

Introduction

The Nuclear Crisis, NATO's Double-Track Decision, and the Peace Movement of the 1980s

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In the fall of 1983 more than a million people all across West Germany gathered under the motto “No to Nuclear Armament” to protest the implementation of NATO’s Double-Track Decision of 12 December 1979 and the resulting deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Germany and other European countries.¹ The media overflowed with photos of human chains, sit-in blockades, and enormous protest rallies. The impressive range of protest events included street theater performances, protest marches, and blockades of missile depots. During the final days of the campaign there were huge mass protests with several hundred thousand participants, such as the “Fall Action Week 1983” in Bonn on 22 October and a human chain stretching about 108 km from Ulm to Stuttgart. It seemed as if “peace” was the dominant theme all over Germany.²

Despite these protests, the West German Bundestag approved the missile deployment with the votes of the governing conservative coalition, thereby concluding one of the longest debates in German parliamentary history.³ A few days later the first of the so-called Euromissiles were installed in Mutlangen, near Stuttgart, and in Sigonella, on the island of Sicily.⁴ The peace movement had failed to attain its short-term political aim. However, after a brief period of reflection, the movement continued to mobilize masses of people for its political peace agenda. Although the government felt its position was strengthened by its handling of the Euromissiles controversy, it nonetheless considered a renewed public debate on the modernization of NATO short-range missiles in the second half of the 1980s infeasible. The “fight for peace” had thus left deep divisions in the political culture of Germany.⁵

The Euromissiles controversy was the chief topic of political debate in the early 1980s.⁶ To reduce the conflict to a simple confrontation between

the political establishment on the one hand and the peace movement on the other would be to misjudge the complexities on both sides. The peace movement was not only a dazzling, but also a collaborative phenomenon, encompassing a wide range of people from Communist groups to conservative Catholics.⁷ At the same time, mainstream political forces were deeply divided. The missile debate thus contributed decisively to a political sea change in Bonn in 1982 with the end of the social-liberal coalition under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl's election as chancellor of a new Christian-liberal government.⁸ This volume explores the different stages of this development, analyzes the position of each side, draws attention to some of the leading political personalities, and finally evaluates the consequences for West German society and the implications for the end of the Cold War.

To highlight the societal context of the debate, we have come to use the term "nuclear crisis." We want to stress that the debate about NATO's Double-Track Decision involved far more than questions of international security and foreign relations. During the nuclear crisis, people in West Germany, like those in many other Western societies, sought to come to terms with their own past, present, and future.⁹ The dispute about arms deployment was an expression of rapid sociocultural changes that started in the 1960s and continued with the economic transformations in the 1970s. As early as 1982, Erhard Eppler, a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and one of the most outspoken critics of nuclear arms modernization, concluded that the peace movement was "one of several manifestations of a change in social perception and a shift in fundamental values that began in the late sixties among young people. It gained momentum during the 1970s until it was accepted among broader segments of society and continued to spread visibly in the 1980s."¹⁰

The Issues

So what was the great controversy of the 1980s actually about? In hindsight the causes and effects are obvious to the supporters of the NATO Double-Track Decision. To Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Foreign Minister of both the social-liberal and the subsequent Christian-liberal coalition, the "Soviet challenge" was the catalyst for a Western arms upgrade—he deliberately coined the term *Nachrüstung* (retrofitting/countervailing strategy). The NATO Double-Track Decision was thus for Genscher both indicative and constitutive of "the period when it was determined whether the Soviet Union would gain political power in Western Europe through military superiority, and whether it would succeed in separating Western Europe from

the United States.”¹¹ In the eyes of Kohl, the Warsaw Pact had “acquired a substantial military predominance in Europe.” Through the deployment of SS-20 missiles NATO’s doctrine of a *flexible response* to a possible Soviet attack was undermined. This presented the US president with a dilemma: in an emergency situation he would have to decide whether to stand by his allies and respond with ballistic missiles or tolerate a decoupling of Europe to protect his own country from a retaliatory Soviet intercontinental missile strike.¹²

To see the NATO Double-Track Decision as a direct response to a unilateral nuclear arms threat by the Eastern bloc is only half the story, however. Anyone who really wants to understand its origins has to dig deeper into history. First, as Tim Geiger shows in his contribution to this volume with regard to its roots, the NATO Double-Track Decision was an unintended consequence of détente and the relaxation of Cold War tensions during the 1960s and early 1970s. As Schmidt argued in a speech delivered to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies in October 1977 (later glorified as the beginning of the Euromissiles rearmament), the SALT negotiations between the superpowers on intercontinental ballistic missiles had left out the long-range and intermediate-range missiles.¹³ The SS-20 fell into a “grey area” because of its target range of 5,000 km, which mostly threatened Europe and the East Asian allies of the United States. As a result, the SS-20 was not considered to be an intercontinental weapon. This created a problem for NATO as its officially adopted doctrine of *flexible response* from 1967–68 required a measured reaction to military aggression. Since NATO had no weapon equivalent to the SS-20, this inequity in the escalation continuum allegedly destabilized the nuclear balance of power.¹⁴

Even at the time there was considerable skepticism—especially within the strategic community—about the proposition that the SS-20 had divided Western deterrence into two spheres and rendered it unviable. Britain and France both commanded their own quite considerable nuclear capacity. Experts, such as the British chief strategist Sir Michael Quinlan, did not accept the idea that nuclear war could be potentially restricted to Europe as not only Schmidt but also his successor Kohl feared. The experts regarded nuclear weapons as essentially political tools. Nuclear arsenals served as a deterrent, that is to say, they prevented war. If deterrence failed, they promised the rapid termination of a conflict.¹⁵ As MC 14/3—the overall strategic concept adopted by NATO in 1967–68—anticipated, this could mean that a demonstrative detonation of a single bomb or several precision nuclear air strikes against selected targets would lead to a cessation of military action. French President François Mitterrand also did not buy into the strategy of flexible response.¹⁶ But since the main interest of the French was to keep the *force de frappe* out of the negotiations and to keep the Federal Republic of

Germany firmly integrated within the alliance, France supported the NATO Double-Track Decision, albeit without any direct involvement.¹⁷

Second, the Double-Track Decision was in part the outcome of the “revolution in military affairs” that had taken place during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact were forced to respond to technological innovations. According to NATO’s Harmel Report of 1967, the Western alliance followed a policy of *détente* and defense through deterrence. It sought to find a diplomatic way to come to an understanding with the East and thus improve security via *détente* while simultaneously continuing to modernize its technology. Since the 1950s, NATO and the United States had pursued technological solutions and nuclear deterrence because these were cheaper and less burdensome to taxpayers. For a long time, nuclear weapons had been seen as politically more acceptable than large-scale conventional armament (“more bang for the buck”). The drawback to this cost-saving strategy was NATO’s relative inferiority when it came to conventional arms. Moscow thwarted this calculation as it gradually improved its arms and, after the 1960s, increasingly reached nuclear parity.

In his survey of the weapons systems developed on both sides of the Iron Curtain since the late 1960s, Oliver Bange discusses the political consequences of technological innovation. NATO planned new conventional and nuclear weapons systems long before the SS-20 turned into a military and political problem for the West. Research and construction on Pershing II and cruise missiles had been in progress since 1969 and 1970. In 1972 the construction of the neutron bomb was resumed after it had been stopped in 1958. Both military alliance systems developed new aircraft that revolutionized warfare: the MRCA Tornado displayed high-performance electronics and was capable of transporting nuclear and conventional weapons at low altitudes behind enemy lines. The Soviet “Backfire” bombers, on the other hand, worried US officials since these weapons could potentially serve as intercontinental bombers. In addition, there was also a new generation of artillery and battle tanks like the German Leopard 2. Bange argues that these new weapons profoundly transformed a strategic perception of war that was shaped by the “major and decisive tank battles” of World War II.

These mutual observations and threat perceptions are crucial for an understanding of the Cold War.¹⁸ Despite the increased access to historical sources and archives, a variety of interpretations remain with regard to Moscow’s motives and reasoning. According to Bange, the Soviet Union was at all times well informed about NATO plans and proceedings. It seems to have partially anticipated NATO’s arms modernization. Convinced that the West pursued inherently aggressive goals,¹⁹ the Kremlin had been expecting the introduction of cruise missiles and Pershing II since their design in 1970 and

had thus preemptively counteracted by introducing new weapons such as the SS-20. Moscow took the view that the SS-20 was merely the result of regular modernization efforts. Other authors point out that during the end of the Brezhnev era the Soviet Union's "military-industrial complex" ultimately acted outside political parameters. The orthodox interpretation assumes that the Soviet Union harbored aggressive motives.²⁰

The third element to consider when reviewing the complex history behind the Double-Track Decision is that the decision was in part the result of internal Western disagreements over strategy. While the decision eventually strengthened the internal bonds and cohesion among Western allies, it at first sought to heal a rift caused by a deep crisis in US-German relations in particular and transatlantic relationships generally, an ongoing predicament that had come to the forefront during the late 1970s.²¹ This was partly the result of increased confidence among the political elites in the two German states. Some thirty years after the end of World War II the leaders of both states were concerned that Germany would again turn into a battlefield. Such worry contributed to a certain convergence of interests between East and West Germany. Hermann Wentker shows that despite a revival of East-West tensions after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, neither side wanted to cut the thread of their bilateral discussions. Although West Germany had been a driving force behind the Double-Track Decision, even hardline conservative Christian Democratic politicians were not inclined



Figure 0.1. Meetings of foreign and defense ministers of NATO member states on 12 December 1979 in Brussels, Belgium (NATO photos)

to use the aggressive anticommunist rhetoric of American neoconservatives around President Ronald Reagan. Anja Hanisch points out that Europeans living on the demarcation line of the East-West conflict valued *détente* substantially more than US decision-makers. Caught in the middle, these everyday citizens were therefore more likely to support, albeit in part rhetorical, concessions to the East.

