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Nazism as Stigma

The first years of peace saw Europe enter into close combat with its own past. The business of settling accounts had started even before hostilities ceased, but the ill deeds of the Second World War could not really be confronted until after the capitulation of Germany in May 1945. Even though the course of events varied from country to country, with hindsight it is possible to see that the process ran along three interconnected tracks during the early postwar period: one was political, one judicial and one cultural.[1]

The *political* settlement was the most immediate and the most thorough. Important guidelines were drawn up at the Great Power conferences held by the Allies in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. One overarching aim in both Eastern and Western Europe was first of all to dismantle what remained of the fascist regimes in order to change the political systems in the desired ideological direction. The political confrontation in the zones of occupation also included the process known as denazification, a process that involved the dissolution of Nazi organisations, a ban on Nazi parties and the purge of Nazi sympathisers in public institutions.[2]

The *judicial* reckoning was an important offshoot of the political processes. The emblematic images here are the Nuremberg trials of 1945 and 1946, the international trials of the surviving Nazi leadership. Many other people were also brought before major or minor tribunals in Germany and in other parts of Europe: the *retsopgøret* in Denmark and the *rettsoppgjøret* in Norway are just two examples among many. In addition to such legal actions, the end of the war also witnessed incidents of non-judicial lynch law against collaborators and quislings. A less confrontational aspect of judicial settlement was provided by the writing of new constitutions in several countries towards the end of the 1940s.[3]

During these first postwar years various types of *cultural* readjustment were also carried through. A limited but not insignificant body of people became involved in debate, criticism and self-examination, and

new dramas, new films and new journals dug deep into the experiences of the war years. The debates took the form of artistic and philosophical examinations of the Nazi inheritance. Old ideals were tested and, if found obsolete, replaced by new.[4]

But these debates rapidly died away as the 1940s came to a close. Having been at their most intense during the first years of peace, they were beginning to fade as early as 1947/1948. By that stage it becomes possible to see the growth of collective national interpretations of the Second World War in all the various countries of Europe. Etienne François has characterised these narratives of the war as *patriotic* narratives. What he meant was that the differing interpretations took the form of narratives defending one's own side and one's own nation in their wartime actions. Different nations claimed that the defeat of Nazism could essentially be ascribed to their particular contribution, whether that meant their particular resistance movement or their particular military input or their unique social system. The outlook was national and the argumentation drew its strength from a sense of self-rectitude; the war years had involved sacrifices and hardships, but by firmly and loyally sticking to the ideals 'we' believed in, 'we' succeeded in keeping the foreign aggressor at bay. After 1945 even the inhabitants of countries that had had strong Nazi or fascist organisations came to regard those organisations as gangs of foreign criminals which had made themselves masters of the nation. Consequently, and without wishing to play down the differences between Eastern and Western Europe, it is possible to argue that the national narratives of the Second World War were all linked by patriotism, and it was patriotism that justified the existing order and defended particular sets of social conviction.[5]

There has been no shortage of explanations for this change of scenario. The war had ripped apart the fabric of community in many of the countries of Europe, destroying people's faith and trust in one another. The new patriotic narratives offered a remedy for this. They acted as levelling and stabilising factors, reconciling and uniting, giving meaning to the enormous sacrifices, providing new identities for the nations that had changed and a future full of promise for the people who had survived. The necessary precondition was that everyone gave their support to a national consensus and set aside the conflicts inflamed by the war. As far as West Germany was concerned, the historian Norbert Frei was of the opinion that a sort of *Vergangenheitspolitik* (politics of the past) took over in the years around 1950: the Allied denazification programmes were halted, guilty Nazis were pardoned and accepted back into society, while extreme parties of both the left and the right were banned. The aim was to forget, to normalise and to strengthen support

behind new values such as the social market economy, an orientation towards the West and anti-totalitarianism. The Federal Republic of Germany may have been a special case but we can discern similar developments in other Western European countries. The historian Tony Judt has argued that collective amnesia was a precondition of the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War: the Europeans succeeded in reconstructing the continent economically and politically by putting the recent past behind them at the same time as a moral and cultural revitalisation demanded that they learn the lessons of that same past.[6]

Sweden is scarcely mentioned in any international discussion of the processes of adjustment following the Second World War. It is as if the fact that the country was neutral and never occupied by Nazi Germany means that no confrontations or crises had arisen. That is not what happened in reality: on the whole, developments in Sweden followed the same rhythm as in Europe in general.[7]

Cleaning Up the *Folkhem*

'Our domestic Nazis no more than an irritant' said the headline to an article in *Svenska Dagbladet* in October 1945. The man responsible for the words was Östen Undén, the foreign minister who, in a speech to the labour movement in Örebro, had been spelling out the government's view on the question of the remaining Swedish Nazis. Various groupings, not least the labour movement, had demanded that the authorities take action and purge Nazis for once and for all. The topic had been brought to the fore by the prosecution of the newspaper *Dagsposten*, when two notorious Swedish Nazi sympathisers (the editor in chief Teodor Telander and the foreign editor Rütger Essén) had been found not guilty of the charges of having accepted economic support from Germany. Undén's view was that any major action against Swedish Nazis would involve a series of problems, both of practice and of principle. The biggest problem, however, was that Swedish National Socialists did not constitute a problem, merely an irritant. They had never been particularly numerous, they had never had any influence, and the collapse of the Hitler regime had been their final catastrophe. According to Undén, a Swedish purge would achieve very little.[8]

The foreign minister's opinion reflected a view of Swedish Nazism that very quickly became a potent one. It went hand in hand with the particular perception of the Swedish wartime stance that took form during the first postwar years – that stance being what we might

call the *narrative of small-state realism*. The basis of this view was that Sweden, as a small state, had had no alternative but to give way to an aggressive Nazi Germany. By making a limited number of concessions Sweden had manage to stay outside the conflict between the major European powers and had thus saved the Swedes from the brutalities of occupation by the Germans. 'The small state role gave Sweden moral absolution', Alf W. Johansson wrote in a paradigmatic article on small-state realism as a self-concept: 'All the difficult questions that the policies of concession posed about the ethos of Swedish society during the war, about the will for resistance or appeasement, about keeping faith with one's own ideals and ideological principles, all of these were swept under the carpet by the triumph of small state realism.'[9]

In Etienne François's terms, then, small-state realism became Sweden's patriotic narrative of the Second World War. The self-justifying aspect was prominent: Sweden may have departed in minor ways from strict neutrality but Swedish policies had by and large constituted an act of resistance and been a contribution to peace. 'We have done our bit; we fought the fight in our own way', as Per Albin Hansson put it in a speech on the very last day of the war. The coalition government emerged as a safe guarantor of peace and sovereignty, its policy of neutrality having saved Sweden from war and occupation.[10]

One aspect of the self-justifying nature of the narrative was the conviction that Sweden had been spared from Nazism. There had admittedly been the odd quisling and fifth columnist, Nazi sympathisers whose national loyalty was dubious, but on the whole the Swedes to a man had resisted National Socialism and rejected its false doctrines. Swedish society had always – so ran the historical lesson of small-state realism – viewed Nazism as something alien. For all those people who, like the political establishment, lined up in support of this conviction, the problem of Swedish Nazis was actually a non-problem and any measures against them were consequently superfluous.[11]

Just as in the rest of Western Europe it did, however, take a few years for the interpretative framework of small-state realism to become fixed. The very earliest postwar phase permitted openness in the face of questions that were as yet undecided.[12] At this stage alternative voices could make themselves heard in Sweden more forcefully than would be the case later. There were, in particular, two counter-narratives – one moral and one communist – that challenged small-state realism. In spite of internal differences these two were united in their fundamental criticism of the Swedish policy of appeasement during the Second World War. Sweden emerged not only as a country that had been meek and resigned, but also as one that had been tainted by Nazism, one where the

strength of pro-German public opinion reflected attitudes that spread through many layers of society. Nazism had run wild among us and the need for self-examination was urgent. In this moral counter-narrative – associated with, for instance, Eyvind Johnson, Vilhelm Moberg, Ture Nerman, Amelie Posse-Brázdova and Torgny Segerstedt (though the latter had died in March 1945) – Sweden emerged as a cowardly and docile country whose leaders had bargained away the principles of democracy and human values. In the communist counter-narrative, Swedish Nazism was viewed as an upper-class phenomenon, which was what made it so urgent that the most tainted institutions in society – particularly the military and the police – should be purged. Many people on the left had long had doubts about the democratic credentials of the military and the police and at the end of the war their suspicions were given a public airing in articles and debate books that demanded anti-fascist purges.[13]

It was, however, not just the extreme left and a group of liberal opinion formers who were demanding a comprehensive inquiry when the coalition government handed over to a purely Social Democrat government in the summer of 1945. Suppressed discontent about aspects of wartime policy was more widespread than that and as early as 1944 Ture Nerman had published an indictment of 'the men of 1940' – Rickard Lindström, Allan Vougt, Harald Åkerberg and Ivar Österström. In this polemic, which took the form of a collection of compromising quotations by these notable Social Democrats, Nerman attacked the defeatism and the enthusiasm for appeasement that had characterised the years around 1940. These accusations were repeated by others during the first postwar years. Liberal newspapers accused Rickard Lindström of kowtowing to Nazi Germany and internal Social Democratic opposition worked against Allan Vougt for a time. Christian Günther, the coalition foreign minister, had to shoulder the blame for the doctrine of small-state realism he had represented during the war. When peace came and he returned to the diplomatic service, he had set his heart on becoming Swedish ambassador in Copenhagen, but the relationship between Denmark and Sweden was still frosty and the Danish king, Christian X, opposed his appointment.[14]

The political establishment in Sweden was aware of the criticism and recognised that action was necessary. With the intention of pouring oil on the waters and going some way to meet the critics, elements of wartime policy were opened up to public examination. The cross-party Sandler Commission, led by the former Social Democratic prime minister and foreign minister Rickard Sandler, attracted particular interest. Its starting point was the accusations levelled against a senior

civil servant, Robert Paulsson, in early 1945: it was claimed that he had passed sensitive information about refugees in Sweden to a man who was in the pay of the German intelligence agency. The Paulsson Affair attracted a great deal of attention and led the Sandler Commission to investigate and report (in three lengthy reports) on the behaviour of the Swedish security service and Swedish refugee policies during the Second World War. The criticism, though harsh at times, particularly with regard to refugee policy during the first phase of the war, did not lead to any substantial judicial or political measures.[15]

In addition to that, selected chapters on the foreign policies of the war years were made publicly available in a number of White Books. A committee of academics and diplomats supervised by the foreign minister Östen Undén was responsible for the publication of four major volumes of documents during 1946 and 1947. Among the particular objectives was that of resolving the difficulties with neighbouring Nordic countries, especially Norway, where there was a residue of bitterness resulting from the subservient aspects of Swedish policy during the first half of the war.[16] The historiography of the White Books espoused the small-state realism reading of the war: Swedish actions had been by no means heroic and there was reason to criticise some of the concessions to Germany, but the policy had on the whole been successful in that it kept Sweden out of the war. In spite of everything, the White Books were well received and generally speaking the Swedish press welcomed the fact that the cards had been laid on the table – and the favourable reactions of the press gave indirect support to the idea of small-state realism. The reception in Copenhagen and Oslo was favourable, too: in the name of Nordic unity there was a will at that stage to seek out any reconciling features of Swedish foreign policy. The effect of the White Books was thus to clear the air in Sweden and to help normalise relations with Sweden's neighbours.[17]

During this early period there was also some degree of public scrutiny of suspected Nazis, particularly those in the military and in public administration. In May 1946, after some hesitation, the government set up Bedömningsnämnden (the Appraisal Committee) whose task it was to investigate civil servants suspected of having shown 'a lack of loyalty, resulting from their Nazi outlook'. Ture Nerman, one of the most bitter critics of the policies of the coalition government, was a member of this committee, along with a number of professors and senior civil servants: Nerman's membership caused public expectations to rise. The hundred or so cases the committee looked at, however, proved to be very difficult to judge. The committee felt its remit was restricted and it was never really able to put a Nazi in a prominent position to

the test. What proved particularly problematical was coming to a decision as to what a lack of loyalty because of Nazi sympathies actually implied. The members of the committee soon requested to be released from their duties.[18]

A parallel internal review was being carried out within the military. Many people were of the opinion that Nazi attitudes had flourished amongst officers of all ranks. The first move was to discover which officers had Nazi or pro-German sympathies. In spite of the investigation it proved difficult to come to any clear-cut conclusions and the inquiry was shelved. During the postwar years officers were even interrogated about their attitude to Nazism before they were appointed or promoted, but no real measures were taken as a result. Helge Jung, however, who was the Commander in Chief, took firm action, thereby pre-empting any criticism for complacency. There were three notable cases and they went on for some years, each of them named after the high-ranking officer in question: the Rosenblad Affair, the Kellgren Affair and the Meyerhöffer Affair. They symbolised the new spirit. Even though it was only a very small part of the officer corps that was investigated this closely, the High Command had set an example: Nazi sympathies were not acceptable in the Swedish forces after the war.[19]

In other areas of Swedish society there was no more than occasional action. Leading politicians discussed the suitability of known Nazi sympathisers working as teachers and examiners in the Swedish school system, but no real measures were taken.[20] Certain ministers and church organisations that had had links with Nazism faced criticism at the end of the war: this so-called 'Church Nazism' was never investigated in depth. The preferred solution at the time – in the words of the church historian Anders Jarlert – was 'modernisation without legal settlements'.[21]

Only a very small part of the Swedish press had been openly Nazi (*Dagsposten, Folkets Dagblad* and a host of more short-lived papers). Much more significant were those daily papers that sympathised with developments in Germany after 1933 and often expressed considerable understanding for the actions of the Third Reich during the Second World War: *Aftonposten* was one such paper, as were also *Östgöta Correspondenten* and *Helsingborgs Dagblad*. In most cases, and with the significant exception of *Aftonposten*, they were not seriously brought to book for the pro-German standpoints they had espoused during the war. With the foundation of *Expressen* in the autumn of 1944 the Swedish press gained a fundamentally anti-Nazi organ, an evening paper with a democratic and culturally radical spirit that took up the cudgels against any remaining Nazi tendencies in Sweden.[22]

The public settling of accounts with Swedish Nazism ceased after a couple of years. For those who had been demanding a radical purge the results were meagre. In only a few cases were serious improprieties uncovered and in even fewer cases was any action taken. There is no doubt that the postwar investigations bolstered the notion of small-state realism. Since Sweden as a whole had not been supportive of Nazism, there could never be any real question of a more detailed examination and once a number of people with Nazi beliefs had been purged nothing more needed to be done.

