleich*) with Hungary and the Constitution of December 1867, designed in response to military defeats by the Sardinians and French (at Solferino in 1859) as well as the Prussians (at Königgrätz/Hradec Králové in 1866), fundamentally changed the character of the Habsburg Empire. Under the constitution, the emperor’s subjects became citizens and were guaranteed equal rights regardless of religion and social background. The empire that had been held together by the Habsburg dynasty became a complex entity consisting of two equal states, dually ruled by the emperor of Austria and the king of Hungary. The kingdom of Hungary, also known as the “Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen” and “Transleithania” due to its geographical location (from a Viennese perspective) beyond the River Leitha, was governed by a separate administration in Budapest.<sup>73</sup> A year later, a compromise was concluded

with Croatia-Slavonia, a possession of the Crown of Saint Stephen, guaranteeing the land autonomy in judicial, administrative, and cultural affairs.<sup>74</sup> As well as constituting half of the empire, Hungary was a centralist Magyar nation-state.

The situation was different, however, in the western half of the empire. Cisleithania, as it was known, even came to oppose national politics. In the age of liberalism, the two German-speaking states that ruled predominantly non-German-speaking areas progressed along divergent paths. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 benefited Hungarians, Croats, and Poles, but pitted them against Slovaks, Croats, or Ukrainians. Elections in Cisleithania in 1879 marked a shift in the balance of power away from the German nationalist Liberals and toward the Slavs and Conservatives.<sup>75</sup> As the German language became less attractive on the periphery, the educated Jewish middle class—hitherto an important group of German speakers—were seen not only to abandon the “German cause” but even to support its opponents, the Hungarian and Slavic nations.<sup>76</sup> Had they openly supported the German nation in Central Europe, they would have incurred the hostility of local nationalists. Of all groups, Jews most often embodied the entanglement of nationalities in Central Europe, which became problematic whenever a situation demanded unequivocal commitment to one nation, excluding all others. Usually, the determining factor was regarded as colloquial language. Yet after 1900, many middle-class Jews in the Habsburg Empire lived with triple identities: in terms of ethnicity and religion they were Jewish; in terms of culture, Polish, Czech, German, Hungarian, or Croatian; and in terms of political allegiance, loyal to the supranational multiethnic state.<sup>77</sup>

In contrast to Austria, Prussia not only persisted with its policies of Germanization and centralization after the founding of the German Empire but even intensified them around the turn of the century. Here, the German language and “German education” remained highly valued cultural assets among Jewish subjects. Yet despite the political divergence between Austria and Prussia, and the rivalry between their dynasties, subjects of both empires continued to see themselves as fulfilling a mission to bring German culture to Central Europe. After 1848, with the growing realization that there would never be a “German Central Europe,” German nationalism gained an exclusive character. The more the nation was imagined as an “objective” community of ancestry rather than a subjective community based on shared ideals, the more precarious the Jewish position became in the respective national projects. Prussia was admired as a pan-German trailblazer by nationalists in Austria as well as in the German Empire. German nationalism, propagated by the rulers in Berlin to consolidate the newly founded empire, consequently served to destabilize and delegitimize Habsburg rule in Cisleithania.<sup>78</sup>

Before this empire was officially named Austria in 1915, it was clumsily called “the kingdoms and lands represented in the Imperial Diet.”<sup>79</sup> The largest and most populous of these was Galicia.<sup>80</sup>

## **Galician “Autonomy” in the Habsburg Empire, or the Polonization of a Habsburg Kingdom**

The Austro-Hungarian Compromise changed the face of the crownland Galicia and its relationship to the rest of the empire. It was preceded by a so-called minor compromise.<sup>81</sup> In exchange for cultural autonomy, the representatives of the Galician elites in parliament, comprising the higher clergy, major landowners, and the conservative bourgeoisie, pledged loyalty to the crown and constitution, and to support the work of the government.<sup>82</sup> Galicia was gradually “Polonized.” Polish was made the official language of government and instruction at the universities in Lemberg and Krakow and at most schools in the land.<sup>83</sup> As more Poles occupied positions in administration, and Polish names became more visible in society, Polish rose in importance on a symbolic level. Middle-class Jews increasingly spoke Polish, rather than German, at home and in their social lives.<sup>84</sup> The Jewish reformist community in Krakow was quicker to embrace this change than the Jews in Lemberg.<sup>85</sup> Indeed, Krakow became something of a Polish pantheon, given to public celebrations of national heroes and landmark events. In the Galician capital Lemberg, in contrast, the different nations fought for dominance of the public sphere. The city became the theater of a Ukrainian-Polish clash of nationalities.<sup>86</sup>

Although the two groups were almost equal in terms of numbers, the Ukrainians were politically and culturally at a disadvantage.<sup>87</sup> Census suffrage and electoral fraud had cemented Polish rule in Galicia.<sup>88</sup> The introduction in 1906 of the universal right to vote for the Imperial Diet, and a major dispute over the choice of teaching language at Lemberg University, which culminated in the murder of Galician governor Andrzej Potocki by a Ukrainian student in 1908, shifted the Ukrainian-Polish conflict to the foreground of political debate, even straining the Habsburg Empire’s relations with Russia.<sup>89</sup> Both the Poles and the Ukrainians regarded Galicia as their Piedmont, holding more potential for political agitation than their national enclaves in the Tsarist Empire.<sup>90</sup> Many nationalists chose Galicia as their center of operations, fueling fears of irredentism in Vienna and St. Petersburg. The governor’s office in Lemberg, the highest level of government in the crownland, tried to allay such fears by cracking down on disloyal opposition. The governor was appointed by the emperor, even during the period of autonomy, and always from the Polish high nobility. A regional committee acted as Galicia’s legislative body; the regional parliament had merely an advisory function. There was also a minister for Galician affairs in the Cisleithanian cabinet.<sup>91</sup> With the political turnaround in Cisleithania in 1879, when the German Liberals lost their hitherto stable majority in the Imperial Diet and the conservative Count Eduard van Taaffe became prime minister, supported by a coalition of clericals and Slavs,<sup>92</sup> Galicians took prominent positions in government for the first time. From a Viennese perspective, Galicia was both far away and



very present. On the one hand, it was geographically remote and still perceived as exotically rustic and backward;<sup>93</sup> but on the other, Galician members of the Imperial Diet now exerted considerable influence on Cisleithanian politics and brought political and national issues from the periphery to the center.<sup>94</sup> By 1897, there were Poles in key positions in the imperial cabinet: Kasimir Badeni, head of government and minister of the interior; Eduard Rittner, minister for Galicia; Leon Bilínskí, finance minister; and Agenor Goluchowski, foreign minister.<sup>95</sup>

## A Second Boost to the Economy and the Start of “Mass Politics”

Despite Galicia having gained “autonomy,” it was now more tightly enmeshed within the empire.<sup>96</sup> Under the constitution, Jews were citizens with equal rights, entitled to vote and stand for election and to acquire land.<sup>97</sup> This served to galvanize the rural economy.<sup>98</sup>

Jews started acquiring large estates and agricultural property, often at public auctions of foreclosure properties, and the proportion of Jewish-owned land quickly grew.<sup>99</sup> In 1877, the Galician diet deemed it necessary to enact a law “against dishonest actions in credit operations,” which was extended to all Cisleithania in 1881.<sup>100</sup> While Jews entered the field of agriculture, hitherto the preserve of Christians, ever more Christians strove to earn a living in the growing trade and service sectors. This break with the traditional roles ascribed to Christians and Jews was attended and interpreted by political debate in the Imperial Diet, press, and during election campaigns.<sup>101</sup>

Addressing issues such as the restoration of Polish statehood or the founding of other nation-states, this debate extended beyond the borders of Galicia. Until the last third of the nineteenth century, Central Europe’s political actors could only imagine accomplishing such changes by means of armed, revolutionary “liberation” from the Partition Powers. But after the failed revolt of 1863–1864, known as the January Uprising, and under the growing influence of the middle-class intelligentsia and its positivist worldview, they started to recognize the potential of “society” to author a state.<sup>102</sup> Intellectuals spoke of “organic work,” by which they envisaged improved material and spiritual circumstances for the masses—the “people”—following reforms in education and the economy. The church started to take an active role in the social life of the villages, with abstinence campaigns and popular gatherings to appeal to the religious community. In parallel, the secular intelligentsia launched its own social improvement offensive, calling for “work for the people.” For their words to make any impact, however, they needed to be followed by actions, and here again Galicia proved more dynamic than the “Vistula Land.”<sup>103</sup>

The imperial government facilitated modern collective identification. The Imperial Diet, known in German as the *Reichsrat*, and the constitution provided a

framework for society's politicization, which progressed steadily after 1867 and increased rapidly from the 1880s onward.<sup>104</sup> The right to freedom of opinion, which removed constraints on political journalism and generated a newspaper boom that made the press a fixture of everyday life, propelled this process.<sup>105</sup> But the main catalyst was the elections to the regional diets and the Reichsrat. Held on a regular basis, they motivated actors to become politically organized and form political parties according to collective markers of identification. Electoral results were interpreted as clear information on community membership.<sup>106</sup> But in fact, the various collectives only became reality in the process of fighting the elections.<sup>107</sup>

Political groups with varying social and national emphases evolved in Galicia in opposition to the long-ruling conservative forces. Here as elsewhere, the political landscape was dualist in character and dominated by conservatives and liberals. But “democracy” was the watchword unifying the opponents of the conservatives. Liberalism, in contrast, tended to be associated with foreign influences and especially German centralism within the Habsburg Monarchy.<sup>108</sup> The Ruthenians also had two main political camps: Conservatives, supported by the clergy and landowners, opposed to a greater extent by a down-to-earth, secular movement than bourgeois Liberals. The national and cultural conflict between Ukrainophiles and Russophiles turned into a party-political clash. Concurrently, the political frontlines shifted as the question of national or social orientation started to displace the conservative/liberal dualism. The ruling Polish Conservatives found themselves confronted by a growing Ukrainian opposition. But opposition to the conservatives was by no means exclusively national—that is, against Galicia's Polonization. Polish nationalists also criticized the elite's Austrian patriotism and alleged indifference toward the plight of the peasants and the people in general. The controversial term “Badenism” was coined—from the name of Governor Kasimir Badeni—to encapsulate the Galician elite's cooperation with the central government in Vienna.<sup>109</sup>

Both in the romantic and positivist traditions of nationalism, the people (Polish: *lud*) were assigned a special role in national “rebirth.”<sup>110</sup> They formed the core and the basis of the nation. New means of communication, improved education, and the prospect of parliamentary representation thanks to extended suffrage opened a broad field of pluralist social activity in rural Galicia.

