

Introduction

Paris 1919: The Challenge of a New World Order

Laurence Badel, Eckart Conze and Axel Dröber

For more than a century, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 has been an object of historical research. It is almost impossible to maintain a general view over the literature on the end of the First World War, the peace treaties of 1919–20 and the effort to prevent a new war by creating a stable international order. The same is true for the consequences and effects of the peace treaties. The Paris Peace Conference, its origins, its course and its results have been and still are important issues in national, international, transnational and, increasingly, global historiography. If ‘in 1919 Paris was the capital of the world’,¹ this implies that the task of the Peace Conference, which officially opened on 18 January 1919, was not only to end a global war but to construct a new global order. The First World War was a global war not only because it was waged geographically almost everywhere on the globe but also with regard to its consequences. From its beginning, it triggered global dynamics that would reach far beyond the war itself and deep into the post-war era. Hopes, ideas and concepts of a – new – world order arose out of the experience of global war. The political language of the time was full of globality: ‘world democracy’, ‘world revolution’, ‘world peace’. This did not reflect a mere spatial extension of concepts of order. From the outset, it involved globally diverging and competing visions of order, giving rise to new dynamics of global politics and power. It is these dynamics that this volume is interested in.

From such a perspective, peace did not simply mean ending the war, ceasing military conflict. Far beyond the end of armed hostilities as such, the word ‘peace’ referred to the future: to a future order. Peace

was not regarded as the day on which the war came to an end but as a long-term condition extending beyond the armistices of 1918 and the peace treaties of 1919–20. Peace, as it was understood at the time, did not mean a simple return to the status quo ante, to the pre-1914 order. Peace meant leaving behind not only the war but the pre-war time and the pre-war order, and creating a new, different, better order – because, many agreed, despite very different perceptions and interpretations, it was the past – the past order – that had led to the war. It was not just that the old order – the order of the nineteenth century, in its basic structures reaching back to the Congress of Vienna of 1814–15 – had come to an end with the Great War. Many contemporary observers agreed that together with individual national policies, this old order had caused the war and had, for this very reason, destroyed itself during the war. Atop its ruins – buried amongst which were millions of dead – a new order had to be built. Against this background, already at the time, the Paris peacemakers explicitly regarded themselves as the architects not just of peace but of a new order – two concepts that were closely interwoven. They were driven by the aim of turning war, destruction and ruin into order: of creating order out of chaos, in the words of David Hunter Miller, the international law expert in the American delegation.² For him, there had simply been no international order at all before the war. ‘Chaos’ in this sense referred not only to the war but to the – real or supposed – international anarchy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which many perceived as a structural cause of the war. Against this backdrop, it was order – above all order of the legal, normative kind, and its institutionalization – that was expected to secure peace and to prevent new war.

The post-1919 global order did not simply emerge. It was created by different actors with different interests and objectives. Although they shared a basic conviction that a new order was necessary, deep conflicts shaped the Paris Peace Conference: conflicts not only between victors and vanquished but also among the victors themselves, as decades of research have shown. Further conflicts and challenges added to these tensions, among them the Bolshevik idea of, and demand for, global order – world revolution – as well as the global, and globally articulated, demand for national self-determination and independence. This latter demand of course referred to the political reordering of Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe after the end of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and, to a certain degree, German continental empires, but also to the non-European world. It was made in response to the continuity of the empires and imperial power of the victors, above all the British and the French.

But a widely shared demand for a new order did not automatically imply a consensus on what this order should look like, how it should be constructed and how it should be stabilized in order to prevent a new war. In Paris in 1919, dissensus on these questions led to both compromise and discontent. Historical research has long pointed to the problems and deficiencies of the Paris order; some have even blamed the weaknesses or mistakes of 1919–20, especially with regard to the peace with Germany, for the outbreak of the Second World War only two decades later. But this view does not do justice to the genuine efforts in 1919 to develop a new international order; indeed, characterizing them as flawed or failed from the outset is ahistorical. For contemporaries, the year 1919 was not the beginning of an ‘interwar period’ but of a post-war period. Taking the Second World War as the only analytical vanishing point, as difficult as this perspective is to avoid in retrospect, prevents a sober analysis of attempts in 1919 to create a new order, and of the results of these attempts, because it ignores the openness and undeterminedness of the historical situation after the end of the Great War.

In focusing on the notion of ‘order’ at the end of the First World War, this book takes up an older concept, going back to the time of the Paris Peace Conference itself. In the vast literature on the end of the First World War – the peacemaking and peace treaties of 1919–20 – the notion of order is omnipresent. But the concept of order, international or global, has received new attention as an analytical category in the last thirty years. With the end of the Cold War, the expression ‘new world order’ became a central element of international political discourse. Ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the events of 9/11 and their consequences further contributed to this discourse, as did the rise of Chinese power and Russia’s policy of outward aggression, which became evident in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and, more radically and brutally than before, with Putin’s 2022 war against Ukraine. It is hardly surprising that this global transformation since 1990 has had an impact on academic research and discussion. In the field of international history, a number of books have recently been published on the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and can be read against the background of international and global developments since 1990.³ They are characterized by their attempts to contribute to our understanding of current developments by analysing the dynamics of global transformation and the emergence of a new world order a century ago. This even includes the argument that ‘the Cold War did freeze some of the persistent post-Versailles problems of the 1920s and 1930s but when first the Soviet Empire, and then the Soviet Union itself collapsed, many of these issues re-emerged’.⁴ Global political developments since 1989 have made 1919 relevant again in a way that it had not been during

the Cold War.⁵ Such perceptions and interpretations have a role in political comparisons and parallelizations articulated by political actors. For example, since the 1990s Russian politicians, including Vladimir Putin, have been describing the West's policy vis-à-vis Russia – in particular the eastward enlargement of EU and NATO – as a humiliation, comparing it with the Allies' treatment of Germany in Versailles in 1919. From the beginning, such statements had a threatening tone because the chain of associations – Versailles–Nazism–Second World War – is firmly established in global collective memory and political awareness.⁶

It is thus not surprising that the term and the concept of 'order' as a historical category have garnered increasing academic attention in recent years.⁷ This volume aims to make a contribution to this scholarly conversation. The term 'order', derived from the Latin word '*ordo*', refers to the ordered relationship between the parts of a whole, based upon particular laws, rules, or norms. It is used not only in and for political contexts but also in legal, economic, social and religious fields, and even beyond the humanities. At the end of the eighteenth century, its hierarchical, predefined and perennial character (particularly as 'divine order') came increasingly into question. In the light of the upheavals of the time – political and social, domestic and international – it became increasingly clear that orders can change, that order can be created or restored.⁸ The term, for example, came to be used more and more to designate the principles, norms and values that unite and characterize states. Over time, epithets specified its quality or its frame of reference: political order, international order, European order. In 1844, for example, François Guizot, France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, defined 'European order' as a 'good understanding among all the great powers and respect for the independence and rights of all the powers, small and great'.⁹

