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Nazism and the Twentieth Century

This study will focus on experiences of Nazism and the lessons those experiences gave rise to. The origins of National Socialism, its manifestations and its organisational forms will not form the subjects of analysis. The spotlight here will be turned on how posterity has experienced and processed Nazism, with particular regard to the conclusions that were drawn from the Nazi experience in the wake of the Second World War. The emphasis will be on the ideological and intellectual arena in Sweden, but the discussion throughout will be set against the general background of postwar Europe.

My task in this first chapter is to define these statements of intent and to develop them further. By the end of the chapter I will have broken them down into more concrete historical problems, but before doing so it will be necessary to place Nazism and its after-effects in a broader historical and scholarly context, Swedish as well as international. That discussion will provide this study with its overarching perspective.

The chapter falls into three parts. The first section deals with what might be called the Nazi epoch and I shall attempt to find answers to how the significance of Nazism in European and Swedish history up the end of the Second World War might best be interpreted. That discussion forms the necessary background to the second section, in which – on the basis of existing research – I shall consider the continued presence of the Nazi experience during the early postwar period, both in Sweden and in a wider international context. The conclusions drawn in these first two parts lead on to the third section, in which the two fundamental historical problems of this study are defined: What did the Nazi experience involve? What conclusions were drawn from it?

In this first chapter, therefore, there is an alternation between historical contextualisation and historiographical discussion. There is an underlying tension between these two that is both unavoidable and fruitful. For contextualisation, the dovetailing of a defined and limited topic into a wider historical whole, is never a simple and uncomplicated

undertaking. The wider context cannot merely be brushed in as an innocuous background wash since it will always be the thing that defines the direction the analysis will take and the conclusions that can be drawn. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the historical context is allowed to take shape in dialogue with appropriate and substantial research traditions. Conversely, the historiographical discussion must not be allowed to stop at the level of being no more than a catalogue of earlier literature on the subject. It should ideally be possible to arrive at a state of interplay between the research overview and the contextualisation that will result in an analytic orientation with regard to the problem.

The Nazi Epoch

Nazism occupies a central position in virtually every significant interpretation of European history in the twentieth century. Despite the fact that geographically speaking National Socialism was mainly confined to one country (Germany) and that its time as the dominant party ideology only lasted twelve years (1933–1945), it has set its stamp on much of our understanding of the modern history of the continent. That can be explained to some extent by the close association between the Third Reich and the Second World War, the devastating conflict which often seems to be the most important watershed of the century. Since 1945, moreover, National Socialism has had an effect on many of the decisive historiographical and intellectual discussions of the age – democracy and dictatorship, power and morality, war and imperialism, culture and civilisation, welfare and modernity. Because of its extremist nature, it has been impossible to ring-fence Nazism: it has remained a constant presence as the extreme point of comparison and as a historical warning.[1]

The specific meaning of Nazism in twentieth-century European history has, however, varied from one interpretation to another. Popular and political accounts of the Third Reich have presented it as the epitome of dictatorship and the absolute antithesis of democracy.[2] But scholarly debate has been dominated by perceptions of an altogether more elaborate order. Theorists of totalitarianism analysed National Socialism as one variant of a totalitarian system and they pointed to clear structural and ideological similarities with communism.[3] Marxist interpreters considered Nazism to be a form of the fascism that lay immanent in all capitalist societies. The conflict between communism and fascism occupied a central position in this historiography.[4]

In a different interpretative tradition, however, National Socialism has been seen primarily as a peculiarly German development, a German *Sonderweg*. It was only possible to explain Hitler by taking into account the militarist and autocratic traits in German history.[5] Nazism has even been allocated a place in various theories of modernisation: for many years it was considered to be a reactionary, anti-progressive force, but since the 1970s there has been an increasingly common tendency to stress its ambivalent attitude to modernity or its character as an alternative modernity.[6] In addition to these, there are more marginal interpretations: National Socialism as a political religion, as a consequence of secularisation, as a product of the soulless mass society and so on.[7]

All of the main interpretations have added to our understanding of National Socialism. It is, however, quite clear that they need to be supplemented further if we hope to find ways of understanding the place of Nazism in modern European history. There has been a marked tendency to view Nazism as a gross aberration from what was presumed to be the main sweep of history. In my view, however, reducing National Socialism to a mere epiphenomenon or inflating it into some grotesque manifestation of power would both be misleading. My position is one of agreement with the fundamental reading of the twentieth century which views Nazism and its ideological legacy in a wider historical context. In particular, it is important to develop a perspective on the Nazi epoch that can form the basis for the main aim of the current study, which is to analyse experiences of National Socialism and the conclusions that were later drawn from them. The stimulus for doing so is to be found in developments in the international research of recent years.

An Ideological Eternal Triangle

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union it was not only the political map that was redrawn: the very preconditions for evaluating the roles played by the ideologies of the twentieth century changed. The recognition that a historical epoch had come to an end prompted the need to take stock of the twentieth century.[8]

One of the contributions to receive most attention was made by the philosopher Francis Fukuyama. Inspired by Alexandre Kojève's readings of Hegel, Fukuyama declared that history was at an end. That did not mean that humankind was now becalmed or that events would cease to occur. What Fukuyama meant was that the fundamental conflicts that had characterised the twentieth century had come to a close. 'Liberal democracy was challenged by two major rival ideologies

– fascism and communism – which offered radically different visions of a good society', Fukuyama stated. The end of the Cold War meant that liberal democracy and the market economy remained as the only surviving form of society. History was at an end because as a result of the victory of liberalism and democracy humanity had achieved the highest forms of recognition and prosperity.[9]

The debate stirred up by Fukuyama's thought-provoking ideas attracted many intellectual critics during the 1990s but professional historians rarely became involved, and on the occasions they did apostrophise 'the end of history' it was often in a sense different from that used by Fukuyama. Without taking his philosophy of history on board, many professional commentators did however espouse the overarching perspective on contemporary European history that he set out. In a similar way to Fukuyama, the authors of many recent monographs and surveys have viewed the twentieth century as the drama of an ideological eternal triangle. The First World War marks the starting point, the ur-catastrophe that swept away the old order and turned Europe into what Tomáš Masaryk called 'a laboratory atop a vast graveyard'. In the wake of the Great War the three main players emerged – fascism, communism and liberal democracy in all their various shapes and forms – and the ideological power struggle between them was to put its stamp on the following decades.[10]

Mark Mazower, one of the historians who has analysed the modern history of Europe in terms of the ideological eternal triangle, has stressed the significance of Nazism for the European twentieth century. The idea that National Socialism can be explained away as a deviation from the Western norm is, in his view, untenable – it fits far too well into the main course of European history not to be taken with the utmost seriousness. Nazism was both an answer to and an outpouring of the most powerful ideas, interests and institutions of the time. Mazower argues that Nazism, like communism, 'involved real efforts to tackle the problems of mass politics, of industrialization and social order'.[11] It is therefore hardly surprising that many observers between the wars saw common features in communism, fascism and liberal democracy. There were those who pointed to the resemblance between Roosevelt's 'National Recovery Administration' and Mussolini's corporatist aspirations, or between Hitler's building of the Autobahn and large-scale American and Soviet ventures of the same kind.[12]

Mazower's arguments are in agreement with the main thrust of the international research work into Nazism and its significance to the postwar period that has been actively pursued since the beginning of the 1990s. National Socialism has increasingly come to be seen as an

integral part of European history, not as a uniquely German *Sonderweg*. Many individual studies have demonstrated similarities between the Third Reich and other countries during the same period, similarities in a range of areas, such as the use of violence, personality cults and racial hygiene.[13] At the same time there have been a number of historians who have contended that Nazism should be analysed as one of a number of competing forms of social organisation during the twentieth century. As a model for social organisation Nazism was situated in a shifting ideological zone in which it shared political methods and elements of thought with other rival viewpoints. It can be seen as a distinct historical ideology, given coherence by its own body of norms, visions and governance.[14]

This view represents the lowest common denominator in the majority of studies of fascism published since the end of the Cold War. In spite of differences of definition and approach, the perspective on twentieth-century European history they adopt is one in which fascism is seen as a society model in its own right. In this respect Nazism is often considered to be the German variant of a phenomenon common all over Europe in the interwar period. As such it was related to the fascist movements and regimes in Italy, Romania, Austria and most other countries on the continent, but it also showed features that were specifically German. Seen in the broader context these movements had enough in common for it to be possible to talk of fascism as a third alternative existing alongside communism and liberal democracy.[15]

To see Nazism in this light is to be open to the views held at the time; in the words of the historian George L. Mosse, it is to 'attempt to understand the movement on its own terms'. International research has stressed the importance of elucidating precisely what gave fascism its political potential and psychological attraction. If we merely seek economic and social explanations we shall be led astray. A better way of approaching fascism is to see it as one of the ideological standpoints available in the years between the wars.[16]

During the Second World War, however, Nazism emerged as an increasingly strident and radical opposite pole, a model of society based on values utterly different from those of communism and of liberal democracy. In the aftermath of the war the image of National Socialism became even more polarised. Both in Eastern and in Western Europe powerful narratives with intrinsic lessons of their own took shape. Victory over Nazi Germany became proof of the superiority of one's own system, whether that system was the communist people's democracy on one side or liberal democracy and the rule of law on the other. The polar opposition between one's own version of society

and the Third Reich that became fixed at the end of the Second World War would retain its hold over people's minds and be the determining factor in years to come.[17]

From my point of view there are a number of important conclusions to be drawn from the international research on Nazism. One fundamental insight is that National Socialism must be viewed as one of several competing models of society and cannot simply be written off as a hotchpotch of disconnected ideas. Even for those who emphatically rejected it, National Socialism was a very real and living alternative, an ideology that believed it had a particular solution to offer to the problems of modernity. At the same time it is essential that we take seriously the way Nazism was understood in its own time. Research shows that a polarisation – we might even say demonisation – of Nazism occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War. As a starting point, then, we can say that interpretations of National Socialism must be seen in the light of the conditions that created them; that the understanding was formed by actually coming into contact and confrontation with Nazism; that the conclusions do not contradict one another. At the time there may well have been good reasons for rejecting National Socialism vigorously while nevertheless still recognising that it was a player on the ideological field. Indeed, it was precisely because National Socialism was conspicuous as a competing but essentially different type of society that it was so important to condemn it.[18]

All this changed completely when what may be called 'the Nazi epoch' came to an end at the close of the war. That epoch – from the early 1930s to 1945 – was the period in European history when National Socialism, both as a very visible power factor and as an ideological manifestation, put its stamp on the political and intellectual affairs of the continent.[19]

Against this background it is time now to focus on Sweden and to ask what role Nazism played in Swedish politics and intellectual debate during the period in question. The discussion will then lead on to one of the central problems of this study: what were the implications of the experiences of Nazism?

Sweden and Nazism

Sweden had stayed out of the First World War. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1919 but the 1920s, as in many other European countries, was characterised by fierce antagonisms and an unstable parliamentary situation. In 1932 Per Albin Hansson formed a purely Social Democratic government. In order to combat unemployment and to safeguard

national unity he came to a crisis agreement with the Agrarian Party. When the Second World War broke out in September 1939 Sweden declared itself neutral and, in contrast to its neighbours, avoided occupation during the years that followed. 1939 saw the formation of a coalition government in which all of the parliamentary parties except the Communist Party were represented. Hansson, whom the Swedes usually refer to simply as Per Albin, remained prime minister throughout the war.