## **On the Kindred and the Other: Peasant Movements in Galicia**

The peasant movements were the clearest reflection of the radical changes occurring in everyday village life in Galicia.<sup>111</sup> They manifested the end of the village communicative sphere's isolation and the dawn of modern forms of political and medial communitization based on reinterpretations of existing structures. They

spawned activists, a new breed of professional politician, who set about improving the lot of the peasants after the example of populism in the Russian Empire and cooperative societies in Western Europe.<sup>112</sup> They gave peasants the opportunity to influence the fate of their class or local environment. The press and various societies and public assemblies joined in the discussions of peasant problems and demands, which were started by intellectuals but needed to be conducted in the language of the peasants and originate from the peasants themselves, acting as lobbyists and politicians, to make an impact.<sup>113</sup>

The history of the peasant movements can be regarded as a history of emancipation from serfdom, illiteracy, and the confined world of the Central European village.<sup>114</sup> Whether it can also be viewed as a history of national awakening is questionable.<sup>115</sup> Certainly, the fact should not be overlooked that one of the peasants' objectives for becoming organized was to free themselves from the "Jewish yoke" and "Jewish hands."<sup>116</sup> To regard the history of the peasant movements expost as a "natural" development of the nation is to see its agitation as the expression of an "objective" conflict over resources and national ownership.<sup>117</sup> By this logic, the liberation of the "kindred" people had to occur at the cost of the "others." But there was no clear definition of who the "kindred" were and, conversely, who "the others" were. People could only claim to belong from the experience of social processes and subsequently transpose their claims onto real life. Communitization worked in opposition to other social groups and by updating the memory of past protests and unrest.

## Peasant Revolts in Constitution-Era Galicia

In spring 1872, eleven sheriffs from central Galicia informed the governor of rumors among the peasants that the gentry (Polish: *pany*) intended to reintroduce the feudal practice of serfdom. Since the emperor, who had abolished it one generation previously, was vehemently opposed, a local manor owner had supposedly planned to assassinate him. According to another rumor, one of the "right-honorable ministers" had struck off the emperor's left ear and injured his hand during a dispute.<sup>118</sup> Sometimes the dispute was said to have been over the distribution of fields and forests among the peasants, which the emperor supported and the nobility rejected. In each case, a bloodthirsty tale culminated in the announcement that rebellious nobles were to be executed in Vienna and that all subjects of the empire were invited to use the train services to the capital free of charge to attend the spectacle.<sup>119</sup>

In 1886, there was turmoil around Easter again when the pressing *Servituten* problem of forest-and-field use was renegotiated under the peasants' threat of repeating the "ruckus" of exactly forty years previously. To make matters worse, the Easter holidays that year fell on the feast of St. Mark, when the fields were

traditionally blessed.<sup>120</sup> But the church's Easter liturgy did not make any allowance for the blessing of fields, and the peasants feared crop failures. In this tense atmosphere, rumors arose that for a period of three days the peasants were authorized to kill anyone "wearing black."<sup>121</sup> This was the color worn by nobles, priests, and Jews.

Information delineating the in-group was still conveyed by traditional means of rural communication. But these were inevitably colored by the multiethnic, constitutional state's growing tendency to categorize and classify for bureaucratic purposes. Parliamentary politics also required individuals to define themselves by supposedly objective criteria and declare to which group they belonged.<sup>122</sup> Yet what and who constituted the nation was no more "objective" than a world divided into nations was without alternative. As life in rural Galicia became increasingly politicized, rifts emerged within groups that were presumed to share common interests—between different-class affiliates of the same nation or between same-nationality peasants who disagreed on certain issues such as the role of the church. In the 1890s, three different peasant parties—the conservative party, the Christian-social party, and the nationalist democratic party—vied for the votes of Catholic, Polish-speaking peasants. In Krakow, the Social Democratic and Christian-social proposals for organizing the workers contended for votes. These varying models of communitization only became tangible, and therefore social reality, when they clashed with others. During the election campaign in the run-up to the Reichsrat elections of 1897, organizations and newspapers in Krakow openly professed to be antisemitic and agitated against Jews, to prevent the (allegedly Jewish) Social Democrats from coming to power.

After the elections, which resulted in Galician oppositionists—some who promised anti-Jewish policies—entering the Reichsrat for the first time, there was rioting and violence against Jews in some areas around Krakow. The disturbances followed an unprecedented surge of political rivalry as the above-mentioned peasant parties campaigned for support in two constituencies. Over a period of two months, several thousand farmers and workers turned on the Jews in over four hundred local parishes. The storm went down in history as the "antisemitic excesses."<sup>123</sup>

## **The Antisemitism Years in Galicia**

Modern antisemitism emerged in Galicia in a field of tension between changing economic parameters and new collective systems of meaning within the political and medial framework of a crownland of the Habsburg Monarchy. Antisemitic options arose here in competition with, and in relation to, other political designs for community. To analyze the antisemitic process, the interplay between discourse and action and the contemporary significance of the attribution "anti-

semitic” must be considered. Jews were not only objects in a program to stimulate the national economy. They were also the “threatening others,” and articulating hostility toward Jews was a communicative technique used to mobilize voters and simplify a complex reality.<sup>124</sup>

Divergent opinions and perspectives divided the various spheres of the press, parliament, and rural life, as described above. In view of these, how did a broad antisemitic debate arise at all, and how was it conducted? Participation in debate is always a question of power. Gaining influence over the media discussion of Jewish integration or exclusion was analogous to obtaining power. Alternatively, control could be asserted by means of physical violence, thus impressing a personal stamp upon relations between Christians and Jews. A third source of power was the Imperial Diet, which some politicians had at their disposal after winning seats in the Reichsrat with their antisemitic election campaigns. These three paths to dominance and influencing the “Jewish question” were each subject to different conditions and show a spectrum of varying insights into collective hostility toward Jews. Yet they were also closely interlinked, and all described as “antisemitic.” How then, should we conceive of antisemitism in Galicia?

## What Was Antisemitism?

The main obstacle to explaining antisemitism in historical terms—what it meant in a certain space at a certain time—is the tendency toward essentialization; that is, to take the existence of antisemitism as a historical subject, so to speak, for granted. But the field must not be left to isms rather than people if historical inquiry is to be productive. Rather, it should focus on the people who spoke of antisemitism and who placed their views in relation to other speech acts, actions, or events. The questions of what people understood by antisemitism and when must be investigated, as both are an essential part of the phenomenon.<sup>125</sup> This phenomenon of antisemitism should not be regarded as an actor but as a social process in which actions and discourse were mutually referential and endowed each other with meaning.<sup>126</sup>

In this study of Galicia, the focus will be placed on the activists in the antisemitic election campaign in West Galicia and the protagonists of the riots of 1898. They were the agents of the antisemitic process: people who acted to the disadvantage of Jews, who had access to receptive publics, and who justified their actions by claiming to have a certain “knowledge” of the Jews, or who demanded political consequences. Some were parliamentarians elected expressly to implement such policy. By representing it in parliament, they legitimized and dignified their underlying “knowledge.” Discourse and practice were, then, connected on many levels. Actors and speakers were mutually dependent, linked by a need to constantly refer to and reassert the connection between them. Their discourse

lent legitimacy to antisemitic demands and actions. In concert, the agents of the antisemitic process tried to turn what was disallowed under the liberal constitution into social reality—namely, to deprive people of rights because of their religion.<sup>127</sup> Antisemitism was the name of a program designed to stretch the rules of sayability and make the formerly unsayable ideologically, scientifically, and sociopolitically acceptable in a succinct and easily communicable way.<sup>128</sup> In parallel, antisemitism was also used for othering and to delegitimize such efforts.<sup>129</sup>

Closer consideration of the interplay between journalism, politics, and social practice can shed light on the periodic increases and decreases in antisemitic speech, writing, and discrimination. The present book aims to show the extent to which (the sometimes conflictual) relations between Christians and Jews were influenced by political antisemitism and, conversely, how far conflicts and contingent events steered the construction of antisemitic meanings. To accurately reconstruct the influence and dependence of antisemitic actors on events and debates, attention will be paid not only to the opinion-making exponents of antisemitism but also to the ordinary people who embraced the antisemitic option. In addition to these, actors who resisted and opposed anti-Jewish speech and actions will also be considered. In this way, Jewish actors appear as autonomous subjects and not merely as victims.

## **Nationalism as a Social Process**

Viewing antisemitism as a process, this inquiry follows the model of historical research into nationalism, and especially Rogers Brubaker's theses on reconstructing the process of how nations are formed and function.<sup>130</sup> Going beyond a history of ideas, or intellectual history, this approach also deals with the repercussions and effects of the ideas on actions.<sup>131</sup> It neither assumes that the nation is a stable, permanent entity nor that the idea of the nation necessarily leads to a national movement. Rather, nationalism is shown to be an ongoing exchange about the nature of national values and characteristics: about who belongs to the nation or should belong to it, to which territory it is entitled, who are its heroes, and who are its worst enemies. This public communication incorporates and processes political events as they occur. Equally, the formation of a national movement that asserts legal and territorial claims precipitates reactions by the state and/or competing nationalities, which can in turn become political events when processed and disseminated by the media.<sup>132</sup> The discussion of such events in the press, at mass gatherings, and by societies offers the individual the experience of belonging to a collective. From myriad interpretations and ideas of the nation, expressed in various fields of communication, a world of signs and symbols crystallizes: representations of the nation.<sup>133</sup> Beyond these representations, the nation does not exist. National belonging is a situational experience that must be constantly

reproduced, each time differently.<sup>134</sup> Wars or the civilized equivalent of sporting competitions between nations create communities of fate—whether they be victorious or vanquished—cemented by emotional bonds linking people who never actually meet. Performative, meaningful acts of gathering at significant sites for public assemblies, celebrations, or commemorative events are attended by media and official commentary. This lends meaning to the actions and assures the individuals of their participation in an epoch-making event.<sup>135</sup> Communication and performance blend into a unit, in which the nation becomes a reality that can be experienced, narrated, and remembered.