Since 1990, and particularly centring around the bicentenary of the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) and the centenary of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, numerous volumes with the word 'order' in their title or subtitle have been published.¹⁰ This historiographical tendency reflects both concern about the erosion of the Cold War international order and the stability it provided and the search for possible foundations for a new one. Against this background, the interest in looking back once again at the Vienna or Paris order – the latter mostly referred to from a narrowing perspective as the 'Versailles order' – is more than historical. Historical analysis, in fact, has been motivated by an interest in resurfacing 'long forgotten expectations of what international politics could become'.¹¹ Labelled with all sorts of epithets ('European', 'international', 'regional', 'global', 'imperial', 'Atlantic', or even 'Nazi')¹² or replaced by its antonyms ('counter-order', 'disorder', 'disruption'),¹³ the contemporary use of the concept has

been applied to various contexts and different periods. 'Order' has been studied as a historical concept, an expression used by historical actors from Prince Metternich to President Wilson, a word that can be found in historical sources and documents. But 'order' has also – and increasingly – been used in more abstract terms, as an analytical category to describe the basic structures and organizing principles of international politics or, in a wider sense, international relations at a given time.¹⁴ Today, its use also embraces non-Western or non-European notions, challenging the Western origins and inscriptions of the concept. Building on these developments, this book intends to shed new light on both the history of concepts of order and the emergence of new orders through an examination of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and processes surrounding it.

Until recently, the historiography of the 1919 Peace Conference and the resulting peace treaties have most often been situated within the history of the First World War and of the 'post-war period', an expression that, by construction, describes a period of transition, of the demobilization of combatants and societies, thereby highlighting continuities and connections with the war and the remainders of the wartime period that continued beyond 1918. This book does not neglect either the war and its continuing effects, such as the 'war in the heads/minds' of European societies after the end of the military conflict,¹⁵ or the violence persisting within societies on the way to peace. The politicians and diplomats involved in the Paris process did not work and negotiate in isolation. This is a notable difference from other, earlier negotiations: the peacemakers of 1919 worked under observation and pressure from public opinion. The idea of a 'democratic peace' implied 'democratic peacemaking'. The negotiators worked in a metropolis – Paris – that still bore the marks of the bombing. They worked in a climate of violence, hatred and tension, in Europe and the world, with war still ongoing, for example, in Eastern Europe, and new wars, as in Turkey, and with massacres taking place in Greece and Syria. Hatred towards the Germans did not disappear after the Armistice; it influenced the treatment of the German delegation at the presentation of the peace conditions in May 1919, and at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June. But tensions and mistrust also characterized the negotiations between the Allies, leading to continuing diplomatic conflicts. Although the exchanges between the Allied delegations were subject to verbatim records and therefore meticulously documented, they were often ruthless, dominated by personal agendas and dependent on the self-image and mission of the different national delegations and political leaders. As British historian Harold Temperley noted as early as 1920, the conference was 'a dynamic and not a static body', a living and emotional organism.¹⁶

However, even if the war was still going on, if political and social violence persisted even over the following decade, situating the 1919 Peace Conference solely in the context of the end of the war would mean losing sight of the processes of systemic transformation that were affecting the international order and the relations between societies and their political leaders in the period. The Peace Conference was both the venue and the addressee of long-standing aspirations that, on this occasion and for a historical moment, gained the possibility of international institutional recognition and contributed to the building of a new international order.

Furthermore, it would be pointless to consider this order exclusively in terms of diplomatic history in a narrow sense. Traditional diplomatic history, which took off in the nineteenth century, had its moment of glory in the interwar period. In that context, it is an immediate history, centred around the reconstruction of the decision-making processes that led to the entry into the war. Marked by a highly national approach, the field was quickly confined and locked, under pressure from public authorities in Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Belgium and France, into a Franco-German debate, which has its own temporal logic. In contrast, over the last thirty years, the history of international relations has taken cultural, transnational and even global turns, without abandoning its initial systemic approach. It continues to pay particular attention to the evolution of principles and institutions underpinning the international order, to the ways in which transnational processes are internationalized and institutionalized, shaping actors and spaces, and to the power relations between political and social actors. One part of this volume is devoted to developments that were less widely perceived by contemporaries than Wilson's public promises of self-determination or respect for international law. Here, the focus lies on the reorganization of global economic governance or the reconfiguration of information and communication networks, for instance.

If the Peace Conference seemed to concentrate global affairs in Paris, the book also highlights the aftermath and repercussions of the Paris order in other parts of the world. The implementation of the different peace treaties led to the multiplication of geographical borders; the emergence of new regional orders in many cases was in tension with the intended international/global order and the associated objectives.¹⁷ This constellation begs for analysis at multiple scales. The Peace Conference was first and foremost a Parisian event. Its delegations were spread over the capital's hotels: the Belgians at the Hotel Lotti, the Japanese at the Hotel Bristol, the Uruguayans at the Meurice, the Americans at the Crillon, and the British at the Majestic and the Astoria. In some cases, the same hotel hosted several delegations, such as the Grand Hotel, where

the Ukrainians, Georgians and Albanians all had their lodgings. Life was organized around these hotels as it had been around the Viennese palaces during the 1814–15 Congress. At the same time, glamorous life resumed: Sacha Guitry married Yvonne Printemps on 10 April 1919 to the delight of the popular press. As we know, the capital hosted other conferences in parallel to the diplomatic one: the Pan-African Congress, for example, which was held in February 1919 on the Boulevard des Capucines, at the initiative of the Senegalese deputy Blaise Diagne, the first African member of the French National Assembly, and Gratien Candace, member of parliament from Guadeloupe. The conference was also a national event: the delegates did not all remain in Paris, and some in particular went to visit the devastated cities of northern France. The reception of Australian Prime Minister William Hughes by Mayor of Lyon Edouard Herriot made headlines, as did Woodrow Wilson's late visit to the city of Reims with its destroyed cathedral. Finally, the conference was also an international event: in China, the 'First Tiananmen' of 4 May 1919 echoed, among many other demands, that of rescinding the decision of the Great Four (France, Britain, USA, Italy) to allocate the German concessions on the Shandong Peninsula to Japan. Like every such international event, the conference was both prepared in advance by cohorts of legal and economic experts and improvised in response to diplomatic and international constraints, as both André Tardieu and Harold Nicolson pointed out immediately after the event.¹⁸ It was also subject to hazard and contingency. What course would the negotiations have taken if the anarchist who shot Georges Clemenceau a month after the conference began had succeeded in killing him? In any case, endowed with iron health, Clemenceau went to convalesce in the deserted park of the Château de Versailles, not far from the Hôtel des Réservoirs, where the German delegation was staying. Surprisingly peaceful images of diplomats and politicians walking through the park appeared in the press at the time.