There is a very considerable body of scholarly literature on Sweden's relations with Nazism and Nazi Germany before, during and after the Second World War. A bibliographical survey carried out in 2002 produced 1,347 references. While some of these may well be of a rather general order, it is nevertheless obvious that the listed items are only a selection. There are, moreover, a number of further studies that have appeared since that date.[20]

It is impossible to sustain a clear-cut line of demarcation in research terms between Nazism and the Second World War. The history of National Socialism naturally cannot be reduced to the history of the Second World War and vice versa, but in scholarly terms the two fields have sometimes overlapped to the extent that it is difficult to separate them. In the Swedish case, for a long time the emphasis was put on the war years. There are therefore good reasons for starting with a discursive synthesis of the historiography of the Second World War before proceeding from there to connect that historiography to the tendencies historical scholarship has shown in its research into Nazism. That will in turn lead on to the core question of this section: what conclusions can we come to about the importance of National Socialism in Swedish history prior to 1945?[21]

Research into the modern history of Sweden took off seriously in the middle of the 1960s. This was particularly true of the history of the war years. A major project, 'Sweden during the Second World War' (Sverige under andra världskriget, SUAV), provided an important knowledge base and during the 1970s some twenty doctoral dissertations were produced within the framework of that project, on topics such as Swedish opinion, supplies policy and foreign relations during the war years. In spite of the scale of the project it has since been a cause of regret that it could not be brought to a full conclusion. No overarching synthesis of the results was ever produced.[22] When writing his major and to some degree semi-official *Svensk utrikespolitik 1939–1945* (Swedish Foreign Policy 1939–1945, 1973) the historian Wilhelm M. Carlgren had access to a wider range of source material than the 'Sweden during the Second World War' researchers but in general he worked from similar

premisses. The same is to a great extent true of Alf W. Johansson's broad-based study *Per Albin och kriget* (Per Albin and the War, 1985).[23]

A notable change of direction in research terms occurred during the 1990s. One of the pioneering works of the new direction was the polemical volume *Heder och samvete* (Honour and Conscience, 1991) by the journalist Maria-Pia Boëthius, who castigated the Swedish policy of appeasement during the war years. In her view the 'Sweden during the Second World War' project was in itself part of the 'conspiracy of silence' that had sustained the consciously adjusted Swedish wartime image.[24] Her book was a scathing indictment that not everyone in the scholarly community was prepared to accept, but in the long run it helped prompt soul-searching even among historians.

One of the most important new insights was that the lion's share of Swedish research into the Second World War up until that point had been carried out within the strict paradigm of small-state realism. In a self-critical reflection in 1995 Alf W. Johansson characterised the typical postwar view of the wartime years as follows: 'Faced with a ruthlessly aggressive Great Power, Sweden had no alternative but to give way.'[25] This was good politics in that it saved the peace. But to maintain such a view and be consistent, however, meant that the ideological perspective on the war simply had to be shelved.[26]

It was precisely this kind of attitude that much of the criticism in the 1990s had in its sights. The interpretative framework of small-state realism meant that essential aspects of the Second World War did not figure in the analysis. Scholars had been far too obliging when they closed ranks in support of the interpretation of the conflict in terms of realpolitik promulgated by the wartime coalition government. By doing so they failed both to challenge this view and to ask urgent moral questions. This became particularly clear in the discussions about the Swedish share (or otherwise) of guilt with regard to the Holocaust. During the 1990s a number of people criticised the 'Sweden during the Second World War' project because none of its studies analysed Sweden in relation to the genocide of Europe's Jews. During the 1970s the Holocaust was not considered to be part of Swedish history.[27]

Along with the moral dimension came the ideological one. The research project 'Sweden during the Second World War' was precisely what its title stated. Since Swedish Nazi parties had played such a limited role as a domestic political movement it had not been seen as a central object for study. The historians involved in the project obviously paid a great deal of attention to relations with Nazi Germany, but how the Nazi experience changed Sweden itself was an issue of subordinate interest. In this respect, too, small-state realism caused the field of view

to be restricted and questions about what effect the ideological trials of strength had had on Swedish identity and orientation remained unanswered.

This last point is also linked to factors within the discipline itself. For most of the postwar period, particularly from the 1960s onwards, historical scholarship in Sweden rested on a foundation of anti-idealism. In the social and structural research that was dominant in historical scholarship at that time, ideas were frequently considered to be the reflection of social strata and economic interests. That was not the case in all of the 'Sweden during the Second World War' dissertations: in several of them, prewar and wartime opinion formation was a central concern.[28] Despite that, however, what was being focused on there was the formation of political opinion and it was not until the 1990s and the reorientation towards the history of ideas and cultural history that attention was directed at wider aspects.

Taken together, all this served to give historical research on Sweden and the Second World War a quite distinctive character. In spite of the substantial amount of empirical mapping carried out from the end of the 1960s, the narrowness of the historical approach resulted in limited understanding. The rigid paradigm – realpolitik – discouraged historians from adopting a perspective on the history of the Swedish 1930s and 1940s that would have enabled them to view the period in the light of the ideological divisions that characterised the Europe of the time.[29]

What we can see here is the origin of a marked historiographical split: the study of Sweden and the Second World War ran along different lines from the study of Sweden and Nazism. For long sections we can talk of two parallel tracks of research and it is not until the end of the 1980s that we can see any real signs of them starting to converge, after which they began more and more to merge. The result was that the scholarly work of the 1990s on Sweden during the Second World War focused increasingly on Sweden's relations with National Socialism and the Third Reich. The difference in the names of the two major scholarly projects – 'Sweden during the Second World War' in the 1970s and 'Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust' in the 2000s – reflects this change.[30] In order to be able to answer one of the central questions of the present chapter – what was the importance of Nazism in Swedish history up to the end of the Second World War? – it will be necessary to provide a little more detail about the main historiographical tendencies.[31]

The history of Swedish Nazism was for many years the history of the Swedish Nazi parties. As early as 1942 the journalist Holger Carlsson published a pioneering survey of the various Swedish National Socialist

groupings and in the decades following the Second World War the picture of the Nazi, fascist and nationalist organisations was filled out and completed. On the basis of research available in the 1980s, the political scientist Ulf Lindström concluded that National Socialism as a parliamentary movement had been a marginal phenomenon in Sweden: the Nazi parties polled their best results in a parliamentary election in 1936, winning no more than 0.7% of the votes.[32]

The charting of Nazism as a parliamentary force was supplemented to some extent by analyses of press, cultural and church spheres. These studies, carried out in the 1970s, were often angled in favour of the political and spiritual opposition to National Socialism.[33] On the other hand, studies of a more critical nature investigating the attraction of Nazi Germany were rare.[34]

The substance of the research into Sweden and Nazism was unambiguous: National Socialism was an alien feature in Swedish political culture and its adherents were insignificant both in number and in influence, whereas Swedish cultural and social life had produced a number of resistance activists. Viewed in the broader European context, Swedish Nazism was a marginal phenomenon.

By the end of the 1980s, however, this perception was being challenged in a manner that produced different answers to the question of the significance of Nazism in Swedish history. The changes occurred on a number of levels, helped shift the focus of research, led to reassessments, and brought a new and critical tone into the debate.[35]

The first step involved a more wide-ranging investigation of Swedish Nazi sympathisers. In 1990 the historian Heléne Lööw published her study *Hakkorset och Wasakärven* (The Swastika and the Vasa Sheaf), a more comprehensive analysis of Swedish National Socialism (primarily the parties led by Birger Furugård and Sven Olov Lindholm) than had appeared earlier. Lööw argued that the membership of Swedish Nazi groups was more numerous than earlier studies suggested. The years following Lööw's work saw the publication of both scholarly and more popular works that moved the spotlight from organised National Socialism to the right-wing or academic bourgeoisie. Against the background of the findings of the 1990s, Lena Berggren, a historian of ideas, thought there was good reason to question the established view that Swedish ultra-nationalism (comprising the various shadings of Nazism, fascism and radical conservatism) was no more than a fringe phenomenon.[36]

Taken together these studies broadened the understanding of Swedish attitudes to National Socialism. This was even more true in the case of the significant amount of research emerging at that time

into Swedish anti-Semitism, race biology and sterilisation for reasons of racial hygiene. During the 1990s and 2000s a number of different and distinct studies analysed the repertoire of anti-Semitic stereotypes and patterns of action visible in the first half of the century. In parallel with this, other historians were turning the spotlight on Swedish race biology and sterilisation motivated by racial hygiene.[37]

It is unlikely that questions concerning Swedish anti-Semitism and racism would have been pursued with such vigour were it not for the Holocaust. During the 1990s discussion of the Second World War came to centre on the genocide of the Jews. Ever since the end of the 1970s the Holocaust as a historical and moral phenomenon had been looming ever larger on the international scene and after the end of the Cold War it moved into the very centre of the debate, becoming a kind of ethical starting point for any assessment of the modern history of Europe; that, in turn, meant that scholarly research took on a moral dimension that had often been missing earlier. The trends and structures of the world between the wars were now being viewed in the light of the Holocaust.[38]

The Swedish position in relation to the Holocaust consequently became a crucial field of research. The first major study was published by the historian Steven Koblik as early as 1987 and a number of others appeared from the middle of the 1990s.[39] In the early 2000s political movements were no longer the main focus, the perspective having widened further. Scholars of many disciplines were involved in problematising the situation while simultaneously emphasising that virtually every corner of Swedish society was affected by developments in their larger neighbour to the south.[40]

There can be absolutely no doubt, therefore, that research into Sweden and Nazism has undergone a metamorphosis.[41] A scholarly change of scene of this kind is highly significant and has to be summarised in several stages. As far as Swedish accounts of the Second World War are concerned, it is possible – to borrow a concept from the historian Etienne François – to talk of a general shift in emphasis from patriotism to universalism. During the postwar period the war was seen from the point of view of small-state realism, a perspective that measured Swedish action against a yardstick that was very different from the universal yardstick that became the standard during the 1990s and the 2000s. The changes opened the way for the moral and ideological aspects of the war to be discussed and, in particular, it seemed that the Holocaust would form the point of departure for both the scholarly and the public debate. As far as Swedish research was concerned, it not only meant that concentration was now brought

to bear on anti-Semitism, concessions and refugee policies but that, as the moral perspective gained the upper hand, the main focus of interest shifted from Swedish resistance to Nazism, to Swedish adaptation to Nazism. And, in a more general sense, it is possible to see research on the Second World War and research on National Socialism going hand in hand for the first time.[42]

The above description of the historiographical context has been necessary in order to put our historical understanding in a proper perspective and to illustrate important aspects of the intellectual processing of National Socialism. The overarching aim, however, is to utilise the insights provided by this research as a basis for reaching conclusions about the role of Nazism in Swedish history. The crux of the matter, therefore, is what are the conclusions that may be drawn from the scholarly debate I have outlined? One very obvious problem is that most of the literature is in the form of special studies and there is an almost complete absence of any works of synthesis dealing with the ideological landscape of Sweden. Despite that, certain conclusions can be suggested.[43]

Nazism was manifestly present in the political and intellectual life of Sweden during the dozen or so years before 1945. For some people Nazism represented a challenge to ideals they cherished; for others it represented both a temptation and the hope of a future new order. Nazism in the party-political sense was certainly weak and without any great influence, but many on the radical right and in conservative academic, military and church circles retained significant levels of sympathy for it even during the war years.[44] Though it has seldom been stated, it can be argued that the effect of more recent research has been to normalise the Swedish interwar period, to make it conform more to the standard developments in the Europe of that time, which was a time of ideological division.