The small-state realist conclusion was spelt out in a debate in the Riksdag in the spring of 1947. In connection with the winding up of the Appraisal Committee, Ture Nerman asked whether there was to be any further investigation into Nazi influence in Sweden. The prime minister's response made it clear that the matter was considered closed. The Swedish authorities had taken what measures were necessary and Nazism no longer constituted a threat. 'It is difficult to imagine how anyone in their right mind could support movements of that sort after the bankruptcy of German Nazism', Prime Minister Tage Erlander stated. He stressed, however, that the police and the democratic organisations should continue to be watchful: 'They will be fully active against any emergent fascist tendencies in order to isolate them promptly and render them harmless.' Nerman accepted the answer but was still concerned that the danger of Nazism was being taken so lightly. 'After the confusion of the collapse of the Hitler regime, it [Nazism] is undoubtedly in the process of reorganising on an international scale', he warned. The exchange between Erlander and Nerman revealed the attitude that was to be the official one: Nazism no longer constituted a danger, but there was a latent threat still lurking beneath the surface, which meant there was good reason to be on one's guard and to counteract any sign of renewal. It would, in fact, be twenty years before Nazism was discussed again in the Swedish Riksdag.[23]

Seen in international terms, the Swedish reckoning with Nazism was a very minor affair, understandably so given that the context of the investigations was different from that in the majority of European countries. Sweden had never been occupied, Nazi parties had had very little influence, and 1945 did not mark a constitutional turning point. There was no Quisling to put on trial, no Leopold III to attack, no Vichy regime to call to account. Circumstances such as these were a hindrance to those who were calling for more thorough investigations. Sweden had been governed by a coalition government and the whole political establishment bore collective responsibility for wartime policies. 'Any more thorough review would consequently imply holding a reckoning

with the whole of the Swedish political system', as Alf W. Johansson has pointed out. 'Such a thing was, of course, unthinkable: the name of the prime minister *after* the war was Per Albin Hansson, just as it was *during* the war.' There were few completely independent bodies with the authority to demand a thorough investigation. The moral and the communist counter-narratives referred to earlier proved unable to challenge the dominant view.[24]

In spite of the particular circumstances in Sweden, it is still illuminating to place the course of events there in a wider Western European context. The relative openness that was the norm during the first postwar years came to an end in most countries by the close of the 1940s and a patriotic view of the role of the country during the Second World War became entrenched. In spite of the fact that Swedish experiences of Nazism and of the Second World War were different from those of other European countries, it is possible to see many features in common. And in Sweden, too, there was a clear and stated desire to leave the past behind and to move on.[25]

At the same time we do need to ask ourselves whether Sweden, too, manifested the will to link arms in support of communal values and to define what was acceptable. Ideological demarcation had been an important element in the West German *Vergangenheitspolitik* analysed by Norbert Frei. There is good reason to investigate more closely whether some sort of watch was kept on ideological respectability and, if so, what form it took. The last chapter showed that the experience of Nazism exerted a powerful appeal that was not matched by the rather lukewarm public settling of accounts with Nazism during the early postwar period. A fundamental aspect of the lesson of Nazism was an unconditional repudiation of the Third Reich and an all-encompassing condemnation of Nazi ideas. There is consequently much to suggest that there was a second and more active confrontation with things connected with National Socialism taking place alongside the official scrutiny.

Biography of Those Branded

The public reckoning with Nazism in Sweden was, as we have seen, limited in time, in scope and in ambition. By comparison with Western European denazification, the political and judicial measures were not significant. In a broader perspective, however, in which judicial processes and state commissions were just one aspect of a larger cultural process, a different picture emerges. Accusations of Nazi sympathies

were levelled at many types of individual during the years after the war. Certain figures in politics, in the cultural sphere, in the academic world and, indeed, in virtually all sectors of society, were held to account. Some of them were seriously damaged by the accusations and ended up being completely marginalised; others quickly shook them off and carried on to a considerable extent as if nothing had happened. Between these two extremes there were people who were damaged by association with Nazism but who were not totally ostracised.

Stigmatisation by Nazi Association

Social psychologists have long been interested in the mechanisms by which the majority excludes those who deviate from it, but for a long time they have distanced themselves from a model in which particular individuals deviate from a given pattern of behaviour and, instead, they put social relationships at the centre. This line of thinking was further developed by, among others, Howard Becker. One central strand in Becker's interactional model stated that 'deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by other of rules and sanctions to an "offender". The deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label'.[26]

We do not need to use the full apparatus of social psychology in order to find this outlook and terminology rewarding and the approach associated with the sociologist Erving Goffman is a particularly fruitful one when it comes to understanding the exclusion of people considered to have been tainted by Nazism. Goffman expounded his ideas on stigma and the role of the deviant in society in a well-received work, and while a good deal of his description and of his empirical data is tied to the social science of his day, his general discussion of the concept of stigma still remains valuable.[27]

In its original sense the word *stigma* can be traced back to the name the Greeks gave to the physical sign that revealed something unusual or derogatory about an individual's moral character. Goffman broadens that definition, pointing out that a stigma does not necessarily have to reveal itself in a physical sense. Closely related to symbolic interactionism, Goffman uses the term to designate an attribute that is profoundly discrediting in relationships between human beings. Some attributes only stigmatise in particular contexts; others are discrediting virtually everywhere in our society. 'An individual', Goffman writes, about the stigmatised individual, 'who in other circumstances would easily have been accepted in social interaction has a feature, an attribute that cannot

avoid attracting attention and which makes those of us who meet that individual turn away from him and ignore the claims for community that his other attributes could in themselves have motivated.' He goes on to develop his ideas as to how the stigmatised individual is excluded from the group and denied acknowledgement. The isolation and the exclusion that follows on from this makes it a political act. Goffman sums it up: 'The stigmatisation of people who have a reprehensible moral register can clearly function as a means of formal social control.'[28]

Erving Goffman's ideas on stigma can usefully be applied to people who, according to the views of the majority in society, were linked with National Socialism. I can deduce from the last chapter that posterity's judgment was harsh and merciless: Nazism was condemned without reservation. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the people, the phenomena and traditions associated with National Socialism were all anathematised. Given that virtually everything it was associated with was discredited, the ideology was stigmatised to the very highest degree. To the outside world the stigma of Nazism would have been sufficient reason to isolate, marginalise and reject anyone tainted by it.

One way of developing this line of discussion is to introduce the concept of the *sphere of association,* by which is meant all the characteristics, behaviours, ideals and major features that are associated with a particular phenomenon. A sphere of association is, of course, defined individually, socially and culturally but it is possible to distinguish the contents and the limits of a sphere within a given historical context. My reconstruction of the content of the experience of Nazism clearly demonstrated that Nazism was universally and unconditionally associated with certain traits and phenomena: nationalism and chauvinism, irrationalism and unreason, barbarism and the decline of civilisation, violence, Prussianism and militarism. The 'Nazi sphere of association', which is the term I shall use for the sake of simplicity and which is to be understood as a metaphorical development of the concept of Nazism, thus included associations to precisely this range of characteristics and phenomena.

Postwar motorways on the other hand, which in the historical context may be viewed as continuations of Hitler's Autobahn, were not immediately associated with National Socialism and thus did not form part of the Nazi association sphere during the late 1940s and early 1950s. That was also true, for example, of the sterilisations performed for reasons of race hygiene. It was in the 1980s and 1990s that eugenics came to be increasingly associated with the Third Reich, whereas during the early postwar period eugenics did not feature in the Nazi sphere of association.[29]

Goffman held that stigmatisation was a question of relationships. It was not necessarily those who had professed Nazism who were stigmatised, nor was the degree of stigmatisation necessarily in proportion to Nazi conviction. What was more decisive was the opinion of those around. It was not only Nazism itself that was stigmatised but anything that fell within the Nazi sphere of association.

Having said this, it is nevertheless important to emphasise that stigmatisation by posterity did not strike indiscriminately. An individual's political outlook and actions before and during the Second World War usually played a decisive part in how that individual was judged after 1945. That does not, of course, mean that there were not some Nazi sympathisers who were able to draw a veil over their past, change course and avoid being branded. Nor is it incompatible with the fact – as the Wittenberg case will show – that a number of outspoken opponents of National Socialism could find themselves being trapped in the flames of the anti-Nazi fires.

Stigmatisation did not always take the same form and its effects were varied. It is nevertheless possible to distinguish certain recurrent patterns which can then be classified into three types.

Absolute Stigmatisation

People who had been enthusiastically involved in Nazi organisations or had actively promoted the Nazi message were regarded as full-blood Nazis and thus fell into this category. They usually continued to defend Nazism, Hitler and the Third Reich even after 1945. After the Second World War these people were stigmatised to such an extent that they were utterly discredited. Branded and outcast, their only public status was to function as examples to repel and deter others. Among those afflicted by absolute stigmatisation of this kind I would include such political figures as Birger Furugård and Sven Olov Lindholm as well as writers and intellectuals such as Per Engdahl, Rütger Essén, Einar Åberg and Annie Åkerhielm.

Partial Stigmatisation

In this group we find people who were regarded to some extent as being borderline. During the Second World War they had often shown considerable understanding of and sympathy with significant aspects of Nazism and Nazi Germany, but they had not unconditionally supported a Nazi organisation. A number of them were notable personalities in Swedish cultural and social life. As a result of their achievements in other fields they were not solely associated with

Nazism and they frequently had sufficiently significant reputations not to be completely marginalised after 1945; they were thus often able to withdraw into a non-political existence and to continue their professional activities. They suffered partial stigmatisation, which was not sufficient for them to be completely excluded, but which remained a handicap and often marred their posthumous reputations. As long as they stayed well clear of political issues they were left alone, but the moment they became involved in sensitive areas they became targets. Among the best known of these figures were Fredrik Böök, Sven Hedin and Zarah Leander, but we might also include Kurt Atterberg, Hugo Odeberg and Karl Olivecrona. They had all, so to speak, been given a conditional discharge.

Secondary Stigmatisation

A number of people were affected by indirect stigmatisation in spite of the fact that they had been active anti-Nazis: the issue here was that they were seen as being supporters of ideas and ideals that contemporary Sweden associated with Nazism. In other words, the stigmatisation was secondary but the consequences could still be serious. These cases demonstrate how difficult it was to draw a line between National Socialism and the other features that were regarded as being related to it – idealism, conservatism, romanticism and broad trends in German tradition. The fact that Nazism and the Nazi sphere of association are not identical is more clearly apparent in these cases than in the other forms of stigmatisation.

The relationship between the level of stigmatisation and its position with regard to the sphere of association can be described metaphorically. Those who suffered absolute stigmatisation are located in the centre of the sphere and are fully enclosed in it, whereas those who are partially stigmatised are only partly enclosed – there are aspects of their existence that remain outside the sphere. People afflicted by secondary stigmatisation also have elements that are within the sphere, but only when they are viewed from a particular angle.

The three main forms of stigmatisation can be biographically analysed, so to speak, by focusing on a few individual careers and observing how, why and by whom they were stigmatised. The biographical approach does not only provide concrete examples of stigmatisation, it also makes it possible to demonstrate how the branding of individuals simultaneously had the effect of discrediting whole traditions and patterns of thought. The aim here is not to rehabilitate people who were accused rightly or wrongly of having been associated with National

Socialism, but is to create understanding of the historical lessons of Nazism.[30]

Outcasts

A few Swedes became the objects of *absolute stigmatisation*. They were mainly individuals who were perceived as having been Hitler's myrmidons, people who supported the cause of Nazism and put all their hopes in the Third Reich. In many cases they continued to defend National Socialism even after 1945. Disgraced and branded, their only public status was as deterrent examples. They became outcasts.

