

CHAPTER 11

“We’re All Humanitarians”

International Humanitarian Organizations, Islamist Service Societies, and the Practice of “Humanitariyan Jihad” in Kashmir

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An earthquake changed the landscape of northeast Pakistan in October 2005. It had its epicenter near Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), which is a part of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir that is administered by Pakistan and claimed by India. Schools, hospitals, government buildings, and houses collapsed, and in mountainous areas, entire villages were buried in landslides. The earthquake killed over 80,000 people, injured approximately 120,000 people, and rendered 3 million people unsheltered as the winter season of the lower Himalayas approached.

This natural disaster brought numerous international agencies, state institutions, and national and transnational voluntary organizations together in a vast humanitarian relief project. Among the voluntary workers who contributed to the relief and rehabilitation efforts in the first days and months after the earthquake were members of militant organizations. Since 1986, AJK had been the center of organizing, recruitment, and training for both nationalist and Islamist militant organizations fighting against the Indian state on the Indian-administered side of the Line of Control (LoC) in an active armed conflict that began in 1989 and continues into the present. After the earthquake, Kashmiri members of these jihadi militant groups declared a temporary stop to their armed activities on the Indian side of the LoC in order to engage in the labor of relief and social welfare work—what they called “*humanitariyan jibad*.”

These jihadis worked alongside delegates of international humanitarian organizations and global Islamic charities, medical personnel of several national militaries, soldiers and officers of the Pakistan Army and security services, and members of Pakistani domestic and transnational civil society groups, all of whom came to AJK to provide emergency relief during the first phase of the crisis. Their relief projects were supported by Islamic charities that competed with international aid agencies for philanthropic donations from Muslim communities around the world. Over the years, many of these workers, without renouncing the possibility of return to militant politics, continued to work as social welfare volunteers and eventually secured employment in local development NGOs.

As the focus shifted from rescue and relief to long-term reconstruction and rehabilitation, it became clear that the earthquake had transformed the social, economic, and political landscapes of AJK as well as the physical landscape. For the international community, an area that had long been a site of global humanitarian refusal became an acceptable terrain of humanitarian engagement because the disaster was “natural.” For Pakistani civic voluntary organizations, four years into the War on Terror, AJK became a territory of compassion, a place in which Pakistani society’s capacity for self-organization and self-care could be mobilized against the images of Pakistan as a place of perpetual crisis and institutionalized disorder, on the one hand, and as the object of militarized humanitarian interventions, on the other. For the demobilized members of active Islamic militant organizations, it became a domain of sacrifice, in which relief and aid work replaced armed jihad as a framework for protecting a vulnerable Muslim population. Eventually, AJK became a domain of welfare governance, in which social welfare became articulated as a form of state security provision that would continue to compete for funds and recognition with the border and national security concerns.

Fault Lines

The earthquake occurred in the morning on 8 October 2005. Schools, government buildings, houses, and other structures collapsed. Entire villages slid down mountainsides, and three of the refugee camps on the outskirts of Muzaffarabad disappeared into the Neelum River. Children and young people were already in school, and many were trapped in their school buildings and colleges and beneath the concrete slabs and iron bars that were the construction norm for modern buildings in the region. The two vehicle crossing points from Pakistan into Azad Jammu and Kashmir were both blocked with damage to their bridges, the roads leading to populated areas unpassable. Towns in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along the routes to the AJK crossing points were also severely impacted. Neither the AJK civilian government, which had lost core

infrastructure, nor the Pakistan Army launched emergency response in AJK for days after the earthquake.

Instead, members of the Kashmiri militant groups operating in the region mounted the first coordinated response. They immediately declared a halt to all armed struggle activities and set to work in rescue and relief efforts. Demobilized members of jihadist organizations stepped into the task of caring for the injured, the displaced, and the dead. Others brought tools for extraction and worked alongside civilians who were desperately digging to reach survivors trapped under collapsed structures. These militant groups put their satellite communications technology to use locating people trapped in the mountains and carried the injured out of isolated villages on their backs. They carried mobile X-rays, centrifuges, and emergency supplies from storehouses located in Pakistan on their backs and pack mules when the roads were blocked. They set up all-weather tents and established secure and hygienic camps for those who had lost shelter. These tented relief camps were so well guarded that men felt comfortable leaving women and young children there—an essential contribution in the first days because these civilians joined in efforts to rescue their neighbors. They also established the first working field hospital with surgical capacity (including mobile X-ray and microbial analysis machines) and obstetric services (see figure 11.1). It was operating just thirty-six hours after the earthquake.