It is important, however, to draw attention to the ambivalences and the tensions. Many of the phenomena that the 1990s and 2000s tended to associate with Nazism were more or less widespread between the wars. Anti-Semitic clichés were common and Jews fleeing persecution were still being excluded as late as the start of the 1940s, but anti-Semitism never gained a lasting foothold in the sphere of national politics. Race biology enjoyed broad political support during the 1920s but was meeting an increasing level of resistance by the middle of the 1930s.[45] Many of the patterns of thought that we now associate with National Socialism were not restricted to the Nazi sphere but were part and parcel of a wider contemporary vocabulary. It is, moreover, difficult to discuss how widespread something was without relating

it to something else. That in turn is made more difficult by the almost complete absence of any comprehensive systematic comparisons that view the Swedish situation in an international perspective.[46]

One important exception to that is the political scientist and historian Norbert Götz and his conceptual history of the construction of the National Socialist *Volksgemeinschaft* (people's community) and the Swedish *folkhem* (people's home). Drawing on a very wide-ranging body of material he investigated the background to both concepts in terms of the history of ideas and in terms of their political impact, particularly during the years from the beginning of the 1930s to the end of the war in 1945. Götz concludes that there were obvious structural and genealogical similarities between *Volksgemeinschaft* and *folkhem* but that the differences between their ideological contexts led to fundamental dissimilarities in terms of objectives and concrete political action. He emphasises, for instance, that ethnic affiliation never figured as a fundamental element in the Swedish *folkhem* project in the way it did in the Third Reich. The various kinds of exclusion from the community that occurred in Sweden (most notably in the matter of sterilisation) were motivated more by utilitarian factors than by race. In essence, it was a matter of two distinct social systems, which may have shared some elements of ideological vocabulary but in which the actualisation of the social and political order took place under different normative signs.[47]

The conclusion that Götz reaches in his important study positions Sweden in the overarching international context I sketched at the start. His work supports the view that the Swedish social model in the 1930s and 1940s should be seen as representative of the liberal-democratic alternative. Despite being quite clearly related to other ideological alternatives – fascism and communism – it constituted a coherent form of society that was distinct from the others in decisive ways. National Socialism was, however, ever present as a competing vision or mirage, as a challenge or appeal, as a manifest and confusing threat.[48]

This approach – studying the ideological and social development of Sweden against a background of Nazism – has been rare among Swedish scholars. Not, however, completely absent. Ulf Lindström cited a whole series of social and political reasons to explain the limited parliamentary success of the National Socialists. One reason was that the Nazi organisations lost many of their potential voters when Bondeförbundet (the Farmers' League) and Allmänna valmansförbundet (the General Electoral League) proceeded to adapt elements of their own rhetoric and ideology rather than confront the extreme right directly. Thus the established right-wing parties, in order to protect

fundamental Swedish social values, opposed the fascist and Nazi movements.[49] Alf W. Johansson has argued that the consolidation of the Social Democrats' political position during the 1930s has to be seen in the context of the threat from National Socialism. The ideology of community they promoted was not only intended to strengthen social integration but also to respond directly to the Nazi challenge: 'The indirect implication of [the prime minister] Per Albin's ideological message to the Swedish people during the 1930s was that there was nothing that the Nazis could achieve *by dictatorship* in Germany that the Social Democrats in Sweden could not achieve *by democracy*. It would, in short, demonstrate that fascism was superfluous in a country like Sweden.'[50]

To recapitulate: Nazism was very clearly present in Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s, but it was a political movement with numerically limited support and its organised groupings lacked any major influence. There is nevertheless every reason to believe that, viewed as a collective experience, National Socialism had far-reaching significance. Nazism was able to engage its age as few other phenomena have done. Politicians and trades unionists, journalists and media people, authors, artists and academics – all of them watched the development of events in the Germany of the 1930s with foreboding. There were undoubtedly some people who felt the attraction of Nazism as a political model and who went to great lengths to gloss over the excesses of the Third Reich, but there were significantly more people who were horrified by what the Social Democratic finance minister, Ernst Wigforss, called 'the darkness on the horizon'. It is no exaggeration to claim that National Socialism was something that everyone who was politically conscious, regardless of profession or preference, had to relate to. Indeed, it was something that the vast majority had to take a stance on, whether that stance was one of reluctantly waiting and watching or one of passionate engagement. Some saw it as part of a greater crisis of capitalism, humanism and the Western world; for others Nazism in itself overshadowed everything. These reactions summoned up a powerful and emotional involvement that lived on beyond the end of the war. The Nazi experience became a challenging memory.[51]

In the next section I shall move on to the post-Nazi period and begin to address the cardinal questions of this study: What happened after 1945 when Nazism ceased to be a concrete threat or a competing form of society? How was the immediate past interpreted? What significance did the experience of National Socialism have for the postwar ideological climate? In short, what conclusions were drawn from the Nazi experience?

A Post-Nazi World

The Nazi era came to an end in 1945 but the Nazi experience remained very much alive. The move from conflict and war to the processing and settling of accounts took place in the middle of the 1940s, the point that Mark Mazower has called the 'the century's watershed'. It is tempting to see a movement from war to peace, from ruin to welfare, from dictatorship to democracy during that decade. Even if that is a generalisation that can hardly be said to hold true for the whole of Europe, Mazower is right to suggest that the period forms a kind of transitional decade in the history of the twentieth century. It is quite possible to hold that view without denying the great sweep of continuity that links the interwar period with the postwar period. A number of the political and social movements that had cut deep furrows during the first decades of the century reached the end of the road at this point. During the final phase of the war a change of direction occurred in many fields and a new future was charted.[52]

In 1990 Hans Magnus Enzensberger stated that there was a lack of exhaustive analyses of the early postwar years and he went on: 'Memory of that period is incomplete and provincial in so far as it has not been completely lost as a result of repression or nostalgia.' While the first half of the 1940s is one of the most thoroughly researched periods in modern history, the second half of the decade has fallen by the wayside. There was a long period when it bucked historians' accepted reading of the twentieth century and was viewed as a short-lived interregnum between the Second World War and the Cold War. Latterly, however, it has been possible to discern signs of a marked change affecting research into contemporary history. With the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the continent of Europe, questions suddenly began to be asked about the development of postwar Europe. People began to look at the years immediately after 1945, the short period during which the devastated continent with its polarised climate of opinion was transformed into a stable order with a notable degree of ideological conformity within each of the two Cold War blocks.[53]

This section begins with an overall characterisation of the significant trends in Western Europe in the years after 1945. Following on from this international contextualisation I shall focus on the early postwar period in Sweden. In this context it will become obvious that the approaches taken to Swedish history have taken very little account of the experiences of Nazism. After a general historiographical discussion I shall turn my attention to the small number of approaches that are most directly linked to the problem sphere of the current study, that is to

say, experiences of Nazism and the lessons that follow on from those experiences.

The Watershed of the Century

The upheavals in the wake of the war affected all sectors of society. In the work of reconstruction, which got under way very quickly, it was not just a case of combating the immediate material and human needs but also of realising the idea of the welfare state in its various guises. In large parts of Western Europe this occurred within the framework of the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy with firmer social and judicial foundations than during the interwar period. During the very first years after 1945 the foundations of the postwar world were laid everywhere and they would define the direction for several decades to come, indeed, not infrequently through to the 1970s and 1980s.[54]

It would be some time before historians set about characterising the new political order that took shape after 1945.[55] The general historicisation of the postwar period that has gathered pace since the end of the Cold War has, however, resulted in a much more comprehensive body of research material. In a number of articles the historian Martin Conway has drawn together the threads and summed up Western European development. He writes: 'The most striking feature of postwar Western Europe is the remarkable uniformity of its political structures.' The uniformity of the postwar period stood in sharp contrast to the overcrowded ideological landscape of the age between the wars. The cataclysmic experiences had led to a revitalisation and redefinition of the concept of democracy as a structure underpinning society. As late as the 1930s there was still a whole series of competing options as to the form that government by the people might take; after 1945 support for liberal democracy was almost unanimous. In major countries like France and Italy suffrage was now extended to women for the first time. Conway points out that within the course of just a few early postwar years democracy established itself as the sole political model in virtually the whole of Western Europe.[56]

The background to this remarkable metamorphosis has been sought in a variety of areas. One interpretation has emphasised the significance of the victorious Anglo-Saxon alliance; another argues that it was only with the arrival of the Cold War that democracy took root in Western Europe. A third interpretation takes a more social perspective: an exhausted population, sick of revolutionary ideologies and the devastation of war, gave its support to parliamentary democracy after 1945

since that model seemed best able to combine political stability with economic prosperity.[57]

None of these explanations is without justification, but they say nothing about the most fundamental precondition for the rebirth and establishment of liberal democracy, which was the demise of authoritarian nationalism. The historian Stanley G. Payne uses the generic concept 'authoritarian nationalism' for fascism, right-wing radicalism and anti-democratic conservatism. These ideological currents had formed a heterogeneous block in many European countries from the time of Mussolini's coming to power in Italy in 1922 to Hitler's suicide in Germany in 1945. In spite of internecine rivalry, authoritarian nationalism had occupied an important political space in Europe during these decades, all the way from Salazar's Portugal and Antonescu's Romania to the Estonia of Päts and the Norway of Quisling. It had begun to take shape during the last two decades of the nineteenth century but it was the First World War that acted as the organisational and ideological catalyst. In virtually every European country it offered a real alternative from the beginning of the 1930s, with a full panoply of political parties, paramilitary units and popular movements.[58]

The end of the Second World War signalled a defeat for authoritarian nationalism – a defeat that virtually amounted to annihilation. Autocratic conservative regimes with their roots in the interwar years would continue to rule the Iberian peninsula until the middle of the 1970s, but in the rest of Europe the anti-democratic right had lost all its attraction. The total downfall of Fascist Italy and, even more, of Nazi Germany in 1945 had utterly discredited that particular ideological alternative.[59] The historian François Furet has given a succinct and pithy summary of how the end of the war undermined all future fascist aspirations:

> Since the wars of religion history offers few examples of a political ideology, defeated by arms, which has then become the utter and absolute taboo that fascist ideology has become. And yet this ideology grew and triumphed in two of the most civilised countries in Europe, Italy and Germany. Before it became an anathema it had been the hope of many intellectuals, including some of the most prominent among them. But by the end of the war it only existed in a demonic form, and that will certainly ensure that it survives for a long time, but only by immortalising those who defeated it.[60]

The stigmatising of the whole fascist sphere took a variety of forms during the early postwar period. In many countries party members and sympathisers were put on trial – when they were not subjected to more direct lynch law. The judicial processes were frequently linked to media

and political campaigns with an anti-fascist import.[61] Outright purges of the administration, education system and armed forces were carried out in many places, above all in the occupied zones of Germany, though more recent research has revealed that continuity remained strong within many professions. The new party landscape that emerged after the war mirrored these changes. The Nazi and fascist parties showed no signs of success in any of the general elections they were permitted to stand in during the second half of the 1940s.[62]

The rejection of authoritarian nationalism should be seen as one element in the more profound transformation of the ideological terrain. Research into this process, both in terms of detail and in terms of its overarching traits, is far from complete, but it is nevertheless possible to pick out certain general trends.

During the 1940s Western European conservatism underwent profound changes. On the one hand the defeat of authoritarian nationalism delivered a mortal blow to the kind of traditional, non-democratic conservatism which had occupied a strong position in many countries even during the 1930s. It was swept along in the downfall of fascism and was never able to compete in terms of public popularity in the postwar period. To an extent, therefore, there is good reason to talk of a wave critical of conservatism in the aftermath of the war. On the other hand, democratic conservatism enjoyed a renaissance in continental Europe during the same period. Moderation was the new virtue, a desire for stability and for the simple everyday virtues. In West Germany, the Benelux countries, Italy and Austria, the newly founded Christian Democrat parties could capitalise on this. By working for a Western orientation, a social market economy and a welfare state based on Christian family values, they were able to gather those with right-wing sympathies into a major parliamentary grouping. Taken as a whole, it is possible to see how the supporters of authoritarian nationalism were marginalised and the conservative tendency was confined to the democratic domain.[63]

Communism enjoyed increased support in the years following 1945, largely because of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Second World War and the prominent part played by communists in the wartime resistance movements. Communism remained an important factor in the political and cultural life of France and Italy for much of the postwar period; in the rest of Western Europe, however, strongly anti-communist attitudes had developed as early as the end of the 1940s. The Prague Coup, the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War and other significant chapters in the early history of the Cold War helped undermine communism.[64]

The position of liberalism during the first postwar decade was also in direct relationship to experiences during the preceding decade. Classic economic liberalism – laissez-faire liberalism – had lost its shine in Europe after the Second World War. The serious social consequences of the depression between the wars had undermined the idea of capitalism and caused a planned economy to appear to be the best way to organise society. Consequently both the left and the right rejected economic individualism and preached state intervention.[65] At the same time as increasing state intervention, the trend in the judicial and political spheres was to promote the primacy of the individual. Experiences of totalitarian regimes, above all experiences of Nazism, led to a re-evaluation of the individual's place in society. In declarations and in new constitutions the inalienable character of the rights and freedoms of citizens was affirmed.[66]

The tectonic shifts in the ideological geography of Western Europe in the postwar years can thus be linked to experiences of the challenge of totalitarianism during the 1930s and 1940s. The triumph of liberal democracy in the years after 1945 must be viewed in this light. Generally speaking, the rubric 'the decade of transition' is justified. The 1940s stand out as the unambiguous watershed in the ideological century, the decade which marked a rapid change of direction.[67]

