CHAPTER 5

Access and Destruction

It all took place at a location the Herero refer to as "by the waterholes of Otjozongombe."[1] A space of deep cultural meaning with fertile lands and sufficient water, its location at the edge of the Omaheke sand field also made it a relatively safe and useful spot during the war.[2] Here, at the Waterberg (literally water mountain), the Herero and their livestock awaited the end of the war with the Germans. General Lothar von Trotha, the commander of the colonial troops and virtual dictator of the colony following the demotion of Governor Leutwein,[3] had other plans. With the support of the high military command in Berlin, and driven by a deep racial hatred that widely defined German mentalities, he was unwilling to engage in any peace negotiations. Instead, and shortly after his arrival in German Southwest Africa in June 1904, he pushed for a decisive battle in the form of encirclement.[4] His strategy was to destroy, exterminate, annihilate the opponent. Later to formulate the war aims in the infamous *Vernichtungsbefehl* (extermination order) that called for the destruction or removal of all Herero from central Namibia, logistics disrupted his plans. The Germans had underestimated the terrain and availability of water.[5] Supplies soon lagged behind. At times, resources awaited landing in Swakopmund for days before hauled inland on a narrow-gauge railroad. It got even more difficult once trying to move supplies beyond the reach of railway lines. In preparation for the Battle at the Waterberg (Battle of Ohamakari) that began 11 August 1904, "Everything the soldiers needed had to be transported by oxwagon," to follow one historian, "a fact that was soon to pose serious problems for the Germans."[6] Isaac Magadi, an ox-driver from the Cape Colony employed by the Germans during the war, described his experiences of trekking to the battle site. "We travelled two months before we reached the scene of war, water was very scarce and we were often delayed four or five days at a time resting the oxen."[7] Without a railway reaching beyond Windhoek, it took German forces a remarkable three months to reach the Waterberg.[8] Plus, sustaining soldiers required additional resources. A British observer put his finger on von Trotha's dilemma when noting, "The more troops that are sent out, the more transport they want and the more men die."[9]

The 1904 war exposed Germany's logistical problems. After countless small revolts, Herero and later Nama groups openly challenged the German Empire in a large-scale rebellion.[10] The Germans were caught by surprise. For them, problems tied to access initially defined their response: all resources had to come through the bottlenecks in Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund, a dynamic that put existing structures to the test. Although military leadership was generally confident, interruptions soon strained reinforcements and supplies. For one, Herero actively disrupted supply lines, especially railway tracks. Such attacks were part of their strategy to weaken German military efforts at the outset of the war. Moreover, natural forces threatened infrastructure. Flash floods in particular destroyed railways while a silting in process tied to the movement of sand along Namibia's coastline north of the Swakop River disrupted landings in Swakopmund. In line with Emmanuel Kreike's framework, chapter 5 centers environmental infrastructure as an instrument of war. Discussions again emphasize multiple agencies and broader colonial narratives. And again, this chapter moves beyond seeing nature merely as a backdrop for human actions. Instead, and in line with more recent scholarship focusing on sizeable territory, unfamiliarity with hostile climates, and unfamiliar diseases in this theater of war,[11] this approach incorporates the impact of the environment onto warfare. After all, to follow historian Isabel V. Hull, "the difficulties of the desert and the climate, limited options for transportation and communication, [and] the shortage of water"[12] defined warfare. Scholars long highlighted how nature helped the Herero;[13] historian Matthias Häussler more directly underscored how logistical and on some level environmental factors shaped war and warfare, and fueled German brutality.[14] Or, to follow Lehmann's more direct claim, "Environmental conditions and cultural perceptions produced the extreme violence that the German army used against the Hereros, whom many soldiers treated on par with—and as a part of—the alien environment."[15]

Environmental infrastructure in war, initially defined by *Mole* and *Staatsbahn*, organizes this chapter. Both structures supplied the war effort and became key to defeating the Herero. The first section focuses on this early phase of the war, highlighting the role of resistance and flash floods. Germans landed supplies in Swakopmund before putting them on railways to reach their troops. Torrents washed away train tracks as Herero attacked Germans; those waters then flushed into the Atlantic Ocean and ultimately began silting in the harbor. The second section then explores German efforts to address disruptions of their structures. Improvisation and exploitation, visible in the use of rafts, dredgers, and Herero forced labor, compensated for such breakdowns. The last section then explores the consequences of these developments. Apart from delaying operations at the Battle of Waterberg and leading at least in part to the replacement of Governor Leutwein, logistical issues helped shape colonial violence. Colonial experiences and narratives certainly speak to Ger-

man soldiers repeatedly fighting against nature *and* people, a mentality that in their view justified brutality. The use of Kreike's concept of environmental infrastructure, employed to incorporate an array of human agents *and* natural forces, to underscore entangled agencies, and to explore links between logistics and genocide, helps wrestle with such stories.

Supplying War

For the Germans the war came at an inopportune moment. When the shooting began 12 January 1904 in Okahandja, most of about seven hundred colonial soldiers were with Governor Leutwein in the south dealing with a smaller rebellion by the Bondelswarts. It would take a quick peace and about a month for him to get to Swakopmund. According to Hull, this left the "4,640 German colonialists amid an estimated sixty thousand to eighty thousand Herero."[16] At the time Captain Gudewill, a local commander, painted a gruesome picture: "confirmed losses—murdered and mostly mutilated: 44 settlers, women and children; 26 [soldiers] fallen; 50 others dead."[17] On 14 January, Local Windhoek District Judge Richter sent a desperate message to the German Foreign Office in Berlin. It read, "All farms in the vicinity of Windhuk plundered by the Herero. Whites living on isolated farms murdered. Situation very grave."[18] Few German settlers would thus ever forget the moment when they "spotted the masts of the slim ship appear on the horizon and come towards us," to quote one newspaper later on. "What a relief," it added.[19] News about the war had reached the German vessel *Habicht* in Cape Town just in time. About ready to leave South Africa following its yearly inspection, it rushed to Swakopmund instead, fully loaded with resources and supplies. "Our spirits rose after hearing that we were to be put ashore," noted one of the fifty-five seamen on board at the time.[20] After bringing supplies ashore using *Mole* and Kru men, the real challenge still lay ahead: protecting the vital railway route from Swakopmund to Windhoek.

German rescue expeditions quickly faced Herero resistance and flash floods. An initial effort to reach Okahandja from Windhoek under Lieutenant Voigts had to be aborted: Herero resistance had been too strong plus the only machine gun failed.[21] A mission led by Lieutenant Zülow and railway assistant Walter Paschasius then left Swakopmund on 12 January; it reached Okahandja three days later. "The fort had not been overtaken," Paschasius wrote later on in a heroic tone, "and its occupants, mainly numerous women and children of murdered farmers and traders that had escaped here, had been saved just in time."[22] The subsequent journey by sailors meant to stabilize supply lines from Swakopmund ran into bigger problems. Their way forward up to the Khan River Valley about forty kilometers inland had gone more or less according to

plan. Then the situation changed. "It had not been the 60 cm gauge, not the materials used for the train," to reference one military bulletin later. Instead, it had been "the water situation."[23] According to the official military report of the expedition, "The natural flow of water runoff had not been taken into account enough" during construction.[24] Torrential rains had ensued in flooding that now washed away dams and bridges, neither of which had been built to withstand such an onslaught. Further inland groups of Herero had also destroyed tracks and railway lines, thus further disrupting potential supplies traveling to the interior. To quote one marine, "What the blacks did not destroy the rain did."[25] Josef Bendix, an engineer formerly employed at the construction of the Otavi railway line, had been called upon to rebuild "the railway that had been destroyed by downpours and the Herero," to quote him directly.[26] He described what happened in several letters home. "I let the crew of sailors push one car at a time across a stretch of five kilometers by hand all in the darkest night. The machine that was last had to be left behind. Everything worked out. Nothing happened."[27] Although African workers helped with such efforts they rarely showed up in colonial narratives.[28] Instead, tales speak of engineers going to work to repair lines and adding culverts so that water could rush under the tracks—in heavy rain and at times under heavy fire. This struggle against nature and Herero fighters defined the way forward. In several instances barely repaired segments washed out again.[29] All of this took time and energy, even without working in the midst of Herero attacks. The elevation did not help either. Railways had to be divided into sections to make it up the hill, a time-consuming process.[30] Eventually, the unit was able to rebuild certain parts before securing the railway line until Karibib. Nonetheless, problems with washouts continued to delay their mission, at times resulting in the locomotive derailing. After days, reinforcements for the fight against the Herero finally reached Okahandja.

Whereas colonial narratives spoke about heroic civil engineers and brave sailors overcoming both aggressors and nature to protect innocent settlers, for Herero the arrival of railways brought very different outcomes. There had been some criticism of early efforts in this colonial war in Germany at the time. The satirical magazine *Kladderdatsch*, for instance, underscored the logistical issues at hand. That magazine commented on injuries to a white man and three or four blacks as a train derailed; it sarcastically added that at least there is a train running now.[31] For Herero, on the other hand, the railway left little room for laughter. For them, it increasingly meant destruction. Niklaas Tsam, a San born in 1914 and one of the few voices commenting on events from a non-German perspective, noted, "I understand that the Hereros tried to stop the train from going north. During this encounter, many Herero were killed by the train."[32] Moses Maharero, who shared the words of his great-grandfather, the paramount chief Samuel Maharero, noted that for the Herero "the whole

war is just coming from Swakopmund."[33] The detailed account by one marine leaves little doubt about the orders at hand: the further inland the Germans got the less likely they took prisoners,[34] rolling over Herero land *and* people.[35]

An array of reasons had resulted in the rebellion, not least of which was the overly zealous junior officer Lieutenant Ralf Zürn. Jan-Bart Gewald convincingly argues that "the origins of the war are to be found in the interpretations and perceptions of the German settlers and missionaries, rather than those of the Herero."[36] In simple terms, more and more newcomers competed for the same resources—land and water.[37] As outlined by much of the scholarship, settlers' indiscriminate use of violence, especially in more remote locations and by private entities, was widespread. "A whip and sjambok," to quote one historian, "were always to hand, and were all too often used out of misunderstanding or sudden fear by settlers surrounded by Africans on a lonely farm."[38] Additionally, a shift in power structures due to the consequences of *Rinderpest* and the reach of capitalistic tentacles stretching deeper and deeper into central Namibia fueled conflicts.[39] That a white settler had murdered the daughter of an Herero leader only to be acquitted by a local court became just another example of everyday colonial violence. With Governor Leutwein in the south dealing with a smaller rebellion, it fell to District Administrator Ralf Zürn to defuse an increasingly tense situation. Yet the young lieutenant's aggressive behaviors and his deep distrust of Herero eventually pushed the colony into war at an inopportune moment,[40] catching German authorities by surprise.