The Congress of Vienna had reconfigured the European order; the ambition of the Paris Peace Conference was to create a new order for the whole world. However, it was a Western, or Westernized, world that was negotiating in Paris, at least on the main stage. In that sense, the 'globalization' of international relations was very relative in 1919, just as the 'world' of the war, its global extent, had been largely restricted to imperial spaces. The reorganization of 1919 did not challenge the political epicentre of global power but confirmed the hegemonic position of the transatlantic sphere, despite the inclusion of the Pacific space and of Pacific powers like Japan, China and, in another way, the United States, at the same time. The expansion of international society in the 1920s

ultimately concerned only non-European states that had already been integrated into the international system through the many administrative unions formed from the 1860s onwards as well as the international conferences of the nineteenth century. However, on the margins of this sphere of Western power projection, regional reorganizations were taking shape. Within the Western world itself, there were two opposing visions of the international order: one supported by the United States, the other embodied by European practice. They represented two opposing approaches to conflict resolution: the diplomatic route and the jurisdictional, involving the promotion of recourse to arbitration in both inter-state conflicts and the private sphere (the International Chamber of Commerce played a decisive role in this area).

The 1919 conference was a unique event: a plethora of delegations (with as many as 200 official delegates in total), including diplomats, experts and their accompanying cohort of secretaries, mimeographers and telegraphers, who often arrived on the first trains; large councils and commissions working alongside each other, and committees that were created ad hoc over the course of the event. Furthermore, negotiations followed each other at an often unprecedented and vertiginous pace: on 7 May 1919, the German delegation was handed the text of the treaty; on 14 May the Austrian delegation arrived in Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Some of the issues examined in Paris were completely new for a peace conference: telecommunications, cultural goods, the environment, international criminal justice, social rights, etc. Putting the debates of the time into perspective can be enlightening for contemporary reflections. The book also includes contributions reminding us of the materiality of international relations, and the power balances at play in the adoption of the economic, technological, political and legal norms that were discussed.

The negotiators of 1919 were heirs to a world based on European international law, which had been gradually imposed on the world through conquest and the accompanying spread of legal norms. President Wilson's vision proposed a *variatio* of this partition, whose content and limits were underlined in his own country by his political opponents. If the order constructed in 1919 was the result of intergovernmental negotiations, it was criss-crossed by new lines of force imposed by other social actors. Voluntarily adopting a form of presentism, in part this book reflects current political and societal concerns about the place of citizens, and of women, in relation to their governments, underlining the existence of alternative negotiation agendas, represented by social groups that were kept on the fringes of the conference but saw it as an opportunity to make their demands heard at a specific and important time and place.

The Paris order was also related to the multiple geographical shifts and territorial conflicts that occurred with the downfall of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, often preceding the Paris negotiations or permanently changing the map of Europe and beyond in parallel with the Allied meetings. Commissions and decision-makers at the Paris Conference tried to formulate regulations on border demarcation and the status of minorities. Russia, which did not participate in the peace negotiations, nonetheless played a central role in many deliberations and decisions as a major absentee. This concerned more than simply the perception of Germany as a protection against Bolshevism, especially on the British side. The Paris negotiators also dealt with areas of the old Tsarist Empire, many of which, due to their geostrategic importance, were in the sphere of interest of other powers that were not represented in Paris, such as Iran. In general – and this can be observed especially at the lowest levels – the Conference's resolutions were not simply implemented and enforced but led to very different national approaches and local reactions, resistances and adaptation strategies.

Finally, the Peace Conference coexisted and often competed with other agendas at the national, supra-regional and international levels.¹⁹ The Pan-African Congress dealt with the administration of the German colonies and the question of indigenous self-government. Also meeting in Paris were the representatives of the Suffragettes of the Allied countries, who, until their appearance before the International Labour Organization and the League of Nations, had sought in vain to make their political voice heard. Not coincidentally, members of women's rights movements were linked to other movements, such as Pan-Africanist and autonomist groups. In general, the decisions of the Peace Conference, as in the case of the Shandong issue, were frequently at odds with the expectations of national movements. Nguyễn Tất Thành – whose birth name was Nguyễn Sinh Cung – worked as a kitchen aid in one of the Paris hotels rented by the Allied envoy groups while he sought contacts with the French Socialists and demanded political autonomy for his native Vietnam in a letter to President Wilson. He did not succeed, and his disappointment contributed to his ideological radicalization; as Ho Chi Minh, he would later lead the struggle against the French and American colonial forces.²⁰

With its global perspective and its focus on visions, efforts and the challenge of a new global order, this book is part of a recent body of research on the Paris Conference, the 1919–20 peace treaties and the resulting international order.²¹ The blooming of this research literature and this historiography, growing out of more or less national approaches and perspectives but becoming increasingly international and even transnational, has become a subject of historical analysis in its own right.

This historiography can hardly be understood without taking into account its political frames, backgrounds and contexts and how they have changed over time.

Early judgements and interpretations of the peace treaties and the Paris peace order were strongly shaped by the accounts and interpretations of participating actors (politicians, academic experts, journalists), oscillating between (self-)justification and strong criticism. The first of these started to appear in the year of the Conference, 1919. A famous example is John Maynard Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, first published in December 1919, a book that strongly expressed and thus contributed to the spread of an extremely critical view of the peace treaties.²² While the details of the Versailles Treaty's reparation clauses were still unspecified at the time, Keynes' sharp verdict on the reparations clauses and on the treaty in general set the tone for a number of books and other writings published from the 1920s until the period after the Second World War. These works harshly criticized the Paris peacemakers for having failed to create a stable international order, and for having paved the way to the next war, including the rise of fascism broadly and the rise of Nazism in Germany and its accession to power in 1933 in particular. Up to the years after 1945, Keynes remained the chief witness and major source for every criticism of the decisions of 1919. His arguments and interpretations were extremely important and influential, not least in German historiography up to the 1960s with its national-political agenda. Only recently have his analysis and underlying assumptions been looked at with an increasingly critical eye.²³

Still, Keynes remains important because his starting point was not, as in many other cases, primarily a national one. His was a criticism of the international economic order created by the peace treaties, especially the Treaty of Versailles. Both in this regard and in terms of its economic focus, Keynes' analysis differed from the majority of publications by participants or academics about the conference and the peace treaties, which came in most cases from a strictly national position and perspective. Despite attempts to overcome this division into national viewpoints – for example, in a joint effort to create a common Franco-German schoolbook as early as the 1920s – this is especially true for French and German historiography. These two examples highlight the degree to which, at least until the 1960s, the interpretation of the peace was an integral part of historiographical and political debates about the origins of the First World War and the so-called 'war guilt question'. Against this background, many analyses and interpretations were less interested in the international order that followed and was established by the Peace Conference and the Versailles Treaty, and more in how they could be retrospectively applied

to apportion blame for the beginning of the war, and thus in drawing connections between 1919 and 1914.²⁴ Despite the huge controversy it caused in Germany and in German historiography, Fritz Fischer's work on the origins of the war and his thesis of German war guilt paved the way for a change in the – German – assessment of the Versailles Treaty. Nevertheless, a bilateral, even bilateralistic Franco-German approach, centred on Franco-German relations as the core of the Peace Conference and its order (and excluding or neglecting other dimensions) remained an important, and in many cases the central, analytical perspective even after the 1960s.