Sweden in the Wake of the Second World War

There are good reasons for seeing the 1940s as a crossroads in the twentieth-century history of Europe. The question is whether that is also true of Sweden. Unlike the situation in the great majority of European countries, the end of the war did not signal a great upheaval for Swedish society: it was not necessary to restore parliamentary democracy, no great constitutional reform occurred and no collaborators were put on trial. Industries, infrastructure and institutions were intact. The national coalition that had governed Sweden since December 1939 was replaced by a purely Social Democratic government in the summer of 1945. The undramatic nature of this process is underlined by the fact that the same man – Per Albin Hansson – was the prime minister before, during and after the Second World War. This provides us with one important explanation as to why the scholarly treatment of Swedish history in the early postwar period has followed a different course from much of the international work.[68]

The research that exists on the early postwar years is divided and not very comprehensive. A couple of areas have been well covered but they are often kept separate from one another and, even more than is

the case for the years between the wars, there are few that offer a synthesis.[69] The general surveys of the period that do exist have tended to have a social science orientation and frequently take the 1930s as their starting point. They emphasise the economic crisis and the socio-political offensive or the rise of the Social Democrats to power and changes in the labour market.[70]

Given their focus, these studies are of no more than subordinate interest to this study. They are, however, indirectly interesting in that they credit neither the Nazi experience nor the Second World War with any decisive significance for the direction taken by Sweden. This is also true of the lion's share of the scholarly literature on the early postwar period. It is no exaggeration to state that the history of the developments that occurred in the aftermath of the war has been written as though the ideological, political and armed struggle of the preceding years lacked all significance for Sweden.[71]

This tendency is marked in those areas scholarly work has tended to concentrate on. A discussion of three of the most significant fields – postwar economic planning, the orientation of foreign policy and the intellectual debate – might help to exemplify and demonstrate the manner in which the immediate postwar period has been linked with the crises and catastrophes of the 1930s and 1940s.

The economic and political planning in preparation for the postwar period has been the subject of thorough studies. Leif Lewin's thesis on the planned economy debate remains the baseline study in that field. He traces the discussions of the topic from the First World War onwards while focusing in particular on the 1940s. He locates the Social Democrat acceptance of the ideology of the planned economy at the start of the 1930s, at which point liberal thinking was still putting up a marked resistance. Under the clouds of war, however, they closed ranks in support of a war economy. According to Lewin, the Social Democrat strategy at the end of the war took the form of a drive towards a planned economy, a drive that had as its overriding aim the realisation of a programme that in all essentials had been conceived in the 1930s. He describes the planned economy debate of the late 1940s as a domestic ideological accommodation between social democracy and the bourgeois groupings.[72]

The studies of postwar planning by Lewin and others are interesting because they illustrate a tendency conspicuous in research into the immediate postwar era: *the parenthesis thesis*, by which I mean that the Second World War and Nazism were seen as parentheses in the social development of Sweden and that consequently there is no reason to reflect on the impact of the war years on the postwar world. This

commonly held view was in line with that held by the prime minister himself. Per Albin Hansson saw the Second World War as an anomaly in terms of the development of society, a regression that had to be survived. The government was compelled to invest in armaments and military enterprises rather than social welfare. The war was considered to be a distraction from the work of realising the welfare state.[73] And in a similar way, the experiences of Nazism and the Second World War have seldom been considered as relevant to the reforms that were introduced in the first decades of the postwar period. In any research on the welfare state the Second World War has not constituted a significant turning point.

Swedish foreign and security policy is another central chapter in the historiography of the early postwar period. A bibliographical survey of the field carried out in 1997 came up with something approaching three hundred titles. One recurring idea is that the period was a formative one. During the second half of the 1940s, for instance, decisions were taken that decisively defined the direction of Swedish foreign and defence policy for the postwar period: cooperation with our Nordic neighbours, the rebuilding of continental Europe, entry into the United Nations, the formulation of the policy of neutrality in a new world order stamped by the Cold War.[74] The majority of the history and political science studies produced in this area have taken the form of surveys charting the policies followed. From my perspective it is striking how rarely these studies have looked at postwar politics in the context of the defence and foreign policy experiences of the decades before 1945.[75]

The situation is rather different in the case of research into Swedish relations with Europe. *Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten* (The Persistent Nation State) by the historian Mikael af Malmborg is the standard work on Sweden's attitude to Western European integration during its first phase. The picture he gives us is of a country that was to some extent prepared to review its international orientation. The change of direction meant that an older, European internationalism gave way to engagement with the Nordic countries and eventually with the United Nations. The author argues that the totalitarian epoch had led to the Swedish working-class movement distancing itself from the continent. The aim instead had been to promote the interaction of welfare ideology and the politics of neutrality with a national framework.[76] His general conclusions are shared by others working in the same area. The historian Bo Stråth has taken up this question in a series of studies. He describes how the internationalism of the 1920s was channelled into an engagement with Europe, which, however,

as the interwar years passed, was replaced by aversion, not least in the form of anti-papist propaganda. Experiences during the Second World War reinforced this antipathy. Taking a rhetorical image from Kurt Schumacher, Europe stood out as a bastion of conservatism, Catholicism and cartels.[77]

In terms of the history of ideas the immediate postwar period has not been given anything like the detailed scholarly attention given to political and economic history. By and large there is a no man's land between the war years and the early 1950s. A telling example of this is provided by *Svensk idéhistoria* (Swedish History of Ideas) by Tore Frängsmyr, a historian of science, in which the substantial chapter 'During Two World Wars (1914–1945)' is followed, as we would expect, by 'The Postwar Period (1945–2000)'. But this latter chapter actually starts with the rationalism and progress of the 1950s, leaving the second half of the 1940s to disappear into an abyss between two epochs.[78] That said, however, there are nevertheless a number of significant studies of the intellectual and cultural climate in the years following the Second World War. Anders Frenander, a historian of ideas, has concluded that there were no real debates on the cultural pages of the newspapers during the first postwar years but that the strength of anti-communist opinion was marked. Existentialism, totalitarianism and the Third Way were other important themes.[79] So there is no lack of a broader picture onto which historical observations could be pinned but, just as in the case of research into postwar economic planning and the orientation of foreign policy, aspects arising from the history of ideas or from cultural history are not linked to the ideological explosion that took place in the first half of the 1940s.

To summarise, I would argue that the perspective taken by research into the early postwar years in Sweden was one in which experiences of Nazism do not seem to have been considered significant. As with my study, a great deal centred on analyses of constituent moments, debates or turning points that essentially defined the outcome for a long time. This is despite the manifest difference between my approach and the one that has often been dominant. The first years after 1945 have been seen as a discrete, semi-enclosed period, open in a forward direction but with the preceding period being little more than a backdrop. The reasons for a pattern of action or a period of development have been sought in the immediately contemporary period (as in the case of Sweden at a crossroads in foreign policy terms) or in a continuing debate which happened to reach a pitch of particular intensity in the second half of the 1940s (as in the case of Lewin's study of the debate about a planned economy). But the postwar crossroads has not been

seen as the response to a challenge, as the reaction to what had happened, or as a conclusion drawn from historical experience.

This, then, is where the present study differs from most Swedish research dealing with the same period. An important though unstated premise in existing studies is that the Swedes quickly left Nazism behind. Sweden was never dragged into the war, never suffered invasion and, additionally, the domestic Nazi organisations lacked any kind of political influence. Seen from this point of view, Nazism was in many ways a non-experience.

This basic assumption, more implicit than expressly formulated, has affected the direction of research into the early postwar period. It has seemed natural for Swedish historians to ask different questions from those being asked by much of the international scholarly community in recent years. But this view of Sweden and Nazism conflicts radically with the great bulk of the results produced by the scholarly work of the 1990s and the 2000s. The most significant conclusion I could draw from the foregoing section was precisely the role that Nazism did play in Sweden before and during the Second World War. The Nazi parties were small, that's true, and their concrete political influence was limited, but Nazism was nevertheless something which many people took very seriously as an alternative form of society and which prompted real ideological mobilisation. From this point of view Nazism was a key experience.

So very present during the interwar period, so very absent during the postwar period: it is remarkable that this change to a post-Nazi world was scarcely of any interest to Swedish historians. What did it mean once National Socialism was no longer a living threat? What traces did the Nazi experience leave behind? How was the postwar ideological pattern influenced by the experiences of Nazism?[80]

Having said this, there is a small number of studies that touch on these questions, the viewpoint adopted being one that forms a bridge between experiences of Nazism and the trends during the period after 1945. In 1984 the Scandinavianist Radko Kejzlar published an overlooked study of wartime and postwar Swedish literature. He was one of the few to follow up the traces of the war in the cultural life of Sweden. He pointed out that the years 1939–1945 rarely figured in Swedish literature before the end of the 1960s. Kejzlar argued that two groupings emerged during the war, one being a humanistic democratic group and the other a neutralist. This bipartite division would continue into the postwar period. Authors like Eyvind Johnson, Pär Lagerkvist and Vilhelm Moberg held the banner of activist humanism high whereas the majority of writers of the 1950s cultivated a literature

that was defeatist and escapist. At the beginning of the 1960s political engagement came to the fore and Kejzlar sees this as partly being penance for the lapses and omissions of wartime. It was not until towards the end of the 1960s that the policies of the 'years on stand-by' were subjected to close scrutiny.[81]

The thesis on anti-Semitism in Sweden after 1945 by Henrik Bachner, a historian of ideas, took up related questions. In his analysis of the press reactions to the murder of Folke Bernadotte in 1948 he established that the assassination gave rise to markedly anti-Jewish reactions in certain quarters, but that they were limited to a minority of Swedish public opinion. 'Even though Nazi crimes had discredited anti-Semitism, the taboo on anti-Jewish views at this time [the late 1940s] had not yet attained the absolute force that became evident during the 1950s and 1960s', Bachner writes. He then concludes: 'In their minds many people were still living in the political culture that existed before the Second World War when anti-Jewish attitudes and ideas were relatively acceptable'.[82] His studies of book publishing and social debate in the 1950s and 1960s reveal that the Swedish image of Israel was overwhelmingly positive. Even if prejudice did flourish, anti-Jewish attitudes were very rare in publicly expressed opinion. The transition has to be seen as a reaction to the Holocaust, but how the extermination of the Jews affected the attitudes of the postwar world remains to be fully examined.[83]

Both Kejzlar and Bachner were dealing with important questions but the significance of the Nazi experience did not constitute a central problem for either of them. If we limit our horizon to well-qualified reflections on the effect National Socialism had on Sweden, there are no more than a handful of contributions to be taken into account. And those that do exist tend to be sketches rather than systematically conducted investigations.

Svante Nordin, the historian of ideas, has suggested that a consensus came into being during the early postwar years. Influential Social Democratic politicians, cultural-radical intellectuals and liberal social reformers gathered around what were called 'the ideas of 1945', a cultural and social vision for the postwar era. They united in defence of rationalism, democracy and the Enlightenment and they closed ranks in support of the growing welfare state and the Swedish model. Nordin gives a pregnant summary of the trends visible in the early postwar period in Sweden.[84] What remains unclear, however, is precisely how the emergence of this dominant tendency should be interpreted; there is a risk that 'the ideas of 1945' are simply a refinement of 'the ideas of 1789'. There is a temptation to see this current of ideas as being at one and the same time an incarnation of the inheritance from the

Enlightenment together with the absolute converse of totalitarian ways of thought. In my view, what is needed is a more precise definition of the political and intellectual import of these ideas, not least in the form of a thorough discussion of the relationship between the emerging outlook and the historical experiences.

