

Civil Society Revisited

Lessons from Poland



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STUDIES ON CIVIL SOCIETY

Chapter 10

ETHNIC BONDING AND HOMING DESIRES THE POLISH DIASPORA AND CIVIL SOCIETY MAKING

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This chapter starts from the assumption that the activism of the Polish diaspora needs to be considered as a significant *civil space* of migrant engagement associated with both civil society of contemporary Poland and the diasporic structures formed in and by the country of settlement. As such, the Polish civil space is connected to, formed, and maintained via central ties, links, norms, and discourses of home, nationhood, and integration. A process-oriented approach to civil society (see Jacobsson and Korolczuk's introduction to this volume) enables the analysis of Polish civil society development in the United Kingdom since the Second World War with a focus on significant London-based associations, central in mediating connections with Poland and within the Polish diaspora in the United Kingdom (Lacroix 2012). The focus of this chapter is the engagement of the Polish diaspora, which has produced a unique pattern of civil society making, due to dividing homing desires of different generations of Poles arriving after the Second World War, during the Cold War and Solidarity periods, and post-EU expansion—stratified also by social status.

The Polish civil space has developed in the United Kingdom with three main waves of Polish migration and with its precarious position as a space of migrant activism *in relation* to the British majority space, other spaces of migrant activism (including cosmopolitan pursuits). As such, it is a civil space of protective ethnonational ambitions for recognition, political rights and group elevation against devaluation and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and class. This chapter will demonstrate that different “homing

desires” are negotiated within Polish London, and that these, in turn, generate a unique pattern of civil society development according to a four-stage process commencing with the foundation of exile organizations, moving towards the maintenance of these organizations, the rejuvenation and amplification of existing organizations, and the diversification of organizational production including campaigning. These stages are linked to varied expressions and desires for home and renegotiations of status and pride from a minority position of civil engagement. Of particular interest for this analysis are uncompromising, diverging, or even dividing “homing desires” that manifest a “desire for home” rather than the “desire to return home” (Brah 1996: 176). Diversity-and-division within the Polish civil space reveals the uneasy coexistence and separation between what are perceived as three main generations of Polish migrants (many of whom are British citizens) and illuminates civil society development both as a process and as a relationship to other civil spaces and to the contestation of re-created memory spaces abroad. Significantly, internal critique does not undermine the existence of co-ethnic organizations. On the contrary, the creation of a Polish-specific civil space, although stratified, is made possible within a framework of a Polish national community sustained by links within and to Poland, produced by underlying uniting national narrations for minority recognition.

The qualitative data on which this chapter is based, comprised over one hundred in-depth interviews mainly conducted with Polish interviewees within Greater London.¹ More specifically, around eighty interviews were conducted with “affiliated representatives” so that different types of associational attachment were represented via the accounts of chairs, trustees, professionals, volunteers and members, paid and unpaid representatives, and volunteers of a variety of Polish organizations.² The sample also includes non-affiliated individuals. For both affiliated and non-affiliated interviewees, sample demography (age, gender, and occupation) has been taken into account. Complementary purposive sampling techniques—snowball, maximum variation and strategic sample—were required in various stages of the interview process to ensure that the affiliated sample of interviewees represented a variety of significant organizations connected to the three generations of Polish migration. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the proportion of Poles in London involved in associations or the scope or variety of organizational and membership activity. The interview phases also included other diaspora groups (N=200), mainly in Greater London, and stretch over the period 2009 to 2015. I would like to acknowledge the many interviewees who have generously contributed to this research.

Following this brief introduction are sections on the conceptualization of migrant activism and patterns of Polish migration into the United Kingdom. Thereafter, we turn to the analysis of the processual development of the Pol-

ish civil space driven by different motivations of migrant generations, relating these to the struggle for recognition. The concluding remarks illuminate processes and relationships associated with the dynamism that characterizes migrant civil society making.