After 1945, more than French or German historiography, Anglo-American research developed interpretations of the 1919 peace efforts, situating them in the perspective of the Cold War and, against this background, the competition between liberal democracy and communism as concepts of global order that were central in influential analyses. In this context, 'world democracy' and 'world revolution', represented by Wilson and Lenin, were understood as representing two global visions of order whose antagonism determined, or at least substantially influenced, decisions in Paris in 1919.²⁵ In this way, the historical genesis of the Cold War order was projected back in time to the end of the First World War and its immediate aftermath. As much as this perspective may be criticized today and its dependence on its political context emphasized, it nonetheless contributed to liberating historiographical research from its fixation on the Great War and the war guilt question. This shift in perspective helped to pave the way for studies that, without sharing the Cold War narrative, interpret the peace of 1919 and its consequences as a first step – in terms of security policy but also economically – towards an Atlantic or Euro-Atlantic order under American hegemony that was only able to successfully unfold after 1945.²⁶

This research literature was also characterized by a growing awareness of the complexity of the peacemaking in Paris – a complexity that resulted both from the experience of the war and from the multiplicity of, and contradictions between, different political, military and economic ideas, and concepts of a peaceful order more generally, that were in play at the Conference.²⁷ This complexity was partly created by the problem of turning war aims into peace aims, but divergence and tensions between competing national interests within the victors' camp also played a major role.²⁸ In this context, the connections between, and interdependence of, developments and constellations within particular polities, societies and borders, on the one hand, and in foreign policy and international dynamics, on the other, have been addressed much more systematically in a number of important recent studies than in the older literature.

Together with growing distance from these historical events, these factors help to explain why, by the last third of the twentieth century, the academic discussion on the peacemaking in Paris had become much more sober, depoliticized and international.²⁹

Part of this process was the end of the historiographical fixation on the Treaty of Versailles and the peace with Germany. Although there can be no doubt about the constitutive meaning of Versailles for the post-1919 international order, this fixation – expressed terminologically by the term ‘Versailles system’ – yielded a constricted and reductive perspective. Of course, there was research on the other treaties (St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, Sèvres), but often from the perspective of national histories. It took time to overcome these narrow and limited approaches, making way for first a European and then an international perspective, with the political and historiographical concept of a ‘European order’ gaining more attention and importance.³⁰ To a certain degree, this development was driven by the transformation of Europe with the end of the Cold War European order and of the division of the continent after 1990. Since that time, more attention has been given to the histories of Eastern, Eastern Central and South-eastern Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, and especially after 1919. One reason for this increasing attention is the fact that the geopolitical order after the end of the Soviet Empire was so similar to the territorial order that had emerged in Eastern and South-eastern Europe during and after the First World War. Nations that first became independent in those years, like the Baltic states, gained their independence once again after 1990. In addition, there was an increasing awareness that the potential for violence, including genocidal mass violence, in the ‘bloodlands’ of Eastern and Eastern Central Europe was part, or even a consequence, of the national, or nationalized, dispensation that was an integral element of the 1919 Paris order.³¹

At the same time, historians began to address two important aspects of the order that followed the First World War and the peace treaties of 1919–20. On the one hand, the multinational, multiethnic empires of continental Europe had dissolved. On the other hand, not only did the overseas empires of the European victors, above all Britain and France, continue to exist but it was after 1919 that they reached the zenith of their geographical and power-political extension. With new historiographical attention to the League of Nations in recent years, it has been analysed as both a global institution and an imperial one, organized to stabilize British and French colonial rule.³² As the results of the Paris Peace Conference and its decisions have increasingly come to be regarded as a global peace, this peace has increasingly been analysed not only in terms of global history but also imperial. Against this background, recent research has

started to address the discrepancy between the Wilsonian idea of national self-determination as a guiding principle of the Paris peace order and the continuity of imperial rule, within Europe (in Ireland) and particularly beyond. Research in this context has stressed the ambiguity of the 'Wilsonian Moment', not least the disappointed hopes and frustrated expectations of movements in the global South for national independence or colonial liberation and the long-term effects of this gap between expectation and reality.³³

It is important to stress that a global, or global history, perspective on 1919 and the Paris order does not imply a narrative of globalization. The war and the peace were both global but not necessarily globalizing. A global perspective has to address the crises of economic globalization after 1919, and its collapse after 1929.³⁴ Recent studies have called into question the older interpretation of the Paris Peace Conference as a decisive step on the way from an imperial world order to a national one. Besides the questioning of the linearity of this type of narrative, its contradiction with the continuity of empire(s) beyond the year 1919 has also been noted.³⁵ We now need to develop a more complex global perspective on the Paris Peace Conference, one that is not determined by the national principle nor limited by the idea of national independence. The Paris order was characterized by the complex and contradictory coexistence of nationality and imperialism as central structural elements. Nationalizing empires and imperializing nation states simultaneously influenced the establishment of this order and contributed to the tensions and conflicts around its development after 1919.³⁶

Structure of the Book

The structure of this volume reflects the attempt to understand the Paris Peace Conference as part of a process aimed at creating a new international order after the First World War that would secure peace and prevent another war. Efforts to create such an order, global in its ambition and scope, began as early as the last years of the war and continued beyond the conclusion of the individual peace treaties, in some cases well into the 1920s. The individual contributions deal with different dimensions of order and shed light on international ideas that influenced the Peace Conference or emerged from it. In many cases, these conceptions show the link between national interests and international order, which was always also a tension. The studies in this book show that the actors at the Conference were not seeking to overcome nation states or a nation-state order, but rather to create a multilateral system that would balance

out the predominance of the autonomous nation state, yielding an order of balance and interdependence between the national interests of different polities.