The growing tensions within the Western alliance were exemplified by Chancellor Schmidt's confident admonitions to the Americans, who seemed to have become forgetful of their contractual obligations within NATO, as well as by divergent perspectives on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and *détente*. Political scientist Helga Haftendorn argued early on that the Double-Track Decision was partly based on a US-German misunderstanding. Following the tradition of his predecessors Kiesinger and Adenauer, Chancellor Schmidt was beset by a lingering nightmare that the superpowers would act in complicity at the expense of West German security. The progress that the United States and the USSR had made in the SALT negotiations was of little use to the West Germans. Chancellor Schmidt's 1977 London speech was a sharp reminder to the Americans that SALT could produce potential imbalances and create more insecurity in Europe. The embattled Carter administration took this as a call for more arms. Now the German Federal government faced a dilemma to which the NATO Double-Track Decision seemed to offer a resolution. As Geiger explains, in his contribution to this volume, the threat to deploy medium-range missiles (i.e., Pershing II and cruise missiles) was combined with an offer to continue disarmament negotiations.

The Double-Track Decision can therefore be seen as an attempt to bridge divergent interests within NATO and to strengthen transatlantic cohesion. The Western alliance had seriously suffered during the turmoil of the Vietnam War.²² Furthermore, Europeans and Americans drew different conclusions from *détente*.²³ After US President Jimmy Carter's coming into office there was little hope of an improvement in German-American relations, since at least Chancellor Schmidt considered the new president's efforts at international politics amateurish.²⁴ The Double-Track Decision was supposed to demonstrate the unity of NATO, which wanted to prevent the appearance of West German nuclear isolation. As a consequence, the cruise missiles were planned to be stationed not only in West Germany but also in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy (Pershing II missiles, more limited in range, were placed exclusively on German territory). Helmut Kohl, Chancellor Schmidt's successor, also attached extraordinary significance to the implementation of this decision with respect to the political alliance. He bluntly accused the peace movement of being anti-American and conjured up an

image of transatlantic estrangement caused by ungrateful Germans toward disappointed Americans.²⁵ For Chancellor Kohl, the political struggle over the missiles was also a struggle for the soul of the alliance.

The Protagonists of the Conflict

Who were the protagonists? The “front line” was more uneven than it appears in retrospect. At the height of the controversy over the weapons modernization in the fall of 1983, two relatively clearly identifiable camps seemed irreconcilably opposed to each other: on the one side, the government led by Helmut Kohl since the autumn of 1982, his coalition parties, the CDU/CSU, the FDP, and its supporters; on the other side, the peace movement as well as the parliamentary opposition (which, after the general election on 6 March 1983, included the Green Party). The two sides had come into formation when NATO made its fundamental decision in December 1979. That it would not be easy for the moderately left or social democratic fathers of the Double-Track Decision—Chancellor Schmidt in Germany, Prime Minister Callaghan in the United Kingdom, President Carter in the United States—to convince their own political following of the necessity of modernizing their nuclear arsenals had been obvious since the controversy about the neutron bomb in 1977; hence, the latter is often regarded as having been a kind of test run for the subsequent Euromissiles controversy.²⁶

The contribution by Jan Hansen on the political parties in West Germany highlights that politicians not only from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), but also from the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and even among the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (though hardly any in the Christian Social Union, CSU), showed an understanding for the concerns of the peace movement, even if they held no outright sympathy. In an address to the national convention of the CDU in Hamburg in 1981, a 22-year-old Christian Wulff, who later would become president of the Federal Republic of Germany, caught national attention when he demanded that everyone “take into account that many people in this country, both young and old, are afraid.”²⁷ The deepest division undoubtedly existed among the Social Democrats. The proponents of the implementation of the Double-Track Decision gathered around Chancellor Schmidt, who insisted on a clear distinction between his own position and that of the peace movement, but found their support diminishing and were soon in the minority. Even though the controversy was seemingly about foreign policy, domestically the SPD faced the prime challenge of integrating the new social movements that had emerged from the student protests of the late 1960s. Party Chairman Willy Brandt

and Party Secretary Egon Bahr, both outspoken critics of nuclear rearmament and proponents of a strong peace policy, tried hard to build bridges to the New Left in the area of foreign policy.²⁸

A similar line of conflict existed among the labor unions, as Dietmar Süß shows. Divisions among its members for and against the peace movement followed comparable age and lifestyle demographics. When the question arose as to how to respond to the new social movements, it seemed to touch on central notions of political identity.²⁹ Despite longstanding antimilitarist traditions within the unions, the attitude of conservative union members, for example Hermann Rappe (chairman of the trade union representing workers in the chemical industry), proved very similar to that of Chancellor Schmidt and his pragmatic and consensual liberal-minded social democrats, and showed little understanding of the peace movement's organization, its forms of protest, or its grassroots political orientation. In addition, the moderate left displayed a knee-jerk anticommunist reaction. As firmly established, powerful institutions, the labor unions in this respect were comparable to the Christian churches and the political parties, and they saw little reason to get involved with the colorful and politically intangible networks of a green and alternative peace movement.

Sebastian Kalden and Jan Ole Wiechmann analyze how the established churches, despite being divided on the “peace issue,” provided “one of the most important platforms for the peace and security policy debates in West Germany around 1980.” The social changes of the 1960s and 1970s did not pass without leaving its mark on the churches.³⁰ Only a small fraction of the congregations of these churches felt an affinity toward the peace movement. Nonetheless, the great mass meetings of the Protestant churches—that is to say the church congresses in Hamburg (1981) and in Hanover (1983)—turned into central events shaping the public debate, as the opponents to the Euromissiles were able to make effective use of the media coverage.³¹ The churches provided an important organizational structure for transnational communication on the topic of peace. Mainly among the Reformed Protestants (to a far less extent among Lutherans), a close exchange of ideas took place, both internally and with other denominations, for example, with the Dutch Reformed Church.³² On the Catholic side, pastoral letters of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops that officially rejected deterrence in 1982 turned into key documents for church discussions in Germany. Even many non-Christian and non-Catholic members of the peace movement followed the words from the American bishops with great interest.

Despite such internal divisions, political parties, trade unions, and churches served as institutionalized forums for the public debate about the Euromissiles. Notwithstanding a lack of research in this area, the same is

likely to be true for public opinion, as polls show a wide spectrum of views. Opponents of the NATO Double-Track Decision claimed that West Germans supported the transatlantic alliance but rejected a defense system based on nuclear weapons.³³ Confronted with the issue of nuclear defense, the majority of West Germans opted for a policy of “better red than dead.” Conversely, Helmut Kohl’s electoral victory in 1983 is often considered a victory for supporters of the Double-Track Decision. Yet other factors played at least an equally if not more significant role in this result. The journalist Josef Joffe commented even then that a chief reason for the political failure of the peace movement was the lesser significance of foreign policy issues in comparison with economic and social issues and the fact that nuclear doomsday scenarios themselves were insufficient to determine electoral outcome.³⁴

The Peace Movement

A peculiar feature of the peace movement of the 1980s is that, as a protest movement, it was characterized by cooperation as well as some competition among influential organizations and established social actors such as political parties, churches, and trade unions, and among other social movements. This meant, in Christoph Becker-Schaum’s view, “an increase in resources and a heightened capacity to rally people.” At the same time, it implied “the danger of dependency,” a worry that was discussed at the time in light of the participation of communists within the movement.³⁵ To balance diverging interests and political traditions, the peace movement created its own organizational structure with a Coordination Committee led by an executive office and various central and regional conferences. As a result, the movement’s dynamic now also influenced traditional organizations. Indeed, the peace movement grew into the largest protest movement in the history of West Germany by adopting structures from the “New Social Movements”³⁶ and the alternative culture of the 1970s. With the end of protests after the deployment of the Euromissiles starting in late 1983, its institutional structure, however, largely dissolved.

The peace movement drew on various sources and realms of experience: first and foremost among these were the ecology and environmental movements of the 1970s. Silke Mende and Birgit Metzger explore how the fight against civilian use of nuclear power “provided significant human and institutional resources” for the peace movement. The environmental movement had already successfully influenced existing institutions such as churches and political parties. Following its lead, the peace movement manifested a comprehensive “perception of a social crisis and its criticism,” which sub-

sequently led to the intellectual basis of a fundamental critique of “existing conditions” and the perceived lack of problem-solving skills within the incumbent “party state.”³⁷ Marianne Zepp then discusses how “Eco-pacifism” and approaches of academic peace and conflict studies served as additional intellectual foundations and precursors. Institutionalized during the era of the social-liberal coalition, peace and conflict research bracketed the peace movement with the support of academic institutions, such as research organizations and universities.³⁸ As a consequence of their advanced research, the peace movement could ground its arguments at the onset of the debate about NATO’s Double-Track Decision in a systematic and science-based critique of the idea of “deterrence.” In many cases, its members appeared better informed on political, military, and moral implications of certain weapons systems than those in favor of the arms upgrade.³⁹

Who then belonged to the peace movement of the 1980s? Next to the traditional institutions already mentioned, ranging from churches to trade unions and the Communist Party, the movement comprised of peace organizations with longstanding traditions (e.g., the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft-Vereinte Kriegsdienstgegner [German Peace Society-United Conscientious Objectors])—some dating back to the time of the German Empire. Certain membership groups modeled on the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament from the 1960s made up the Easter March movement. Finally, participants in social phenomena such as the squatter scene and the ecological movement need to be included. In his contribution, Christoph Becker-Schaum points out that the peace movement showed all the characteristics of a youth movement, albeit less explicitly than the student movement of the 1960s. Participants were slightly older, often in their twenties and occasionally in their early thirties, whose formative years had been during the often-depressing social upheavals of the 1970s that were marked by anxiety and deep crisis (“No Future”). Active members were also closely aligned with the alternative milieu.⁴⁰ They formed the movement’s bulk and its active core. In the early 1980s, they were thus younger than the former activists of the 1968 generation and regarded the Green Party as representing their point of view, but kept the Old Left, including all communists, at bay.