The scholar who has given the most profound thought to this relationship – the after-effects of Nazism in postwar Sweden – is Alf W. Johansson. His view is that the ideological conflicts of the war years and the standpoint taken in terms of realpolitik provided the basis for the postwar discourse in Sweden. 'Neutrality', Johansson writes, 'was not only the self-imposed security policy during the war, it also created a mentality'. It was a perception of self that was reinforced in the immediate postwar years when the paradigm of small-state realism – the idea that Sweden, as a small state, had had no alternative than to yield to the aggressive great power – was elevated to a universal truth. Johansson's view is that with the passing of time this caused a split in Swedish consciousness: on the one hand, any criticism of the wartime national leadership was rejected as being a manifestation of naïve and irresponsible idealism; on the other hand, there was the development of an almost pathological fear of viewing Swedish policies in the perspective that became the dominant one on the continent – a struggle between democracy and dictatorship, humanity and inhumanity, good and evil.[85]

Small-state realism gave moral legitimacy to the doctrine of neutrality, the foremost advocate of which was Östen Undén, the foreign minister. Once peace was enthroned as the highest of all values Sweden had – by definition – been right to stay out of the war. As a consequence of this, the war years were rarely discussed during the 1950s and 1960s. All eyes were fixed on the future and history had no lessons to offer. The drive for modernity overrode everything else in the Swedish perception of self and the war years appeared to be an insignificant pause in the realisation of the most modern of societies. The freedom of publication legislation of 1949 and the debate about the planned economy were certainly regarded as direct consequences of the war but, apart from that, the war left no very deep traces. Johansson continues, however:

> But having said this, it has to simultaneously be pointed out – and this is paradoxical – that in its efforts to become the ideal country of modernism Sweden turned itself on a more profound level into the antithesis of everything Nazism had stood for. The development of Swedish society was *in itself* a repudiation of Nazi values. If the Nazi ideal was constructed around the strong heroic individual and that individual's powerful development, Sweden structured itself as a country designed for the needs

> of the weak and the handicapped. […] In that respect one might argue that Sweden became the most anti-fascist society in the world.[86]

Alf W. Johansson returns to similar kinds of interpretation in other contexts. In his book *Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget* (Herbert Tingsten and the Cold War) he provides a characterisation of the ideological geography that took shape after 1945. In his opinion there was virtually universal support for anti-fascism and anti-communism in Western Europe and the U.S.A. The dystopian perception of these two meant that parts of the ideological field were anathemised and, of the two, anti-fascism became the consensus ideology *par excellence*, its core elements being its opposition to racism, dictatorship, nationalism, hierarchy and symbolism. The dominance of anti-fascism not only made any resurrection of National Socialism impossible, it also led to many of the ideas of traditional conservatism being tainted. Nation, church, respect for authority, society as an organism – after the Second World War all of these concepts were loaded with connotations that made them ideologically unusable. In a similar way, anti-communism contributed to the ostracising of the representatives of left-wing radicalism, although anti-communism was never as all-pervasive as anti-fascism. The shock waves that emanated from Nazism shook the very core of liberal society, Johansson asserts, and he argues that the postwar ideologies of Western Europe can consequently be seen as variants of the anti-fascist consensus.[87]

As with Svante Nordin, Alf W. Johansson's associative, virtually essayistic, manner of writing helps to broaden the horizon and open up new perspectives in a fruitful way, but at the same time it does mean that many questions are left unanswered. And one frequently finds oneself seeking in vain for the empirical basis on which conclusions rest. Furthermore, there is the problem that the distinction between self-perception and outer reality is not always adhered to. It is not evident, for instance, whether Sweden was really the most modern state in the world or whether that was no more than the image it had of itself. And that in its turn has to do with an unclear concept of modernisation in which *the modern* becomes identical to the ideals that formed the bedrock of postwar Sweden.[88]

The arguments put forward by Nordin and Johansson stimulate many questions. The most fundamental of these are how we should understand the Swedish experiences of National Socialism: what does the concept of experience actually mean and what is the content of this particular experience? How should we analyse the way the experiences of Nazism and the origin of the dominant postwar order relate to one another?

Cardinal Points

In the previous section I have been dealing with the area of tension between the historical context and the debate concerning historiographical research. Two lines of argument have been clear: in the first place, in Sweden as in the rest of Europe Nazism was a pervasive and significant reality up to the end of the Second World War, an ideological alternative that virtually anyone who was politically or intellectually conscious had to adopt a position on; secondly, it seems that hardly anyone has reflected on the meaning of the Nazi experience and the conclusions drawn from it during the postwar period even though a great deal of intellectual effort has been devoted to determining how Sweden related to National Socialism.

The Historical Problems

The primary task of this study is to analyse the Swedish experiences of Nazism and the lessons that arose from them in the wake of the Second World War. That objective can be broken down into more circumscribed historical problems. Since they are linked in a sort of logical progression, it seems sensible that the disposition of this book should relate to them.

The first problem has to do with the Nazi experience itself. It is important at the start to define the concept of experience more closely and to discuss in terms of principles the form of historical understanding that it relates to. This I do in Chapter II. The chapter begins with a theoretical discussion, which then moves into a more concrete analysis of the history of the concept, all of this being viewed in a wider international context. Thus at this early stage a bridge is built between the theoretical basis of the study and its empirical investigations.

The next problem involves analysing the conclusions that resulted from the Nazi experience in the wake of the war. The three chapters that follow are devoted to that topic at the same time as the enquiries proceed to deepen our understanding of the experience itself. Chapter III concentrates on the most immediate confrontation with Nazism after the coming of peace. Right from the start this chapter offers support for the view that stigmatisation was not restricted to Nazis in the narrow sense – indeed, the reverse is true, the Nazi experience having generated profound lessons that affected the ideological landscape and warped cultural orientation. In Chapter IV I then turn the spotlight on the emergence of what might be called the 'ideas of 1945'. My aim here, at the point where versions of the experiences of the past intersect

with projections of the future, is to analyse how the Nazi experience gave rise to a lesson that played a part in two significant but dissimilar debates of the 1940s and 1950s: educational reform and the renaissance of natural law. The ideological tendency visible in both of these debates went hand in hand with a cultural reorientation. Following on from that I consequently concentrate on the German cultural sphere in the aftermath of the war, in particular the orientation away from 'the German' that took place during this period. Chapters III–V, which form the empirical core of this study, analyse the way the lessons of Nazism contributed to the formation of the political, cultural and intellectual order of postwar Sweden. My consistent aim is to connect the Swedish experiences with points of international comparison.

The final problem involves the deeper implications of the experience of Nazism during the postwar period. In my final chapter both chronology and perspective are opened up. The conclusions reached up to that point form the basis of a more general characterisation of the connection between the Nazi experience and the postwar ideological territory. And at the same time I discuss the social location and historical transformation of those lessons during the second half of the twentieth century.

My fundamental historical-theoretical view (which is discussed more fully in Chapter II) should make it possible for this study to be more than an analysis of 'the image of Nazism', 'the discourse of Nazism', and so on. Rather than that, the general problem will consider how people after the events live and orient themselves in the light of profound historical experiences. The centre of gravity of this study is thus neither the experience of Nazism nor the emergence of the postwar ideological order but the interplay between them – *the lessons of Nazism*.

The setting of my study is the aftermath of the Second World War. In a chronological sense, then, it means that I am mainly concentrating on the period between the last years of the war and the time around 1950. The point of departure is motivated by the profound changes brought about by the end of the war: Nazism no longer constituted a living threat, planning in readiness for the postwar period really accelerated and the process of confronting the immediate past began. It is more difficult to settle on an end point and in this respect I am allowing myself a greater degree of flexibility. In the majority of cases the direct settling of accounts with National Socialism was already over by the end of the 1940s and new problems, the Cold War being not the least of them, caused a shift in public focus. There are cases, however, where there are good reasons for following the debates and tracing the ideas

through into the 1950s. And in the last chapter the discussion is broadened further to include most of the postwar era – indeed, in certain cases, all of it.

History, the historian Ingvar Andersson once said in a wonderful phrase, 'should include the play of all the forces'. It is a great dream, and an unachievable one. Every study has its own particular emphasis and in my case it is the history of ideas. That does not imply that I am using *intellectual history* or *Geistesgeschichte* in a narrow sense and thus only giving space to the grand ideas, but it does mean that my orientation is towards intellectual traditions, ideological pronouncements and cognitive concepts, frequently in their more conscious and articulated versions. What it is concerned with, then, is opinion formation, perceptions, clashes of ideas in the public sphere where the agents are mainly the various elites of modern society: opinion formers, intellectual, political and artistic writers. The book also contains significant elements of what we might call political cultural history. What I am referring to here is partly the interweaving of political and cultural life which stands at the centre of certain parts of the book, partly the broader context of opinion (experiences, processing, memories) that was certainly not always put into words but which nevertheless underpinned the ideological order.[89]

Anyone involved in carrying out research into the twentieth century risks drowning in the abundance of material that the century left behind. The only salvation is to have what the Germans call *Mut zur Lücke* – the courage to be selective. But the selection must never be arbitrary, it must be determined by the historical problems.

The Comparative Perspective

This is a study of Sweden seen in a wider international context. Swedish empiricism provides the foundation of the historical analysis and many of the concrete investigations proceed from Swedish circumstances. The interpretations, however, are consistently related to the wider world. Consequently it is a study in which comparisons play an important part even though they may not take the form of systematic and symmetrical comparisons between Sweden and any other equivalent country.

My ambition, rather, is to bring 'the Swedish' into a wider European space. By doing so, Europe – used here in a pragmatic analytic sense, not an ideological or metaphysical one – will become a sort of heuristic background against which Sweden will stand out. Since the end of the Cold War more historians have been criticising the fact that for far too long the history of Europe has been the history of the big countries

of Western Europe. There is justification for that view. In my case, however, it is not a matter of placing Swedish history in relation to the overarching pattern of European development: had that been the case I would have needed to structure in a wide range of south, central and eastern European coordinates. My aim, rather, is to place the history of Sweden in relief and to pin down its distinctive character while at the same time finding approaches that can illuminate the Swedish case.[90]

In practice my focus will often be on Germany/West Germany, but on occasion it will shift to other points of comparison in north-western Europe. There are a number of reasons why Germany should be at the centre of any comparison. Above all it is because of the special position of Germany in terms of twentieth century European history. It was the homeland of National Socialism and the country that once the war was over was most intensely involved in the processing of the Nazi experience. Herein lies an abundance of possibilities for comparison. Over and above that there are significant differences and similarities between Sweden and Germany in terms of their general historical development to make it possible to generate a striking contrast. Last but not least, there is the fact that historical literature about Germany in the period in question is very comprehensive. That is extremely useful for anyone wanting to make point by point comparisons.

Comparison with Germany opens up several rewarding perspectives while simultaneously causing a variety of complications. The postwar situation of Germany provides an enormous contrast to that of Sweden. The institutions of politics and law were declared bankrupt, infrastructure and economy were shattered, material need and spiritual disorientation had reduced existence to a state of utter impoverishment. From 1945 to 1949 Germany was divided into an American, a British, a French and a Russian zone of occupation. The first three became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1949 while the last-named became the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) later the same year. Developments after the end of the war took the two societies in quite different directions: in the East there was the planned economy of a people's democratic dictatorship, in the West the democratic free-market social state. From my point of view West Germany is undoubtedly the more interesting. During the early postwar period there were attempts there to interpret the experience of Nazism. This occurred, as in Sweden, within the framework of a liberal democratic ideology but, as a consequence of historical traditions and experiences, at times the outcomes were different.[91]

With the historian Jürgen Kocka as my stimulus I can define my comparative working method more closely. Kocka distinguishes four

functions that comparison can fulfil: the heuristic, the descriptive, the analytic and the paradigmatic. Comparison as heuristics implies historical thinking being enriched with new questions and ways of looking at things at the same time the historian being able to discover that important historical problems have been insufficiently investigated. This function is absolutely central in the case of my study, particularly in the opening and closing chapters, where the viewpoint has been allowed to open up. The descriptive aspect of comparison makes it possible to describe phenomena in a way that primarily highlights the distinguishing features. I make most use of this approach in my empirical chapters. The third of Kocka's methodological possibilities is the analytic. Comparative study almost always provides an opportunity to develop a line of thought as to the historical reasons for similarities and differences that have been discovered. This method is primarily used towards the end of my study. Finally Kocka talks of the paradigmatic advantages of comparison, its potential to elevate the observer above provincialism and open the road to alternative interpretations. Once again, it is mainly in my introductory and closing sections that this is brought into play.[92]

It is not, however, my intention to stop short at the stage of having described the international background to Swedish events and analysed the effect that foreign impulses had on Sweden. My aim, with comparison as a tool, is to discuss Swedish experiences primarily in relation to north-west European experiences and in particular to German experiences. To bring a medium-sized country – in this case Sweden – into a discussion of modern European history, which has all-too-often been based on no more than a couple of major powers, will undoubtedly enrich the discussion and introduce a level of multivocality. In that respect this study will not just make a contribution to Swedish history but also, to a very great extent, to international history.[93]

Historicising the Present

It would be possible to justify a study of this kind purely from the point of view of the discipline itself. The survey of research literature revealed significant lacunae in existing knowledge. The current profusion of specialist studies of Sweden between the wars stands in sharp contrast to the small number of studies of the early postwar period. Those that link the two epochs are even fewer, a fact that is particularly noticeable when compared with the international situation.