This objective is already clear from the considerations of law, and especially international law, that played a determining role in the Peace Conference, and that were to form the basis for what would be referred to today as rule-based multilateralism, in the League of Nations system (Part I). Beyond the international legal and political-diplomatic aspects of the post-war dispensation, the international economic and financial system formed another central dimension that was characterized by increasing interdependence between different countries. This went far beyond peace treaty reparations (Part II). The global nature of the Versailles order becomes evident in the light of aspirations to establish regional systems during the Peace Conference, often following Western states' interests and reflecting the tension between national self-determination and imperial claims to power and legitimacy (Part III). The idea of national self-determination, programmatically proclaimed by Wilson as the main goal of the peace negotiations and the core of a new world order, was a major challenge to the Allied efforts to establish order in Paris. It was linked to the dynamics of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, the dissolution of multinational empires, and the emergence of a new world of states. With it, new actors entered the stage of international politics (Part IV). But alternative ideas of order were also partly represented in the political class of the great powers, not least the rising world power, the United States.

Opening Part I, Vincent Laniol's contribution deals with the significant role that considerations of law and justice played during the elaboration of the Treaty of Versailles. The clash of divergent, often contradictory views dominated the Allies' talks and negotiations before the Conference even got started and continued to the point when the German delegation travelled to Versailles. Not least in the so-called 'penal provisions' of the Treaty (Articles 227–230) but also in the famous 'war guilt article' (Article 231), concepts and objectives from civil law (liability for damages, etc.) were mixed together with ideas of criminal law, particularly with regard to the prosecution and punishment of war crimes, including the drive to bring the former German Kaiser before an international tribunal. It is precisely here that the Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles belong to the history of international criminal law and international criminal law policy. In Paris, the international order was conceived not only as a legal order in general but more specifically as a penal order. Allied efforts to lay down new principles of legal accountability and criminal prosecution were further encouraged by the idea of creating and securing

peace through international jurisdiction, as well as by public opinion in the victorious states, especially France and Great Britain (as in Lloyd George's famous 1918 campaign slogan, 'Hang the Kaiser!'), for which a just peace had to be a punitive one.

For many German International Law Scholars, too, ideas of peace were first and foremost ideas of law, as Miloš Vec argues in his contribution. The Paris Peace Treaties aimed at an international legal order with broad regulatory reach. As much as German legal scholars in the immediate context of 1919 rejected the Versailles Treaty and sharply criticized the emerging order because of the inferior status assigned to the German Reich, later, under changing political conditions, they recognized the opportunities that the increasing juridification of international relations created for Germany at the same time. Moreover, the extent to which this juridification was also occurring in other fields (economy, technology, science) was in continuity with developments from the period before 1914, when dynamics of internationalization had begun to break through the hard shell of state sovereignty. In other parts of the world and among Allied powers, this increased internationalism challenged traditional politics and diplomatic customs, as was the case of the Japanese Empire. Urs Matthias Zachmann shows how after 1919, in a process of learning and adaptation, Japanese politicians and diplomats adopted the idealistic Wilsonian mode of politics, at least in performative terms. This did not mean leaving behind the ultra-realism that had marked the country's foreign policy since the pre-war period, with its orientation towards clearly defined, and above all confrontationally determined, national goals.

The new order that took shape in Paris also included new actors and institutions in the field of international economic and technical relations: they are the subject of Part II. Martin Bemmman deals with the Supreme Economic Council, founded by the Allies in 1919, and its efforts, driven primarily by the British side, to compile and spread global economic data. The responsibility for producing the *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, initially published by the Council, shifted to the League of Nations as early as 1921. By this time, it was no longer focused solely on economic measures related to the consequences of war and reconstruction but was increasingly guided by the ambition to create a global economic order. Since the end of the war, the compiling and publishing of the *Bulletin* had been driven by government, not primarily private economic actors, unlike previous efforts at compiling large-scale economic statistics. And as it was aimed less at individual countries than at the world, it stood for the emerging global order while at the same time contributing to its further development. There was no contradiction between this global character and the continuing economic competition of national states. Bemmman's

account sheds further light on the simultaneity of internationalism and nationalism as a determining element of the global order of 1919.

Pascal Griset addresses the question of telecommunications, noting that while submarine telegraph cables were a highly visible part of the negotiations at Versailles, the issue of wireless telegraphy was marginal. He highlights the role played by engineers in keeping radio out of the scope of the Conference negotiations. These men, who played a decisive role during the war, succeeded in 1918 in exercising direct control over the projects that would follow it, far from the politicians and diplomats. They wanted to define the mode of governance of world telecommunications using their own criteria, taking an approach that represented an early phase of technocratic internationalism. He observes that although the United States was a driving force in this moment, it cannot be considered a pivotal one in the affirmation of American leadership. In this respect, in the light of the evolution of major technical systems, the Peace Conference is better understood as a parenthesis that revealed the tensions between technical and balance of power logics than as a decisive step towards internationalization. Because of the complexity of the issues at stake and the emergence of new ways of structuring negotiations, to be carried out by actors who had previously been little visible, he considers this process in the first half of 1919 one of the first expressions of an 'innovation diplomacy' that would flourish in the twentieth century.

Jérôme Sgard deals with the emergence of international commercial arbitration, which also occurred in the period immediately after the end of the First World War. It was part of the system of supranational arbitration with its claims to global legitimacy, embodied primarily by the League of Nations. Established as part of the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Court of Arbitration began its work in 1923. It was not created as a result of Western politics or as an instrument of hegemonic powers, first and foremost the United States, but on the initiative of companies and entrepreneurs. The Court nonetheless had a strong political impact: international commercial arbitration modified the boundaries of nation-state sovereignty and contributed to the emergence of early global governance structures that had a significant impact both in the private and the public sphere.

Part III deals with local developments, and thus the relationship between regional and global efforts to establish a new post-war order. Looking at the example of the Caucasus, Etienne Forestier-Peyrat examines the dissolution of multinational imperial structures, emphasizing the dynamics and effects of the downfall of Tsarist Russia and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. More precisely, he analyses the options and opportunities for geographical and political change in a region shaken

by revolution and civil war and trapped between political vacuums at the margins of two collapsing empires, Tsarist and Ottoman. At the same time, and on this basis, it became a sphere of influence of the emerging Soviet Union. The experience of regional disorder and disintegration led to new efforts to restore or establish (new) order, centred around the Paris imperative of national self-determination and sovereignty. But these efforts led to new crises and conflicts, which affected not only the stability but also the legitimacy of the emerging new administrative and political structures.