Resources to sustain a war in central Namibia had to come through Swakopmund, a coastal town that had just experienced a "coming off." In late 1903 and early 1904, lots of rain from the interior had collected in generally dry riverbeds. High waters of the Swakop River certainly became a barrier for Victor Franke trying to reach Okahandja in late January.[41] Water and debris then flushed downstream until eventually reaching the Atlantic Ocean, a process locally known as *abkommen* (coming off). Captain Hugo von François had described a similar situation in 1896. "Dirt, rocks, mud, muck, and such, not very pleasantly mixed, fill the actual riverbed, and then the brew widened to both sides over the inundation area at great speed, wherever there was space. A couple of days later, of course, one does see little more than some marks, the sand barely a couple of feet deep soaked with water."[42] Such flash floods had reached the ocean before. In one instance observers had pointed to "massive coastal shifts of the sandbanks located" at the mouth of the river.[43] The Nama words *Tsoa* (anus) and *Xou* (excrement), the basis for naming river and town, colorfully outline what "coming off" is all about.[44] An undated photograph accessible in the colonial records in Windhoek provides some insights into what it all looked like this time around.[45] There is little to see apart from some cloudy waters. Locals certainly did not seem alarmed whatsoever. If anything, they welcomed the rain with "excitement," saddened to see the precious water

lost to the ocean.[46] And so few worried about it at the time, especially since all that "sand, mud, rocks, brush, and such" was gone just a couple of days later.[47]

But all that debris did not simply disappear. A military report from November 1900 had on some level anticipated what might happen with it—"marshland on the southern side [of the *Mole*] has been forming since the beginning of construction in 1898, that now steadily follows the progression of the *Mole*, [and] even after its completion will with a high probability expand to the head of the *Mole* and will silt in the entry."[48] By referencing the situation in nearby Sandwich Harbor the author underscored concerns regarding shifting sands. And exactly that became a reality now. By December 1903, a local newspaper reported on a brown sandy substance making its way up the coastline, eventually reaching the *Mole*. These were the sands that had just been flushed into the ocean.[49] By then local German inhabitants worried more about how to keep access to drinking water segregated for whites and blacks given disruptions to the water supply than what this could mean for the harbor.[50] Several sketches by Captain Connemann later published in the journal *Marine-Rundschau* illustrated what happened next (Figure 5.1): in February of 1904 much of the sand that had been pushed into the ocean was still located near the mouth of the Swakop River. By May, currents had carried it northward near the *Mole*, where it began assembling on its outside wall. In June, it began forming a sandbank at the tip of the *Mole*.[51] Traffic meanwhile continued.[52] It had to, especially in the wake of preparations for the Battle at the Waterberg.

Silting in resulted in delays right away. According to the *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* newspaper, which counted an astounding six steamships waiting to land in late June, "Existing infrastructure are not sufficient to address military needs, to say nothing about the supply of the civilian population."[53] While the paper called for the extension of the *Mole* already, the situation only worsened by July.[54] According to another paper, "If this situation would have been sad enough during peace times, then today, when in a short period 7,000 German soldiers will be in Southwest Africa, it takes on a rather menacing character."[55] It referenced a telegram from von Trotha, the commander overseeing German military efforts. The general certainly demanded improvements on the *Mole* as soon as possible. He was not alone. As one German colonial official noted a little later, the silting in of the *Mole* in Swakopmund "severely endangered"[56] reinforcements and supplies, turning Swakopmund into a chokepoint and logistical nightmare. The colony had turned even more into Germany's *Schmerzenskind* mischief-maker.[57]

In desperate need of supplies, German ingenuity—or maybe more so despair and improvisation—relied on using rafts. Early trials took place in late July, and did not go well. For one, cargo transported on wooden rafts got wet, eventually rotting on the beach. Landing animals was even more tricky. Oxen and horses were put onto a raft before they were dragged as close to the shore-

line as possible. Then they were pushed into the ocean waves. Officials on site could only hope and pray the animals would reach the beach. One can only imagine the terror of such creatures, first traveling for weeks aboard some ship only to be shoved overboard into the cold and hazardous waters of the Atlantic Ocean. The animals arrived exhausted, if alive.[58] As one newspaper noted when describing an early effort, "Only two arrived where they were supposed to, on land, the other three were carried away along the *Mole* with the strong current and had to be towed by boats towards the crane before dragged on land."[59] Although the newspaper concluded that repetitions were not encouraged, strained landing structures left officials with few alternatives. Resources had to land—German troops awaited them when closing in on the Waterberg. As the same newspaper blatantly put it a couple months later, "[i]t is indeed striking that the unloading process relies on rather primitive means,—but what can one do; most importantly, one achieves their objectives in the end."[60] The use of rafts thus continued. In one instance, several frightened horses jumped into the waves too early. "One of them drifted towards the *Mole* due to the strong current, and it seemed unavoidable that it would be thrown by the surf onto the cliffs and blocks surrounding concrete structure and be killed there. The horse came close to those cliffs yet then turned around and swam through an unforgiving surf away from the *Mole*. Instead of turning towards the shore, however, it continued to swim against the breakers further into the ocean."[61] In this case, the exhausted animal survived. With somewhat better rafts and a steam engine, the situation improved slightly over time. Soon around thirty terrified animals could be loaded on each raft, a couple of kilometers off the coast, with a crane. Horses dangled high up in the air, "screaming terribly and kicking," an "amusing site," to quote one unfazed observer.[62] Still, and as apparent in photographs (Figure 5.2), much of the work fell to West African Kru men, "the lifeblood that ensured that the veins of commerce that coalesced at Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht functioned," to follow one scholar.[63] On 7 September 1904, a stunning 277 animals came ashore that way; five days later it was 326. Whereas the latter number seemed to have been a high point and only short by six compared to the best days of the *Mole*,[64] it became clear that something had to be done.

Maintaining Access

File number 509 can tell readers much about the situation in Swakopmund. Published on 29 November 1904 and part of the German parliament records, this particular document is a supplementary budgetary proposal put forward by Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow. In office since October 1900, Bülow was an ardent supporter of Wilhelm II's *Weltpolitik* (world policy). In 1897 he had

gefüllt, und gleichzeitig hatte sich an der Molenspitze eine Barre gebildet, die anscheinend in ihrer Richtung vom Lande ab zeigte. Die Einfahrt bis hinter die Mole wurde hierdurch nur wenig behindert, da die Dampfer einfach um die Barre herumfahren konnten.

Ende Juni 1904. (Skizze 3.)

Die Versandung am Strande südlich der Mole hatte wenig zugenommen, der südliche Winkel der Mole war ziemlich ausgefüllt, die Lotungen ergaben bereits eine

Skizze 1.



Skizze 2.

allgemeine Verflachung seewärts der Mole und nördlich und südlich davon. Die Barre nahm an Ausdehnung zu und verlief in ihrer weiteren Fortentwicklung nicht mehr von der Küste ab, sondern parallel oder sogar etwas auf die Küste zu, so daß die Gefahr einer Schließung der Moleneinfahrt zu der Zeit bereits drohte.

Von Juli 1904 an. (Skizze 4.)

Es zeigte sich, daß die Bildung der äußeren Barre nur eine primäre Erscheinung war, der bald eine zweite, das Hineinschieben der Sandmassen vor die

Figure 5.1. "Sketches at Swakopmund's landing spot, February to July," in *Marine-Rundschau*, "Meinungsaustausch," June 1908, HathiTrust/public domain.

Hafeneinfahrt, folgte. Dieses Hineinschieben wurde durch die von Südwest heranrollende Brandung verursacht und trat besonders stark nach Tagen mit schwerer Brandung auf. Es ließ sich dies mit Hilfe der Lotungen, die stets nach dem Verlaufe einiger schwerer Brandungstage gemacht wurden, gut verfolgen: Die äußere Barre hatte durch die Brandung abgenommen, die innere war gewachsen.

Trat nun auf einige Tage oder Wochen ruhiges Wetter mit geringer Brandung ein, so wuchs die äußere Barre (Nehrung) durch die sandführende Strömung wieder an, während die innere ziemlich unverändert blieb. Sobald wieder schwere Brandung einsetzte, wurde der ganze Sand nach der Küste zu, das heißt, vor die Moleneinfahrt

Skizze 3.



Skizze 4.



gewaschen. Hier blieb er selbstverständlich liegen, da er im Schutze die Mole von der Strömung nicht weiter fortgetragen werden konnte.

Da vor der Hand keine Gegenmaßregeln ergriffen werden konnten (Bagger waren draußen nicht vorhanden und konnten für diese außergewöhnlichen Verhältnisse auch nicht kurzerhand beschafft werden), so wiederholte sich das Spiel so lange, bis das Hafenbecken durch eine vom Molenkopf im Bogen auf die Küste zu sich hinziehende Barre (Nehrung) so gut wie abgeschlossen war.

Art der natürlichen Versandungserscheinungen an der südwestafrikanischen Küste.

Dieser bei der Mole beobachtete Vorgang deckt sich aber auch mit den sonstigen Versandungserscheinungen an der Küste.

Figure 5.2. NAN 05040, "Kru workers pull a raft with baled hay to the shore, Swakopmund 1904," courtesy of the National Archives Windhoek.

famously demanded Germany's own place in the sun in parliament. Now, in 1904, his proposal pointed to expenditures. One item had been earmarked "For the operational restoration of the harbor structure in Swakopmund, first installment"—a stunning 2.2 million Marks. A more detailed explanation referenced the construction of another breakwater, the acquisition of two steam dredgers meant to keep access open to the *Mole*, and the expansion of the concrete structure; the proposal also included materials and machinery for the assembly of a wooden jetty meant to serve as a second landing spot. The situation tied to silting in had become a major problem, a summary explained, and something had to happen. After all, Swakopmund was "the only German entry into the middle and northern parts of the Southwest Africa," a gateway that had to be kept open "under all circumstances."[65]

The acknowledgement that the *Mole* was failing took some time. As late as August 1904 some voices still praised the concrete landing structure.[66] At that point the satirical magazine *Klatterdatsch* already commented on the constant problems and setbacks at the *Mole* in a poem.[67] A month later one report then admitted that the sand that had flushed down the Swakop River had brought considerable problems: "During many days the traffic has to be stopped due to unfavorable [conditions of the] ocean."[68] By then the concrete landing structure could only be used four to five hours a day, at high water—instead of

twelve to fourteen hours.[69] The situation became all the more complicated as the season began to change. On 3 November the wind and current caught the tugboat *Südwest* and pushed it into the *Mole*. Whereas all passengers were saved, the boat was lost—"already the next day it looked like a wreck,"[70] to quote one newspaper. From this point silting-in continued, even worsened. By early 1905 it became clear that the rafts could only be a "makeshift" solution.[71] What was there to do? By August 1904, a commission assessing the situation in Swakopmund had already arrived on site.[72] Hydrology engineers and other specialists were certainly required. However, as one local newspaper pointed out, the experts had spent little time in Swakopmund; they also only saw good weather.[73] In any case, that commission proposed a three-part plan that called for the use of dredgers, the construction of a jetty including a breakwater, and the extension of the *Mole*. With just the first installment requiring a payment of 2.2 million Marks,[74] it became clear that keeping Swakopmund's harbor viable would be an expensive endeavor.