Researchers into nationalism do not, however, focus only on its “success stories.” They also consider the alternatives for collective identification—multinational empires, churches, and international political movements.<sup>136</sup> Historians are interested in the relationship between national belonging and regional or social identity, especially where divergent models clash.<sup>137</sup> They inquire not only into the integrated members of national communities, who share the fulfilling experience of belonging, but also those who become excluded from, and are made into others and perhaps even enemies of, the national community.<sup>138</sup> This kind of exclusion, if directed at Jews, constitutes part of modern antisemitism and is more than a by-product of nationalism.<sup>139</sup>

## Antisemitism as a Social Process

Antisemitism can be regarded as a discrete process propelled by mutually referential speech and actions. These justify the exclusion of Jews by interpreting the coexistence of non-Jews and Jews as essentially conflictual and detrimental to the kindred, non-Jewish community, which claims a precedential right to prosperity and wellbeing.<sup>140</sup> Discussion of antisemitism was not purely academic and detached from reality but took place in the light of concurrent social events and developments. Antisemitic meaning-makers did not operate within a vacuum. When writing texts, devising programs, and founding societies, they always referred to specific actions by Jews, developments within Jewish communities,<sup>141</sup> or conflicts between Jews and non-Jews. They sought to portray isolated conflicts as evidence of a fundamental Jewish–non-Jewish antagonism, and hence emphasize the urgency of the “Jewish question.”<sup>142</sup>

The claim that Jews and non-Jews essentially clashed was perhaps a reaction to the blurring of the once clear boundaries dividing the Christian and Jewish worlds. During the second half of the nineteenth century, these became indeterminate or even obsolete in some fields, such as urban leisure culture. Antisemitic discourse, then, drew a clear distinction that did not exist in social reality.<sup>143</sup>

The formative phase of modern antisemitism processed major events such as the stock market crash and economic crisis of the early 1870s, the Congress of

Berlin and the antisemitism debate, the pogroms in the Russian Empire and the Tizsaeszslar trial, the Dreyfus and Hilsner affairs, and countless minor events, such as the trial of Gittla and Moses Ritter recounted above. All these were described, discussed, and interpreted in numerous books and newspaper articles. People cited these events as grounds for acting hostile toward Jews, founding parties with anti-Jewish objectives, banning Jews from their unions and associations, and establishing “scientific” institutions to research the influence of Jews on society. The concept of “antisemitism” evolved at the interface between these various initiatives, events, and debates. Once formulated, the term allowed the wide range of related observations, opinions, and practices to be condensed into one complex. The adoption of the concept into the language of politics seemed to prove not only the existence of the “Jewish question” but also its importance. The establishment of antisemitism as a discursive fact in political communication prepared the ground for antisemitic reality to develop. One might say that belief in the reality of the concept grew as the term became established in discourse. Whenever newspapers ran articles criticizing anti-Jewish comments, violence, or discrimination, anti-Semites claimed they were proof that public opinion was manipulated by Jews, and that the press was overrun by Jews.<sup>144</sup>

Yet anti-Semites could not stage-manage antisemitic realities alone. They were in fact helped by the press. Scandals and media sensations invited new commentaries and explanations, some of which claimed Jews were to blame or identified them as the root cause of conflicts. By the very fact that such allegations garnered wider attention, provoked further comment, and were found to be antisemitic, the concept was reaffirmed and its agents’ arrival in the world of politics ensured. They were taken seriously as anti-Semites. Actors who identified themselves—or someone or something else—as antisemitic tapped into the power to polarize, promote identification, and reduce complexity that is eagerly sought in parliamentary politics. Political debate on antisemitism negotiated more than the significance and prospects of self-confessed anti-Semites. Debate on how to define and evaluate antisemitism simultaneously negotiated the majority society’s sayability and behavioral rules toward Jews.<sup>145</sup> When antisemitism was used for othering, actions and speech acts defined as antisemitic were rendered taboo. Anything that was not generally considered to be antisemitic, on the other hand, even if it was pejorative or critical of Jews and Judaism, was sayable even for convinced opponents of antisemitism.<sup>146</sup> Hence the struggle to define the attributes of antisemitism was part of the antisemitic process.

Debates on the nature of antisemitism were almost always sparked by comments or actions that had already shifted the sayability or behavioral boundaries concerning Jews. Current affairs might be interpreted in the media as proof of a general grievance with, or threat posed by, Jews.<sup>147</sup> These theories then influenced further developments, as protagonists referred to them to justify and rationalize



statements and actions against Jews. The appearance of a hitherto unknown action or rhetoric against Jews, which social and political actors subsequently welcomed or defended, could shift the sayability rules concerning Jews and the nature of antisemitism again.<sup>148</sup> Public debate surrounding events with antisemitic potential fed into and perpetuated the discourse on antisemitism. At the interface between abstract discourse and tangible reality, an antisemitic option for action arose that appealed to people for various reasons.<sup>149</sup> It made a complex world seem easier to understand, and social problems simpler to solve. Antisemitism included people in communication processes from which they would otherwise have felt excluded.<sup>150</sup> Devaluing and excluding Jews helped to increase self-worth.<sup>151</sup> Moreover, excluding others brought material advantage, as it implied “defending” the available resources or appropriating the others’ property. The others’ entitlement was denied on principle or regarded as secondary to the needs of one’s “own group.”<sup>152</sup>

## Antisemitism and Anti-antisemitism

Accepting antisemitism as a fact of life could even be advantageous to Jewish actors. Jewish nationalists cited antisemitism as a reason to establish a Jewish state. Jews of all nationalities could use the antisemitic label to describe incidents or a social climate, and so promote awareness of the intolerability of discriminatory practices they experienced. To acknowledge that the term “antisemitism” was deconstructed in this way is not to imply that Jews did not experience hostility or hatred. Rather, it highlights the benefits of communicating such experiences effectively—that is, normatively. The term “antisemitism” was and is an especially suitable device for purposeful communication of this kind.

This communicative process, fueled by a combination of events and their interpretation in public and political debate, is what the present book attempts to describe and place in the context of the various, shifting, milieu-specific meanings, implications, and functions of the term antisemitism. On the premise that a historical inquiry into antisemitism during a given period cannot reconstruct stable attitudes or ideologies, it focuses on tracing the anti-Jewish statements and situations that produced meaning in their specific contexts and seemed to promise an advantage for their authors. Since historical science has recourse only to the records of words and actions, but not to the thought processes behind them, statements of hostility toward Jews will not be assessed as definitive articulations of antisemitic attitudes. They merely show that their authors opted in a certain situation to speak in an antisemitic mode or to rationalize their actions in this mode. It took more than the word “antisemitism” to make conduct readable as antisemitic. The word had to be endowed with meanings and values, and these had to be popularized.

## Preconditions for the Antisemitic Process

For the antisemitic process to begin, a communicative space where anti-Jewish ideas could evolve and become established needed to exist. This space was created by various political and social camps, using their affiliated newspapers and assemblies and their embeddedness in longer-established local and social communities. Their communication concerning Jews was part of a general discourse on issues such as the “Jewish question” and “knowledge” about Judaism and the Jews. Whatever was said in any given environment did not remain within the confines of a clearly demarcated community. Although such communication used peculiar semantics that were not necessarily comprehensible to all sections of society for the purpose of creating community, it simultaneously aimed to convince a broader public and participate in the world beyond the community. For this reason, milieu-specific discourse adhered to standards related to those of general politics. To be heard and not excluded from the general community of communication, it was necessary to conform to that community. Another precondition for the antisemitic process was the occurrence of events that gave cause to talk about Jews. One example was the murder of Franka Mnich, described above. Its part in the process can be schematically outlined as follows:

A young woman was murdered in a remote Galician village. Some of the villagers accused a prominent Jewish member of the local community of the murder, leading to his arrest and the start of judicial proceedings. The case became a nationwide media sensation. Within the bounds of the prevalent sayability rules, there was scope for interpreting the incident as a case of lethal Jewish rites. Indeed, “experts” were found—Jewish believers named Kenner and Schutz—who confirmed that cutting off braids and extracting fetuses were Jewish practices.<sup>153</sup> In this way, concrete “knowledge” was constructed *ex post*: on the strength of the injuries found on the victim’s body, a generalizing assumption was made and subsequently disseminated. This in turn aroused further interest in the trial and the subject of the Talmud, which August Rohling stepped in to satisfy. On the political stage, Teofil Merunowicz linked the incident in Lutcza with an “expertise” by a professor from Prague and took this as grounds for demanding anti-Jewish legislation. His (and the local priest’s) arguments reinforced the suspicions of the people in Lutcza that the murder must have been committed by a Jew and convinced them to testify in court that they had always been wary of dealing with Jews or had long since suspected “the Jews.” The first bill of indictment enshrined the ritual-murder theory. Even in far-off Berlin, the “documentary description” of “Jewish ritual murder” added plausibility to the theory, which could be articulated in the appropriate situations.<sup>154</sup> The theology professor, the politician, the “Jewish experts,” the files of the royal-and-imperial Habsburg judiciary, and the “violently extracted” confession delivered by the accomplice Stochliński all contributed to engendering a discursive antisemitic

reality in which it was plausible that Jews slit the throats of Christians in their cellars.

Yet although this picture was popularized by the sheer frequency of its repetition in public debate, it was not unrivalled. Nobody was forced to believe it was true, let alone ensure that it remained in currency. But it seemed plausible or appealing to some people in certain situations, for which reason they postulated and circulated it.<sup>155</sup> Mr. Mandela enjoyed a moment in the limelight with his story of going blind. The villagers took the opportunity to besmirch the wealthy, aloof-seeming Moses Ritter by listing all the times he had attracted suspicion. Speaking the language of antisemitism was one option among several. Moses and Gittla Ritter were not imprisoned for five years because of antisemitism but because their own neighbors incriminated them. But these neighbors lent their suspicions weight by denouncing the Ritters specifically as Jews, and by borrowing from antisemitic discourse, which was kept in circulation and endorsed by actors such as Rohling, the clergymen Jakub and Jan Drzewiecki, and various supposed experts on Jewry. Their discourse consequently influenced individual conduct, including that of the court officials. Such conduct in turn facilitated Merunowicz's antisemitic politics. His demand to limit Jewish rights after the introduction of equality shifted the contemporary sayability rules. It cast doubt on the state's guarantee to respect the rights of every individual citizen, regardless of faith.

As the example of Merunowicz shows, actors not only advanced interpretations of events but used them to legitimize demands for new legislation and anti-Jewish policies. The reading of occurrences as "antisemitic events" as well as the frequent articulation of anti-Jewish policies in public debate will be regarded below as antisemitic agitation.<sup>156</sup>

## A Process on Three Levels

This book explores the process of antisemitism in three chapters, each dealing with one level. The historical stages of each level are considered in chronological order. But since it is an inquiry into a process, they overlap and coincide, reflecting the complexity of antisemitism as it resulted from the interplay between political meaning-making and social practice.

The chapter "Agitation" describes how the Galician public interpreted events in antisemitic terms, and the negative "knowledge" of the Jews this generated.<sup>157</sup> It assesses the importance and functions of hostility toward Jews in peasant party mobilization and why Christian-social groupings described themselves as antisemitic.

The chapter "Violence" focuses on the "antisemitic riots" among the rural population, describing them in close detail and from the perspectives of all the

groups of actors involved. It asks in what sense the riots were triggered by party-political agitation and whether they were an attempt to put thus expressed demands of economic “liberation” from the Jews into practice.

The chapter “Politics” considers the Galician politicians who were voted into the Reichsrat in 1897/98 on the strength of anti-Jewish agitation. First, it shows how they appropriated the riots and the debate surrounding antisemitism within the public arena of the Imperial Diet. The focus here is on their parliamentary work and specifically the interpellations with which they implemented their policies and included their voters in discriminatory actions against Jews. In other words, this chapter is concerned with the process by which parliamentarians utilized antisemitism as a resource for parliamentary work, along with the power of the parliamentary mandate, to assert their position on Jews and “knowledge” of Jewish practices. Second, it enquires into anti-Jewish practices that took place beyond political processes and without the label of antisemitism.

