



## THE LESSONS OF NAZISM

When Olof Palme boarded a liner for America, in the harbour in Gothenburg in 1947, it marked a break with family tradition. The twenty-five year old from Östermalm had grown up in an upper middle-class environment, he had attended exclusive schools, become a reserve officer in the cavalry and studied law. His family had long and wide links across the whole Baltic region, including strong connections in the Finnish and Baltic German aristocracy. His mother, Elisabeth, born von Knieriem, had fled Lithuania during the First World War and spoke German to her son right from the start. Up until the Second World War it would have been natural for a talented young man from the Swedish haute bourgeoisie to travel to Germany to study. Now, however, two years after the war, the young Palme chose to go west, to a New World and a new future.<sup>1</sup>

Olof Palme spent the academic year 1947–1948 at Kenyon College in Ohio. He studied social science, debated the great questions of the day and wrote a critical examination piece on Friedrich von Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*. More than that, however, he imbibed *the American way of life*. He also spent two months travelling far and wide across the American continent. He met jazz musicians, war veterans and political activists at cafés, on night buses and at petrol stations.<sup>2</sup>

Once back in Sweden, the future prime minister summarised his American experiences in an article in *Svenska Dagbladet*. It began as a review of Norman Mailer's recently published *The Naked and the Dead* but quickly moved on to reflect on the presence of the war in postwar American society. Palme asked himself whether it was possible to find there the same anxiety and death wish that Wolfgang Borchert had depicted in his play *Draussen vor der Tür* (Outside, at the door) (1947). His answer was no. Whereas German young men had returned to 'a civilisation in ruin, to material and moral decay on an appalling scale', Mailer and his contemporaries had returned to 'a flourishing America

and Americanism, to a bubbling vitality, with its mixture of life-affirming materialism and naïve idealism'.<sup>3</sup>

The young Swede was conscious of the clichés about Americans that that were still flourishing at the end of the 1940s, perceptions of spiritual superficiality and blue-eyed carefreeness. But Palme found something deeply attractive in the American appetite for life and optimism. It was a social ethos utterly different from the postwar lethargy of Europe and it would take America forward and out of the trauma of the Second World War:

It is [...] striking proof of the vitality and healing ability of the American nation, it is a fact that has to be accepted and built on, for it is this American wartime generation, the millions of farmers, workers and students, who by dint of their own vitality will for the foreseeable future dominate and function as norm-givers for the strata of people in Western Europe who have traditionally been the bearers of culture.<sup>4</sup>

Olof Palme belonged to a generation the whole of whose adult lives would be lived out in the postwar world. In the aftermath of the war they were not the ones who had the right to interpret the official historical lesson of the Nazi experience: they were too young for that. But they were the ones who would live with it; they were the ones who would implement the ideas of 1945 and complete the break with the German cultural tradition.

The foregoing chapters have seen the beginnings of the new postwar territory formed by the interplay between historical experiences and emergent visions in the years around 1945. To provide a more rounded picture, however, entails filling it out with further material, and that process is central to the present chapter. The social dimensions of the experiences, who embraced them, and in which milieux they were anchored, have so far only been sketched. The same is true of their scope: how long can an experience be valid before being replaced by another? In order to address these problems more closely and to reflect on the whole compass of the historical lesson of Nazism, this last chapter will be permitted to range more widely geographically, thematically and historically.

## **Nazism and the Territory of the Postwar Age**

The Nazi experience was a living experience. In the wake of the war it contributed to pruning the ideological map, fostering the advance of cultural radicalism and confirming cultural reorientation. In order for

the postwar landscape to emerge in its entirety, with all its boundaries and its nuances, we need a detailed panorama.

### *The Political Field*

At first it might seem as though the lesson of Nazism caused nothing more than party political change in Sweden in that the Nazi and fascist groupings disappeared. Admittedly some of them, the circle around Sven Olov Lindholm for instance, did not cease their activity until around 1950, but their influence was already completely marginal even by the end of the war. Although minor National Socialist parties were established during the 1950s and 1960s, it would take several decades before they achieved any sort of public breakthrough. With the end of the Second World War authoritarian nationalism had exhausted all its ideological strength in Sweden as in the rest of Europe.<sup>5</sup>

But its political significance did not stop there. If we broaden our enquiry we find that the experiences of Nazism were particularly noticeable immediately after the war. Alf W. Johansson has argued that anti-fascism together with anti-communism became the two consensus dystopian ideologies of the postwar years. They were 'counter-ideologies that expressed anti-utopias, something that people should strive to avoid; they constituted negative patterns of thought that made certain sectors of the ideological field taboo'.<sup>6</sup> Even though anti-fascism was the more fundamental, towards the end of the 1940s it was pushed into the background as a result of the burgeoning Cold War. Between 1943 and 1946 anti-fascism had shown a marked tendency towards equality and was quite compatible with communist convictions. One sign of this is that the Swedish Communist Party received its all-time highest number of votes (11.2%) in the local elections of 1946. Just a couple of years later, however, anti-fascism was outflanked by anti-communism as a factor in political mobilisation. In the election of 1948 the communists lost a great deal of support whereas the anti-communist parties of the centre – the Social Democrats and the Liberals – triumphed. The Prague coup and the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe made anti-totalitarianism a decisive signpost even in Swedish domestic politics. Consequently, Johansson argues, the two dystopian lines of thinking effectively cut the ideological field: anti-fascism contributed to the discrediting of the right-wing concepts of the conservatives and to moving them in a liberal direction, whereas anti-communism reinforced the liberal elements in social democracy and prevented it moving in the direction of socialism.<sup>7</sup>

Seen from this point of view the experiences of National Socialism were a part of postwar life, and the strength of Alf W. Johansson's argument lies in its general characterisation of the ideological field. As far as changes in political geography are concerned, my conclusions do not differ seriously from his, but I stress *the Nazi experience* as a decisive factor. When Johansson talks of a 'dystopian ideology', a negative form of thought that made parts of the political landscape taboo, it is an idea that defines the more conscious formation of attitudes. To me it seems to be a historical experience of such dignity that it influenced far more fields than just the political. The concept of ideology is, therefore, too constricted, and nor does it offer a form of interpretation that connects experiences of the past with conceptions of the present and of the future.

Alf W. Johansson does, however, expressly underline the fact that resistance to Nazism had consequences that went far beyond party politics. He summarised the profound significance of anti-fascism as follows:

With the elimination of fascism as a power political threat, the prime function of anti-fascism became the upholding of a philosophical consensus that prevented the occurrence of fascist tendencies: every variety of thought or ideological element that could possibly act as a seedbed for fascism must be resisted and made taboo. This was particularly true, of course, for all forms of racist thinking, but anti-fascism implied significantly more than anti-racism. It also stood for anti-dictatorship, anti-nationalism, anti-hierarchy, anti-symbolism, anti-ritualism, pro-modernism [...].<sup>8</sup>

One way of problematising and developing this characterisation is to look at the fields of politics in the light of postwar rational cultural radicalism. Its view of society, man and culture was revealed in the Schools Commission of 1946 and manifested in the debates about natural law. The Swedish interpretations of Nazism took shape in this cultural-radical space, where idealist, metaphysical and nationalist approaches were banned. Enlightenment rationalism, so dominant in Sweden during the first quarter of a century after the war, thereby shaped the understanding of the Nazi experience.<sup>9</sup>

Rationalist cultural radicalism might lean in a somewhat socialist direction or in a somewhat liberal direction, but it was not a movement of the right. Many of the things it condemned were cardinal points of conservatism: tradition, Christianity, hierarchies, the immutable nature of values. Alf W. Johansson has therefore argued that the world of conservative ideas collapsed after 1945 and that the heritage of German Romanticism appeared to bear the taint of Nazism after the

Second World War. Torbjörn Nilsson has picked up on this suggestion but linked it with a debate within political science about the tension between conservatism and liberalism in the development of right-wing ideas during the twentieth century. And Nilsson is more restrained in his judgment. With regard to the first postwar years it seems more reasonable to talk of the national organisation of the Conservative Party receiving new and progressive impetus. Social conservatism underwent a recovery in the second half of the 1940s and the Conservatives stressed an active social policy much more than they had done earlier, even though between 1950 and 1961, during Jarl Hjalmarson's time as leader, they returned to a more classic form of economic liberalism. Nilsson's conclusion is that the Conservative Party had not abandoned conservatism but, during the first postwar decade, still found itself in the zone of tension between conservatism and liberalism.<sup>10</sup>

Torbjörn Nilsson brings significant nuances to the discussion but he does not actually address the question of which parts of conservative tradition became unusable as a result of National Socialism. Social and economic policies lie at the centre of his argument and those were areas in which experiences of Nazism did not call for general reorientation. There was a small group of liberals who, in line with Friedrich von Hayek, considered that a planned economy would pave the way for totalitarianism and who consequently argued for capitalism with fewer regulations.<sup>11</sup> But in Sweden, as in large parts of Europe, state interventionism enjoyed its heyday in the years after the Second World War. The conclusions drawn from the Depression of the 1930s provide the explanation to that; so the historical lesson was generated more by a background historical factor in Hitler's accession to power than by Nazism itself.

My study reveals, however, that several traditional conservative ideals were weakened in the aftermath of the Second World War, particularly within the cultural and intellectual fields. The best example is the schools question. The cultural-radical tradition of values that emerged with full force at the end of the war was made manifest in the Schools Commission of 1946 with its upgrading of political democracy, its education in citizenship focusing on the issues of the day, and with an educational approach based on the social sciences. It implied a complete break with the idealism of Neo-Humanism and the nationalism of popular rule. There were nevertheless those among the conservatives who were prepared to resist what they saw as secularisation and the removal of tradition; they emphasised, for instance, the importance of Christian concepts in matters of morality and upbringing. At the end of the 1940s a culturally conservative counter-offensive was initiated

against the dominance of cultural radicalism, but it is difficult to find any areas in which it genuinely succeeded in turning things around. In fact, seen in a longer historical perspective, it must be described as the death throes of cultural conservatism. Even within the Conservative Party the process of secularisation advanced by leaps and bounds in the second half of the 1950s and committed Christians found it more and more difficult to gain a hearing for their views.<sup>12</sup>

The key question is not whether it is possible to discover conservative tendencies in Swedish politics after 1945; the central issue is, rather, to locate the parts of the traditional conservative system of ideas that were stigmatised by the Nazi experience. Three main forms of conservative tradition developed in the first half of the nineteenth century in the aftermath of the French Revolution: legitimist conservatism, which upheld the concept of reaction and emphatically turned its back on the ideals of the Enlightenment; romantic conservatism, which was primarily a home for aesthetes – Schlegel, Novalis, Chateaubriand – and which longed for a return to a spiritual, pre-revolutionary *Alteuropa*; and liberal conservatism, which counted Edmund Burke as its progenitor and argued for successive limited reforms rather than revolutionary eruptions against tradition. It was only the last of these three that retained its viability for the whole of the century but, from the middle of the nineteenth century, social conservatism emerged as a new current alongside it: its criticisms focused on the negative sides of industrialisation and, in a spirit of patriarchalism it called for reform. The period after the First World War saw a more radical and active conservatism in Europe, known in Germany as ‘the conservative revolution’. Its supporters (Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger and so on) broke with the Christian ethics of the nineteenth century and evoked a heroic aristocratic order instead.<sup>13</sup>

It was only the liberal conservative and social conservative strands that ran on into postwar Europe. The older forms were long since played out and the activist mobilisation of the interwar years stood far too close to Nazism to be able to muster any credibility. Consequently it was those conservative groupings that drew their nourishment from reactionary, romantic and ultra-nationalistic thinking which were dragged down with the collapse of the Third Reich. These were the conservatives who had never come to terms with the era of liberal democracy and who were fighting for something radically different, whether that involved a return to an older order or support for a revolution of the right. They coincide closely with what Stanley G. Payne has called authoritarian nationalism.<sup>14</sup> The conservative parties that re-emerged in Western Europe after 1945 espoused parliamentarism and the welfare

state and took moderation and *common sense* as all-round virtues. In the guise of Christian democratic parties they exerted significant influence in countries such as France, Italy, West Germany and Austria during the first postwar decades.<sup>15</sup>