The removal of sand was no easy task. Two thick folders of Swakopmund's harbor administration give a sense of the problems at hand.[75] Newspapers also reported on efforts to reverse silting-in, with one article describing how logistical nightmares delayed the arrival of one dredger from far away Stettin.[76] Several times the topic even came up in German parliament. There had been a debate on 1 February about the harbor and dredgers;[77] it was on the agenda again in March.[78] Delays meanwhile piled on. For one, authorities of *Kaiser-Wilhelm Kanal* (channel) in the north of Germany could not give up the only useable dredger. A different machine thus had to be organized and outfitted for the long journey to Swakopmund. That took months.[79] One dredger finally arrived on 3 March 1905.[80] Delays due to strong currents cost additional time. Once on site "the loaded [dredging] vehicles could not cross the breaking surf anymore," to quote one internal report.[81] This now required small crafts, machinery not readily available in Swakopmund.[82] In the meantime, the dredger started "digging out a channel through the tidal bore to ensure the *Mole* could be used without disruption," one newspaper noted.[83] Representatives in Berlin were happy that these expensive tools would at least be used to some extent.[84] Yet much of what was removed silted in again shortly thereafter.[85] German shipping engineer and globetrotter Gustav Buß described the situation in Swakopmund in late 1904 in detail, including how a dredger silted in altogether.[86] The mere presence of such large machinery within the busy loading zone also caused problems. In May 1905, for example, strong currents pushed one machine against other ships before it was almost completely lost.[87] At that point, the Woermann-Line, the main logistics company responsible for landing supplies, threatened officials that it would stop using the *Mole* altogether.[88] Whereas such warnings increased speculations about a forthcoming upgrade of harbor structures,[89] the blame game had begun as well. One repre-

sentative in parliament noted that the harbor in Swakopmund is certainly no "glorious chapter in the history of our colonial administration;"[90] other voices pointed to environmental factors and outlined that it had just been an "exceptional year" regarding the movement of sand.[91] With worries about future flash floods lingering, officials seemed to be unsure how to proceed. And so the situation got worse and worse every day,[92] with newspapers soon updating readers on the slow death of the "unfortunate Mole."[93]

German authorities increasingly forced prisoners of war to replace machines and animals. It had taken pressures from Berlin to bring some sort of negotiations to the war, the first genuine effort coming from Major Ludwig von Estroff in December 1904.[94] By that point other groups had joined the war and few Herero had survived the German onslaught. Missionaries thus eventually set up collection points. Those spots were not meant to provide support. Instead, they became ways to pull those that surrendered into a large-scale concentration camp system. Missionary documents are frank about the state of captives. According to the chronicle of Omaruru, "Most people that come from the fields were miserable figures so one had to ask oneself: how could they even make it here. Small children in particular brought pity. The body is often reamed to disfigurement, the rest of the body is completely haggard and coated with withered skin. It is often heart-warming to see how the starving mother is still caring about its child plagued by diarrhea with affectionate concern. . . . Miserable figures like this are likely never to be seen again in life."[95] In Windhoek a similar description spoke of skeletons clothed in rags.[96] Those collected in the interior by missionaries generally ended up on the coast. As outlined by Horst Drechsler, "Prisoners of war were immediately carted off to Swakopmund to perform slave labour, the most gruelling jobs on the railway line under construction there being assigned to them."[97] In Swakopmund, workers helped unload supplies pouring into a still inadequate harbor. According to statistics put forward in the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* newspaper in fall 1904, the harbor alone employed a total of 1,200 laborers to unload cargo: 500–600 Kru men, 400 likely white seamen, 80 white workers on the land, and about 80 black workers.[98] In 1905, and according to another newspaper, the 130 Kru men and 443 Herero toiled in the harbor.[99] A German account from September 1904 described the hard work of "negroes" in Swakopmund, "the whole day in water, where it is hardly 13 degrees (Celsius) and one must work in heavy surf;" that voice also added that "many die from pneumonia."[100] Apart from compensating for missing machines and failing landing structures forced laborers also completed the work of draft animals. Herero women formed teams of eight to pull cars on the narrow-gauge railway.[101] Hendrik Fraser, a worker from South Africa, described the situation as women loaded and unloaded hand-carts and wagons. "They even had to pull fully laden donkey-carts to Nonidas [nine to ten kilometers from Swakopmund] where there

Figure 5.3. NAN 29871, "Herero women (prisoners of war) pulling loads in Swakopmund, 1905?," courtesy of the National Archives Windhoek.

was a depot. Some eight women were harnessed to a donkey-cart and had to pull it like draft oxen," he added, before describing their total exhaustion and the brutal punishments with a sjambok whip.[102] James Tolibadi, a worker from the Cape Colony employed in both Windhoek and Swakopmund, described women "compelled to work and carry heavy articles."[103] A photograph taken in Swakopmund around that time shows several women hauling wooden crates on their shoulders (Figure 5.3).[104] Missionary Vedder, who visited prisoners several times, added that "[h]undreds were driven to their deaths like cattle and like cattle they were buried."[105]

The situation for workers housed in Swakopmund was brutal. Apart from the Woermann-Line's own private camp,[106] most prisoners ended up in a concentration camp. "*Ombepera I koza*" (the cold is killing me).[107] These were the words of Herero prisoners to German missionary Vedder in 1905. Vedder described the circumstances on site in great detail, including the cold that led to pneumonia overnight and death by the next morning.[108] The camp was located near the harbor to have easy access to the pool of labor. According to Vedder, newly arriving inmates "were placed behind double rows of barbed wire fencing, which surrounded all the buildings of the harbor department quarters, and housed in pathetic structures."[109] Work shifts were from early morning until late at night, every day. Food was scarce, especially given that most inmates had already been weakened by life in the field. Miserable spaces, made up only

of sackcloth and laths, to still follow Vedder, as prisoners worked beyond exhaustion, with little food but brutal punishments.[110] The cold and damp maritime climate made survival even more difficult. Diseases ran rampant.[111] The personal photos of Nuremberg native and captain Friedrich Stahl depict barely clothed and haggard bodies of Herero lying in the dirt without any protection.[112] As a result, and to follow another observer, "the Herero in Swakopmund were dying at an alarming rate due to "inadequate facilities." The poor conditions were made worse by the "raw, uncommon ocean climates and the weakened state in which they [the prisoner] arrived."[113] Between 29 January and 12 June 1905, 583 Herero men, women, and children died.[114] At the worst period, thirty people perished each day.[115] A quick look into the death register of Swakopmund confirms high mortality rates: "death through exhaustion, bronchitis, heart disease or scurvy."[116] Historian Joachim Zeller estimates that in the camp in Swakopmund alone 2,000–2,500 individuals died—1,811 are recorded until March 1906 alone.[117] Between October 1904 and March 1907, 7,682 out of 17,000 inmates (15,000 Herero and 2,000 Nama) lost their lives, which is a death rate of 45.2 percent.[118]

Overworked, exhausted, exposed, freezing, and undernourished inmates had little left to resist—although some tried.[119] Escape to nearby Walvis Bay seemed most promising and resulted in diplomatic entanglements with the local British magistrate, especially once German troops entered British territory or harassed African-British subjects. Take the German arrest of a postal runner and British subject by the name of Jacob in Swakopmund. As outlined in the colonial records, "The next morning he was taken to the 'Mole' and flogged in the presence of the same officer who assured him that he would be conveyed to Windhoek and then hanged."[120] Although locked up again he managed to escape to Walvis Bay, resulting in complaints from British authorities. In another instance, nine prisoners had dug up the cement floor in one of the barracks and slipped out under desert sands. "Pursuing them, of course, is useless," a German newspaper commented, "because the escapees have turned towards Walvis Bay, which begins just ten minutes outside of Swakopmund."[121] In response to such defiance, the German colonial government felt it had to implement even more drastic responses, moving from corporal to capital punishment.[122] For German officials the lack of labor had been upsetting already;[123] that workers escaped to the German competitor nearby made them livid. Yet escapes continued, such as in November 1906, when Timotheus Hipangua fled with his wife, child, and many others, as one missionary noted. "Many preceded and many would follow him, to swop their toiling existence here for an existence of tedium in the mines of South Africa."[124] That would not end until the forced labor system shut down in 1908, after three years and five months, and many lives lost.[125]

Fighting Nature *and* People

"So we stood by the hour at the bow, looking out; but a fog lifted, and we saw on the horizon some great steamers and behind them an endless strop of reddish-white sand lifting itself out of the ocean." These are the words of Peter Moors, the main protagonist of Gustav Frenssen's novel *Peter Moors Journey to Southwest* upon his arrival. Grounded in experiences of returning veterans, and a colonial narrative par excellence, the author described the arrival of soldiers in Swakopmund. He notes, "The harsh, glaring sun burned down on the dunes and sea, and we thought at first that was a bar which lay off the shore so that the great city of Swakopmund and the palms and lions wouldn't get their feet wet, but soon, when the fog had entirely receded, we saw in the glittering light some white houses and barracks and a lighthouse on the bare sand. Then all stood amazed and delivered their opinions. Many looked silently and soberly upon the inhospitable, barren land; others jeered and said: 'To come so far for a country like that!'"[126] For many what they were about to see would be "the most desolate region in Africa, yes truly in the entire world,"[127] to follow another account. As his ship steamed into the region of Swakopmund one German soldier thought he spotted some familiar green, maybe even trees, from afar. He was disappointed once he realized that all this was just sand lingering behind the city.[128] "That is land," exclaimed one arriving soldier, "Lord is that barren!"[129] There was simply no lion along with submissive Africans paying homage to a heroic knight-like German figure as outlined in the satirical magazine *Simplicissimus*.[130] According to another commentator, "How many of our people arrive naïvely, to hunt lions and to dream under palm trees, only to learn to capture their wild fantasies while making bricks."[131] Birthe Kundrus, who has analyzed such descriptions in detail, noted that for German newcomers these were open and empty spaces, dismal and barren landscapes, vermin, diseases, periods of drought.[132] None of that was the norm back in Germany. Whereas later on German accounts of nature became somewhat romanticized,[133] at the time descriptions painted a picture of some unexpected Other. The landing then underscored the overall shock of this space. One newcomer captured how he got soaking wet in the landing process in Swakopmund. He had expected a much more advanced and sophisticated German outpost, adding that he eventually traveled inland in a cheaply built train across "sand dune upon sand dune."[134] Expectations in the metropole and realities in Southwest Africa rarely matched.

