

## Controlling Protestors in the Protest Years



When asked about the 1960s in Munich for a recent publication, Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel briefly referred to shifting policies. “We had two deaths and endured vicious quarrels; this gave the conflict between students and authorities a certain intensity. We had to deal with that, but quite differently than we did during the riots of Schwabing 1962.”<sup>1</sup> Vogel illustrated how Munich had had the chance to learn from earlier events. Initially caught by surprise during the riots and protests in Schwabing in 1962, the former mayor hints at a learning curve. But how did local officials defend its understanding of democracy in the light of protestors? How did the city contain *the student* and *the Gammeler*?

As for many onlookers and protestors, the events in Schwabing too marked a turning point for local authorities. Initially surprised and overall unable to cope with the new threat, the police faced criticism by the general public. This backlash resulted in a new approach regarding the control of protesting youngsters. Known as *die Münchner Linie* or the Munich Line, the police moved from active intervention towards preemptive and more targeted measures. More precisely and in response to the riots in Schwabing, law enforcement put the young in Schwabing under constant surveillance. Promoted as de-escalation and restraint, this new approach targeted youth more secretively. In this sense, *the student* and *the Gammeler* had become valuable tools to justify the installation of a police state in Schwabing.

Again, a diverse set of adult protagonists framed and controlled both images. Since 1960, Hans-Jochen Vogel from the Social Democrats Party (SPD) was mayor of Munich. As the youngest mayor in West Germany at the time, the riots of Schwabing were among his first

challenges in office. Additionally, newly installed Police Chief Manfred Schreiber modernized the police by moving away from pre-1933 tactics; he also presented Munich as a tolerant and open-minded city. At the same time, state authorities got involved as well, especially given that *the student* disrupted university settings. Conservative voices dominated politics there and even had an absolute majority in the Bavarian parliament by 1962. Apart from the president of Bavaria, Hans Ehard, and his successor Alfons Goppel, it was in the roams of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Culture and Education, and the Ministry of Justice to take action. In addition, conservative party leader and future Bavarian president Franz-Josef Strauß was also anxious to get involved and make his mark as a politician. He demanded more rigorous restrictions against *the student* and *the Gammeler*, only to be superseded by the right-wing Nationalist Party (NPD).<sup>2</sup> Together with the media and various other social commentators, these authorities in particular set out to control a threatening minority in an attempt to defend their conception of West German democracy while ultimately hoping to prevent the instabilities of the Weimar Republic.

Unlike previously, however, the actual young were increasingly organized and actively participating in debates, especially after the riots in Schwabing. More and more aware of their voices and power, many joined community initiatives and other organizations. Some student groups like AStA shifted between politically moderate in 1962 to more radical positions throughout the later period. This radicalization became also visible in organizations like the socialist group SDS. Student leaders and organizers included Rolf Pohle and Reinhard Wetter, while Dieter Kunzelmann and Fritz Teufel often helped represent *the student*. Soon such groups relied on their own publications: they printed leaflets and newspapers, or made their voices heard in interviews within the mainstream media. These comments contested, disrupted, and—at times—altered discussions, and challenged the monopoly of authorities to frame images of youth. Young people's abilities to organize and resist had an impact on state responses and mechanisms of control, arguably resulting in more subtle attempts to regulate society.

### **Police Brutality in Schwabing**

In the early 1960s, harsh restrictions aimed against the young were still in place. Fears, panics, and larger circumstances tied to the rise of *the Halbstarke* and *the teenager* had criminalized both groups and resulted in various means of control. The police patrolled the streets

looking for loitering *Halbstarke*, and they monitored traffic, wondering about the young cruising through the city on their mopeds. Authorities also observed certain clubs playing rock 'n' roll music. These concerns brought police patrols to Schwabing early on. Seen as the young, vibrant, and bohemian part of town, Schwabing offered a variety of entertainment. Youngsters could hang out with friends at ice cream parlors, movie theaters, or on street corners; they could also listen to their favorite tunes on jukeboxes located in bars and various restaurants. In addition, Schwabing was close to the university, a location that brought countless students to Leopoldstraße boulevard. Whereas the Youth Protection Law prohibited youngsters to frequent bars or clubs in the evening,<sup>3</sup> *the student* could move around more freely. As a space for the young, Schwabing meant potential trouble for those concerned about juvenile delinquency.<sup>4</sup>

Police patrols on duty in Schwabing focused on several issues. Expected to keep law and order, their most imminent task was to limit disruptions of peace and public order. Especially on warm summer nights, numerous noise complaints reached police headquarters. After receiving such calls, a unit of two officers would generally arrive at the scene to disperse the source of trouble. Those disquieting the peace usually followed orders without problems. Sentiments gradually changed in the early 1960s, however. Then, more and more youngsters felt harassed by overly zealous police measures. As a new generation, many of the young also rejected orders of their predecessors almost instinctively. On 21 June 1962, one such minor incident proved the last straw, as constant control and harassment of youngsters had led to the Schwabing riots, surprising local authorities. In this sense, in 1962, a diverse group of youngsters not only dismissed calls to end their music but also fought back. With little prior experiences regarding large crowds, overwhelmed police officers followed chaotic orders and the pre-1933 tactic—"mount, march out, dismount, clear, mount, retreat, [and] eat."<sup>5</sup> Mayor Vogel and subsequent court decisions were consequently correct overall when noting that the police "was acting according to the wording of the law."<sup>6</sup>

The use of such police strategies was not a coincidence. Apart from being rooted in outdated tactics, the response was embedded within larger postwar attitudes. To control the young and those disturbing the peace by force was acceptable at the time. It was a reflection of current political and societal values. To clear streets employing batons as a way to ensure the free flow of traffic was seen as an appropriate measure by most of Munich's citizens in the early 1960s. Munich had experienced an enormous rise in traffic—not least due to the lack of a subway

system—making main routes like Leopoldstraße boulevard essential.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, the street was a potential space for social conflicts, plus the police were supposed to protect the state against internal threats in the first place. Public order was important as many contemporary authorities and officials vividly recalled the chaotic situation during the Weimar years. Hence, authorities saw a robust democracy that fought back as essential in their attempts to prevent similar events in Munich. At the same time, many had experienced National Socialism. As outlined by historian Nick Thomas,

Hans-Jochen Vogel, the SPD Mayor of Munich, declared that “in the Munich City Council sit many men and women who were hunted down and robbed of their freedom between 1933 and 1945. The police president was also a political victim. They are all, as I am myself, certainly no friends of rubber truncheons,” but he justified the police tactics, saying “the police cannot allow the destruction of the peace and the law-breaking on the streets of a democratic state in homage to a mistaken concept of freedom.”<sup>8</sup>

This understanding of democracy as static, state-supported, and constantly under attack partially explains the behavior of authorities; it also indicates the use of the past to justify present actions. The fact that stringent retributions seemed to work and people eventually cleared the streets at some point strengthened these ideals [Figure 6.1].

After the riots in Schwabing and brutal police reaction, city authorities supported the police without hesitation. Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel, the city council, and the honorary Council of the Elders stood by the police, not least because the city council and the mayor as elected bodies were in charge of the police. It was thus not surprising when authorities avoided blaming each other. At the first meeting of the city council shortly after the events,<sup>9</sup> the recent riots had been added to the agenda at the last minute. Actual discussions were cut short. Instead, council members listened to a report by Police Chief Anton Heigl before, according to *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, “praising the police.”<sup>10</sup> Council Member Georg Fischer from the social democrats (SPD) noted, the police did not “clear the area until *after* traffic was disrupted, property damaged, and even lives of citizens endangered.”<sup>11</sup> The SPD Caucus led by Mayor Vogel published a proclamation after the meeting, concluding, “The Social Democratic Caucus of the city council regrets any kind of actions that call for police intervention; yet it cannot dismiss such police assignments because they are in the interest of security for our citizens.”<sup>12</sup> The SPD Caucus also promised, “If violations [by the police] occurred then there will be a proper inves-



**Figure 6.1** Police arrest a youngster during the “Schwabing Riots,” 1962. Courtesy of Otfried Schmidt/Süddeutsche Zeitung Photo.

tigation. The Caucus will discuss its results and draw its conclusions. We pass on our sympathy to those guiltless caught in the middle of the events.”<sup>13</sup> This brief acknowledgment of potential missteps seemed superficial given the magnitude of recent events in Schwabing.

### **Punishing the Student**

Authorities equally applied the full force of the law after the riots, regardless of evidence. They wanted to convict all those arrested during the events. However, initial hearings of early cases outlined problems with evidence. In the trial against twenty-year-old Karl Kristan, for instance, the police had not even sufficient evidence to indicate why it had kept him in custody for sixty-seven days. A police officer initially claiming he knew the accused only to partially retract his original testimony later on. According to *Der Münchner Merkur*, the trial became “a farce.”<sup>14</sup> For authorities, however, even such lack of evidence did not automatically result in the dismissal of a case, an aspect that captures desires to blame and persecute *the student* at all costs. One of the mu-

sicians, initially at the scene in Schwabing, experienced this after his arrest. Without much evidence against him, the police searched his room hoping to unearth links to communism; he was also interrogated at his work. This questioning took place in front of his boss, making it all the more uncomfortable and intimidating. In the end, he faced a 150 Deutsche Mark fine for “improper use of the sidewalk.”<sup>15</sup>

Subsequent trials continued to illustrate the exaggerated response of the judicial system. In late September 1962, a male youngster was accused of participating in the riots. He noted, “I wanted to see how someone is arrested for once,” and thus decided to come to Schwabing.<sup>16</sup> There, according to various witnesses, he was “particularly active”:<sup>17</sup> he walked slowly across the street to disrupt traffic, encouraged others to sit on the road, and failed to follow police orders. That the attorney detected “anarchic”<sup>18</sup> characteristics in the accused did not help his defense. He was eventually sentenced to eleven months in a juvenile prison. Other youngsters experienced similar verdicts. A twenty-three-year-old French journalist had to go to jail for mocking the police and “banding together” with others.<sup>19</sup> In one case the statement by a youngster that his friend was more active than him brought that friend to jail and to court. Sentences ranged from pedagogical measures or community service to much stricter verdicts, and the judicial review seemed to care surprisingly little about broad generalizations and limited evidence. In fact, twenty-one-year-old student of medicine Elmar was sentenced to six months in juvenile prison because he supposedly kicked a journalist. According to the verdict, “more self-restraint and reason should be expected from a student coming from a good family.”<sup>20</sup> Even Director of the Youth Welfare Office Kurt Seelmann was initially indicted based on his mere presence at the event,<sup>21</sup> an aspect that underlines the stark judicial response of local courts.