Conceptualizing Migrant Activism

Migrant activism, along with associated civil spaces of voluntary organizations and associations, is key to understanding permanent settlement, maintenance of communities, and changing dimensions of “home” (Castles and Miller 2003; Jordan and Düvell 2003; Portes 1995), contextualized by its development in the “second space”—positioned in between the “first space” of the majority and the “third space” characterized by cosmopolitan intermixtures (Hutnyk 2010; Van Hear, 2015; Vertovec 2010). Polish London has also developed with reference to both known and imagined communities (Anderson 1991; Chojnacki 2012; Van Hear 2015)—in relation to the majority, to other minorities, and alongside struggles for recognition, ethnonational distinction, and evolving notions of home—with voluntary associations on behalf of and as an extension of the Polish diaspora. The focus of this study is the *diaspora* structures visible through and “complete with various associations and more formal organizations” (Brinkerhoff 2009: 38), characterized by the *ethnic bonding of social capital* that encourages particular bonds, relationships, organizations, and networks based on perceptions of similarity, shared history, religion, and language. Diasporic groups are clearly upheld along a continuum of loyalties of those forced to maintain old ties, those escaping the bonds into which they were born, or those never fully integrating or wishing to be part of multiple groups. For this study, the social relationships formed between co-ethnics through formal and voluntary organizations and associations, characterized by the ethnic bonding of social capital,³ along with the resources generated by these relationships, are of particular interest (Putnam 2000: 134). (See also Heath and Demireva 2014; Elgenius and Heath, 2014; Laurence and Maxwell 2012; Maxwell 2012; Morales and Giugni 2011). Ethnic bonding has been argued to provide a safety net from marginalization (Gittel and Vidal 1998 and others) and, here, arguably a buffer from and platform for protesting discrimination. Interviewees refer to the “Polish community” in terms of “formal organisations, oriented around community centers, clubs and groups” (Burrell 2006: 141; Cohen 1985; Cohen, 2008; Sword 1996). Maintaining Polish traditions, acquiring knowledge about Polish history, and learning Polish is, as expected, important, although much disagreement exists as to what constitutes authentic “Polishness” and the “real Poland”—disagreements develop

alongside different migratory experiences and opportunities of returning. The Polish diaspora illuminates therefore the role of ethnic bonds despite diverging homing desires, existing dissimilarities, and continuously re-created civil society processes outside Poland. (Bridging ties between different the Polish diaspora and other ethnic groups and civil initiatives of cosmopolitan intermixtures are undoubtedly also formed as part of the Polish civil space in the United Kingdom.⁴)

Polish Migration into the United Kingdom

According to estimates of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012, 15 to 20 million people of Polish ancestry lived outside Poland, which would make up 39 to 52 percent of the current population of 38 million. As highlighted by Burrell (2006), the history of Polish sociopolitical and socio-economic emigration is one of border shifts, forced resettlement, and economic crises. Such multifaceted trajectories of mobility had already developed by the Second World War in the aftermath of occupation and warfare. The Polish diaspora settled in a number of European states, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, France, Sweden, and Ireland, but also outside Europe in the United States, Brazil, Canada, Australia, and Argentina.

Around 160,000 Poles had settled in the United Kingdom after the Polish Resettlement Act of 1947, which offered citizenship to displaced Polish troops in the aftermath of the Second World War (Burrell 2006). Their deportation and displacement, their loyalty to Allied forces, the experiences of the postwar generation of not being able to return to Poland and the associated exile narration remain imprinted on contemporary Polish London. The commemoration of the war dead—in Polish parishes, clubs, and supplementary schools—constitutes an essential part of the ceremonial year and stands out as particularly important (see Elgenius 2011a; King 1998). The majority of the postwar generation have passed away, but their children have followed the path of civil engagement of their parents, interestingly (self-)assigned the same position as their parents, as belonging to the Polish postwar migrant cluster of this ranked chain of Polish migrants and British citizens of Polish descent, a matter that will make sense as the arguments in this chapter are developed.