Some volunteers had signed up enthusiastically to defend German settlers abroad against what they saw as criminal Herero slaughtering innocent German women and children. Accounts speak widely about such patriotism and the supposedly defensive nature of the war.[135] Of course these heroic tales

generally emerged after the war. Women at the frontier like Margarethe von Eckenbrecher also contributed to such narratives. She found that she was "*mutterseelenallein* (all by her lonesome self)" at the frontier facing deceptive, cruel, and bloodthirsty black warriors.[136] Such storylines portrayed the Herero as beasts. In February 1904, Curt von François wrote "[s]urprised, dismayed, originally helpless regardless of feeling our authority, we saw the bestial anger of this black tribe mangle our defenseless fellow countrymen."[137] Now, help and reinforcements were on the way, meant to maintain German presence and defeat local resistance. Hauptmann Maximilian Bayer compared it all to a "crusade" and "knights" going into battle;[138] he also saw the conflict as a struggle according to "the laws of nature" as "the weak and purposeless will perish in favour of the strong."[139] Racism and Social Darwinism were thus key ingredients of German mentalities. According to two historians, "Although some overconfidence can be explained by the inordinate faith they placed in artillery and the Maxim gun, their readiness to discount the military and strategic abilities of the Herero also points to deeply held racial suppositions."[140] Germans indeed saw their opponents as racially inferior, a people that had been incapable of harnessing and managing nature.[141]

Feelings of German superiority quickly clashed with the abilities of Herero fighters. Häussler recently underscored the difference between "old Africans" that had been in the colony for some time and oblivious newcomers just arriving on site; he also underlined how high expectations in Berlin raised all kinds of challenges on the ground.[142] The initial phase of the war certainly highlighted the abilities and capabilities of the Herero as they attacked railway and telegraph lines; they had also lashed out against farmers found in more remote areas. During that phase Herero efforts to control strategic locations could barely be averted. Take the situation of Okahandja in January 1904. Located along the vital train route from Swakopmund to Windhoek, Herero control effectively disrupted this supply line. Victor Franke, the officer in charge, faced a skilled opponent making use of their surroundings, thick thorn bushes and difficult terrain. It was the use of a mobile gun that gained colonial troops control of the area. Herero resistance then moved eastward, taking further advantage of terrain and German inexperience. For weeks German patrols found themselves exposed while Herero warriors seemingly blended into their surroundings. German confidence and belief in technology increasingly faltered in thick and thorny bushes waiting for backup or losing their opponents in endless chases.[143] According to historian Marion Wallace, "During March and April 1904 the Herero forces pursued a largely successful military campaign, making skillful use of their mobility and knowledge of the ground by repeatedly ambushing the Germans and drawing men into fighting in areas of dense bush, where heavy guns were of the least use."[144] A Herero group ambushed German soldiers desperately moving toward the waterhole called Owiumbo

in early April.[145] Such asymmetric tactics, or "small wars," to follow Häussler, increasingly frustrated the Germans.[146] For them, who were unprepared for these conflicts, the fighting style of the Herero was lazy and cowardly. Eventually, a period of waiting followed this early chapter of the war. Governor Leutwein, who by then had returned from the south of the colony, had initiated negotiations. He seemed willing to make peace. Awaiting potential talks, and given previous examples of peace agreements, the Herero retreated to the area of the Waterberg. But negotiations were cut short: decision-makers in Berlin had other plans. They replaced Leutwein with Lothar von Trotha, the latter unwilling to entertain negotiations. His plan was to encircle and annihilate the Herero, an effort that took shape with the Battle of the Waterberg.[147]

Even without Herero fighters, the environment greatly worried German soldiers. Anxieties generally grew once newly arriving soldiers left hubs and main travel routes on their journey inland. Away from structures and supplies in Swakopmund or Windhoek, horses and ox wagons, not railways, defined the conflict. That there had been little penetration beyond such settlements now became blatantly apparent. In a way, colonial topographies could be compared to castles in the Holy Land during the crusades. In Namibia, and outside certain settler spaces such as Keetmanshoop, forts littered along major trade routes and in the proximity of strategically important sections. Few patrols ever left these strongholds beyond so-called punitive expeditions.[148] As a result, there had been a surprisingly small presence of German authorities inland. As historian Susanne Kuss observed, "Those living beyond the reach of the station were viewed almost as part of the wilderness and were described as being shy and frightened."[149] Besides, there were few options to make use of indigenous knowledge. According to one report, local inhabitants knew about water along some routes but "they keep it a secret among themselves."[150] To still follow Kuss, "No official maps existed with information regarding altitude, the course of the rivers, the nature of the watering holes, or the land cover to the degree of accuracy necessary to enable the planning and evaluation of military operations. The areas away from the major routes were entirely blank."[151] Widespread fears of poisoned water holes, a real or imagined threat, thus only underscored German anxieties around this precious good. These logistical challenges directly defined the conflict. One military pamphlet spoke of "[t]he incalculability of the environment and the insecure nature of communications in South-West Africa."[152] Besides, such local circumstances, combined with German racist mentalities, made those living beyond the grasp of German structures part of nature. One contemporary commented that "[t]he extraordinarily confusing character of the land, the curious water conditions, the, at times, faulty knowledge regarding parts of this colony make fighting a war rather difficult and our good soldiers were put in a difficult position. Since the enemy was difficult to catch and stood still nowhere, so the war turned



Figure 5.4. NAN 02438, "Schutztruppe water carts being filled from well (water trough), Windhoek, people standing around waiting their turn," undated, courtesy of the National Archives Windhoek.

into a battle, in which the blacks are again and again able to break through somewhere with the masses and thereby escape from the vengeful nemesis."[153]

The water problem most directly shaped logistics and German anxieties; it also defined subsequent colonial narratives. *Südwester* (Southwesterner) folk tales capture the early experiences of German newcomers. According to one such *storie*, a soldier rode into the Kalahari Desert, got off his horse without taking his water along and saw the animal run away. Luckily a patrol found him before he died.[154] Gustav Frenssen noted, "We had no moisture in our mouths to wet our lips a little. Our breath came dry and hot through our parched mouths and the burning dryness penetrated, as though with spurs and prickles, ever deeper into our throats."[155] Damara on some level served as paramilitary units and played a supporting role in the field and when it came to finding water. According to the oral history of !Kharuxab, "When they first began fighting, [the Germans] did not know how to find water."[156] Yet discovering water remained difficult in a country where it is as rare as champagne elsewhere, to follow one description.[157] At times, "where there ought to have been water there was not always any there. Then, suffering terribly from thirst, we had to dig holes to see if we could find a little water slowly filtering through. Often it was salt or milky from lime, or smelled vile; and oftener we didn't find even this miserable, loathsome water, and we had to go on again, thirsty, far into the night."[158] Elsewhere faded photographs showcase efforts

to dig for water—one with the caption "Digging for water in vain."[159] At the same time, soldiers also described the joy of returning to Windhoek (Figure 5.4) or finding water—"It quenches not just thirst but gives life."[160] In many instances, newcomers could not fully grasp the aridity of their surroundings. "'Here is Otjikuoko!' 'Where? I do not see it!' 'The place, where we are now, is called that,' he noted dryly, 'there is nothing else around.' I looked around. All around me there was nothing but thorn bushes, some taller trees were scattered around. White sandy surfaces shined through the undergrowth. Nothing to see of a settlement, negro huts, of water, trees, houses, people."[161]

A small biological agent equally shaped war, especially when conditions in the field turned unsanitary. Although widely described as typhus at the time, contemporaries tracked the spread of typhoid fever in some detail, a bacterium related to salmonella food poisoning known as *Salmonelle typhi*. Presumably introduced to the area from the Cape Colony during the construction of the railway line from Swakopmund to Windhoek, typhoid had ravaged the country since 1898.[162] A highly contagious disease, those infected can pass it on through their stool or urine. Since unwashed hands resulting in contaminated water are thereby a major concern, a Medical Ordinance from summer 1904 emphasized the need to be careful. "It is strictly forbidden to drink unboiled water. The use of a filter is to be viewed as a duty [of every soldier] and should be used only to clean cloudy water; the water must then be boiled. Wherever possible, washing water should also be boiled. Typhoid prevention is the primary task of all health measures. The troops are to be instructed in these tasks; officers and medical officers are to ensure that the provisions are maintained."[163] Although soldiers had to follow these instructions, epidemics plagued different areas and groups throughout the war. Assistant physician Ernst August Kaerger, who was part of the expedition forces, observed the situation among the German troops in Southwest Africa in February and March 1905. He emphasized issues surrounding water and sanitation; Kaerger also pointed to an increase in "personal disposition," a phrase utilized to capture the difficult circumstances grounded in a lack of supplies and overall support when fighting in Southwest Africa.[164] Soldiers that got the bacteria had to deal with headaches, stomach pain, constipation or diarrhea, as well as high fever. Without access to microscopes doctors initially tended to prescribe quinine, which helped decrease a patient's temperature but did little otherwise.[165] Once a diagnosis based on clearer symptoms had been established, then getting the individual to a faraway hospital became the issue.[166] Although some fully recovered, others dealt with subsequent episodes. Medical magazines later reported widely on the situation, comparing the spread to similar situations in British and US colonies and blaming it on "the undeveloped state of the country in German Southwest Africa."[167] One recent estimate counts 1,613 casualties with only 88 based on combat or accidents among German soldiers; 725 fatalities were tied to illnesses (450 of

them from typhus).[168] By mid-January alone the German troops had lost fifteen out of 247 men from typhoid fever.[169] The study and use of early vaccines during the conflict helped on some level and speaks to the opportunities some in the medical field saw when it came to colonial playgrounds.[170]

Other diseases equally shaped the war. As one anonymous contemporary voice summarized the situation, "Almost worse than enemy bullets are the typhoid, malaria and scurvy decimating the rows of German soldiers."[171] A report captured the German mindset at that time when noting, "The land itself provides nothing which one can use to restrict the spread of the epidemic; our actions cannot be measured against peace-time or European standards. Everything out there is different to that at home; even the use of familiar names rarely refers to a familiar phenomenon."[172] Of course, such diseases impacted Africans as well—yet apart from references to Krumen supposedly spreading certain diseases colonialists seemed to worry little about them.[173] For Germans, fears about soldiers losing their minds played a role as well. The climate was much better in Southwest Africa compared to the so-called tropics. Nonetheless, sun and heat could presumably turn upright men into lunatics. Contemporaries referred to that as *Tropenkoller* (colonial madness), a state officials also frequently tied to sexual promiscuity, especially in the context of relations with African women.[174] At least in response to his efforts to help imprisoned African women and children, the main protagonist in Uwe Timm's novel *Morenga* hears his superior respond by shouting "Jungle fever!"[175] In that sense, numerous threats defined the war and Germany's response, and scholars have noted that two typhoid epidemics in 1904, one in summer, one in fall, contributed to Leutwein's delayed response to the war and brought about his replacement with the ruthless Lothar von Trotha.[176]