Accused participants, bystanders, and victims had little leverage. Often without the means or support to push for convictions of police officers, those individuals deciding to put forward a complaint could only rely on an inadequate judicial review. Police officers rarely recalled when they were involved in what brawl. If they did, then they kept it to themselves. A strong and largely institutionalized bias within the judicial system towards law enforcement plus the chaotic scenes during the riots did not help. That victims had no way of identifying police officers, who had no visual identifications, made prosecution virtually impossible. As a result, courts dismissed many accusations based on a lack of evidence,<sup>22</sup> and the first actual trial against a police officer did not occur until February 1963. Then, a policeman accused of heavy assault against a student faced charges.<sup>23</sup> The officer had

twice pushed student Klaus Staudt onto the side of the road. Staudt severely injured his knee. In this case, the accused faced six weeks in prison and a fine of 200 Deutsche Marks. Yet over the course of the trials, only fourteen out of 248 police officers were convicted.<sup>24</sup> In May 1963, an editorial in *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung* summarized the judicial review of Schwabing, stating that 25 percent of all civilians initially arrested were convicted while only 1 percent of police officers. “This is,” the editorial concluded, “simply shocking.”<sup>25</sup>

The role of Kurt Seelman finally gave some credibility to those pushing back already. Caught up in the riots plus a victim of police brutality, Seelman spoke out against the police. His credibility grounded in his role within the city administration and adult age made him a powerful voice. According to mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel, “it was the case of Kurt Seelmann in particular” that inspired others to speak up against the police.<sup>26</sup> At least then the mayor met with victims, showed his sympathy, and promised that “violations by police officers will not be covered up.”<sup>27</sup> At the end, however, only a couple of police officers faced charges, making it all look like a cover-up and embarrassment for the city of Munich, now promoting itself as a cosmopolitan metropolis and tourist destination.

### **The Birth of the Munich Line**

While the judicial process took shape and complaints continued to pour in, local decision makers began revisiting police tactics. In the first meeting of the city council after summer break, authorities focused on possible changes to general strategies as well as identification numbers for police officers, the latter being quickly dismissed because of privacy issues and fears of discrimination.<sup>28</sup> Discussions about tactics, on the other hand, continued, increasingly shaped by a public debate and new insights. City Council Member Georg Fischer (SPD) addressed Police Chief Anton Heigl during the council meeting in October directly, noting, “It should not happen again that the police walk around without clear guidance, like chickens.”<sup>29</sup> When Anton Heigl did not react to this criticism, conservative Council Member Peter Schmidhuber (CSU) got short, stating, “If you are not going to respond, then I wonder why we even discuss this issue.”<sup>30</sup> This incident, amongst others, underlined Heigl’s inability or unwillingness to communicate with authorities and the press. His attempts to emphasize that Munich’s police were “not barbarians”<sup>31</sup> in the newspaper *Welt am Sonntag* was not enough to rebuild a by then damaged reputation. Soon Heigl be-

came a prime target of the media, and a symbol for static, outdated, and traditional administrative structures.

His illness and sudden death in a tragic accident eventually allowed the city of Munich to replace Anton Heigl with a younger, more communicative, and less predisposed police chief. According to Mayor Vogel, Manfred Schreiber perfectly fit this description and also followed more current police tactics.<sup>32</sup> Another official referenced continuities within the mindset of the city police when discussing Heigl's replacement and noted, "It had been quite difficult to impose new guidelines for training and fill the structure of the police with more democratic formats. The understandings of some participants in the war [World War II] and now members of the police was simply overshadowed by militaristic ideologies."<sup>33</sup> Local leadership hoped that thirty-seven-year-old Manfred Schreiber could more easily address these issues. He had been the public face of the police in Munich even before Heigl's death. As Schreiber acknowledged himself, "To better the relationship between police and public" became his main objective following the riots.<sup>34</sup>

Although technically legal given outdated police standards, the police had certainly not played a positive role in the riots. Changes seemed necessary, especially once public pressure increased. After initial debates on various levels, a broad proposal outlined more detailed possibilities. First, officials thought about hiring a psychologist to better prepare police officers for stressful situations. Second, authorities debated whether to purchase an additional water cannon. State officials had underlined the necessity for this in the past, and most agreed that the use of a water cannon during the riots in Schwabing would have defused the situation. Only Anton Heigl—among a few others—had stated that a water cannon would be empty too quickly, forcing the police to withdraw while protestors regrouped. In addition, the police discussed the need for new procedures. During the riots, a lack of coordination had become apparent: time and again supervisors left police officers behind or with little to no guidance. A clear structural framework seemed necessary, as were concisely worded demands to be read to rioters. Discussions surrounding the purchase of a video and audio vehicle finally addressed the need to gather evidence.<sup>35</sup>

After extensive debates, the city of Munich endorsed this so-called Munich Line, a police reform grounded in post-riot lessons. One of the reports summarized its content in thirteen points. These included better schooling of the police, more coordination, more flexibility in response to rioters, the need for more street and undercover patrols, and the necessity to employ a psychologist.<sup>36</sup> In an interview with the



news magazine *Der Spiegel*, Manfred Schreiber, who in many ways personified the Munich Line, specifically commented on the need for a psychologist. In a surprisingly blunt statement he noted, “the police ... do not have access to the best and the brightest; that is why one could only weed out those not useful for the police; to school the rest by employing psychological techniques is necessary to get as close as possible to the ideal police officer.”<sup>37</sup> Psychologist Rolf Umbach and eight others took on this role, and soon trained police officers for different scenarios.<sup>38</sup> Such psychological training included ways to remain calm when provoked by a rebellious crowd. Apart from a psychological division, the police also established a film and audio crew to gather evidence.<sup>39</sup> An emphasis on better cooperation with the press and an increased attention to public relations in general indicated that the police wished to avoid bad publicity in the future.<sup>40</sup> In the evaluation of police historian Josef Falter, the Munich Line meant the “internal and external modernization of the city police,”<sup>41</sup> arguably—one could add—to primarily better public perceptions.

The Munich Line became the pride of the city police. Proudly promoted and applied in the following years, authorities saw it as a step towards de-escalation and cooperation. Compared to other cities still relying on pre-1933 tactics, the Bavarian capital did indeed lead the way towards more tolerance. According to Police Chief Schreiber, “not beating or hitting, but convincing ... and guiding are in the foreground today. The police tactic is based on the tactic of demonstrators, knowledge based on the psychology of the masses, and the general environment.”<sup>42</sup> The new Munich Line also incorporated the press, and aimed to limit provocations, all in an effort to mainly avoid bad publicity. Streamlining police tactics and procedures was meant to create stricter hierarchies and limit mistakes. In order to avoid a lack of evidence after a riot, the police would now carefully document any misbehavior of protestors with cameras; that the use of recording devices helped dismiss calls for police identification was all the more reason to implement such setups.<sup>43</sup>

Overall then, the implementation of the Munich Line did not indicate a change of heart. Even though the police became more open and less brutal, previous attempts to move forward against rioting youngsters were not dismissed. Instead, the Munich Line merely acknowledged that brutal behaviors would bring negative publicity to the police and could escalate a situation. One official report had stated without hesitation, “events [in Schwabing in 1962] were without precedence after the war, and have been dealt with in the best manner possible given the situation.”<sup>44</sup> Police Chief Manfred Schreiber agreed with

such sentiments.<sup>45</sup> Actually, the Munich Line was not a soft approach, but more a way to appear more modern, gather more evidence, and act preemptively. In a way, this framework marked a shift towards more nuanced and subtle tactics of social control, still to be used to target youth, but now much more in line with Munich's self-image as an international, cosmopolitan, and open metropolis. The role of police officer Rudolf Mayer during a demonstration in November 1969 underlines this most clearly: Mayer linked his arms with protestors and joined them in their demonstration through Munich. From then on informally known as Unterhak-Mayer arm-linking Mayer, his behavior symbolized the positive and de-escalating role of the Munich Line for years to come<sup>46</sup>—without acknowledging that even his mere presence at the head of demonstrations underlined that mechanisms of control had gained access to previously protected spaces within protest movements.

### Monitoring Schwabing

With the official approval of the Munich Line, authorities imposed an intricate system of social control. Instead of running the risk of bad publicity and collective resistance, the police took a more indirect and preventive approach. This included much more clandestine work. Most notably, shortly after the riots in Schwabing, undercover police patrols on foot increased dramatically, especially during summer months. A direct order outlined that “younger officers in particular”<sup>47</sup> need to patrol in Schwabing; this would limit detection among a primarily young crowd. The directive also specifically stated that these undercover patrols should not provoke or spark disruptions. Instead, they needed to observe as events unfold, only to step in once a situation has calmed down or disruptive individuals were isolated. Precise reports indicating disruptions and concerning behaviors were recurred at 8 P.M. every night. From spring until fall every year, officials put forward a similar directive. If the weather was nice and *the student* and *the Gammeler* was out, then undercover agents were on duty walking and observing Schwabing.

The daily reports produced by such patrols give detailed insights into how authorities perceived youth. Still wary of a repeat of the June 1962 riots, patrols documented any potential threat. On 10 June 1964, for instance, a patrol noted “two twenty-two-year-old American students ... because they played guitar on a bench” at the Leopoldstraße boulevard.<sup>48</sup> Such behaviors could spark a riot again, they warned. A week later, the police followed up on a call complaining about “a crowd

of students storming the cinema box office.”<sup>49</sup> When they arrived the supposed threat had disappeared. On a Saturday in July the police noted “two students sitting on a doorstep. . . . Whereas one was singing foreign songs, the other one played along with the guitar.”<sup>50</sup> This conduct was threatening, and the police on duty made sure to write down as much information about these musicians as possible. Two days later, a patrol reported how “students and those, who claim to be students,” were selling paintings.<sup>51</sup> For those on duty even that was a potential threat. The next day, a patrol responded to another breach of peace regarding the music of young street musicians. In this instance “the students reduced the volume of their music without problems” once notified.<sup>52</sup> Yet the threat such individuals posed to society was highlighted in the evening report. To keep an eye on *the student* and *the Gammler*, note any misbehavior, and preemptively write down everything about certain youngsters was seen as vital in attempts to prevent future riots and gather evidence for later.