The number of Poles arriving in the United Kingdom varied between a few hundred and a few thousand annually from 1956 to the 1980s, the figure of multiple thousands referring to the 1980s (Sword 1996) when altogether 2 million people left Poland (Iglicka 2001). The emigration from Poland commenced after 1956 with new political opportunities brought

about by de-Stalinization and a divided party elite, emanating over Poland's relationship with Soviet Union. Poland also witnessed an upsurge of protests demanding economic improvement, political freedom, and national autonomy with the strike waves of the 1970s and 1980s that highlighted economic grievances and steep price rises. Such realities prepared the way for the Solidarity movement that emerged in August 1980 and that turned into a central node for different core groups or "social/ideological categories" of Polish society. Solidarity coalesced with help from a novel combination of social actors, relying on the strength of the industrial workers within the communist structure, the traditional power of the Catholic Church, and the organizational activity of intellectuals on the secular left (Osa 2003).

Interviewees relate to this period as "having to leave Poland" due to their engagement in Solidarity and not being able to return. Following years of repressive martial laws and banned opposition groups, barriers were lifted after 1989 and Poles were free to leave and free to return to Poland (Iglicka 2001: 38). Polish migration to the U.K. was further facilitated by a relative lack of restrictions on establishing businesses (1993) and minimal visa obligations for short stays (Sword 1996: 69)—which generated undocumented over-stayers (Düvell 2004) as well as short-term and circular migration movements (Wallace 2002).

Polish migration continued with a steady increase into the United Kingdom, and with EU enlargement in 2004 figures increased drastically at a time when unemployment peaked at 21 percent in Poland. (For the impact of emigration on Polish communities in Poland, see White 2011). Polish migration is unique with its recent increase and the Polish language is today the second largest language in the U.K., with Poles being the second largest foreign-born group in the country (after the largest overseas-born group from India). According to the most recent censuses, the numbers of Polish people in the U.K. was estimated to be 579,000 in 2011, reaching 688,000 two years later (Home Office 2013). The Annual Population Survey of 2015 confirms that Poland is the second most common non-U.K. country of birth, with 780,000 residents, and the group in which non-British nationality, with 850,000 residents, is most common (Office for National Statistics 2015a, 2015b).⁵

The Polish diaspora and its creation of memory places, show how nurturing a sense of home is "intrinsically linked to the way in which processes of inclusion or exclusion operate and are subjectively experienced under given circumstances" (Brah 1996: 192). It is therefore critical to say something about the excluding processes and macro-level politics before moving on to related perceptions of exclusion and building of alternative spaces in the civil sphere. With the increase of Polish migration in recent years, the British Prime Minister David Cameron (2010–2016) commented that Britain

must avoid a repeat of what he called the “Polish situation” with regard to Bulgarians and Romanians (Economist 2013). Anti-immigrant discourses such as these (driven by party competition and UKIP claim making; see Ford and Goodwin 2014; Koopmans et al. 2005) are significant as exclusive contexts.⁶ Paradoxically to Cameron’s claim, Poles have been readily absorbed into the British labor market and the Labour Force Survey estimates that 84.6 percent of Polish-born residents (aged 16 to 64) are employed, compared to 70.4 percent for the U.K. population as a whole (Office for National Statistics 2011). However, migrants of Polish descent have mostly ended up in fast-growing parts of the country in low-paid jobs and in particular niches of the labor market (Drinkwater et al. 2009; Eade et al. 2006). The rewards from education are also lower for recent Polish arrivals compared to earlier cohorts (Eade et al. 2006) and demonstrate that an “ethnic penalty” exists for the Poles, too (Heath et al. 2007b). For instance, the Poles in the British labor market have been described as being “Poles apart” (Drinkwater et al. 2009). Burrell aptly notes that in terms of ethnic stratification no amount of “European rebranding could disguise the underlying inequalities among European citizens” (2009: 5). The divide between East and West has remained visible after 1989 with a sustained postcolonial discourse on the “backwardness of Eastern Europe,” a theme also reproduced by members of the diaspora of this study.

Coping with stereotypes and prejudice as part of the experience of the Polish diaspora, is especially highlighted by Polish migrants of the 2004 generation in this study, and enforces insider-outsider discourses with competing struggles for recognition.