A struggle-against nature narrative in line with the survival of the fittest also defined warfare. From the German point of view, a nature people living in a preindustrial and maybe even a prehistoric age tried to upend the natural order.[177] According to the German high command, "The struggle with these hard and worn out *Naturvolk* nature people in a land lacking culture has showcased that the German people have regardless of their cultural achievements not lost their warlike value."[178] A German soldier fighting in Southwest Africa noted along similar lines that a "*Naturvolk* had dared to do whatever it would like."[179] Although the Germans had long worked with different African societies and understood their opponents' heterogeneity, the war increasingly overshadowed such nuances. Instead, accounts of soldiers describing the war made Herero and later Nama repeatedly part of the natural environment. Audiences could thus read about encounters in difficult terrain, hostile environments, and arid landscapes, all factors that brought Social Darwinist tales even more into the limelight. Later Farmer Schlettwein wrote that this was "[n]ot a war against men but beasts, worse than the animals of the wild."[180]

Failure to completely destroy the Herero at the Battle of Waterberg, and subsequent efforts to end the war, underscore the nature of this conflict. Complete destruction in a single battle, the African-Sedan some had hoped for, had not materialized.[181] Many Herero had fled into the Omaheke desert to escape German annihilation. Herero had long traveled through these spaces; they also relied on water structures as described in chapter 4. Yet this was different. Instead of migrating along with yearly weather cycles in small groups now thousands together with their remaining cattle tried to cross that strip of land. Existing environmental infrastructure could not sustain such efforts. "The land had lots of sand," recalled Herero Andreas Kukuri in 1953, "but green trees and water were not there. And we moved in vain into the center of the Veld, that had no water, until all living beings, that is cattle and humans died of thirst."[182] This "desperate exodus"[183] took Herero from empty waterhole to waterhole in the hottest time of the year.[184] The timing had worked out for the Germans, and von Trotha turned the failure of his troops to fully encircle into a ploy of war. Now, the desert would "do the killing for him," to follow one historian.[185] Oral histories outline the devastation.[186] Major von Estorff, who vividly described the situation and later complained that he was simply playing the role of a "hangman,"[187] underscores that General von Trotha wanted "total extermination."[188] On 2 October 1904, the latter had published his infamous *Vernichtungsbefehl* extermination order.[189] Widely referenced as showcasing the intent to exterminate the Herero people in the first genocide of the century, it simply codified long-standing German behaviors. Herero's oral histories outline malnutrition and exhaustion during their escape. German soldiers, on the other hand, sustained by bases outside the Omaheke, had a somewhat easier time when chasing after Herero men, women, children, and their cattle. At times, they stumbled across "spots where the Herero had burrowed desperately for water," to quote Lieutenant Maximilian Bayer. "There was not a single drop of liquid in these sand holes."[190] Some Herero later surrendered; many "had to run," as oral histories have it.[191] Countless died in the desert, struggling to move on, falling behind, left behind. "The wind has blown sand over the tracks and tears, one can't narrate how it was," one survivor noted to a missionary later on.[192] Few made it across this desert to safety. One who did was Samuel Maharero, who according to oral traditions was "riding with horses of hunger" into neighboring British Bechuanaland (modern-day Botswana).[193] Yet most perished in a desert landscape, chased out by German soldiers, cut off from accessing waterholes, and hindered from returning home.

Colonial narratives framed these moments as struggles against nature. Missionary Jakob Irle described how the war "turned Hereroland into a desert, full of human corpses and the cadavers of livestock." He did not distinguish between perpetrators and victims when continuing, "Everywhere we encounter the bleaching bones of the Herero and the graves of brave German soldiers.

The country has become a giant cemetery in which whites and blacks rest facing one another."[194] For him, and many other German accounts, the torment of Germans due to a lack of water is central to the storyline.[195] Logistics had certainly strained German troops. Yet they were still the ones doing the chasing. In that sense, and along with the official order to not take prisoners, the reversal of suffering became a way to deflect any responsibility or blame for the destruction of the Herero. Instead, Germans pointed to nature. As outlined by one eyewitness, "Sick and helpless men, women and children who had collapsed with fatigue, lay in masses in the bush . . ., parched with thirst, lacking all will-power and awaiting their fate."[196] Later descriptions began emphasizing the German suffering even more, with one noting, "On our thirsting, starving horses, we thirsting and starving men rode on. At some distance crouched a crowd of old women who stared in apathy in front of them. Here and there were oxen, bellowing. In the last frenzy of despair man and beast will plunge madly into the bush, somewhere, anywhere to find water, and in the bush they will die of thirst."[197] Moments of empathy for opponents shift into passive voice, and blame harsh desert landscapes for the tragedy. "Just like a hounded animal," to follow the official history of the war put forward by the German military in 1906, colonial soldiers chased the Herero from waterhole to waterhole "until he finally became a will-less victim of nature in his own country."[198] Soon the Herero became no more than a faraway sight, according to some void of any humanity, as the Germans seemed to be no more than bystanders in all of this—"From a hill we saw two mighty clouds of dust moving rapidly to the north and north-east, toward a certain death from thirst."[199]

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The *Rinderpest* pandemic, the tentacles of railway lines, and the increasing German takeover of land and water disrupted and destroyed pastoral livelihoods; it also brought the war and the subsequent genocide. Early on Herero targeted railway and telegraph lines, and focused on frontier settlements and farms situated beyond the reach of German defense lines. The destruction of farmhouses, wells, and experimental stations, all of which the Herero saw as signifiers of a future without African agents, made sense to them. For German settlers this was unfathomable. As reinforcements landed in Swakopmund and traveled along the railway, natural forces added pressure to their efforts, crushing expectations that this would be quick war. Apart from facing Herero fighters, battalions had to rebuild whole sections of a railway not meant to supply large scale operations during wartime. German ingenuity, or more so improvisation and desperation, was to keep environmental infrastructure open. Yet natural forces in the form of silting-in also shaped landing structures, forcing the Germans to yet again play it by ear. Rafts and Krumen picked up the slack,

to land supplies and keep the war effort on track. Over time, and as the war progressed, forced laborers equally compensated for failed structures. Apart from shaping access, human agents in the form of Herero resistance as well as natural factors such as aridity, difficult terrain, and diseases also shaped logistics and warfare. Racist mindsets and the unwillingness of decision-makers to make peace only worsened the situation. To follow Häussler, and as the war progressed, "the lower the potential to still catch and decisively defeat the Herero the more categorically German violence targeted *every* individual Herero."[200] Delays and anxieties, apparent once exploring the role of the multiple agents that shaped environmental infrastructure in times of war, thus complicated and brutalized warfare, especially once soldiers found themselves away from sustaining structures. In frontier spaces removed from supply lines, where opponents used terrain to mess with Germans that were unfamiliar, unprepared, and unwilling to engage in such skirmishes, extreme violence became acceptable. To follow Lehmann, "The alien and dangerous environment . . . heightened the feeling of the German soldiers that they were not dealing with an ordinary enemy, but with hostile *nature* above all else."[201]

German narratives soon packaged their military experiences into colonial frameworks. The struggle of sailors rebuilding railways and dredgers fighting against silting-in tell some of these tales. Nature has agency as an opponent worth wrestling. African fighters in the war, or African bodies repairing, maintaining, or expanding landing structures and railways, on the other hand, are either not seen as worthy opponents or completely silenced. That the exploitation of African labor meant systematic extermination, a final solution as discussed further in chapter 6, became a backstory.[202] Natural forces, of course, shaped the war. However, such agents did not work in a vacuum. After all, and certainly after the replacement of Governor Leutwein, German leadership did not consider a peace settlement. Instead, German troops pushed Herero into the desert, von Trotha encouraged extermination as decision-makers in Berlin cared little about African populations. Efforts to deflect such responsibility as apparent in some apologetic narratives thus have little to do with the desire to underscore the multitude of agencies that are at play here.[203]

Notes

1. Willy Njanekua and Kasisanda Muuondjo, "Tjiponda, Kahivesa, and the Wars of the Hereros," 28 January 1986, 154–217, here 154, in *Michael Scott Oral History Project*. See also Katharina von Hammerstein, "Kriegs-Schau-Platz Omaheke: Multiple Perspektiven auf den Völkermord an den Herero," *Acta Germanica* 45 (2017): 29–44, here 35.
2. Baumann, *Van sending tot kerk*, 150; Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 140. See also Hammerstein, "Kriegs-Schau-Platz Omaheke."

3. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 159. See also Lukas Grawe, "The Prusso-German General Staff and the Herero Genocide," *Central European History* 52, no. 4 (2019): 588–619, here 593.
4. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I des Grossen Generalstabes, ed., *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika. Auf Grund amtlichen Materials,* vol. 1 (Berlin, 1906), 156–59. See also Gerhardus Pool, *Samuel Maharero* (Windhoek, 1991), 251–53; Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 163.
5. Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 164. Häussler follows Lundtofte's point that developments during the Battle of Waterberg shaped von Trotha's decisions. Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 184. See also Hendrik Lundtofte, "'I believe that the nation as such must be annihilated . . .': The Radicalization of the German Suppression of the Herero Rising in 1904," in *Genocide: Cases, Comparisons and Contemporary Debates,* ed. Stephen B. Jensen, 15–53, here 34–35 (Copenhagen, 2003).
6. Drechsler, *"Let Us Die Fighting*," 153. See also Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 158.
7. TNA, CO 879/86/4, Further Correspondence [1905] relating to the Affairs of Walfisch Bay and the German South-West-African Protectorate, enclose no. 59, enclosure 1, Isaac Magadi, affidavit sworn 22 April 1905.
8. Timothy J. Stapleton, *A History of Genocide in Africa* (Santa Barbara, CA, 2017), 16. See also Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 79.
9. TNA, CO 879/86/4 Further Correspondence [1905] relating to the Affairs of Walfisch Bay and the German South-West-African Protectorate, no. 36, enclosure (11 April 1905, Gleichen, Lieutnant-Colonial Military Attache, report).
10. Groups included Nama under Hendrik Witbooi, the Franzman people under Simon Kooper, the Red Nation under Manasse Noroseb, and the Veldschoendragers under Hans Hendrik, among others. The Basters at Rehoboth fought with the Germans. Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 166–67.
11. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 7–8. See also Hammerstein, "Kriegs-Schau-Platz Omaheke."
12. Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 13.
13. Nuhn called nature an "ally" of the Herero. Walter Nuhn, *Sturm über Südwest: Der Hereroaufstand von 1904—ein düsteres Kapitel der deutschen kolonialen Vergangenh*eit (Koblenz, 1989), 75.
14. Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*. See also Matthias Häussler, "From Destruction to Extermination: Genocidal Escalation in Germany's War Against the Herero, 1904," *Journal of Namibian Studies* 10 (2011): 58–81.
15. Lehmann, "Between Waterberg and Sandveld," 536. See also Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 7.
16. Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 7. The Herero were also unprepared. See Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 165–67.
17. Gudewill to Col. Dept., tel. Nr. 26, Feb. 3, 1904, BArch-B, R 1001, Nr. 2111, 177, as quoted in Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 10. The exact numbers vary depending on account.
18. District Judge Richter Windhuk, 14. Jan. 1904, BArch-B, R 1001, Nr. 2111, 22, quoted in Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 7.
19. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 3 August 1904. See also *Kolonie und Heimat*, "Der Krieg in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1904–07," 23 May 1908; Kurd

Schwabe, "Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Geschichte–Völker- und Landeskunde: Das Groß-Namaland und das mittlere Schutzgebiet," in *Die Deutsche Kolonien, Band 1: Togo–Kamerun–Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, ed. Kurd Schwabe, 75–138, here 95 (Berlin, 1909).