The power exerted by the Nazi experience on the minds of succeeding generations means, however, that it can never just be an issue of

purely academic interest. For the individual historian, just as for the wider public, the motive for paying attention to National Socialism is virtually always something outside the discipline itself – something political, moral or existential. This is not something that is unique to Nazism, but it does apply to Nazism to a much greater extent than to anything else. That in turn means that it offers particular possibilities and poses particular challenges. It is possible on the one hand to formulate a more elaborate and extensive motivation of the subject than is usually possible. On the other hand, the particular circumstances mean that a historicisation of Nazism brings with it serious complications.

In a frequently quoted article in the first number of the journal *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* the historian Hans Rothfels discussed the concept of contemporary history. According to him *Zeitgeschichte* may be defined as 'the epoch that has been experienced by those still alive and the scholarly study of that epoch'. Thus, and in contrast to a great deal of older history, contemporary history is not just the name of a historical period but also an active space for memory and experience.[94] Rothfels's definition has been criticised but has also served as inspiration. One obvious problem is that even epochs that are distant in time can have a tangible existence in the present: the significance of antiquity to Western Christendom is just one of many examples. In this regard the Egyptologist Jan Assmann has made a fundamental distinction between communicative memory and the cultural memory. Whereas the former applies to biographical, self-experienced memories within a limited temporal space, the latter takes the form of culturally transmitted memories which may have their origin in a distant past time.[95] For the generations born before the Second World War National Socialism was both a communicative and a cultural memory. They had personal recollections of the Third Reich and these recollections had an enduring influence on their convictions. And their experiences were also collective experiences that were passed on through institutions, legal texts and public debate.

The experiences of National Socialism continued to leave deep traces on the postwar world. Conclusions reached during the second half of the 1940s survived that decade and are even now a significant element in the legacy of the twentieth century. The value of this study is thus not just that it reveals the significance of the Nazi experience and the lessons it has led to. It is also a contribution to the Swedish treatment of a central chapter of the modern history of Europe.

The stigmatisation of Nazism has had the effect of a stimulant on scholarly activity. Ever since the 1960s research into National Socialism has spread to include an ever wider range of topics and the time is long

past when an overview was a possibility.[96] Simultaneously, however, the moral and ideological force of the denunciation of Nazism has complicated a particular kind of historical approach – what we might call the historicisation of Nazism, fitting Nazism into its historical context. The discussion of that issue took off at the end of the 1980s thanks to a wide-ranging public correspondence between two historians, Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer. Broszat urged historicisation, arguing that the harsh moral condemnation of the Third Reich hindered historical insights. Friedländer countered his arguments with the warning that any normalisation of Nazism might, in a worst case scenario, serve as an invitation to relativise the Holocaust.[97]

Jörn Rüsen has examined the arguments involved in this discussion from the point of view of a theorist of history and has lifted them onto a general plane. He points out the contemporary history has always come up against problems of historicisation because the temporal proximity of the object of study gives rise to criticism that such an approach is insufficiently historical in outlook. Rüsen questions the suppositions on which the objections are based, pointing out that history does not merely depend on temporal distance but also on whether the past relates in a meaningful and significant way to the present. Nazism certainly does so, both politically and existentially, more than most issues in modern history. The problem only arises if historicisation means the exclusion of all questions of norms from historical discussion. That is not something that either Broszat or Rüsen wanted: in spite of their differences they favoured approaches to Nazism that avoided both political instrumentalisation and moral detachment.[98]

I am in agreement with their position. In my case, however, the problem of historicisation is of a different and milder order since I am not concerned with Nazism in itself but with how the experiences of it played out in the world that came after. I do not need to confront directly the madness of the Nazis, I do not need to identify with the world and the life of the camp commandant. On the other hand, it is important for me to historicise the implications of the Nazi experience and to bring that experience into a more profound historical sphere. That might be interpreted as being a relativisation of National Socialism; in reality, however, it is a relativisation of a historical experience and the conclusions that were drawn from it.

Given that I support the moral anathematisation of National Socialism in the wake of the war, my difficulty consists in finding a point of departure for my critical analysis that does not simultaneously place me in a normative dilemma. My answer – which this study exemplifies – is to rely on the proven virtues of wide contextualisation,

international comparisons, hermeneutic inspiration, coherent argumentation and humanistic values.

Notes

1. Overarching interpretations of twentieth-century history are discussed in C. S. Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', *The American Historical Review* (3) (2000); K.H. Jarausch and M. Geyer (eds), *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 37–108; A. Schildt, 'Überlegungen zur Historisierung der Bundesrepublik', in K.H. Jarausch and M. Sabrow (eds), *Verletztes Gedächtnis: Erinnerungskultur und Zeitgeschichte im Konflikt* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2002); K.H. Jarausch and M. Sabrow (eds), *Die historische Meistererzählung: Deutungslinien der Deutschen Nationalgeschichte nach 1945* (Göttingen: Vandenhoech & Ruprecht, 2002); F. Furet and E. Nolte, '*Feindliche Nähe': Kommunismus und Faschismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Ein Briefwechsel* (Munich: Herbig, 1999).
2. An important variation, 'the Churchillian interpretation of the Wars', is discussed in D. Reynolds, *In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War* (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 2004).
3. See, for example, K. Hornung, *Das totalitäre Zeitalter: Bilanz der 20. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1993) and G. Besier, *Das Europa der Diktaturen: Eine neue Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006).
4. E.J. Hobsbawm's wide-ranging work *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), for instance, offers a Marxist interpretation.
5. J. Östling, 'Tysklands väg mot moderniteten: Hans-Ulrich Wehler och *Sonderweg*-tesen', in L. Berntson and S. Nordin (eds), *I historiens skruvstäd: Berättelser om Europas 1900-tal* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2008).
6. R. Bavaj, *Die Ambivalenz der Moderne im Nationalsozialismus: Eine Bilanz der Forschung* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003); R. Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
7. See, for example, M. Burleigh, *The Third Reich: A New History* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2001), E. Voegelin, *Die politischen Religionen* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1996) and E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Rinehart, 1941).
8. J. E. Cronin, *The World the Cold War Made: Order, Chaos, and the Return of History* (London: Routledge, 1996), ix; K. Salomon, *En femtiotalsberättelse: Populärkulturens kalla krig i folkhemssverige* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2007), 21–22. Major works on twentieth-century history include Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, G. Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1994), F. Furet, *Le passé d'une illusion: Essai sur l'idée communiste au XXe siècle* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995) and

H. James, *Europe Reborn: A History, 1914–2000* (Harlow, U.K.: Pearson-Longman, 2003).

9. F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992), 7.
10. See, for example, Furet, *Le passé d'une illusion*; L. Berntson, G. Hálfdanarson and H. Jensen, *Tusen år i Europa: 1800–2000* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2004). However, the interpretation of the first half of the twentieth century and, in particular, the years 1917–1945, as an ideological triangle drama is older: see H. Rothfels, 'Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (1) (1953), 7 for an early instance. Masaryk is quoted from M. Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, 1998), x.
11. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, xii.
12. J.A. Garraty, 'The New Deal, National Socialism, and the Great Depression', *The American Historical Review* 76 (4) (1973) and W. Schivelbusch, *Entfernte Verwandtschaft: Faschismus, Nationalsozialismus, New Deal 1933–1939* (Vienna: Hanser, 2005), particularly 7–22.
13. For general reference, see Schivelbusch, *Entfernte Verwandtschaft*, but also Burleigh, *The Third Reich*, 343–404, J. Baberowski and A. Doering-Manteuffel, *Ordnung durch Terror: Gewaltexzesse und Vernichtung im nationalsozialistischen und stalinistischen Imperium* (Bonn: Dietz, 2006) and P.M.H. Mazumdar (ed.), *The Eugenics Movement: An International Perspective*, vol. 1–6 (New York: Holt, 2007).
14. G.L. Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism* (New York: Howard Fertid, 1999), ix–xi.
15. R. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1991); S.G. Payne, *A History of Fascism: 1914–1945* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995); R. Eatwell, *Fascism: A History* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1995); R. Griffin (ed.), *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus* (London: Arnold, 1998); Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution*; R.O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London: Penguin, 2004); M. Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). The field is discussed in L. Berggren, 'Den svenska mellankrigsfascismen – ett ointressant marginalfenomen eller ett viktigt forskningsobjekt?', *Historisk tidskrift* (3) (2002); A. Bauerkämper, *Der Faschismus in Europa 1918–1945* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2006), 16–19 and L.M. Andersson and H. Bachner, 'Nationalsocialismen: En begreppsdiskussion', in G. Andersson and U. Geisler (eds), *Fruktan, fascination och frändskap: Det svenska musiklivet och nazismen* (Malmö: Sekel, 2006).
16. Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution*, x.
17. J. Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget: Från patriotism till universalism under efterkrigstiden', in L.M. Andersson and M. Tydén (eds), *Sverige och Nazityskland: Skuldfrågor och moraldebatt* (Stockholm: Dialogos, 2007), particularly 26–30.
18. The historian Norman Davies coined the phrase 'the Allied Scheme of History', the triumphal Anglo-Saxon historiography, as a result of victory in the Second World War. Core aspects of it were both programmatic anti-fascism and 'a demonological fascination with Germany, the twice-defeated

enemy'. See N. Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 39–40.

19. Cf. E. Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche: Die Action française, der italienische Faschismus, der Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: R. Piper, 1963), 23–35 and C. Cornelißen, 'Epoche', in S. Jordan (ed.), *Lexikon Geschichtswissenschaft: Hundert Grundbegriffe* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2002).
20. S.F. Vedi, 'Bibliographic Companion to the Preceding Research Surveys', in S. Ekman and K. Åmark (eds), *Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust: A Survey of Research*, trans. D. Kendall (Stockholm: Swedish Research Council, 2003), 275. Ekman and Åmark's invaluable survey is supplemented with Patrick Vonderau, *Schweden und das nationalsozialistische Deutschland: Eine annotierte Bibliographie der deutschsprachigen Forschungsliteratur: 825 Einträge – 439 Annotationen* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2003).
21. What is meant by National Socialism in this context is partly Nazism as an ideological vision and competing social order, partly Nazi Germany as a power and a foreign policy threat. At the end of the 1930s and beginning of the 1940s the latter understanding would have undoubtedly have been central. In this study, which concentrates above all on the early postwar years, Nazism is understood as the former.
22. A.W. Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen: Aspekter på andra världskriget* (Stockholm: Prisma, 2006), 284–285. See also S. Ekman, 'Introduction', in S. Ekman and K. Åmark (eds), *Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust: A Survey of Research*, trans. D. Kendall (Stockholm: Swedish Research Council, 2003), 16–30, J. Östling, 'The Rise and Fall of Small-State Realism: Sweden and the Second World War', in H. Stenius, M. Österberg and J. Östling (eds), *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011) and J. Östling, 'Sweden and the Second World War: Historiography and Interpretation in the Postwar Era', in Jill Stephenson and John Gilmour (eds), *Hitler's Scandinavian Legacy* (London, New Delhi, New York & Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2013).
23. W.M. Carlgren, *Svensk utrikespolitik 1939–1945* (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1973); A.W. Johansson, *Per Albin och kriget: Samlingsregeringen och utrikespolitiken under andra världskriget* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1985); S. Ekman (ed.), *Stormaktstryck och småstatspolitik: Aspekter på svensk politik under andra världskriget* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1986).
24. M.P. Boëthius, *Heder och samvete: Sverige och andra världskriget* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1991).
25. Ekman, 'Introduction', 23–25; Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 285–287.
26. Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 279–280.
27. See, for example, P.A. Levine, 'Whither Holocaust Studies in Sweden?: Some Thoughts on *Levande Historia* and Other Matters Swedish', *Holocaust Studies* (1) (2005).
28. A.W. Johansson, *Finlands sak: Svensk politik och opinion under vinterkriget 1939–1940* (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1973); K. Åmark, *Makt eller moral: Svensk offentlig debatt om internationell politik och svensk utrikes och*

försvarspolitik 1938–1939 (Stockholm: Allmänna förlag, 1973); L. Drangel, *Den kämpande demokratin: En studie i antinazistisk opinionsrörelse 1935–1945* (Stockholm: Liberförlag, 1976); T. Nybom, *Motstånd – anpassning – uppslutning: Linjer i svensk debatt om utrikespolitik och internationell politik 1940–1943* (Stockholm: Liberförlag, 1978).