The peace movement of the 1980s encompasses an astonishingly broad spectrum not only of institutions, but also individual members. Irrespective of the high proportion of young adults, its following was less clearly defined than the protest movements of the late 1960s, because it cut across generational lines. Compared to 1950s antinuclear activism, which was strongly grounded in the labor movement and Protestant milieus, the social background of the 1980s peace movement was more heterogeneous. Reinhild Kreis describes how women in particular were able to play an independent

and socially salient role in the peace movement—which contrasted sharply with their less visible participation in the strikingly male-dominated 1968 protests and 1950s campaigns against rearmament.⁴¹ Not surprisingly, female as well as male members of the peace movement sought to highlight this important position of women in the media coverage. Saskia Richter's chapter shows the incredibly diverse range of prominent personalities involved in the movement. They include former Chancellor and SPD chairman Willy Brandt and the circle of his ambitious SPD successors, such as Oskar Lafontaine (himself a future SPD chairman), but also former army general Gert Bastian, conservative journalist Franz Alt, as well as Eva Quistorp, cofounder of the women's peace movement. Petra Kelly may be singled out among the immensely diverse group of activists in that she was a charismatic politician with a US background and a completely different political and organizational style.

Similar to proponents of the NATO Double-Track Decision who enacted a show of international solidarity at summits and state visits, the opponents of the arms upgrade also engaged in international exchanges among likeminded groups. Facilitated by national and international church organizations, scientific groups such as the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, artistic and cultural initiatives, and more institutionalized and regular platforms hosted by groups such as European Nuclear Disarmament (END), among others, the connections among nuclear disarmament activists intensified rapidly from the beginning of the 1980s. This development fostered joint protest actions and the swift dissemination of relevant literature, protest strategies and techniques, as well cultural practices and visual representations of antinuclear activism across national borders.⁴² Although often mediated by individuals with international contacts and experience (such as Petra Kelly or Mary Kaldor), these relationships could also rely on a well-established global nuclear disarmament movement that had come into being after World War II.⁴³ Nonetheless, these transnational networks were frequently caught in the conflicting priorities of local and transnational issues and needs, as the ultimate aims of these national movements differed considerably.⁴⁴

The European line of demarcation known as the “Iron Curtain” did not prevent a regular exchange of ideas and people. Next to a multitude of transatlantic meetings, there were international ties within Western Europe and between Westerners and dissidents in Eastern Europe. The latter played a highly symbolic role in the publicity generated by the visit of Green Party members from Bonn to dissidents of the German Democratic Republic in 1983. Rainer Eckert explains that participants in the independent peace movement in East Germany were rarely in a position to participate actively in international networks yet perceived themselves, just like their Western

counterparts, as members of a pan-European and global movement.⁴⁵ With Polish and Czech dissidents they shared a belief that international peace was impossible without the right to domestic freedom and democracy.⁴⁶

The Forms of Conflict

How did the peace movement communicate its protest? Kathrin Fahlenbrach and Laura Stapano reveal how contemporary images displayed certain patterns. Photos, posters, and film footage persistently showed a cross-section of society—adults, children, teenagers, and grandparents—demonstrating side by side. It has already been mentioned that the ideology of the peace movement grew out of the social movements of the 1970s and the practices of peace activism followed the traditions of the protest movement of 1968.⁴⁷ This also holds true for its aesthetic dimension and general character. Posters deliberately copied the style of the student movement and, according to Fahlenbrach and Stapano's analysis, members symbolically emphasized their ideological distance from the norms and styles of conventional politics by wearing casual clothes and publicly employing expressive modes of communication like dance and stylized movement. Such provocative anti-establishment aesthetics sometimes alienated proponents of the Double-Track Decision. Interestingly enough, the conservative CDU copied the format of protest events with a campaign of "10,000 days of peace," but deliberately chose a different set of aesthetics for it.⁴⁸

The choice of location and social space for each protest was a central element in the communication strategy of the peace movement: opponents to the Euromissiles preferred to draw on the "local" dimension and made use of a personal environment, which Susanne Schregel defines as "local space" in the struggle for peace. Crowd-drawing demonstrations were staged in central venues, although many small regional protest events took place as well. Some of these locations certainly attracted more than local media attention, taking on national and international significance, especially the missile depot near the village of Mutlangen close to Stuttgart and Waldheide near Heilbronn, as well as corresponding hotspots of missile deployment in other European countries. The local blockades literally performed "body politics" and drew attention to the spatial and regional threat of the arms upgrade to neighborhoods. A novel concept of a nuclear-free zone was developed that deliberately set "realms of peace" apart from "military settings." Despite this focus on local landmarks, international twin partnerships developed as well. In this respect, the peace movement anticipated a subsequent global justice movement that stresses the importance of local developments in relation to global processes.

This pronounced localization and simultaneous interconnection between local and regional with international and global events are also characteristics of nuclear doomsday scenarios portrayed in the arts and popular media during the 1980s. The film *The Day After* (1983), for example, chooses a seemingly arbitrary city from the American Midwest as the site of a nuclear apocalypse and Gudrun Pausewang's popular novel *The Last Children of Schewenborn* situates a nuclear war in a small town setting. This new focus on local environments was a marked shift in popular culture dealing with nuclear disaster—and it was not the only one, as Philipp Baur points out. Fiction took a turn to the serious in the sense that most narratives did not offer an escapist happy ending like the one in the movie *War Games* (1983). Films like *The Day After* and *When the Wind Blows* (1986) terminate in real-time disaster. The early 1980s also saw the rise of “nuclear pop.”⁴⁹ This type of popular music communicated anxiety and served as a mouthpiece to artists who identified with the peace movement for its aims and purposes. Up to a certain degree this music may even be understood as a social mechanism for coping with the nuclear crisis.⁵⁰

Scientists of various disciplinary backgrounds played a prominent role in the public debates about the nuclear threat covered by the media. In her chapter Marianne Zepp analyzes networks of scholars from the social sciences who specialized in peace and conflict studies. These scientists were highly skilled in communicating information and had privileged access to print and broadcast media; thus, they had no trouble arguing their case in the public domain. Among these experts, there were both proponents and opponents of the Euromissiles. Claudia Kemper argues, for example, that specialist knowledge—such as the principles of civil defense and first-hand experience in dealing with emergencies and catastrophes, as well as familiarity with military war planning—was used for legitimizing as well as rejecting NATO's planned nuclear weapons upgrade. Science therefore became a central arena of conflict. This is reflected in the media history of the nuclear crisis, in which the experts' discourse and its reception mirror the public debate on the looming “nuclear holocaust.” Nuclear disaster scenarios developed by civil defense experts often found their way into fictional texts, such as Anton-Andreas Guha's *Ende: Diary of a Third World War* (1986, German edition 1983) and Raymond Briggs' graphic novel *When the Wind Blows* (1982). These national networks of experts were thus part of international and transnational communicative contexts.

The peace movement's communication strategy directed toward media coverage took on various forms, including demonstrations, parliamentary debates, party congresses, publications, and the physical obstruction of missile transports. The strategy at times involved deliberate conflicts with the

police and the judiciary. This struggle was an essential element of the peace movement as a whole. Court cases about sit-ins in Mutlangen or the “arms tax boycott” passed through the entire court system right up to the Federal Constitutional Court. The courts by and large adopted the reasoning of the proponents of the NATO Double-Track Decision and the logic of the necessity of an upgraded arms threat. At the same time, the principle of freedom of assembly was strengthened. Security laws were tightened in part, and the police union started an internal debate questioning the legality of blockades. Moreover, as Michael Sturm shows, the police gradually revised their methods. A comprehensive process of learning had been initiated that assumed a form of “citizen orientation” and a more relaxed attitude. Ultimately the police developed new techniques (protest policing) to adapt to these new forms of protest.⁵¹

History and the Movement’s Legacy

The historical consequences of the nuclear crisis have not yet been systematically explored by scholars. Contemporaries were arguing intensely about the impact the social movements of the 1980s exerted on security policy. They asked whether the grand debate on security in the early 1980s over the NATO Double-Track Decision had a lasting impact on the strategic culture of West Germany and what its enduring heritage might be.⁵² Contemporary fears were formulated, for example, by the political scientist and Adenauer biographer Hans-Peter Schwarz, who suggested that the German *Machtbesessenheit* (obsession with power) during the first half of the twentieth century had mutated into a *Machtvergessenheit* (being oblivious to power) and hence a shift toward denouncing all responsibility for international politics.⁵³ Drawing upon these arguments, historians such as Peter Graf Kielmansegg, Heinrich August Winkler, Jeffrey Herf, and Eckart Conze have argued that the refusal of the peace movement to back the NATO Double-Track Decision broke an accepted consensus about security concerns that “had held for two decades.”⁵⁴

With regard to the impact of the nuclear crisis, four questions seem particularly pertinent:

First, contemporary conservatives wondered about the “fortification/militancy of democracy” (*Wehrhaftigkeit der Demokratie*) and the strength of democratic systems to resist totalitarian challenges. With regard to the politics of memory, this argument is fraught with danger: it compares the appeasement policies of the 1930s with actions by the seemingly powerless executives of democratically elected governments in the face of the Soviet challenge. This

sharply contrasts with the argument that the debate over the Double-Track Decision enhanced the roots of democratic culture in West Germany⁵⁵ and was a sign of a consolidated post-fascist cultural consensus that was tightly interwoven with a self-definition of Germany as a peace-oriented society, thus demonstrating another phase of the country's continuous liberalization.⁵⁶

Second, a closely related and equally controversial question, is whether the critique of the arms upgrade via the Euromissiles debate led to a retreat to nationalist attitudes and positions—and thus had an alienating effect on West Germany in relation to other Western democracies—and whether the peace movement can be found guilty of a prejudiced anti-Americanism. Opponents to the Euromissiles again take the opposite view and point out that due to multiple pan-European and transatlantic contacts the peace movement resulted in an increased Western integration of the Federal Republic of Germany and, perhaps even more importantly, its protests, just like the 1960s protests⁵⁷ served as a gateway for Western influences, thus contributing to a larger “Westernization” process (Anselm Doering-Manteuffel).