20. G. Auer and M. Unterbeck, eds., *In Südwestafrika gegen die Hereros: Nach den Kriegs-Tagebüchern des Obermatrosen G. Auer* (Berlin, 1911), 28, as quoted in Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 96.
21. Pool, *Eisenbahnen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, 105.
22. Paschasius, *Die Militäreisenbahn Swakopmund-Windhuk*, 7. See also Walter Paschasius, *Die Befreiung Okahandjas während des Herero-Aufstandes* (Windhoek, 1951); *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Der Zug der Abteilung v. Zülow von Swakopmund nach Okahandja," 26 January 1904; "Beiträge zur militärischen Geschichte des Jahres 1904, Dritter Teil, Bericht über die kriegerischen Ereignisse in den deutschen Kolonien," 447–88, here 455, in *V. Löbell's Jahresberichte über die Veränderungen und Fortschritte im Militärwesen*, ed. Gerhard von Pelet-Narbonne (Berlin, 1905). For broad summaries see Pool, *Eisenbahnen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, 104–14; Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railways in Namibia*, 62–64; Nuhn, *Sturm über Südwest*, 77–84; Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 139–41.
23. R. Boethke, "Verkehrstruppen in Südwestafrika," *Militär-Wochenblatt* (1906), 39–56, here 41.
24. Admiralstab der Marine, ed., *Die Tätigkeit des Landungskorps S. M. S. 'Habicht' während des Herero-Aufstandes in Süd-West-Afrika, Januar/ Februar 1904* (Berlin, 1905), 6.
25. Auer and Unterbeck, *In Südwestafrika gegen die Hereros,* 32.
26. Hartmut Bartmuß, "Primary Source Josef Bendix: Briefe und Feldpostkarten aus Deutsch-Südwestafrika Oktober 1903 bis März 1904," *Journal of Namibian Studies* 19 (2016): 109–22, here 114 (letter 17 January 1904). Bendix later died in combat near Owikokorero. See also Harmut Bartmuß, *Joseph Bendix: Regierungsbaumeister, Ingenieur und Offizier in Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin, 2015); Conrad Rust, *Krieg und Frieden im Hereroland: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Kriegsjahre 1904* (Leipzig, 1905), 220.
27. "Primary Source Josef Bendix," 118 (letter 2 March 1904).
28. Admiralstab der Marine, *Die Tätigkeit des Landungskorps S. M. S. 'Habicht' während des Herero-Aufstandes in Süd-West-Afrika*, 7.
29. "Primary Source Josef Bendix," 118 (letter 2 March 1904). See also Admiralstab der Marine, *Die Tätigkeit des Landungskorps S. M. S. 'Habicht'*, 8; Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railways in Namibia*, 62–63.
30. Hermann Schwabe, "Ueber die Hafen- und Eisenbahnbauten in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika," *Deutsche Bauzeitung* XXXIX, no 10 (4 February 1905): 63–66, here 66.
31. *Kladderdatsch, humoristisch-satirisches Wochenblatt*, "Erfreuliches," 17 January 1904.
32. Niklaas Tsam, 36, in Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say*.
33. Moses Maharero, 52, in Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say.*
34. Auer and Unterbeck, *In Südwestafrika gegen die Hereros.* Bendix describes hanging opponents on the spot. See "Primary Source Josef Bendix," 119 (letter 2 March 1904).
35. Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 164–65.
36. Ibid., 142.
37. Schneider, "Bewässerungslandwirtschaft in Namibia und ihre Grundlagen in der Kolonialzeit," 128; Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 123; Drechsler, "*Let Us Die Fighting,*" 132.
38. Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule,* 96.

39. German businessmen and traders at times took advantage of local groups, claimed their land and access to water. See Njanekua and Muuondjo, "Tjiponda, Kahivesa, and the Wars of the Hereros," 154–73, here 162, *Michael Scott Oral History Project*. See also Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot be Found,* 84.
40. Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say*, 47; Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 150–51; Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 157.
41. Nuhn, *Sturm über Südwest*, 88.
42. François, *Nama und Damara*, 37. See also Moritz Eduard Pechuel-Loesche, "Das Abkommen des Riviers," in *Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Land und Leute: eine Heimatkunde für Deutschlands Jugend und Volk*, ed. Bernhard Voigt, 24 (Stuttgart, 1913); Schwabe, *Mit Schwert und Pflug,* 419.
43. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Swakopmund einst und jetzt," 31 October 1901.
44. Goudie and Viles, *Landscapes and Landforms of Namibia*, 12. See also Walter Moritz, "Zur Geschichte und Bedeutung des Names Swakop und Swakopmund," *Namib und Meer* 3 (Sonderdruck) (1972), 37–41, here 39. Namibian oral traditions tell larger stories about the reason for such floods. See Muzumi Roberts, "The Story of Muzimbikana," in Namibia Oral Tradition Project, *Muzimbikana and Other Namibian Adventures*, 31–33, here 33.
45. 1748, T.VII.F. 3 (vol 5) Hafen von Swakopmund Bau einer Mole Specialia Alte Akten. (1904–1905), Abkommen des Swakopmund, undated.
46. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Das Abkommen des Swakop," 12 February 1903. See also *Deutsch Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 20 December 1903; *Deutsch Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 22 December 1903; *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, "Die diesjährige Regenzeit," 15 February 1904.
47. Rudolf Fitzner, *Deutsches Kolonial-Handbuch*, vol. 1, 2ed (Berlin, 1901), 127.
48. NAN, HBS, St. Unit 1, File 1/2, Allgemeiner generelle Verhandlungen und Verfügungen dn Hafenbau betreffend, 1898–1902, "Militärischer Bericht" der S.M.S. Wolf, 9 November 1900.
49. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund: Das Abkommen des Swakop," 22 December 1903.
50. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Das Abkommen des Swakop: Störung der Wasserleitung," 29 December 1903. The drinking water had its starting point in the riverbed of the Swakop River.
51. Connemann, "Meinungsaustausch," *Marine-Rundschau* (June 1908), 756–70, here 756–58.
52. *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, "Lösch- und Ladeverkehr in Swakopmund," 1 June 1904.
53. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 29 June 1904. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 10 August 1904.
54. Connemann, "Meinungsaustausch," *Marine-Rundschau* (June 1908), 756–70, here 756–58. See also *Deutsch Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 13 July 1904; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 6 July 1904.
55. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Die Landungsverhältnisse in Swakopmund," 21 July 1904.
56. Hintrager, *Südwestafrika in der deutschen Zeit*, 61.
57. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Der deutsche Reichstag und das südwestafrikanische Schmerzenskind," 11 May 1904. See also Nuhn, *Sturm über Südwest*, 188–89.

58. Erich von Salzmann, *Im Kampfe gegen die Herero*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1905), 35. Salzmann's publication includes a handful of photographs that capture the fright of the animals. Salzmann, *Im Kampfe gegen die Herero*, 35 and 38. Horses had been brought in from all over the world, few in good shape in the first place. Nuhn, *Sturm über Südwest*, 208 and 215; Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 248.
59. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 3 August 1904. See also Conrad Rust, *Krieg und Frieden im Hereroland: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Kriegsjahre 1904* (Leipzig, 1905), 336–37; *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Ueber die Truppen- und Pferdetransporte nach Swakopmund und deren Landung daselbst," 4 August 1904.
60. *Deutsch Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 17 August 1904. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 7 September 1904; *Deutsches Kolonialbatt*, "Hafenverkehr in Swakopmund," 15 April 1905. See also Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 98.
61. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 7 September 1904.
62. BArch-F, Militärgeschichtliche Sammlung (MSG) 2/12682, Lieutenant Eberhard von Hagen, "Auf der Fahrt von Swakopmund nach Lüderitzbucht," 24 September 1905.
63. Lyon, "From Labour Elites to Garveyites," 37–55, here 42.
64. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 14 September 1904. See also *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Südwestafrika: Hafenverkehr in Swakopmund," 22 April 1905. According to one account, 11,065 horses were brought ashore that way, from 1904 to 1906. See Kirsten Kraft, *Wo einst der Fuß des Kriegers trat, wächst heute Kopfsalat: Swakopmunder Geschichte(n)* (Windhoek, 2014), 16.
65. Aktenstück Nr. 509 (Zweiter Nachtrag zum Haushalts-Etat für die Schutzgebiete für 1904), 2670- 2701, here 2677, accessible at www.reichstagsprotokolle.de, last accessed 11 March 2021.
66. *Archiv für Post- und Telegraphie,* "Kleine Mitteilungen," August 1903, 481–483, here 483.
67. *Kladderdatsch, humoristisch-satirisches Wochenblatt*, "Mein Aerger," 7 August 1904. See also *Kladderdatsch, humoristisch-satirisches Wochenblatt,* "Ein Vorschlag," 4 December 1904.
68. BArch-B, R 1001/1865a, Hafenanlagen in Swakopmund (Vorschläge zum Ausbau des Hafens). There were no significant changes until April 1903; by 4 May 1904, there was already too much sand, however. BArch-B, R 1001/1865a, Hafenanlagen in Swakopmund, (Anlage).
69. NAN, HBS, St. Unit 2, File 1/8, Vorschläge zum weiteren Ausbau des Hafens in Swakopmund, September 1904; BArch-B, R 1001/165a, Vorschläge zum weiteren Ausbau des Hafens in Swakopmund, September 1904; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 4 January 1905.
70. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 9 Nov. 1904.
71. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus dem Schutzgebiet," 4 January 1905. See also Schwabe, "Ueber die Hafen- und Eisenbahnbauten in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika," 62–63.
72. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 24 August 1904.
73. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 14 September 1904. See also NAN, HBS, 2, Baggerarbeiten im Hafen Swakopmund, 1904–06 (Vorschläge zum weiteren Ausbau des Hafens in Swakopmund, 14 September 1904).