The Polish Civil Space: A Four-Stage Process of Diaspora Engagement

This study on the civil society in the Polish diaspora is a unique opportunity to apply a process-oriented approach to activism, as suggested by the editors in the introduction. As a processual development it is driven by the different migrant generations and their concerns about integration and Polishness. With reference to civil society in Poland itself, it was described as “weak” and characterized by the absence of “enterprise, civic and discursive cultures” in the 1990s (Sztompka 1993), as well as by activity in the “private sphere” only (Tarkowska and Tarkowski 1991). The “paradoxical combination” of high levels of individual initiative arguably coexisted with a relative lack of collective expression (Gliński 2004)—and such contradictions are addressed and challenged elsewhere in this volume (see chapters by Ekiert and Kubik, Giza-Poleszczuk, and Jacobsson in this volume).⁷ In


comparison, the London-based Polish space in the U.K. reached well beyond the private sphere long before the 1990s in its first stage of founding exile organizations.

As emphasized at the outset of this book, civil society cannot be reduced to organizational structures but must be understood as “relational and processual” phenomenon (Jacobsson and Korolczuk in this volume). Applied to the Polish civil space, it may be analyzed in broad terms as a four-stage process originating with the founding exile organizations and protecting traditional notions of home to new forms of Polish professional, occupational, or cultural organizations, including also political campaigning for representation. The influence of three generations of Polish migration is integral to this nexus of civil development. A staggering 25 percent of all existing Polish organizations were created after 2004 (Lacroix 2012) with the rejuvenation of original exile organization. As the timeline below (Figure 10.1) illustrates, this development includes the following stages: (1) the *foundation of exile organizations* in the postwar period, (2) the *maintenance* of these by children of the postwar generation and migrants arriving during the Cold War and Solidarity periods, (3) the *rejuvenation and amplification of existing organizations*, and (4) the *diversification of organizations and political campaigning* with the engagement of the post-2004 generation.

Home as Precious and Lost, in Parallel and in Opposition: Stage of Exile Organizations

The aim of the postwar Polish migrants was to create organizations that reflected the traditions and socio-political contexts of Poland before war and communist times. Such efforts were articulated with an overall anti-communist strategy to protect a degree of proper “Polishness” (Lacroix 2012) and political opposition abroad became the blueprint for the early exile organizations for which the postwar generation transferred their efforts when they could not return to Poland. Activities of the emerging Polish diaspora, although originally undertaken within an anti-communist framework, were later reformulated with a clear nationalist ethos (Garapich 2014) that is clearly visible today and for which anti-communist narrations remain integral. Burrell argues that the grand narrative of the postwar generation was built on the mythologization of hardship reaching the United Kingdom, the nation as a “treasured possession,” and a sense of community emphasized by the Polish language, its history, and the active participation in the Polish church (2006: 77). The émigré world was constructed in parallel to the national calendar of Poland (Chojnacki 2012). The narratives of martyrdom remained integral to Polish London as it developed along the lines of two

Figure 10.1. Timeline: Polish Diaspora Organizations and Campaigns.



The timeline above contains a non-exhaustive list of London-based organizations to help visualize the engagement of the main generations of migrants and citizens of Polish descent. Please note that Polish Catholic Mission was established already in 1894 (omitted above) and that the Polish Media has diversified into a variety of Polish newspapers, radio, and TV stations.

civil society pillars—a religious one and a secular one. The work by the Polish Catholic Mission (founded in the U.K. in 1894) and the Polish churches (the first founded in 1948) came to play a major role for the Polish diaspora. The Polish churches nurtured close links to existing civil organizations such as the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (1945). The first Polish Saturday school (opened in 1949) and an increasing number of Polish schools generated an umbrella organization, the Polish Educational Society (1953). A child of the postwar generation reflects on his involvement in Polish youth clubs, schools, and scouts: “In my case everything basically started and was founded around the Parish. So people were involved with the church and within we also had a youth group where I’d say the priests were involved” (former chair of a PSS, Polish Supplementary School).