Absolute stigmatisation prevented them stepping into the public space. Major publishers rejected their products, the main newspapers refused their articles, influential organisations would have nothing to do with them. And the scorn was mutual. Those who stuck firmly to their old ideals after the Second World War felt increasingly alien in the Swedish *folkhem*. The dream of what might have been was kept desperately alive. They sought community in shrinking nationalist groupings that were pro-German while simultaneously believing in the notion of Great Sweden. In such groups there was great sympathy and understanding for the drive and objectives of Nazi Germany – a sympathy often underpinned by anti-communism, anti-Semitism and pro-Germanism, royalism, a patriotic love of the fatherland and dreams of a new European order. Thanks to a few devoted activists and wealthy financiers they were able to survive into the 1950s, the 1960s and 1970s, but their influence on public opinion was extremely limited. In so far as newspapers like *Fria ord* (Free Words) (the successor to *Dagsposten*) and *Nation Europa*, organisations like *Nysvenska rörelse* (the New Swedish Movement), *S:t Mikaelsorden* (the Order of St Michael) and *Nordiska rikspartiet* (the Nordic Realm Party), or individuals like Carl Ernfrid Carlberg, Per Engdahl, Nora Torulf and Einar Åberg resonated at all in wider circles it was only as warning exceptions that underlined the democratic consensus.[31]

Two biographical examples will serve to illustrate absolute stigmatisation. Both are authors and media figures who were unambiguously positioned right in the centre of the Nazi sphere of association, not least because of their participation in compromising publications during and after the Second World War. And both were relatively well-known cultural figures who had regularly published books, written in the papers and participated in debate during the interwar years. But the consequence of absolute stigmatisation was complete and utter marginalisation.

Annie Åkerhielm (1869–1956) made her debut as a novelist in 1899 and over the following decades published thirty or so works with a conservative ethos. Her books were reviewed in both metropolitan and provincial papers and she was awarded literary honours, including by the Swedish Academy. She made a name as a conservative, patriotically minded journalist first of all in the *Gefle-Posten* and eventually in *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* from 1913 to 1936. During the 1930s she turned more and more towards the new Germany and both her journalism and her books bore witness to her enthusiasm for Nazism. Åkerhielm had a positive vision of the Third Reich as national rebirth, as salvation from the appalling consequences of democracy and the impoverishment of Western culture. As far as one can judge, both her person and her work disappeared into a silent void after the Second World War: if she was written about at all, what was written was pejorative; if any attention was paid to her, it was because of her Nazi association. It is true that Åkerhielm was relatively old by the end of the war and her active years were behind her, but the extremely limited space she was allowed bears witness to her isolation.[32]

We can see an even more clear-cut example of absolute stigmatisation in the case of the author and journalist Rütger Essén (1890–1972). He belonged to the political and journalistic establishment of the years between the wars. Following a short career as a diplomat after the First World War, he was a contributor to *Stockholms Dagblad* and *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* during the 1920s and 1930s. Based firmly in the conservative tradition he won a reputation as a knowledgeable and combative writer on political questions. As late as the end of the 1930s he was still publicly debating political democracy with Herbert Tingsten and in 1940 he was appointed one of the editors of the seven-volume Bonnier's contemporary history, for which he wrote the fourth volume, *Illusionernas årtionde: Den politiska världsutvecklingen 1917–1930* (The Decade of Illusions: The Political Development of the World 1917–1930). During the 1930s he had been increasingly attracted by Nazi Germany and in 1941 he was the driving force behind the foundation of the newspaper *Dagsposten*. His anti-democratic, pro-Nazi outlook led to him being called 'the cultural and intellectual figurehead of Swedish Nazism'. After 1945 he continued in his role of editor of *Dagsposten* and then its successor *Fria ord*. From having been a frequent writer in wider contexts between the wars he found himself relegated to fringe organs in the postwar period.[33] In 1955, when he produced *Demokratien och dess gärningar* (Democracy and its Doings), his settling of accounts with popular democracy, it was published privately and caused no public response. His panegyric biography of his friend Sven Hedin was published by

Druffel-Verlag, a West German publishing house for extreme right-wing literature.[34]

Absolute stigmatisation inevitably led to manifest marginalisation. Per Engdahl seems to some extent to have been an exception in that he was permitted access to the national press on a number of occasions. In an article in *Expressen* in April 1959, for instance, he attacked democracy and argued for corporatism instead. Ten years later Engdahl returned to the issue and in a major article in *Dagens Nyheter* complained that he was the victim of exclusion. The articles written in response to Engdahl by Ivar Harrie and Olof Lagercrantz respectively showed no sign of them having taken any of his ideas on board.[35]

The fact that those with Nazi convictions were relegated to peripheral publications and organisations after 1945 is scarcely surprising; given the impact of the Nazi experience anything else would have been amazing. The branding of those who were totally enclosed in the Nazi sphere of association does not, however, reveal the more thorough-going changes that the discrediting of Nazism produced. It is actually more enlightening to consider the other two forms of stigmatisation – the partial and the secondary.

Fredrik Böök – A Tainted Figure

A not insignificant group of Swedes were *partially stigmatised*. They were never completely ostracised but were nevertheless tainted by the anti-Nazi anathema. They were often associated with Nazism because they had revealed considerable sympathy for elements of its core vision before or during the Second World War but without ever fully joining up. They might continue making notable contributions to Swedish social and cultural life after the war, but they bore the mark of Cain. As soon as they stepped outside the sphere to which they had been relegated, as soon as they re-entered the political arena, the mark of Cain flared. Their fate was to have been partially stigmatised, which was not usually sufficient reason for complete ostracisation but was nevertheless a stain on the character and one that would usually blacken their posthumous reputation. Fredrik Böök provides one of the clearest examples of partial stigmatisation.

Fredrik Böök (1883–1961) experienced the mechanisms of ostracisation more than almost anyone else. For many years he had been among the most lauded and respected figures in Swedish cultural life, a one-man institution which set the tone for much of the period between the wars. As a critic, literary historian, essayist, travel writer, journalist, author, debater and member of the Swedish Academy, Böök had been

passionately involved in the debates on the pressing questions of the age: democracy, the world wars, the national community, the temptations of ideology and the role of art and tradition in the modern world. He was a well-known figure even in circles that did not share his views. That was changed for ever by his support for the new rulers in Berlin and by the hopes he voiced for Nazism as the saviour of Germany from collapse, humiliation and Bolshevism. As the Second World War proceeded, it became more and more difficult for him to find a platform for his opinions. He withdrew in the 1940s, to quote Staffan Björck, 'into the passionless domain of research [and] away from the deluded paths of political adventure'. When he returned to politics at the start of the 1950s he was received with stolid resistance. A portal figure of the years between the wars had become a postwar pariah.[36]

What we are focusing on here is the way his pro-German outlook before and, even more, during the Second World War defined the image posterity came to have of him. Böök had been a contentious and combative figure from his youth onwards, from his early literary agitation about activism during the First World War to the many disputes he was involved in during the interwar period. But it was his support for Germany when Nazism utterly dominated that country that led to the stigma that was attached to him for the rest of his life.

More than any other single event his posthumous reputation was decided by a fateful speech he gave on 4 October 1940. Böök had been invited to give the traditional ceremonial address at the Tegnér Celebration in Lund. He began in the customary manner by welcoming the students to the autumn semester and he then proceeded to describe the trials and tribulations of the age in elevated tones. He spoke – in rather mystifying words – of history having now come to a crossroads, but that renewal would follow on from the destruction. In veiled phrasing, replete with allusions to Tegnér, he exhorted the students to trust in the future and to affirm the new. Böök's address at the welcoming ceremony caused a great sensation; it was printed verbatim in *Svenska Dagbladet* and stirred up a storm of reactions and responses. The speech was generally interpreted as promoting Nazism and supporting the German–Soviet Pact. The most significant response came from Herbert Tingsten. At a student meeting in Stockholm a week or so later he attacked Böök's appeasement of the Nazis. Tingsten argued, mobilising the real Tegnér against the enemies of humanism, that what Böök was preaching was that might was right, that every conqueror was a man of destiny.[37]

Over the following years his Tegnér speech would cast a dark shadow over Böök. It was widely believed that his known pro-German

sympathies had become pro-Nazi sympathies and in the view of many people his insidious references had denigrated the Swedish literary tradition and tarnished his own reputation as a humanist. This marked the start of his isolation, an isolation that became even more marked after Böök published the pamphlet *Tyskt väsen och svensk lösen* (German Spirit and Swedish Salute) in the late autumn of 1940; Böök saw the pamphlet as developing further the ideas of his Lund speech, but it signally failed to gain a hearing from majority public opinion in Sweden. And, taking a longer term view, he also encountered for the first time a number of powerful opponents, Herbert Tingsten in particular, who would do everything in their power to oppose him during the postwar years.[38]

Böök was well aware of the risks involved in taking a sympathetic view of Nazi Germany. In a moment of clarity, in a letter to his wife in December 1941 he revealed the fate he saw for himself and for Europe if Germany was defeated:

> It's impossible to stop pondering the course of world events and I am anxious about the future. It really does look as if Germany was on the defensive and that the blockade was becoming a problem. Can it be overcome? Or is this war to end like the last one – in a catastrophe for Germany? For me that would mean moral isolation, and for us it would mean economic retrenchment. After all, the whole of Swedish public opinion is set on an Anglo-Saxon victory and those who, like me, have sympathised with the German side will find things very restricted. From a literary and journalistic point of view I will be a dead man without even a hint of influence, and I will have to be grateful if I am not dismissed from the paper. But no doubt there will be a crust of bread left and I will share it with you just as I've shared the good years. By focusing on Heidenstam, Stagnelius and Tegnér I can move sideways to a field where people won't be able to ignore me completely, so it should be possible to put a bit of something on the bread after all.[39]

During the last years of the war Böök began to feel the consequences he had foreseen. He put politics to the side and limited his journalistic work to cultural historical articles and nature columns. His main enterprise in the following years was a series of great literary biographies: Verner von Heidenstam (1945–1946), Esaias Tegnér (1946), Victoria Benedictsson (1950) and Erik Johan Stagnelius (1954). The volumes on Heidenstam and Tegnér, in particular, are ranked among the lasting literary biographies in Swedish. According to Bertil Malmberg, his enormous creativity during these years resulted from 'the productivity of ostracisation'; and in the words of Carl Fehrman, the writing of biographies became 'a refuge, a place of sanctuary'.[40]

Böök's re-entry into literary history proved to be a lucky throw. In many ways he was a beaten man after the war and Olle Holmberg, the

literary historian and a student of Böök's, remembers seeing his old mentor on the street in Lund at the start of the 1950s, silent, tired, leaning on a cane. Holmberg remembers thinking that here was a man who had lost two world wars. The public arena that Böök had previously been so at home in now allowed him no more than limited access. In *Svenska Dagbladet*, the paper in which he had shone as one of the stars, the editor in chief Ivar Anderson refused to let him write on political topics in spite of his repeated attempts. He had little in common with the other members of the Swedish Academy and seldom attended its meetings. But as a biographer he was, however, very successful.[41]

In her thesis on Swedish literary biographies the literary scholar Inger Larsson has analysed Böök's book on Heidenstam and, to some extent, the one on Tegnér. 'Let me state at the start', she writes in the opening to her section on reception, 'that the majority of reviewers of *Heidenstam* and also of *Esaias Tegnér* do *not* write anything that questions Böök's ideological standpoint or suggests that they considered the biographies to be justifications of self'. Having said that, however, she still had to admit that there were more or less clear political references and allusions in at least a third of the reviews of those volumes. The reading of the Heidenstam biography by critics such as Stig Ahlgren, Hugo Kamras, Ingemar Wizelius and Per-Olof Zennström was in part political, and there were those who distanced themselves in more general terms from Böök's version of the nationalist Heidenstam. But there were also those who drew parallels between the political naivety of the author and that of his subject, between Heidenstam's lofty patriotism and Böök's enthusiasm for Great Sweden and all things German. As the discussion progressed, Nazism and the very recent world war were often hinted at in interpolations but sometimes also explicitly. The memory of Böök's notorious 4 October 1940 speech was still fresh in people's minds when the Tegnér biography was published in 1946. Several reviewers questioned his suitability as biographer and set about saving Tegnér from Böök's malevolent interpretations, in particular the idea that Tegnér's admiration for Napoleon was a constant. This was an explosive issue that Böök had gone into back in 1940 and which had not become any less explosive in the intervening years, particularly in view of the fact that Tegnér's poem 'Det eviga' (The Eternal) had been imbued with such value as a humanistic symbol during the war years. Reviewers also drew a parallel between the biographer and his subject. Viveka Heyman, for instance, pointed out that Böök's relationship with Tegnér had always been an aspect of his relationship with Germany and that, as a result, contemporary events shine through in 'the chapters dealing with Tegnér's (read Böök's) attitude to Napoleon (read Hitler)'.[42]

Those who read Böök's literary biographies as products of his ideological views were, however, in a minority and the books were on the whole well received by Swedish critics. But Böök was soon to become aware that tolerance was conditional and did not imply absolution for his political sins. In December 1947 he gave a speech at the formal meeting of the Swedish Academy, in which he voiced the disquiet and anxiety felt by himself and the postwar world with its bombed-out cities and nuclear threat. He invoked Geijer, who had embraced both destruction and renewal and he affirmed the idea of 'surrendering oneself unconditionally, even to the dark depths that we cannot penetrate, whatever comforting name we might give them'. Once again he was putting all his hope in fate, but this time without alluding to the demons of the moment.[43]

A few days later Herbert Tingsten, Böök's main adversary from the autumn of 1940, reacted. In an article in *Dagens Nyheter* he called the speech peculiarly repulsive in that it voiced at one and the same moment paeans to life and then to death, at one and the same moment to the king and then to the people, all in a spirit of universal servility. Tingsten wrote: 'The very thought that just a few years ago this same man was acting as a mouthpiece for the court of Hitler – who seemed to be the very embodiment of fate at that point – makes it all unbearable. Does official hypocrisy have no limits?' But it was not so much the officious and pathetic tone that really jarred, it was Böök's attempt to justify the past and draw a veil over it. 'Hamsun's speech in his own defence, and even Quisling's defence, seem honourable when set beside this mendacious attempt at an alibi', was Tingsten's biting conclusion.[44]