In his contribution, Thomas Fischer argues that the role of Latin America and Latin American states deserves to be more than just a footnote in accounts of the Paris Peace Conference. Focusing on Brazil and using a 'glocalist' approach, Fischer points out that the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference were a decisive watershed for Latin America. Representatives of several Latin American states were present in Paris, participating actively in the peacemaking process, and the peace treaties and the emerging order had profound repercussions for the Latin American states and their societies. The chapter shows how the Peace Conference provided an opportunity for Latin American states to establish themselves as accepted actors on the international stage. One of their guiding principles was the idea of national greatness, which in the case of Brazil was not only a political message of domestic importance but intended to shape the Paris negotiations and Brazil's role in the League of Nations. From the perspective of international order, the de-Europeanizing and globalizing effects of the presence of non-European states in Paris 1919 should not be underestimated.

The challenges and dilemmas of post-war planning are also the subject of Carolin Liebisch-Gümüş's contribution on proposals for the future of Istanbul after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The author develops the thesis that diverging ideas about the metropolis on the Bosphorus not only reflected but also articulated different ideas of international and regional order. Thus, the chapter does not look at the Ottoman Empire or the emerging modern state of Turkey from the established perspective of great statesmen and high politics but focuses on a set of actors whose internationalism, which had grown out of different interests, gave rise to ideas for the creation of an 'international city' – including even the project of making Istanbul the seat of the League of Nations. While their various proposals expressed new ideas of international sovereignty, what seem at first glance to have been progressive visions also reflect the persistence of Western imperial pretensions to hegemony and superiority. And, Liebisch-Gümüş argues, the emancipatory aspect of the Wilsonian imperative of national self-determination was undermined by the denial

of the Turkish nation's right or ability to govern a multinational 'cosmopolis' like Istanbul.

In Part IV of the volume ('Challenges of the Paris Order'), Mona L. Siegel explores the story of Soumay Tcheng, a political activist who was a lawyer and diplomat in the Chinese delegation in Paris. As a woman, Tcheng was an exception on the political-diplomatic stage of the Peace Conference. Moreover, she stood in a specific way for self-determination as a global principle: in her work, she combined the goal of individual self-determination as a woman and national self-determination as a representative of China. She thus linked together feminism and nationalism, particularly when she went to Paris, where she both met French feminists and successfully prevented the head of the Chinese delegation from signing the Peace Treaty that ceded Shandong to Japan. As an opponent of colonialism and as a feminist, Tcheng challenged the – exclusively male – peacemakers, advocating a different global order based on democracy and self-determination. This was contradicted by imperial ideas of domination and the gender stereotypes of the European great powers. Tcheng thus also stood for those women who entered the world stage in Paris to promote their agenda, supporting transnational movements and gaining a global public, even if they did not immediately succeed in realizing their aspirations.

Emmanuelle Sibeud likewise does not present a success story in her chapter, taking a broad perspective on the 1919 Pan-African Congress, which was organized by the US sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois and the Senegalese politician Blaise Diagne, and which took place in Paris at the same time as the peace negotiations. Sibeud critically reassesses historiographical narratives and interpretations that present the Congress either as a doomed visionary initiative that heralded the awakening of people of African descent, or as a cynical concession made by the great powers in the context of the division of the German colonies and the Middle Eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire. For Sibeud, the Pan-African Congress instead brought into relief the formation of a new world order characterized by intensified racialization. While this process did not begin in Paris, the Peace Conference contributed to making 'race' a decisive criterion for belonging to the international community, including in legal, international and diplomatic terms.

At the same time, Woodrow Wilson and his ideas of order may not have prevailed in Paris, or only partially, but he shaped the agenda of the Peace Conference, and especially of the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Versailles. So great and dominant did Wilson appear, whether among his followers or his critics, that we know little about other American concepts of global order at the end of the First World War. Manfred Berg

turns to these alternative conceptions, linking them to concrete manifestations of American nationalism. Berg argues that at the centre of the disputes between Wilson and his domestic political opponents on both the right and left was the question of multilateralism versus unilateralism. In this light, the chapter analyses not only Wilson's ideas on the role of the United States in a liberal world order but also the views of his political rivals, who ultimately succeeded in preventing the country from joining the League of Nations. The challenge of this tension between transatlantic commitment and withdrawal from supranational institutions has shaped American politics up to the present, with ever-new answers in evolving international and global constellations.

The concluding chapter by Eckart Conze underlines the global dimension of the Paris Conference and the intrinsic link between European and global agendas and ideas of order. Following the much-quoted formulation of the 'Wilsonian moment' (Erez Manela), Conze stresses what he calls the 'Paris moment', referring both to the special context in which this event took place and to its aftermath, as well as to the legacy of a long war that did not end everywhere in 1919. Not only were individual peace treaties negotiated and signed in the French capital and in Versailles, not only were particular topics and questions discussed, debated and negotiated over, but a new international order was founded. Now, a century after the Peace Conference, the 'old demons', as French President Emmanuel Macron has called them – nationalism, unilateralism, authoritarianism – are alive again. The findings of research, and of this volume in particular, on the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 are thus of more than simply historiographical interest.

* * *

A long time has passed between the international conference in June 2019 on 'The Paris Peace Conference: The Challenge of a New World Order' and the publication of this volume. Covid-19 is the single most important factor explaining this delay. As editors and with the book finally published, it is our obligation and pleasure to convey our gratitude. Both the conference and the book have been collective efforts, and we would like to acknowledge the help of all those who made them possible. The Fritz Thyssen Stiftung provided generous financial support. The German Historical Institute Paris (IHA) hosted the conference; the Centre de Recherche – Château de Versailles made it possible for one section of the conference to be held at the Château. Other institutions were equally supportive: Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Philipps-Universität Marburg, UMR SIRICE (Sorbonne – Identités,

relations internationales et civilisations de l'Europe), Labex Ecrire une histoire nouvelle de l'Europe (EHNE), the ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, the Mission du Centenaire de la Première Guerre mondiale, the Commission for the History of International Relations (CHIR), the German Historical Institute London (GHIL), and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. A number of colleagues helped to conceive the conference and the book, among them Carl Bouchard, Jean-Michel Gieu, Norman Ingram, Peter Jackson, Thomas Maissen, Stefan Martens, William Mulligan and Matthias Schulz. We thank Berghahn Books for their interest in the topic, as well as the anonymous reviewers, whose critique and comments contributed substantially to this volume. Last, but not least our thanks go to Paul Reeve, who did a wonderful job preparing the book for publication, which is not adequately described as copyediting and translation.