The secular pillar of founding organizations was based around the government in exile, not officially recognized after 1946 and in principal underground until 1989, after which the Federation of Poles (1946) became the officially recognized representative of Poles in Britain. The Polish Ex-Combatants Association (PECA) was formed by the Polish military (1946). A few years ahead of these initiatives was the first Polish members club—the Polish Heart or *Ognisko*—inaugurated by the Duke and Duchess of Kent in South Kensington in London in 1940. The club constituted a memory space for the higher social strata of the diaspora and tells us something about the significance of social distinction and recognition at a time of loss of status. The first Polish occupational association, the Polish Engineers (1940), was established the same year. Later, the Polish Social and Cultural Association (POSK) was opened (1967) and it remains an official Polish center in London and home to around thirty other organizations.

The foundations were thus laid out to preserve pre-war Poland with the first exile stage as “the postwar generation that did not have a real Poland to go back to tried to recreate the Poland that was before the war, here” (Top Official, the Polish Heart, *Ognisko*). Organizations such as these provided a site for cultivating tradition (the Polish church), and for the children of the postwar generation to learn Polish (Polish school) and culture (Polish Scouts and Guides, Polish youth organizations). For some organizations, prewar social structures remained remarkably intact as the higher strata and traditional Polish hierarchy was re-enacted (Polish club) with particular emphasis on recognition from the majority society for Polish sacrifices during the war (PECA). The formative stage of the founding postwar years was by no means a homogenous effort, and parallel Polish worlds crystallized in London; examples are distinct Polish communities emerging in West and South London (that came to an end by 1976) and in Lewisham (Chojnacki 2012).

*Home as Marker of Suspicion and Differentiation Within:
Stage of Maintenance*

Many Polish organizations would not have survived had it not been for the voluntary engagement of the children of the postwar generation and those who arrived in larger numbers during the Solidarity period. The children of the postwar generation who grew up in England remain a highly visible group in Polish London and explain their connectedness to Poland as nurtured and deep-rooted: “We were all born in England and naturally hold British passports, but our cultural and social allegiances are within a Polish tradition. This generation is currently in the 40’s and 50’s age group and was brought up on a ‘diet’ of Polish Saturday Schools, Polish youth organizations and Polish student and graduate groups, all of them established ‘na emigracji’” (Ania’s Poland Blog). The postwar children and the generation that arrived during the Solidarity years secured the continued success of the Polish Saturday schools, a central institution of the Polish space with a clear agenda of providing a toolkit of “Polishness” of a traditional and pre-communist character to younger generations. It is not surprising that the Polish organizational space was maintained and reformulated with the help of a clear nationalist agenda increasingly absorbing anti-communist strands that followed the successes of the Solidarity movement in Poland. Burrell argues that the Cold War and Solidarity generation (pre–EU enlargement) did not have an “enormous impact on the infrastructure of community” (2009: 3), which is true to the extent that they did not transform existing exile organizational structures or become identified with specific migrant locations. Gasińska notes that the migrants arriving during the Cold War and Solidarity “usually had problems being accepted in centres ruled by the postwar group” (2010: 943). This is a significant finding for this study too and accounts for their relationship to the civil sphere and to its development as a whole. However, the involvement of the second migrant generation, that with the children of the postwar generation maintained Polish London, should not go unnoticed as their engagement contributed to replenishing national narratives of sacrifice with their existence abroad and lack of possibility to return to Poland.

*Home as Martyrdom to Combat Devaluation and Regaining Status:
Stage of Rejuvenation*