Tingsten returned to the attack a few years later. After a period of ill health at the start of the 1950s, Böök returned to the scene with two books of memoirs and self-examination. In 1953 he published *Rannsakan* (Soul-searching) which was partly a series of portraits of people he had known during his early years in Lund and partly fragments of autobiography that focused on Böök's own religious and philosophical development. His spiritual and intellectual history followed a dialectical and diverse course, along which he was torn between Burckhardt, Hegel and Marx, between idealism and materialism, between literature and politics, will and contemplation. The book took the form of an act of meditation, a thoughtful examination of a long and varied life, packed with personal memories and pictures of the past. 'The press received *Rannsakan* with such devastating criticism that it is hard to explain it other than by saying that a dam of suppressed aggression against the author had burst', Svante Nordin writes in his biography of Böök. 'The extent of Böök's moral isolation, which had been concealed by the

favourable reception of his literary biographies, was again made clear. Yet again Böök was having to pay for the deficit in credit and credibility he had brought on himself by his stance during the war. But he also learnt how isolated he was in his view of the contemporary world situation. In Cold War Sweden he took a "third standpoint" and that did not even have the redeeming feature of being shared by a like-minded group.'[45]

Nordin's description of the situation is apt but does not fully capture the split that was visible in the majority of the reviews. Many of the reviewers, including some of the most hostile, praised the vitality of the style and the excellent depictions of milieux. The target of the savage criticism was Böök's ideological argumentation, his unwillingness to really dig deep into his own biography and his tendency to place the war crimes committed by the Western powers on an equal footing with the evils of the totalitarian regimes. The harshest critic, not surprisingly, was Herbert Tingsten, who flayed Böök and his book in a lengthy review on the day of publication. *Rannsakan* was inevitably putting the case for the defence and was self-exultation flowering 'in the fertile soil of sin'. Since Böök's penitence was general – all human beings are sinners, him as much as the rest – there was no need for him to go into his own failings. Tingsten, however, was in no doubt as to the failings Böök had to confess. 'We don't need to do more than recall that ten years ago Professor Böök was proclaiming the victory of Nazism and the necessity of bowing down before the conqueror', he wrote and, recalling the Tegnér speech, he continued: 'In short, during the glory days of Nazism Professor Böök in Lund saw Hitler as a man sent by providence, just as Professor Hegel in Jena, on seeing Napoleon on his horse, saw "the spirit of the world"'. Böök's only solution was to preach a relativist gospel, which made it possible for him to conclude that a totalitarian regime did not differ significantly from a democratic one. Naturally enough this aroused Tingsten's ire, which was directed in particular at the insidious criticism of democracy that was interwoven with Böök's confession. 'Professor Böök did not throw away his weapons when he donned the garb of the penitent. There is still plenty of Hitler's defender left in him', Herbert Tingsten concluded. Böök was stigmatised, then, by allusions to Nazism, by locating him in the same context as Hitler. His political stance placed him clearly within the Nazi sphere of association.[46]

Ivar Harrie's squaring of accounts in *Expressen* followed the same pattern. His whole personal ethos, what gave him an advantage over Böök right from the start, derived from the recognition that he was morally superior to his opponent. In a review that lacked nothing in sarcasm

and condescension, Harrie went to work on what he considered to be Böök's sickening attempt to present himself as mild and conciliatory. This Fredrik Böök, 'who rejoiced spontaneously when Hitler entered Vienna and Prague', was actually quite the reverse: he was a standard bearer of fanaticism and phariseeism. He had been trumpeting his dark words about the interchangeability of ideologies in the autumn of 1940 and his dialectical worldview had not changed since then. Böök was a man discredited for ever and Harrie found his humanistic pleas risible. But like Tingsten he found it impossible not to be seduced by Böök's skill as a writer, although it was a case of seduction rapidly turning to disgust: 'You have to condemn his ideology, and his unctuousness makes you vomit. Nevertheless, when opposing him, you wonder whether there is an element of envy there, pure and simple envy. How can a man who is so wrong write Swedish that is so right, that is right to the nearest millimetre, that is so infinitely much better than that of those who think right?'[47]

Rannsakan encountered similar reactions elsewhere. The author's habit of glossing things over demonstrates that he has never seriously desired to do much soul-searching. On the contrary, his exculpations serve to reinforce the feeling that the same wartime sympathies still exist, that at bottom he remains what he always has been. The idea that it was all six of one and half a dozen of the other, the relativism that erased the distinction between the gas chambers in German-occupied Poland and the bombing of Hiroshima, was seen as no more than one element of his apologia.[48] The positive notices that did appear restricted themselves almost exclusively to the literary and biographical aspects of the book and left the ideology and outlook to one side.[49]

The following year, 1954, Fredrik Böök published *Betraktelse* (Reflection), another book of self-examination, this time more focused on politics. Inspired by prominent figures in the philosophy of history and in *realpolitik* – from Talleyrand and Tocqueville to Butterfield and Kennan – he attempted an unemotional survey of the postwar world, a world in which Europe was squeezed between the two Great Powers. Böök's view was an unmistakably pessimistic one.[50]

The reception of *Betrakelse* was at least as negative as the previous year's volume. Once again Tingsten went on the attack. Böök's book made a general call for reconciliation and understanding, but when the editor in chief of *Dagens Nyheter* scraped away the surface he revealed 'the angry polemicist against democracy, the admirer of strong men, of dictatorship and absolutism'. The same relativism that had ranked democracy and dictatorship on the same level in the previous book was still present in this one. Other papers struck a similar note, but a

certain weariness is visible, as if the reviews were merely duty-bound. Ivar Harrie exclaimed in his review that he no longer had the energy to be rude to Böök. 'To enter into an argument with the muddled world politics in his new book […] – would be to waste one's powder on dead Böök's', he said, but still insisted on pointing out how captivating the prose was, so captivating that the reader did not notice that 'the whole thing is a plea, a speech in defence of Hitler's Reich'. There was no doubt that Böök was a man dethroned, a remnant of an age that was past. His attempts to draw a veil over his own personal shortcomings did nothing to rehabilitate his honour. There was no longer anyone who would take his views and arguments seriously. He was not merely scorned and tainted: he was also harmless and insignificant.[51]

The case of Böök is an unusually clear-cut example of partial stigmatisation. It was still possible for him to win respect as a literary biographer, but he was met with accusations of Nazism whenever he attempted to comment on his own age. The moment he approached anything political, his past caught up with him and he became part of the Nazi sphere of association. The crippling effect of the stigma can be seen in the press reaction to his books. The arguments against him did not have to be particularly careful, references to the Tegnér speech and reminders of his pro-Germanism were usually quite sufficient. Pathos ruled over logos. Even more remarkable was the self-evident nature of the ethos of Böök's critics. They had history on their side and they spoke with the authority of the righteous. No one was left in any doubt as to who occupied the moral high ground, who represented the future and who belonged to the past.

In a letter to Ingemar Hedenius, the critic Knut Jaensson talked of Böök as 'an endless source of inspiration'. 'If it wasn't for the fact he was so well off he ought to be paid a percentage on all our polemical articles', Jaensson wrote. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s Fredrik Böök was a stigmatised figure. A group of culture-radical intellectuals with Tingsten at their head attacked him with particular brutality – they formed a sort of anti-Nazi guard on Swedish public opinion. As far as they were concerned he was a red rag, perhaps more of an irritant than a real threat. If he stuck to literary biography, they left him alone; if he returned to political issues, they struck. That was the way partial stigmatisation operated.[52]

The Wittenberg Case

Secondary stigmatisation is the most elusive and difficult to pin down of the types although in many ways it is the most interesting. It shows

that in the process of branding National Socialism, other traditions, too, are rejected – patterns of thinking that were not necessarily related to National Socialism but which even years after the war were still included in its sphere of association. One example that occurred in an academic environment will serve to turn the spotlight on the mechanisms of indirect stigmatisation.

One of the most striking cases with regard to professional preferment took place in academic Sweden at the end of the 1940s. The Wittenberg Case, as it became known, set in train a tangled web of expert pronouncements, rejections and appeals. In many ways the Wittenberg Case was a personal tragedy, a painful reverse for an individual, but what is at issue in this context is the way it reflected attitudes in the world of intellectual and academic culture in the early postwar period. In the present context the Wittenberg Case really bursts into flame when it is interpreted as a form of secondary stigmatisation.[53]

Erich Helmut Wittenberg was born into a middle-class Jewish family in Hamburg in 1907. His father, a lawyer by profession, had been decorated during the First World War and considered himself to be German through and through. The family moved to Berlin and there Wittenberg began studying history, philosophy, political science and related subjects under a number of the leading authorities of the day. In 1933 his studies culminated with his thesis on August Bebel's educational ideas. When the Nazis came to power he was forced to interrupt his academic career and in 1935 he came to Sweden as a refugee. He settled in Lund, set about learning Swedish and wrote various articles and essays both for the daily press and for professional journals, his specialist area being the history of German philosophy and ideas, nineteenth-century idealism in particular. By the time he became a Swedish citizen in 1945 he had published a considerable number of reviews, essays and articles and made a name for himself in intellectual circles in Sweden. In May 1948 Wittenberg applied for a readership (*docentur*) in the history of political ideas at Lund University. That was the background to the Wittenberg Case.[54]

After some difficulty in finding external assessors of Wittenberg's application, the Humanities section of the Philosophical Faculty settled on two professors of political science: Fredrik Lagerroth, who professed the discipline in Lund, and Herbert Tingsten, who was editor in chief of *Dagens Nyheter* at that point, but who as a political scientist had specialised in particular in the history of political ideas. The expert reports of these two men pointed in diametrically opposite directions. Lagerroth testified to Wittenberg's learned and versatile record of publication, witnessed to his scholarly merits and concluded by declaring him qualified for the readership for which he had applied. Tingsten,

however, was blisteringly critical of Wittenberg's scholarly production and condemned him with the crushing judgment: 'Since I consider W's writings to be weak and in many cases positively substandard, it seems to me self-evident that he is not qualified for a readership.' Tingsten's biting words led to a response by Wittenberg, in which he countered Tingsten point by point. Meanwhile one of the staff of the Humanities section, the literary historian Olle Holmberg, voiced criticism of aspects of one of the specimen publications, an essay on Heinrich Mann's political ideas. Holmberg's intervention led to an exchange of views between him and Wittenberg. In the April of 1949, after exhaustive discussion, the section voted by eleven votes to seven to reject Wittenberg's application for a readership. But that was not the end of the matter. In a written appeal to the national chancellor of Swedish universities and copied to the Humanities section in Lund, Wittenberg argued his case with renewed force. The majority of the professors in the section did not, however, consider that any decisive new evidence had been produced and they rejected the appeal, as did the chancellor, citing the same reason. Wittenberg then appealed to the king. Any conclusion was now delayed further by the decision of the cabinet to call in an extra specialist moderator, Carl Arvid Hessler, a professor at Uppsala University. His report was to a considerable extent in agreement with Tingsten's and so once again there was a rejection. In one last appeal Wittenberg responded to Hessler's report, but to no effect: Erich Wittenberg's appeal was definitely rejected by the government.[55]

At that point the Wittenberg Case could just have been written off as one of a series of prolonged and fierce cases of academic preferment, even though it was rather more fierce and prolonged than usual. But there are aspects of the case that mean that it should not simply be shelved. In order to dig deeper into the case we need to characterise Wittenberg in intellectual terms and to use his biography to find out what he represented in the Swedish academic sphere during the years following the Second World War. There was, at bottom, a major clash between the ideals that were now advancing and the older traditions that were being repudiated.

Given his great admiration for German idealistic humanism Wittenberg was a *rara avis* in 1940s Sweden. There were a few theologians, humanists and artists who shared his views, but there can be no doubt that there would have been many more if he had been active a few decades earlier.[56] When he mobilised Fichte, Burckhardt and Meinecke against the Nazis during the war years, seeing them as the salvation from barbarism, he stood more or less alone. From an ideological point of view he could most easily be associated with the anti-Nazi German

aristocrats who, led by Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg, carried out the failed assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler on 20 July 1944.

Wittenberg had been an intellectual opponent of Nazism from a German national conservative perspective ever since the 1930s. In one publication after another he had argued that there was an essential difference between Nazism and conservatism. In the middle of his long struggle for preferment he had written an article on precisely that theme in a *festschrift* to Fredrik Lagerroth (*nota bene*). He drew up a long list of antitheses to demonstrate the distinction between Bismarck's Germany and Hitler's:

> On this side a constitutional state, on that a violent state; on this a constitutional monarchy, on that a totalitarian state; on this a small German state, on that a pan-German power; on this military and dynastic leadership, on that a Führer state on racial foundations; on this the military subject to political leadership, on that the warrior as the sole ideal and purpose of politics and culture; on this a centuries old monarchical tradition as the firm foundation of the empire, on that a radical break with the German political and cultural tradition.[57]

That was not an outlook shared by everyone in Sweden, far from it. Wittenberg discovered that when he reviewed Herbert Tingsten's book *De konservativa idéerna* (Conservative Ideas) in 1940. In a long and very critical review Wittenberg argued against various aspects of Tingsten's interpretation of conservatism. In the exchange that followed in *Historisk tidskrift* (Historical Journal) it emerged that their differences were many, not least when it came to the relationship between conservatism and contemporary political trends.[58]

In spite of the fact that Wittenberg had repudiated Nazism so definitely, despite the fact that as a Jew himself he had been forced to flee Germany, he was repeatedly associated with Nazism. It was evident that Wittenberg's German national conservatism and philosophical idealism made him susceptible to being attacked for Nazi sympathies.[59] This interpretation of Wittenberg as the representative of a worldview is necessary to any analysis of his case. Herbert Tingsten's, Olle Holmberg's and Carl Arvid Hessler's presentations of the case all rest on arguments and strategies that witness to their view of what Wittenberg stood for. That was also true of many of the others who were involved in and expressed an opinion on the issue, but Tingsten, Holmberg and Hessler are particularly relevant since they produced written reports that weighed heavily against Wittenberg. To all intents and purposes, they were the ones who decided the outcome of the case.