These three levels can also be regarded as phases in the antisemitic process. In the first phase, ideas about Jews were introduced into political culture. These were repeated and modified in the light of conflicts between Christians and Jews during the second phase. In the third phase, such conflicts were placed on the agenda of the Imperial Diet and thus anchored in political discourse from a high position of power.

## Notes

1. Robert Musil, *The Man without Qualities*, translated by Sophie Wilkins (London, 2011), 1.
2. Maria Ciesła, Jolanta Żyndul, and Sprawa Ritterów, “Aktualizacja legendy mordy rytualnego w Galicji końca XIX wieku,” in Grażyna Borkowska and Magdalena Rudkowska (eds), *Kwestia żydowska w XIX wieku: Spory o tożsamość Polaków* (Warsaw, 2004), 439–452.
3. Gmina Strzyżów (city website), [www.strzyzow.pl](http://www.strzyzow.pl).
4. Civil society is understood here as a “network of human relationships and institutions beyond the direct control of the state that structure individual action and allow private persons, unconnected by personal attachments, to manage their affairs.” Cit. from Joseph Bradley, *Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society* (Cambridge, 2009), 9.
5. Moritz Csáky, *Das Gedächtnis der Städte: Kulturelle Verflechtungen – Wien und die urbanen Milieus in Zentraleuropa* (Vienna, 2010). The term “Central Europe” is used here in keeping with his definition. Martin Pollack, *Der Kaiser von Amerika: Die große Flucht aus Galizien* (Vienna, 2010); Annemarie Steidl, “Ein ewiges Hin und Her. Kontinentale, transatlantische und lokale Migrationsrouten in der Spätphase der Habsburgmonarchie,” *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften* 19 (2008): 1; Grzegorz Maria Kowalski, *Przestępstwa emigracyjne w Galicji 1897–1918: Z badań nad dziejami polskiego wychodźstwa* (Krakow, 2003).

6. Markus Schroer, "Grenzverschiebungen: Zur Neukonstruktion sozialer Räume im Globalisierungsprozess," in Carsten Würmann et al. (eds), *Welt.Raum.Körper: Transformationen und Entgrenzungen von Körper und Raum* (Bielefeld, 2007), 15–36, 20.
7. Larry Wolff reflects on the invention of Galicia and its gradual impact in his recent book, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, 2010).
8. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 2009).
9. Michael G. Müller, *Die Teilungen Polens 1772, 1793, 1795* (Munich, 1984).
10. Manfred Rauchensteiner, *Der Tod des Doppeladlers: Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg* (Graz, 1993).
11. Krakow was incorporated into Galicia in 1846 in response to revolutionary activity, having previously been a free city under the control of the three partition powers. On Galicia's borders, see Christoph Augustynowicz and Andreas Kappeler (eds), *Die galizische Grenze 1772–1867: Kommunikation oder Isolation?* (Vienna, 2006).
12. Paul R. Magocsi, "Galicia: A European Land," in idem and Christopher Hann (eds), *Galicia: A Multicultural Land* (Toronto, 2005), 3–21; Christoph Augustynowicz, *Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas: Ein Abriss* (Vienna, 2010), 67–70.
13. Hans-Christian Maner, "Zwischen 'Kompensationsobjekt,' 'Musterland' und 'Glacis': Wiener politische und militärische Vorstellungen von Galizien von 1772 bis zur Autonomieära," in idem (ed.), *Grenzregionen der Habsburgermonarchie im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Bedeutung und Funktion aus der Perspektive Wiens* (Münster, 2005), 103–122.
14. These two main conflicts in policy on Galicia persisted until well into the nineteenth century. Hans-Christian Maner, *Galizien: Eine Grenzregion im Kalkül der Donaumonarchie im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2007), 27–85.
15. On the Josephine reforms, see Roman Rosdolsky, *Untertan und Staat in Galizien: Die Reformen unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II.*, ed. Ralph Melville (Mainz, 1992); Horst Glassl, *Das österreichische Einrichtungswerk in Galizien (1772–1790)* (Wiesbaden, 1975).
16. "Nędza Galicyjska" (Galician misery) was the title of an influential book, published in 1888, by the entrepreneur and politician Stanisław Szczepanowski.
17. Pollack, *Der Kaiser von Amerika*; Maner, *Galizien*. R. Mahler, "Jewish Emigration from Galicia," in Deborah Dash Moore, *East European Jews in Two Worlds: Studies from the YIVO Annual* (Evanston, 1990); Klaus Hödl, *Als Bettler in die Leopoldstadt: Galizische Juden auf dem Weg nach Wien* (Vienna, 1994).
18. Maner, *Galizien*.
19. A firmly postcolonial perspective is taken in the anthology by Johannes Feichtinger, Ursula Prutsch, and Moritz Csaky (eds), *Habsburg postcolonial: Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis* (Innsbruck, 2003). See also Anna Veronika Wendland, "Imperiale, koloniale und postkoloniale Blicke auf die Peripherien des Habsburgerreiches," in Claudia Kraft and Alf Lüdtke (eds), *Kolonialgeschichten: Regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phänomen* (Frankfurt a. M., 2010), 215–235. Galicia's response to the oil boom in the late nineteenth century illustrated that local actors were not primarily concerned with promoting the economy but with pursuing political goals such as "autonomy" or the "development of the national community." Alison Fleig Frank, *Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, 2005); Klemens Kaps, "Peripherisierung der Ökonomie, Ethnisierung der Gesellschaft: Galizien zwischen äußerem und innerem Konkurrenzdruck (1856–1914)," in Doktoratskolleg (eds), *Galizien: Fragmente eines diskursiven Raums* (Innsbruck, 2009), 37–62; Sławomir Tokarski, *Ethnic Conflict and*

- Economic Development: Jews in Galician Agriculture 1868–1914* (Warsaw, 2003); Michał Śliwa and Nędza Galicyjska, “Mit i rzeczywistość,” in Włodzimierz Bonusiak and Józef Buszko (eds), *Galicja i jej Dziedzictwo*, vol. 1: *Historia i Polityka* (Rzeszów, 1994), 145–155.
20. Juliusz Łukasiewicz, *Kryzys agrarny na ziemiach polskich w końcu XIX wieku* (Warsaw, 1968), 220–233; Kai Struve, “Die Kapitalisierung der Landwirtschaft und die Durchsetzung der Industrialisierung als strukturbildende Faktoren in den Teilungsländern,” in Michael G. Müller et al. (eds), *Polen in der europäischen Geschichte: Ein Handbuch*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 2019); Tomasz Kargol, “Wirtschaftliche Beziehungen zwischen Galizien und den Ländern der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Augustynowicz and Kappeler, *Die galizische Grenze*, 33–50; Helena Madurowicz-Urbańska, “Die Industrie Galiziens im Rahmen der wirtschaftlichen Struktur der Donaumonarchie,” *Studia Austro-Polonica* 1 (1978): 157–173; Stella Hryniuk, *Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in South-Eastern Galicia 1880–1900* (Edmonton, 1991); Leslie Kool, *Economic Development on the Periphery: A Case Study of East Galicia* (Ann Arbor, 1994).
  21. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, vol. 1: *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung* (Vienna, 1973).
  22. Christoph Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, *Freiheit in der Unfreiheit: Die nationale Autonomie der Polen in Galizien nach dem österreichischen-ungarischen Ausgleich von 1867; Ein konservativer Aufbruch im mitteleuropäischen Vergleich* (Wiesbaden, 1993); Rosdolsky, *Untertan und Staat*.
  23. Józef Burszta, “Kultura chłopska a ruch ludowy 1895–1949,” in Zygmunt Hemmerling (ed.), *Ruch ludowy w najnowszych dziejach Polski* (Warsaw, 1988), 201–237, 210.
  24. Gershon David Hundert, “Jews in Poland-Lithuania in the Eighteenth Century: A Genealogy of Modernity” (Berkeley, 2004); idem (ed.), “Jews in Early Modern Poland,” *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* 10 (1997); Saul Miller, *Life in Galician Shtetl, 1890–1907* (New York, 1980); Antony Polonsky, *The Jews in Poland and Russia*, vol. 2: *1881–1914* (Oxford, 2010); Piotr Wróbel, “The Jews of Galicia under Austrian-Polish Rule, 1869–1918,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 25 (1994): 97–138. See also Heiko Haumann, *Geschichte der Ostjuden* (Munich, 1990).
  25. Murray J. Rosman, *The Lord’s Jews: Magnate-Jewish Relations in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Eighteenth Century* (Harvard, 1992); Hillel Levine, *Economic Origins of Antisemitism: Poland and Its Jews in the Early Modern Period* (New Haven, 1993).
  26. Jews made up a distinctly larger percentage of the population in East Galicia (12 percent) than in West Galicia (8 percent). For information on Galician demographics, see Rudolf Mark, *Galizien unter österreichischer Herrschaft: Verwaltung-Kirche-Bevölkerung* (Marburg, 1994); Krzysztof Zamorski, *Ludność Galicji w latach 1857–1910* (Krakow, 1989). Some 90 percent of Galicians working in trade and hostelrys were Jewish, and around 64 percent of those working in crafts. Cf. Jadwiga Hoff, “Stosunki wyznaniowe i struktura społeczno-zawodowa małego miasta galicyjskiego w dobie autonomii,” in *Miasteczka Polskie: Z dziejów formowania się społeczności* (Kielce, 1992), 131–146, 140f. See also Józef Buzek, “Rozsiedlenie ludność Galicji według wyznania i języka,” *Wiadomości statystyczne o stosunkach krajowych* 21, no. 2 (1909). On the Jewish inhabitants of the Carpathian foothills, see Andrzej Potocki, *Żydzi w Podkarpackiem* (Rzeszów, 2004).