During the years between the two world wars conservatism had been a more marginal force in Sweden than on the continent – this was particularly true of the anti-democratic, Greater Sweden movement connected with Rudolf Kjellén and Adrian Molin. It had lost much of its attraction after the dissolution of the union with Norway in 1905 and the setbacks suffered by the activists during the First World War. Social and economic conservatism was also considerably weaker in Sweden than in other Western European country after the Second World War. The groups in West Germany, for instance, that were arguing for Neo-Humanism and natural law as a response to the Nazi experience had very few equivalents in Sweden, where the power to draw conclusions lay in other hands. Thus the development of ideas among the Swedish right during the early postwar period reveals the more general connection between experience, historical lessons and perception of the future. The experiences of Nazism prompted a lesson that to some extent stigmatised certain aspects of the conservative tradition and to some extent cleared the road for a cultural-radical advance.<sup>16</sup>

Whether the lesson of Nazism also weakened the utopian left is an interesting question. As has already been mentioned, communism experienced a short-lived period of popularity around the end of the war, but it was quickly replaced by a growing sense of aversion. Although it is difficult to provide proof, there are signs that suggest that the Cold War and totalitarianism are not the only explanations for postwar anti-communism. One possibility is that the historical lesson of Nazism helped undermine all eschatological, titanic ideas in the political sphere. The postwar weariness with ideology was an expression of this anti-utopianism.<sup>17</sup>

But there are also other examples. It was not only the Prague coup that led three youngish Social Democrats to break away from the Clarté League in 1948. The letter they wrote to give their reasons for leaving refers to the experiences of Nazism:

Communism is a totalitarian ideology with roots in German metaphysics; in terms of economic theory it rests on a rigid doctrine of nationalisation, on the cultural plane it tacks in accordance with winds from Russia. Both ideologically and culturally modern social democracy build on impulses from the Anglo-Saxon tradition, on rationalism of the Bertrand Russell sort and, in terms of economic policy, on the technology of planned

economy that has been developed in Scandinavia, Great Britain and America during the last decades.<sup>18</sup>

This passage is enlightening. An attack on German metaphysics was combined with an attack on Russian influences, both being seen as evils. Over against them was modern social democracy, not attached to continental roots but springing from a progressive Anglo-Saxon tradition of rationalism and social planning. Similar voices could be heard from other sectors of the far left. Of course, not all of the changes in the Swedish communist party in the wake of the war can be reduced to a reaction to the Nazi experience, but the development from a full-blooded revolutionary communism to a more broadly based workers' party that started during these years fitted in well with the larger post-war pattern.<sup>19</sup>

If we look beyond the political sphere, the breakthrough of rationalist cultural radicalism is even more marked. 'The ideas of 1945', a manifestation of this tradition of values in very many respects, has been shown to be visible in education policies and in postwar legal discussions, but the lessons of Nazism put their mark on far more spheres than that. The antipathy to nationalistic outpourings, idealistic phraseology and grandiloquent metaphysics was visible everywhere.

The discipline of philosophy provides an illuminating example. During the first half of the twentieth century leading practitioners like Axel Hägerström and Adolf Phalén cleared away the remnants of idealism one by one. The gulf between the analytical camp and the continental camp became an abyss when Ingemar Hedenius, Konrad Marc-Wogau and Anders Wedberg occupied the three prestigious chairs of philosophy during the years immediately following the Second World War. The philosopher Johan Strang has looked at this process within a larger context and his views offer support to my propositions about the Nazi experience. He is of the view that the dominant position of analytical philosophy was linked with the process whereby the cultural centre of the Western world shifted from the German to the Anglo-Saxon sphere. To the eyes of the analytical philosophers, during the years between the wars continental philosophy had appeared as an expression of the conservative, German national tendencies of the age, and because of 'the perception that there was a connection between totalitarianism and "the other philosophers"', it took a long time for many parts of the Anglo-Saxon cultural sphere to consider it politically acceptable to be interested in continental philosophy'. That was certainly true in postwar Sweden, where the very fact that there were roots that linked the two orientations was denied.<sup>20</sup>



The experiences of Nazism in themselves did not, of course, shape the postwar conceptual world, but they undermined attempts to challenge cultural-radical rationalism. The 'faith and knowledge' debate (*tro- och vetandedebatten*), the great philosophical debate that took off around 1950, may be seen in this perspective. The profound repercussions that this trial of strength had on the intellectual culture of Sweden cannot be explained exclusively by Hedenius's combative debating technique. It was as if the resistance put up by the theologians was pointless, as if there was no room for anything other than analytical argumentation and a rationalistic outlook on the world.<sup>21</sup>

Anti-metaphysics, anti-idealism and anti-nationalism accorded with the more profound conclusions drawn from the Nazi experience. That was particularly true for the discipline of philosophy, but similar thinking occurred in almost all fields of knowledge. In 1949 Erik Lönnroth, the most influential Swedish postwar historian, published *En annan uppfattning* (A Different Point of View). In 'Epic and History', the introductory essay, he took up arms against the deviant forms of the epic, 'one of the very best resources for mendacious political propaganda' that constitutes a threat to 'the guarantee of reality that is provided by history working with the scientific method'. European disasters of recent decades – the allusion to Nazism was unambiguous – were spurred on to damnation by heroic legends, simplistic ideals of personality and 'the longing for a mighty world of epic rather than everyday life'. The work of the historian must be a constant struggle against 'the suggestible values of atmospherics', his aim 'the truth and nothing but the truth'. As far as Lönnroth was concerned, the discipline of history was all about a process of spiritual cleansing in the service of democracy, a struggle against idealistic ballast, empty convention and the false simplification of reality. He was thus working within and carrying on the inheritance from Lauritz Weibull who, with his inaugural lecture in 1919 immediately after the first great European war, had attempted to liberate the discipline from 'the militaristic and nationalistic philosophy of history of Treitschke'.<sup>22</sup>

The intellectual adjustment following 1945 was linked with a geographical reorientation. The examples from the disciplines of history and philosophy have demonstrated this, but it was also reflected in the social sciences. That was particularly the case with sociology, a discipline with a strong empirical orientation, inspired by Anglo-Saxon ideals and closely allied to architects of the welfare state.<sup>23</sup> Looking back on the first years after the Second World War, Bo Anderson, who like his teacher Torgny T. Segerstedt had moved from philosophy to sociology, recalled how the intellectual shaping of the new discipline went hand in hand with a process of cultural distancing:

After an uncertain start sociology had become a natural science, and since we believed that these philosophical authors are describing how natural sciences actually work, we sociologists diligently read theoretical works by Hempel, Braithwaite and Popper, partly to calm our occasional and at that time uncomfortable suspicion that sociology was not actually a natural science 'properly speaking'. Philosophical authors who were not reckoned to be founders of scientific theory were dismissed as 'metaphysicists' (if it was possible to state that a line of thought was *German* metaphysics then we considered we had said something *utterly* decisive).<sup>24</sup>

The aversion to things German that became entrenched in the wake of 1945 has been an important thread throughout my study. The movement towards the Anglo-Saxon world thus went hand in hand with an acceptance of new ideals and values. This reorientation to the west was so comprehensive that it has only been possible to suggest all its implications. Viewed from a more profound perspective it formed a definitive break in a very long historical process. Ever since the Middle Ages the most decisive impulses to reach Sweden had come from the south. Now, however, broad sections of the population regarded continental Europe – and Germany in particular – as highly suspect. As far as the working-class movement was concerned, the historian Klaus Misgeld has talked of a Swedish *Berührungsangst* (reluctance to come in contact) in respect of the continent with 'its unruly, even disquieting, diversity and its different cultural traditions'.<sup>25</sup> It is a description that helps us to understand the political and cultural gulf that opened up between Sweden and Western Europe in the postwar period. To find its causes we need to give some thought to the 1940s and ascribe central importance to the experiences of Nazism. The affairs of the continent, above all those of Germany, were omnipresent in public consciousness in Sweden during the first period after the war: 'the German catastrophe', in all its breadth and horror, was, as we have seen, thoroughly discussed. The conclusions that people drew reinforced a perception that already existed in many cases and hastened a shift away from the main European line that had already started.

Swedish attitudes to Catholicism will serve to illustrate this process. Anti-Catholic attitudes had been widespread in Sweden ever since the Reformation. Leading Swedish politicians and cultural figures could mount attacks on papist conservatism as late as the 1930s and 1940s. So it cannot be argued that the historical lesson of Nazism paved the way for anything very new in this area, but it did undoubtedly contribute to an already existing mistrust of Catholicism. It happened by two mutually reinforcing processes. On the one hand, the Catholic

Church played an important role in the integration of Western Europe that took off during the first years after the Second World War. To a considerable extent the initiative in this case lay in the hands of the Christian Democrat leaders at the heart of Catholic Europe and many people in Sweden considered it to be an undertaking that was biased in a confessional sense. On the other hand, many Swedes thought that Catholicism had similar characteristics to Nazism: irrationalism, mysticism and anti-modernism.<sup>26</sup> Even though Catholicism was not compared to Nazism, the two movements could be seen as having sprung from the same source. It is once again obvious that the lessons of Nazism were connected with how the development during the years around 1945 was interpreted, but it is also important not to fall prey to historical reductionism. It is not possible to evince any uncomplicated causal connections between the Nazi experiences and the new postwar order. The animosity against Catholicism reveals, like so much else in this study, that it was a matter of the interaction between recently won experiences, existing traditions, emerging perceptions – and who had succeeded in appropriating the right to interpret the historical lesson that followed from all of these.

If it is difficult to determine simple causal connections between the experiences of National Socialism and the cultural orientation of the postwar years, it is even more so in the case of the changed Swedish relationship with what we might call ‘the national’. Since Swedes had viewed Nazism as an ultra-nationalist phenomenon it is reasonable to assume that the Nazi experience led to reassessment and validation in this area too. To give a detailed picture would demand a more empirically based analysis than I have been able to provide here and my arguments must consequently remain tentative.

A number of observers have noted how the national discourse changed character between the interwar years and the postwar years. The 1930s had been characterised by a general stirring of national feeling in Sweden just as in other parts of Europe. The interests of the nation became paramount and national political consciousness took shape. The process of closing ranks behind the national flag crossed party lines, but the approval and support of Social Democrats were particularly important. During the course of the 1930s the dominant party of labour succeeded in clothing its vision of the *folkhem* in national costume, in a way that stressed the healthy and responsible love the Social Democrats had for their homeland, as compared to the jingoistic patriotism of the Conservatives. National consensus reached its height with the spirit of ‘preparedness’ of the Second World War.<sup>27</sup>

The process of retreat from such national sentiments has been shown in this study, and not only in the analyses of the school reforms in the middle of the 1940s. In actual fact, all significant discourse about the Nazi experience resulted in a resolute and unconditional rejection of nationalism. That is not, however, the same thing as saying that all forms of nationalism or nation-state ideology were spent after 1945. The nation was and remained a leading principle, although it was now, of course, associated with different concepts and symbols than it had been earlier. During the postwar period the home for the people, neutrality and modernity became the objects of national identification around which the consensus formed.<sup>28</sup>

What really suffered absolute reversal and decline with the end of the Second World War was the use of grandiose jingoistic language. What little remained of the rhetoric of 'Greater Sweden' faded away quite rapidly with the return of peace. Annual torchlit processions in memory of Karl XII were held until 1950, but the 30 November ceremonies disappeared out to the fringes after that. Gustavus Adolphus Day was still celebrated in Gothenburg at the beginning of the 1960s, but it is not clear whether what was being celebrated was the memory of him as hero king or as founder of the city. A more significant change can be perceived in social democratic historiography during the early postwar period. The historian Åsa Linderborg summarises it as follows: 'There was much less of an effort now to draw parallels between their own greatness and the Great Swedish past and much more effort to stress their own historical achievements. Out went the romance of ancestral burial mounds and in came paeans to the home for the people.'<sup>29</sup>

We might also reflect in the same spirit about the way the Nazi experience affected the postwar perception of humankind. Alf W. Johansson argued that anti-fascism anathematised all ideological elements that might be a seedbed for fascism, 'above all, of course, all forms of racist thinking'. That is a truth that needs nuancing. Racism was not, as my study has shown, central to the reading of Nazism current at that time. It was not until towards the end of the twentieth century that racial beliefs came to be seen as something that belonged to the essence of Nazism. As racial biology – which is one part of a larger complex of race ideology – was given official approval in the Third Reich, more and more people were challenging it. American and British geneticists had already begun criticising its basic concepts during the 1920s, but it was only in the 1930s that opposition solidified and by the end of that decade race biology had few adherents outside Germany. Race ideology was effectively played out as a part of political and scientific discourse after the Second World War, in Western Europe anyway. The historical

lesson of Nazism thus carried both a confirmatory and a self-examining impulse and these worked together to discredit perceptions of race.<sup>30</sup>