By 2004 there was a platform of Polish activity in place and an embryo migrant industry with special concentration to London (Garapich 2008). The decisions of the British authorities in the 1990s not to enforce visa obligations

and to facilitate new businesses opened things up for Polish entrepreneurs, lawyers, brokers, consultants, and travel agents and generated Polish enterprises in the United Kingdom. The Polish-specific for-profit sector worked “in parallel to the existing associational framework” and formed a network that “put itself in charge of catering to the needs of newcomers” (Lacroix 2012: 193). The Polish for-profit sector merged to a degree with the civil space as the last obstacles to Polish migration were removed in 2004 (Düvell 2004). The Federation of Poles (formed in 1946) had been the officially recognized representative of Poles in Britain; by 2012 it had been revived and was operating as the umbrella organization for around seventy-five organizations. Interestingly, other original organizations, whose membership had been dwindling, attracted new members from the newly arrived post-2004 migrants. In a puzzling manner, the large wave of Polish migrants arriving after 2004 did not fundamentally challenge or transform the associational Polish arena founded by the exile generation; instead they contributed to the simultaneous rejuvenation and amplification (stage three) and then diversification and campaigning (stage four) of the Polish civil space (changes were brought about by internal contestation between the generations). Membership in the Polish churches in England and Wales had grown steadily until the 1960s, by which time the Polish Mission owned thirty churches, twelve chapels, thirty-nine presbyteries, and fifty-five centers (Lacroix 2012). Today, the assets account for seventy-one local Polish parishes in over two hundred localities in which over one hundred Polish priests exercise spiritual and pastoral leadership.⁸ In the London Borough of Ealing, Sunday mass is attended by over ten thousand, and constitutes one of the largest Polish churches in London that celebrates mass six times every Sunday. The myth of the *Catholic nation*, the intertwined nexus of the Catholic Church and the Polish nation through the former’s hegemony over Polish history, made possible with 85 percent of the population declaring some form of affiliation to the church (Porter 2001: 289), explains the continued appeal of the church along with the growing strength of nationalist discourses (cf. Platek and Plucienniczak in this volume). The numbers are striking, but priests of the parishes estimate that they reach around 10 to 15 percent only of the total Polish population in London (Polish Parish Priest, London), and would make secularization a decisively marked trend for the Polish diaspora. Yet, as noted by Lacroix’s study of the North of England (2012), the increase of Polish migrants post-2004 “Polish-ified” the churches and led to overcrowding. As a result, the members of the postwar generation, their children, and the Solidarity generation migrated to other Polish or English churches. Leaving the Polish space highlights the diversity within, and is explained by the interviewees as a result of the lack of consideration shown the exile generation who founded the original churches, parishes, and other organizations: “I

don't mind saying this because I express my views about this but when the recent waves of immigrants came over, the priests decided that they were only interested in the new Polish immigrant society and all of a sudden they were not interested in people like my mother and like us and the Polish scouts and other organizations based there ... My mother moved to another Polish church that maintains the old émigré, let's say, values. My family, we moved [to an English church] and the majority of people who used to go to the Polish church in Ealing left" (top official, trustee PSS, postwar child).

As a process, this is one of clashing values with regard to deservedness and entitlement but also with regard to home and religion objecting to the "subservience" of newcomers and the hierarchical structures of the Catholic Church transported by the clergy from Poland to the U.K. Significantly, the "émigré values" that materialized with the forming of the first Polish churches, schools, youth clubs, cultural clubs, and political groupings were built upon traditional notions of religion, culture, and politics, too. Yet, interviewee statements disassociated the older generations from the "subservience," linking this to the "backwardness" of "post-communist" Poles. Church mobility in London provides one example of how Polish London is changing—dividing tendencies generated by the uneasy interaction between migrant generations. In her assessment of the church, another interviewee declared the opposite, however: "the Church is the only place where difference [referring to the 'generations of Polish migrants'] does not matter" (official, PES, EU-generation). The statement nevertheless points to dividing structures and is in this case, most likely, a result of the stratification that to a degree characterizes the Polish diaspora churches.

The rejuvenation of another traditional section of the Polish space has also occurred with reference to national narratives of sacrifice and courage in war. A number of scholars have noted that Poland is "constructed in relation to the past, where sacrifice, victimhood and martyrdom" are central virtues (Kania-Lundholm 2012: 159). Raising membership figures in PECA must be seen from this perspective, especially telling in view of prediction that the association was "dying out." PECA's membership quadrupled from 1990 to 2012 (from 7,000 to 27,000; Lacroix 2012). This is a sign of successful unity narration of the migrant space, which highlights Polish sacrifice alongside the Allies against a mutual enemy (Elgenius 2011ab, 2015).