29. The current perception that research about the Second World War seems restricted is not merely a Swedish phenomenon: See Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget'.
30. The direction research has been taking since the early 2000s is shown by K. Åmark, *Att bo granne med ondskan: Sveriges förhållande till nazismen, Nazityskland och Förintelsen* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 2011), 11–40. See also L.M. Andersson and M. Tydén, 'Historikerna och moralen', in L.M. Andersson and M. Tydén (eds), *Sverige och Nazityskland* (Stockholm: Dialogos, 2007), 11.
31. Excellent historiographical surveys of the field can be found in Ekman and Åmark (eds), *Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust: A Survey of Research*, trans. D. Kendall (Stockholm: Stockholm Research Council, 2003), in particular Jonas Hansson, 'Sweden and Nazism', Harald Runblom, 'Sweden and the Holocaust from an International Perspective', Svante Nordin, 'Literature on Sweden and Nazi Germany' and Klas Åmark, 'Democracies in the Struggle Against Dictatorships'.
32. H. Carlsson, *Nazismen i Sverige: Ett varningsord* (Stockholm: Federativs, 1942); Å. Thulstrup, *Med lock och pock: Tyska försök att påverka svensk opinion 1933–45* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1962); E. Wärenstam, *Sveriges nationella ungdomsförbund och högern 1928–1934* (Stockholm: Svenska bokförlaget, 1965); R. Torstendahl, *Mellan nykonservatism och liberalism: Idébrytningar inom högern och bondepartierna 1918–1934* (Stockholm: Svenska bokförlaget, 1969); E. Wärenstam, *Fascismen och nazismen i Sverige 1920–1940: Studier i den svenska nationalsocialismens, fascismens och antisemitismens organisationer, ideologier och propaganda under mellankrigsåren* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970); U. Lindström, *Fascism in Scandinavia 1920–1940* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1983).
33. B. Landgren, *Hjalmar Gullberg och beredskapslitteraturen: Studier i svensk dikt och politisk debatt 1933–1942* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1975); M. Lind, *Kristendom och nazism: Frågan om kristendom och nazism belyst av olika ställningstaganden i Tyskland och Sverige 1933–1945* (Lund: Håkan Olssons förlag, 1975); Drangel, *Den kämpande demokratin*; W. Sauter, *Theater als Widerstand: Wirkung und Wirkungsweise eines politischen Theaters: Faschismus und Judendarstellung auf der schwedischen Bühne 1936–1941* (Stockholm: Akademilitteratur, 1979).
34. For example, T. Forser, *Böök 30-tal: En studie i ideologi* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1976) and J. Olsson, *Svensk spelfilm under andra världskriget* (Lund: Liber Läromedel, 1979).
35. Östling, 'Svenska berättelser om andra världskriget', 38–42. See Chapters III and VI.
36. H. Lööw, *Hakkorset och Wasakärven: En studie av nationalsocialismen i Sverige 1924–1950* (Gothenburg: Historiska institutionen, 1990); K.N.A. Nilsson, *Svensk överklassnazism: 1930–1945* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 1996); S. Oredsson,

Lunds universitet under andra världskriget: Motsättningar, debatter och hjälpinsatser (Lund: Lunds universitetshistoriska sällskap, 1996); Berggren, 'Den svenska mellankrigsfascismen'.

37. P.A. Levine, *From Indifference to Activism: Swedish Diplomacy and the Holocaust, 1938–1944* (Uppsala: Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 1996); L. Berggren, *Nationell upplysning: Drag i den svenska antisemitismens idéhistoria* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 1999); H. Bachner, *Återkomsten: Antisemitism i Sverige efter 1945* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1999); L.M. Andersson, *En jude är en jude är en jude …: Representationer av 'juden' i svensk skämtpress omkring 1900–1930* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2000); H. Carlsson, *Medborgarskap och diskriminering: Östjudar och andra invandrare i Sverige 1860–1920* (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2004); H. Blomqvist, *Nation, ras och civilisation i svensk arbetarrörelse före nazismen* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2006); H. Rosengren, '*Judarnas Wagner': Moses Pergament och den kulturella identifikationens dilemma omkring 1920–1950* (Lund: Sekel, 2007); P. Garberding, *Musik och politik i skuggan av nazismen: Kurt Atterberg och de svensktyska musikrelationerna* (Lund: Sekel, 2007). See also I. Svanberg and M. Tydén (eds), *Sverige och Förintelsen: Debatt och dokument om Europas judar 1933–1945* (Stockholm: Arena, 1997), H. Blomqvist, *Gåtan Nils Flyg och nazismen* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 1999), H. Blomqvist, *Socialdemokrat och antisemit?: Den dolda historien om Arthur Engberg* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2001), G. Blomberg, *Mota Moses i grind: Ariseringsiver och antisemitism i Sverige 1933–1943* (Stockholm: Hillelförlag, 2003), H. Karlsson, *Det fruktade märket: Wilhelm Peterson-Berger, antisemitismen och antinazismen* (Malmö: Sekel, 2005) and M. Byström, *En broder, gäst och parasit: Uppfattningar och föreställningar om utlänningar, flyktingar och flyktingpolitik i svensk offentlig debatt 1942–1947* (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2006), K. Kvist Geverts, *Ett främmande element i nationen: Svensk flyktingpolitik och de judiska flyktingarna 1938–1944* (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Uppsaliensis, 2008) and H. Bachner, '*Judefrågan': Debatt om antisemitism i 1930-talets Sverige* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2009). On sterilisation, see Gunnar Broberg and Mattias Tydén, *Oönskade i folkhemmet: Rashygien och sterilisering i Sverige* (Stockholm: Gidlunds, 1991), Maciej Zaremba, *De rena och de andra: Om tvångssteriliseringar, rashygien och arvsynd* (Stockholm: Bokförlaget DN, 1999), Maija Runcis, *Steriliseringar i folkhemmet* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 1998) and Mattias Tydén, *Från politik till praktik: De svenska steriliseringslagarna 1935–1975* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2002).
38. This historiographical and historio-cultural shift is discussed from a variety of perspectives in P. Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999); Runblom, 'Sweden and the Holocaust from an International Perspective'; K.G. Karlsson, 'The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture', in K.G. Karlsson and U. Zander (eds), *Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003).
39. S. Koblik, '*Om vi teg, skulle stenarna ropa': Sverige och judeproblemet 1933–1945* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1987).
40. In addition to previously mentioned texts the following should be noted: A. Ohlsson, '*Men ändå måste jag berätta': Studier i skandinavisk förintelselitteratur*

(Nora: Nya Doxa, 2002); G. Andersson and U. Geisler (eds), *Fruktan, fascination och frändskap: Det svenska musiklivet och nazismen* (Malmö: Sekel, 2006); A. Jarlert, *Judisk 'ras' som äktenskapshinder i Sverige: Effekten av Nürnberglagarna i Svenska kyrkans statliga funktion som lysningsförrättare 1935–1945* (Malmö: Sekel, 2006); G. Richardson, *Beundran och fruktan: Sverige inför Tyskland 1940–1942* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 1996); B. Almgren, *Illusion und Wirklichkeit: Individuelle und kollektive Denkmuster in nationalsozialistischer Kulturpolitik und Germanistik in Schweden 1928–1945* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2001); Liljefors *Bilder av Förintelsen*; B. Almgren, *Drömmen om Norden: Nazistisk infiltration i Sverige 1933–1945* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2005); I. Lomfors, *Blind fläck: Minne och glömska kring svenska Röda korsets hjälpinsats i Nazityskland 1945* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2005). Many important results from the research of recent years can be found in C. Brylla, B. Almgren and F.M. Kirsch (eds), *Bilder i kontrast: Interkulturella processer Sverige/Tyskland i skuggan av nazismen 1933–1945* (Ålborg: 'Institut für Sprache und internationale Kulturstudien, 2005), L.M. Andersson and M. Tydén (eds.), *Sverige och Nazityskland* and in Åmark, *Att bo granne med ondskan*. This latter work provides in many ways a synthesising and concluding report of the research programme 'Sweden's relations to Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust'.

41. Hansson, 'Sweden and Nazism'.
42. E. François, 'Meistererzählungen und Dammbrüche: Die Erinnerung an den Zweiten Weltkrieg zwischen Nationalisierung und Universalisierung', in M. Flacke (ed.), *Mythen der Nationen: 1945 – Arena der Erinnerungen*, vol. 1 (Berlin: DHM, 2004); C. Bryld, '"The Five Accursed Years": Danish Perception and Usage of the Period of the German Occupation, with a Wider View to Norway and Sweden', *Scandinavian Journal of History* (1) (2007); Östling, 'The Rise and Fall of Small-State Realism'.
43. Hansson, 'Sweden and the Holocaust from an International Perspective', 194–195, calls for a more synthesising coverage of the ideological landscape of the first half of the twentieth century. Two major works with synthesising ambitions have appeared in recent years: Åmark, *Att bo granne med ondskan* and Y. Hirdman, U. Lundberg and J. Björkman, *Sveriges historia: 1920–1965* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 2012). However, none of these works aims to map the ideological landscape.
44. Cf. Kent Zetterberg's review of Lööw's dissertation, 'Nationalsocialismen i Sverige 1924–1950', *Historisk tidskrift* (2) (1992) and Heléne Lööw's *Nazismen i Sverige 1924–1979: Pionjärerna, partierna, propagandan* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2004).
45. See Chapter VI.
46. In the case of certain issues, particularly those to do with sterilisation, Sweden has been discussed in relation to other countries, for instance G. Broberg and N. Roll-Hansen (eds), *Eugenics and the Welfare State: Sterilization Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2005).
47. N. Götz, *Ungleiche Geschwister: Die Konstruktion von nationalsozialistischer Volksgemeinschaft und schwedischem Volksheim* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), 529–543. A kind of counterweight to Götz's study is provided

in L. Trägårdh, *The Concept of the People and the Construction of Popular Political Culture in Germany and Sweden, 1848–1933* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1996).