Third, some historians question whether the nuclear crisis had an overall impact on institutional party politics and the general potential of social movements to influence political decision-making within and outside parliament. The prevailing view is that the peace movement failed in its self-imposed task to prevent the implementation of the NATO Double-Track Decision and, as a consequence, has not left deep marks in the fabric of West German democracy. Yet the Green Party's election into parliament institutionalized the protest movement, which certainly had a tremendous impact on the political landscape and the ability to create majorities for government.

Finally, the fourth question is whether the 1980s debate about security policy in general and the NATO Double-Track Decision in particular played a role in bringing about the end of the Cold War. There are again very different and opposing perspectives on this complex matter. Some argue that the uncompromising attitude of Western governments forced the Soviet Union into giving in to an arms agreement. Others, by contrast, claim that the ostracization of nuclear weapons and an emerging peace consensus set the ground for more relaxed international relations in the second half of the 1980s, which in turn led to the collapse of communist regimes, therefore making a significant contribution to the end of the Cold War.

Politics of Memory

With regard to our first question, the “fortification/militancy of democracy” (*Wehrhaftigkeit der Demokratie*) and the coming to terms with the National

Socialist past, Helmut Kohl justified his support for the NATO Double-Track Decision with reference to an “ethical responsibility” stating that “we all ... learned a lesson from history in two terrible wars, with displaced persons and refugees, survivors and the fallen of two world wars.” Policy should “prevent the apocalypse with the help of historical experience and practical common sense [and] it needs to prevent an extortion that harbors the possibility of unleashing an inferno.”⁵⁸ In a fierce rhetorical skirmish delivered in parliament in June 1983, the general secretary of the conservative Christian Democratic Party, Heiner Geissler, accused Green politician Joschka Fischer of being responsible for the ethics of pacifism in the 1980s, which resembled those of the appeasement policy of the 1930s that “had made Auschwitz possible.” According to Geissler, the death of millions of people could have been prevented “if the weakness of liberal democracies had not made it so easy for the dictator of the Nazi regime to start the war. This is the truth.”⁵⁹

Supporters of the NATO Double-Track Decision belabored historical analogies to justify taking a “firm stand” against the Soviet Union. However, Geissler’s antagonist Fischer had employed similar rhetoric only a few days earlier when he gave an interview to the political journal *Der Spiegel*. Fischer argued that it was “morally appalling that in the logical system of modernity after Auschwitz [that] there was still no taboo against preparing for mass destruction.”⁶⁰ Fischer had also warned against false analogies between Nazi crimes and the East-West conflict. But his own comments were representative of similar rhetorical devices used by large segments of the peace movement. Slogans like “No More War” and recalling the memory of the German genocide of the Jews in the 1940s had become increasingly widespread and were supposed to boost motivation to engage in current political action. Time and again memories of World War II were invoked in order to support a “resistance against nuclear missiles” and score political points. Memorial days such as 8 May (Victory in Europe Day, day of German surrender), the “Antiwar Day” on 1 September, and ceremonies held in memory of anti-Nazi resistance fighters invoked the past for the political purpose of rallying the public to a pacifist stance.⁶¹

Opponents of the Euromissiles considered it their duty, in the spirit of a “militant/fortified democracy,” to engage in “resistance” to accelerated arms production and deployment, using precisely this term due to its strong historic connotations. Günter Grass, author and subsequent winner of the Nobel Prize for literature, characterized the underlying logic of nuclear armament as a “cynical abandonment of fundamental values of human ethics ... , which had back then led to the Wannsee Conference and the decision for the final solution—nowadays it results in military simulation games which assume worst-case scenarios with casualty figures of fifty or eighty million deaths



Figure 0.2. Demonstrators with banner in front of the Memorial Church on the Kurfürstendamm in West Berlin on 10 June 1982 protesting against the visit of US President Ronald Reagan (ullstein bild / Stark-Otto)

as inevitable fallout.”⁶² Supposed parallels to a “nuclear holocaust” (a term that was in high circulation) or “Shoah” were drawn countless times in word and picture as well as expressed by symbolic actions (demonstrators wearing concentration camp clothes, posters displaying slogans such as “Pershing sets you free”).⁶³

Given the importance of Holocaust remembrance in Western societies in the 1980s as a central moral point of reference, both sides of the conflict emphasized—with an almost disconcerting harshness from today’s perspective—that the issue of armament was much more than a simple question of security policy. The change of government and the conservative turn in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1982–83 only intensified both sides’ polemical rhetoric in this debate, which was also about the future of society; more specifically, the question was posed if a “left-liberal political hegemony” would successfully withstand a “neo-conservative reversal.” It was the time of the decade-long dispute in intellectual circles and among historians known as the *Historikerstreit* (historians’ dispute) and there would be no consensus about which lessons could be learned from history. The German theologian Dorothee Soelle, who taught in New York, described the Pershing II missiles in Mutlangen as “flying incinerators”;⁶⁴ a verdict, which in retrospect is perhaps not quite so shocking if one bears in mind that members of the Ploughshares movement in the United States used similarly drastic historical analogies.⁶⁵

“We want to learn from history. We never again want to make the mistakes that led to Nazi barbarism,” said Kohl in November 1981.⁶⁶ It would have been unthinkable that this frank announcement, which certainly also hides more than it reveals, could have been uttered by a Christian Democratic or conservative politician in the 1950s.⁶⁷ Although the antagonists did not agree regarding the way Hitler and Nazi Germany constituted a warning and what political conclusions or moral proscriptions might be deduced from the Holocaust, there was a firm understanding on all sides that the identity of West Germany was based on an acceptance of crimes committed “from German soil” and a wholehearted rejection of these atrocities. This consensus was expressed subsequently by Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker in his famous speech delivered on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II in 1985.

Western Ties and Anti-Americanism

The second question raised earlier relates to whether there was a consolidation or a disengagement of “Western ties,”⁶⁸ and how this affected “Germany’s position in the world.” Again we find a surprising bitterness in the aggressive clashes of opposing opinions. Ultimately, however, the frequent mutual visits across the Atlantic and within Europe that occurred during this time only further enhanced West Germany’s integration into the West. Euromissile opponents were regularly accused of an “alienation from the de-

mocracies of the West,”⁶⁹ even though many of them were deeply influenced and inspired by Henry David Thoreau, Martin Luther King, Jr, Mahatma Gandhi, and other protagonists of nonviolent resistance equally revered by the US peace movement. In a sense they served as agents of a “Westernization” and proliferation of a democratic culture of protest of American origins even acknowledged by Chancellor Kohl.⁷⁰ The peace movement in West Germany therefore ensured that its mass gatherings and large demonstrations included well-known figures from the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands who held speeches and were prominently placed on the podium to demonstrate internationalism accordingly.⁷¹

Members of the peace movement in Germany vehemently denied the charge that they were “anti-American.” Quite a few, however, readily made a bogeyman out of US President Reagan and regarded themselves, together with their friends in the United States, as part of an anti-Reagan movement.⁷² Officials of the Reagan administration, on the other hand, also firmly relied on crude enemy images, which in the American domestic context was not without precedent and was thus less sharp in its tone for US audiences than in German translation.⁷³ Such linguistic misunderstandings in transatlantic communications are likely to have escalated the struggle regarding the Double-Track Decision. The Krefeld Appeal (1980)—a plea directed at the West German government, formulated by various opponents of the Double-Track Decision, to refrain from deploying the Euromissiles—for example, equally rejected the Euromissiles, because Germany should not be at the mercy of an “American decision” based on the assumption that “a limited nuclear war in Europe is feasible.”⁷⁴ The Appeal of Bielefeld—put forward by the SPD’s youth organization—made a similar plea. Ironically, it was precisely this sentiment that had been the motive for Chancellor Schmidt as well as others in their support of the Double-Track Decision: to prevent a solitary decision by the Americans. Interviews given by senior American politicians and projections by American military planners who claimed that “victory is possible” were therefore grist for the mill for opponents of the Euromissiles and found their way into numerous pamphlets and speeches delivered at peace demonstrations.⁷⁵

The security plans of the Reagan administration provoked a lasting debate about Germany’s position within the transatlantic alliance among intellectual leaders of the peace movement as well as numerous local or regional grassroots initiatives. Did the alliance still serve German interests and should German-American relations continue to form a “second constitution” for the Federal Republic? The historical irony of this was, of course, that in the process of this debate the initial involvement of the Federal Government and Chancellor Schmidt’s role in initiating the NATO Double-Track Decision

gradually vanished and the decision came to be reinterpreted as an American imposition.⁷⁶ In this context, Pastor Heinrich Albertz, a member of the SPD and former mayor of Berlin, coined the well-known phrase that Germany remained an “occupied country,”⁷⁷ which further indicated the national fervor with which the political situation of the divided country was observed by some representatives of the peace movement. Certain opponents of the Euromissiles at the same time hoped for a reformulation of the German question and for more national political autonomy; their sentiments were summed up by the motto “The FRG is El Salvador.”⁷⁸

Faced by a renewed nuclear arms race and a strategic realignment of US politics toward a tough anti-Soviet confrontation, the question of national interest was therefore raised anew: “Who are we really, and in what situation do we find ourselves as Germans in the middle of Europe and with respect to the superpowers that dominate the world? How much freedom do we have to make our own decisions and how tight is the network of dependencies? Is our position different from that of our European neighbors in the East or the West?”⁷⁹ The state of being “occupied” was graphically illustrated on covers of respective publications, which displayed representations of missile deployments and nuclear explosions on West German territory, or the extensive maps of the *Militarization Atlas of West Germany*; one chapter of this book by Alfred Mechttersheimer, a social scientist and peace researcher, was in fact titled “An Occupied Country.”⁸⁰

A basic narrative that portrays Germany as a victim of a superpower conflict, particularly at the hands of an “American imperialism” aggravated by Reagan, forms a leitmotif for many publications of the peace movement and sympathetic intellectuals during the 1980s. Not only the Krefeld Appeal, initiated by communists shortly after Reagan’s election, called for the government in Bonn to unilaterally prevent the creation of “a modernization of nuclear weapons in Central Europe as a nuclear arms platform for the United States.”⁸¹ Other perhaps more balanced publications that also directed criticism toward the Soviet Union nonetheless adopted and spread perceptions of Europe as a quasi-colonial protectorate of imperial superpowers. Albertz and Eppler, for example, made it perfectly clear that they judged the Soviet arms upgrade as great a problem as that of the West. Yet their formulations generally attacked Western positions more severely because, in their view, there was less chance of influencing Moscow from Western Europe.⁸²

Given the harsh criticism of the plans of the US administration on the part of many members of the peace movement, their opponents regularly made pointed and polemical accusations that the movement paid homage to an undifferentiated and prejudiced anti-Americanism.⁸³ That certainly struck a nerve, and leading figures of the movement reacted in the strongest terms.