Not all disruptions led to a citation. Whereas some patrols pressed charges once they had isolated the violator and felt safe from collective resistance, others took the relaxed climate of Schwabing into account. According to one report, “the daily situation at the Leopoldstraße boulevard might violate laws in various ways, yet this is well-known in higher ranks and seen virtually as a normal state for Schwabing. It is officially tolerated.”<sup>53</sup> Aware of such lenient tendencies amongst some officers, Police Chief Manfred Schreiber soon clarified the official standpoint of the police. As Schreiber stated in official orders, “Painting on the sidewalk or making music is prohibited. Such individuals need special attention because their behaviors inherently carry additional potential for disruptions of law and order.”<sup>54</sup>

The creation of a massive data system including information about supposedly disruptive individuals soon supported surveillance efforts and prosecution. Rooted in a directive from June 1964, “all incidents connected to the situation at the Leopoldstraße boulevard and its surroundings have to be centrally collected, indexed, and stored at the police station.”<sup>55</sup> A complex system based on various color codes organized the data. For example, the letter L scribbled on a card with a green pencil underlined the urgency of a specific note. Such setups allowed the police to determine disruptive individuals without problems; it also provided valuable evidence once a youngster faced criminal charges.

Police presence increasingly deterred disruptions. In June 1965, Manfred Schreiber noted, “Mainly students have become more careful as they hope to avoid citations”<sup>56</sup> and conflicts with the law. That

everyone could read about the presence of undercover police officers in newspapers significantly helped deter disruptive forces. For local authorities, these measures turned out to be an excellent preemptive tool as they successfully intimidated and controlled *the student* and *the Gammmler* in Schwabing<sup>57</sup>—even if constant surveillance and the collection of data could not prevent all disruptions. Many youngsters became simply more cautious as they spent time in public spaces, talked loudly, and sometimes used a moment of solitude to play music.

Nonetheless, in late fall of 1965, the city council of Munich decided to tighten restrictions, using urban design as a tool of control. In a nonpublic meeting on 14 November, a report backed by the police and the city park service outlined the problem while providing an adequate solution. According to the official record of the meeting, “during the summer dangers regarding disruptions of order remain high. ... Based on years of supervision and numerous experiences by the police, it has become obvious that Wedekindplatz square [in Schwabing] in particular remains an attraction for so-called Gammmler and a starting point for disruptions of all kinds.”<sup>58</sup> Such unruly forces included local youngsters and travelers from all over. “They occupy the benches and the area of Wedekindplatz square from early in the morning until late at night.”<sup>59</sup> In order to deal with such disruptive individuals the report proposed a new spatial concept for this area: “Only the cultivation of plants at Wedekindplatz square can bring relief. The new spatial concept would limit the behaviors described above. ... Legally the police would also have leverage to tighten control in this area, because the space left after spatial restructuring needs to be clear for pedestrians; trespassing onto [then planted] city park property is a misdemeanor.”<sup>60</sup> The report even outlined that some plants are better than others and suggested the “use of thorny groves so as to avoid trespassing. ... Planting roses would further increase the threshold within the population to damage this public space.”<sup>61</sup> The city council agreed with the proposal, and city planners went to work. Over the winter months, authorities remodeled the public area around Wedekindplatz square; city services narrowed the sidewalk and planted thorny bushes.

The use of spatial planning fulfilled its immediate objective, yet the overall setup ultimately failed. When the next surveillance season started in April 1966, a report noted, “The proposed remodeling and plantation of Wedekindplatz square has been completed, so that additional opportunities regarding police action are more likely possible.”<sup>62</sup> As additional reports indicate, the police had no problem bringing this disruptive space formerly used by potentially unruly youngsters under control. Few stepped into the bushes, aware that their thorns are un-

comfortable. Those who simply blocked the sidewalk could be cited for disrupting the flow of traffic. Although spatial planning had helped remold an urban environment to fit the needs of local law enforcement without exposing the authorities to public scrutiny, the larger plan to expel clusters of disruptive youth from city spaces failed. Instead of showing up in supervised youth organizations, as authorities had hoped, the young found new spaces to hang out. In the 1960s, many moved into the area around the University and the Academy of the Arts; those loitering in the summer also hung out in local parks. To remodel all parks was impossible given its disposition as an area for public leisure and recreation. In this sense, the success of Wedekindplatz square in Schwabing did not solve the problem, and it would take decades until authorities considered including the young into urban planning processes and providing spaces for them within Munich as a way to deal with the situation.

Constant surveillance of Schwabing also brought *the Gammmler* more specifically into the limelight. Since at least 1964, this homeless young bum had been spotted mainly in Schwabing. *The Gammmler* came from a middle-class background and should have attended college or gotten a job. Instead, such youngsters decided to live on the streets, supposedly sold drugs, and tainted the image of the city, all behaviors that raised fears. These anxieties had already influenced the redesign of Wedekindplatz square, a favorite spot of *the Gammmler* in Schwabing. By the mid-1960s numerous authorities and social commentators had voiced additional concerns. According to some, *Gammmlers* literally and metaphorically besmirched the clean city of Munich, and many feared their lifestyle choices.<sup>63</sup> By 1966, even national newspapers picked up the story. With numerous *Gammmlers* on the cover, *Der Spiegel* introduced, among others, Helga Reiners, age twenty, who hung out in Munich begging for “pennies, a sip of your beer, and a smoke from your cigarette.”<sup>64</sup> For one commentator of the conservative Springer press, *Gammmlers* were “the ugliest the twentieth century has seen.”<sup>65</sup> Whereas such aspects unmistakably aligned *the Gammmler* with delinquents and criminals, these references once more also provided an avenue to act against youth within Schwabing.

After closely observing *the Gammmler* in the aftermath of the riots, conservative authorities eventually had had enough. In 1966, one city council member of the Conservative Socialist Union (CSU) demanded the police to “reduce Gammmlerism ... to an appropriate amount”<sup>66</sup>—whatever that entailed. The Nationalist Party (NPD) hoped for even stricter measures. In a party leaflet it called for “measures ... to deal with the whole problem ... in a radical way and along public senti-

ments.”<sup>67</sup> These voices had support from high up. In a directive to state ministries of the interior, conservative Chancellor Ludwig Erhard asked for precise information regarding *the Gammler*. Erhard wanted to know, “in what manner do Gammler threaten law and order; are Gammler similar to vagabonds; do Gammler riot and vandalize; and are there foreigners among the Gammlers.”<sup>68</sup> Together with local authorities he was “ready to fight against Gammler and delinquents.”<sup>69</sup>

To take on *the Gammler* was not that simple, yet existing mechanisms of control following the Schwabing riots helped authorities. Forced to work with laws in place at the time, Police Chief Manfred Schreiber outlined, “Dirt in itself is not a crime.”<sup>70</sup> But since the *Gammler* problem was most evident in Schwabing, the police simply employed existing measures. Schreiber even added more police officers believing that such “reinforcement was necessary because the entertainment quarter [Schwabing] had become increasingly popular.”<sup>71</sup> Now the police paid attention “specifically ... to the Gammler,”<sup>72</sup> collected, filed, and indexed all information about such bums; they also wrote weekly reports for Police Chief Schreiber and a monthly *Gammler* report for local newspapers. The creation of such data helped authorities in their attempts to spot and interrupt disruptive forces early on; it also raised awareness and deterred *the Gammler*.<sup>73</sup> As one contemporary voice noted, “the cops patrol and control [certain areas] four, five times each and every day.”<sup>74</sup> Once spotted on daily patrols, the police could charge *the Gammler* according to a variety of laws. When they were seen bumming around in the park, they could face five days in jail due to a violation of landscape and park orders or trespassing; if *the Gammler* was sitting on the sidewalk, he or she either had to pay a fine of forty-five Deutsche Marks, or spend three days in jail for disruption of traffic. Constant control for identification gave authorities the most helpful avenue to harass *the Gammler*. A newspaper described in 1966,

For the first time in the history of Schwabing seven long-haired “Gammler” were called off the trees in the English Garden. They had spent the night there and were now welcomed by the Munich police. The wake-up call was “ID check.” Initially, these jobless young gentleman with their mop tops [hair] spent their short nights ... in the English Garden park. There they faced trespassing charges. On the grass ... they got too cold. “The first snow will deal with this problem,” noted a local and optimistic police officer.<sup>75</sup>

The news magazine *Der Spiegel* reported on one instance in which one youngster was jailed for blasphemy. He had carried a sign stating, “Jesus was also a Gammler.”<sup>76</sup> In addition, large-scale raids through-

out the late 1960s underlined authorities' willingness to crack down on this social group as they had against *the delinquent boy* and *the sexually deviant girl* during the crisis years. The southern part of the English Garden city park was systematically searched various times. By early 1968, local law enforcement had detained 600 male and 135 female youngsters for a variety of reasons.<sup>77</sup> Twenty-year-old Helmuth Waitschies, for instance, was caught spending the night in a shabby hut with three girls and was sent to prison for four weeks;<sup>78</sup> others went to prison because they had been unable to provide evidence of residency or appropriate means to sustain themselves. Countless youngsters experienced a similar fate, encouraging the newspaper *Der Münchener Merkur* to name 1967 a record year regarding arrests.<sup>79</sup> In that sense, existing mechanisms seemed to be an excellent tool against different and hence abnormal behaviors detected among the young, *students* and *Gammlers* alike.