In his expert report Tingsten focused in particular on Wittenberg's attempts to rescue conservatism from the clutches of Nazism. After an

introductory section in which he condemns Wittenberg's doctoral thesis as an utterly mediocre compilation of reports and obscure reflections, he characterised Wittenberg's programme as follows:

> W.'s writings after his move to Sweden should be understood against the background of his political outlook. This may best be described as a version of German conservatism and nationalism with strong links to the idealistic philosophy of his homeland. Since this is the philosophy that to a considerable extent is used to legitimate Nazism (a movement W. repudiates), and since non-German authors have often pointed out that it has provided impulses to the Nazi outlook, W. has made it his main concern to place the writers in question in what he considers to be the 'right' light, i.e. to show that their outlook coincides with his own. In short, W. is competing with the Nazis for the great German masters. This attitude does not, of course, in itself preclude worthwhile research and analysis. But in the case of W. it takes the form of incorrect, unreasonable and contradictory statements, a humanising whitewash of the German models.[60]

Tingsten's rejection of Wittenberg as a scholar draws much of its rhetorical force from this prelude. He conceded that Wittenberg had repudiated Nazism but he nevertheless attributed to him the same view that had legitimated and stimulated the 'might is right' doctrine of the brownshirts. By presenting it as a case of self-justification, he cast suspicion on Wittenberg's efforts to show the purported ancestors of Nazism in a proper light. He suggested that Wittenberg, in order to realise his programme, had whitewashed his German models and contravened the principles of scholarship. In what followed, Tingsten reinforced his argument with examples drawn from right across Wittenberg's collected writings. Elevated thoughts about, for instance, Fichte, Hegel, Treitschke and Nietzsche were given no quarter by Tingsten, who claimed emphatically that they were the philosophers of nationalistic might and therefore the forerunners of Nazism. In Tingsten's view Fichte's *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat* (The Closed Commercial State), for instance, led one's 'thoughts directly to the communist and Nazi dictatorships of the day', and on the topic of Hegel he wrote: 'W. even manages to make Hegel an adherent of freedom of thought. Formally that is, of course, quite correct: Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin have similarly praised freedom of thought – Hegel does so in a similar way.' The essence of Tingsten's argument is that Wittenberg had misrepresented the German thinkers in order to rehabilitate them. His eager attempts to absolve them had led him to shut his eyes to the ominous larger tradition these philosophers were part of. Wittenberg was – according to a quotation Tingsten borrowed from a review by Ingemar Hedenius – 'typical of what may be expected to become the established – in the bad sense – German way of reasoning'.[61]

This last quotation goes to the heart of the issue: Erich Wittenberg was a stereotypical representative of the German outlook that was associated with irrationalism and idealism, with myth and the worship of power. Rhetorically speaking, Tingsten was able to brand this line of tradition by linking it with Nazism. But it is not possible to reduce his argumentation to a sort of *guilt by association* in which superficial similarities were used as a pretext for condemnation. What Tingsten was striving to do was to show that Fichte's nationalism, Hegel's doctrine of power and Nietzsche's superman all existed within the circle of thought that had bred Nazism. Tingsten's conclusion was that if we are to rid ourselves of National Socialism once and for all, we must oppose and combat this whole sphere of ideas. Wittenberg's efforts to rescue its reputation were inappropriate, valueless and doomed to failure, he meant.

Olle Holmberg's contribution concentrated on Wittenberg's essay on Heinrich Mann's political ideas. At first sight he seems to be focusing mainly on inaccurate quotations and readings, but his piece also has a clear direction. Holmberg returned time after time to Wittenberg's effort to ascribe views to Mann that the latter had never held. He argued against Wittenberg's disparaging judgments of Mann. Wherever Wittenberg downgraded Mann's contributions, Holmberg upgraded them; wherever Wittenberg saw a socialist fellow-traveller and uncultured internationalist, Holmberg saw friend of peace, an enlightened man, a scourge of Prussianism. It is reasonable to assume that what lay behind the dispute was not just the evaluation of an individual authorship but profound differences in outlook. But Holmberg never indulged in condemnation on the same scale as Tingsten.[62]

He did, however, remove the self-imposed gag once the case was over. In an article in *Dagens Nyheter* in July 1951 he revealed a similar view of Wittenberg to that held by Tingsten. Just as Tingsten's report had done he found Wittenberg not guilty of the accusations of Nazism, but he then followed it up with an unmistakable insinuation:

> Dr W. has had a stroke of luck in his life though he perhaps does not know it: it is the fact that he is a Jew. Where would he have ended up in terms of ideology if he had been something else, one might ask oneself? As it is he has revealed opinions that seem strange to be coming from a German-Jewish refugee. There was a time during the 1930s when the university teacher Ivan Pauli, who was unaware of his origins, polemicised against him believing him to be a Nazi.[63]

As far as Holmberg was concerned, Wittenberg's Jewish background was not so much a mitigating circumstance as the only thing that had saved him from truly unpleasant aberrations. In spite of him being a

Jew he embraced the same kind of ideals as the Nazis; in spite of him being a Jew 'modern humanitarian democratic internationalism based on a radical affirmation of the principles of freedom, equality and fraternity was utterly alien to him'. Olle Holmberg found it incomprehensible that a Jew in Sweden after 1945 could be anything other than a straightforward man of the Enlightenment.[64]

It is also possible to pick out a particular tendency in Carl Arvid Hessler's report. His judgment was not as merciless as Tingsten's but he presented Wittenberg as a confused mediocrity, better at abstracting and commenting than at coming up with any real insights. More interesting, however, is the fact that he viewed the bulk of Wittenberg's writings as 'a plea in defence of idealism in German cultural life' and in 'his striving to glorify this Wittenberg can sometimes write the most peculiar sentences'. As an example, Hessler referred to Wittenberg's efforts to absolve Rudolf Kjellén of all responsibility for Nazism without even examining the connection between Kjellén's geopolitics and the Nazi doctrines of *Lebensraum*. Time after time Wittenberg's indefatigable attempts to idealise certain German thinkers led him into profound contradictions. Hessler more than any of the others emphasised the lack of farsightedness that characterised Wittenberg's work, in particular his tendency to adopt the arguments of conservative writers wholesale at the same time as attacking those who did not share his views. 'When it comes to describing Heinrich Mann's political ideas Wittenberg reveals a level of aggression only matched by the slavish admiration with which he generally follows his own conservative authorities', Hessler wrote. All in all, Hessler judged Wittenberg to be an archetypical unrepentant German idealist given to the sort of bombastic phraseology characteristic of that tendency. Dispassionate analysis and empirical broadmindedness were not to the taste of a man who refused to see where the tradition of idealism had led.[65]

Wittenberg's critics were essentially in agreement on major points. All of them described his scholarship as that of a mediocre epigon who was more persistent in taking the side of fellow-believers than in seeking the truth. More significant, however, was his role as representative of an antiquated and hateful tradition, and this was the fundamental reason why Tingsten, Holmberg and Hessler judged him so harshly. And that is also what is characteristic of secondary stigmatisation: by defending German conservative idealism, which was the ultimate source of Nazism, Wittenberg posed a potential threat to the anti-Nazi position.

Taken out of context the Wittenberg Case could have been any one of a string of feuds about academic preferment, but when viewed in its

historical context an underlying pattern becomes apparent. The case cannot be reduced to nothing more than a simple political campaign or ideological conflict – it involves too many other aspects that cannot be ignored. Nevertheless it does demonstrate that the purging of Nazi influence and guarding against any recurrence took a variety of forms. It was not only Nazi sympathisers who were anathematised; the flames of the fire licked around everything that was involved in a wider sphere of Nazi association.[66]

The Repertoire of Stigmatisation

The cases of Fredrik Böök and Erich Wittenberg are virtually archetypical examples of two of the main types of stigmatisation, in one case partial and the other secondary. They are instructive, but more material is needed if we are to draw general conclusions. Although it is impossible to carry out a full survey, a number of significant examples will illustrate the wider repertoire of stigmatisation.

There are a good many examples of partial stigmatisation. Apart from Fredrik Böök, one of the most revealing cases is that of Zarah Leander (1907–1981). Leander began her career as a cabaret artist at the end of the 1920s and to further her career she soon moved to Germany and Austria, where her deep contralto voice and special stage presence brought her fame. With her many films, recordings and performances she became one of the most popular artists in Nazi Germany. When she returned to Sweden in 1943 she was not welcome on the Swedish stage and spent the following years on her farm at Lönö in Östergötland before making a comeback in 1949 with the support of her friend and well-known anti-Nazi revue artist Karl Gerhard. During the 1950s and 1960s she continued her career as a singer and film actress in Scandinavia and West Germany and was still appearing before enthusiastic audiences in her seventies. But her career in the Third Reich did, however, cast a shadow over the whole of her career.[67] Her return to the Swedish stage in the summer of 1949 provoked some press reaction, although it cannot be said to have sparked off any real debate. At this point two main biographical narratives formed around Leander and Nazism. In the first of them Leander was the naïve diva, the blue-eyed young artiste who had gone out into the world and made her name: she was an apolitical creature, neither interested in, nor with any understanding of, politics, a prima donna who simply wanted to please and entertain. Over against this was the other narrative, the narrative of *die Leander*, a morally questionable woman in the entertainment industry who was happy to consort with the grandees of the Third Reich and to

act in Nazi propaganda films without any moral scruples. Some people felt that the fact she was allowed to perform again meant that Sweden wanted to forgive and forget. 'The Hitler period is to be erased from the public memory, so much is obvious', Erwin Leiser wrote in a critical commentary. But for much of the postwar period the narrative of the naïve and apolitical diva would be the dominant one.[68]

The explorer Sven Hedin (1865–1952) is another well-known case. Ever since the end of the nineteenth century he had been one of the most notable cultural figures in Sweden, a geographer and populariser on a grand scale, but also a conservative patriot of the Great Sweden variety who was profoundly engaged in questions of defence and foreign policy, particularly at the time of the First World War. As a result of his anti-Bolshevism and pan-Germanism his support of Nazi Germany was considerably more wholehearted than that of many others who were partially stigmatised. Hedin had viewed the Third Reich as a Germanic bastion in a Europe that was surrounded and he defended the Nazi New Order until the last days of the war. He had been marginalised step by step during the war years, restricted to writing in openly Nazi organs and he had continued to deny the imminent defeat of Germany until the last minute. Even when Germany capitulated in May 1945 Hedin persisted, although with no response from the wider Swedish public. In spite of taking the side of the Third Reich, however, Hedin was only partially stigmatised. His reputation as an author and scientist seems to have been so solidly founded that he could not be totally deposed. He made a comeback in 1949 with his apologia *Utan uppdrag i Berlin* (*Sven Hedin's German Diary, 1935–1942*), but Swedish critics were quick to dismiss it. Rehabilitation of a sort began with his death in 1952: the emphasis on his politics was muted and his journeys of exploration brought to the fore. Sten Selander, who succeeded Hedin to Chair no. 6 in the Swedish Academy, struck the new tone in his speech on taking up his seat in the Academy. He presented Hedin as a man of action whose adventurous life was like schoolboy dreams brought to life. The greater part of the necrologue was devoted to Hedin's journeys in Asia and only towards the end did Selander touch on his predecessor's ideological outlook. Without attempting to defend him, Selander sought an explanation in Hedin's historical romanticism and love of Germany, presenting him as an essentially nineteenth-century man out of his time, who had been so naïve that he had failed to recognise that the men in Berlin were a league of mass-murderers. His support of Hitler was seen as an example of Hedin's blindness, something he himself had had to atone for during the last years of his life: 'We Swedes often have a short memory for our great men and show

them scant gratitude. Everything Sven Hedin had achieved before 1939 was forgotten and the only things left were his political aberrations.' Postwar biographies of Hedin followed the line set by Selander and the man of the vast plains of Asia was saved from the devastating stigma of Nazism.[69]

The academic world contained many people who showed considerable sympathy for the Third Reich even during the Second World War, but they were nevertheless permitted to continue in their professional functions after 1945. At Lund University – which seems to have more examples to offer than other seats of learning – the following might be mentioned: Gottfrid Carlsson (historian, 1887–1964), Lizzie Carlsson (historian, 1892–1974), Herman Nilsson-Ehle (geneticist, 1873–1949), Hugo Odeberg (theologian, 1898–1973), Karl Olivecrona (jurist, 1897–1980) and Erik Rooth (Germanist, 1889–1986). They were permitted to continue as teachers and researchers without being investigated, in the case of Olivecrona actually becoming a respected dean of the Faculty of Law. But even though they held on to their academic positions they nevertheless fall into the category of partial stigmatisation. Just as Böök had withdrawn into the protected enclave of literary history, the Lund professors retreated into the world of the university. Their wartime outlook was common knowledge and so they were allowed only the most limited influence in the world of public affairs in the postwar decades.[70]