Figure 11.1. • Women's health unit of the Jamaat-ul-Dawa Mobile Medical Camp, Muzaffarabad, AJK. November 2005. © Cabeiri deBergh Robinson.

In comparison, the Turkish military had an operational field hospital running in Muzaffarabad five days later, the United States eight days later. Five weeks after the earthquake, when I was escorted on an official visit to a Pakistan military field hospital on the Line of Control (LoC) near the Chakoti border, the Pakistan Army's model civilian field hospital consisted of a tent, three chairs, and a table with a display of bandages, analgesics, and antimalarials (see figure 11.2). Even the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which normally maintains large stores of tents and other supplies in Pakistan for its Afghan refugee operations, was unable to meet the needs quickly, as they had depleted their regional supplies during the relief work that followed the Indian Ocean Tsunami earlier in the year.

A commonly told tale in those first months went like this: Pakistani army troops, redeployed from the Punjab, showed up in AJK and then marched to the border to protect it from military adventurism by Indian troops. Or, troops arrived at a collapsed school with weapons but no heavy equipment suitable for extracting survivors from beneath the slabs of fallen concrete. A trope of complaints was, "The army showed up with bayonets, not shovels, and tanks, not bulldozers." (Many in AJK attributed this to Pakistan's interest in "Kashmir, not Kashmiris," but the same complaint was made in Islamabad where two



Figure 11.2. • Model military-civilian field hospital, Chakoti, AJK. November 2005.
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of the luxury apartment towers in the Margala complex had collapsed; the first military responders had arrived armed but not prepared for the task at hand.)

Days later, military relief missions deployed by Türkiye, China, Cuba, and the United States and formal humanitarian organizations, such as the UNHCR, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mercy Corps, and Save the Children, arrived in AJK. By the time that delegates of the formal international humanitarian organizations established an operational presence on the ground in AJK, they found themselves working side by side with international volunteers who had arrived with extraction and mountain-climbing equipment, with soldiers from many national armies—including two Cuban army doctors who had, lacking their own transport, hitched a ride to Muzaffarabad in an American Black Hawk helicopter—and with militants from several groups on international designated terrorist organization lists.

In the early days and weeks after the earthquake, the militants and jihadis were widely regarded by Azad Kashmiri citizens to be the most responsive and effective relief and aid workers. Jihadi organizations had stores of such equipment already stashed in various locations around Pakistan, and their organizational structure was inherently adaptable. The demobilized members of jihadi groups were able to quickly organize themselves into informal brigades and then easily morph and re-form as new tasks demanded. They settled, if temporarily, into organized service committees (*kbidmat-e-khalq*) with assigned tasks. Because these *kbidmat-e-khalq* were organized around tasks or areas of expertise, they were eclectic in regard to their composition by nominal membership in jihadi organizations. These committees turned to well-established charitable foundations associated with either religious groups or with political parties to fund and support the committees' work longer term. They received support from multiple charities, which later became competitors with international aid agencies for philanthropic donations from Muslim communities around the world at a time when those agencies were facing lower-than-needed contributions and were worried about the problem of donor fatigue.¹ They also worked closely with Pakistani civic groups and domestic NGOs as receivers and distributors of donated goods that came from all over Pakistan.

Once the roads were open, social activists, political parties, and student volunteers organized charity drives that brought in donations from across Pakistan and mobilized diaspora communities to support small-scale relief initiatives. Professional humanitarian workers with strict hierarchical ideas of relief dispersal found it difficult to work with these various voluntary groups because Pakistani relief activists preferred to personally deliver goods and funds. Members of the *kbidmat-e-khalq* were also willing to work alongside student volunteers who set up schooling within the camps for children—so that even within entirely jihadi-run relief camps, children were receiving tuition for the state educational curriculum.

Even several months into the six-month relief phase, the hospitals and camps set up in the days after the earthquake remained a vital resource for impacted residents of AJK. These relief hospitals and sites provided free medical care, whereas established hospitals in Pakistan required payment. Until the AJK government hospitals were able to resume some operations, many residents of Muzaffarabad used these emergency field hospitals.