Over the course of several summers, authorities seemed to bring the Schwabing problem under control. According to an official report released in February 1968, the numbers of wandering youth bumming around in Schwabing slowly decreased, and Schwabing became cleaner; yet the same report remained unsure how international trends like the hippie movement or the rise of a drug culture would influence the situation in the future. It thus advised authorities to stay alert, and continue to watch out for *the student* and *the Gammler*.<sup>80</sup>

### **Coping with the Student in 1968**

Apart from minor disruptions, the visit of the shah in 1967 marked the first real test of the Munich Line. Partly applied at a Rolling Stones concert in 1965,<sup>81</sup> this new tactic had been useful when trying to defuse hostile situations during that particular visit. Whereas numerous individuals protested, blocked streets, and disturbed public order, the police were able to separate opposing groups. In addition, it did not allow protestors to provoke police officers. The approach of standing back instead of stepping in initially sparked criticism: many wondered if the soft line of the police was appropriate for authorities aiming to keep law and order. News regarding the escalation of a similar situation in West Berlin changed such attitudes. There, the police were unwilling to separate pro-shah protestors from demonstrators but stepped in violently later on. The situation soon escalated, leading to the death of Benno Ohnesorg. Once hearing about this tragedy, local officials and the media in Munich became quite satisfied with the Munich Line.

Then, in the following months, the university became the center of protests. There, student organizations met to organize demonstrations before marching from the university through the city. To control this environment was thus important. Apart from regular patrols within the university area and Schwabing as a whole, the police soon looked for a way to monitor newly forming student organizations. To infiltrate such groups undercover became a prime objective. This intrusion could give authorities insights into the structure and composition of certain organizations and groups; it would also allow the police “to detect possible threats prior to the actual event.”<sup>82</sup> *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung* described such attempts as “Mao’s tactics”;<sup>83</sup> the Minister of the Interior Bruno Merk vehemently supported the approach. In his view, “subversive behaviors of disruptors could only be controlled by ‘quasi subversive’ measures of authorities.”<sup>84</sup> The local police had the blessing to move forward, and in the following months it sent undercover officers to various student meetings, especially those of more radical groups like the SDS. They hoped to find out more about future protests and disruptions. In order to avoid detection, young officers generally took on such tasks. On their secret missions, such undercover police officers collected data on leaders and other participants. Based on those reports, officials created individual files on various protestors, student groups, and leading figures. These included photos, newspaper clips, and police reports.<sup>85</sup> Whereas such data was useful for potential future investigations and convictions, a mere presence also gave authorities enough information about plans to prevent surprises. Coordination between different agencies was key in that process, and had worked well ever since undercover agents patrolled the streets of Schwabing. In fact, local authorities connected to the Immigration Office to access information about Iranian émigrés living in Munich before the shah visited the city. According to *Der Spiegel* at least, those in opposition to the shah, or merely with a questionable attitude, faced a curfew while the shah was in the city.<sup>86</sup> A potential visit by student leader Rudi Dutschke sparked similar conversations amongst local authorities. One such discussion circled around preemptively detaining Dutschke, if he should approach the Bavarian capital,<sup>87</sup> and is a striking example for mechanisms of social control authorities deemed acceptable in this fight against *the student*.

In general, local authorities did little to hide their attempts to infiltrate student life, and many therefore knew about surveillance. Police Chief Schreiber and Minister of the Interior Merk spoke freely about their desire and ability to spy on student organizations; both even gave an interview to the more conservative student paper *Konturen* in



May 1968 regarding their actions.<sup>88</sup> This openness, they hoped, would deter *the student* from attending certain meetings while underlining the constant presence of law enforcement. For potential protestors, on the other hand, such infiltration only sustained their views of an increasingly restrictive state. Actually, at one teach-in in December 1967 demonstrators detected an undercover police officer.<sup>89</sup> Though these instances were uncommon, detected police agents played into the hands of those believing that the state employed fascist and totalitarian surveillance methods, infiltrated universities, and subverted freedom of academia, speech, and assembly. In this sense, exposure and detection merely heightened anxieties, and contributed to an ever-growing polarization by early 1968.

As division increased, various authorities began presenting themselves as protectors of society and proposed ways to further strengthen and expand mechanisms of social control. Originally less strict in his outlook,<sup>90</sup> Minister of the Interior Bruno Merk at this point employed fierce rhetoric to directly attack *the student* and the SDS. He noted in the newspaper *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, “Whoever thinks doing damage to property and assault in order to push one’s own agenda against a majority is not far away from those who try the same by using bombs.”<sup>91</sup> For him, amongst others, newly imposed measures including infiltration seemed insufficient. Of course, such voices also repeatedly used these discussions to strengthen their own political profile. Merk, at least, felt that the police were unable to deal with this situation, thus favoring a more stringent reaction than Police Chief Schreiber.<sup>92</sup> Munich’s police initially brushed off such accusations. Yet divisions emerged even within the state government, especially once the leader of the conservative party (CSU), Franz-Josef Strauß, voiced his views. Minister for Culture and Education Ludwig Huber felt pressured by Strauß and others to do more. Indeed, in February 1968, Strauß sent Huber an angry telegram encouraging him to move forward more fiercely against “such leftist terror.”<sup>93</sup> In his view, a left, radical, and threatening minority of students staged protests in Munich and elsewhere, and that needed to stop. At the same time, *Der Münchner Merkur* questioned Munich’s “soft approach” against protestors altogether. Are “gloves instead of batons”<sup>94</sup> the solution? Huber was irritated, and responded with an annoyed letter to Strauß. He voiced his antipathy regarding “the form and the publication [in the media] of this [private] correspondence.” Huber made clear that the state government “is fully aware of its constitutional obligation and political duty to the state of Bavaria.”<sup>95</sup>

Others were upset about the supposed lax application of available measures. In February 1968, Minister of Justice Philipp Held advised

local judges to “fight against such criminal behaviors quickly and effectively.”<sup>96</sup> Police and various administrative authorities likewise pushed for more efficiency. Police Chief Manfred Schreiber agreed, stating, “a liberalization of the law” would worsen the situation.<sup>97</sup> He had been upset several years earlier when the federal government consisting of conservatives and liberals had passed a new criminal proceedings law. Since it forced the police, among other measures, to notify those arrested about various procedures, some saw it as “a criminal protection law.”<sup>98</sup> Now, such measures limited the ability of authorities to move forward swiftly. Authorities also became increasingly frustrated with demonstrations. With little means to restrict the Right of Assembly granted in the Constitution, attempts to impose requirements when registering a protest gave authorities some leverage. City officials could demand registration for certain events, and in that process they pushed for compliance with certain codes of conduct and rules. Those taking responsibility for scheduled demonstrations had little issues with such restrictions, and simply completed the necessary paperwork. Once protests took place, however, such previous agreements were often broken. To then catch those breaking the rules was almost impossible. Cameras helped, but many soon figured out how to sneak around these documentation devices; participants at demonstrations also employed passive resistance like sit-ins or teach-ins. These provocations further limited the ability of the police to avoid direct engagement and escalation.

At this time, *the student* was not only a recipient of retribution. Reasonably educated and aware of civil liberties within a democracy, most protestors took advantage of their rights. For those less versed regarding judicial processes, student organizations set up assistance groups, one actually led by well-known student leader Rolf Pohle himself.<sup>99</sup> These organizations outlined the necessity to remain silent, once arrested, and handed out contact information for judicial assistance at demonstrations. A group set up by the Extraparliamentary Opposition shared its contact information during the Easter march in 1968,<sup>100</sup> for example, thus preparing demonstrators for various eventualities. Most groups also remained active beyond certain riots. For instance, after the Easter riots the Judicial Assistance Group of the Extraparliamentary Opposition ran a small ad in the local newspaper, looking for eyewitnesses to the riots.<sup>101</sup> The need for evidence became vital when it came to trials and also challenged the monopoly of state authorities’ views of the events. Soon court rooms became spaces for the continuation of discussions and struggles as protests continued within such environments. Student leaders like Rolf Pohle “feared a cover-up” by

local authorities;<sup>102</sup> Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel and other officials, on the other hand, questioned the role of student groups and called on the Extraparliamentary Judicial Assistance to actually put forward their supposed evidence.<sup>103</sup> Such endless debates outlined how student organizations constructed authorities as a threat in response to their own demonization. The result was a stalemate, as both sides relied on vague evidence to accuse each other, making it almost impossible to move forward against actual criminals. That neither the circumstances surrounding the death of Klaus Frings nor Rüdiger Schreck were ever fully uncovered was thus not surprising [Figure 6.2].

### Reacting to the Easter Riots

Preemptive measures could not avert the riots at the Buchgewerbehaus building. Whereas local authorities had previously considered arresting Dutschke to prevent his possible visit to Munich, they could not



**Figure 6.2** Conclusion of a student protest in honor of Klaus Frings and against “Political Murder, Terror and Violence as an Instrument of Politics.” One banner reads, “Rocks are no arguments.” Munich, 1968. Courtesy of Fritz Neuwirth/Süddeutsche Zeitung Photo.

stop information regarding the attempted assassination of the student leader from reaching the Bavarian capital. Unlike other cities, however, Munich had experienced a similar situation in 1962. During the riots in spring 1968, the police followed its Munich Line, smothered protestors, and avoided provocations.<sup>104</sup> Demonstrators, on the other hand, aimed to disrupt such attempts by resisting passively, and by trying to specifically provoke authorities. Their prime objective during the riots was to expose the police as part of a fascist system. Over the course of the Easter weekend, the situation climaxed with the death of two individuals, a reporter and a student. The Munich Line had paradoxically claimed two victims. Neither demonstrators nor authorities were prepared for that tragedy.

Throughout the protests, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger felt the need to take a stand. Without any executive power within the states, he asked several ministers of the interior if they felt up to the task.<sup>105</sup> Of course, no state asked for help. Getting federal assistance meant transferring some state power to the federal level. More specifically, this option was not feasible for a state with antifederalist tendencies, like Bavaria. Even the news about the death of Klaus Frings and later Rüdiger Schreck did not change such sentiments, and local officials felt they had everything under control even thereafter.