27. For a brief survey of the emancipation of Jews in Galicia, see the following works: Małgorzata Śliż, *Galicyjscy Żydzi na drodze do równouprawnienia 1848–1914* (Krakow, 2006), 15–21; Tomasz Gąsowski, *Między Galicyjczykami a światem: Dylematy ideowe Żydów galicyjskich na przełomie XIX i XX wieku* (Krakow, 1997), 9–29. On the situation in the Austrian empire in general, see Joseph Karniel, *Die Toleranzpolitik Kaiser Josephs II.* (Görlingen, 1985); Kurt Schubert, “Der Einfluss des Josephinismus auf das Judentum in Österreich,” *Kairos*, NF 14 (1972): 81–97; also Wolfgang Häusler, “Zwischen Wien und Czernowitz: Die Emanzipation des habsburgischen ‘Ostjudentums’ und der Antisemitismus,” in Ralph Schattkowsky and Michael G. Müller (eds), *Identitätenwandel und nationale Mobilisierung in Regionen ethnischer Diversität: Ein regionaler Vergleich zwischen Westpreußen und Galizien am Ende des 19. und Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Marburg, 2004), 63–88. Jürgen Hensel, *Polnische Adelsnation und jüdische Vermittler, 1815–1830: Über den vergeblichen Versuch einer Judenemanzipation in einer nicht emanzipierten Gesellschaft* (Berlin, 1983), 71ff.; Teresa Andlauer, *Die jüdische Bevölkerung im Modernisierungsprozess Galiziens (1867–1914)* (Frankfurt a. M., 2001).
28. Kai Struve, *Bauern und Nation in Galizien: Über Zugehörigkeit und soziale Emanzipation im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2005).
29. John-Paul Himka, “Dimensions of a Triangle: Polish – Ukrainian – Jewish Relations in Austrian Galicia,” *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* 12 (2000): 25–48; idem, “Ukrainian-Jewish Antagonism in the Galician Countryside during the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Peter J. Potychnyi and Aster Howard (eds), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988), 111–158.
30. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule,” in Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (eds), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, 1982), 23–67, 25.
31. Alexandra Binnenkade, Ekaterina Emeliantseva, and Svjatoslav Pacholkiv, *Vertraut und fremd zugleich, Jüdisch-christliche Nachbarschaften in Warschau-Lengnau-Lemberg* (Cologne, 2009), 15.
32. Heiko Haumann, “Juden in der ländlichen Gesellschaft Galiziens am Ende des 19. und zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Andrea Löw et al. (eds), *Deutsche – Juden – Polen: Geschichte einer wechselvollen Beziehung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt a. M., 2004), 35–58. Philipp Ther has also underlined the long periods of peaceful coexistence in between conflicts: Philipp Ther, “War versus Peace: Interethnic Relations in Lviv during the First Half of the Twentieth Century,” in John Czaplicka (ed.), *Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture* (Cambridge, 2000), 251–284.
33. Rosa Lehmann, *Symbiosis and Ambivalence: Poles and Jews in a Small Galician Town* (New York, 2001).
34. Till van Rahden coined the term “situational ethnicity” to describe the urban bourgeois context of Jews in Breslau, which is useful for understanding Christian-Jewish coexistence in general. Cf. Till van Rahden, “Intermarriages, the ‘New Woman,’ and the Situational Ethnicity of Breslau Jews from the 1870s to the 1920s,” *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 46, no. 1 (2001): 125–150; also idem, *Juden und andere Breslauer: Die Beziehungen zwischen Juden, Protestanten und Katholiken in einer deutschen Großstadt von 1860 bis 1925* (Göttingen, 2000).
35. Arnon Gill, *Die polnische Revolution von 1846: Zwischen nationalem Befreiungskampf des Landadels und antifeudaler Bauernerhebung* (Munich, 1974).

36. Inspired by the French Revolution, Tadeusz Kościuszko and his fellow campaigner Hugo Kołłątaj staged a *levée en masse*, having first improved the situation of the peasants with the “Universal” of 1793, and successfully deployed armed peasant units against the tsarist army. See Franciszek Ziejka, *Złota legenda chłopów* (Krakow, 1983).
37. Bieberstein, *Freiheit in der Unfreiheit*; Rosdolsky, *Untertan und Staat*.
38. Some Galician hostelry owners, most of whom were Jews, tried to undermine support for the abstinence campaign, which often used anti-Jewish rhetoric, by portraying it to their Catholic clientele as part of the nobility’s strategy to torpedo state efforts to redistribute land. Jan Kracik, *W Galicji trzeźwiejącej, krwawej, pobożnej* (Krakow, 2008), 28–50.
39. Michal Chvojka, “Zwischen Konspiration und Revolution: Entstehung und Auswirkungen der Revolution von 1846 in Krakau und Galizien – Wahrnehmung und Aktionsradius der Habsburger Polizei,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 58 (2010): 481–507.
40. The district captain of Tarnów, Josef Breinl, was said to give especially generous rewards to supportive peasants. The uprising was known as *Rabacja* in Polish, a term originating from the German *Rabatz* (English: ruckus) or *Raub* (robbery). Cf. Andrzej Chwalba, *Historia Polski 1795–1918* (Krakow, 2001), 302.
41. Cf. Stefan Kieniewicz, *Ruch chłopski w Galicji w 1846 roku* (Wrocław, 1955), 300. The uprising and the subsequent punitive expeditions were followed by a famine attended by outbreaks of cannibalism, typhoid fever, and cholera. Robert F. Leslie, *The History of Poland since 1863* (Cambridge, 1980), 8. See also Thomas W. Simmons, “The Peasant Revolt of 1846 in Galicia,” *Slavic Review* (1971): 795–817.
42. It was said that on 22 February in Tarnów Cathedral a peasant had declared, “The Emperor has decreed, our holy Father allows [us to kill the nobles].” Cited from Kracik, *W Galicji*, 48.
43. A painting by Jan Lewicki titled “The Galician Slaughter” rooted this image in the public consciousness. An interesting source on the uprising is Stefan Dembiński, *Rok 1846: Kronika dworów szlacheckich zebrana na pięćdziesięcioletnią rocznicę smutnych wypadków lutego* [The year 1846. A chronicle of the noble seats, compiled to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the sad events in February] (Jaśło, 1896).
44. “It is true that the peasants murdered! They murdered because they had been ordered to do so, because they had been encouraged to do so! . . . The peasants did not murder to gain revenge but to fulfil a devious plan, which is proven by the fact that all the slaughter took place at the same time within a few days, when the order was spread across the country by the servants of the system.” Dembiński, *Rok 1846*, 39f.
45. A song popular among Galician peasants until World War II went “Do you remember, Sir, the year forty-six? How the peasants drove you away with sticks?” (Pamięć ty Panie rok styardziesty szósty, Jak cię chłopcy były kijami w zapusty?). Leslie, *The History of Poland*, 8.
46. On the relationship between the nobility and peasantry in nineteenth-century Poland, see Struve, *Bauern und Nation*; also Jan Molenda, *Chłopi – naród – niepodległość: Kształtowanie się postaw narodowych i obywatelskich chłopów w Galicji i Królestwie Polskim w przedniu odrodzenia Polski* (Warsaw, 1999).
47. Struve, *Bauern und Nation*, 85ff.
48. Stefan Kieniewicz, *Pomiędzy Stadionem a Goslarem: Sprawa włościańska w Galicji 1848 r.* (Warsaw, 1980).
49. Many landowners obstructed the Habsburgs’ agrarian reforms so that in some places they were implemented only very hesitantly or after long delays. Cf. Augustynowicz, *Geschichte*



- Ostmittleuropas*, 68. On the myth of the good emperor, see Zbigniew Fras, "Mit dobrego cesarza," in Wojciech Wrzesiński (ed.), *Polskie mity polityczne XIX i XX wieku* (Wrocław, 1994), 139–152; also John-Paul Himka, "Hope in the Tsar: Displaced Naïve Monarchism among the Ukrainian Peasants of the Habsburg Empire," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 7, no. 1–2 (1980): 125–138.
50. Hillel Levine, "Gentry; Jews, and Serfs: The Rise of Polish Vodka," *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies* 4, no. 2 (1980): 223–250.
  51. On East Galicia, see Himka, *Galician Villagers*, 36–56; Jan Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją: Studia z dziejów ukraińskiego ruchu narodowego w Galicji w latach 1848–1849* (Kraków, 1975). On West Galicia, see Struve, *Bauern und Nation*, 109ff.
  52. Stefan Ingot, *Historia społeczno-gospodarcza chłopów polskich* (Warsaw, 1970), 246.
  53. Himka, *Galician Villagers*, 158ff.; idem, "Ukrainian-Jewish Antagonism"; Tokarski, *Ethnic Conflict*, 69 and 102.
  54. Maner, *Galizien*, 99ff. For further reading on Bukovina, see Emanuel Turczynski, *Geschichte der Bukowina in der Neuzeit: Zur Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte einer mitteleuropäisch geprägten Landschaft* (Wiesbaden, 1993).
  55. Galicia's two high courts were also located in Krakow and Lemberg, as were two of the three Galician chambers of commerce; the third was in the merchant town Brody. Tomasz Kargol, *Izba Przemysłowo-Handlowa w Krakowie w latach 1850–1939* (Kraków, 2003).
  56. Maner, *Galizien*, 99–105.
  57. Stella Hryniuk, "Polish Lords and Ukrainian Peasants: Conflict, Deference, and Accommodation in Eastern Galicia in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Austrian History Yearbook* 24 (1993): 119–132.
  58. On the various national options for Galicia's Ruthenians, see John-Paul Himka, "The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions," in Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (eds), *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation* (Ann Arbor, 1999), 109–164; Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001); idem, "Die Rückkehr der Russophilen in die ukrainische Geschichte: Neue Aspekte der ukrainischen Nationsbildung in Galizien, 1848–1914," *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Osteuropas* 49, no. 2 (2001): 178–199. On Ukrainian national awakening in Galicia, see Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia 1815–1849* (Edmonton, 1986).
  59. Christopher Hann and Paul R. Magocsi, *Galicia: A Multicultural Land* (Toronto, 2005).
  60. Religion is nonetheless frequently used as an identifier rather than national attributions, even when referring to nationalism's heyday, as religious affiliation is unambiguous in a way that vernacular language and nationality are not. Indeed, the imperial states based their population statistics on declarations of religion. Nationality, insofar as it is not stated in a passport or similar document, is entirely subjective. Many Roman Catholic peasants in Galicia objected to being called Poles as they did not want to be associated with the nobility, whom they saw as Polish. Similarly, Russophile supporters would have objected to being called Ukrainians. Cf. Harald Binder, *Galizien in Wien: Parteien, Wahlen, Fraktionen und Abgeordnete im Übergang zur Massenpolitik* (Vienna, 2005), 14. Certainly, a study of antisemitism in Galicia must distinguish between the categories Jewish and Christian (or non-Jewish), rather than Polish and Ukrainian, unless the latter arise in self-ascriptions.
  61. Jerzy Holzer, "Zur Frage der Akkulturation der Juden in Galizien im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 37 (1989): 35–59. *Akkulturation* (En-