Kurt Atterberg (1887–1974), on the other hand, was investigated in the wake of the Second World War. Ever since the 1920s he had been one of the most influential composers, critics and organisers in Swedish musical life, frequently in opposition to those who supported modernism. In cultural terms his orientation was towards Germany, where he had been active professionally after 1933 and cultivated contacts with the musical establishment of Nazi Germany. At the end of the war, when Atterberg was accused of Nazi sympathies, he defended his involvement with the Third Reich by pointing out that he had never adopted a political stance. In order to clear his reputation he himself took the initiative in a so-called Nazi investigation in the autumn of 1945. When the results were made public in the spring of 1946 it was clear that Atterberg had been absolved. In spite of that, the ethnologist Petra Garberding, who has analysed this case in her thesis, stresses the fact that Atterberg never completely lost the Nazi taint. The discussions in the press at the time revealed critical voices which did not share the conclusions reached by the investigators. And a younger generation of composers showed no interest in him at all, a stigmatised man whose political preferences were as out of tune with the times as his aesthetic.[71]

One particular form of stigmatisation was the posthumous variety. It might be assumed that people who had shown Nazi sympathies at an earlier stage but died before the end of the war would have been granted 'die Gnade des frühen Todes' ('the mercy of an early death') – to adopt and adapt Helmut Kohl's words. Examples of the opposite are, however, more interesting and Verner von Heidenstam (1859–1940) offers a clear-cut case. Heidenstam changed ideological loyalties during his lifetime and various different groupings would like to claim him as their own: socialists, liberals and finally conservatives. His biographer, Per I. Gedin, stresses that he was pro-German, anti-Bolshevik, an admirer of strong men and that during the 1930s he frequented circles that were sympathetic towards Nazi Germany. On the other hand, however, he contests the suggestion that Heidenstam himself was a Nazi. The view taken by posterity is of most significance in a context of this sort and on numerous occasions during the postwar period more or less explicit accusations were made that Heidenstam had been a Nazi sympathiser. The issue has been studied by Martin Kylhammar, a historian of ideas and of literature, who dismisses the charges and considers them to be 'a biographical factoid'.[72]

The cases of partial stigmatisation considered here have many features in common. Initially, in the context of the end of the war and the years that followed, people were called to account, or there were attempts to do so. A number of the best known individuals – Böök, Leander, Hedin – were put in a sort of quarantine during the second half of the 1940s and barred from making any political statements. The people who survived stigmatisation best were those who refrained from all political activity and restricted themselves strictly to their professional fields – the Lund academics are an excellent example. During this period public monitoring was used in the service of the anti-Nazi cause. The pressure eased around 1950 and some were then allowed to return to their careers while others were rehabilitated – but always on condition that they did not re-enter the political arena – if they did, the stigma was reactivated. The timing of these changes in Sweden followed essentially the same pattern as in the rest of Western Europe.

What was revealed in the Wittenberg Case was a process of secondary stigmatisation. Erich Wittenberg became the victim of ostracisation irrespective of his anti-Nazism. There are few examples of the mechanisms of indirect branding as obvious as that, although there is no shortage of instances of related forms of secondary stigmatisation. In terms of their expression and their effects, they were milder, but they still throw light on the general connection between experience, historical lesson and expectation during the early postwar period.

As a critic, poet and botanist, Sten Selander (1891–1957), was one of the influential intellectuals of the interwar years. At an early stage he had condemned Nazism for its primitivism and for its disruption of civilisation; during the Second World War he was initially a 'Finland Activist', but after 1940 he worked primarily in defence of bourgeois humanism and national culture. In the early postwar period Selander nevertheless became a victim of accusations of Nazi sympathies. The background to this is to be found in his ambivalent attitude to the victory of artistic modernism. As a poet, Selander had been influenced by modernist tendencies, but during the 1930s and 1940s he took an increasingly critical stance to a literary aesthetic that had become more and more a sort of *l'art pour l'art*, divorced from human needs and engagement with society. The 1946 'incomprehensibility debate' sparked by Selander's critical review of Erik Lindegren's modernist collection of poems *mannen utan väg* turned into a veritable trial of strength between him and the younger generation of writers of the 1940s. Karl Vennberg belonged to the advance guard of the modernists and in a number of articles he portrayed Selander as a critic who was reactionary in both ideological and literary terms, a worthy successor to Fredrik Böök in every respect. Vennberg dropped insidious hints that Selander was following in his predecessor's political footprints and showing the same kind of understanding of the aims of the Nazis. The secondary stigmatisation caused by these hints cannot per se have decided the incomprehensibility debate in favour of the writers of the 1940s, but by branding one of their main opponents as being influenced by Nazism they not only sullied Selander's reputation, but they also undermined the opposition to literary modernism.[73]

The composer and music journalist Moses Pergament (1893–1977) was also the object of accusations that revealed elements of secondary stigmatisation. Unlike a number of other Swedish music critics, Pergament, a man of Jewish origin but profoundly attached to the German cultural tradition, defended the appearance of the German conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler at the Stockholm Concert Hall in 1943. Furtwängler, who had never been a member of the Nazi party but was nevertheless a sort of cultural prophet in the Third Reich, was conducting Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Pergament identified himself with what he regarded as a manifestation of the other Germany – the country of Goethe and Beethoven, in which national culture and cosmopolitan humanism ran together. In the debate that followed the concert it became clear that by no means everyone saw it as a protest against the values of Nazism. Rather the reverse: leading critics showed little understanding of the distinction Pergament wanted to make

between different German traditions, and his defence of Furtwängler's guest appearance was branded as appeasement of National Socialism. Even though the accusations still surfaced after the war – the author Moa Martinson and the music critic Curt Berg accused Pergament of having fraternised with the Nazis – his stigmatisation did not have the same far-reaching effects as in the Wittenberg Case. And in this case the accusations cannot really be regarded as a conflict between different artistic ideals.[74]

The biography of the author and critic Hans Ruin (1891–1980) leads to similar conclusions. German literature and philosophy pervaded his education and he identified with a defeated Germany after the First World War. From a position of bourgeois humanism, however, Ruin emphatically objected to the political developments of the 1930s. Like Wittenberg, Selander and Pergament, he was one of the opponents of Nazism who made a distinction between the Third Reich and other German traditions. In the final phases of the war he disapproved of the behaviour of the victorious powers and expressed alarm that the civilian population would have to pay a high price in terms of retribution. But recognising that taking a public stance would be misunderstood and bring harsh criticism down on his head, he chose to say nothing. In spite of that, Ruin still occasionally found himself being rebuked in the postwar period for showing too much understanding not just for the suffering of the German people but also for elements of Nazism. The literary scholar Thomas Ek finds this puzzling but suggests an answer: 'Perhaps his bourgeois Finland-Swedish background and the generally pro-German attitude found there led to people placing him in the wrong camp almost as a matter of routine; or is it simply that his unwillingness to buy cheap solutions has been held against him?'[75]

The case of the banker Jacob Wallenberg (1892–1980) demonstrates that it was not only politicians and cultural figures who could be affected by secondary stigmatisation. Wallenberg had had close links with leading representatives of the German business world both before and during the Second World War. His political sympathies seem to have been with bourgeois critics of the Nazi regime, such as those in the ambit of the 20 July plotters, with whom he also had close personal connections. In the aftermath of the war the Wallenberg brothers were accused by the Americans of having acted as front men for the Germans and as a consequence their assets in the U.S.A. were blocked. As the managing director of the bank, Jacob Wallenberg had to carry the can and his reputation suffered badly. The Bosch Crisis as it came to be known hastened a change of leadership in the family business

and Jacob had to hand over the reins to his younger brother, Marcus Wallenberg, earlier than planned.[76]

Cases of secondary stigmatisation had features in common. The victims might well be of different political persuasions, but the examples reveal that they frequently shared bourgeois traits and sometimes a tendency to some form of conservative or traditionalist outlook. A factor that was at least as important was that they shared a desire to make a distinction between Nazi Germany and the other Germany. The limits of the National Socialist sphere of association were not the same for them as for society at large. The Wittenberg Case also revealed that at the heart of it lay a major ideational confrontation between emerging ideals and weakened traditions.[77]

Nazism as Stigma

The experiences of Nazism were the common ground for stigmatisation arising from the Nazi sphere of association, but the forms varied. Absolute stigmatisation is an adequate term for those who were considered to be Hitler's Swedish lackeys, those who usually continued defending National Socialism after 1945 and who were consequently completely excluded from the public arena. Those who were partially stigmatised, not infrequently people with elevated cultural or social profiles, had, in judgment of posterity, fraternised inappropriately with Nazism during the war years but could – albeit with their wings clipped – continue with their professional activities after the war. The discharge they were given was, however, a conditional one: if they became involved in politics or if they defended their actions, they were immediately anathematised. Secondary stigmatisation afflicted people who had never been supporters of Nazism but who nevertheless found themselves within its sphere of association. They found themselves associated with aspects of National Socialism in spite of the fact that they actually belonged among its opponents.

Nazism as a Stigma in Postwar Swedish Culture

Stigmatisation was a part of the historical lesson of Nazism. Its prerequisite was the total discrediting of National Socialism. The shock effects that the terror and tyranny of the Third Reich had sent through Western societies ensured that Nazism became the most despised political object in the postwar world. The extent to which an accusation of Nazism could be used to stigmatise ideological opponents has been

compared to sitting with a trump card in one's hand: the player who played the Nazi card could destroy his opponent.[78]

The fact that Nazism could be used as a rhetorical cudgel was noted as early as the end of the 1920s. The newspaperman Torgny Segerstedt, whose democratic credentials were being questioned at that point, observed that accusations of fascism were resorted to when other arguments failed. The method remained a common one even after the Second World War: when, during the Cold War in the 1950s, the Soviet Union was likened to Nazi Germany, the polemical edge was unmistakable.[79]

But even though the stigma of Nazism was a powerful weapon in domestic debates, it cannot merely be reduced to little more than a rhetorical strategy. The stigma has to be seen in the light of Swedish postwar culture and it is important to bear in mind the way National Socialism was perceived at that time. In the first place, it was not felt that Nazism had been totally overcome. In spite of the fact that Tage Erlander, Östen Undén and other leading politicians had clearly stated that Swedish Nazis were no more than a minor irritant, there was still a significant undercurrent of concern during the first postwar years. The war may have been won and the Nazi regime defeated in Germany but an indeterminate Nazi threat still existed. Reports from the occupation zones in Germany indicated that the denazification process had come to a stop. A few years after the end of the war the fear of a Nazi restoration was very much alive and anti-Nazi preparedness for such an eventuality was still necessary.[80]

There is a second factor that goes along with this: since Nazism was still a potential threat that needed to be combated whenever it showed its head, it was necessary to strike at everything that came within the Nazi sphere of association. During the first postwar decades the dominant line of interpretation linked Nazism to continental idealism, German Romanticism and conservative nationalism. According to this tradition, Nazism was an atavistic Prussian phenomenon that conflicted with rationalist democratic modernity. The result of this was that during the first postwar years these lines of tradition were also perceived as being within the Nazi sphere of association. That did not mean that German Romanticism was condemned as unreservedly as National Socialism, but it did mean that German Romanticism could in certain circumstances be tainted by the stigma of Nazism, particularly if it was brought into a political context.

In the Wittenberg Case these two factors went hand in hand – the threat of the continuation of Nazism and the interpretation of the origins of Nazism. The currents of fear and recognition flowed together when he – as a representative of the currents that had fed Nazism – stepped

forward. Anyone who wanted to combat Nazism also had to combat idealism, romanticism and nationalism.

Stigmatisation was usually followed by marginalisation. That, of course, affected those who had been absolutely stigmatised by making it impossible for them to regain any public standing after the war. Those who were partially stigmatised were also circumscribed and directed to non-political spheres of activity. But there is good reason not to equate stigmatisation with marginalisation. Stigma could in the long run actually guarantee the individual a degree of fame, albeit herostratic fame. Would any attention have been paid today to someone like Annie Åkerhielm or Rütger Essén had they not been branded as Nazis? Would Fredrik Böök or Zarah Leander have stirred the interest of posterity in the same way if they had never had the finger of suspicion pointed at them?

Stigmatisation went together with the Nazi experience and with the conclusions drawn from it. The examples also demonstrate that the lessons of Nazism had a dimension that pointed forward and was linked to expectation. The stigmatisations were thus one element in the process of breaking with the past, part of the struggle about how a broader vision of the future was to be achieved. The Wittenberg conflict provides unequivocal evidence of that.

Those who were the driving force in opposing Erich Wittenberg were representative of a direction that became significant in the years after 1945. Their support for political democracy, rationalist modernity and the Swedish welfare state was a common denominator. Herbert Tingsten, Olle Holmberg, Ingemar Hedenius and the others who were setting the tone belonged to a generation of cultural radicals who came to the forefront in the wake of the war. In spite of differences they were united in their defence of secularism, enlightenment and materialism as well as in their opposition to the restraints imposed by traditionalism, titanic ideology and idealistic rhetoric.