Laurence Badel is Professor of Contemporary History of International Relations at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. A specialist of European diplomatic practices, she is developing work in two directions: the history of women in diplomacy and international relations and the history of diplomatic capitals. Her recent publications include *Diplomaties européennes: XIX^e–XXI^e siècle* (Presses de Sciences Po, 2021), which won the Institut de France's 2022 Prix Edouard Bonnefous; as editor, *Histoire et relations internationales: Pierre Renouvin, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle et la naissance d'une discipline universitaire* (Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2020); and 'Diplomacy and the History of International Relations: Redefining a Conflictual Relationship', *Diplomatica* (2019). Her latest book, *Ecrire l'histoire des relations internationales, XVIII^e–XXI^e siècle: Genèse, concepts, perspectives*, was published by Armand Colin in 2024.

Eckart Conze is Professor of Modern and Contemporary History and Co-Director of the International Research and Documentation Centre for War Crimes Trials (ICWC) at the University of Marburg (Germany). He has held visiting professorships at the Universities of Toronto, Cambridge, Bologna, Utrecht and Jerusalem. His main areas of research are the history of international relations (nineteenth to twenty-first centuries), the history of elites and the aristocracy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the history of security. His books include *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (with Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes and Moshe Zimmermann; Karl Blessing, 2010), *Geschichte der Sicherheit: Entwicklung – Themen – Perspektiven* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017) and *Die große Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt* (Siedler, 2018). His latest book

is *Schatten des Kaiserreichs: Die Reichsgründung 1871 und ihr schwieriges Erbe* (dtv, 2020).

Axel Dröber is a researcher at the German Historical Institute Paris and visiting lecturer at Université Sorbonne-Nouvelle. He studies nineteenth and twentieth-century Western European history, with a focus on the history of public security and the state monopoly on violence in post-revolutionary Europe. His book-length study on the National Guard during the Restoration and the July Monarchy in France, *Nation, Militär und Gesellschaft*, was published in 2022 (Heidelberg University Publishing). He is currently working on the topic of migration and citizenship after the First World War. Taking a transnational perspective, he is investigating the history of citizenship in the context of the international peace order of 1919, the development of naturalization in France, and transnational German migration.

Notes

1. The first sentence in MacMillan, *Peacemakers*, 1. From a more global, non-Western perspective, see also Goebel, *Anti-imperial Metropolis*.
2. Miller, *My Diary*, 36.
3. See, for example, Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order*; Jackson, Mulligan and Sluga, *Peacemaking*; Bouchard and Ingram, *Beyond the Great War*; Leonhard, *Große Erwartungen*; Davion and Jeannesson, *Les traités de paix*.
4. Sharp, *Consequences of Peace*, 4–5.
5. Or in another way, as Arno Mayer's study on 'containment and counterrevolution at Versailles' demonstrates. See Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy*.
6. See Vladimir Putin, '75th Anniversary of the Great Victory'.
7. See Badel, *Diplomaties*.
8. See Meinhardt et al., 'Ordnung', 1295.
9. In a speech to the Chambre des députés on 21 January 1844: 'la bonne intelligence de toutes les grandes puissances et le respect de l'indépendance et des droits de toutes les puissances, petites ou grandes': 'Discussion sur l'entente cordiale entre la France et l'Angleterre, au sujet des affaires d'Espagne et de Grèce', Guizot, *Histoire parlementaire*, 190.
10. See, for example, Sluga, *Invention*; Ikenberry, *After Victory*; De Graaf, De Haan and Vick, *Securing Europe*; Jarrett, *Congress of Vienna*; Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order*; Jackson, Mulligan and Sluga, *Peacemaking*; Bouchard and Ingram, *Beyond the Great War*.
11. Sluga, *Invention*, 4.
12. See, for example, Durand, *Nouvel ordre*; Belissa, *Repenser l'ordre*; Armstrong, *Revolution and World Order*; Chomsky, *World Orders*; Dukes, *World Order*; Keylor, *A World of Nations*; Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*; Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations*; Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order*; Krige and Rausch, *American Foundations*; Hoffman, *American Umpire*; Fink, *The Long Gilded Age*; Scott-Smith and Rofo, *Global Perspectives*; Sharman, *Empires of the Weak*; Menzel, *Ordnung der Welt*; Kissinger, *World Order*; Maull, *Rise and Decline*; Maull, 'Die internationale Ordnung'; Mearsheimer, 'Bound to Fail'; Tooze, *The Deluge*.

13. See Bouchard and Ingram, *Beyond the Great War*.
14. Osterhammel, 'Weltordnungskonzepte'.
15. See Krumeich, *Versailles 1919*.
16. Temperley, *History*, 236.
17. On Central Europe, see Plyer and Schirmann, *Les traités*.
18. Nicolson, *Peacemaking*; Tardieu, *La Paix*.
19. Goebel, *Anti-imperial Metropolis*.
20. Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 839; Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 216–17; see also Manela, *Wilsonian Moment*, 3–4, and Mishra, *From the Ruins*.
21. See Jackson, Mulligan and Sluga, *Peacemaking*; Bouchard and Ingram, *Beyond the Great War*, as well as the monographs by Conze, *Die große Illusion*; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*; Schwabe, *Versailles*; Bernardini, *Parigi 1919*; with a focus on questions of international law and the international legal order, Payk, *Frieden*, and Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*; in a broader perspective: Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order* and Tooze, *Deluge*.
22. Keynes, *Economic Consequences*.
23. See, for example, Tooze, *Deluge*, or Schuker, 'J.M. Keynes'.
24. See, for example, in Germany: Ritter, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk*; Erdmann, *Die Zeit*; in France: Renouvin, *Les origines immédiates*.
25. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy*.
26. Jackson, *Beyond the Balance*; Tooze, *Deluge*; Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace*; Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order*.
27. See, for example, with their emphasis on the question of reparations: Trachtenberg, *Reparation*; Krüger, *Deutschland*; Marks, *The Illusion*.
28. Soutou, *L'Or et le sang*.
29. For a balanced and – at the time – consensual overview of international research 75 years after the conference, focusing on the Versailles Treaty, see Boemeke, Feldman and Glaser, *Treaty of Versailles*. From a broader perspective, see also Steiner, *The Lights*.
30. See, for example, Payk and Pergher, *Beyond Versailles*.
31. Snyder, *Bloodlands*; Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*; Bartov and Weitz, *Shatterzone*. With particular attention to the dynamics of nation-building and the concept of sovereignty: Smith, *Sovereignty*.
32. Henig, *League of Nations*; Pedersen, *Guardians*; Guieu, *Le Rameau*.
33. Manela, *Wilsonian Moment*; Goebel, *Anti-imperial Metropolis*.
34. Boyce, *The Great Interwar Crisis*.
35. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*.
36. Hirschhausen and Leonhard, *Empires*, 611.

Bibliography

- Armstrong, James D. *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
- Badel, Laurence. *Diplomaties européennes, XIXe–XXe siècle*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2021.
- Bartov, Omer and Eric D. Weitz. *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013.
- Belissa, Marc. *Repenser l'ordre européen (1795–1802): De la société des nations aux droits des nations*. Paris: Kimé, 2006.