- glish: acculturation) has today superseded the problematic term assimilation, though the latter cannot be avoided as it is ubiquitous in the sources. Cf. on Polish Jewry: Theodore R. Weeks, "Assimilation, Nationalism, Modernization, Antisemitism: Notes on Polish-Jewish Relations, 1855–1905," in Robert Blobaum (ed.), *Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland* (Ithaca, 2005), 20–38. On the debate surrounding the concept of assimilation among German-speaking Jews, see Till van Rahden, "Treason, Fate, or Blessing? Concepts of Assimilation in the Historiography of German-Speaking Jewry since the 1950s," in Christhard Hoffmann (ed.), *Preserving the Legacy of German Jewry: A History of the Leo Baeck Institute, 1955–2005* (Tübingen, 2005), 349–373.
62. The frequency of marriages between Ukrainians and Poles shows that the boundaries between the groups became more fluid at the same time. Ihor Kosyk, "To Marry the Other: Zur Geschichte der gemischten Ehen in Galizien und Lemberg in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Doktoratskolleg, *Galizien*, 99–112.
  63. Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, 2006).
  64. Historic nations are understood here in Herder's sense as nations with a history of independent statehood, while unhistoric nations were those that could not claim to have any statehood or aristocracy. Among the latter were Slovenians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Belarus, Estonians, Latvians, and Finns.
  65. In the debate surrounding a German constitution, East Central Europe was conceived of as the German "frontier." Cf. Gregor Thum, *Traumland Osten*. See also the introduction in Martin Schulze-Wessel, *Russlands Blick auf Preußen: Die polnische Frage in der Diplomatie und politischen Öffentlichkeit des Zarenreiches und des Sowjetstaates 1697–1947* (Stuttgart, 1995). When it came to inviting delegates to the parliament in St. Paul's Church, it became apparent that the Bohemian lands no longer wished to be regarded as "German lands." Jiří Kořalka, *František Palacký (1798–1876): der Historiker der Tschechen im österreichischen Vielvölkerstaat* (Vienna, 2007).
  66. Augustynowicz, *Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas*, 101.
  67. The German population in Galicia shrank considerably around 1900. In 1880, 323,612 people described themselves as German (5.4 percent); ten years later, the number had fallen to 227,158 or 3.5 percent, by 1900 to 2.9 percent, and in 1910 only 90,416 people saw themselves as German, or 1.1 percent. Cf. Franz Stefczyk, *Polen und Ruthenen in Galizien im Lichte der Bevölkerungs- und Steuerstatistik* (Lemberg, 1912), 9. This trend can probably be attributed to a growing sense among Galician Jews of belonging to the Polish nation.
  68. The best-known exponents were writers such as Leopold Herzberg-Fränkell and Karl-Emil Franzos. Gabriele von Glasenapp, *Aus der Judengasse: Zur Entstehung und Ausprägung deutschsprachiger Ghetto-literatur im 19. Jahrhundert* (Tübingen, 1996).
  69. Cf. Victor Karady, *Gewalterfahrung und Utopie: Juden in der europäischen Moderne* (Frankfurt a. M., 1999). The choice of language a country used in administration and education was crucially important. Beyond Austria's hereditary lands, the crownlands of the Habsburg Empire opted less and less for German. Peter Karoshi, "Patriotismus und Staatserhalt. Konstruktionen "österreichischer Gesamtstaatsideen,"" *Newsletter Moderne: Zeitschrift des SFB Moderne*, special issue 2 (March 2003): 12–16.
  70. Heiko Haumann, *"Luftmenschen" und "rebellische Töchter": Zum Wandel ostjüdischer Lebenswelten im 19. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2003).
  71. Recurring stereotypes were the "trouser-selling lads" from the "Polish cradle," popularized by Treitschke, and the poor and sickly "Galitsians" living in the Leopoldstadt district of

- Vienna. Ulrich Wyrwa, "Genese und Entfaltung antisemitischer Motive in Heinrich von Treitschkes *Deutscher Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert*," in Werner Bergmann and Ulrich Sieg (eds), *Antisemitische Geschichtsbilder* (Essen, 2009), 83–101; Hödl, *Als Bettler in die Leopoldstadt*.
72. Steven Beller, *Antisemitism: A Very Short Introduction* (New York, 2007).
  73. Foreign policy, along with the army and navy and related finances, were the only areas controlled by imperial ministries responsible for both states. A Council of Ministers from both governments, led by the foreign minister, ruled on joint affairs. After 1878, this Council of Ministers also governed Bosnia, which did not belong either to the Transleithanian or Cisleithanian half of the empire.
  74. Joachim von Puttkamer, "Ungarn," in Harald Roth (ed.), *Studienhandbuch Östliches Europa*, vol. 1: *Geschichte Ostmittel- und Südosteuropas* (Cologne, 1999), 411–430, 420.
  75. Pieter Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire 1848–1914* (Ann Arbor, 1996).
  76. Peter Haslinger (ed.), *Die Grenze im Kopf: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Grenze in Ostmitteleuropa* (Frankfurt a. M., 1999); idem and Daniel Mollenhauer (eds), "Arbeit am nationalen Raum. Deutsche und polnische Rand- und Grenzregionen im Nationalisierungsprozess," *Comparativ* 15 (2005): 2.
  77. Marsha Rozenblit, *Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I* (Oxford, 2001).
  78. Julia Schmid, *Kampf um das Deutschtum: Radikaler Nationalismus in Österreich und dem Deutschen Reich 1890–1914* (Frankfurt a. M., 2009); Robert Kriechbaumer, "Das Trauma der unmystischen Wirklichkeit. Die Sehnsucht nach der imaginierten deutschen Heimat," in idem, *Die großen Erzählungen der Politik: Politische Kultur und Parteien in Österreich von der Jahrhundertwende bis 1945* (Cologne, 2001), 160–165.
  79. Robert Musil's famous description of the Habsburg Empire as a land without a name was based on the fact that the western half of the empire did not have its own name until 1915. The imperial council met in Vienna and consisted of two chambers, a parliament and an upper house.
  80. Consequently, when universal suffrage was introduced in 1905, Galicia sent the most representatives (sixty-three) to the imperial parliament. Both in view of its purported historical link with the Hungarian crown and its location beyond the Leitha, Galicia would more logically have belonged to the Hungarian half of the empire.
  81. The minor compromise was concluded in 1873. Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 39, also for further reading.
  82. The pledge of allegiance, "Bei Euch Majestät stehen wir und wollen wir stehen" (By you, Your Majesty, we stand and wish to stand), became a popular saying. Cf. Stanislaw Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem a habsburskim lojalizmem: Polacy wobec przemian ustrojowych monarchii habsburskiej (1866–1871)* (Krakow, 2003). Catholicism became an important legitimizing factor and a bridge between Polish-Galician conservatism and the Habsburg dynasty, as impressively demonstrated at the bicentenary celebration of the Relief of Vienna in Krakow: Harald Binder, "Kirche und nationale Festkultur in Krakau 1861 bis 1910," in Martin Schulze-Wessel (ed.), *Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation in Ostmittel-, Südost- und Osteuropa im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2006); Philip Pajakowski, "The Polish Club and Austrian Parliamentary Politics, 1873–1900," PhD diss., Indiana University, 1989; For an overview of the relevant literature, see Claudia Kraft, "Das galizische Bürgertum in der autonomen Ära (1867–1914).

- Ein Literaturüberblick,” in Peter Heumos (ed.), *Polen und die böhmischen Länder im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1997), 81–110.
83. Jan Fellerer, *Mehrsprachigkeit im galizischen Verwaltungswesen (1772–1914): Eine historisch-soziolinguistische Studie zum Polnischen und Ruthenischen (Ukrainischen)* (Cologne, 2005).
84. Albert Lichtblau and Michael John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina, in Lemberg and Czernowitz: Two Divergent Examples of Jewish Communities in the Far East of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,” in Sander Gilman and Milton Shain (eds), *Jewries at the Frontier: Accommodation, Identity, Conflict* (Urbana, 1999), 29–66; Heiko Haumann, “Jüdische Nation – Polnische Nation? Zur gesellschaftlichen Orientierung von Juden in Polen während des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Gabriella Gelardini (ed.), *Kontexte der Schrift*, vol. 1: *Text, Ethik, Judentum und Christentum, Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart, 2005), 442–457.
85. Hanna Kozińska-Witt, *Die Krakauer Jüdische Reformgemeinde 1864–1874* (Frankfurt a. M., 1999); Andrzej Żbikowski, *Żydzi krakowscy i ich gmina 1868–1918* (Warsaw, 1994), 77–109. On the conflicts surrounding the Haskalah and use of the German language in sermons in Lemberg in the 1840s, see Michael Stanislawski, *A Murder in Lemberg: Politics, Religion, and Violence in Modern Jewish History* (Princeton, 2007).
86. On Lemberg, see Markian Prokopovych, *Habsburg Lemberg: Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772–1914* (West Lafayette, IN, 2009); “Forum: A City of Many Names: Lemberg/Lwów/Lviv/L'vov – Nationalizing in an Urban Context,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 34 (2003): 57–109; John Czaplicka (ed.), *Lviv: A City in the Crossroads of Culture*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Cambridge, MA: 2000), 1 and 4. On Galicia’s urban dualism (Lemberg/Krakow), see Harald Binder, “Politische Öffentlichkeit in Galizien: Lemberg und Krakau im Vergleich,” in Andreas R. Hofmann (ed.), *Stadt und Öffentlichkeit in Ostmitteleuropa: 1900–1939. Beiträge zur Entstehung moderner Urbanität zwischen Berlin, Charkiv, Tallinn und Triest* (Stuttgart, 2002), 259–280. On Krakow, see Simon Hadler, “Von sprechenden Steinen. Die Mythologisierung des urbanen Raumes in Krakau,” in Doktoratskolleg, *Galizien*, 159–170; Orton D. Lawrence, “The Formation of Modern Cracow (1866–1914),” *Austrian History Yearbook* 17 and 18 (1983/1984): 101–115; Larry Wolff, “Dynastic Conservatism and Poetic Violence in Fin-de-siècle Cracow: The Habsburg Matrix of Polish Modernism,” *American Historical Review* 106 (June 2001): 3, 735–764; Patrice M. Dabrowski, “Cracow and Warsaw,” in Emily Gunzburger Makaš and Tanja Damljanović Conley (eds), *Capital Cities in the Aftermath of Empires: Planning in Central and Southeastern Europe* (London, 2010). At the same time as being a Polish pantheon, Krakow also underwent a drastic transformation and modernization, as Nathaniel Wood has recently reconstructed in idem, *Becoming Metropolitan: Urban Selfhood and the Making of Modern Cracow* (De Kalb, 2010).
87. Markovits, “Introduction: Empire and Province,” in idem and Sysyn, *Nationbuilding*, 1–22.
88. Those in power in Galicia were not so much a party as a lobby for the leading families in the land, who frequently used state institutions to block opposition. “Galician elections” became a synonym in the empire for electoral fraud. These families’ representatives in government offices worked to suppress not only the Ukrainian political movements but also the Polish Peasant Parties and the Socialists. Census suffrage secured their majority in the Galician parliament, but with each stage in the extension of suffrage, in 1882, 1896, and 1906, the opposition grew stronger.