It is possible, then, to see the Wittenberg Case as a link in a larger confrontation between an enlightenment tradition (which many of the trendsetters saw themselves as the products of) and the idealistic-romantic tradition (which Wittenberg was seen to represent). There is nothing to suggest that the Wittenberg Case can be limited to a conflict between different viewpoints and it reveals compelling biographical and ideological aspects which cannot be ignored. The fact that Olle Holmberg was a major player in the opposition to Wittenberg is, for instance, symptomatic. He had made a name for himself during the Second World War as a fervent anti-Nazi coming from a liberal standpoint. He wrote, he took part in debates and he gave lectures. During the

last years of the war and the first of the peace, Holmberg was involved in several notable cases at Lund University, where he featured as an active anti-Nazi and worked to have academics sympathetic to Nazism excluded from the university. That was especially true in the case of German as a subject – the historian Sverker Oredsson describes the situation as follows: 'You can say that as from 1943 there was an explosive conflict around the teaching of German and the German Department at Lund University. The protagonists in this struggle were the head of department Erik Rooth and his colleague in the humanities section Olle Holmberg, Professor of Literature. The invective they hurled at one another was so brutal that a present-day reader is amazed that they could be present in the same conference room.' The cause of the conflict was a German anthology for which Rooth had written an enthusiastic foreword. Holmberg accused it of being openly pro-Nazi. The debate raged back and forth and no sooner had the waves begun to settle than the next storm blew up, this time about the post of German lecturer in Lund. On a number of successive occasions Rooth recommended candidates who sympathised with the Nazis. Holmberg doggedly opposed them and completed his mission by purging any remaining Nazi elements even after the war was over. He sounded the alarm whenever any ex-Nazi applied for a post and he checked the German literary histories that were used at the universities in the country.[81]

Olle Holmberg's activities in the years around 1945 throw light on the way he acted in the Wittenberg Case. By the time the war ended he was already acting as a zealous agent of anti-Nazism, keen to ventilate the malodorous corners of academia and to stop all enemies of enlightenment at the gate. His intellectual profile was not a little reminiscent of that of Tingsten, Hedenius and other cultural radicals, critics and cultural commentators with whom he shared the columns of *Dagens Nyheter* for many years. Significantly, it was Holmberg who was responsible for Thomas Mann, the prime representative of the 'other Germany', being awarded an honorary doctorate by Lund University in 1949.[82]

Other cases of Nazi stigmatisation can also be seen in this context. The opposition to Sten Selander should be viewed as part of a bigger struggle about the meaning of literary modernism. Because of his criticism of the writers of the 1940s, Selander was acting as a brake on the development and institutionalisation of postwar literature. In contrast to Selander, Kurt Atterberg had actually moved among the potentates of Nazi Germany, but in the debate that revolved around him it became clear that it was not simply his personal reputation that was at stake: the stigmatisation of the composer Atterberg has to be seen against

a background of rifts in the music scene in Sweden. The National Romantic tendency that Atterberg was considered to represent was condemned – by the circle around the Monday Group, for instance – as out of tune with the times. The accusations of Nazism against Atterberg were one element in the settling of accounts with an older musical establishment. The victory of modernism was undoubtedly eased by the fact that it was perceived to be utterly and essentially distinct from National Socialism.[83]

Kurt Atterberg and Sten Selander belonged to a group of artists and intellectuals that was gradually forgotten in the decades following the war. The marginalisation that affected them also affected many of their contemporaries – figures such as Alf Ahlberg, Emilia Fogelklou, Torsten Fogelqvist, John Landquist, Ellen Key, Bertil Malmberg, Ludvig Nordström, Hans Ruin and Elin Wägner. All of them had been considered influential personalities in the cultural life of the interwar period. Only in a few cases and to a limited extent, however, could their rapid postwar marginalisation be seen as resulting from Nazi stigmatisation. It was more a case that they embodied ideals that were pushed aside during the first postwar decades. Their spiritual roots, idealistic standpoint and frequently national liberal views were out of tune with the currents that were dominant after 1945, all the more so as they often went hand in hand with ambivalent attitudes to the idea of progress, artistic modernism, industrial and technical rationality and some aspects of the welfare state project.[84]

The writer Ulrika Knutson has asked the same kind of questions about the Fogelstad Group – Emilia Fogelklou, Ada Nilsson, Elin Wägner and others – and why their ideas lost authority in the first decades after the war. She suggests a number of likely reasons: they were politically involved but they were not party members; they were active participants in the modern project but were themselves products of a nineteenth-century cultural and educational tradition; their outlook was Christian and they had a deep spiritual commitment that was little understood in a more rationalist age.[85]

All this helped set in motion a process of marginalisation at the end of the war. Martin Kylhammar has characterised the course of this process as follows:

> If we think of the public arena as a limited space in which more people want to live and be visible than there is room for, then it is obvious that there will be competition for space. Such conflicts, whether involving direct confrontation or indirect, occur for limited periods of time and in a situation stamped by certain dominant aesthetic and political ideals. The consequences of these conflicts can, on the other hand, be enormously

> resilient and mark our perception of history. And they can do so even though the dominant aesthetic and political ideals of the present time are totally different ones.[86]

There is a good deal of evidence that stigmatisation of the Nazi sphere of association led to the possibility of expansion for other spheres of thought. When one segment of the ideological field was compressed, another could expand; when certain ideas gained admittance, others were ejected. The shifts in power depended on the particular understanding of National Socialism during the postwar years. When the historical lessons of Nazism led to the stigmatisation of the Nazi sphere of association it was not just an ideological *reaction*, it was to a very great extent part of a larger ideological *vision*.

Notes

1. T. Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (London: Penguin Press, 2005), 13–62.
2. N. Frei (ed.), *Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik: Der Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006); I. Deák, J.T. Gross and T. Judt (eds), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
3. Frei, *Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik*. The Danish and Norwegian trials are the subjects of D. Tamm, *Retsopgøret efter besættelsen*, vol. 1–2 (Copenhagen: Jurist- og økonomforbundets forlag, 1997) and, respectively, H.F. Dahl and Ø. Sørensen (eds), *Et rettferdig oppgjør?: Rettsoppgjøret i Norge etter 1945* (Oslo: Pax, 2004).
4. Judt, *Postwar*, 197–225.
5. E. François, 'Meistererzählungen und Dammbrüche: Die Erinnerung an den Zweiten Weltkrieg zwischen Nationalisierung und Universalisierung', in M. Flacke (ed.), *Mythen der Nationen: 1945 – Arena der Erinnerungen*, vol. 1 (Berlin: DHM, 2004), 16–20. I have developed this topic in several articles, particularly in J. Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget: Från patriotism till universalism under efterkrigstiden', in L.M. Andersson and M. Tydén (eds), *Sverige och Nazityskland: Skuldfrågor och moraldebatt* (Stockholm: Dialogos, 2007), J. Östling, 'Swedish Narratives of the Second World War: A European Perspective', *Contemporary European History* (2) (2008) and J. Östling, 'The Rise and Fall of Small-State Realism: Sweden and the Second World War', in H. Stenius, M. Österberg and J. Östling (eds), *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011).

6. François, 'Meistererzählungen und Dammbrüche'; Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*; Judt, *Postwar*, 61–62.
7. See for instance Deák, Gross and Judt, *The Politics of Retribution in Europe* and Frei, *Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik*.
8. 'Hemmanazisterna blott ett irritationsmoment', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 13 October 1945. With regard to *Dagsposten* see S. Bruchfeld, 'Grusade drömmar: Svenska "nationella" och det tyska nederlaget 1945', in C. Brylla, B. Almgren and F.M. Kirsch (eds), *Bilder i kontrast: Interkulturella processer Sverige/Tyskland i skuggan av nazismen 1933–1945* (Ålborg: Institut für Sprache und internationale Kulturstudien, 2005), 63–65.
9. A.W. Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen: Aspekter på andra världskriget* (Stockholm: Prisma, 2006), 280.
10. Quoted from Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 277.
11. Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget', 31–34.
12. For a Danish discussion see C. Bryld and A. Warring, *Besættelsestiden som kollektiv erindring* (Roskilde: Dansk Historisk Faellesraad, 1999), 35–38 and 75–137.
13. E. Wallberg, *Övervakningen av nazister och högerextremister: Säkerhetstjänst, nazism och högerextremism 1946–1980* (Stockholm, SOU 2002:94), 11; R. Bokholm, *Tisdagsklubben: Om glömda antinazistiska sanningssägare i svenskt 30-och 40-tal* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2001), 407–421; A.K. Carlstoft Bramell, *Vilhelm Moberg tar ställning: En studie av hans journalistik och tidsaktuella diktning* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2007), 243–267. Counter-narratives of various sorts appeared, for instance, in T. Nerman, *Sverige i beredskap* (Stockholm: Trots Allt, 1942); V. Moberg, *Segerstedtstriden* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1945); E. Boldt-Christmas, *Voro vi neutrala* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1946) and A. Sastamoinen, *Hitlers svenska förtrupper* (Stockholm: Federativs förlag, 1947).
14. T. Nerman, *1940 års män: Historiska citat av Richard Lindström, Allan Vougt, Harald Åkerberg, Ivar Österström* (Stockholm: Trots Allt, 1944); L.E. Hansen, *Rickard Lindström: Per Albins folkhemsvisionär?* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2007), 214–232; K. Björk, *En utskälld man: Allan Vougt och hans tid* (Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 2007), 230–242; H. Arnstad, *Spelaren Christian Günther: Sverige under andra världskriget* (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2006), 479–480.
15. S. Oredsson, *Svensk rädsla: Offentlig fruktan i Sverige under 1900-talets första hälft* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2001), 265–285; Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 276–280.
16. W.M. Carlgren, *Korten på bordet?: Svenska vitböcker om krigsårens utrikespolitik* (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska förlaget, 1989), 6–7 and 39–79. The three most important White Books were published in February 1947: *Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget: Transiteringsfrågor och därmed sammanhängande spörsmål april–juni 1940* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1947); *Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget: Transiteringsfrågan juni–december 1940* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1947); *Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940–45* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1947). A first White Book – *Förbindelserna mellan chefen för Lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition och tyske militärattachén i Stockholm 1939–1945* (Stockholm: Fritzes, 1946) – had been

published in July 1946, but it was of a different kind than the others. See Carlgren, *Korten på bordet?*, 9–39.

17. Carlgren, *Korten på bordet?*, 63–73. See also Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 278–280.
18. Wallberg, *Övervakningen av nazister och högerextremister*, 31; Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 277–278.
19. Wallberg, *Övervakningen av nazister och högerextremister*, 13–27. A particular form of anti-Nazi opinion was manifested in the debate about the return of the Baltic refugees in 1945/1946. Many articles, especially in labour movement newspapers, insinuated that dark forces were at work behind the very large actions expressing sympathy for the Baltic peoples threatened with expulsion. It was suggested that the interned Baltic soldiers were Nazi sympathisers and that the Swedes now supporting their case were in fact their ideological kindred. See C. Ekholm, *Balt- och tyskutlämningen 1945–1946: Omständigheter kring interneringen i läger i Sverige och utlämningen till Sovjetunionen av f d tyska krigsdeltagare: Utlämningen och efterspelet* (Uppsala: Studia historica Upsaliensia, 1984), 105–107 and 305–319.
20. In his diaries Tage Erlander complained about the difficulties involved in getting Nazis excluded from state service, all the more so since various professional groups tended to protect their own. 'Purge everywhere, but not within our own particular circle of acquaintances', was the motto, according to the prime minister. See T. Erlander, *Dagböcker: 1945–1949* (Hedemora: Gidlunds förlag, 2001), 89.
21. I. Brohed, *Sveriges kyrkohistoria: Religionsfrihetens och ekumenikens tid* (Stockholm: Verbum, 2005), 190–191; A. Jarlert, 'Sverige: Modernisering utan rättsuppgörelse', in J.H. Schjørring (ed.), *Nordiske folkekirker i opbrud: National identitet og international nyorientering efter 1945* (Århus: Århus Universitetsforlag, 2001).
22. G. Lundström, P. Rydén and E. Sandlund, *Den svenska pressens historia: Det moderna Sveriges spegel (1897–1945)* (Stockholm: Ekerlids förlag, 2001), 351–362 and 372–380; K. Holt, *Publicisten Ivar Harrie: Ideologi, offentlighetsdebatt och idékritik i Expressen 1944–1960* (Stockholm: Carlssons, 2008), 187–189.
23. Quoted from 'Svenska nazistförrädare åtalas, nazismen självdör, sa Erlander', *Aftontidningen*, 11 June 1947. See also Wallberg, *Övervakningen av nazister och högerextremister*, 114–116.
24. Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 277.
25. Cf. P. Garberding, *Musik och politik i skuggan av nazismen: Kurt Atterberg och de svensktyska musikrelationerna* (Lund: Sekel, 2007), 222.
26. Quoted from J.P. Hewitt, *Self and Society: A Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1976), 231.
27. E. Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963).
28. Goffman, *Stigma*, 11–16 and 144 (quotations 14 and 144).
29. I develop this further in Chapter VI.
30. See H. Rosengren and J. Östling (eds), *Med livet som insats: Biografin som humanistisk genre* (Lund: Sekel, 2007).