Nobel Laureate for Literature Heinrich Böll, for example, said at a demonstration in Bonn on 10 October 1981, that as a writer in 1945 he had, like many of his colleagues, been “liberated by American literature.” He was more pro-American than the conservative parties of CDU/CSU, where American politics were even “less controversial” than “in America itself.”⁸⁴ “No, it is not anti-American,” argued Walter Jens, professor of rhetoric in Tübingen, “to declare, in agreement with the proclamations of the [US] civil rights movement, the hubris of the Reagan regime” and to highlight salient differences between German and American survival plans. To place oneself in the position of the Soviet Union, which was surrounded on all sides by the West, was also, according to Jens, not an indication of anti-American sentiment.⁸⁵

Conversely, for the governing conservative coalition parties the massive and often unfounded criticism aimed at President Reagan and the United States in general was a most welcome opportunity to display faithful political allegiance and to act pro-American. Like Konrad Adenauer before him, the leader of the Christian Democrats and chancellor, Helmut Kohl, warned of the “illusion of a third way,” in other words, a “special role for Germany” between East and West.⁸⁶ The SPD, he claimed, was cultivating “the evil spirit of anti-Americanism.”⁸⁷ The conflict about the adequate security policy generated a “bad mood” in American-German relations and would promote isolationist tendencies in the United States. Left-wing leaders like Lafontaine and Eppler were “more Soviet than the Soviets” and statements by the Social Democratic chairman Herbert Wehner were disqualified by Kohl as “outright assistance” to the USSR.⁸⁸ Opponents to the Double-Track Decision conjured up fears of war, but his Union stood equally “for peace.”⁸⁹ It was not the morality of deterrence that was open to debate, but the defense of Western values and the principles of democracy, freedom, justice, and human rights. More specifically, for Kohl the task was to defend a future in “a community of free peoples” in which they are able to create “jointly with our friends our destiny in peace and freedom.”⁹⁰

It would be misleading to consider the Euromissiles debate an example of an “alienation from Western democracies.” The fact that the degree to which the Germans deemed themselves to be with the “West” was subject to debate ultimately consolidated cultural and political ties within the West. Both sides of the Double-Track Decision saw themselves as part of a transatlantic political community that provided different solutions to the problem of how the security issues relating to nuclear deterrence and the East-West conflict should be dealt with. There was no consensus on foreign policy in the United States during the Reagan administration, and neither was there any in West Germany. Chancellor Kohl expressed regret that during his visits to the United States he had to answer “nagging questions” of his American

friends as to “where the path of West Germany [was] leading?”⁹¹ Petra Kelly pointed out that she and her American friends “struggled for hope,”⁹² and Willy Brandt explained to his friends in the United States that the rejection of new missiles was not anti-American but in line with the demands of the American freeze movement.⁹³

The Impact on Party Politics

The third question about the political impact and the consequences of the nuclear crisis for the West German political system seems to be the easiest one, answered once the Schmidt government was replaced in 1982 at the height of the “missile debate.” However, we need to avoid the false straightforward link between chronology on the one hand, and cause and effect on the other. Indeed, the social-liberal coalition did not primarily collapse because of the nuclear crisis, but due to profound disagreements in economic and social policy as well. The nuclear crisis was more significant, however, for the success of the Green Party in these elections and their mandate to enter into parliament in March 1983. But even in this case the controversy about the Euromissiles was merely one among several factors, and the extent to which it was decisive for the electoral success of this new party remains controversial.⁹⁴ However, as Mende and Metzger argue, the issue of nuclear weapons was more compatible with other goals than the objectives of the antinuclear energy lobby and the environmental movements. The debate about the NATO Double-Track Decision thus seems to have had the most profound effect upon the party system of West Germany ever since the 1950s, even if the precise impact is impossible to measure by social scientific standards. After all, one result was the permanent expansion to a four-party system.

The nuclear crisis therefore did not alter the fundamental structure of the political culture in Germany in its orientation toward the West or its post-Nazi consensus; rather, both experienced a certain consolidation. The nuclear crisis did nonetheless affect everyday party politics and changed the configuration of power relations in parliament. Similarly, the breakup of the social-liberal coalition under Schmidt and Genscher was connected to the “missile controversy,” even if this was by no means the sole reason for the departure of the Free Democratic Party from government.⁹⁵ Right after the change of the governing coalition, the Double-Track Decision served like an appeal to the internal solidarity of the newly formed alliance and as a unifying bond between the new coalition partners despite a rather heterogeneous spectrum of opinions. The Green Party’s electoral success, on the other hand, is evidence of the SPD’s failure to integrate the votes from the left-alternative movements.

At the same time, however, it enhanced internal party cohesion and determination and had a calming internal effect among Social Democrats, which, as a result, would probably have returned the party to power in the 1991 elections if it had not been for the historic German unification in 1989–90.⁹⁶

In sum, West German politics and its major parties were yet again, despite serious disputes and conflicts on foreign policy, fundamentally united to a remarkably high level on issues of domestic and social policy. The differences pertaining to foreign policies, however, helped to secure and legitimize new coalition governments, as they did in 1969. It was a manifestation of West German normalcy that the various political camps—unlike, for example, in the United Kingdom and the United States—accentuated their political profile with the help of foreign rather than domestic policy. Consequently, the dispute on nuclear deterrence continued well after 1983 because it allowed for an antagonistic positioning of both camps without infringing on the great democratic consensus that entailed, above all, issues of social policy. It may thus not be unreasonable to argue that the nuclear crisis did ultimately not so much fracture but further a basic consensus in West German society.⁹⁷

The End of the Cold War

And finally, the fourth question: What is the connection between the nuclear crisis and the end of the Cold War? Historians are reluctant to explain historical developments with reference to single issues or events. The question can therefore not be satisfactorily answered when phrased in this limited way. In his contribution to this volume, Florian Pressler underlines that the “victory of arms control” in the second half of the 1980s had many fathers and mothers. Following the argument of the doyen of the history of the global peace movement since 1945, Lawrence S. Wittner, it is possible that protests indeed exerted pressure on the US administration and its European allies.⁹⁸ President Reagan personally had a deep-seated aversion to nuclear weapons (which explains his enthusiasm for the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI) and increasingly revealed himself from 1983–84 onward to be a radical nuclear abolitionist.⁹⁹ At the same time, the conservative supporters of a “Cold War triumphalism”—but not only those—are probably right in their assessment that Gorbachev had to respond, as he himself wrote, to the fact that the USSR was “pressed into an exhausting arms race to which it was nearly led to the brink of ruin.”¹⁰⁰

The Soviet Union reacted to the Double-Track Decision with various diplomatic and security policies, as Oliver Bange explores in his contribution to this volume. These included indirect and concealed strategies—through

the “peace policy” of allied countries such as East Germany—but also partially open and direct financial and logistical support for the Western peace movement. This “infiltration” does not, however, explain the phenomenon of the peace movement in all its heterogeneity. Ultimately, the movement had to compete and resonate in an open, pluralistic society and to succeed in a free market system of Western media.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact had adapted their military plans early on and managed to adjust to the new strategic realities that were created by the stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. Recent research recognizes in this period a transition to an increasingly defensive-minded strategy by the Warsaw Pact and, with the Berlin Declaration of May 1987, a complete shift toward defensive planning.

The renewed intensification in the East-West confrontation since the late 1970s—the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union marks an important date in this process—was one of the roots of the resurgence of the peace movement in the early 1980s. News about multiple instances of near-war emergencies that could be prevented only at the very last minute resulted in a major rethinking on the part of the USSR as well as the United States.¹⁰² Unlike in the 1950s, Europeans in the East and West during the 1980s were no longer prepared to readily accept the severe confrontational rhetoric of the superpowers. The sudden return of a nuclear threat that many had believed gone and that popular culture had helped to discredit provoked a serious shock. Against this background both President Reagan as well as his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, gave in. After their first meeting in Geneva in 1985, a second encounter in Reykjavik in 1986 almost resulted in a sensational disarmament deal.¹⁰³

It is hard to imagine that the East-West conflict would have found such a dramatic but peaceful end with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989–90 if there had been no prior phase of serious progress in the area of détente. The INF Treaty of 1987 abolished all medium-range missiles on both sides, representing the implementation of the disarmament part of the NATO Double-Track Decision, and provided an important psychological breakthrough. It was, however, embedded in numerous other steps toward détente in Europe and beyond, including the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Both Reagan and Gorbachev primarily kept in mind their domestic situation when embarking on these initiatives. Consequently, their drastic steps toward a rapprochement provoked skepticism on the part of their allies, who considered this reversal to be too fast.¹⁰⁴ Curiously, in 1987–88, shortly before the end of the Cold War, these differences even led the American government to question the solidarity of the West German government, one of its foremost political allies.¹⁰⁵

The debate about the Double-Track Decision prepared the way for the reunification of Europe in spirit, if not in quantifiable terms or as a specific causal event. The nascent independence of the Europeans in the East and West from the two dominant superpowers has already been referred to. But there is another point to be made: peace organizations like the British European Nuclear Disarmament (END) early on engaged in a dialogue across the frontiers of the Cold War. They systematically communicated not only with the official, that is, the state-sponsored peace movement of the East, but also with members of human rights groups, which had emerged in countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary because of the Helsinki process. Initially, considerable tensions developed as the Western members of the peace movement insisted on discussing disarmament while their Eastern activist counterparts refused to separate external peace from civil liberties and personal freedom on a domestic level. To these activists, human and civil rights in their own countries were a prerequisite and a guarantee for détente and peace at large. One of the most burning issues of our days thus first emerged in the context of the nuclear crisis in a way that cut across the ideological blocs of East and West.