Many locales and those affected were ambivalent about accessing the military hospitals set up by foreign states like the United States. Suspicion existed on all sides; once members of international relief delegations realized that a substantial contingent of the relief workers whom they had been working alongside were members of jihadist groups, they began separating their projects. International organizations either saw collaboration with these groups as a threat to their humanitarian principles or felt a renewed concern for the security of ground personnel because these potential allies were listed on state terrorist watchlists. At the same time, local residents suspected that they would not be treated well at American-run hospitals. Locals worried about exposure to products, including medicines, that contained *baram* (unclean and forbidden) ingredients. They also voiced concern that Americans were not able to distinguish between militant and nonmilitant Muslims and that civilians seeking medical treatment might be subject to investigation. But when Americans were able to earn the trust of locals, they were compared positively to the service groups formed by jihadi relief workers. One young man described a turning point after which locals in Muzaffarabad changed their opinion of the American field hospital:

Our neighbor became very ill and had to go there. On the examining table, she began to vomit. The [male] doctor cleaned up the mess. He didn't pass that work to someone else, and he was very respectful to her and gave good treatment, even though she had dirtied him with vomit—he was just like the *kbalq*, they don't think they are too good to take care of anyone. Afterward, her daughter-in-law cooked some food and brought it to the hospital in thanks. An officer came out and said, "You can't eat that, it might be poisoned." But the doctor took the food, and later we heard that the staff had been seen eating it. Then we know it would be alright to get care at that hospital.

If members of international humanitarian organizations and national militaries deployed on a humanitarian mission were unsure about continuing to work alongside irregular fighters, not all militants felt so worried. In the words of one young man who had recently set aside his automatic rifle in favor of a clipboard and ration book, and who was assigned by the head of a tented relief camp to give me a tour of the camp:

There is no reason that we should not work alongside these foreigners. This is service. Christian, Muslim, Pakistani, American. We are all humanitarians. The meaning of the Kashmir Jihad is to defend the oppressed people of Kashmir. Now there is no need to cross this LoC, this is "*humanitariyan jibad*" . . . we are all humanitarians.

The understandings of what it means to care for, and to be cared for, that emerged out of these practices in a moment of crisis show that for both the jihadis who claimed the title of "humanitarian" for their work, and for the victims of the disaster, care was not an experience that could be disentangled from the reestablishment of social and political relationships.

"We're All Humanitarians"

Disasters in their full sociopolitical manifestation are never just "natural"; they develop within a context of human social response and political management, and humanitarian responses to suffering cannot escape the historical conditions within which human suffering occurs.² The "emergencies" that develop around them (such as displacement and dispossession, food insecurity, and unequal healthcare delivery) develop from structural inequalities that predate the crisis that creates the emergency.³

The 2005 Kashmir earthquake was a measured 7.6 on the Richter scale and was categorized as category 8 (severe) on the seismic magnitude scale. The epicenter of the earthquake was in northeast Pakistan at the border between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (known as Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province until 2010) and the semiautonomous State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Pakistan and India had gone to war over Kashmir three times (1947–48, 1964, and 1971), and they fought an undeclared war in the Kargil region of Kashmir in 1999. Their armies also engage regularly along the militarized Line of Control (LoC) that divides the Pakistan-administered regions from those administered by India. These confrontations between two nuclear-armed states made the LoC one of the world's most volatile borderlands. In addition, there has been an armed liberation struggle carried out on the Indian side of the LoC that began in 1989 and continues in the present. Azad Kashmir, as AJK is known in local parlance, has served as an organizing ground for the armed wings of political parties as well as for jihadi organizations.