The situation in Sweden seems in general terms to have followed the same curve. When the National Institute for Race Biology was set up in Uppsala in the 1920s following a unanimous decision in parliament, eugenics was highly thought of. By the time Herman Lundborg, the first superintendent of the institute, openly came out in favour of Nazism in the early 1930s, race biology had already lost much of the respect which it had been afforded by the Swedish establishment. Gunnar Myrdal, Herbert Tingsten and others used their influence to have Gunnar Dahlberg appointed Lundborg's successor in 1936: Dahlberg was a researcher with social democratic leanings who broke with Lundborg's ideas and proceeded to replace ideas of race with reform eugenics.<sup>31</sup> In spite of the undermining of the scientific status of race biology in the course of the 1930s, sterilisations motivated by race hygiene continued on a relatively large scale even after 1945. The reasons for such operations were mental deficiency, mental illness and social circumstances and it was not until around 1950 that indications based on hereditary hygiene were replaced by medical and social policy indications. Mattias Tydén studied sterilisation in a comparative Scandinavian context and he pointed out that the use of repressive eugenic sterilisation peaked immediately after the Second World War. The conclusion reached by his study suggests that 'The collapse of Nazism and the revelations concerning Nazi racial policy do not seem to have had any immediate impact on the practice of sterilisation whether in Denmark or in Norway or in Sweden'. Tydén asks why the experiences of the Nazis' compulsory sterilisations had such a limited effect on the practice. His answer was that it probably depended on the fact 'that those applying the sterilisation laws did not see – or were not prepared to acknowledge – that there were parallels between the Nazi German and the Swedish sterilisation policy'. This supports my conclusion that race biology and race hygiene were not recognised as being central components of National Socialism.<sup>32</sup>

Anti-Semitic statements and stereotypes became taboo in Western European countries after the Second World War. That change is incontrovertible as far as the first two decades following 1945 are concerned. It has seemed natural – without going into the connection more closely – to ascribe this to the extermination of the Jews during the war years. The negative attitudes to Jews that continued to exist in the early postwar period were not voiced in the public arena – indeed, there has even been reference to the public philo-Semitism of that period as, for instance, revealed by strong support for the state of Israel.<sup>33</sup> In his study

of Swedish anti-Semitism after 1945 Henrik Bachner suggests that very much the same sort of development could be seen in Sweden. The murder of Folke Bernadotte in 1948 led to angry reactions, but only in exceptional cases were there signs of anti-Semitism. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s anti-Semitism was virtually unanimously condemned in Sweden and only later did anti-Semitic stereotypes and accusations surface again in debate, usually in connection with the conflicts in the Middle East.<sup>34</sup>

The postwar condemnation of nationalism, racism and anti-Semitism cannot be seen as a simple and self-evident reaction to Nazism. It is rather an example of the way experiences are interpreted and converted into a historical lesson that wins widespread acceptance. For Enlightenment-minded cultural radicals a condemnation of expressions of racism and Nazism was absolutely in line with the value tradition they subscribed to and worked to promote. The historical lesson of Nazism contained a defence of democracy and human values, but it equally involved an attack on unscientific and superstitious doctrines. This was the basis on which influential postwar intellectuals like Gunnar Myrdal and Herbert Tingsten combated racism and nationalism.<sup>35</sup> But the case of the race hygiene sterilisations demonstrates how important it is to distinguish between the perceptions of Nazism in the 1940s and the perceptions of Nazism in the 2000s. Since eugenics was not unquestioningly associated with Nazism in the years after the war, it avoided being radically discredited.

Posterity also reacted against the Nazi creed of traditionally masculine and military virtues. The capitulation of Germany meant that 'the myth of the experience of war' (George L. Mosse) finally lost its powerful attraction. Hitler had been promising to re-establish German honour as late as his last radio speech in January 1945: the concept of honour, however, now underwent a drastic shift of meaning, moving in the direction of civil and democratic virtues.<sup>36</sup> There are signs in Sweden that the Nazi cult of the body led to the ideals of Lingian gymnastics becoming suspect: it had already been in decline during the interwar period – like many other features that had their origin in the early nineteenth century – but the real coup de grâce came during the 1940s. The sports historian Jan Lindroth has suggested several explanations, one of which was that the Ling tradition was very different from the Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition. 'Certain aspects of Lingian gymnastics – the mass performance to military-style commands, for instance – seem likely to have been associated more with Germany and, perhaps, other countries on the losing side in the war', he writes with reference to its definitive demise after the Second World War.<sup>37</sup>

On a more profound level we need to ask whether the Nazi experience did not drag a whole emotional register into disrepute. After 1945 was it still possible to argue for unconditional discipline, sacred earnestness or heroic dedication? Anecdotal evidence from Henrik Munktell, a Conservative and a legal historian, suggests that certain kinds of emotional commitment were treated with suspicion, in the political sphere anyway. He attended a Social Democrat meeting in 1948 and was frightened by the enthusiasm of the participants. Munktell was of the opinion that had it not been for the absence of boots and brown shirts he might well have been at a Nazi meeting.<sup>38</sup>

### *Nazism and the Postwar Territory*

Rationalist cultural radicalism thus set its stamp on the postwar ideological terrain. The experiences of Nazism generated a lesson that to a very considerable extent was oriented towards the future. The ideas of 1945 did, of course, have historical origins in earlier periods, but there was no need to return to ideals whose time had passed. Sweden differed from Germany in this respect: in West Germany there was a strong desire to link back with something that had not been destroyed, something that existed before the great catastrophe – like Neo-Humanism and natural law. In Sweden it was all about sweeping away any remaining remnants and looking to the future.

The differences between the two countries offer a fruitful contrast. Their background has to be sought in fundamental historical conditions: which traditions remained strong at the end of the war; which interpretations of Nazism were present; which groups had the power to form opinion. And there is no doubt that among such things is what might be called – in a rather nebulous way – the significance of concrete experience. In 1945, in a Germany that was demoralised and ravaged by war, people were faced with problems of a totally different order from those faced in Sweden. The experience of Nazism, both as an ideology and as a power system, had been so much more pervasive in Germany and that shaped the processing and the historical lesson.

An example will serve to underline the different preconditions. Very shortly after the war West German architects set about freeing themselves from the monumentalist architectural ideals of the Nazis. Their common purpose was to rehabilitate *die Neue Sachlichkeit* (new objectivity), the form of Weimar modernism represented above all by the group around the Bauhaus school. During the Third Reich it had been categorised as a hotbed of cultural decadence and many of its practitioners driven into exile. When German architects, industrial designers and

town planners took up their Bauhaus inheritance again at the end of the 1940s, they did so quite specifically in order to distance themselves from Nazism, particularly from the 'aestheticisation of politics' that, according to Walter Benjamin, was one of its characteristics. Much of the debate and the practical work during these years involved the rediscovery of simple, respectable ideals, untarnished by Nazism.<sup>39</sup> Swedish architecture of the same period, on the other hand, saw no need to settle accounts with the recent past. Wartime shortages had certainly meant that the onward march of 1930s modernism had come to a halt, but after 1945 the heritage of functionalism could be developed further without any discussion of its foundations. In so far as the issue of Nazism arose at all, it was as a weapon for opponents to use against one another. As far as Swedish town planners and architects were concerned, the experience of Nazism never led to a general review of national traditions: if anything, it reinforced tradition and encouraged continuity.<sup>40</sup>

The debate about architecture provides a good example of the significance of the concrete experience. In the case of Germany it was a matter of finding as quickly as possible an architectonic ideal that could form the basis for the rebuilding of the devastated townscape. As with educational policy, but unlike the situation in the legal sphere, it was done by distancing themselves from the ideals that had pertained in Nazi Germany and reconnecting with what had been a strong trend in the Weimar republic. Sweden had no totalitarian architecture to settle accounts with and there was no desire to break with the preceding decade. In spite of different preconditions, the German and the Swedish historical lessons led to support for related ideals.

The larger postwar territory, too, had its architects, planners and developers and they were the ones who decoded and administered the historical lesson; they were the ones who interpreted the experiences and drew the conclusions that provided the basis for the new ideological landscape. Theirs were the plans that would hold good for the first two postwar decades anyway; thereafter – bit by bit – they would be revised and overturned.

## **The Historical Lesson: Locus and Change**

Up to this point the historical lesson of Nazism has appeared as something of a free-floating entity. It has been articulated by individuals and it has been possible to trace it in significant documents, but it has never been anchored in a social collective. The scope of the lesson has, moreover, been limited to the early postwar period whereas, in fact,



the Nazi experience survived longer than that. To follow change in the lesson, in the zone of tension between old and new experiences, offers a perspective on our own time.

### *The Privilege of Formulating the Historical Lesson*

Historical processes are shaped in the dynamism between change and continuity. That is also true of the processes which are in the foreground here. Two examples, one German and one French, will be instructive in helping us to understand how the lesson of Nazism could set its mark on the postwar period.

Historians have long been involved in a debate about the place of the Third Reich in the history of Germany. During the years immediately after the Second World War the dominant understanding was that the Nazis were an alien element in German history and that, consequently, the years from 1933 to 1945 were a parenthesis. In contrast to this the 1960s and 1970s came up with an interpretation which explained Nazi Germany as the culmination of the authoritarian and militaristic tendencies in German history. This variant, which was associated in particular with Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Jürgen Kocka and their *Sonderweg* (special path) thesis, emphatically stressed the continuity between Bismarck's empire and Hitler's. Thomas Nipperdey objected that such an interpretation was far too one-sided. He saw German history as consisting of several continuities. The Kaiser's empire could not only be seen as a predecessor to 1933 but was also a part of the prehistory of the Weimar republic and the Federal Republic. It was self-evident that the roots of Nazism should be sought in Germany's past, but so too should those of postwar democracy.<sup>41</sup>

Nipperdey's view can be transferred to Sweden: just as there is more than *one* form of continuity in German history, there is more than *one* form in Sweden. The order that took shape after the war was not inscribed on a tabula rasa. The men and women of 1945 connected with existing traditions at the same time as the experiences of Nazism were weakening other lines of thinking or causing them to be discarded. Rationalist cultural radicalism had had its proponents long before the Second World War, but as late as the 1930s it was still being challenged by other tendencies and lacked the self-evident dominance that it enjoyed later.

How can a political and intellectual trial of strength change the direction of social development? In a study of France during the First World War, the historian Martha Hanna put forward a thought-provoking view. The struggle in France was essentially between two ideological

camps: on one side was the secular, scientific and cosmopolitan left, on the other the conservative, Catholic and royalist right. The war involved a nationalist revival which the intellectuals of the right were best placed to utilise. Their reading of the war was adopted and paved the way for the advance of conservatism in the 1920s. In a climate permeated by anti-intellectual, anti-Semitic and anti-German attitudes, many disillusioned intellectuals on the left deserted politics. Hanna sees the broad support for the right during the interwar period as a result of the truce between the political parties that was agreed during the First World War, a *union sacrée* that welded the nation together and led it to accept values that were essentially conservative. The prewar polarisation was thus exchanged for a consensus which bore the imprint of Maurice Barrès, Charles Maurras and Maurice Pujo.<sup>42</sup>

What could be witnessed in France during the First World War might be described as *the privilege of formulating the historical lesson*. The war in itself did not cause an ideological fault line. It was the interpretation of its meaning that prepared the way for the advance of political ideas in the postwar years. The French right succeeded in gaining mastery of the collective experience and assuming the right to interpret its meaning. In short, they usurped the privilege of formulating the lesson.<sup>43</sup>

The idea can be transferred to the Swedish situation. As we have seen, in the wake of the Second World War a multifarious reworking of the events of the foregoing years took place. Unlike the situation in France it is not possible to distinguish two distinct factions fighting for the privilege of formulating the lesson: what characterised the Swedish situation, in fact, was the significant level of unanimity. As in France, however, the conclusions that were drawn had far-reaching consequences. The interpretation of the Nazi experience was reserved for a certain – albeit large and vocal – segment of the Swedish public. For that segment, ‘the generation of 1945’, the historical lesson prompted rethinking at the same time as reinforcing previously held convictions.