The staggering number of new Polish organizations created after 2004 includes new Polish Supplementary Schools (PSS), new Polish clubs, Polish occupational organizations, Polish media, and Polish cultural interest organizations. With reference to both rejuvenation and amplification of voluntary initiatives, the Polish supplementary schools are of particular relevance for the narration of pride and home with special relation to the younger generation of Poles. The supplementary schools are cofinanced by the Polish

government, local authorities, and the parents themselves (Official Representative of PES; Trustees of PSS; Sobków 2014). As White highlights, sending children to Polish schools involve a certain financial investment. Yet the number of supplementary schools doubled during the period from 2004 to 2009, peaking at ninety (White 2011: 169). By 2016, the number of Polish supplementary schools in England and Wales had reached 150; they are run by hundreds of volunteers on weeknights and on Saturdays when two thousand teachers teach over seventeen thousand children (Official representative of PES, PES Official website). More and more, new schools are set up by parents to meet increasing demands. The PSS maintain close links to the PES, the parishes and the Embassy, and they articulate the collective notions of traditional diaspora homeland activism:⁹ “to give pupils a grounding in the Polish language, history, geography, culture and tradition. It was set up originally by people like my parents—who left Poland and who wanted their children to know or to have a background in Polish culture, that would make them feel Polish” (Trustee of PSS, postwar child). The curriculum emphasizes Polish language, history, geography, religion, poetry, music, and literature and has been described as “traditional, normative and nostalgic” (Chowaniec 2015). As argued by yet another trustee of a PSS: “if you are out of the country you become more patriotic than you would be when you were living there. That’s one of the things we are trying with the children here, it’s not only to teach them the language but also culture and tradition” (trustee of a PSS). Statements such as these (by trustees, head teachers, teachers, volunteers, parents, and pupils of the PSS) introduce us to one articulation of “homing desires” and attachment to “home” as “deep-seated” and an “emotional commitment” to “giving the child the Polish language,” “the culture of their parents,” “an understanding of their heritage” and tradition.

Home as Distinction and Discrimination: Stage of Diversification and Campaigning

A large number of voluntary associations emerged post-2004 (25 percent of all current Polish organizations) and untapped areas were explored and diversified Polish London by adding new concerns and ways of communicating. The diversification of the Polish press and media increased from four weekly papers in 2004 to several dozen papers and websites today: advertising jobs, accommodation, housing, and cultural events. New professional networks formed, most notably the Polish Professionals (established in 2005), which called on membership from various professional groups, and other Polish organizations formed by Poles working in the City of London, such as the Polish City Club (2005). Polish Artists in London (2010) and

Polish Writers are examples of voluntary associations of the cultural sphere. The significance and growth of online portals, websites and blogs reduce the distance between the U.K. and Poland. Over twenty significant online portals with this particular aim had been founded by 2011 (Seredynska-Abou Eid 2011).¹⁰