"Azad Kashmir" literally means "Free" Kashmir" or "Liberated" Kashmir. Since 1989, Kashmiri militant groups have been engaged in an armed struggle to institute a reunited and fully liberated political vision of the currently disputed territory. The members of jihadi organizations who stepped forward as active relief workers in the initial phase of postdisaster response in Azad Kashmir had a long association with what they refer to as the "Kashmir Jihad." From 1989 to 1993, antistate violence in Indian Jammu and Kashmir State was organized by transnational Kashmiri militant organizations with clear hierarchical command structures that paralleled allied political parties. By the mid-1990s, a number of organizations with no direct links to political parties other than jihad had become prominent in the struggle. These were the jihadi orga-

nizations (*jibādī tanzīms*). For some, the *jibād-e-kashmīr* (Kashmir Jihad) was part of a network of global struggles of Muslim peoples against the oppression of non-Islamic states. For others, the Kashmir Jihad was a defensive war against the oppression of Kashmiri Muslims specifically. These groups united in 1996 under the umbrella organization Muttahida Jihad Mahaz (United Jihad Front), also known as the United Jihad Council (UJC). In 1999, the UJC launched the Kargil offensive, and in the summer of 2000, the largest UJC organization declared a short-lived unilateral ceasefire.⁴ Thus, by the early 2000s, *jibādī tanzīms* had become prominent enough to challenge the political parties that had first directed the armed insurgency. They recruited members and conducted fundraising campaigns transnationally using the hybrid notion of Kashmir Jihad as a struggle to protect Kashmiris against human rights violence by the (Indian) state.⁵

Before 2005, Kashmiri politicians, human rights activists, and refugee advocates had lobbied the international community for decades to turn its attention to the human impact of the Kashmir dispute. However, international humanitarian organizations (with the exception of Islamic Relief, which did have an active presence) had avoided becoming directly involved because they considered the forced displacement in the region to be a political issue and within the competencies of local government. Their refusal also avoided the question of whether the LoC should be treated as an international border and, therefore, whether people displaced across were merely “internally displaced.”

However, four years into the War on Terror, the international community saw offering aid to earthquake-affected people in Kashmir as an opportunity to demonstrate its concern for Muslim victims. Delegates from several different international humanitarian organizations told me that it was important that their organizations provide relief to Muslims in Pakistan because the dynamics of the War on Terror politicized the humanitarian work they did in places such as Afghanistan and Iran. They expressed a personal belief that they were doing “real humanitarian work”; they also said that their organizations felt that their presence would build trust in those organizations with Muslim communities around the world.

(Islamic) Charity, (Islamist) Service Committees, and Islamic Humanitarianism

Many scholars and policy experts see “Islamic charities” as propaganda, a cover for transferring funds to terrorist organizations, and therefore approach Islamic philanthropy as a problem.⁶ Even with this distrust, they acknowledge that Islamic charities and organized charitable work have become so extensive and impactful that it is imperative to work with them.⁷ To deal with this, several

INGOs (such as the ICRC)—who see the values of Islamic charity and Western humanitarianism as fundamentally in competition with each other—have legal specialists on staff whose job it is to explain how humanitarian ideals can be expressed in Islamicate terminology, all to make it possible for humanitarian organizations to work with Islamic NGOs.⁸

Euro-normative humanitarian traditions have long sought to separate humanitarianism—as a practice of care for others based in unmotivated practice of alleviating human suffering—from the realm of the political.⁹ These Euro-normative traditions require continuous ideational labor—mental gymnastics one might say—to stabilize the idea that humanitarianism is an inherently apolitical project despite its manifest political effects. Yet it is also well recognized that humanitarian organizations advance the ability of combatants to wage warfare, contribute to actually governing spaces or peoples who receive nominally temporary aid for long periods of time, and also use humanitarian institutions and infrastructure to develop social or political systems as matter of policy.¹⁰ Against these ideals, much writing on the connection between humanitarianism and modern Muslim societies has argued that the highly regulated religio-political practices of compulsory charitable giving (*zakat*) and holding of religious endowments for community benefit stand in opposition to the values represented by international humanitarian norms.¹¹

This characterization, however, has hampered the understanding of practices and theories of caring in Muslim societies. On the one hand, it prioritizes aspects of the Islamic tradition that are tied to textually legitimized and authorized ideals, entirely missing the reasoning behind these practices, which emphasize justice, compassion, and equity, not equality;¹² this ethical reasoning has been the defining feature of modernist Islamic political intellectual movements. On the other, the characterization that Islam's core tenants are incongruent with care and service fails to evaluate the practices and social effects of actual welfare work. A focus on practice and the labor of care work reveals the important connections between charitable funds and service committees, which are common institutional structures and mechanisms in Muslim societies.¹³ As the humanitarian mandate has expanded and transformed globally, NGOs and faith-based organizations of various religious and political affiliations increasingly gain social authority and political legitimacy through work and service provision once reserved exclusively for the state and the international community.¹⁴