89. Alexey Miller, "Galicia after the Ausgleich: Polish-Ruthenian Conflict and the Attempts of Reconciliation," *Central European University History Department Yearbook 1993*, 135–143; Harald Binder, "Die Wahlreform von 1907 und der polnisch-ruthenische Konflikt in Ostgalizien," *Österreichische Osthefte* 40, no. 3 (1996): 293–320; Kerstin S. Jobst, "Ein politischer Mord in der Habsburgermonarchie: Das Potocki-Attentat von 1908 – Ein Kulminationspunkt der galizischen Krise?," *Österreichische Osthefte* 41 (1999): 25–45; Klaus Bachmann, "Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland": *Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Rußland (1907–1904)* (Vienna, 2001).
90. Józef Buszko, *Galicja 1859–1914, Polski Piemont?* (Warsaw, 1989); Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont* (Toronto, 2002). In the German-speaking lands, a melancholy memory of Galicia and Bukovina is cultivated, based primarily on literary works such as those of Joseph Roth. Verena Dohrn, *Reise nach Galizien: Grenzlandschaften des alten Europa* (Berlin, 2000); Martin Pollack, *Galizien: Eine Reise durch die verschwundene Welt Ostgaliziens und der Bukowina* (Frankfurt a. M., 2001).
91. The lowest administrative unit was a district, of which there were seventy-four, governed by district captains. Parishes were self-governing under local chiefs or mayors (Polish: *wójt*). They formed parish councils which were led by a parish president. Urszula Jakubowska, "Galicja na progu XX wieku," in idem (ed.), *Galicyjskie spotkania* (Kalisz, 2004), 10.
92. Eduard Graf Taaffe (1833–1895); this coalition was also known as the "Iron Ring." Cf. Ulrich E. Zellenberg, "Ein Konservativer über den Parteien – der 'Kaiserminister' Eduard Graf Taaffe," in idem (ed.), *Konservative Profile: Ideen und Praxis in der Politik zwischen FM Radetzky, Karl Kraus und Alois Mock* (Graz, 2003), 225–243.
93. Transferal to Galicia was used as a punishment in the military, although other places had even worse reputations, such as Bosnia. Cf. Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck, "Die bewaffnete Macht in Staat und Gesellschaft," in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, vol. 5: *Die bewaffnete Macht* (Vienna, 1987), 110.
94. Maner, *Galizien*, 149–157. The Viennese public's perception of the Polish nobility controlling Galicia changed accordingly. For a wealth of material on this point, see the study by Marcin Siadkowski: *Szlachcicen: Przemian stereotypu polskiej szlachty w Wiedniu na przełomie XIX i XX wieku* (Warsaw, 2011).
95. Waldemar Łazuga, "Rządy polskie" w Austrii: *Gabinet Kazimierza hr. Badeniego 1895–1897* (Poznań, 1991); Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 352.
96. The term "autonomy" is problematic since it de facto applied only to the Poles. Other groups in Galicia did not experience self-determination but merely a shift in predominance from German culture to Polish, and from centralist politics to nationalist politics. Cf. Harald Binder, "'Galizische Autonomie.' Ein streitbarer Begriff und seine Karriere," in Lukás Fasora (ed.), *Moravské vyrovnání z roku 1905/Der Mährische Ausgleich von 1905* (Brno, 2006).
97. The accompanying debate in the Galician diet is described in chapter 1 of the present book. See also Małgorzata Śliż, *Galicyjscy Żydzi na drodze do równouprawnienia 1848–1914* (Krakow, 2006); Tomasz Gałowski, *Między gettem a światem: Dylematy ideowe Żydów galicyjskich na przełomie XIX i XX wieku* (Krakow, 1997), 9–29.
98. Richard L. Rudolph, "The East European Peasant Household and the Beginnings of Industry: East Galicia 1786–1914," in Ivan S. Korporecky (ed.), *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretative Essays* (Cambridge, 1991), 339–382.

99. The only reliable statistics available are on purchases of estate land by Jews, which rose from 0 percent in 1867 to 16 percent in 1912. Cf. Tomasz Gaşowski, "From Austeria to the Manor: Jewish Landowners in Autonomous Galicia," *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* 12 (1999): 120–136; Teresa Andlauer, *Die jüdische Bevölkerung im Modernisierungsprozess Galiziens (1867–1914)* (Frankfurt a. M., 2001), 135–141. On the question of rural Jewish holdings, see also Haumann, "Juden in der ländlichen Gesellschaft Galiziens," 35–58.
100. *Reichsgesetzblatt für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder* 47 (1881): 161ff.
101. Kai Struve, "Peasant Emancipation and National Integration: Agrarian Circles, Village Reading Rooms, and Cooperatives in Galicia," in Torsten Lorenz, *Cooperatives in Ethnic Conflicts: Eastern Europe in the 19th and Early 20th Century* (Berlin, 2006), 229–249.
102. An important center was the old capital of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth and metropolis of the west of the Tsarist empire, Warsaw. The school of thought was therefore labeled "Warsaw positivism."
103. After the January Uprising was quashed, the Kingdom of Poland in the Vistula Land (*Przyslinsky Krai*) was renamed. Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb, 1996).
104. Gary Cohen, "Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867–1914," *Central European History* 40 (2007).
105. This was, of course, preconditioned upon improvements in school education, ensuring that more people gained literacy. Andrzej Meissner (ed.), *Chłopi – Naród – Kultura*, vol. 4: *Kultura i oświata wsi* (Rzeszów, 1996); Jerzy Potoczny, "Oświata dorosłych i popularizacja wiedzy w plebejskich środowiskach Galicji doby konstytucyjnej (1867–1918)," in *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, vol. 10 (Rzeszów, 1998).
106. Contemporaries did not consider it paradoxical to categorize everyone in clearly defined and distinct communities within the nation even though such membership was purportedly natural and objective. In a nationalist view, the knowledge and insight that the (simple) people lacked needed to be compensated for by the elites. In the multiethnic regions of the Central European empires, competition arose between activists who tried to gain influence over people's votes by any means possible. Peter Thaler, "Fluid Identities in Central European Borderlands," *European History Quarterly* 31 (2001): 4.
107. Recently, the conflict between the activists' nationalist concept of objective exclusive national belonging and the electoral majority's indifference, in view of the prevalent multilingualism and non-nationally encoded life-worlds, has come to be regarded as an important motor of nationalist agitation, not to be equated with an expression of national patterns of perception. Cf. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*; Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands 1900–1948* (Ithaca, 2008); Jonathan Kwan, "Review Article: Nationalism and All That: Reassessing the Habsburg Monarchy and Its Legacy," *European History Quarterly* 41 (2011): 88–108.
108. The idea of democracy continued the concept of a fundamentally Polish-national, democratic mode of communitization as discussed in the lost Aristocratic Republic's "free early community" and during the European wars of liberation, supported by Polish fighters. Among Democrats, "liberalism" was perhaps viewed positively for its economic policy or support of secular government but not as a political principle in general. Cf. Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 34ff.; Maciej Janowski, *Polish Liberal Thought before 1918* (Budapest,

- 2004); Zbigniew Fras, “Die liberale Strömung unter den galizischen Demokraten 1848–1882,” in Hans-Georg Fleck and Ryszard Kołodziejczyk (eds), *Liberale Traditionen in Polen* (Warsaw, 1994), 143–158.
109. Kasimir Felix Badeni (1846–1909) was governor of Galicia from 1888 to 1895 before becoming minister president.
  110. Dabrowski, *Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland* (Bloomington, 2004); Stanisław Dąbrowski, *Chłopi, naród, kultura*, part 2: *Działność polityczna ruchu ludowego* (Rzeszów, 1996). The Ukrainian national movement inevitably focused on Christendom as Ruthenia, or Ukraine, had no aristocratic, bourgeois, or even Jewish traditions. The intelligentsia was primarily made up of members of the clergy until the mid-nineteenth century, before a secular view of the world evolved with national aspirations. Svjatoslav Pacholkiv, *Emanzipation durch Bildung: Entwicklung und gesellschaftliche Rolle der ukrainischen Intelligenz im habsburgischen Galizien, 1890–1914* (Vienna, 2002).
  111. John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1988); Józef Buszko, “Die politischen und sozialen Bewegungen der polnischen Bauern in Galizien am Ende des 19. Und zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Karlheinz Mach (ed.), *Galizien um die Jahrhundertwende: Politische, soziale und kulturelle Verbindungen mit Österreich* (Vienna, 1990), 51–68.
  112. Paul Robert Magocsi, “The Kachkovs’kyi Society and the National Revival in Nineteenth-Century East Galicia,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 15, no. 1/2 (1991): 48–75.
  113. Tim Buchen, “Die Sprache der ‘Christliche – Volkspartei’ Westgaliziens und die Bauernnruhen von 1898,” master’s thesis, Humboldt University, Berlin, 2006.
  114. This has been done for Polish peasants by Keely Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland 1848–1914* (Ithaca, 2002); and as a comparative study of Ruthenians and Poles: Kai Struve, *Bauern und Nation in Galizien: Über Zugehörigkeit und soziale Emanzipation im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2005).
  115. Jan Molenda claims that the national moment did not become central to the peasant movement until during World War I. Molenda, *Chłopi*. In my master’s thesis, I argue against classifying the peasant movements as genuinely national movements: Buchen, “Die Sprache der ‘Christliche – Volkspartei.’”
  116. In 1900, 88 percent of Galicians occupied in the trade of goods were “of the Mosaic faith.” Cf. Ignacy Schiper, *Dzieje handlu żydowskiego na ziemiach polskich* (Warsaw, 1937).
  117. According to Klaus Bachmann, “Antisemitismus,” in Andreas Lawaty and Hubert Orłowski (eds), *Deutsche und Polen: Geschichte-Kultur-Politik* (Munich, 2003), 439–450. See also Stanislav Andreski, “An Economic Interpretation of Antisemitism in Eastern Europe,” *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 5 (1969): 209.
  118. Alexey Miller, “Do charakterystyki wsi powłaszczeniowej w latach siedemdziesiątych XIX wieku. Panika galicyjska 1872 roku,” *Przegląd Historyczny* 79 (1988): 103–107, 105.
  119. In the Lemberg archives, however, only one peasant is on record as giving the emperor’s invitation as his reason for traveling without a ticket. Miller, “Do charakterystyki,” 105.
  120. Cf. chapter 1. As talk of the *pany* getting revenge for the “ruckus” by reintroducing serfdom circulated, some peasants went to church armed, and many nobles sought shelter in the cities. Overall, however, the Easter holidays proceeded peacefully. Struve, *Bauern und Nation*, 112.