74. Schwabe, "Ueber die Hafen- und Eisenbahnbauten in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika," 63. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "An den Herausgeber," 24 August 1904; Bravenboer and Rusch, *The First 100 Years of State Railway in Namibia*, 98.
75. NAN, HBS, 2, Baggerarbeiten im Hafen Swakopmund, 1904–06.
76. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," March 29, 1905. See also *Deutsch- Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 4 January, 1905.
77. Reichstag, 131. Sitzung, 1 February 1905. Retrieved 11 March 2021 from www.reichstagsprotokolle.de.
78. Reichstag, 167. Sitzung, 18 March 1905. Retrieved 11 March 2021 from www.reichstagsprotokolle.de.
79. Reichstag 74. Sitzung, 24 March 1906. Retrieved 11 March 2021 from www.reichstagsprotokolle.de.
80. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus dem Schutzgebiet," 8 March 1905. Efforts continued to have two functional dredgers on site. See NAN, HBS, 2, Baggerarbeiten im Hafen Swakopmund, 1904–06 ("Der Königliche Maschineninspektor, 5 June 1905).
81. BArch-B, R 1001/1865a, Hafenanlagen in Swakopmund (Aufzeichnungen betreffend die Beschaffung von Baggerprähmen für Swakopmund). See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 29 March 1905; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus dem Schutzgebiet," 5 April 1905.
82. *Deutsch Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 26 April 1905. See also *Deutsch Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 29 March 1905; *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus dem Schutzgebiet," 6 April 1905. Additional parts had to be ordered and took time to arrive on site. NAN, HBS, St. Unit 2, File 1/8, St. Unit 2, File 1/8, Brief, Der Königliche Maschinenbauinspektor, 31 May 1905.
83. *Deutsches Kolonialblatt*, "Hafenverkehr in Swakopmund," 15 April 1905.
84. Reichstag 74. Sitzung, 24 March 1906. Retrieved 11 March 2021 from http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de.
85. NAN, HBS, 2, Baggerarbeiten im Hafen Swakopmund, 1904–0 ("Auf das Telegramm Nr. 17, 10 June 1905).
86. Cb 83 Gustav Buß, *Der Globetrotter*, 25, Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek Kiel. See also Semler, *Meine Beobachtungen in Süd-West-Afrika*, 53.
87. *Deutsch Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 17 May 1905.
88. NAN, ZBU, 1751, T.VII. F.4 Hafen von Swakopmund Molenbetrieb Specialia Akten (1903–1906), Woermann Linie, 4 May 1905.
89. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Swakopmund," 20 May 1905.
90. Reichstag 74. Sitzung, 24 March 1906. Retrieved 11 March 2021 from http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de. See also *Deutsch Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 29 March 1905.
91. Connemann, "Hafenanlage in Swakopmund," *Marine-Rundschau*, June 1910, 304–6, here 305.
92. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Landungsverhältnisse in Swakopmund," 8 July 1905. See also *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 16 August 1905.
93. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Südwestafrika: Die unglückselige Mole," 23 September 1905. See also *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Südwestafrika: Die unglückseligen Swakopmunder-Hafenverhältnisse," 18 November 1905; *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Südwest-

afrika: Wieder die Mole," 9 December 1905; *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Südwestafrika: Immer noch die unglückselige Mole," 30 December 1905.

94. Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 183.
95. Ortschronik Omaruru, Archives of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN), V. 23.1., 312, as quoted in Kreienbaum, "*Ein trauriges Fiasko,*" 223.
96. Ortschronik Windhoek, ELCRN, V. 37.2., 27, as quoted in Kreienbaum, "*Ein trauriges Fiasko,*" 223.
97. Drechsler, "*Let Us Die Fighting*," 207. Steinmetz speaks about "slavelike forced labor after 1904." Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 197. In some instances, local inhabitants chose domestic servants. Maria Muschalek, "Violence as Usual: Everyday Police Work and the Colonial State in German Southwest Africa," in *Rethinking the Colonial State*, ed. Søren Rud and Søren Ivarsson, 129–50, here 141. Bingley, UK, 2017.
98. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Südwestafrika: Landungsverhältnisse in Swakopmund," 6 October 1904.
99. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 14 June 1905.
100. Werner Haak, *Tagebuchblätter aus Südwest-Afrika* (Berlin, 1906), 12, as quoted in Lyon, "Namibian Labor Empire."
101. Olusago and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 167.
102. Report on the Natives of South West Africa and Their Treatment by Germany (London, 1918), 100, as quoted in "'Ombepera i koza—The Cold Is Killing Me,'" 70, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*. See also Zeller, "'Wie Vieh wurden Hunderte zu Getriebenen und wie Vieh begraben': Fotodokumente aus dem deutschen Konzentrationslager Swakopmund/ Namibia 1904–1908." *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 49, no. 3 (2001): 226–43, here 235–36. Fraser also described sexual violence. Report on the Natives of South West Africa and Their Treatment by Germany (London, 1918), 100, as quoted in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
103. TNA, CO 879/91/4, Further Correspondence [1906] relating to the Affairs of Walfisch Bay and the German South-West African Protectorate, no. 291, enclosure (James Tolibadi, signed/ sworn 11 August 1906).
104. Zeller, "'Wie Vieh wurden Hunderte zu Getriebenen und wie Vieh begraben,'" 235.
105. Zeller, "'Ombepera i koza—The Cold Is Killing Me,'" 64, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*. See also Casper W. Erichsen, *"The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them": Concentration Camps and Prisoner-of-War in Namibia, 1904–1908* (Leiden, 2005), 84.
106. Zimmerer, "War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in South-West Africa," 53, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*, 53. See also ELCIN, Ortschroniken Swakopmund, as quoted in Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 188; Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 205.
107. Zeller, "'Ombepera i koza—The Cold Is Killing Me,'" 67, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
108. Letter Heinrich Vedder to Johannes Spiecker, 26 May 1905, Archiv der Vereinigten Evangelischen Mission (AVEM), Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft (RMG) 1.660a, Bl. 64–67, quoted in Kreienbaum, "*Ein trauriges Fiasko*," 228. For his visit of the camp more specifically, see AVEM, RHG, C. V. 31, Gemeinde-Chronik Swakopmund, 220,

as quoted in Zeller, "'Wie Vieh wurden Hunderte zu Getriebenen und wie Vieh begraben,'" 227.

109. ELCIN, Ortschroniken Swakopmund, as quoted in Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 188. See also Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 205; Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 163.
110. AELCRN, Windhoek, C.V. 31, Gemeinde Chronik [Community Records], Swakopmund, 6f, as quoted in "'Omberpera i koza—The Cold Is Killing Me,'" 64, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
111. Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 165.
112. Abb. 6, as referenced in "'Wie Vieh wurden Hunderte zu Getriebenen und wie Vieh begraben,'" 233.
113. ZBU 454, D. IV.l.3, vol. I, pp. 58–9, as quoted in Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 169.
114. AELCRN, Windhoek, C.V. 31, Gemeinde Chronik [Community Records], Swakopmund, 6f, quoted in "'Omberpera i koza—The Cold Is Killing Me,'" Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*, 64.
115. Vedder, Kurze Geschichten, 138, as quoted in "'Omberpera i koza—The Cold Is Killing Me,'" 69, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
116. Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 171.
117. Zeller, "'Wie Vieh wurden Hunderte zu Getriebenen und wie Vieh begraben,'" 241. See also Gesine Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein: Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia, 1904–1907* (Göttingen, 1999), 130.
118. Zeller, "'Ombepera i koza—The Cold Is Killing Me,'" 78, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
119. Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 190.
120. BArch-B, R 1001/1808, Grenzverletzungen, Okt. 1906-Okt. 1911, letter, Berlin 20 December 1906 (Lasalles).
121. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 22 June 1904. See also NAN, BSW, 107, UA.10/2 Entlaufen von Eingeborenen nach Walfischbay, 1904.
122. Kreienbaum, "*Ein trauriges Fiasko*," 270.
123. *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, "Aus Swakopmund," 22 June 1904. In some instances, this resulted in shortages of workers for the Woermann-Line. See: Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 190; Zeller, "'Wie Vieh wurden Hunderte zu Getriebenen und wie Vieh begraben,'" 238–39.
124. ELCIN, V. Ortschroniken, Swakopmund 1906, as quoted in Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 190.
125. Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say*, 49.
126. Frenssen, *Peter Moors Journey to Southwest*, 36–37.
127. Fritz Maywald, *Südwest und seine Helden* (Berlin, 1934), 9, as quoted in Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten*, 146.
128. Eisinger, *Im Damaraland und Kaokofeld. Erinnerungen an Südwest-Afrika*, 5–6. See also Philalethes Kuhn, *Gesundheitlicher Ratgeber für Südwestafrika* (Berlin, 1907), 223, as quoted in Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten*, 170; Max Belwe, *Gegen die Herero 1904/1905 Tagebuchaufzeichungen* (Berlin, 1906), 8.

129. Salzmann, *Im Kampfe gegen die Herero*, 30. See also Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten*, 146; Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 7.
130. *Simplicissimus: Illustrierte Wochenschrift*, "Entwurf eines Wandgemäldes für das Regierungsgebäude in Windhuk," 1 April 1907 (Spezial-Nummer, Erster April).
131. Simplex Africanus, "Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika," in *Mit der Schutztruppe durch Deutsch-Afrika*, ed. Simplex Africanus, Lieutenant Laasch, and Hauptmann Leue, 1–71, here 51 (Minden i. W., 1905
132. Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten*, 152. See also Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten*, 145–46.
133. Friedrich Zöllner, *Als Arzt in Deutsch-Südwest* (Magdeburg, 1939), 33–35, as quoted in Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten*, 151.
134. Franz Henkel, *Der Kampf um Südwestafrika* (Berlin, 1908), 4.
135. Hermann Alverdes, *Mein Tagebuch aus Deutsch-Südwest;* Belwe, *Gegen die Herero*; Henkel, *Der Kampf um Südwestafrika*; Salzmann, *Im Kampfe gegen die Herero*. See also Frenssen, *Peter Moors Journey to Southwest*, 6.
136. Eckenbrecher, *Was Afrika mir gab und nahm*, 186.
137. Curt von François, "Der Herero-Aufstand, II," *Militär-Wochenblatt* no. 18, 11 February 1904.
138. BArch-K, N 1101/7, Nachlass Franz Ritter von Epp, Helden-Epos von Hauptmann Bayer. See also Africanus, Laasch, and Leue, *Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika*, 1. Public opinion and overall expectations "demanded a quick victory." Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 13.
139. Maximilian Bayer, *Der Krieg in Südwestafrika und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Kolonie* (Leipzig, 1906), 9, as quoted in Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 133.
140. Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 135.
141. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 143.
142. Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 142, 157 and 151.
143. Ibid., 148–49, 152 and 247.
144. Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 161. For instance, in one skirmish near Omaruru the Herero took advantage of the rocky terrain. See Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I Großer Generalstab, eds., *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika, Erster Band, Der Feldzug gegen die Hereros* (Berlin, 1906), 50. See also Nuhn, *Sturm über Südwest*, 336–37; Gerhardus Pool, *Die Herero-opstand, 1904–1907*, 2nd ed. (Pretoria, 2016).
145. Kirsten Alnaes, "Living with the Past: The Songs of the Herero in Botswana." *Africa* 59, no. 3 (1989): 267–99, here 281–83.
146. Häussler, *Genozid an den Herero*, 233–34. See also Nuhn, *Sturm über Südwest*, 322–23.
147. Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 170.
148. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 165.
149. Ibid., 168.
150. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Südwestafrika. Belohnung für den Nachweis von Wasser," 23 June 1904.
151. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 158.
152. *Praktische Erfahrungen aus Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin, 1904), point 43, as quoted in Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 123.