Once the riots ended, city officials still drew a positive conclusion. Apart from keeping law and order most of the time, the police and other authorities had worked together efficiently. In a city council meeting on 22 April, members congratulated themselves. Although shocked by the death of Klaus Frings and Rüdiger Schreck, one member noted, "The police completed the assignment in a satisfying manner" and did "excellent" work; another member outlined, "The psychological schooling of the police had brought wonderful results." Police Chief Manfred Schreiber agreed, of course, and proudly asserted, "The Munich Line had stood the test." In his view, authorities had reacted well. The water cannon, though welcomed by some protestors as a cooling system, had repeatedly dispersed the crowd. In addition, most police officers did not fall for provocations. Instead, many of them carried on political discussions with protestors, thus creating outlets for them and helping to humanize law enforcement officers.<sup>106</sup> The slogan was, "Where discussions happen there is no brawl."<sup>107</sup> Within the self-congratulatory environment of the council meeting, the deaths of two individuals seemed of little importance. Instead, participants applauded themselves and worried little about the underlying motives of protestors, and how such should be approached in the future. In effect, everyone agreed as the meeting adjourned: a tight system of social control and

the Munich Line had protected social order. Only Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel seemed a little uneasy about the possibility of someone leaking the content of the meeting to the press, as the council's position and lack of empathy might be misunderstood by the general public.<sup>108</sup>

Numbers seemingly sustained positive evaluations. By 17 April, authorities indicted 180 individuals;<sup>109</sup> fifty-three additional cases were added later on, based on witnesses and photos.<sup>110</sup> According to one statistic from 16 April, 110 individuals were taken into custody after the Easter march on Monday. Surprisingly, only thirty-three of them were university-attending students.<sup>111</sup> The rest were a mixture of high school students and adults alike, with diverse backgrounds and motivations. This diversity did not seem to matter in a time when *the student* was seen as the dominant threat to society.

State officials were also pleased with the way local authorities had dealt with the riots. On 24 April, the Bavarian parliament discussed the events. After commemorating the deaths of Frings and Schreck, fears of "Bonn becoming another Weimar" became visible.<sup>112</sup> This comparison loomed throughout debates as authorities feared for democratic structures. Anxieties seemed all the more prominent in Munich given the city's own experiences following World War I. In November 1918, a socialist revolution led by Kurt Eisner had helped oust the Bavarian monarchy, and later on events like the Beer Hall putsch had threatened existing structures. As a result, for many officials the true test for any democratic state arose when it had to defend itself but still could maintain law and order. After several comments along these lines, Minister of the Interior Bruno Merk shared his interpretation of the events taking place over Easter. He explained difficulties facing the police, namely in regard to withstanding provocations and finding sufficient evidence to persecute demonstrators. Throughout his explanations, he emphasized that officials should abstain from "generalizations" and "too many emotions" regarding *the student* or the young generation.<sup>113</sup> To stay calm seemed important. At the same time, Merk did exactly what he noted should not be done: That is, to raise fears. During his speech, he insisted that the state did not simply face an extraparlimentary opposition but was fighting against an antiparlimentary resistance in the form of a Maoist revolution: "I am amazed at the fact that some democrats still refuse to take that into account."<sup>114</sup> The general assembly cheered in response to such remarks. When he assured the audience that the police needed to use batons and weapons in self-defense, fellow conservatives applauded. Social democrats interrupted him during his speech once he talked about the events on Friday because some of them felt that the situation was not handled

properly. For others, the arrest of forty-one individuals that day was simply not enough. Towards the end, Minister of Culture and Education Ludwig Huber underlined the possibility of passing stricter disciplinary measures; Minister of Justice Philipp Held called for “a quick and efficient prosecution.”<sup>115</sup> Bavarian President Alfons Goppel eventually closed the session by ensuring his audience, “the state is safe.”<sup>116</sup>

Overall, state authorities could be satisfied. The Ministry of Culture and Education had cooperated efficiently with the Ministry of the Interior. In mid-April, the latter had forwarded a list of 134 students who had come into conflict with the law during the protests. The Ministry of Culture and Education passed this information to universities, directing them to take appropriate actions. These consisted of disciplinary sanctions including the removal of students from the university.<sup>117</sup> In addition, Minister of the Interior Merk had called for a quick judicial review throughout the riots. According to him, “It is good that justice is done quickly. It is necessary and right that the crimes committed in the riots are prosecuted.”<sup>118</sup> Those convicted of a crime faced severe punishments.<sup>119</sup> Most were accused of creating a brawl or a mass resistance against governmental authorities and breach of public peace. The first sentence was announced only a couple of days after the riots: student Gerhard Rothmann had to go to prison for seven months.<sup>120</sup> Other participants, like Heinz Koderer and Alois Aschenbrenner, were sent to prison for nine and four months;<sup>121</sup> student leader Rolf Pohle faced charges of leadership during the Easter riots. As a student of jurisprudence, a conviction and three months in prison destroyed his chances of becoming a judge in the future.<sup>122</sup> Although these sentences were partially repealed later on, at the time authorities moved forward efficiently. According to Bavarian Minister of the Interior Bruno Merk, “the police had everything under control,”<sup>123</sup> the state was not in jeopardy of experiencing another Weimar, and officials did not need to employ additional measures of social control.

Within a short time, however, it became obvious that the prosecution of *the student* did not move forward so smoothly. Although the police had made an effort to precisely document criminal behavior during the Easter riots and beyond, such proof was not always useful evidence in court. Also, during the riots, the police had to rely on images taken by journalists from *Die Bildzeitung* because “the camera vehicle [of the police] was too expensive to use.”<sup>124</sup> The press photos could only provide limited references because they were not taken for prosecutorial purposes. Moreover, the continuing resistance of some protestors disrupted the judicial process. Well aware of their rights, many of those arrested refused to cooperate with authorities and re-

mained silent—consequently slowing down the judicial process significantly. It soon dawned on authorities that various judicial assistance groups had adequately prepared them, and they would continue to do so as long as protests and antagonisms persisted. The Extraparliamentary Judicial Assistance Group even presented its own report on the Easter riots in June 1968.<sup>125</sup> Eighty-two pages long, it was based on numerous statements from witnesses. Although it was rooted in attempts to demonize authorities, such evidence had to be taken seriously, especially because other groups, including the German Association for Journalists, also questioned the judicial process. Even the newspaper *Der Münchner Merkur* and the broadcasting cooperation *Der Bayerische Rundfunk* eventually joined such calls.<sup>126</sup> Such pressure put additional limitations on the police and only led to further delays.

Such setbacks soon raised concerns and complaints amongst authorities. State officials hoped for more preemptive interference and a stricter application of the law by the police. But to set up preventative measures was difficult as the German Constitution guaranteed a Right of Assembly. Police Chief Manfred Schreiber also did not want to move away from his beloved Munich Line.<sup>127</sup> In his view, it was the fault of the judges. According to Schreiber, they should just consider “the partially subversive nature” of certain crimes, and not let protestors get away so easily.<sup>128</sup> Bavarian Minister of Justice Philipp Held, on the other hand, pushed back and blamed other factors.<sup>129</sup> Yet data supported Schreiber’s general claims. Until 1 May 1969, the Higher Regional Court in Munich had investigated 478 cases; only ninety-seven of them resulted in convictions.<sup>130</sup> The 233 individuals arrested throughout the Easter riots took a long time to make their way through the judicial system.<sup>131</sup> Such low numbers and frequent delays indicate that initial efforts to reach suspended sentences as a way to “educate” *the student* was ultimately declined.<sup>132</sup>

### Judicial and University Reform

Local authorities saw an upcoming judicial reform as an excellent opportunity to approach a variety of issues regarding the control of youth. West Germany’s penal code was indeed in dire need of revision. Still partly based on laws from 1871, attempts to revise outdated measures had been on the agenda of the federal government since 1949. According to *Der Spiegel*, in the 1960s “verdicts remain tied to the ideological standpoint of the judge,”<sup>133</sup> a problematic dynamic for any democracy. Local Bavarian authorities and officials, on the other hand, hoped that

reform would help streamline the judicial process, and make the persecution of *the student* much easier. For them, the situation was out of control, and the government needed much more power.

The most prominent voice in that context remains conservative leader and Bavarian politician Franz-Josef Strauß. In several meetings of subcommittees in the West German parliament he specifically opposed “a soft approach.”<sup>134</sup> Whereas, as he noted, he “did not favor a police state or terror of justice,” he believed that “each citizen has the right for protection from criminal elements and authorities the duty to protect the state from revolutionary upheavals.”<sup>135</sup> Strauß referred to recent developments within the state of Bavaria; he also more particularly referenced *the student* to sustain his claims. In fall 1968 protestor Reinhard Wetter was indicted for various crimes in the context of his opposition.<sup>136</sup> Sentenced to eight months of juvenile detention, he served his term in Ebrach near Bamberg in Northern Bavaria. Throughout June and July 1969 some protestors from all over West Germany came to the Bamberg area to show their support for Wetter. They set up a camp and hoped to spark protests within the region. However, only a couple of minor brawls broke out because the local population did not show much sympathy for them.<sup>137</sup> Nonetheless, Franz-Josef Strauß understood the events in Ebrach as another attack on the state. Apart from sending a letter to Bavarian President Goppel asking him to move forward against such individuals, Strauß also noted that those protesting in Bamberg “behave like animals, which makes it impossible for current laws to apply.”<sup>138</sup> According to Strauß’s continuing demonization, “APO revolutionaries urinated and defecated in public.”<sup>139</sup> In December 1969 he pointed out that they supposedly trashed a county office, urinated on documents, and stole religious ornaments from the local cemetery. “One female student fornicated with two men in public and in front of three- to six-year old children.”<sup>140</sup> None of his accusations could be proven or sustained, and the statement as such led to criticism from various sides. Even the German Judges Association condemned his use of “Nazi vocabulary.”<sup>141</sup> Strauß, on the other hand, did not concede easily, and called members of the Extraparliamentary Opposition “mentally ill,”<sup>142</sup> thus continually trying to benefit from his own construct of juvenile delinquency.