121. In Rzepienik-Strzyżewski, three people were arrested who had mentioned the warrant. In Zakliczyn, the military intervened to prevent the panic escalating, and gossipmongers in several places were arrested. Philip Pająkowski, “Dynamics of Galician Polish Conservatism in the Late Nineteenth Century,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, NF 43 (1995): 19–33, 25. The repercussions of such rumors and the tendency of anti-Jewish riots to fall on Christian feast days are also illustrated by the notorious case of the Warsaw Christmas unrest in 1881. These disturbances followed a panic in the Church of the Holy Cross which was allegedly precipitated by Jews and resulted in fatalities. Chief of Police Buturlin was rumored to have responded by permitting Christians to rob Jews until 6:00 p.m. on Christmas Day or, according to other rumors, for a period of seven days. As the police did nothing to prevent lootings, and sometimes even participated in them, the rumors seemed to be true. Golczewski, *Beziehungen*, 42.
122. Peter Stachel, “Ein Staat, der an einem Sprachfehler zugrunde ging: Die ‘Vielsprachigkeit’ des Habsburgerreiches und ihre Auswirkungen,” in Johannes Feichtinger and Peter Stachel (eds), *Das Gewebe der Kultur: Kulturwissenschaftliche Analysen zur Geschichte und Identität Österreichs in der Moderne* (Innsbruck, 2001), 11–45.
123. See now Daniel Unowsky, *The Plunder: The 1898 Anti-Jewish Riots in Habsburg Galicia* (Stanford, 2018). For a detailed discussion on the literature on antisemitism and Jewish-Christian relations in Galicia, see Tim Buchen, *Antisemitismus in Galizien: Agitation, Gewalt und Politik gegen Juden in der Habsburgermonarchie um 1900* (Berlin, 2012), 48–52.
124. Joanna Michlic, *Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present* (Lincoln, 2006). The communicative dimension of antisemitism is discussed in greater depth in the following section.
125. One could say that antisemitism was both a vocabulary of the academic language of observers and a source term used by protagonists as well as critics, who each associated it with different concepts.
126. See the outstanding study by David Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1996).
127. Some studies on Germany show cases of local populations offering considerable resistance to Jewish equality in order to conserve tradition. James Harris, *The People Speak!: Anti-Semitism and Emancipation in Nineteenth Century Bavaria* (Ann Arbor, 1994); Rainer Erb and Werner Bergmann, *Die Nachtseite der Judenemanzipation: Der Widerstand gegen die Integration der Juden in Deutschland 1780–1860* (Berlin, 1989).
128. Jacob Katz, *Vom Vorurteil bis zur Vernichtung: Der Antisemitismus 1700–1933* (Munich, 1989), 9; on the concept of the rules of sayability and their connection to actions, see Willibald Steinmetz, *Das Sagbare und das Machbare: Zum Wandel politischer Handlungsspielräume: England 1780–1867* (Stuttgart, 1993).
129. Othering often worked by portraying antisemitism as German or Prussian, making it automatically a phenomenon of the others within the political commonwealth that had fought wars against Prussia. See the articles on Denmark and Poland in Christoph Wyrwa, *Einspruch und Abwehr: Die Reaktion des europäischen Judentums auf die Entstehung des Antisemitismus (1879–1914)* (Frankfurt a. M., 2010): Christoph Leiska, “‘Das Geschrei des Herrn von Germanenstolz’: Dänisch-jüdische Intellektuelle und der moderne Antisemitismus im deutschen Kaiserreich,” 114–130; and Maciej Moszyński, “Die ‘Hydra von der Spree’: Die Warschauer Zeitschrift *Israelita* und die Anfänge des modernen Antisemitismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich,” 299–312.



130. I owe thanks to Daniel Unowsky for the idea of transposing the model of process-oriented nationalism research on to an analysis of antisemitism. See Rogers Brubaker, "Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event," *Contention* 4, no. 1 (Fall 1994): 3–14; idem, "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism," *Annual Review of Sociology* 35 (1009): 21–42; idem, *Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1998), 272–306; idem, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, 1996).
131. It is based on sociological works on the mutability of societal structures and the connection between structure and event, also termed praxeological history. Among its most prominent exponents are William Sewell, Marshall Sahlins, and Lynn Hunt; the theoretical concepts originate from Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens. Cf. Sven Reichardt, "Praxeologische Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Diskussionsanregung," *Sozial. Geschichte* 22, no. 3 (2007): 43–65.
132. The mutual effects of national movements in East Central Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have often been described in terms of a history of relations. See Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948* (Princeton, 2005); James E. Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor, 2008); Brendan J. Karch, "Nationalism on the Margins: Silesians between Germany and Poland, 1848–1945," PhD diss., Harvard, 2010; William W. Hagen, *Germans, Poles and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772–1914* (Chicago, 1980).
133. Representations are not only employed and illustrate precast concepts but also create meaning and "set reality" in the interplay between producer and recipient. Erika Fischer-Lichte and Doris Kolesch (eds), *Kulturen des Performativen* (Berlin, 1998).
134. The simplest way of constantly reproducing the experience of national belonging is in the context of a nation-state. Citizens of a nation-state are sent to school and perhaps the army, where its signs and symbols are continuously updated, and motivated to carry identification documents, the language and insignia of which are constant reminders of the polity to which they belong. See the pioneering studies by Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1880–1914* (Stanford, 1976), and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1982).
135. Such events are commended to the collective memory by everyday public communication, or left to be forgotten by silencing, in keeping with the dictum formulated by Ernest Gellner. Cf. idem, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, 1983).
136. Scholars researching the Habsburg Monarchy / Galicia include Daniel Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848–1916* (West Lafayette, IN, 2005); idem and Laurence Cole (eds), *Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy* (New York, 2007); Kerstin S. Jobst, *Zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalismus: Die polnische und ukrainische Sozialdemokratie in Galizien von 1890 bis 1914* (Hamburg, 1996).
137. Pieter M. Judson and Marsha Rozenblit (eds), *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (New York, 2005).
138. This applies mainly to national minorities under various systems of rule, such as, e.g., in Poland in the nineteenth century. See Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other*; Theodore Weeks, *From Assimilation to Antisemitism: The "Jewish Question" in Poland 1859–1914*

- (DeKalb, 2006); Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (Oxford, 2000).
139. Klaus Holz has shown that proponents of antisemitism formulated concepts not only of excluding Jews from the nation but also of Jews torpedoing the national principle as such. See Klaus Holz, "Die antisemitische Konstruktion des Dritten und die nationale Ordnung der Welt," in Christina von Braun and Eva-Maria Ziege (eds), *Das bewegliche Vorurteil: Aspekte des Internationalen Antisemitismus* (Würzburg, 2004), 43–61.
  140. I am not concerned here with comparing nationalism and antisemitism, or with analyzing the relation between the two. But I take an analogous approach to nationalism research, using the process model. Similarly, socialism, or Marxism, can be understood as a social process by which classes become historically significant subjects, making the notion of a working class become tangible reality via communication and the pursuance of practices that generate meaning. See Ulrich Wyrwa, *Branntwein und "echtes" Bier: Die Trinkkultur der Hamburger Arbeiter im 19. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg, 1990). Racism and Social Darwinism can also be conceived of as processes, by which people see their choice of mates, diet, or physical training as a service to the continuation of the race and the history of mankind as a struggle for survival between hermetic races. The various processes inevitably intersect and influence each other.
  141. Or people and organizations labeled "Jewish." Albert Lindemann, *Esau's Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews* (Cambridge, 1997). A connection between the "rise of the Jews" and the increase in hostility toward Jews had already been asserted distinctly earlier. See the review of *Esau's Tears* by Alan Steinweis at H-Net: <https://networks.h-net.org/node/2645/reviews/4124/steinweis-lindemann-esaus-tears-modern-anti-semitism-and-rise-jews>, accessed 31 March 2011.
  142. Rürup, *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus*.
  143. Csaky, *Gedächtnis der Städte*, 261ff.
  144. Daniel Vyleta, *Crime, Jews and News: Vienna 1895–1914* (New York, 2007), 48ff., 60.
  145. One example is the incident described in the prolog of Merunowicz referring to an unsolved murder case as grounds to call for restrictions on Jews. Another good illustration is the Konitz case. After the Löwy family had been accused of the murder of Ernst Winter, antisemitic journalists traveled to the scene to spread this version abroad and purposefully intervene in the search for Ernst Winter's murderer. Christoph Nonn, *Eine Stadt sucht einen Mörder: Gerücht, Gewalt und Antisemitismus im Kaiserreich* (Göttingen, 2002).
  146. Compared to sayability rules in Western societies today, a striking number of stereotypical notions concerning Jews were not regarded as antisemitic around 1900, which certainly would be today. See the late-nineteenth-century discussions on antisemitism described by Hermann Bahr, "Der Antisemitismus: Ein internationales Interview," (Berlin, 1893) with Wolfgang Benz, *Was ist Antisemitismus?* (Munich, 2004).
  147. The high concentration of Jews in finance, academia, the arts, and professions, for example, was portrayed as one such threatening scenario. On the other hand, it was warned that the "rise" of Jews, being equal citizens, would open the floodgates to the mass immigration of "East Jews" and result in society becoming overrun by them. Combining these two trains of thought on Jews to paint a picture of the "Jewish infiltration" of capital cities was a key feature of antisemitic rhetoric, especially in the Central European capitals Budapest, Vienna, and Berlin. Cf. Beller, *Antisemitism*; Csaky, *Das Gedächtnis der Städte*, 261.

148. Research into drastic mass events such as revolutions has shown that groundbreaking actions do not always follow previously devised and formulated plans, but merely appear planned and purposeful when viewed and explained in retrospect. For a study applying this insight to radical aggression toward a group, the genocide of the Herero, see Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2008), 167ff.
149. Hence, a functionalist explanation of antisemitism must take precedence over a substantialist one. Werner Bergmann, *Geschichte des Antisemitismus* (Munich, 2002), 6.
150. See Moritz Föllmer, "Gewalt und Antisemitismus," review of Nonn, Christoph: *Eine Stadt sucht einen Mörder: Gerücht, Gewalt und Antisemitismus im Kaiserreich* (Göttingen 2002) and Walser Smith, Helmut: *Die Geschichte des Schlachters: Mord und Antisemitismus in einer deutschen Kleinstadt* (Göttingen 2002), *H-Soz-u-Kult*, 8 January 2003, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2003-1-010>.
151. Kai Struve, "Gentry, Jews and Peasants: Jews as the 'Others' in the Formation of the Modern Polish Nation in Rural Galicia during the Second Half of the 19th Century," in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed.), *Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (New York, 2003), 103-126.
152. One example is university fraternities: Monika Natkowska, *Numerus clausus, getto ławkowe, numerus nullus, "paragraph aryjski": Antisemityzm na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim 1931–1939* (Warsaw, 1999); Norbert Kampe, *Studenten und "Judenfrage" im Deutschen Kaiserreich* (Göttingen, 1988).
153. One can only speculate what their motives were. Perhaps they were members of a Jewish reform movement who wished to discredit the Orthodox religion, or were simply seeking public attention. It is not known whether they were personally acquainted with Moses Ritter.
154. In Prussia around 1900, prominent ritual murder cases were recorded in Xanten in 1891 and Konitz/Chojnice in 1900.
155. Most examples can be found in the detailed accounts of the Konitz murder case written by Christoph Nonn and Helmut Walser Smith.
156. The diversification of the press and party-political landscape, Jewish equality, and the concept of antisemitism were three major new departures that changed society in the late nineteenth century, for which reason Christian-Jewish relations and hostility toward Jews in this period must be distinguished from that of the early modern period. Cf. Christhard Hoffmann, "Christlicher Antijudaismus und moderner Antisemitismus," in Leonore Siegele-Wenschkewitz (ed.), *Christlicher Antijudaismus und Antisemitismus: Theologische und kirchliche Programme Deutscher Christen* (Frankfurt a. M., 1994), 293–317.
157. Knowledge is understood here in a broad sociological sense as the sum of socially accepted opinions. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit: Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie* (Frankfurt a. M., 1987).