### *The Generation of 1945*

The early postwar period certainly did not lack its controversial issues but the interpretation of Nazism was not one of them. The fact that the Swedish public arena was relatively homogeneous is an important factor. It was an arena dominated by well-educated men, often the products of one of the country’s few seats of learning. In many respects the public space had been gradually opened up since the end of the nineteenth century but, as far as public discourse was concerned, the newspapers in the major cities remained the most important forum of

opinion. Those who set the tone of this discourse belonged to a great extent to the same classes as those that dominated political and cultural life.<sup>44</sup>

It is possible to argue that circumstances like these limit the scope of this study. In a certain sense that is so. Reinhart Koselleck has, however, pointed to something central in this context. There is a multiplicity of factors – social, cultural, political – that overlies historical experiences and acts like a sort of filter, defining the extent to which experiences can be made by being both a limitation *and* a precondition of collective experiences.<sup>45</sup> Koselleck distinguishes a number of social and cognitive premises that circumscribe but also enable superindividual experiences, for instance linguistic community (shared communication and interaction), shared conceptions (religious, ideological, outlook on the world) and social stratifications (gender, class and other categories). The concept of generation is of particular importance for the sort of historical experience represented by the Nazi experience in that it makes it possible to anchor the tradition of culture-radical values in a social and intellectual collective, a group of decision makers, opinion formers and thinkers who transformed practical experience to historical experience and historical experience to historical lesson.<sup>46</sup>

Any scholarly discussion about generations has to relate to the interwar sociologist Karl Mannheim. His general terminology is still useful even though his theory of generations bears a strong imprint of German experiences in the wake of the First World War. The concept of generations for him did not refer to birth cohorts and was not primarily defined in temporal terms. What constituted a generation was above all shared experiences.<sup>47</sup>

The overarching concept for Mannheim is the ‘generational stratum’ (*Generationslagerung*); this defines the collective that is born at approximately the same point in time and in the same historical-social space. This basic affiliation to a historical community forms the precondition for what he calls ‘generational context’ (*Generationszusammenhang*), a grouping that does not only exist in terms of existence during a given period but which also demands engagement in the currents and crises of the age. In other words, membership of a particular birth cohort is not sufficient in itself to be counted as a shared generational context: it is necessary to be an integral part of the action of the problems of the age. In a generational context there are, in turn, a number of generational factions (*Generationseinheiten*) each of which reacts to and processes the key events of its age in its own way. A generational faction is united partly as a network in which ideas are exchanged and questions debated and partly in its support of the same basic intentions

and principles. A form of socialisation takes place within each faction, which means that members view questions from the point of view of the group. Mannheim distinguished three different types of generational faction: the leading (*führende*) faction, the redirected (*umgelenkte*) and the suppressed (*unterdrückte*). Ideological and cultural changes are reflected in the shifting of power between these three groups.<sup>48</sup>

Karl Mannheim's overall theory may be transferred to what I have chosen to call 'the generation of 1945'. It is a designation for the leading generational faction of Enlightenment-minded, rationalist cultural radicals who had the privilege of formulating the lesson in the early postwar period. They were a segment of the larger generation made up of Swedes born between 1890 and 1910. The generational context, the collective that formulated and addressed collective problems, consisted of the intellectual, political and artistic groupings which had involved themselves in the ideological eternal triangle of the interwar years. They had been profoundly influenced by the divisions in political ideas in Europe in the aftermath of the First World War, and during the 1930s they had closed ranks against Nazism. In contrast to a younger generation, however – the generation whose childhood and youth coincided with the 1920s and 1930s – they often retained an ambivalent attitude to German culture.

Herbert Tingsten (1896–1973) and Ingemar Hedenius (1908–1982) were typical of the generation of 1945. They were representatives of their generational faction not least because of their polemical contributions and ideological purification work in *Dagens Nyheter*, the most influential press organ of the time in terms of opinion formation. But they were not alone. At the end of the 1940s and the start of the 1950s numerous influential writers and academics of the same stamp emerged: the economist Torsten Gårdlund (1911–2003), the journalist Ivar Harrie (1899–1973), the literary historian Olle Holmberg (1893–1974), the critic Knut Jaensson (1893–1958), the author Artur Lundkvist (1906–1991), the historian Erik Lönnroth (1910–2002), the sociologist Torgny T. Segerstedt (1908–1999), the author Karl Vennberg (1910–1995) and the philosopher Anders Wedberg (1913–1978). Among those with more direct party-political affiliations there were Social Democrats like Tage Erlander (1901–1985), Alva Myrdal (1902–1986), Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987), Ulla Lindström (1909–1999) and Ernst Wigforss (1881–1977); and there were also Liberals such as Bertil Ohlin (1899–1979), Thorwald Bergquist (1899–1972) and Hardy Göransson (1894–1969).<sup>49</sup>

Belonging to the same generational faction there was a large group of people who were active in more specific areas in which rationalist cultural radicalism had an influence in the early postwar years: public

health representatives like Axel Höjer (1890–1974), Signe Höjer (1896–1988) and Gustav Jonsson (1907–1994); Social Democrat education politicians like Stellan Arvidson (1902–1997), Ragnar Edenman (1914–1998) and Nils Gustav Rosén (1907–1993); journalists and publishers like Manne Ståhl (1901–1976), Anders Yngve Pers (1902–1985) and Carl Björkman (1901–1961); writers and academics like Leif Kihlberg (1895–1973), Per Nyström (1903–1993) and Henrik Sandblad (1912–1991); authors like Stina Aronsson (1892–1956), Eyvind Johnson (1900–1976) and Vilhelm Moberg (1898–1973); scholars with an orientation towards social science and jurisprudence like Torsten Husén (1916–2009), Per Olof Ekelöf (1906–1990) and Jörgen Westerståhl (1916–2006).<sup>50</sup>

There is little need to point out that this generation of 1945 covers a very wide range. I have put Cold Warriors like Ture Nerman and Herbert Tingsten alongside representatives of the Third Way like Artur Lundkvist and Karl Vennberg, academic liberals like Erik Lönnroth and Torgny T. Segerstedt alongside Social Democratic politicians like Alva Myrdal and Stellan Arvidson.<sup>51</sup> If the concept is not to lose all its meaning we need to place this leading generation in contrast with something else, with the redirected and the suppressed generations for example.

The generation of 1945 did not include any purely conservative advocates: they were excluded for ideological reasons as we have seen in my discussion of the nature of the political field during the early postwar period. Gösta Bagge (1882–1951), Erik Wellander (1884–1977) and Tor Andrae (1885–1947) were typical representatives of that tendency, all of them important figures in the 1940 Schools Commission but perhaps rather too old to really be counted within the same generational context. In the Conservative Party, in the conservative morning papers, and in many church circles, there were, however, a number of people in the 1950s who could not come to terms with the ideas of 1945: they included authors such as Harry Blomberg (1893–1950) and Sven Stolpe (1905–1996), representatives of the church such as Märta Boman (1902–1986) and Bo Giertz (1905–1998) and of the Riksdag such as Ebon Andersson (1896–1969) and Axel Fredrik Mannerskantantz (1897–1975). Nor did the dominant generational faction include out-and-out communists, many of whom – including Hilding Hagberg (1899–1993), Sven Linderot (1889–1956) and Set Persson (1897–1960) – actually shared the rationalism and enthusiasm for the enlightenment of cultural radicalism, but given their stance in the world of the Cold War and their attacks on political democracy they could never be part of the influential mainstream. Both these groups constituted suppressed generational factions and lacked the power to influence broad opinion or to shape the order of the postwar years.<sup>52</sup>

Mannheim's discussion of the redirected generational type is somewhat unclear. He seems to mean that these people were predisposed to both the victorious ideal of the time and to the defeated ideal. It was circumstances that led them to move in the direction of the former.<sup>53</sup> Expressed in different terms, this can imply both greater ideological shifts within a given generational faction as well as rethinking by individuals. The change that can be seen in the schools debate between 1944 and 1946 – that is, the move from a Neo-Humanist and national attitude to one of democratic citizenship – provides an example of that kind of ideological shift. Between the wars there must have been quite a number of younger Swedes who sympathised with some form of authoritarian nationalism (without, however, going as far as Nazism) but who changed their position during the 1940s. During the 1930s the historian Sven Ulric Palme (1912–1977) was involved in the Heimdal movement and the national conservative debate, although always keeping well away from Nazism. After the Second World War Palme distanced himself from the ideals of his youth and appeared as an orthodox Weibullian. In 1953 Palme, marked by the Nazi experience, published a book about hero worship in history. It had an expressly political purpose: 'to serve as a remedy for the hero worship and the worship of power, success and physical force that traditionalist historiography and certain modern heresies have spread even in our country'.<sup>54</sup>

The leading faction, the men and women of 1945, can to some extent be seen as a political generation, a generational context characterised by prewar and wartime conflicts.<sup>55</sup> But the lesson of Nazism never shaded the ideological landscape along straightforward party political lines. Chapter III dealt with the marginalisation of certain groups – often those of a Christian or idealistic worldview – that did not fit in with these limits. Alf Ahlberg (1892–1959), author, philosopher and popular educator, is a case in point. Ahlberg was active in the labour movement throughout his life, including as rector of the Brunnsvik Folk High School from 1932 to 1959. During the 1930s and 1940s he was an energetic defender of democracy and translated a great deal of anti-Nazi literature. So Ahlberg undoubtedly belonged to the same generational context as Tingsten, Hedenius and others in the generation of 1945, but not to the leading faction. For many years he regularly wrote cultural articles for *Dagens Nyheter*, but after the war the leading newspaper in Sweden no longer wanted him. In spite of the fact that his party political sympathies were in accord with the age, his Christian humanism and idealistic standpoint were regarded as outdated goods by the influential cultural radicals.<sup>56</sup>

Mannheim's generation theory is valuable in that it underlines the importance of historical experiences. It also provides a terminology for delimiting and categorising collectives. In order to understand the dynamics of history, why certain ideas triumph and others are abandoned, generational shifts must be taken into account. This is particularly so for the Swedish 1940s.<sup>57</sup>

By the end of the Second World War those born during the 1870s and 1880s were finally stepping down from their cultural and political platforms. It was not only Fredrik Böök and Sven Hedin: the whole of their generational context, so marked by its enthusiasm for things imperially German, turn-of-the-century nationalism and the rifts of the First World War, was replaced by a new context. They were replaced by the generation of 1945, a faction of rationalistic cultural radicals born around 1900, and it was the experience of Nazism of this latter group that paved the way for the postwar ideological orientation. The contrast with the Federal Republic of Germany is striking: when Tage Erlander became Swedish prime minister in 1946 he was forty-five years old; when Konrad Adenauer became the first chancellor of the Federal Republic a few years later, he was seventy-three. The Christian Democrat from Cologne demonstrates that public life in Germany was dominated by older men. The generational faction that set the tone during the 1950s had its own experiences of the Wilhelmine age and the Weimar Republic and was keen to see a return to the central ideals of these periods. Younger groups seldom had anything to say.<sup>58</sup>

In spite of the generational change, a form of continuity in Sweden must be highlighted. In a very rewarding essay the historian Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner has revealed a chain of generations that are linked together by a common fundamental purpose (*Grundaufgabe*). Three consecutive generations, from the early period of empire up to the First World War, shared the goal of creating a special German form of modernity – heroic modernity. They influenced each other and were part of an intertextual union, but there were particular features that distinguished one generation from another. Kittsteiner's argument offers a way of reconciling break and continuity in our view of historical generational changes – and it can quite easily be transferred to the Swedish situation.<sup>59</sup> The generation of 1945 goes together with that of the 1880s and with the cultural radicals of the interwar period: their common mission was to work in a rationalistic, democratic, Enlightenment spirit founded on materialism and secularism. At the same time, however, the cultural radicals of the postwar period were distinct from their late-nineteenth-century predecessors: they lacked, for instance, much of the unconditional belief in development and

the confidence in the future that were so characteristic of the 1880s generation.<sup>60</sup>

The generational change in the middle of the twentieth century offers a social explanation for the cultural radicals' ownership of the privilege of formulating the historical lesson. That explanation can be complemented by a more psychological one. Inspired by Tocqueville, the media scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann has developed a theory of the spiral of silence. The basic idea is a simple one: people who rightly or wrongly believe themselves to be deviating from the dominant opinion tend to suppress their desire to express their views, whereas those who believe their opinion to be in accord with the dominant one are reinforced in their view. According to Noelle-Neumann, the fear of isolation is more important to the great majority of people than expressing what they really believe. Since individuals are aware of swings of opinion and have a tendency to adapt to the winning side, divergent attitudes are marginalised one by one and a spiral of silence arises.<sup>61</sup> The theory thus provides a social psychological perspective. One obvious weakness is that it does not provide a satisfactory explanation as to why a particular opinion gains the upper hand in the first place. Nor does it take account of other reasons for individuals avoiding expressing their opinions: knowledge, interest, relevance, confidence and so on. On the other hand, it does give us a degree of understanding as to how a set of values and ideals – the ideas of 1945 – could establish itself so quickly as the hegemonic body of views. Given the enormous pressure exerted by the Nazi experience many people with anachronistic attitudes remained silent.