Yet a shift on the federal level made it increasingly difficult for those in favor of more stringent measures against *the student*. In October 1969, Willy Brandt became the first social democratic chancellor and the head of a new coalition. Brandt and the social democrats (SPD) had not won the elections. Instead, Kurt Georg Kiesinger and the conservative party received the most votes. In this sense, a majority of the



people in West Germany seemed at least content with the way conservatives dealt with current problems. However, the liberals shifted coalitions. This possibility had become available ever since social democrats (SPD) and liberals (FDP) supported the same presidential candidate. A variety of internal frictions between conservatives and liberals then lead to the first SPD-FDP coalition, marking a major shift in West German politics;<sup>143</sup> it also influenced debates regarding *the student*. Willy Brandt's credo of "daring more democracy"<sup>144</sup> emerged partially in response to calls by the young as some members of this coalition hoped to bring *the student* back into society. Ongoing discussions about judicial reform provided an avenue for reaching out to those under investigation, especially once numerous well-known intellectuals favored such an amnesty.<sup>145</sup>

Conservatives throughout West Germany and particularly in the state of Bavaria pushed back. As the media reported, they had "reservations"<sup>146</sup> and certainly opposed an amnesty.<sup>147</sup> Such concerns of "the law and order faction" even within Brandt's coalition government resulted in an initial delay.<sup>148</sup> As conversations resumed in early 1970, so did fears. In spring 1970 Bavarian Justice Secretary Josef Bauer sent a letter to Federal Minister of Justice Gustav Heinemann outlining his distress regarding a possible amnesty more specifically. In his view, such a measure would encourage delinquent behavior in the future and jeopardize stability.<sup>149</sup> His letter did not result in the desired outcome. In March the social democrats and liberals passed judicial reform, including an amnesty for protestors. Demonstrators like Fritz Teufel saw it as too weak; conservatives understood it as a post-legalization of unlawful protests.<sup>150</sup> Either way, and similar to the situation in other countries, the protests seemed over and SPD and FDP could at least hope that *the student* would cast votes for them in the future.

Yet in Munich discussions continued, now tied to the attempt of the Bavarian government to pass university reform as a way to control *the student*. Such conversations had gained momentum since late 1968, especially once protestors had shifted their focus away from emergency laws<sup>151</sup> and towards disrupting academic life.<sup>152</sup> As a result, local authorities had concentrated on getting police access to institutions of higher education to dissolve meetings of student organizations and prevent further disruptions—a tricky attempt given current law.<sup>153</sup> In a meeting on 10 January 1969 representatives of the police, the Ministry of the Interior, and university officials had already looked into this issue and possible responses, including the possibility of checking stu-

dent identification cards. This approach, they had hoped, would prevent disruptors from infiltrating higher education, inciting university students, and disturbing lectures. Most officials had deemed such an approach as impractical and “unfeasible”<sup>154</sup> although, as one official had noted then, “factual jurisdiction of the police also includes universities.”<sup>155</sup> Conversations briefly shifted in early February 1969 when the Ministry of the Interior considered an accelerated judicial process if existing disciplinary measures and convictions based on compensation for damage turned out to be insufficient.<sup>156</sup> On 13 February 1969, several members of the conservative CSU, led by Professor Friedrich August von der Heydte, also proposed more stringent penalties to protect what he saw as the freedom of academic affairs. This proposal included cuts to certain scholarships,<sup>157</sup> an approach many conservatives believed could “end the spook” of left-radicalism within various student organizations.<sup>158</sup> One member of Parliament went even further when stating,

Let’s end the uproar of so-called students. ... We fight against the use of our tax money if such is given to these elements that do not have any real work on their minds but only pranks. ... Expel students, or we will not pay taxes anymore. Give them a snow shovel and send them to work camps so that they learn how to work.<sup>159</sup>

By the summer of 1969, Bavarian authorities also pushed more directly for a comprehensive disciplinary law.<sup>160</sup> Whereas many believed such a reform would break “the dictatorship of learners against teachers,”<sup>161</sup> Minister of Culture and Education Huber did not want to wait for its passage on the federal level. Instead, he—among other mainly conservative state ministers—followed the lead of the state government of North Rhine-Westphalia and signed on to a broader agreement. This document also touched on “the standardization of disciplinary measures at universities.”<sup>162</sup> In addition, Ludwig Huber proposed a provision regarding “behaviors of order within the university.”<sup>163</sup> Conservative Bavarian authorities consequently continued to employ *the student* as a way to push for additional measures of social control although protests had decreased significantly and broader federal dynamics had favored a more cooperative approach.

Not surprisingly, demonstrations in opposition to such proposals surged within Munich, aimed primarily against Huber. Protestors now more specifically tied to university environments relied on the power of student bodies and various organizations to dismiss governmental attempts to interfere in academic life and within university spaces.

Early on, various protestors had simply blocked the decision-making process within disciplinary committees. Authorities had become frustrated with such efforts, apparent in a report by university professor Paul Bockelmann.<sup>164</sup> To expand state rule within academia by limiting student governance and overall participation in various forums soon ranked high on the agenda of authorities given such early pushbacks in such spaces. Soon opposition against Huber's university reform became much more organized and coherent. Supported mostly by left-leaning organizations, student groups began defining the proposed reform as another emergency law. Moreover, different groups organized. In February 1969, ten student organizations had already signed a resolution against the Bavarian emergency law<sup>165</sup> while some had occupied Munich's Academy for the Arts;<sup>166</sup> the student newspaper *unireport* had proclaimed its decisive "No! Regarding the CSU-Emergency Law!" by 1969.<sup>167</sup> In the following weeks and months, Huber became enemy number one for demonstrators because he was pushing for "more state power within lecture halls."<sup>168</sup> Unable to prevent him from signing the law, protestors continued to demonize the minister by demonstrating against the possibility of a new and more restrictive university reform.

Attempts to control and student responses in the form of protests reached a final climax in 1973. Then, more than 20,000 students joined the opposition against Huber's successor in Munich,<sup>169</sup> the new Minister of Culture and Education Hans Maier. The latter also pushed for more stringent mechanisms of control; he even called for "a separate university police."<sup>170</sup> According to his proposal, the state had to hold domestic power over the university. In Munich, Maier asked for "more state authority [and] less autonomy"<sup>171</sup> overall and continued to push for the states' ability to "exercise domestic authority;"<sup>172</sup> he also hoped the state would be able to expel rebellious students. Compared to other state legislatures, this approach seemed radical. While Bavarian state officials simply continued to demonize *the student* as left-radicals in their attempts to shape university reform,<sup>173</sup> states led by a social democratic government had allowed more student participation and governance within the university as a whole. In that sense, Maier and others tried to avoid more democratization and broader shifts within the university setup—and they took advantage of *the student* as an initially constructed threat as long and as much as possible.

Actual students fought back. During a visit at a Bavarian university Maier experienced the nature of protests as masked protestors interfered with several meetings. "A brawl developed," *Der Spiegel* wrote

in 1973, and after “extreme chaos the students left the assembly hall again.”<sup>174</sup> Protestors had organized and used their power to directly challenge what they saw as undemocratic and illegal state interference; some of them had also more fully endorsed *the student* as their identity given issues at hand.

In the end, Hans Maier and other conservative Bavarian officials seemingly succeeded. The Act of Higher Education for Bavaria passed in December 1973, before the federal Framework Law for Higher Education. Similar to the situation in other conservative states,<sup>175</sup> this law “beefed up the disciplinary powers of the university authorities;”<sup>176</sup> the reform also limited student participation within the university. The strongly politicized student group AStA, for instance, was dissolved. Such new restrictions and authoritative measures ended remaining concerns of authorities for now.<sup>177</sup>

The protest years in Munich might have ended in 1973; images of youth, however, continued to haunt discourses thereafter. In fact, by the mid-1970s images of youth shifted along broader discussions tied to the end of economic progress and environmental issues. The oil crisis outlined economic instability and the “Limits of Growth” debate increased fears regarding environmental degradation. Constructs of youth followed such narratives, now seen as environmentally conscious, in support of direct democratic processes, and more likely to vote for the German Green Party. Previous stereotypes tied to *the Gammeler* remained in place particularly around connections between youth and drugs. In the 1980s, discussions around armament brought the peace movement back into the public limelight as thousands protested against the return to harsh Cold War rhetoric that endangered planet and future. Again, youth mattered.<sup>178</sup> In the 1990s, references to inner city youth became a way to discuss immigration at a time when a united Germany wondered about its national and potentially nationalistic identity. Such conversations continue as Turkish male youngsters in particular have become the new threat. In February 2011, for example, an article in the news magazine *Der Spiegel* referred to male youth as Halbstarke. In this context the article tries to capture complex relationships and dynamics regarding young male Halbstarke with an immigrant background within Berlin-Neukölln’s urban topography.<sup>179</sup> In other words, although some normalization is apparent and broad hysteria and panic much less common, youth remains a discursive space, at this point tied to immigration, housing, crime, and education.

## Notes

1. Hans-Jochen Vogel (*Aus heutiger Sicht*), quoted in Stankiewitz, *München* '68, 55.
2. Christian conservative (CSU) and former state representative Heinrich Junker was minister of the interior until 1966. His successor was Bruno Merk (1966–1977). Throughout the timeframe discussed, Bavaria had three different ministers of culture and education. Theodor Maunz (CSU) was in power until 1964, followed by Ludwig Huber (CSU) (1964–1970) and Hans Maier (1970–1986).
3. Youngsters under the age of sixteen had to be home by 8 P.M., those under the age of eighteen by 10 P.M.
4. For the situation in Schwabing prior to 1962 see, for instance: Ernst Hoferichter, "Unsterbliches Schwabing," 218–30, in *Lebendiges Schwabing*; Fritz Lutz, *Über den Dächern von München* (Munich, 1966).
5. Schreiber, "Das Jahr 1968 in München," in *1968: 30 Jahre danach*, 38. See also: Sturm, "Wildgewordene Obrigkeit," in *Schwabinger Krawalle*, 67.
6. Vogel, *Die Amtskette*, 45.
7. Gerhard Fürmetz, "Polizei und Verkehrsdisziplin in Bayern," in *Nachkriegspolizei*, 199–228, here 203–4; Peter Borscheid, "Auto und Massenmobilität," in *Die Einflüsse der Motorisierung auf das Verkehrswesen von 1886 bis 1986*, ed. Hans Pohl (Stuttgart, 1988), 117–41, here 123; Klaus Zimniok, *Eine Stadt geht in den Untergrund: Die Geschichte der Münchner U- und S-Bahn im Spiegel der Zeit* (Munich, 1981).
8. Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, 42.
9. StadtAM, Ratssitzungsprotokolle, Sitzungsprotokoll 735/85 (1962).
10. "Der Stadtrat lobt die Polizei," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23 June 1962.
11. "Der Krawall bleibt auf der Tagesordnung: Heigl vor dem Polizeiausschuss: Bedauern für die unschuldig Betroffenen," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 6 July 1962. See also: "Krawalle doch noch auf der Tagesordnung: Stadtrat diskutiert den 'Fall Schwabing,'" *Der Münchner Merkur*, 5 July 1962.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. "Erste Krawall-Verhandlung," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 31 August 1962. See also: "In Schwabing festgenommen," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 September 1962.
15. Oktavia Depta, prod., *Wolfram Kunkel und die Schwabinger Krawalle*.
16. "Elf Monate für jugendlichen Randalierer," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27 September 1962.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. "Krawall-Prozesse," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 28 September 1962. See also: "Krawall + Diebstahl = 1 Jahr 4 Monate," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 October 1962; "Es war ein Rädelsführer, sagt der Richter," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 19 October 1962.
20. "Medizinstudent als Aufwiegler," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 5 April 1963.
21. "Keine Ermittlungen gegen Seelmann," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 December 1962; "Verfahren gegen Seelmann eingestellt," *Die Abendzeitung*,