- Bell, Duncan. *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Bernardini, Giovanni. *Parigi 1919: La conferenza di pace*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2019.
- Boemeke, Manfred F., Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser (eds). *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Bouchard, Carl and Norman Ingram (eds). *Beyond the Great War: Making Peace in a Disordered World*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022.
- Boyce, Robert. *The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Burkman, Thomas W. *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–1938*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008.
- Chomsky, Noam. *World Orders Old and New*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Cohrs, Patrick O. *The Unfinished Peace After World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- . *The New Atlantic Order: The Transformation of International Politics, 1860–1933*. Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
- Conze, Eckart. *Die große Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt*. Munich: Siedler, 2018.
- Davion, Isabelle and Stanislas Jeannesson (eds). *Les traités de paix, 1918–1923: La paix les uns contre les autres*. Paris: Sorbonne Université Presses, 2023.
- De Graaf, Beatrice, Ido de Haan and Brian Vick (eds). *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Dukes, Paul. *World Order in History: Russia and the West*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Durand, Yves. *Le nouvel ordre européen nazi: La collaboration dans l'Europe allemande (1938–1945)*. Brussels: Complexe, 1990.
- Erdmann, Karl Dietrich. *Die Zeit der Weltkriege*. Vol. 1: *Der Erste Weltkrieg, die Weimarer Republik*. Stuttgart: Union Verlag, 1973.
- Fink, Leon. *The Long Gilded Age: American Capitalism and the Lessons of a New World Order*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.
- Gerwarth, Robert. *The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923*. London: Allen Lane, 2016.
- Goebel, Michael. *Anti-imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Guieu, Jean-Michel. *Le Rameau et le glaive: Les militants français pour la Société des Nations*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2008.
- Guizot, François. *Histoire parlementaire de France: recueil complet des discours prononcés dans les Chambres de 1819 à 1848*. T. 4. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1864.
- Henig, Ruth. *The League of Nations*. Edinburgh: Haus, 1973.
- Hirschhausen, Ulrike von and Jörn Leonhard. *Empires: Eine globale Geschichte 1780–1920*. München: C.H. Beck, 2023.
- Hoffman, Elizabeth C. *American Umpire: The New Rules of World Order, 1776 to the Present*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.

- Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.
- Jackson, Peter. *Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Jackson, Peter, William Mulligan and Glenda Sluga (eds). *Peacemaking and International Order After the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.
- Jarrett, Mark. *The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2013.
- Keylor, William R. *A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945*, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Keynes, John Maynard. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1919.
- Kissinger, Henry. *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*. New York: Penguin, 2014.
- Koskenniemi, Martti. *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Krige, John and Helke Rausch (eds). *American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012.
- Krüger, Peter. *Deutschland und die Reparationen 1918/19: Die Genesis des Reparationsproblems in Deutschland zwischen Waffenstillstand und Versailler Friedensvertrag*. Stuttgart: De Gruyter, 1973.
- Krumeich Gerd (ed.). *Versailles 1919: Ziele-Wirkung-Wahrnehmung*. Köln: Klartext, 2001.
- Leonhard, Jörn. *Der überforderte Frieden: Versailles und die Welt 1918–1923*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018.
- Leonhard, Jörn (ed.). *Große Erwartungen: 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt*. Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023.
- MacMillan, Margaret. *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War*. London: Murray, 2001.
- Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Marks, Sally. *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe 1918–1933*. Basingstoke/ London: Macmillan, 1976.
- Maull, Hanns W. 'Die internationale Ordnung: Bestandsaufnahme und Ausblick'. *SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen* 4(1) (2020), 3–23.
- Maull, Hanns W. (ed.). *The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Mayer, Arno J. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 'Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order'. *International Security* 43(4) (2019), 7–50.
- Meinhardt, Helmut et al. 'Ordnung', in Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer and Gottfried Gabriel (eds), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 6 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 1249–1309.
- Menzel, Ulrich. *Die Ordnung der Welt*. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015.

- Miller, David Hunter. *My Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents*, vol. 3. New York: Appeal Printing Company, 1924.
- Mishra, Pankaj. *From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012.
- Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking 1919*. London: Constable, 1933.
- Osterhammel, Jürgen. 'Weltordnungskonzepte', in Jost Dülffer and Wilfried Loth (eds), *Dimensionen internationaler Geschichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 409–28.
- Payk, Marcus M. *Frieden durch Recht? Der Aufstieg des modernen Völkerrechts und der Friedensschluss nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018.
- Payk, Marcus M. and Roberta Pergher (eds). *Beyond Versailles: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and the Formation of New Politics after the Great War*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2019.
- Pedersen, Susan. *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Plyer, Ségolène and Sylvain Schirmann (eds). 'Les traités de paix en Europe centrale: quels potentiels pour quelles réalisations?' *Revue d'Allemagne* 52(2) (2020).
- Putin, Vladimir. '75th Anniversary of the Great Victory: Shared Responsibility to History and our Future (2020)'. Retrieved September 2023 from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63527>.
- Renouvin, Pierre. *Les origines immédiates de la guerre (28 juin–4 août 1914)*. Paris: Alfred Costes, 1925.
- Reynolds, Michael A. *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Ritter, Gerhard. *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des 'Militarismus' in Deutschland*, 4 vols. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1959–1968.
- Schuker, Stephen A. 'J.M. Keynes and the Personal Politics of Reparations: Part 1'. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 25(3) (2014), 453–71.
- Schwabe, Klaus. *Versailles: Das Wagnis eines demokratischen Friedens 1919–1923*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019.
- Scott-Smith, Giles and J. Simon Rofe (eds). *Global Perspectives on the Bretton Woods Conference and the Post-War World Order*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Sharman, Jason C. *Empires of the Weak: The Real Story of European Expansion and the Creation of the New World Order*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.
- Sharp, Alan. *Consequences of Peace – The Versailles Settlement: Aftermath and Legacy 1919–2015*. London: Haus, 2010.
- Sluga, Glenda. *The Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021.
- Smith, Leonard V. *Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Snyder, Timothy. *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*. New York: Basic Books, 2010.
- Soutou, Georges-Henri. *L'Or et le sang: Les buts de guerre économique de la Première Guerre mondiale*. Paris: Fayard, 1989.

- Steiner, Zara. *The Lights That Failed: European International History 1919–1933*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Tardieu, André. *La Paix*. Paris: Payot, 1921.
- Temperley, Harold W. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. 1. London: Oxford University Press, 1920.
- Thomas, Martin. *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918–1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Tooze, Adam. *The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931*. London: Allen Lane, 2014.
- Trachtenberg, Marc. *Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.