Viewed historically the cultural radicalism of the postwar period cannot be distinguished from the general radicalism that characterised the time: each fuelled the other in many respects. Immediately after the war the Social Democratic government launched a whole series of legal, economic and social reforms, of which the programme for a planned economy was among the more controversial. A greater degree of party political agreement was achieved in other questions and a whole series of significant decisions was taken in the first postwar years: decision on the old-age pension in 1946, universal child benefit in 1947, the code of judicial procedure in 1948, freedom of the press law in 1949, the comprehensive school in 1950 and the religious freedom law in 1951. An all-round spirit of reform added wind to the sails of the rationalistic cultural radicals as they set course for the future.

The members of generation of 1945 thus became bearers of the historical lesson of Nazism. Statistically speaking they were no more than a small proportion of the population and to a great extent they



were representative of the ideological and intellectual top stratum. The proportion of women, for instance, was small in these circles during the 1940s and 1950s, even though there were relatively many in other areas – in education in particular.<sup>62</sup> In spite of the class and gender limitations it has to be emphasised that the rationalist cultural radicals had real power when it came to shaping the postwar order. In the beginning, right at the end of the war, they were a radical avant-garde and it took some time for everyone to be convinced.<sup>63</sup> As resistance weakened during the 1950s they were able – as the trend-setting elite – to exert a noticeable influence on the age in which they lived. But nothing lasts for ever.

### *The Changing Historical Lesson*

A central element in Hans-Georg Gadamer's thinking was that an experience remained valid for as long as it was not refuted by a new experience. The historical process contains continual confirmations of experiences – as well as challenges to them. That leads to even the most profound experiences eventually being reassessed and ascribed a new meaning. For Reinhart Koselleck experience had the character of the present past, whether it was a case of a rational reworking of historical experiences or of a more unconscious attitude. Like Gadamer he thought that the meaning of an experience changes with time. Experiences overlay and permeate one another, and new hopes and new disappointments have a retrospective effect on them.

The lesson itself changes over time. When the meaning of the experience changes, the conclusions that were once drawn from it are challenged. At the same time, the transformation of the historical lesson is closely linked to new perceptions of the future taking shape. When a formerly unknown horizon of expectation emerges, the experiential space appears to some extent in a new light. But not all experiences are reassessed at the same time, and it is necessary to separate out different levels. Koselleck distinguishes between three layers of experience in this instance.

The first, utterly primary, experience is the one acquired by actually taking part in it, by actually being present. It is unique, cannot be repeated and is usually limited to one individual or to a smallish group. A different form of experience is provided by those experiences that have a really long-term effect, those profound historical currents that are not usually immediately obvious and only become apparent through systematic historical reflection. Koselleck suggested the decline of the Roman Empire as an example, arguing that long-term experiences

transcend the specific experiences of generations, of groups, or of the formation of nations.<sup>64</sup> Between those two forms lies another layer of experience: this form involves accumulated experiences, those that are re-narrated and passed on. In contrast to primary experiences these are more lasting and self-confirming in that they are transmitted in larger collective circumstances. Consequently they are also strongly dependent on social and cultural demarcation and, in particular, they are generation specific. It is possible to fix and institutionalise experiences in many ways – in the family and group, in a party or organisation, or in social and ideological milieu. ‘Thus experiences are unique – in that they happen, and at the same time they are repeatable – in that they are collected’, Koselleck concluded.<sup>65</sup>

The Nazi experience is a typical example of this intermediate layer. National Socialism was experienced and confronted in a specific generational context. The cultural-radical faction that assumed the right after the war to interpret the meaning of the experience could do so with lasting effect. It is unlikely that the lesson of Nazism was changed in any fundamental way once the generation of 1945 departed from the scene, because much of the experience had been institutionalised by then, sometimes so successfully that it had been transformed into the third and most long-lasting type, what Koselleck called *Fremderfahrung*, the transmitted or narrated form of experience. That does not prevent new experiences and perceptions of the future having an impact on the conclusions that were eventually reached and leading to a partially new historical lesson.<sup>66</sup>

Taking the central layer of experience as our starting point we can sketch the transformation of the lesson of Nazism during the postwar period. Although it is a process that can only be touched upon in the present context it is important to see it in connection with the changes in the collective memories of National Socialism. A central question is how the change in memories also changed the historical lesson of Nazism.<sup>67</sup>

A number of international works have treated the first post-1945 years as a specific epoch, complete in itself. The early postwar period was a time characterised on one hand by coming to terms with the disasters of the foregoing decade, and on the other hand by wide-ranging planning for the future. In Sweden as in the rest of Europe the after-effects of National Socialism were very evident during the first years of peace.<sup>68</sup>

With the end of the 1940s, however, Nazism rapidly disappeared from the public space in Sweden. National Socialism had set its mark on debate for almost two decades, but it was definitively pushed into

the background during the 1950s. There was a flurry of debate around 1960 and the occasional new book sparked off some interest, but taken as a whole it really was a mild flurry compared with the storm of interest in National Socialism during the 1940s. To all intents and purposes Nazism was absent from public debate in Sweden.<sup>69</sup>

The Swedish pattern matches the bigger Western European picture. The memory of Nazism faded and lost its charge during the 1950s. National Socialism was incorporated into the patriotic narratives about the Second World War that were growing in strength during that period. They took the form of special pleading in defence of the wartime actions of one's own particular country. In this context Nazism was presented not only as essentially different from postwar democratic systems but, in a more profound sense, as an anomaly in the political traditions of the nations, as an alien element lacking any domestic provenance. Even in countries like Italy, West Germany and Austria guilt was toned down and ascribed to a thin stratum of evil, manipulative leaders. The historical lesson of Nazism served effectively for purposes of self-confirmation during the early postwar decades.<sup>70</sup>

The fact that the manifestations of memory were weak does not imply the same thing as saying that the experience had lost its meaning. The lesson laid down by the generation of 1945 stood up well for two decades and, in many respects, for longer than that. Representatives of this faction occupied the leading offices in cultural life and society up until the end of the 1960s. The two decades that followed the end of the war stand out as a well-defined era, sometimes referred to as 'the long 1950s'. In cultural terms American influence was strong and there existed an ideological scepticism about totalitarian claims and grand projects. In the shadow of the Cold War and with an expanding welfare state the public sphere was dominated by experts in social reform and intellectuals attached in some way to the state, rather than free thinkers or members of bourgeois culture. This was the high period of cultural-radical rationalism. No decisive experiences emerged during this time to undermine the historical lesson of Nazism and perceptions of the future remained largely intact.<sup>71</sup>

By the middle of the 1970s it was possible to register the first signs of a thoroughgoing transformation of the landscape of collective memory. In West Germany Nazism had been dragged back to the centre of events as early as the 1960s as a result of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961 and the Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt from 1963 to 1965. For Marxists of the 1968 movement fascism lay latent in all capitalist systems, particularly in states that had never confronted their past and were now considered to be ruled by Nazi sleepers. When revolutionary

commitment eased back a little in the early 1970s there were fears that the retreat from left-wing radicalism would be followed by a reaction from the right.<sup>72</sup> Around 1980, Nazi crimes were given renewed prominence and brought to a wider audience: *Holocaust*, the American television series, was shown all over the Western world in between 1978 and 1979 and contributed to fixing the images of the Final Solution in the minds of millions. During the 1980s a wave of self-examination swept over Western Europe and brought old issues to the surface. The past of president Kurt Waldheim was discussed in Austria; West Germany had nothing short of a *Historikerstreit* (historians' dispute); and debates about collaboration and resistance raged in France and in Belgium. The culture of memory was in the process of change and a new lesson – more critical, more self-searching – was emerging.<sup>73</sup>

It took some time before these changes could be discerned in Sweden. Admittedly the fascist structure of society was a target for the movement of 1968 in Sweden too, but settling accounts with the events of the Second World War was never – unlike the situation on the continent – a main concern of radical left-wingers in Sweden. The small-state realist interpretation remained dominant both among scholars and with the public for a long time; it was a patriotic narrative that not only defended the wartime policies of the coalition government but also viewed Nazism as something alien to the life of Swedish society.<sup>74</sup>

During the latter part of the 1980s, however, it was possible to hear the opening notes of the process of self-examination that would characterise the following decade. One significant example was the animated debate that broke out about Zarah Leander. Ever since her return to the stage in Sweden at the end of the 1940s the dominant narrative had been that of the naïve and apolitical diva. The Swedish primadonna made herself an eloquent proponent of this view. In her autobiographical volume *Vill ni se en diva?* (Do you want to see a diva?) (1958) Leander admitted she had been ill-informed about the way events were developing in Nazi Germany, but she stressed that she had gone there in order to earn money, not because she had any sympathy with the regime. Swedish reviewers of the book accepted her account of the situation and passed it on. The story of the naïve diva recurred in *Zarah* (1972), her volume of memoirs, which dismissed her career in the Third Reich as of no consequence. At the end of the 1980s, however, a compromised narrative of Leander emerged as the result of a musical about her. Ingrid Segerstedt Wiberg, a well-known liberal anti-Nazi, went on the attack against the accolades being showered on a Nazi fellow traveller, and there was no shortage of supporting fire. A steady stream of articles by well-known writers set about revising the image

of Leander the innocent primadonna. She was presented instead as a willing servant of the regime in Germany, someone whose presence on the German stage was a cog in the Nazi war machine. Leander's creation of an innocent blue-eyed self was no longer given much credence – 'anyone who wanted to know knew', as the journalist Anders Ehnmark put it. The apolitical diva had to move over and make space for the immoral diva.<sup>75</sup>

The critical new narrative fitted in well with the in-depth reassessment of the Swedish relationship with Nazism that began in earnest around that time. In 1987, the same year as the Leander musical opened, Ingmar Bergman published his *Laterna Magica* (The Magic Lantern). The autobiography attracted much attention, not least because Bergman openly admitted that he had been fascinated by Nazism in his youth. A year or so later a book about the prominent Swedish financial dynasty, the Wallenberg family, and its links with Nazi Germany also led to public controversy.<sup>76</sup>

There were some people who were inclined to see a bigger picture behind the Leander controversy. The cultural journalist Ingmar Björkstén, for example, took the view that Swedish intellectuals had avoided really dealing with the mentality of the Second World War. In his view neither the arts nor scholarship had shown themselves capable of truly getting to grips with the problems. He saw the tribute devoted to *die Leander* as profoundly symptomatic:

That this is happening in Sweden is not surprising. Quite the opposite: it confirms the function that has been placed on Zarah Leander by her 'forgetful' countrymen in her homeland. By forgiving and glossing over the fact that she actually served German interests up to the fateful year 1942/1943 just as zealously as Swedish foreign and trade policy did, *the conscience of Sweden is forgiving itself*.<sup>77</sup>