- 18 December 1962. See also: Fürmetz, "Anwalt der Jugend," in *'Schwabinger Krawalle'*, 141–50.
22. StadtAM, Ratssitzungsprotokolle, Sitzungsprotokoll 735/85; StadtAM, Ratssitzungsprotokolle, Sitzungsprotokoll 735/14 (1962); StadtAM, Stadtchronik (1962). See also: "In Schwabing festgenommen," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 September 1962.
  23. "Am Aschermittwoch: Krawallprozess," *8-Uhr Blatt*, 25 February 1963; "Erster Polizisten-Prozeß in Sachen Schwabing," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 28 February 1963. For the verdict see: "Ein Polizeibeamter muss ruhig Blut bewahren," *Die Abenzeitung*, 1 March 1963. For a previous trial against a prison guard see: "Ich bin doch immer gut zu den Gefangenen," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 29 November 1962.
  24. Michael Sturm, "'Unruhestifter' und Polizisten vor Gericht: Das juristische Nachspiel der 'Schwabinger Krawalle,'" in *'Schwabinger Krawalle'*, 175–203, here 176.
  25. "Als ob nichts gewesen wäre," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27 May 1963.
  26. Vogel, *Die Amtskette*, 47. See also: BayHStAM, Ministerium des Inneren 97954.
  27. "Vogel: Bedauern und Mitleid," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 7 April 1963. See also: "Oberbürgermeister will einrenken, Beschwerdeführer bei Dr. Vogel: Sachliches Gespräch über Krawalle," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 7 April 1963.
  28. StadtAM, Ratssitzungsprotokoll, Sitzungsprotokoll 735 (1962).
  29. Ibid.
  30. Ibid. See also: "Mit Heigl unzufrieden," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 11 October 1962.
  31. "Wir sind keine Barbaren!," *Welt am Sonntag*, 1 July 1962.
  32. Vogel, *Die Amtskette*, 48.
  33. "Der Gummiknüppel steht erst an sechster Stelle: Die Schwabinger Krawalle aus Sicht der Polizei-Strategen," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3 July 1962. See also: Schreiber, "Das Jahre 1968 in München," in *1968: 30 Jahre danach*; Drost, prod., *Gestern und Heute*.
  34. Manfred Schreiber, quoted in Falter, *Chronik des Polizeipräsidiums München*, 150.
  35. StAM, Polizeipräsidium München 11051.
  36. StAM, Polizeidirektion München. See also: Vogel, *Die Amtskette*, 49; Manfred Schreiber, "Münchens Polizei: Kein Staat in der Stadt," in *München und seine Polizei*, ed. Manfred Schreiber and Ernst Krack (Wiesbaden, 1964), n.p.; Schreiber, "Das Jahre 1968 in München," in *1968: 30 Jahre danach*, 39; Sturm, "'Wildgewordene Obrigkeit?,'" in *'Schwabinger Krawalle'*, 100–105.
  37. "Psycho," *Der Spiegel*, 26 February 1964. Schreiber later partially revised his comments. See: "Mitteilungen des Personalrats" Nr 90/64, quoted in Falter, *Chronik des Polizeipräsidiums München*, 155–56.
  38. Peters, ed., *'1200 Jahre Schwabing'*, 126–28; Rolf Umbach, "Konfliktzentrum Straße," in *München und seine Polizei*, 18–19; StAM, Polizeidirektion München 11055.
  39. Cameras and audio vehicles were available by November 1964.
  40. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 11055.

41. Falter, *Chronik des Polizeipräsidiums München*, 155.
42. Manfred Schreiber (*Jahresbericht 1967*), quoted in *ibid.*, 176.
43. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 11129. See also: Manfred Schreiber, "Die 'Schwabinger Krawalle,'" *Die Polizei* 56 (1965): 33–37, here 35. Discussions regarding the identification of policemen made its last appearance after the protests in 1968. See: StadtAM, Rats Sitzungsprotokolle, Sitzungsprotokoll 741/13 (1968).
44. Falter, *Chronik des Polizeipräsidiums München*, 144.
45. Manfred Schreiber, "Die 'Schwabinger Krawalle.' Versuch einer Zwischenbilanz," *Die Polizei* 55 (1964): 37–40. On the Munich Line not being a soft approach see, for instance: Falter, *Chronik des Polizeipräsidiums München*, 176.
46. Schreiber, "Das Jahr 1968 in München," in *1968: 30 Jahre danach*, 40. See also: "Zollstock angelegt," *Der Spiegel*, 18 July 1977; "Der 'Unterhak-Mayer' ist tot," *Merkur-Online*, 22 October 2010.
47. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 11130. Controls began on 29 May 1964, 14 May 1965, and 27 April 1966. See also: "Polizeipatrouillen in Schwabing," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 29 June 1962; "Schwabing ist ein unruhiges Pflaster," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 27–28 June 1964.
48. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 11130.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.* See also: Sturm, "'Wildgewordene Obrigkeit?'" in *'Schwabinger Krawalle'*, 102.
56. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 11130.
57. *Ibid.* See also: "Schwabing ist ein unruhiges Pflaster," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 27–28 June 1964.
58. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 11130.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Ibid.*
63. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15622.
64. "Schalom aleichem," *Der Spiegel*, 19 September 1966.
65. *Ibid.*
66. "Wiar a Kropf," *Der Spiegel*, 23 October 1967. See also: StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15622.
67. "Schalom aleichem," *Der Spiegel*, 19 September 1966.
68. *Ibid.*
69. *Ibid.*
70. "Wiar a Kropf," *Der Spiegel*, 23 October 1967.
71. StadtAM, Rats Sitzungsprotokolle, Sitzungsprotokoll 741/13 (1968).
72. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15622.
73. *Ibid.* See also: StadtAM, Pressesammlung no. 134.

74. Kosel, *Gammler, Beatniks, Provos*, 96. Margaret Kosel notes that the police in Munich had some kind of gentlemen's agreement with *the Gammler*: they could sleep in certain areas but had to disappear during the day. However, most sources question this understanding, and her interpretation might be based on only a couple of instances.
75. *Die Presse* (1966), quoted in Fricke, *München rockt*, 62.
76. "Wiar a Kropf," *Der Spiegel*, 23 October 1967.
77. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15622. *Der Spiegel* spoke of 637 *Gammlers* for the year 1967. "Wiar a Kropf," *Der Spiegel*, 23 October 1967.
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ibid.*
80. On deterrence and official reports regarding *the Gammler* throughout this time see, for example: StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15622. As rightfully outlined by Georg Lipitz, *the Gammler* was also incorporated by the commercialization and development of an underground "youth' culture economy." See: Lipitz, "Who'll Stop the Rain?" 213. See also: Weinbauer, "Eliten, Generation, Jugenddelinquenz und innere Sicherheit," 43.
81. Schreiber, "Das Jahr 1968 in München," in *1968: 30 Jahre danach*, 39; Fricke, *München rockt*, 33–34.
82. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 17432.
83. *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15 March 1968, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 46.
84. StAM, RA 101154. See also: Stankiewicz, *München '68*, 24.
85. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 8888; StAM, Polizeidirektion München 8922; StAM, Polizeidirektion München 8999. See also: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 47 and 52.
86. "Tod vor der Oper," *Der Spiegel*, 5 June 1967.
87. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 16580; Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 47.
88. BayHStAM, Studentische Gruppen an der LMU München 6, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 37.
89. StAM, RA 101154.
90. "Innenminister Bruno Merk zeigt Verständnis für Studentenunruhen," *Die Abendzeitung*, 14 February 1968.
91. "Merk greift den SDS an," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 March 1968.
92. Wolfgang Zorn, *Bayerns Geschichte seit 1960*, ed. Rolf Kießling (Regensburg, 2007), 28. See also: "Wachsam nach rechts und links," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 14 February 1968.
93. BayHStAM, MK Reg. VI/133, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung*, 31 and 38.
94. "Samthandschuhe statt Knüppel," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 10 February 1968.
95. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13617.
96. BayHStAM, Ministerium des Inneren 90051, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 61. See also: StAM, RA 101190.
97. Schreiber, "Das Jahr 1968 in München," in *1968: 30 Jahre danach*, 40.
98. *Ibid.* See also: Weinbauer, "Eliten, Generationen, Jugenddelinquenz und innere Sicherheit," 45. This minor revision passed on 19 December 1964 (implemented 1 April 1965). See: BGBl. 1964, 1067, quoted in Falter, *Chronik des Polizeipräsidiums München*, 162.