Understanding Islamic humanitarianism requires examining how people articulate Islamic values as a source of intellectual knowledge that underwrites logics of care as well as a force of faith. Members of jihadi and Islamist militant organizations whom I met in the earthquake relief operations described their involvement in the relief work as a part of their greater struggle (*jibād*) to serve and defend—a project they called "*humanitariyan jibād*."¹⁵ This articulation did not originate with the leaders of these organizations but with the demo-

bilized jihadis, many of them of Jammu and Kashmir origin, who declared a temporary stop to their armed activities in order to engage in the labor of relief work. In the first weeks, they operated through fluid work groups they referred to as self-organized groups, which did the work of *kbidmat* (voluntary service). Within six weeks, the composition of these service committees no longer reflected the pre-October 2005 militant affiliations of the members. Individual workers had moved at will between different service committees, and established charitable trusts began to provide funds to support this voluntary labor.

The service groups were organized around categories of relief-associated labor. For example, some groups did sanitation work across multiple camps, others assisted in running field hospitals, others provided security in tented camps. The jihadis adopted an institutional structure for their humanitarian jihad based in Islamist party organizing practices, but which exhibited on the ground the fluidity of membership and disinterest in adherence to party ideology. Islamist political parties, those that seek to reform society by transforming the practices of the state, have a strong history of commitment to social welfare provision. Indeed, the paradigmatic structure of Islamist parties involves the formation of three wings—political, social welfare, and defense (military wing or allied militant group).¹⁶ The structural mirroring with communist revolutionary groups is not accidental: Maulana Maudoodi, the founder of South Asia's first Islamist political party the Jamaat-e-Islami, was greatly influenced by Leninist thinking. The social welfare wings of such parties have long provided services to communities that have been ignored by the state.¹⁷

Over a decade later, many residents of Muzaffarabad who lived through the earthquake still recall those first days afterward. They remember who first responded to the crisis—self-named jihadis brought the first help they received, excavating survivors and delivering food and water to people unable to make their way through the rubble of the urban *moballabs* (neighborhoods with structured social and political hierarchies). These groups also stayed in those neighborhoods and villages to bury the dead. As one man I've known for many years said to me, declaring his shame and his gratitude:

[My children's mother] was carrying my three children, my brother and uncle and I carried father and grandfather out on a *charpai* [a cord bed]. In the end, I looked at the dead and then I walked over their bodies. When we came back, in each of those spots where there had been a body there was a flag with a number, and a notation of the burial ground where each of those bodies had been properly buried. I failed my neighbors, but in the end, the jihadis kept a list of the person's age and what they were wearing, and every family could find their loved ones in the ground where they had been laid to rest, and the funeral prayers said in their name.

What these jihadis did was deathwork, a form of care that extends alleviation of suffering to the dead, a group often excluded from Euro-Christian human-

itarianism that is focused on the preservation of life and rarely on the healing that can come from caring for the dead.

Members of the jihadi organizations also referenced a political thinking that demonstrated a broad concept of security—although they were founded as vehicles for militant struggle, they also had a concept of logistical security that paralleled a human security framework. As the resident surgeon of the Jamaat-ul-Dawa relief camp and field hospital complex said to me:

We know if there is some invasion or disaster, the common people suffer most, so we have to plan and be prepared for their safety. Our closest storehouse was in Balakot, but that was destroyed, so we had the supplies brought from Peshawar and Lahore.

He himself had been working in a free medical clinic in Lahore run by the Jamaat-ul-Dawa until they asked him to oversee the field hospital in Muzaffarabad. Members of militant groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayiba were able not only to tap into material resources and vast funding networks but also to connect with highly specialized expertise and established welfare activities that were already undertaken by the charitable trusts in other parts of Pakistan.