These contacts and relationships were neither void of conflict nor restricted to the political “leaders” of each side; instead, they were ever-expanding and embraced by constantly widening social forces. The thriving social ties between the Western peace movement and Eastern civil rights activists in the context of the nuclear crisis during the 1980s thus substantially helped pave the way for the great turning point of 1989–90 and the subsequent growing together of all of Europe. The resumption of talks, meetings, and general communication based on these transnational networks and relationships of peace movements in the East and West¹⁰⁶ also built a common European identity and, in the case of Germany, a novel identity for all German citizens. Eventually the “nuclear crisis” also provided a path to this larger socio-cultural transformation, just as it helped strengthen an internal democratic consensus.

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Notes

1. NATO’s Dual-Track Decision, 12 December 1979, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm?selectedLocale=en
2. Rundbrief des Koordinationsausschusses für die Herbstaktion vom 15.–22.10.1983, Nr. 1, July 1983, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis (hereafter AGG), Berlin ZS 8389.
3. Proceedings of the German Parliament, Stenographische Berichte, 10. Wahlperiode, 36. Session, 2590.
4. Archiv der Gegenwart (hereafter AdG), 26 November 1983, 27213.
5. Jeffrey Herf, *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (New York, 1991); Eckart Conze, *Die Suche nach Sicherheit: Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1949 bis in die Gegenwart* (Munich, 2009), 623–33.
6. For an international perspective, see Leopoldo Nuti et al., eds., *The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC, 2015).
7. Thomas Leif, *Die strategische (Ohn-)Macht der Friedensbewegung: Kommunikations- und Entscheidungsstrukturen in den achtziger Jahren* (Opladen, 1990), 32–55.

8. The significance of the Double-Track Decision for the end of the Schmidt-Genscher government has been contentious. See the contribution of Jan Hansen in this volume.
9. Philipp Gassert, "Arbeit am Konsens im Streit um den Frieden: Die Nuklearkrise der 1980er Jahre als Medium gesellschaftlicher Selbstverständigung," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* (hereafter AfS) 52 (2012): 491–516.
10. Erhard Eppler, "Friedensbewegung," in *In letzter Stunde: Aufruf zum Frieden*, ed. Walter Jens (Munich, 1982), 143–66, especially 152.
11. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany's Reunification* (New York, 1997), 154; 164. For an introduction to the Euromissile Crisis, see also David Holloway, "The Dynamics of the Euromissile Crisis, 1977–1983," in Nuti, et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 11–28.
12. Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990* (Munich, 2005), 140.
13. Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," in *Survival* (1978), 2–10. See also NC homepage: <https://www.box.com/shared/266gfcxsf>.
14. The concept of "flexible response" harks back to the late 1950s. It became official policy in December 1967 through MC 14/3, compare the Report of the Military Committee of NATO, 16.1.1968, <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf>; on Schmidt's geopolitical nightmares, see Philipp Gassert, "Did Transatlantic Drift Help European Integration? The Euromissiles Crisis, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Quest for Political Cooperation," in *European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s*, ed. Kiran Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (New York, 2013), 161–62.
15. Beatrice Heuser and Kristan Stoddart, "Großbritannien zwischen Doppelbeschluss und Anti-Kernwaffen-Protestbewegungen," in *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive*, ed. Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (Munich, 2011), 316f. See also Kristan Stoddart, "Creating the 'Seamless Robe of Deterrence': Great Britain's Role in NATO's INF Debate," in Nuti et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 176–95.
16. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Helmut Kohl: Eine politische Biographie* (Munich, 2012), 428.
17. Georges-Henri Soutou, "Mitläufer der Allianz? Frankreich und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss," in Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker, *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, 363–76; Frédéric Bozo, "France, the Euromissiles, and the End of the Cold War," in Nuti et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 196–212.
18. Gottfried Niedhart, "Selektive Wahrnehmung und politisches Handeln: Internationale Beziehungen im Perzeptionsparadigma," in *Internationale Geschichte: Themen—Ergebnisse—Aussichten*, ed. Winfried Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel (Munich, 2000), 141–57.
19. See also Gerhard Wettig, "Sowjetische Euroraketenrüstung und Auseinandersetzung mit den Reaktionen des Westens. Motivationen und Entscheidungen," in Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker, *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, 49–64.
20. Herf, *War by Other Means*. That the Soviet hegemony was actually weakening has been argued by Vladislav M. Zubok, "The Soviet Union and Europe in the 1970s," in *Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World*, ed. Antonio Varsori and Guia Magni (Brussels, 2011), 143–58. See also Jonathan Haslam, "Moscow's Misjudgment in Deploying SS-20 Missiles," in Nuti, et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 31–48.

21. Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, eds., *The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter* (New York, 2009); Kristina Spohr Readman, "Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-alliance Nuclear Politics: Western Europe, America and the Genesis of Nato's Dual-Track Decision, 1977–1979," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 2 (2011): 39–89; Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, "NATO's Nuclear Politics and the Schmidt-Carter Rift," in Nuti et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 139–57; William Burr, "A Question of Confidence: Theater Nuclear Forces, US Policy toward Germany, and the Origins of the Euromissile Crisis, 1975–76," in Nuti et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 123–38.
22. Andreas W. Daum, Wilfried Mausbach, and Lloyd C. Gardner, eds., *America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives* (New York, 2003).
23. Leopoldo Nuti, ed., *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985* (London, 2009); Schulz and Schwartz, eds., *The Strained Alliance*.
24. Klaus Wiegrefe, *Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen* (Berlin, 2005).
25. "Bericht des Parteivorsitzenden Dr. Helmut Kohl," 29. Bundesparteitag der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands (Niederschrift), Mannheim, 9.–10.3.1981, Ms. Bonn 1981, 34–35.
26. Tim Geiger, "Die Regierung Schmidt-Genscher und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss," in Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker, *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, 95–122, especially 100–105; Philipp Gassert, "Viel Lärm um Nichts? Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss als Katalysator gesellschaftlicher Selbstverständigung in der Bundesrepublik," in Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker, *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, 175–202.
27. Protokoll des CDU-Bundesparteitages 1981 in Hamburg, 60, quoted after Hansen in this volume.
28. According to Boll and Hansen, "Doppelbeschluss und Nachrüstung als innerparteiliches Problem der SPD" in Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker, *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*; see also Bernd Faulenbach, *Das sozialdemokratische Jahrzehnt: Von der Reform euphorie zur neuen Unübersichtlichkeit. Die SPD 1969–1982* (Bonn, 2012). On the repercussions for Social Democratic parties across Europe, see Bernd Rother, "Family Row: The Dual-Track Decision and Its Consequences for European Social Democratic Cooperation," in Nuti et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 331–47.
29. See also Wolfgang Schröder, "Gewerkschaft als soziale Bewegung. Soziale Bewegung in den Gewerkschaften in den Siebzigerjahren," in AFS 44 (2004): 243–57.
30. Bernd Hey, *1968 und die Kirchen* (Gütersloh, 2008).
31. Hans-Jochen Luhmann and Gundel Neveling, *Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag* (Hamburg, 1981); *Dokumente* (Stuttgart, 1981); Susanne Schregel, "Konjunktur der Angst: 'Politik der Subjektivität' und 'neue Friedensbewegung,' 1979–1983," in *Angst im Kalten Krieg*, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, and Dierk Walter (Hamburg, 2009), 495–520.
32. Sebastian Kalden, "A Case of Hollanditis: The Interchurch Peace Council in the Netherlands and the Christian Peace Movement in Western Europe," in *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s*, ed. Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (New York, 2016), 251–267.
33. Ralf Zoll, "Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte im Spiegel öffentlicher Meinung in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Genese*,