48. An example of the Swedish attitude toward the Nazi social model is given in N. Götz and K.K. Patel, 'Facing the Fascist Model: Discourse and the Construction of Labour Services in the USA and Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s', *Journal of Contemporary History* (1) (2006), 65–73.
49. Lindström, *Fascism in Scandinavia 1920–1940*, 305–307.
50. Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 148–151 (quoted 151).
51. E. Wigforss, *Minnen: 1932–1949* (Stockholm: Tidens förlag, 1954), 76.
52. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, x.
53. H.M. Enzensberger, *Europa in Ruinen: Augenzeugenberichte aus den Jahren 1944–1948* (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1990), 16. From the point of view of historical scholarship Enzensberger's statement was an exaggeration because there had long been a rich body of research dealing with the earliest phase of the Cold War. A number of collections have been devoted to the upheavals of the early postwar period, for instance, I. Deák, J.T. Gross and T. Judt (eds), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), D. Geppert (ed.), *The Postwar Challenge: Cultural, Social, and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945–1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), R. Bessel and D. Schumann (eds), *Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History During the 1940s and 1950s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), and N. Frei (ed.), *Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik: Der Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006). The period is also central in several larger works of recent years on modern European history: Mazower, *Dark Continent*; R. Vinen, *A History in Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001); James, *Europe Reborn*; T. Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (London: Penguin Press, 2005). Changing historiographical trends are dealt with in M. Mazower, 'Changing Trends in the Historiography of Postwar Europe, East and West', *International Labor and Working-Class History* (58) (2000).
54. T. Judt, 'Preface', I. Deák, J.T. Gross and T. Judt (eds), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); D. Geppert, 'Introduction', in D. Geppert (ed.), *The Postwar Challenge: Cultural, Social, and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945–1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); M. Conway, 'The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age, 1945–1973', *Contemporary European History* (1) (2004).
55. K.D. Bracher, *Zeit der Ideologien: Eine Geschichte politischen Denkens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Jahrhundert, 1982), 271–290.
56. M. Conway, 'Democracy in Postwar Western Europe: The Triumph of A Political Model', *European History Quarterly* (1) (2002), 59. See also Conway, 'The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age, 1945–1973' and S. Reynolds, 'Lateness, Amnesia and Unfinished Business: Gender and Democracy in Twentieth-Century Europe', *European History Quarterly* (2) (2002).

57. Conway, 'Democracy in Postwar Western Europe', 68–70. See also K.H. Jarausch, *Die Umkehr: Deutsche Wandlungen 1945–1995* (Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2004) and A. Bauerkämper, K.H. Jarausch and M.M. Payk (eds), *Demokratiewunder: Transatlantische Mittler und die kulturelle Öffnung Westdeutschlands* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005).
58. Payne, *A History of Fascism*.
59. Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*, 23–58; G.L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975), 3–6; Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, 172–173.
60. Furet, *Le passé d'une illusion*, 411.
61. Deák, Gross and Judt (eds), *The Politics of Retribution in Europe*; Frei (ed.), *Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik*. See also Chapter III.
62. N. Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich: Beck, 1996); T. Fischer and M.N. Lorenz (eds), *Lexikon der 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' in Deutschland: Debatten und Diskursgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus nach 1945* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007), 92–106.
63. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 317; T. Buchanan and M. Conway (eds), *Political Catholicism in Europe: 1918–1965* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); A. Schildt, *Konservatismus in Deutschland: Von den Anfängen im 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998).
64. Judt, *Postwar*, 88 and 217–225. For France and Italy: T. Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 2–5 and 118–138 and P. Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943–1988* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 186–209.
65. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 185–209.
66. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 185–209.
67. In spite of this, research into the actual transition has been very sparse. 'We have given enormous thought to how Europeans got into fascism and war; the time has come to understand, on social and cultural as well as political and economic terms, how Europeans got out', as stated in Bessel and Schumann (eds), *Life After Death*, 13
68. Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 276–278.
69. An exception to this is Hirdman, Lundberg and Björkman, *Sveriges historia*, in which the presentation takes the form of a welfare narrative structured around the dynamic interplay between political history and social transformation. See my discussion in J. Östling, 'När allt mätbart blev bättre i Sverige', *Respons* (5) (2012). The historian Marie Cronqvist points out in *Mannen i mitten: Ett spiondrama i svensk kallakrigskultur* (Stockholm: Carlsson bokförlag, 2004), 14–15, that two of the most important Swedish postwar themes, *folkhemmet* ('the people's home') and neutrality, have had the spotlight shone on them, but that the relationship between the two has to a great extent been pushed aside. Her study is a contribution to the analysis of this situation.
70. N. Stenlås, *Den inre kretsen: Den svenska ekonomiska elitens inflytande över partipolitik och opinionsbildning 1940–1949* (Lund: Arkiv förlag, 1998), 33–34.

71. See, for instance, S. Carlsson, *Svensk historia: Tiden efter 1718* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1980), 595.
72. L. Lewin, *Planhushållningsdebatten* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967). Later scholars in this field have argued among other things that the Swedish debate, too, should be seen in the light of the Cold War and the contemporary postwar programmes in Europe: T. Jonter, *Socialiseringen som kom av sig: Sverige, oljan och USAs planer på en ny ekonomisk världsordning 1945–1949* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 1994); Ö. Appelqvist, *Bruten brygga: Gunnar Myrdal och Sveriges ekonomiska efterkrigspolitik 1943–1947* (Stockholm: Santérus, 2000). Aspects of postwar economic policies are also addressed in B. Karlsson, *Handelspolitik eller politisk handling: Sveriges handel med öststaterna 1946–1952* (Gothenburg: Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen, Göteborgs universitet, 1992), C. Sevón, *Visionen om Europa: Svensk neutralitet och europeisk återuppbyggnad 1945–1948* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1995), Stenlås, *Den inre kretsen* and N. Almgren, *Kvinnorörelsen och efterkrigsplaneringen: Statsfeminism i svensk arbetsmarknadspolitik under och kort efter andra världskriget* (Umeå: NRA Repro, 2006).
73. Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 269.
74. A.M. Ekengren, *Sverige under kalla kriget 1945–1969: En forskningsöversikt* (Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, 1997). Since then many contributions have been added to the history of Swedish foreign and security policy during the first postwar decades, including S. Ottosson, *Den (o) moraliska neutraliteten: Tre politikers och tre tidningars moraliska värdering av svensk utrikespolitik 1945–1952* (Stockholm: Santérus, 2000), M. Petersson, *'Brödrafolkens väl': Svensk-norska säkerhetsrelationer 1949–1969* (Stockholm: Santérus, 2003), S. Ekecrantz, *Hemlig utrikespolitik: Kalla kriget, utrikesnämnden och regeringen 1946–1959* (Stockholm: Santérus, 2003) and R. Dalsjö, *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of 'Neutral' Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West* (Stockholm: Santérus, 2006).
75. Ekengren, *Sverige under kalla kriget 1945–1969*, 8–9; Charles Silva and Thomas Jonter (eds), *Sverige inför en ny världsordning, 1945–50: Formativa år för svensk utrikespolitik?* (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska institutet, 1995); Karlsson, *Handelspolitik eller politisk handling*, Jonter, *Socialiseringen som kom av sig*; C. Silva, *Keep Them Strong, Keep Them Friendly: Swedish-American Relations and the Pax Americana, 1948–1952* (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 1999); T.B. Olesen (ed.), *The Cold War and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at a Crossroad* (Odense: University of Southern Denmark, 2004).
76. M. af Malmborg, *Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten: Sverige och den västeuropeiska integrationen 1945–1959* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1994).
77. B. Stråth, *Folkhemmet mot Europa: Ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1993); B. Stråth, 'The Swedish Demarcation of Europe', in M. af Malmborg and B. Stråth (eds), *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among Nations* (Oxford: Berg, 2002). Similar conclusions were reached in other studies: K. Misgeld, *Sozialdemokratie und Außenpolitik in Schweden: Sozialistische Internationale, Europapolitik und die Deutschlandsfrage 1945–1955* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1984); K. Misgeld, *Den fackliga europavägen: LO, det internationella samarbetet och Europas enande 1945–1991* (Stockholm: Atlas, 1997).

78. T. Frängsmyr, *Svensk idéhistoria: Bildning och vetenskap under tusen år: 1809–2000* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 2000), 299–302.
79. A. Frenander, *Debattens vågor: Om politisk-ideologiska frågor i efterkrigstidens svenska kulturdebatt* (Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, 1999), 78–108; T. Stenström, *Existentialismen i Sverige: Mottagande och inflytande 1900–1950* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1984); A. Berge, *Det kalla kriget i Tidens spegel: En socialdemokratisk bild av hoten mot frihet och fred 1945–1962* (Stockholm: Carlsson, 1990); B. Skovdahl, *Tingsten, totalitarismen och ideologierna* (Stockholm and Stehag: B. Östlings bokförlag, 1992); T. Forser and P.A. Tjäder, *Tredje ståndpunkten: En debatt från det kalla krigets dagar* (Staffanstorp: Cavefors förlag, 1972).
80. There is, as pointed out earlier, a certain amount of literature about Nazism in Sweden from the period immediately after 1945, but it tends to focus on surviving groups attracted to authoritarian nationalism: Lööw, *Hakkorset och Wasakärven*; K.N.A. Nilsson, *Överklass, nazism och högerextremism*; Lööw, *Nazismen i Sverige 1924–1979*; S. Bruchfeld, 'Grusade drömmar: Svenska "nationella" och det tyska nederlaget 1945', in C. Brylla, B. Almgren and F.M. Kirsch (eds), *Bilder i kontrast: Interkulturella processer Sverige/Tyskland i skuggan av nazismen 1933–1945* (Ålborg: 'Institut für Sprache und internationale Kulturstudien, 2005); C. Mithander, '"Let Us Forget the Evil Memories": Nazism and the Second World War from the Perspective of a Swedish Fascist', in C. Mithander, J. Sundholm and M. Holmgren Troy (eds), *Collective Traumas: Memories of War and Conflict in 20thcentury Europe* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2007).
81. R. Kejzlar, *Literatur und Neutralität: Zur schwedischen Literatur der Kriegs und Nachkriegszeit* (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1984).
82. Bachner, *Återkomsten*, 85.
83. Bachner, *Återkomsten*, 148–150.
84. Nordin, 'Literature on Sweden and Nazi Germany', 255–256; S. Nordin, 'Torsten Gårdlund: De efterkrigstida idéernas förridare (1911–2003)', *Dagens forskning* (7) (2003).
85. Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 274–280 (quotation 274). See also Stråth, *Folkhemmet mot Europa*, 196–222.
86. Johansson, *Den nazistiska utmaningen*, 283.
87. A.W. Johansson, *Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget: Antikommunism och liberalism i Dagens Nyheter 1946–1952* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1995), particularly 224–37. See also A.W. Johansson, 'Vill du se ett monument? Se dig omkring!: Några reflektioner kring nationell identitet och kollektivt minne i Sverige efter andra världskriget', in K. Almqvist and K. Glans (eds), *Den svenska framgångssagan* (Stockholm: Fischer & Co., 2001) and A.W. Johansson, 'Inledning: Svensk nationalism och identitet efter andra världskriget', in A.W. Johansson (ed.), *Vad är Sverige?: Röster om svensk nationell identitet* (Stockholm: Prisma, 2001).
88. A problematising discussion of the concept of modernity can be found in M. Wiklund, *I det modernas landskap: Historisk orientering och kritiska berättelser om det moderna Sverige mellan 1960 och 1990* (Eslöv: B. Östlings förlag, 2006), particularly 74–108.
89. I. Andersson, *Sveriges historia* (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1943), 7.

90. Davies, *Europe*, 7–16.
91. Wide-ranging introductions to early postwar Germany are M. Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), J. Echternkamp, *Nach dem Krieg: Alltagsnot, Neuorientierung und die Last der Vergangenheit 1945–1949* (Zurich: Pendo Verlag, 2003) and E. Wolfrum, *Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006).
92. J. Kocka, 'Comparison and Beyond', *History and Theory* (1) (2003); H. Kaelble, *Der historische Vergleich: Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1999).
93. Cf. S. Eklöf Amirell, 'Den internationella historiens uppgång och fall: Trender inom svensk och internationell historieforskning 1950–2005', *Historisk tidskrift* (2) 2006, 259–264.
94. Rothfels, 'Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe', 2; G. Metzler, *Einführung in das Studium der Zeitgeschichte* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2004), 12–19.
95. J. Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich: Beck, 1997).
96. Michael Ruck's major two-volume bibliography of National Socialism from 2000 lists 37,077 titles in English, German and French. See M. Ruck, *Bibliographie zum Nationalsozialismus*, vol. 1–2 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000).
97. M. Broszat, *Nach Hitler: Der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte: Beiträge* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1986); M. Broszat and S. Friedländer, 'Um die "Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus"', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (2) (1988); I. Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (London: Hodder Arnold Publication, 2000), 218–236.
98. J. Rüsen, *Zerbrechende Zeit: Über den Sinn der Geschichte* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001), particularly 217–28. See also M. Wiklund, 'Det historiska berättandet och historiekulturens förnuft', in J. Rüsen, *Berättande och förnuft: Historieteoretiska texter* (Gothenburg: Daidalos, 2004), 24–25.

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