31. H. Lööw, *Nazismen i Sverige 1924–1979: Pionjärerna, partierna, propagandan* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2004), 121–159; S. Bruchfeld, 'Grusade drömmar'.
32. B. Jonsson, *Blod och jord i trettiotalet: Kvinnorna och den antimoderna strömningen* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2008); S. Bokholm, *I otakt med tiden: Om rösträttsmotstånd, antipacifism och nazism bland svenska kvinnor* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2008).
33. L. Berggren, *Nationell upplysning: Drag i den svenska antisemitismens idéhistoria* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 1999), 202–205; Bruchfeld, 'Grusade drömmar: Svenska "nationella" och det tyska nederlaget 1945'. Tingsten has written about the debates with Essén during the 1930s in H. Tingsten, *Mitt liv: Mellan trettio och femtio* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1962), 263 and 301.
34. R. Essén, *Demokratien och dess gärningar* (Stockholm: publisher unknown, 1955); R. Essén, *Sven Hedin: Ein großes Leben* (Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel, 1959).
35. P. Engdahl, 'Varför inte demokrat?', *Expressen*, 26 April 1959; I. Harrie, 'Replik', *Expressen*, 26 April 1959; P. Engdahl, 'Kättare i folkhemmet', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1 February 1970; O. Lagercrantz, 'Kommentar till Per Engdahl', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1 February 1970. See C. Mithander, '"Let Us Forget the Evil Memories": Nazism and the Second World War from the Perspective of a Swedish Fascist', in C. Mithander, J. Sundholm and M. Holmgren Troy (eds), *Collective Traumas: Memories of War and Conflict in 20thcentury Europe* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2007).
36. My account in general relies heavily on S. Nordin, *Fredrik Böök: En levnadsteckning* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1994). Various aspects of Böök and Nazism have also been dealt with by T. Forser, *Bööks 30-tal: En studie i ideologi* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1976); T. Stenström, 'Fredrik Böök och nazismen', in J. Stenkvist (ed.), *Från Snoilsky till Sonnevi: Litteraturvetenskapliga studier tillägnade Gunnar Brandell* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1976); S. Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget: Motsättningar, debatter och hjälpinsatser* (Lund: Lunds universitetshistoriska sällskap, 1996); N. Shachar, 'Förord', in F. Böök, *Under stjärnorna: Ett ofullbordat porträtt* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 1998); I. Larsson, *Text och tolkning i svenska författarbiografier: Elin Wägners* Selma Lagerlöf, *Elisabeth Tykessons* Atterbom *och Fredrik Bööks* Verner von Heidenstam (Hedemora: Gidlunds, 2003) and S. Björklund, 'Fredrik Böök på det sluttande planet', *Scandia* 70(1) (2004). Björck is quoted from Larsson, *Text och tolkning i svenska författarbiografier*, 224.
37. Nordin, *Fredrik Böök*, 321–333; Stenström, 'Fredrik Böök och nazismen', 130–139.
38. Nordin, *Fredrik Böök*, 316–327; Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 88–90.
39. Quotation from Nordin, *Fredrik Böök*, 341–342.
40. Nordin, *Fredrik Böök*, 346–374. Quotation from Larsson, *Text och tolkning i svenska författarbiografier*, 226.
41. Larsson, *Text och tolkning i svenska författarbiografier*, 222–227; Nordin, *Fredrik Böök*, 382.
42. Larsson, *Text och tolkning i svenska författarbiografier*, 281–285.

43. Nordin, *Fredrik Böök*, 362–363.
44. 'Professor Böös tal i Svenska akademin [*sic!*]', *Dagens Nyheter*, 22 December 1947. For Böök and Tingsten see also A.W. Johansson, *Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget: Antikommunism och liberalism i Dagens Nyheter 1946–1952* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1995), 64–65.
45. F. Böök, *Rannsakan* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1953); Nordin, *Fredrik Böök*, 389.
46. H. Tingsten, 'Professor Böös sista alibi', *Dagens Nyheter*, 21 October 1953.
47. I. Harrie, 'Drypande sirap', *Expressen*, 21 October 1953.
48. S. Rinman, 'Rannsakan med förhinder', *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning*, 3 December 1953; E.H. Linder, 'Böös syndabekännelse', *Stockholms-Tidningen*, 22 October 1953; N.I. Ivarsson, 'Gift ej bot', *Kvällsposten*, 5 November 1953.
49. C. Fehrman, 'Fredrik Böök ser tillbaka', *Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten*, 21 October 1953; K.G. Hildebrand, 'Fredrik Böös rannsakan', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 21 October 1953.
50. F. Böök, *Betraktelse* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1954); Nordin, *Fredrik Böök*, 391–393.
51. H. Tingsten, 'Kannstöperi och alibism', *Dagens Nyheter*, 22 May 1954; I. Harrie, 'Tre gudsmäns vittnesbörd', *Expressen*, 27 May 1954. See Nordin, *Fredrik Böök*, 394–395.
52. I. Hedenius and K. Jaensson, *En vän att tala med* (Stockholm: Bromberg, 1986), 70. Regarding Hedenius and Böök see S. Nordin, *Ingemar Hedenius: En filosof och hans tid* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 2004), 105 and 113–114.
53. The section on Erich Wittenberg and secondary stigmatisation has been published in a different version as J. Östling, 'Fallet Wittenberg: Nazismen som stigma i den svenska efterkrigskulturen', *Personhistorisk tidskrift* (1) (2007).
54 . Erich Wittenberg's life and career is the subject of the book he published in 1951, *Ett akademiskt justitiemord?: En vädjan till den svenska demokratiens samvete: Handlingar rörande docenturen i politisk idéhistoria vid Lunds universitet* (Lund: publisher unknown, 1951), which is simultaneously a collection of documents and him pleading his case. Along with an introduction, a German summary and a bibliography of his works, this also contains all the essential documents in his fight for promotion – the application documents, statements from the referees, extracts from the minutes, decisions, press reactions and more. Wittenberg is also discussed in A. Ers, *Segrarnas historia: Makten, historien och friheten studerade genom exemplet Herbert Tingsten 1939–1953* (Umeå: Text & Kultur, 2008).
55. The whole course of events may be followed in Wittenberg, *Ett akademiskt justitiemord?*.
56. S. Nordin, *Romantikens filosofi: Svensk idealism från Höijer till hegelianerna* (Lund: Doxa, 1987); M. Persson, *Förnuftskampen: Vitalis Norström och idealismens kris* (Stockholm and Stehag: Symposion, 1994); C.G. Heidegren, *Det moderna genombrottet i nordisk universitetsfilosofi 1860–1915* (Gothenburg: Daidalos, 2004).
57. E. Wittenberg, 'Utgör Bismarcks Rike en grundval för det Tredje Riket?: Ett idéhistoriskt utkast', in A.N. Thomson (ed.), *Studier tillägnade Fredrik Lagerroth* (Lund: Gleerup, 1950), 410.

58. Herbert Tingsten's book, *De konservativa idéerna* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1939), was reviewed by Erich Wittenberg in Sweden's leading historical journal. See E. Wittenberg, review of 'De konservativa idéerna', *Historisk tidskrift* (3) (1940). Tingsten and Wittenberg's exchange of views was featured in H. Tingsten, 'De konservativa idéerna: En replik', *Historisk tidskrift* (4) (1940) and E. Wittenberg, 'De konservativa idéerna: En replik', *Historisk tidskrift* (1) (1941).
59. I. Karlsson, *Historien som biologiskt öde: Om perspektivförskjutningar inom mellankrigstidens tyska historieskrivning* (Gothenburg: Akademitryck, 1989), 9–15; B. Odén, 'Gurevitjs undran', in J. Dietsch et al. (eds), *Historia mot strömmen: Kultur och konflikt i det moderna Europa* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2007).
60. Quoted from Wittenberg, *Ett akademiskt justitiemord?*, 35.
61. Quote and reference to Wittenberg, *Ett akademiskt justitiemord?*, 35–41. Ingemar Hedenius passed judgement on Wittenberg in a review of his *Historiska idéer och makter* (Stockholm: Gebers, 1944). Hedenius republished the text later as 'Tyska humanister' in *Tro och vetande* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1949). In the first piece he stated his view of the relationship between Nazism and older German traditions: 'There is without doubt a crisis of culture. It depends among other things on the decline of humanistic education in Germany, which was once one of the greatest cultural countries. German humanists have been in the vanguard of those spreading a great deal of false romanticism and empty verbiage that has freed many writers from clear and sensible reflection, logic and realism in humanistic matters. That style flourished in many areas during the Weimar Republic. But it effectively became all-dominant after 1933 when, so to speak, it was taken over by the state and put in the hands of Nazi cultural propaganda [...].' See Hedenius, *Tro och vetande*, 299.
62. Wittenberg, *Ett akademiskt justitiemord?*, 79–99.
63. O. Holmberg, 'Ett akademiskt domslut', *Dagens Nyheter*, 4 July 1951.
64. Holmberg, 'Ett akademiskt domslut'.
65. Quote and reference to Wittenberg, *Ett akademiskt justitiemord?*, 183–187.
66. In spite of the resistance Wittenberg met in academic circles he did enjoy the support of parts of the press, including the student newspaper *Lundagård*.
67. See in general J. Jacobi, *Zarah Leander: Das Leben einer Diva* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 2006).
68. E. Leiser, 'Allt går igen …', *Judisk tidskrift* (1949:22). See also J. Östling, 'Leander och den svenska självprövningen', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 25 September 2007.
69. S. Hedin, *Utan uppdrag i Berlin* (Stockholm: Fahlcrantz & Gumaelius, 1949); S. Selander, *Sven Hedin: Inträdestal i Svenska Akademien* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1953), especially 20–23. See also S.K. Danielsson, *The Explorer's Roadmap to National-Socialism: Sven Hedin, Geography and the Path to Genocide* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) and A. Odelberg, *Äventyr på riktigt: Berättelsen om upptäckaren Sven Hedin* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 2008), 507–588.
70. Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 219–221. It is worthy of note that the articles on Hugo Odeberg and Erik Rooth in *Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon* never go into their ideological relationship to Nazism: see T.

Kronholm, 'Odeberg, Hugo', *Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon*, vol. 28 (Stockholm: Svenskt biografiskt lexikon, 1992) and M. Åsdahl Holmberg, 'Rooth, Erik Gustaf Teodor', *Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon*, vol. 30 (Stockholm: Svenskt biografiskt lexikon, 2000). This distinguishes them in a deplorable way from K.Å. Modéer, 'Olivecrona, Knut Hans Karl', *Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon*, vol. 28 (Stockholm: Svenskt biografiskt lexikon, 1992). In an article, Carl Martin Roos describes his own experiences in the law faculty at the start of the 1960s: 'Olivecrona himself had been pro-German for a part of the Second World War, but had apologised for it. Nevertheless he was – paradoxically enough – the most respected of our professors both inside and outside the faculty.' See C.M. Roos, 'Juridiska fakulteten på 1960-talet', in *Under Lundagårds kronor* (Lund: Akademiska Föreningens Förlag, 2005), 22.

71. Garberding, *Musik och politik i skuggan av nazismen*, 220–236.
72. P.I. Gedin, *Verner von Heidenstam: Ett liv* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 2006), 579–592; M. Kylhammar, 'Biografiska faktoider: Personhistoriens försanthållna felaktigheter', in H. Rosengren and J. Östling (eds), *Med livet som insats: Biografin som humanistisk genre* (Lund: Sekel, 2007).
73. M. Kylhammar, *Den okände Sten Selander: En borgerlig intellektuell* (Stockholm: Akademeja, 1990), especially 146–174. See also P. Luthersson, *Svensk litterär modernism: En stridsstudie* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2002), 325–330.
74. H. Rosengren, *'Judarnas Wagner': Moses Pergament och den kulturella identifikationens dilemma omkring 1920–1950* (Lund: Sekel, 2007), 319–327.
75. T. Ek, *En människas uttryck: Studier i Hans Ruins självbiografiska essäistik* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2003), 208–216 (quotation 216). In the title of his article, 'Beundra, fördöma, förlåta: En nordisk humanists syn på Tyskland under 1900-talets första hälft', published in *Nya Argus* (1) (1991), Olof Ruin captures his father's changing attitude to Germany.
76. H. Lindgren, *Jacob Wallenberg 1892–1980* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2007), 251–323.
77. For an interesting Danish parallel case, see P. Øhrgaard, 'Fra forsvarsven til scavenianer: Carl Roos (1884–1962), Professor i tysk', *Historisk Tidsskrift* (2) (2007).
78. P.K. Jensen, 'Det sidste argument: Brugen af nazismen som fjendebillede i dansk politisk kultur 1945–2004, belyst gennem Europa- og utlændingedebatterne', (Århus: unpublished *speciale* at the Institut for historie og områdestudier, Historisk afdelning, Århus University, 2004), 1–3.
79. K. Fant, *Torgny Segerstedt: En levnadsskildring* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2007), 104; K. Salomon, *En femtiotalsberättelse: Populärkulturens kalla krig i folkhemssverige* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2007), 72–77. See also L.K. Adler and T.G. Paterson, 'Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's-1950's', *The American Historical Review* (4) (1970).
80. I develop this idea in Chapter V.
81. Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 171–176; B. Almgren, *Drömmen om Norden: Nazistisk infiltration i Sverige 1933–1945* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2005), 141–146.

82. C. Fehrman, H. Westling and G. Blomqvist, *Lärdomens Lund: Lunds universitets historia 1666–2004* (Lund: Lund University Press, 2004), 245–246.
83. Kylhammar, *Den okände Sten Selander*, 155–157; Garberding, *Musik och politik i skuggan av nazismen*, 224–235.
84. Martin Kylhammar puts forward a similar argument in 'Torsten Fogelqvist, *Dagens Nyheters* själ och den intellektuella biografins metodfråga', *Scandia* (2) (2007), 122–123.
85. U. Knutson, *Kvinnor på gränsen till genombrott: Grupporträtt av Tidevarvets kvinnor* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 2004), 8–12. See B. Jonsson, *Blod och jord i trettiotalet*, especially 47–52.
86. Kylhammar, 'Torsten Fogelqvist, *Dagens Nyheters* själ och den intellektuella biografins metodfråga', 122.

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