- Struktur und Wandel von Meinungsbildern in Militär und Gesellschaft: Ergebnisse und Analyseansätze im internationalen Vergleich*, ed. Ralf Zoll (Opladen, 1982), 33–65; Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik: Neuorientierung der Entscheidungsprozesse im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Mainz 1988), 194. On public opinion across Western Europe, see Maria Eleonora Guasconi, “Public Opinion and the Euromissile Crisis,” in Nuti et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 271–90.
34. Josef Joffe, “Peace and Populism: Why the European Anti-Nuclear Movement Failed,” *International Security* 11 (1987): 3–40.
 35. For a brief overview of the German peace movement, see also Holger Nehring, “The Last Battle of the Cold War: Peace Movements and German Politics in the 1980s,” in Nuti et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 309–30. On the “infiltrated” peace movement, see Udo Baron, *Kalter Krieg und heißer Frieden: Der Einfluß der SED und ihrer westdeutschen Verbündeten auf die Partei “Die Grünen”* (Münster, 2003); Michael Ploetz and Hans-Peter Müller, *Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung? DDR und UdSSR im Kampf gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss* (Münster, 2004); for a critical reexamination of the “fifth column thesis” see Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann, “Do All Paths Lead to Moscow? The NATO-Dual-Track Decision and the Peace Movement—A Critique,” in *Cold War History* 12, no. 1 (2012): 1–24.
 36. A term that only gained traction in Germany during the 1980s; compare Wilfried Mausbach, “The Present’s Past: Recent Perspectives on Peace and Protest in Germany, 1945–1973,” *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für Soziale Bewegungen* 32 (2004): 67–98, especially 68; Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht, eds., *Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: Ein Handbuch* (Frankfurt am Main, 2008), 640–41.
 37. On the environmental dimension, see also Wilfried Mausbach, “Nuclear Winter: Prophecies of Doom and Images of Desolation During the Second Cold War” and Stephen Milder, “The Example of Wyhl: How Grassroots Protest in the Rhine Valley Shaped the West German Anti-Nuclear Movement,” both in Conze et al., *Nuclear Threats*, 27–54; 167–185.
 38. Ulrike Wasmuht, *Friedensbewegungen der 80er Jahre: Zur Analyse ihrer strukturellen und aktuellen Entstehungsbedingungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika nach 1945* (Giessen, 1987); see also Benjamin Ziemann, “Perspektiven der historischen Friedensforschung,” in *Perspektiven der historischen Friedensforschung*, ed. Benjamin Ziemann (Essen, 2002), 13–39, esp. 14–15; David J. Dunn, *The First Fifty Years of Peace Research: A Survey and Interpretation* (Aldershot, 2005).
 39. Andreas Rödder, “Bündnissolidarität und Rüstungskontrollpolitik: Die Regierung Kohl-Genscher, der NATO-Doppelbeschluss und die Innenseite der Außenpolitik,” in Gassert, Geiger and Wentker, *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, 123–36, especially 125.
 40. See Sven Reichardt and Detlef Siegfried, eds. *Das Alternative Milieu: Antibürgerlicher Lebensstil und linke Politik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Europa 1968–1983* (Göttingen, 2010); Hanno Balz and Jan-Henrik Friederichs, eds., *All We Ever Wanted ... Eine Kulturgeschichte europäischer Protestbewegungen der 1980er Jahre* (Berlin, 2012).
 41. On the women’s movement and 1968, see Kristina Schulz, *Der lange Atem der Provokation. Die Frauenbewegung in Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik, 1968–1976* (Frankfurt am Main, 2002).

42. For transnational connections of church-based activism, see Sebastian Kalden and Ole Wiechmann's contribution in this volume, as well as Beatrice de Graaf, *Die DDR, die niederländischen Kirchen und die Friedensbewegung* (Münster, 2007). For END, see Patrick Burke, "A Transcontinental Movement of Citizens? Strategic Debates in the 1980s Western Peace Movement," in *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989*, ed. Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraic Kenney (Lanham, MD, 2004), 189–206; Patrick Burke, "European Nuclear Disarmament: Transnational Peace Campaigning in the 1980s," in Conze et al., *Nuclear Threats*, 227–250. On the spread of "Nuclear Free Zones," see Susanne Schregel, "Global Micropolitics: Towards a Transnational History of Grassroots Nuclear Free Zones," in Conze et al., *Nuclear Threats*, 206–226. For transnational linkages in a more general perspective, please see Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 1999).
43. On individuals such as Petra Kelly, see Stephen Milder, "Between Grassroots Activism and Transnational Aspirations: Anti-Nuclear Protest from the Rhine Valley to the Bundestag, 1974–1983," *Historical Social Research* 39, no. 1 (2014): 191–211. On the global movement against nuclear disarmament, please see the pioneering works by Lawrence Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1979 to the Present*, vol. 3 of *The Struggle against the Bomb* (Stanford, CA, 2003); *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953* vol. 1, of *The Struggle against the Bomb* (Stanford, CA, 1993); and *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement 1954–1970*, vol. 2 of *The Struggle against the Bomb* (Stanford, CA, 1997).
44. On transatlantic differences, see Wilfried Mausbach, "Vereint marschieren, getrennt schlagen? Die amerikanische Friedensbewegung und der Widerstand gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss," in Gassert, Geiger and Wentker, *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, 283–304; Kyle Harvey, "The Promise of Internationalism: US Anti-Nuclear Activism and the European Challenge," in *Making Sense of the Americas: How Protest Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond*, ed. Jan Hansen, Christian Helm, and Frank Reichherzer (Frankfurt am Main, 2015), 225–244; Dario Fazzi, "The Nuclear Freeze Generation: The Early 1980s Anti-Nuclear Youth Revolt between 'Carter's Vietnam' and 'Euroshima,'" in *A European Youth Revolt: European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Movements in the 1980s*, ed. Knud Andresen and Bart van der Steen (Basingstoke, 2016), 145–158.
45. See the contribution by Rainer Eckert in this volume. See also Thomas Goldstein, "A Tenuous Peace: International Anti-Nuclear Activism in the East German Writers Union in the 1980s," in Conze, et al., *Nuclear Threats*, 142–164.
46. See also Malcolm Byrne, "The Warsaw Pact and the Euromissile Crisis, 1977–1983," in Nuti, et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 104–120; Idesbald Godeeris and Malgorzata Świder, "Peace or Solidarity? Poland, the Euromissile Crisis, and the 1980s Peace Movement," in Nuti, et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 291–308; Christie Miedema, *Vrede of Vrijheid? Dilemma's, dialoog en misverstanden tussen Nederlandse en West-Duitse linkse organisaties en de Poolse oppositie in de jaren tachtig* (Amsterdam, 2015); Christie Miedema, "'Hätten wir doch mehr auf die polnischen Ratschläge gehört': Die Grünen und die polnische Opposition in den 1980er Jahren," in Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, *Grünes Gedächtnis 2015*, 59–82.

47. For the various forms of protest in the peace movement, see Tim Warneke, "Aktionsformen und Politikverständnis der Friedensbewegung: Radikaler Humanismus und die Pathosformel des Menschlichen," in Reichardt and Siegfried, *Das Alternative Milieu*, 445–72.
48. Aktionszeitung, "5. Juni, Hofgarten in Bonn—Großdemonstration Gemeinsam für Frieden und Freiheit, ACDP, CDU, Bundespartei, Ordner 2/20, 2/207 Broschüren und Flugblätter Jan.1982–Aug.1983; eine Übersicht zur Kamapagne 10.000 Friedenstag in Übersicht," in Union in Deutschland (hereafter UiD) 26 (1983): 1.9.1983; Deutsches Monatsblatt, 7/8 (1983).
49. Martin Klimke and Laura Stapano, "From Artists for Peace to the Green Caterpillar: Cultural Activism and Electoral Politics in 1980s West Germany," in Conze, et al., *Nuclear Threats*, 116–141.
50. See also William Knoblauch, "Will You Sing About the Missiles? British Anti-Nuclear Protest Music of the 1980s," in Conze, et al., *Nuclear Threats*, 101–115. On the politics of emotions, see Schregel, "Konjunktur der Angst."
51. See the contribution by Michael Sturm in this volume.
52. For a summary, see Risse-Kappen, *Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik*.
53. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die gezähmten Deutschen: Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit* (Stuttgart, 1985).
54. Peter Graf Kielmansegg, *Nach der Katastrophe: Eine Geschichte des geteilten Deutschland* (Berlin, 2000), 234; Eckart Conze: *Suche*, 544; Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen: Deutsche Geschichte vom "Dritten Reich" bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, Band 2 (Munich, 2000), 370f.; Herf, *War by Other Means*, 27, does not only see the security and foreign policy but also the democratic consensus in jeopardy overall.
55. See the contribution by Marianne Zepp in this volume.
56. The following remarks on points 1 through 3 draw on Gassert, "Viel Lärm um Nichts?"
57. For the transatlantic dimension of protest, see Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties* (Princeton, NJ, 2010).
58. Grundsatzrede des Vorsitzenden der CDU Deutschlands, Helmut Kohl, auf dem 30. CDU-Bundesparteitag, Hamburg, 2.–5.11.1981, 28–51, especially 33–34.
59. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographische Berichte, 10. WP, 13. Sitzung, 15.6.1983, 755.
60. "Wir sind ein schöner Unkrautgarten," Spiegel-Gespräch mit Joschka Fischer und Otto Schily, *Der Spiegel* 24, 13 June 1983, 23–27, especially 26.
61. See, for example, the flyer of the Peace Initiative Wilmersdorf in Fritz Teppich, ed., *Flugblätter und Dokumente der Westberliner Friedensbewegung: 1980–1985* (Berlin, 1985), 25.
62. Günter Grass, "Vom Recht auf Widerstand: Rede auf der Gedenkveranstaltung der SPD zum 50. Jahrestag der Machtergreifung Hitlers in Frankfurt," in Grass, *Essays und Reden III, 1980–1997* (Göttingen, 1997), 63–70.
63. For the illustrations, see Volker Nick, Volker Scheub, and Christof Then, *Mutlangen 1983–1987: Die Stationierung der Pershing II und die Kampagne Ziviler Ungehorsam bis zur Abrüstung* (Mutlangen, 1993). See also Eckart Conze, "Modernitätsskepsis und die Utopie der Sicherheit: NATO-Nachrüstung und Friedensbewegung in der Ges-