These groups also demonstrated their willingness to work with other aid groups that had no connection to Islamist parties or Islamic charitable trusts. Domestic Pakistani and transnational Kashmiri NGOs mobilized professional expertise—engineers, doctors, mountain climbers—to do volunteer work in Azad Kashmir. Then as international organizations began to get involved, the regional Pakistani and Kashmiri engineers, doctors, and other volunteers found that the demobilized members of the *khalq* were more willing to integrate them into their practices than the international organizations. Many of these expert volunteers became a vital resource to the AJK government in the reconstruction phase, but in the initial relief phase, the flexible structure of the Islamic groups allowed them to incorporate volunteers regardless of ideological affiliation.

Humanitariyan Jibad as Postdisaster Reconstruction Welfare Activism

Although members of jihadi organizations, Islamist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government militaries, and international humanitarian organizations worked together throughout the relief phase, there was increasing pressure to isolate the jihadis from the international effort. This was both because international humanitarian organizations were uncomfortable with the perceived politicization of their work and because Pakistani civil society groups—and the English press—were increasingly critical of international resources going to places other than secular civil society groups. After the initial

emergency phase of rescue and relief and during the designated postdisaster reconstruction and rehabilitation phase—which began in 2006 and nominally ended in March 2014—international organizations began to pressure the Pakistani government to separate the jihadi volunteers from the international humanitarian project.

Reconstruction projects funded an array of economic, social development, and scientific initiatives and supported an emergent private sector. The UN emerged as the coordinator of a five-year Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (originally scheduled to conclude in 2011, it was extended to conclude in 2014) called “Build Back Better” that represented a form of development humanitarianism. It conceived of humanitarian work as a long-term process to rebuild sustainable civil infrastructure and build local capacity and expertise, but it distrusted government officials and institutions as corrupt and preferred to foster private initiatives and support private contractors. Historical restrictions on property ownership and employment created opportunities for AJK residents and documented state refugees to provide contract labor for international agencies and establish new local businesses, because Pakistani-owned firms did not have a foothold in the state. The presence of the UN and international nongovernmental organization (INGO) projects and foreigners, in a region that had been closely surveilled and though which financial regulation had been under tight Pakistani government control, allowed the establishment of new flows of capital that were not controlled by the government as a form of patronage. The rise of international access to AJK after the earthquake, new opportunities for private sector employment, and employment with international organizations laid the groundwork for a new and vocal public critique of Pakistani intervention in AJK political life.¹⁸

Postdisaster reconstruction funds were jointly administered by the United Nations and the Government of Pakistan through a new agency, the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA), and a parallel government finance account. The ERRA distributed funds to the AJK State Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agencies (SERRA) of AJK and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The AJK SERRA also coordinated development programs run by IGOs and INGOs. The ERRA became a site through which the international community moved its substantial aid and reconstruction funds and established principles of transparency in funding and expenditure. In practice, this transparency was accessible for institutional funders, but local communities and the AJK government officials were kept from viewing the total picture regarding how money was spent. They questioned, for example, why funds were spent importing raw materials from Türkiye for the rebuilt campus of the University of Azad Kashmir, or why a team of Turkish engineers, all collecting overseas deployment and hazard pay, were running the project when Kashmiri engineers were unemployed. This financial aid system inculcated a

notion that the local government was inherently corrupt and failed to recognize local expertise in professional fields (such as engineering, law, medicine, and education). At the same time, it protected a space for the emergence of Kashmiri civil society groups, religious and secular. For the first time in Azad Kashmir's postcolonial history, this civil society could withstand the political suspicion of the state security agencies and command resources independent of the Pakistani state and national elites.

The UN-led recovery and reconstruction project also sought to insulate itself from all forms of interaction with the Islamic charities, jihadi volunteers, or Islamic service societies that had been first on the ground during the rescue and relief efforts in those first six months after the earthquake. This separation took institutional form in the establishment of a new department within the AJK government in 2006: the Azad Kashmir Camp Management Organization. The AJK Camp Management Organization was established as the site through which humanitarian workers on the ground could appear to be accountable to local populations and civil society initiatives while also isolating themselves from the religious organizations that had spearheaded first responses during the relief phase.

Within the camps, though, former members of the *kbalqs* continued to work with department employees and through them with the international organizations. The AJK government still used former *kbalq* members to help daily operations and supply chain networks. These members had proven themselves effective camp managers when running their own camps, and the Camp Management Organization now relied on their experience and the trust that they had built with local communities. Over the years, several of these former *kbalq* members were hired by international organizations to staff local offices, and several have moved on to international deployments. These workers did not renounce jihad, but over time their *humanitariyan jibad* began to refer to a struggle to establish norms of welfare provision within the AJK state, growing to become a term used to describe an array of ideas that range from civil volunteerism to political struggle for expanded rights within the domestic state structure.