153. Jean Gümpell, *Die Wahrheit über Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika* (Cassel, 1905), 9.
154. Scherz, *Südwester Geschichten am Lagerfeuer erzählt*, 65.
155. Frenssen, *Peter Moors Journey to Southwest*, 45.
156. Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say*, 16. Those Damara groups that joined the rebellion would of course use their knowledge against the Germans—like Benjamin/Howaseb, who shared how a group under the leadership of Gariseb used mountains and rocks to target the Germans pursuing them. Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say*, 18.
157. Auer von Herrenkirchen, *Meine Erlebnisse während des Feldzuges gegen die Hereros und Witboois nach meinem Tagebuch* (Berlin, 1907), 19.
158. Frenssen, *Peter Moors Journey to Southwest*, 68/69.
159. Herrenkirchen, *Meine Erlebnisse während des Feldzuges,* 81. For the importance of waterholes in general, see also Ada von Liliencron, *Heiße Arbeit unter heißer Sonne: Bilder aus dem Südwestafrikanischen Feldzug* (Berlin, 1907), 64
160. Conrad Rust, *Krieg und Frieden im Hereroland: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Kriegsjahre 1904* (Leipzig, 1905), 323.
161. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, "Südwestafrikanische Kriegsbilder," 26 October 1907. See also Simplex Africanus, Leutnant Laasch, and Hauptmann Leue, eds., *Mit der Schutztruppe durch Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika* (Minden i. W., 1905). Frenssen wrote extensively about these situations, with some hindsight. Frenssen, *Peter Moors Journey to Southwest*, 52–53 and 168.
162. Ernst Kaerger, "Der Typhus in Südwestafrika [Ostabteilung (Major von Glasenapp) und Marine-Expeditionskorps] Februar 1904 bis März 1905" (PhD. diss., Königl. Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel, 1905), 5. See also Karla Poewe, *The Namibian Herero: A History of Their Psychological Disintegration and Survival* (Lewiston, 1985), 86.
163. *Sanitätsordnung während des Kriegszustandes in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika*, 1 July 1904, sec. 14, emphasis in the original, as quoted in Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 192. See also "Diary of Heinrich Geisel, Sanitary Sergeant in the Kaiserliche Schutztruppe for South West Africa, January 1905–October 1906," transcribed by Hartmut Bartmuß," *Journal of Namibian Studies* 21 (2017): 117–34, here 119; Hans Berthold, "Vom Kriegsschauplatz in Südwest: Von einem alten Afrikaner," *Kolonie und Heimat*, 1 October 1907. Margarethe von Eckenbrecher included a photograph showing a soldier "boiling water." Eckenbrecher, *Was Afrika mir gab und nahm*, table 6.
164. Kaerger, "Der Typhus in Südwestafrika," 8–10.
165. Ibid., 12.
166. Ibid., 7.
167. Major F. F. Russel, "The Prevention of Typhoid Fever by Vaccination and Early Diagnosis and Isolation," *The Military Surgeon* XXIV, no. 6 (Jun., 1909): 479–518, here 485.
168. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 193. Kreienbaum and Bley speak of over 2,000 casualties. Kreienbaum, *"Ein trauriges Fiasko,"* 84; Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft*, 193. Leutwein later noted that typhus "demand[ed] more victims than the Hereros." Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouveneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, 507.
169. Lukas Grawe, "The Prusso-German General Staff and the Herero Genocide," *Central European History* 52, no. 4 (2019): 588–619, here 609n168.
170. Eckert, *Medizin und Kolonialimperialismus*, 277–78.

171. Deutschlands koloniale Wehrmacht in ihrer gegenwärtigen Organisation und Schlagfähigkeit: Auf Grund der neuesten amtlichen Dokumente bearbeitet von einem höheren Offizier, Hermann von Wissmann (Berlin, 1906), 94, as quoted in Kuss, *German Colonial Wars,* 203.
172. Schian, "Die Bekämpfung des Typhus unter der Schutztruppe in Südwestafrika im Hererofeldzug 1904/05," *Deutsche Militärärztliche Zeitschrift* 34 (1905): 593–604, here 594, as quoted in Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 192.
173. Eckert, *Medizin und Kolonialimperialismus*, 278. Of course, officials knew about the impact of diseases onto prisoners of war. Eckert, *Medizin und Kolonialimperialismus*, 283–90.
174. Werner, "Nervenkrankheiten," in *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon*, Band II, 628. See also Daniel J. Walther, *Sex and Control: Venereal Disease, Colonial Physicians, and Indigenous Agency in German Colonialism, 1884–1914* (New York, 2015). Although it played a larger role in German East Africa, at times it became part of a defense in court in German Southwest Africa. See *Windhuker Nachrichten*, "Der Strafprozess Wiehager," 28 February 1907.
175. Baer, *The Genocidal Gaze*, 71.
176. Kuss, *German Colonial Wars*, 193. See Sanitäts-Bericht über die Kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Südwestafrika, vol. 2, 2, 402, as referenced in Kuss, *German Colonial Wars,* 202. Major Estroff had hoped to attack the Herero at the Waterberg before the arrival of von Trotha fearing the further spread of typhus among his troops—a request von Trotha declined. Herrenkirchen, *Meine Erlebnisse während des Feldzuges*, 8
177. "Völkerkunde," 630, in *Deutsches Koloniallexikon*, III. "Until now everything Naturvölker needed grew for them." Karl Dove, *Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika*, 187. See also Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, 237–52.
178. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I des Großen Generalstabes, ed., *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika. Auf Grund amtlichen Materials,* vol. 2 (Berlin, 1907), 302.
179. Max Belwe, *Gegen die Herero 1904/1905. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen* (Berlin, 1906), 115
180. Carl Schlettwein, *Der Herero-Aufstand, was hat ihn veranlaßt und was lehrt er uns?* Vortrag (Wismar, 1905), 14.
181. Walther Rathenau used such language while also condemning "the greatest atrocity that has ever been brought about by German military policy." Walther Rathenau, *Industrialist, Banker, Intellectual, and Politician: Notes and Diaries 1907–1922*, ed. Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Oxford, 1985), 81.
182. Andreas Kukuri, *Herero-Texte: Erzählt von Pastor Andreas Kukuri* (Berlin, 1983), 51, as referenced in Hammerstein, "Kriegs-Schau-Platz Omaheke," 36.
183. Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say*, 44.
184. Gesine Krüger, "Beasts and Victims: Women in the Colonial War," 170–92, here 170, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
185. Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 194.
186. Raimund Ohly, *Herero Ecology: The Literary Impact* (Warsaw, 2000), 131. See also Alnaes, "Living with the Past," 267–99.
187. Telegram from Oberleutnant Estorff to Foreign Office in Berlin, 10 April 1907, BArch-B, RKA, vol. 2140, 88v, as quoted in Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 11. See

also Ludwig von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika und Südafrika 1894–1910*, ed. Christoph-Friedrich Kutscher, 2nd ed. (Windhoek, 1979), 117, as quoted in "War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in Southwest Africa," 48–49, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*, 48–49; Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 194.

188. Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika und Südafrika*, 117, as translated in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*, 48–49. See also Ludwig von Estorff, *Kriegserlebnisse in Südwestafrika* (Berlin, 1911).
189. Jan-Bart Gewald, "The Great General of the Kaiser," *Botswana Notes and Records* 26 (1994): 67–76, here 68. See also Erichsen, *"The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them,"* 11; Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say,* 44–45.
190. Maximilian Bayer, *Mit dem Hauptquartier in Südwestafrika* (Berlin, 1909), 195, as quoted in Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 193–94.
191. Alnaes, "Living with the Past," 275.
192. VEM C/o.5 Joh. Neitz: Reise zu Samuel Maharero, Makapaanspoort, 8.11.1907, as quote in Pool, *Samuel Maharero*, 276.
193. Alnaes, "Living with the Past," 276.
194. Jakob Irle, *Die Herero* (Gütersloh, 1906), 344, as quoted in Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 195.
195. Belwe, *Gegen die Herero*, 104–5. See also Hintrager, *Südwestafrika in der deutschen Zeit*, 63.
196. Zimmerer, "War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in Southwest Africa," 47, in Zimmerer and Zeller, *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
197. Frenssen, *Peter Moors Journey to Southwest*, 193. See also Baer, *The Genocidal Gaze*, 50.
198. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I des Grossen Generalstabes, ed., *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, 207. See also Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner*, 39; Kreienbaum, "*Ein trauriges Fiasko*," 69; Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 162.
199. Frenssen, *Peter Moors Journey to Southwest*, 226.
200. Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*, 190.
201. Lehmann, "Between Waterberg and Sandveld," 553. See also Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero*.
202. Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 215, "systematically worked to death" Nama in Shark Island. Both scholars speak of Governor von Lindequist's final solution. Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 206. As historian Zeller concludes, "It is therefore possible to see the treatment of prisoners in the camps as a continuation of the policy of extermination introduced by General Lothar von Trotha." Joachim Zeller, "'Ombepera i koza—The Cold Is Killing Me,'" 78, in *Genocide in German South-West Africa*.
203. References to nature as the culprit still masks some colonial apologetics. See Martin Kalb, "Reprinting German Colonial Settler Narratives in Namibia Today," in *Archiving Colonialism: Culture, Space and Race*, ed. Yu-Ting Huang and Rebecca Weaver-Hightower, 221–237 (New York, 2018).