Björkstén's plea that the Swedes should set about examining their own actions was mirrored elsewhere. A couple of years later, in 1991, Maria-Pia Boëthius published *Heder och samvete* (Honour and Conscience), her assessment of Swedish small-state realism – a book based on the same propositions as Björkstén. During the 1990s and early 2000s a whole series of critical articles and works of popular history appeared on the subject of Sweden's relationship with Nazism and the Third Reich.<sup>78</sup> That development was accompanied by a change of focus in Swedish historical research and considerable numbers of studies of anti-Semitism, race biology and Swedish relations with Nazi Germany were published. The new narrative was given an official blessing in 1997 when the prime minister, Göran Persson, took the initiative to set up the Living History Project, the aim of which was to disseminate

information and promote the work of democracy, tolerance and human rights, taking the Holocaust as its point of departure.<sup>79</sup> A series of public revelations also attracted a great deal of attention. The biographies of notable figures in the cultural and commercial worlds – figures such as Ingvar Kamprad, Karl Vennberg and Per Olof Sundman – had to be adjusted when their political engagement during the 1930s and 1940s was revealed. At the end of the war they and many others had managed to paper over the brown chapters in their lives and thus avoid being branded. These cases reminded people of the presence of Nazism in Swedish history and gradually encouraged the emergence of a different view of the past.<sup>80</sup>

The transformation of Swedish cultural memory has to be seen against a broad background. The end of the Cold War was a basic precondition: many points of postwar orientation became obsolete with the collapse of communism. Another important factor was the shift away from a patriotic narrative of the Second World War to a moral narrative in the years around 1990. In many parts of Europe at the end of the twentieth century self-righteous attitudes were being replaced by attitudes of self-reproach, with national sovereignty being set against national narrow-mindedness and security set against humanity. The historical lesson of the narrative was more than ever a moral one when the Holocaust was both its beginning and its end.<sup>81</sup> There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that Swedish opinion was influenced by international developments – Ingmar Björkstén, for instance, pointed to the West German historians' dispute as a precedent. The intensity of the West German debate was given fairly comprehensive coverage in Sweden and may well have added fuel to the Swedish process of self-examination.<sup>82</sup> An additional factor was provided by the wave of neo-Nazi actions and chauvinistic attitudes that surfaced in many European countries in the last two decades of the century. National Socialism, after almost half a century's absence from political life, suddenly became a reality again.<sup>83</sup>

There can be no disputing the fact that the Swedish cultural memory underwent a radical change during the 1980s and 1990s. At one and the same time it is possible to see how the content of the concept of Nazism moved and how a partially new form of historical lesson took shape. It is also clear that the transformations of experiences were connected to profound ideological undercurrents. As Kay Glans has pointed out in an essay, new political climates often define themselves through or in conjunction with reinterpretations of the Nazi period. His observations were made on the basis of changes in Germany since the 1980s, but they are equally valid for Sweden.<sup>84</sup>

The meaning of the Nazi experience had changed in a number of important respects between the 1940s and the 1990s. By the end of the century the German dimension of Nazism seems to have become less dominant. The derivation of National Socialism was still to be sought in German history but many of the issues being debated had more to do with Swedish Nazism and Sweden's relations with the Third Reich than with special traits in German history. German nationalism, an overarching characteristic of the understanding of Nazism in the immediate postwar period, had been sidelined by racism and anti-Semitism as explanatory factors. During the late twentieth century then, Nazism was condemned on the basis of a universal norm, with the Holocaust as the central point. This implied a kind of de-Germanisation of National Socialism – the phenomenon that in the early postwar period had seemed to be an exclusively German problem had become much more of a universal human problem by the end of the century. The internal development of Germany contributed to this. At the start of the Cold War, when memories of the war years were still at the forefront of people's minds, Germany was still perceived as a potential power-political threat; the new, reunited and democratic Federal Republic, however, did not seem like that at all. Thus, at the end of the century, there was nothing in the Nazi lesson that would lead Swedes to turn away from Germany. Rather the reverse, in fact: the drive towards Europeanisation during the 1990s led in some cases to the re-establishment of contacts with the continent. In order to be truly accepted into a European community of values, which in the years around the turn of the century was cultivating a culture of guilt and penance, it was essential that the history of Sweden and Nazism took the form of a morality.<sup>85</sup>

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Nazism was condemned as an atavism, a reaction against the very idea of modernity. That was an interpretation that did not hold water fifty years later. A number of significant studies during the 1980s and 1990s problematised the ideological character of the Third Reich and dismissed the rigid polarisation between Nazism and modernity. There is no doubt that the criticism levelled against the whole of the modern project during the last quarter of the twentieth century was part of the bigger picture, with the lethal philosophical arrows launched by postmodernism combining with a vague but growing distrust of rationality, progress and enlightenment. All this taken together rocked the foundations on which postwar society was built.<sup>86</sup>

The modified historical lesson was voiced in a number of Swedish controversies in the years around 2000. The Swedish *folkhem* itself became the subject of debate in a series of conspicuous clashes on instrumental

rationality, race hygiene sterilisations and lack of respect for the individual. The ferocity of the public discourse on these issues has to be seen in the light of the change in the lesson of Nazism. Phenomena such as eugenics and social engineering had not been associated with the Third Reich during the 1940s and 1950s. Half a century later, however, the sphere of association had shifted and as a consequence other areas found themselves the target of harsh condemnation – a constant in the case of anything to do with Nazism. In the new ideological climate of the closing years of the twentieth century when many of the accepted truths of the postwar years were being reassessed and found to be false, there was a shift in the meaning of the Nazi experience.<sup>87</sup>

How could the historical lesson undergo transformations of this kind? One answer was that the experience was so intimately connected to membership of a generation. As far as Germany is concerned, Norbert Frei has distinguished a number of phases in the postwar processing of the Third Reich and associated them with different *Erfahrungsgenerationen* (experience generations). Even though there are decisive differences between Sweden and West Germany, Frei's typology is still valuable. It was necessary in both countries for the early postwar elites to leave the public arena before a new cultural memory could take shape. In the case of the Federal Republic a profound and thorough revision of the history of the war years began as early as the middle of the 1960s whereas in Sweden it was to be another quarter of a century before anything similar got under way.<sup>88</sup>

Another answer is that the lesson of Nazism coincided and was in accord with a greater degree of self-knowledge on the part of the Swedes: as one changed, the other changed, and vice versa. The main narrative of modern Sweden took shape during the 1930s and social democracy was its most prominent interpreter over the decades that followed. It stressed a view of Sweden as a neutral, democratic and prosperous country where everyone worked for the common good, where people preferred to resolve conflicts peacefully and where the overarching aim was to develop the welfare state. It goes without saying that pathological Nazism had no right of residence in a society of that kind. The Nazi experience – and the small-state realist interpretation of the Second World War with which it lived in a state of symbiosis – could exist in a friction-free relationship with the main narrative of modern Sweden. Even when it was being challenged from the 1960s onwards (by 1960s leftists, by the new women's movement, by the alternative movement and new liberal currents), the lesson of Nazism was not undermined. It was only when the postwar order collapsed that the change really took off.<sup>89</sup>



## The Historical Lesson of Nazism

If people who have had the same upbringing as me, talk the same language as me and love the same books, the same music, the same paintings as me – if these people cannot be certain that they won't be transformed into monsters who will do things that we could not imagine that people in our days – apart from a few pathological exceptions – were capable of, what is there then to say that I can live in certainty?<sup>90</sup>

The Swiss author Max Frisch was interrogating himself. He had been a border guard during the war years and ensured that the neutral Alpine republic remained closed to fleeing Jews. When he surveyed the devastated continent from *le balcon sur l'Europe* in 1946 he was convinced that the causes of the great catastrophe also lay within himself. The Nazi regime had not been a barbaric memory, a temporary return into the abyss of history. Anyone seeking its origins had to wrestle with their own shortcomings and take the risk of looking inwards.

Not everyone was prepared to follow Max Frisch's example. There were many among his Swiss countrymen who wanted to draw a veil over the political compromises and lucrative trade of the war years. The investigations that did take place were – as in other European countries – selective and partial. Ordinary Swiss wanted to carry on as before. Nevertheless – and this is what united an apparently divergent Switzerland with the rest of Europe – the first years after the war were a constitutive period, a time for striking camp and moving on.<sup>91</sup>

In Sweden, too, the experiences of Nazism provided continuity as well as reassessment. In the larger context, however, it was without doubt self-confirmation that ruled. One way of putting it is to say that the Swedes had to relate to two competing experiential spaces at the end of the war: on one side was the deep national space that was long-lasting and drew its nourishment from Swedish value traditions; on the other was the wider international space, limited in terms of time and containing European experiences of Nazism. The generation of 1945 entered the first space and shut the door on the second.

There have been attempts to seek a background to the ownership by the cultural radicals of the privilege of formulating the historical lesson. Those institutions that could have opened the door to the second, more international, experiential space had also undergone change: the church had lost much of its authority as a result of secularisation and during the early postwar years many theologians and clerics withdrew from the public arena in which they had still figured at the beginning of the 1940s; in the course of the 1930s the labour movement had moved in under the banner of Swedishness and become national.

The consequences were that Swedish society became distanced from the European experiential space. And when a gap appeared it was to the west, towards the sphere of Anglo-Saxon culture.<sup>92</sup>

Having said that, we need to ask the question whether a radical defeat is necessary before there can be any profound self-examination. The historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch has put that argument forward. He believes that the consciousness of being defeated offers inexhaustible scope for self-reflection in a way that is not open to the victors. The Fronde suffered major defeat in its rebellion against absolutism in France in the seventeenth century, but Schivelbusch argues that it was only a temporary defeat and actually led to a fruitful phase of rethinking. After going through a process of profound self-criticism they could re-emerge and pave the way for the ideas of the Enlightenment.<sup>93</sup>

But victories, too, demand their tributes. The inconvenient diversity of history is an early victim. In order to achieve a desirable consensus, in order to close ranks, historical memory frequently needs to be re-touched: anything that diverges is far too difficult to fit into the victors' image of their own origins. The next stage involves demonising the enemy, dispossessing the enemy of all good qualities. In this process of adjustment and exclusion forgetfulness takes shape: to borrow the terminology of the philosopher Paul Ricœur, it involves a combination of active and passive forgetfulness, of far too short a memory and far too great a reluctance to look at the dark side of the past.<sup>94</sup>

The origin and the consolidation of the ideas of 1945 followed this pattern. The significance of Nazism to Sweden was watered down: Swedish Nazis had been on the periphery, their influence was meagre and National Socialism as a philosophy lacked any relevance to the direction taken by Sweden. It was an absolute picture and it was confirmed by the historical research of the postwar period. The upheavals of the years around 1990, however, caused a historiographical landslide that opened up new perspectives on the history of Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s. The quintessential character of the Nazi experience became clear.

Bidding farewell to the German sphere was a cause of regret to an older generation, but it entailed no loss for younger generations. There was nothing constructive to be gained from the German tradition, no positive lessons to be learnt. When the leading newspaper in the country summarised in 1945 what Sweden had taken from Germany over the course of history, it came up with no more than militaristic policing and early socialist impulses. Towards the end of the twentieth century when the historical lesson had changed, there were people who bemoaned the loss of memories and cultural links. What had seemed

to be a self-evident and unproblematic reorientation in the wake of the war had actually proved to have a price.<sup>95</sup>

In this study I have tried to reveal the Swedish experiences of Nazism. Rather than just an analysis of a change of epoch in modern history, I have shown how people and societies live with historical experiences. It could have been the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the Thirty Years War or the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it has centred on the downfall of the Third Reich and the death of National Socialism as an ideological programme. All of these cases involved historical upheavals that lived on as experiences. They gave rise to historical lessons that pointed in specific directions and influenced the general direction of society.

In the wake of the Second World War, the historical lesson of Nazism helped to characterise the ideological order, pave the way for rationalistic cultural radicalism and hasten cultural reorientation. The world of postwar Sweden emerged from the interplay between the dark experiences of history and the bright dreams of the future.