- chichte der Bundesrepublik" in *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, Online-Ausgabe, 7 (2010): H. 2, <http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Conze-2-2010>.
64. Nick, Scheub, and Then, *Mutlangen 1983–1987*, 6. For references to Nazi Germany in general, see Eckart Conze, "Missile Bases as Concentration Camps: The Role of National Socialism, the Second World War, and the Holocaust in the West German Discourse on Nuclear Armament," in Conze, et al., *Nuclear Threats*, 79–97.
 65. Mausbach, "Vereint marschieren, getrennt schlagen."
 66. Helmut Kohl auf dem 30. Bundesparteitag der CDU in Hamburg, 2.–5.11.1981, 30.
 67. Philipp Gassert, "Zwischen 'Beschweigen' und 'Bewältigen': Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus in der Ära Adenauer," in *Epoche im Widerspruch. Ideelle und kulturelle Umbrüche der Adenauerzeit* (25. Rhöndorfer Gespräch), ed. Michael Hochgeschwender (Bonn, 2011), 183–205.
 68. Heinz Bude and Bernd Greiner, eds., *Westbindungen: Amerika in der Bundesrepublik* (Hamburg, 1999); Mary Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America 1890–2010* (New York, 2012), 302–10.
 69. Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen*, 373, turns his contemporary criticism from within the party into an academic argument supported by empirical evidence. Compare the contemporary contributions by Winkler, Gesine Schwan, and others, in Jürgen Maruhn and Manfred Wilke, eds., *Wohin treibt die SPD? Wende oder Kontinuität sozialdemokratischer Sicherheitspolitik* (Munich, 1984). In a similar vein see the highly tendential description in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, Bd. 5, (Munich, 2008), 250.
 70. Kohl stressed repeatedly that the Americans "truly do not lack democratic understanding for demonstrations of free citizens for goals that deviate from those of the government." See CDU-Bundesparteitag Hamburg 1981, 33.
 71. See photos as well as press coverage in *Aktion Sühnezeichen*, Bonn 10.10 1981.
 72. See, for example, Petra Kelly "'Sie sollen sich Sorgen machen': Rede auf dem zweiten Forum der Krefelder Initiative, Dortmund, 21.11.1981," printed in Petra Kelly, *Um Hoffnung kämpfen: Gewaltfrei in eine grüne Zukunft* (Cologne, 1983), 69–71.
 73. The crusade metaphor is often misunderstood in Germany, since in the United States "crusades" or "wars" are traditional terms stemming from the Christian social reform movement of the nineteenth century for campaigns against poverty, racial discrimination, etc. Along the same lines, many German commentators took the religious dimension of Reagan's "evil empire" rhetoric literally and saw its significance in Reagan's move toward the evangelical spectrum of the Republican Party, which had been partially critical of the "Reagan Revolution" and its domestic policies. See Werner Schmidt, "Die außenpolitische Rhetorik Ronald Reagans und die politische Kultur der USA," in *Rekonstruktion amerikanischer Stärke. Sicherheits- und Rüstungskontrollpolitik der USA während der Reagan-Administration*, ed. Helga Haftendorn and Jakob Schissler (Berlin, 1988), 87–100; Matthew Avery Sutton has noted that "While premillennialism had little (if any) direct influence on [Reagan's] actual foreign policy, it provided him with the rhetorical tools for mobilizing the American people to wage the Cold War." *American Apocalypse: A History of Modern Evangelicalism* (Cambridge, MA, 2014), 355.

74. "Bielefelder Appell" (Dezember 1980), abgedruckt in Vorwärts, 14.5.1981, online verfügbar unter, <http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/deu/Chapter12Doc7KM.pdf>.
75. See Alfred Mechttersheimer and Peter Barth, eds., *Den Atomkrieg führbar und gewinnbar machen? Dokumente zur Nachrüstung*, vol. 2 (Reinbek, 1983), 59, 73, 79, for example, which includes explanations by members of the Reagan administration. See also Robert Scheer, *Und brennend stürzen die Vögel vom Himmel. Reagan und der 'begrenzte' Atomkrieg*. (Munich, 1983).
76. For more detail, see Herf, *War by Other Means*, 119f.
77. Heinrich Albertz, Panel Discussion "Wie christlich kann Politik sein?," 19.6.1981, Sporthalle Alsterdorf, in Luhmann and Nevelin, *Kirchentag*, 692.
78. Philipp Gassert, "Anti-Amerikaner? Die deutsche Neue Linke und die USA," in *Anti-Amerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa*, ed. Jan C. Behrends, Árpád von Klimó, and Patrice G. Poutrus (Bonn, 2005), 250–67.
79. Heinrich Albertz, "Von der Nation und von Wichtigerem," in Jens, *In letzter Stunde*, 135–42, especially 135.
80. Alfred Mechttersheimer and Peter Barth, ed., *Militarisierungsatlas der Bundesrepublik. Streitkräfte, Waffen und Standorte. Kosten und Risiken* (Darmstadt, 1986), 13.
81. "Krefelder Appell," in *Nachrüsten? Dokumente und Positionen zum NATO-Doppelbeschluß*, ed. Alfred Mechttersheimer (Reinbek, 1981), 250; available online in Michael Schmid, "Der Krefelder Appell," in 100(0) Schlüsseldokumente, http://mdzx.bib-bvb.de/cocoon/de1000dok/dok_0023_kre.pdf?lang=de.
82. This victimization discourse is palpable in a series of articles by the left/liberal magazines *Der Spiegel*, *Stern*, and *Die Zeit*. See, for example, the title of the *Spiegel* cover of July 1981: "Deutschland—Schießplatz der Supermächte" (Germany—Shooting Range of the Superpowers), which adopted Albertz's phrase from the panel discussion of the church congress. The series was published as Wilhelm Bittorf, ed., *Nachrüstung. Der Atomkrieg rückt näher* (Hamburg, 1982).
83. For a contemporary response to the claims, compare Emil-Peter Müller, *Anti-amerikanismus in Deutschland: Zwischen Care-Paket und Cruise Missile* (Cologne, 1986; see also Reinhild Kreis, "'Eine Welt, ein Kampf, ein Feind'? Amerikakritik in den Protesten der 1980er Jahre," in Balz and Friedrichs *All We Ever Wanted*"), 135–55.
84. Heinrich Böll, "Dieser Tag ist eine große Ermutigung," in *Bonn 10.10.1981*, 159–62, especially 159.
85. Walter Jens, "Appell in letzter Stunde," in Jens, *In letzter Stunde*, 7–26, especially 13.
86. "Bericht des Parteivorsitzenden Dr. Helmut Kohl," 29. Bundesparteitag der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands (Niederschrift), Mannheim, 9.–10.3.1981, Ms. Bonn 1981, 34f.
87. Ibid.
88. Kohl calls statements by Herbert Wehner a "sheer relief operation for the Soviet Union." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 February 1979. For the other quotations, see Weber, *Zwischen Nachrüstung und Abrüstung*, 132.
89. As Kohl stated on the thirtieth national party convention of the CDU, "We are part of the German peace movement," Protokoll des 30. Bundesparteitags in Hamburg, 2–5.11.1981, 33.

90. "Frieden und Freiheit: Resolution zur aktuellen Friedensdiskussion. Verabschiedet vom Bundesausschuss der CDU am 15. Juni 1981," printed in Mechttersheimer, *Nachrüsteten?* 182–89, quotation at 186, 189. On the transatlantic relationship, see also Reinhild Kreis, "Trust through Familiarity: Transatlantic Relations and Public Diplomacy in the 1980s," in "Trust, but Verify" *The Politics of Uncertainty & the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991*, ed. Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian Ostermann (Redwood City, CA, 2016), 218–234.
91. Helmut Kohl auf dem 30. Bundesparteitag der CDU in Hamburg, 2.–5.11.1981, 33.
92. See the title of her book, *Petra Kelly: Um Hoffnung kämpfen. Gewaltfrei in eine grüne Zukunft* (Bornheim-Merten, 1983).
93. Offener Brief des Vorsitzenden der SPD, Brandt, auf Fragen amerikanischer Freunde, 7.8.1983. In *Willy Brandt: Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Beziehungen und deutsche Frage 1982–1992*, ed. Uwe Mai, Bernd Rother, and Wolfgang Schmidt (Bonn, 2009), doc. 6, 142–46.
94. See Silke Mende, *Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn: Eine Geschichte der Gründungsgrünen* (Munich, 2011), as well as Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, *Red, Green, and Beyond* (New York, 1993), 106–12.
95. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 447f., talks about "compelling domestic and international causes," whereas "everything else" was increasingly "covered" by the NATO Double-Track Decision. See also Tim Geiger and Jan Hansen, "Did Protest Matter? The Influence of the Peace Movement on the West German Government and the Social Democratic Party, 1977–1983," in Conze et al., *Nuclear Threats*, 290–315.
96. Boll and Hansen, "Doppelbeschluss und Nachrüstung," in Gassert, Geiger and Wentker, *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, 203–28.
97. Philipp Gassert, "Arbeit am Konsens."
98. Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present* (Stanford, CA, 2003), esp. 369–404. See also Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 1999).
99. See Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, MO, 1997), 102–43; Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York, 2005).
100. Michail Gorbatschow, *Gipfelgespräche: Geheime Protokoll aus meiner Amtszeit* (Berlin, 1993), 9 (cited by Pressler). For the argument that the Soviet Union fell victim to the arms race with the United States, see the summary by Richard Pipes, "Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hardliners Had It Right," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 154–60.
101. Helge Heidemeyer, "NATO-Doppelbeschluss, westdeutsche Friedensbewegung und der Einfluss der DDR," in Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker, *Zweiter Kalter Krieg*, 247–68; Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann, "Führen alle Wege nach Moskau? Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss und die Friedensbewegung. Eine Kritik," in *VfZ* 59 (2010): 81–100.
102. See *The Able Archer 83 Sourcebook*, posted 7 November 2013, The National Security Archive, retrieved 19 November 2014 from <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ablearcher/>; Vojtech Mastny, "How Able was 'Able Archer'?" *Journal of*

- Cold War Studies* 11 (Winter 2009): 108–23; Georg Schild, *1983: Das gefährlichste Jahr des Kalten Krieges* (Paderborn, 2013); Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Not Crying Wolf’: Soviet Intelligence and the 1983 War Scare,” in Nuti, et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 49–65; Conze, et al., eds., *Nuclear Threats*, passim.
103. On the impact of Reykjavík, see Elizabeth Charles, “Gorbachev and the Decision to Decouple the Arms Control Package: How the Breakdown of the Reykjavik Summit Led to the Elimination of the Euromissiles,” in Nuti, et al., *The Euromissile Crisis*, 66–84.
 104. Hermann Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949–1989* (Munich, 2007).
 105. Michael Broer, “The NATO Double Track Decision, the INF Treaty, and the SNF Controversy: German-American Relations between Consensus and Conflict,” in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook*, 2 vols., ed. Detlef Junker et al. (New York, 2004), 2: 148–54.
 106. Kacper Szulecki, “‘Hijacked Ideas.’ Human Rights, Peace and Environmentalism in Czechoslovak and Polish Dissident Discourses,” *East European Politics and Societies* 25, no. 2 (2011): 272–95.