99. "Nach der Straßenschlacht die Redeschlacht," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 25 April 1968.
100. StAM, RA 101122.
101. *Die Abendzeitung*, without title, 22 April 1968.
102. "Alles Material übergeben," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 29 April 1968. See also: "Kripo beschuldigt Rechtshilfestelle," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 26 April 26, 1968; "Kontroversen Studenten: Polizei," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 23 April 1968.
103. StAM, RA 101154. See also: "Alles Material übergeben," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 29 April 1968.
104. BayHStAM, Ministerium des Inneren 90050; BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13620. See also: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 33; Schult, "Panoptikum der Exoten?" in *Drachen mit tausend Köpfen*, 52–64, here 54,
105. "Einer wird gewinnen," *Der Spiegel*, 22 April 1968.
106. StadtAM, Ratssitzungsprotokolle, Sitzungsprotokoll 741/13 (1968).
107. Fricke, *München rockt*, 67.
108. StadtAM, Ratssitzungsprotokolle, Sitzungsprotokoll 741/13 (1968).
109. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 9570/ 10.
110. BayHStAM, Ministerium des Inneren 90051.
111. StAM, RA 101154. See also: "Verlorenes Wochenende," *Der Spiegel*, 22 April 1968.
112. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13617.
113. *Ibid.*
114. *Ibid.* See also: "Anschlag auf rechtstaatliche Ordnung," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 24 April 1968.
115. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13617. See also: StAM, RA 101154.
116. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13617.
117. BayHStAM, MK Reg. VI/133, quoted in Fürmetz *Protest oder Störung?* 31.
118. "Endlich! Schnellgerichte gegen die Rädelsführer!" *Bild (Berlin)*, 17 April 1968.
119. StAM, RA 101154.
120. "Erster Demonstrant verurteilt: 7 Monate," *Telegraf*, 17 April 1968.
121. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 16393; Landgericht München I, 9 July 1968, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 62 and 71.
122. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15994, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 62. Pohle received amnesty in 1970 but flunked the second exam. See: StAM, RA 101112, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 62. Most documents regarding prosecution are not accessible due to privacy restrictions. For some insights see: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 66–86.
123. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13612.
124. StadtAM, Ratssitzungsprotokolle, Sitzungsprotokoll 741/13 (1968). See also: StAM, Polizeidirektion München 9570/3.
125. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 9570/9.
126. "Neugierig genügt," *Der Spiegel*, 15 July 1968. Later on, students also protested at trials. Whereas this would sometimes delay procedures, it did not affect the actual outcomes of trials. See: StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15982; StAM, Polizeidirektion München 16394; StAM, Polizei-

- direktion München 9566. See also: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 69–72; Gerstenberg, *Hiebe, Liebe und Proteste München 1968*, 59–63, passim.
127. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13621; BayHStAM, Ministerium des Inneren 90051; StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15970.
  128. Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 63.
  129. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13620. See also: StAM, RA 101192.
  130. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13620.
  131. StAM, RA 101154. See also: BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13621 quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 61 and 66.
  132. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 17432, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 68.
  133. “Die Richter sind in einer schwierigen Lagen,” *Der Spiegel*, 3 November 1969. See also: “Datum: 1. Dezember. Betr.: Amnestie,” *Der Spiegel*, 1 December 1969; “Jede unfriedliche Demonstration ist ein Graus,” *Der Spiegel*, 15 December 1969. On amnesty see: “Schlechtes Theater,” *Der Spiegel*, 1 December 1969; “Datum: 1. Dezember. Betr.: Amnestie,” *Der Spiegel*, 1 December 1969.
  134. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13622.
  135. *Ibid.*
  136. Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 61. Together with others, Reinhard Wetter wrote an in-depth analysis of the German prison system. In more than 200 pages, he outlines methods, objectives, and other aspects of imprisonment. Reinhard Wetter and Frank Böckelmann, *Knast Report* (Frankfurt am Main, 1972). See also: IfZM, ED 328/9, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 61.
  137. BayHStAM, Ministerium des Inneren 89991. See also: “Schlägerei in Bamberg,” *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 July 1969.
  138. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13622; “Strauß verunglimpft Studenten in Ebrach,” *Der Spiegel*, 22 December 1969.
  139. “Nichts zu finden,” *Der Spiegel*, 22 December 1969.
  140. *Ibid.*
  141. *Ibid.* See also: BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13622.
  142. Wolfram Bickerich, *Franz-Josef Strauß* (Düsseldorf, 1996), 226.
  143. Baring, *Machtwechsel*.
  144. Willy Brandt and Wolther von Kieseritzky, *Mehr Demokratie wagen: Innen- und Gesellschaftspolitik 1966–1974* (Bonn, 2001).
  145. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13622 (25 November 1969): An Mitglieder und stellvertr. Mitglieder des Bundesrates der BRD: Amnestie für Demonstranten; “Datum: 1. Dezember 1969. Betr.: Amnestie,” *Der Spiegel*, 1 December 1969. This article was signed by: Arnold Arndt, Ernst Bloch, Heinrich Böll, Alexander Mitscherlich, Kurt Scharf, and Thomas and Heinrich Mann.
  146. “CDU-Vorbehalte gegen Novelle zu den Demonstrationsdelikten,” *Die Welt*, 5 December 1969.
  147. “Keine Amnestie für Demonstranten,” *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 December 1969. See also: “Hearing zum Demonstrationsgesetz: Strafrechtler, Studenten und Polizeibeamte sollen zu Reform aussagen,” *Der Münchner Merkur*, 5 December 1969.
  148. “Amnestie,” *Der Spiegel*, 29 December 1969.

149. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13620.
150. "Ein Schlußstrich," *Die Zeit*, 27 March 1970. See also: "Einer für alle," *Der Spiegel*, 18 January 1971. The law (Straffreiheitsgesetz bei Demonstrationsvergehen) was passed on 20 May 1970. See also: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 62–63.
151. "Der unbequeme Staatsbürger Schmid," *Der Münchner Merkur*, 16 December 1968; "Beim Demonstrieren etwas zu weit gegangen," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8 December 1968; "Jetzt muss er für den Sitzstreik sitzen," *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 December 1968.
152. BayHStAM, MK Reg. VI/134, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 40. Protests continued. Students, for instance, occupied the Institute for Journalism located in the *Amerikahaus* on 12 February 1969. See: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 41. See also Sub-Bavaria (1969), accessible at <http://protest-muenchen.sub-bavaria.de>, [last accessed 11 March 2015].
153. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13617. Professor of Law Peter Lerche's report was passed on to the Bavarian State Government in January 1968. See also: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 36.
154. BayHStAM, Ministerium des Inneren 90050.
155. *Ibid.* A representative from the Ludwig-Maximilians University, the Technical University, and the Academy for the Arts were present at this meeting, as was Police Chief Manfred Schreiber. See also: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 30.
156. BayHStAM, Ministerium des Inneren 92243, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 39.
157. BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13620, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 31–32.
158. BayHStAM, MK Reg. VI/453, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 41.
159. *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15 February 1968, quoted in Gerstenberg, *Hiebe, Liebe und Proteste München 1968*, 16.
160. BayHStAM, NK Reg. VI/188 and 189, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 32; BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13620; Andreas Reich, ed., *Bayerisches Hochschulgesetz. Kommentar* (Bad Honnef, 1977); "Mit dem Latein am Ende," *Der Spiegel*, 14 July 1969 until 13 October 1969 [weekly series]; "Für große Reformen ist eine Utopie nötig," *Der Spiegel*, 17 November 1969.
161. *Bayernkurier*, quoted in "Das Mißtrauen ist nahezu absolut," *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1973.
162. Staatsvertrag über die Grundsätze zur Reform der wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen und über die Vereinheitlichung des Ordnungsrechts an den Hochschulen, 27 March 1969, BayHStAM, MK Reg. VI/188, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 32.
163. BayHStAM, Studentenschaft des Freistaats Bayern 7 (April 1969), quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 32–33.
164. Paul Bockelmann, "Professorenstreik?" *Deutsche Richterzeitung* (July 1969): 219, quoted in BayHStAM, Staatskanzlei 13622.

165. StAM, Polizeidirektion München 9216, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 32 and 58.
166. StAM, RA 101147; StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15975; StAM, Polizeidirektion München 16006.
167. *unireport* 2, no. 9 (1969), in Universitätsarchiv Munich, Flugblätter und Zeitungen 1967–1971, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 38; StAM, Polizeidirektion München 9216, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 58. See also: IfZM, Dn 358 (Zeitschrift apo press, Nr. 7/II), quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?*.
168. “Mehr Staat im Hörsaal,” *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1973.
169. “Das Mißtrauen ist nahezu absolut,” *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1973. See also: IfZM, ED 328/37, quoted in Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 32; StAM, RA 101150.
170. “Ungeheurer Umbruch,” *Der Spiegel*, 29 January 29, 1973.
171. “Das Mißtrauen ist nahezu absolut,” *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1973. See also: “Ungeheurer Umbruch,” *Der Spiegel*, 29 January 1973.
172. “Das Mißtrauen ist nahezu absolut,” *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1973.
173. “Ruf aus Bayern,” *Der Spiegel*, 6 November 1972.
174. “Das Mißtrauen ist nahezu absolut,” *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1973. See also: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 59; BayHStAM, Plakatesammlung 27464; StAM, Polizeidirektion München 15996 (June 1969).
175. At the time social democrats governed the states of Bremen, Hamburg, (West) Berlin, Hessen, and North-Rhine Westphalia. Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatine, and the Saarland had a conservative leadership. See: “Das Mißtrauen ist nahezu absolut,” *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1973.
176. Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, 142. See also: Zorn, *Bayerns Geschichte seit 1960*, 56–57.
177. For the Act of Higher Education for Bavaria (Bayerisches Hochschulgesetz, BayHSchG), especially regarding disciplinary measures, see article 76 (Ordnungsverstöße und Ordnungsmaßnahmen) and article 77 (Verfahren). See: Reich, ed., *Bayerisches Hochschulgesetz*. See also: Fürmetz, *Protest oder Störung?* 34; “Herzog Doppelzunge,” *Der Spiegel*, 19 May 1969. For later developments see namely: Peter Dallinger, Christian Bode, and Fritz Dellian, *Hochschulrahmengesetz: Kommentar* (Tübingen, 1978).
178. See, for instance: Schildt and Siegfried, *Between Marx and Coca-Cola*; Roger Karapin, *Protest Politics in Germany: Movements on the Left and Right since the 1960s* (University Park, 2007).
179. “Endstation Vorstadt,” *Der Spiegel*, 28 February 2011.