## Notes

1. K. Östberg, *I takt med tiden: Olof Palme 1927–1969* (Stockholm: Leopard, 2008), 15–46; H. Berggren, *Underbara dagar framför oss: En biografi över Olof Palme* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 2010), 111–141.
2. Östberg, *I takt med tiden*, 61–68; Berggren, *Underbara dagar framför oss*, 111–141.
3. O. Palme, 'Den amerikanska krigsgenerationen', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 21 February 1949.
4. Palme, 'Den amerikanska krigsgenerationen'.
5. H. Lööv, *Nazismen i Sverige 1924–1979: Pionjärerna, partierna, propagandan* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2004), 121–159. See in general S. Ugelvik Larsen & B. Hagtvet (eds), *Modern Europe after Fascism, 1943–1980s*, vol. 1–2 (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1998).
6. A.W. Johansson, *Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget: Antikommunism och liberalism i Dagens Nyheter 1946–1952* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1995), 224–233 (quotation 226). Johansson uses the concept 'anti-fascism' whereas I prefer 'anti-Nazism'.
7. Johansson, *Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget*, 224–233; T. Nilsson, 'Den gåtfulla parentes – högeropinion mellan världskrig och kallt krig', in R. Björk and A.W. Johansson (eds), *Samtidshistoria och politik: Vänbok till Karl Molin* (Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 2004).
8. Johansson, *Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget*, 226.
9. N. Runeby, 'Klerkernas ansvar och frihetens organisation: Kring de intellektuellas mobilisering i 1950-talets Sverige', in W. Butt and B. Glienke (eds), *Der nahe Norden: Otto Oberholzer zum 65. Geburtstag: Eine Festschrift*

- (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1985); M. Wiklund, *I det modernas landskap: Historisk orientering och kritiska berättelser om det moderna Sverige mellan 1960 och 1990* (Eslöv: B. Östlings förlag, 2006), 153–157.
10. A.W. Johansson, 'Inledning: Svensk nationalism och identitet efter andra världskriget', in A.W. Johansson (ed.), *Vad är Sverige?: Röster om svensk nationell identitet* (Stockholm: Prisma, 2001), 10; T. Nilsson, *Mellan arv och utopi: Moderata vägval under 100 år, 1904–2004* (Stockholm: Santérus, 2004), 84–89; J. Hylén, *Fosterlandet främst?: Konservatism och liberalism inom högerpartiet 1904–1985* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1991); S.B. Ljunggren, *Folkhemskapitalismen: Högerens programutveckling under efterkrigstiden* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1992).
  11. Friedrich von Hayek's best-known work was published in Swedish in 1944. For its reception see L. Lewin, *Planhushållningsdebatten* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967), 267–348 and Johansson, *Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget*, 53 and 246–258.
  12. Nilsson, *Mellan arv och utopi*, 205–213.
  13. R. Vierhaus, 'Konservativ, Konservatismus', in O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politischsozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982); H. Grebing, *Konservative gegen die Demokratie: Konservative Kritik an der Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik nach 1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1971), 16–48.
  14. S.G. Payne, *A History of Fascism: 1914–1945* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995). Exceptions were the authoritarian regimes of Franco and Salazar in Spain and Portugal, respectively.
  15. T. Buchanan and M. Conway (eds), *Political Catholicism in Europe: 1918–1965* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); H. Grebing, *Konservative gegen die Demokratie: Konservative Kritik an der Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik nach 1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1971); J.W. Müller, 'Introduction: Putting German Political Thought in Context', in J.W. Müller (ed.), *German Ideologies since 1945: Studies in the Political Thought and Culture of the Bonn Republic* (New York: Palgrave, 2003).
  16. N. Elvander, *Harald Hjärne och konservatismen: Konservativ idédebatt i Sverige 1865–1922* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961), 446–479; Nilsson, *Mellan arv och utopi*, 129–175.
  17. Criticism of all-encompassing thought systems was typical in influential periodicals like *40-tal* and *Prisma* immediately after the war. See C.G. Holmberg, *Upprorets tradition: Den unglitterära tidskriften i Sverige* (Stockholm: Symposion, 1987), 72–74. The aversion to the utopian programmes of the interwar years was a portent of the discussion in the 1950s and early 1960s about 'the death of the ideologies' associated with names like Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Seymour Lipset and, in Sweden, Herbert Tingsten. See J. Lundborg, *Ideologiernas och religionens död: En analys av Herbert Tingstens ideologi och religionskritik* (Nora: Nya Doxa, 1991), 105–119.
  18. Quoted from D. Königsmann, 'En idéhistorisk studie i studentpolitik: Clartés politiska linje, dess mål och medel, 1944–1957', *Idéhistoriska uppsatser*, (6) (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 1983), 29.

19. Y. Hirdman, *Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti 1939–1945* (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1974), 182–183.
20. J. Strang, 'Arvet efter Kaila och Hägerström: Den analytiska filosofin i Finland och Sverige', in S. Nygård and J. Strang (eds), *Mellan idealism och analytisk filosofi: Den moderna filosofin i Finland och Sverige 1880–1950* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland/Atlantis, 2006), 237–244 and 259–264 (quotation 242).
21. R. Carls, *Om tro och vetande: Ingemar Hedenius kristendomskritik i ett halvsekelsperspektiv* (Lund: Arcus, 2001); S. Nordin, *Ingemar Hedenius: En filosof och hans tid* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 2004), 135–183.
22. E. Lönnroth, *En annan uppfattning* (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1949), 11–13. Weibull is quoted from A.W. Johansson, 'Biografin och den svenska historievetenskapen', in H. Rosengren and J. Östling (eds), *Med livet som insats: Biografin som humanistisk genre* (Lund: Sekel, 2007), 21.
23. S. Nordin, *Från Hägerström till Hedenius: Den moderna svenska filosofin* (Bodafors: Doxa, 1984), 193–195. See A. Larsson, *Det moderna samhällets vetenskap: Om etableringen av sociologi i Sverige 1930–1955* (Umeå: Institutionen för historiska studier, 2001).
24. Quotation from Nordin, *Från Hägerström till Hedenius*, 194–195. See also J. Asplund, *Avhandlingens språkdräkt* (Gothenburg: Korpen, 2002), 52.
25. K. Misgeld, 'Den svenska socialdemokratin och Europa – från slutet av 1920-talet till början av 1970-talet', in B. Hultdt and K. Misgeld (eds), *Socialdemokratin och svensk utrikespolitik: Från Branting till Palme* (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska institutet and MH Publishing, 1990), 205. See also B. Stråth, *Folkhemmet mot Europa: Ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1993), 194–227.
26. Stråth, *Folkhemmet mot Europa*, 205–217; Y.M. Werner, *Nordisk katolicism: Katolsk mission och konversion i Danmark i ett nordiskt perspektiv* (Gothenburg: Makadam, 2005), 309–323; Y.M. Werner, 'Schwedentum, Katholizismus und europäische Integration: Die katholische Kirche in Schweden nach 1945', *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte/Contemporary Church History* (1) (2006), 81–84 and 101–106; D. Alvunger, *Nytt vin i gamla läglar: Socialdemokratisk kyrkopolitik under perioden 1944–1973* (Gothenburg: Församlingsförlaget, 2006), 29–36 and 202–208.
27. See, for example: J. Larsson, *Hemmet vi är vde: Om folkhemmet, identiteten och den gemensamma framtiden* (Stockholm: Bokförlaget Arena, 1994), 138; Å. Linderborg, *Socialdemokraterna skriver historia: historieskrivning som ideologisk maktresurs 1892–2000* (Stockholm: Atlas, 2001) 250–253 and 456–462; H. Berggren and L. Trägårdh, *Är svensken människa?: Gemenskap och oberoende i det moderna Sverige* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 2006), 195–198.
28. Stråth, *Folkhemmet mot Europa*; Johansson, 'Inledning: Svensk nationalism och identitet efter andra världskriget'; A.W. Johansson, 'Vill du se ett monument? Se dig omkring!: Några reflektioner kring nationell identitet och kollektivt minne i Sverige efter andra världskriget', in K. Almqvist and K. Glans (eds), *Den svenska framgångssagan* (Stockholm: Fischer & Co., 2001); R. Johansson, 'Konstruktionen av svenskheten', in K. Almqvist and K. Glans (eds), *Den svenska framgångssagan?* (Stockholm: Fischer & Co, 2001).

29. S. Oredsson, *Gustav Adolf, Sverige och Trettiåriga kriget: Historieskrivning och kult* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1992), 226; H. Lööv, 'Karl XII:s dödsdag 30/11 – en lång kravalltradition', *Nord Nytt* (73) (1998), 23; Linderborg, *Socialdemokraterna skriver historia*, 461. For an interesting Danish parallel see A. Warring, *Historie, magt og identitet: Grundlovsfejringer gennem 150 år* (Århus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2004), 129–158.
30. E. Barkan, *The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States Between the World Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), particularly 341–346; A. Tunlid, *Ärftlighetsforskningens gränser: Individer och institutioner i framväxten av den svenska genetiken* (Lund: Lund University, 2004), 224–225.
31. G. Broberg, *Statlig rasforskning: En historik över Rasbiologiska institutet* (Lund: Ugglan, 1995), 66–82; Tunlid, *Ärftlighetsforskningens gränser*, 225–231. During the Second World War, Gunnar Dahlberg published a critical study of race biology, *Arv och ras* (Stockholm: Kooperativa förbundets bokförlag, 1940), which was then translated into a number of languages. He also became a member of the group which, on behalf of UNESCO, produced the important document *Statement on Race* (1950), a severely critical account of the conceptual world of racism. In 1948 when leading researchers in genetics met for the first major international postwar congress in Stockholm, the importance of free research was stressed, particularly against the backdrop of experiences of totalitarianism. 'The much more sensitive question of the extent to which geneticists themselves had contributed, especially to the crimes of Nazism, was however not discussed', Anna Tunlid, a historian of science, writes. See Tunlid, *Ärftlighetsforskningens gränser*, 251. For a conceptual discussion see G. Broberg, 'Förtänta och förbjudna ord: Anteckningar om ras och rasism', in B. Lindberg (ed.), *Trygghet och äventyr: Om begreppshistoria* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2005).
32. M. Tydén, *Från politik till praktik: De svenska steriliseringslagarna 1935–1975* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2002), particularly 520–525 and 573–578 (quotations 525 and 577, respectively). A conclusion suggested in L. Olsson, *Kulturkunskap i förändring: Kultursynen i svenska geografiläroböcker 1870–1985* (Malmö: Liber, 1986), 112–121, was that racist elements remained common in Swedish schoolbooks into the 1950s, but racism was toned down after the Second World War, partly because of the experiences of Nazism.
33. B. Wasserstein, *Vanishing Diaspora: The Jews in Europe Since 1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996), 58–84; H. Bachner, *Återkomsten: Antisemitism i Sverige efter 1945* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1999), 15–16, 30–32 and 89–90.
34. Bachner, *Återkomsten*, particularly 89–90 and 148–150.
35. Gunnar Myrdal's critical analysis of American race relations in *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944) and Herbert Tingsten's attack on the apartheid regime in *Problemet Sydafrika* (1954) are two examples.
36. G.L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York: Collier Books, 1990), 201–225; D. Burkhart, *Eine Geschichte der Ehre* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2006), 112–119.

37. J. Lindroth, *Ling – från storhet till upplösning: Studier i svensk gymnastikhistoria 1800–1950* (Eslöv: Symposion, 2004), 291.
38. Johansson, *Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget*, 353.
39. P. Betts, 'The Politics of Post-Fascist Aesthetics: 1950s West and East German Industrial Design', in R. Bessel and D. Schumann (eds), *Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History During the 1940s and 1950s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
40. Nazism figured occasionally in the debates in the periodical *Byggmästaren* 1946–1948. See C. Caldenby, 'Arkitekturen', in *Signums svenska konsthistoria: Konsten 1950–1975* (Lund: Signum, 2005), 452–453. The limited Swedish discussion stands in contrast to the settling of accounts with totalitarian monumentalism initiated by leading international architects (Sigfried Giedion, Walter Gropius, Lucio Costa and others) during the second half of the 1940s. See W. Schivelbusch, *Entfernte Verwandtschaft: Faschismus, Nationalsozialismus, New Deal 1933–1939* (Vienna: Hanser, 2005) 7–12.
41. C. Lorenz, *Konstruktion der Vergangenheit: Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie*, trans. A. Böttner (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1997), 277–284; T. Nipperdey, '1933 und die Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte', *Historische Zeitschrift* (227) (1978).
42. M. Hanna, *The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and Writers During the Great War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 1–27 and 209–242.
43. The concept is formed on analogy with 'the privilege of formulating the problem'. See L. Gustafsson, *Problemformuleringsprivilegiet: Samhällsfilosofiska studier* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1989).
44. E. Österberg and C. Carlsson Wetterberg (eds), *Rummet vidgas: Kvinnor på väg ut i offentligheten 1880–1940* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2002).
45. R. Koselleck, *Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), 265–272.
46. Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, 267–270.
47. K. Mannheim, 'Das Problem der Generationen', in *Wissenssoziologie: Auswahl aus dem Werk* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1964). See also U. Jureit, *Generationenforschung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 20–25.
48. Mannheim, 'Das Problem der Generationen', particularly 541–553 and 559–562. I prefer 'generation faction' for *Generationseinheit*, since, by definition, there was always competition between the groupings.
49. Runeby, 'Klerkernas ansvar och frihetens organisation', 290–291. See also E. Österberg, *Vänskap: En lång historia* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2007), 225–229.
50. Cf. Runeby, 'Klerkernas ansvar och frihetens organisation', 290–291.
51. The divisions within the generation of 1945 were not always political. For an example, see K. Holt, *Publicisten Ivar Harrie: Ideologi, offentlighetsdebatt och idékritik i Expressen 1944–1960* (Stockholm: Carlssons, 2008).
52. Nilsson, *Mellan arv och utopi*, 208–211.
53. Mannheim, 'Das Problem der Generationen', 559–561.
54. S.U. Palme, *Vår tids hjältar* (Stockholm: Landbruksförbundets Tidskriftsaktiebolag, 1953), 273; A.W. Johansson, 'Palme, Sven Ulric Adalvard', *Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon*, vol. 28 (Stockholm: Svenskt biografiskt lexikon, 1994).