Once the Camp Management Organization took over the refugee camps, former *kbalq* members who did not work with the AJK government began to move to other projects funded by other charities—projects such as establishing free, well-staffed schools and health clinics in outlying areas and the development of very small-scale hydroelectric power projects to bring power to isolated mountain communities. In the short term, the projects and practices of the members' service committees were brought into closer alignment with the priorities of the charities. A year after the earthquake, activists no longer identified themselves by the militant organization to which they previously belonged. Members of the service societies and Islamic charities took up central roles in supporting the initiatives of local civic groups; they maintained a

self-identification simply as jihadis without affiliation to a particular militant organization.

Thus, these demobilized militants, without renouncing violence or the legitimacy of the use of violence to achieve political ends, had effectively severed their connection with jihadi organizations. They still claimed engagement with a jihad for Kashmiris—now “*humanitariyan jibad*”—which was now reconceived as potentially permanent social welfare work and advocacy.

This rethinking of how best to serve Kashmir, what it means to struggle for justice, was part of a broader shift within AJK political thinking. Members of jihadi organizations contributed to this shift through their relief and social welfare work within the earthquake relief service committees. As one young man, who had started working for an international humanitarian organization as a translator after the earthquake and who is now a country director for another in Islamabad, said:

I am Kashmiri and will always struggle for freedom [*azaadi*]. But our leaders hurt our people by making all development contingent on first getting full independence. What about women’s healthcare? The end of child labor? Provision of education in the rural areas? Why should Kashmiri people be kept backward as well as be occupied?

Or, as an older man, a resident of a conservative area in one of the harder hit districts in the lower mountains told me:

Pakistan always wanted Kashmir, but it never cared about Kashmiris. Then, this earthquake happened, and Pakistanis sent us their daughters [as volunteer doctors and nurses and aid workers]. We didn’t send out our own daughters, but Pakistanis sent us their daughters. Now I think that Pakistanis have real love for Kashmiris. Now I allow my daughter to work outside of the house in service. It worries me, to have her work out of the house, but this is my sacrifice . . . that I had to allow the daughter of my house to leave the house to serve her Kashmiri sisters and brothers.

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Notes

1. Pappas and Hicks, “Coordinating Disaster Relief”; Rehman and Kalra, “Transnationalism from Below.”
2. Hannigan, *Disasters without Borders*; Bornstein and Redfield, *Forces of Compassion*.
3. Calhoun, “World of Emergencies.”

4. Robinson, *Body of Victim, Body of Warrior*, 193–94, 270n27
5. This connection between rights and jihad was a cultural formation forged by the Kashmiri refugee community in AJK and Pakistan during the 1990s. See Robinson, *Body of Victim*, 171–200.
6. Burr and Collins, *Alms for Jihad*. See Benthall, "Overreaction against Islamic Charities," for a critique of this perspective.
7. van Bruinessen, "Development and Islamic Charities."
8. Hyder, "Humanitarianism and the Muslim World."
9. Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason*.
10. Bornstein and Redfield, *Forces of Compassion*; Feldman and Ticktin, *In the Name of Humanity*.
11. Bellion-Jourdan, "Islamic Relief Organizations"; Cockayne, "Islam and International Humanitarian Law"; Krafess, "Influence of the Muslim Religion"; Ghandour, "Humanitarianism, Islam and the West."
12. Osanloo, "Measure of Mercy."
13. Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *Charitable Crescent*; Minn, "Toward an Anthropology of Humanitarianism."
14. Duffield, "Complex Emergencies"; Chandler, "Road to Military Humanitarianism"; Hall and Biersteker, *Emergence of Private Authority*; Pandya, "Private Authority and Disaster Relief."
15. Bamforth and Qureshi, "Political Complexities"; Qureshi, "Earthquake Jihad"; Robinson, *Body of Victim*, 237–42.
16. Wittes, "Islamist Parties."
17. Roy, *Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza*; Nasr, "Pakistan after Islamization."
18. Robinson, "Dangerous Allure."

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