55. The concept 'political generation' is used in influential works like D. Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987), U. Herbert, *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft, 1903–1989* (Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 1996) and M. Wildt, *Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes* (Hamburg: HIS Verlag, 2002).
56. K. Krantz, *Alf Ahlberg (1892–1979): En biografi* (Ludvika: Dualis, 1998), 528–529, 558–563 and 599–615.
57. See the general discussion in A. Schulz and G. Grebner, 'Generation und Geschichte', in A. Schulz and G. Grebner (eds), *Generationswechsel und historischer Wandel* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003).
58. M. Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), 83–94 and 188–189.
59. H.D. Kittsteiner, 'Die Generationen der "Heroischen Moderne": Zur kollektiven Verständigung über eine Grundaufgabe', in U. Jureit and M. Wildt (eds), *Generationen: Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlichen Grundbegriffs* (Hamburg: HIS Verlag, 2005).
60. G. Aspelin, 'Tidsidéer och tidsideal', in J. Cornell (ed.), *De 50 åren: Sverige 1900–1950*, vol. 3 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1950), 53.
61. E. Noelle-Neumann, *Die Schweigespirale: Öffentliche Meinung – unsere soziale Haut* (Munich: Piper, 1980), 13–22.
62. C. Benninghaus, 'Das Geschlecht der Generation: Zum Zusammenhang von Generationalität und Männlichkeit um 1930', in U. Jureit and M. Wildt (eds), *Generationen: Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlichen Grundbegriffs* (Hamburg: HIS Verlag, 2005); M.R. Lepsius, 'Kritische Anmerkungen zur Generationsforschung', in U. Jureit and M. Wildt (eds), *Generationen: Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlichen Grundbegriffs* (Hamburg: HIS Verlag, 2005).
63. See G. Richardson, *Drömmen om en ny skola: Idéer och realiteter i svensk skolpolitik 1945–1950* (Stockholm: Liber, 1983), 317, about Gunnar Helén (1918–2002), radio journalist and future leader of the Liberal People's Party, who ideologically belonged in the same camp as the generation of 1945, but felt uneasy about the certainty of faith that characterised the debate.
64. Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, 34 and 38–41.
65. Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, 35–38 (quotation 37).
66. Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, 39.
67. Koselleck does not analyse the relationship between the concepts 'memory' and 'experience' very closely. Experience is the central issue for him and is said to be 'the present past, the events of which have been incorporated and can be retrieved from the memory', something that 'clings deeper than memory'. In this connection I see experience as something that contains an aspect of memory but which is more firmly anchored in the consciousness of an individual or group than memory is. At the same time, new historical events tend to challenge old experiences and that distinguishes them from memories. Experience is furthermore conclusive in the sense that a historical lesson can be drawn from it. Cf. R. Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979), 350–354.
68. See Chapters I and III.



69. A sign of the absence of Nazism from Swedish public life in the 1950s is that there are so few articles in the Sigtunastiftelsen cuttings archive for that period. The occasional work, such as Alan Bullock's biography of Hitler (original 1952; translation 1960) and William L. Shirers book about the Third Reich (original 1959; translation 1961), did, however, attract attention. During the 1960s Nazism could become the object of debate in the press, for example, the dispute in *Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten* in 1965 which involved Sven-Eric Liedman, Eskil Block and Gunne Bengtson, among others. See also Lööw, *Nazismen i Sverige 1924–1979*, 45–61
70. See Chapter III. The following is based J. Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget: Från patriotism till universalism under efterkrigstiden', in L.M. Andersson and M. Tydén (eds), *Sverige och Nazityskland: Skuldfrågor och moraldebatt* (Stockholm: Dialogos, 2007).
71. For the concept 'the long 1950s' see M. Cronqvist, *Mannen i mitten: Ett spiondrama i svensk kallakrigskultur* (Stockholm: Carlsson bokförlag, 2004), 14. It is maintained, though indirectly, in many scholarly works on the period that there was a turning point in Swedish postwar history sometime at the end of the 1960s or the beginning of the 1970s. However, there are divided opinions as to what it actually involved. Cf. Nordin, *Från Hägerström till Hedenius*; K. Salomon, *Rebeller i takt med tiden: FNL-rörelsen och 60-talets politiska ritualer* (Stockholm: Rabén Prisma, 1996); F. Sejersted, *Socialdemokratins tidsålder: Sverige och Norge under 1900-talet*, trans. L. Andersson and P.L. Månsson (Nora: Nya Doxa, 2005); M. Cronqvist, L. Sturfelt and M. Wiklund (eds), *1973: En träff med tidsandan* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2008).
72. S. Friedländer, *Reflections of Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984); J. Östling, 'Kampen mot kontinuiteten: Historiepolitik i den västtyska sextioåttarörelsen', *Aktuellt om historia* (3) (2006); P. Gassert and A.E. Steinweis (eds), *Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955–1975* (New York: Berghahn, 2006); J. Östling, 'Massor av män: Fascismen som fantasi i 1970-talets politiska kultur', in M. Cronqvist, L. Sturfelt and M. Wiklund (eds), *1973: En träff med tidsandan* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2008).
73. P. Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 207–238; U. Zander, 'Holocaust at the Limits: Historical Culture and the Nazi Genocide in the Television Era', in K.G. Karlsson and U. Zander (eds), *Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003), 256–257; Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget', 30–31.
74. Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget', 31–34; also J. Östling, 'Leander och den svenska självprövningen', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 25 September 2007. See also Chapter I.
75. Z. Leander, *Vill ni se en diva?* (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1958); Z. Leander, *Zarah: Zarah Leanders minnen* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1972). I. Segerstedt Wiberg, 'Nazisternas diva får nu beundran', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 3 January 1988; U. Myggan Ericson, 'Divan teg om politiken', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 10 January 1988; L. Svanberg, 'Zarah med vidöppna ögon – för att rädda gods och guld', *Expressen*, 16 January 1988; L. Persson, 'Var

- finns motgifftet?', *Expressen*, 24 January 1988; A. Ehnmark, 'Påminner om Koestler', *Expressen*, 27 January 1988; S. Örnberg, 'Moralen – en fråga om lönsamhet?', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 30 January 1988. Less accusatory were, for instance, E. Moberg, 'Att förstå är inte att försvara', *Expressen*, 17 January 1988 and Y. Stenius, 'Att förstå Zarah', *Aftonbladet*, 18 January 1988.
76. I. Bergman, *Laterna Magica* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1987); G. Aalders and C. Wiebes, *Affärer till varje pris: Wallenbergs hemliga stöd till nazisterna*, trans. S. Karlsson (Stockholm: B. Wahlström, 1989).
  77. I. Björkstén, 'Vi vill se en stjärna – inte sanningen', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 15 January 1988.
  78. General information about the debate can be found in U. Zander, *Fornstora dagar, moderna tider: Bruk av och debatter om svensk historia från sekelskifte till sekelskifte* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2001), 445–455, Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget', 38–40 and Chapter I. See, for example, M.P. Boëthius, *Heder och samvete: Sverige och andra världskriget* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1991); M. Wechseltmann, *De bruna förbindelserna* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 1995); L. Einhorn, *Handelsresande i liv: Om vilja och vankelmod i krigets skugga* (Stockholm: Prisma, 1999); B. Schön, *Svenskarna som stred för Hitler: Ett historiskt reportage* (Stockholm: DN förlaget, 1999); N. Sennerteg, *Tyskland talar: Hitlers svenska radiostation* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2006) and O. Larsmo, *Djävulssonaten: Ur det svenska hatets historia* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 2007).
  79. D. Ludvigsson, "'Levande historia" – inte bara levande historia', in C.T. Nielsen, D.G. Simonsen and L. Wul (eds), *Rapporter til Det 24. Nordiske Historikermøde, Århus 9.–13. august 2001: Mod nye historier* (Århus: Jysk Selskab for Historie, 2001); K.G. Karlsson, 'Förtintelsen som politik och historiebruk: Exemplet Levande historia', in K. Almqvist and K. Glans (eds), *Den svenska framgångssagan?* (Stockholm: Fischer & Co, 2001).
  80. See, for instance, P. Svensson, *Frostviken: Ett reportage om Per Olof Sundman, nazismen och tigandet* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1998); B. Torekull, *Historien om IKEA: Ingvar Kamprad berättar för Bertil Torekull* (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1998); Larsmo, *Djävulssonaten*; T. Hübinette, *Den svenska nationalsocialismen: Medlemmar och sympatisörer 1931–45* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2002); J. Svenbro, *Försokratikern Sappo och andra studier i antikt tänkande: Med ett bihang om Martin P:s Nilsson och den genetiska determinismen* (Gothenburg: Glänta, 2007).
  81. Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget', 40–42.
  82. A Swedish discussion of the West German *Historikerstreit* was aired in *Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten* January–February 1988, and Kay Glans wrote no fewer than seven long articles on the topic for *Svenska Dagbladet* the summer of the same year, but it also attracted attention in other contexts. See L.A. Norborg, "'Att hantera historien" – om den tyska historikerstriden', *Historielärarnas förenings årsskrift* (1988/1989) and T. Nybom, 'Den tyska "Historikerstriden": En svensk reflexion i anledning av ett tidsläge', *Historisk tidskrift* (1) (1989).
  83. H. Lööv, *Nazismen i Sverige 1980–1999: Den rasistiska undergroundrörelsen: Musiken, myterna, riterna* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2000).

84. K. Glans, 'Förflutet som förflyttar sig: Historikerstriden i Tyskland', in L. Bertson and S. Nordin (eds), *I historiens skruvstäd: Berättelser om Europas 1900-tal* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2008).
85. Karlsson, 'Förintelsen som politik och historiebruk', 279–280.
86. See Chapter II and Glans, 'Förflutet som förflyttar sig'.
87. For the debates of the 1990s: Zander, *Fornstora dagar, moderna tider*, 402–459; Linderborg, *Socialdemokraterna skriver historia*, 419–423; G. Rosenberg, 'The Crisis of Consensus in Postwar Sweden', in N. Witoszek and L. Trägårdh (eds), *Culture and Crisis: The Case of Germany and Sweden* (New York: Berghahn, 2002).
88. Jureit, *Generationenforschung*, 114–123; N. Frei, *1945 und wir: Das Dritte Reich im Bewußtsein der Deutschen* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005), 23–40.
89. Wiklund, *I det modernas landskap*, 109–161.
90. Quoted from H. Welzer, *Täter: Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2005), 141.
91. A. Ruth, 'Postwar Europe: The Capriciousness of Universal Values', *Dædalus* (126) (1997) and M. König and B. Zeugin (eds), *Die Schweiz, der Nationalsozialismus und der Zweite Weltkrieg: Schlussbericht* (Zurich: Verlag Pendo, 2002).
92. Krantz, *Alf Ahlberg (1892–1979)*, 561.
93. W. Schivelbusch, *Die Kultur der Niederlage: Der amerikanische Süden 1865, Frankreich 1871, Deutschland 1918* (Berlin: Alexander Fest Verlag, 2001). See also Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, 67–77.
94. P. Ricœur, *Minne, historia, glömska*, trans. E. Backelin (Gothenburg: Daidalos, 2005), particularly 540–549.
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