Significantly, the Polish diaspora emerged as a political force as per public campaigns such as “Poles are Polls” (2007), “Save-Polish-A-Level” (2014–2015), “British Poles Initiative” (2015), and “Donate Polish Blood” (2015)—and related to empowerment and group recognition in relation to the British majority. First, “Poles are Polls” was initiated by Polish Professionals in 2007 and devised to encourage members of the Polish community to register to vote in local elections. The aim was also to “improve the perception of the group” in an increasingly anti-immigrant climate by distributing key statistics on Poles in the U.K., referring to their high employment rates or conveying messages like “Immigration lowers budget deficit with 7 billion GBP per year.” Second, “Save Polish A-level” (#SavePolishALevel) was conducted during 2014–2015 after the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance (AQA) had agreed to terminate the A-level option for Polish-language speakers in 2018. “Save Polish A-level” turned into a unified protest within which petitions were devised and signed at PSS’s, the PES, the Embassy, and other centers. It was argued that “the growth over a ten-year period in the number of candidates taking Polish A-Level is remarkable. French decreased by 26%, German by 28%, Spanish increased by 33%, Chinese by 74%, Russian by 90%, and Polish by 1000%” (Polish Educational Society 2015). The Polish ambassador to London (2012 - 2016) Witold Sobków, argued in the *Guardian* that the possibility of taking examinations in Polish at the GCSE or A-level gives pupils a strong motivation to learn the language of their parents. “By attending Saturday schools, Polish children not only learn to speak two languages, but they also learn the history of two countries and two cultures. It is extremely important that over the course of their education they get acquainted with Polish customs” (Sobków 2014). Third, “The British Poles Initiative” (2015), a collaborative volunteer-led project, took campaigning to a new level with the promotion of “Polish matters” in British politics,¹¹ by making it easier for Poles to ascertain the views of their Members of Parliament on specifically “Polish matters”. The Polish diaspora hereby opened another door to Polish identity politics via the construction of a website that facilitated contact with Members of Parliament during pre-election campaigning. Polish residents could hereby easily contact their MPs (identified by postcodes) and send them a set of prewritten questions: “So people were asking the candidates what they thought about Polish immigration and Polish contributions. Forty-five MPs who were asked questions became MPs and since then we continue to ask these MPs. We reached almost a hundred so it

is quite, quite a number because and gives you an outlook on the British-Polish relations” (co-organizer of the campaign) (The public elects 650 Members of Parliament to the House of Commons). MPs were asked to help the Polish community with four main concerns: to help lobby for A-level Polish (i.e. for Polish remaining an A-level subject); to challenge British media in instances where Nazi camps were labeled “Polish concentration camps” (in light of the fact that “the Polish army contributed to the defeat of Nazi Germany”); to promote information about the positive contributions of Polish immigration to the British economy; and to support Polish residents’ right to the immigration status “indefinite leave to remain” in the event of Brexit. Fourth, the “Donate Polish Blood” campaign (August 2015) encouraged blood donations to the National Health Service in order to demonstrate (continuing) Polish loyalty to Britain and remind the public of Polish sacrifices during World War II. Originally, Polish Blood emerged as a buffer and counter-campaign to a proposed and failed call to a “Polish strike” as protest against the discrimination of Polish workers and to raise awareness of the Polish presence in the labor market (Polish Express). However, the strike faced internal opposition and few attended (co-organizer, Polish Blood Campaign). In sum, 2,500 people committed themselves to donating blood under the banner “I don’t strike, I save lives. Polish blood”; this campaign was reported on by the world press (co-organizer, Polish Blood Campaign; Davies and Carrier, 2015).

In conclusion, the development of the civil society of the Polish diaspora and a Polish space in the United Kingdom highlights the significant role of central and close-knit organizations such as the Polish Mission and other London-based associations in the mediation of links within the diaspora and between this and Poland, confirming the findings of an earlier pilot study of Polish organizations in Birmingham and Slough (Lacroix 2012). Many of these central organizations were founded by the exile community and their leadership has remained with the children of the postwar and Solidary generations; furthermore, recent migrants have been disproportionately underrepresented on boards of trustees although a shift toward higher representation has been witnessed in recent years.

Critical Solidarity: Ethnic Bonding vs. Ethnic Solidarity

The processual development of Polish London negotiates different “homing desires” that, in turn, generate a unique pattern of civil society development comprising four distinct stages, simultaneously producing a protective ethnonational space for minority recognition and for regaining lost status, for group elevation in view of devaluation. The generated development is linked

to dividing “homing desires” and different cultures of migration, but uniting initiatives for recognition ultimately turns this diaspora space into a Polish one.

Dividing Homing Desires: Home Imagined, Real, or Absolute

The concept of ethnic bonding of social capital is traditionally applied to social ties of long-established groups and tends to hold limited applicability for the newly arrived (Ryan et al. 2008). In the context of the Polish diaspora, ethnic bonding ties are applicable to identify newer forms of activism too, as generated by the post-2004 generation via stages of rejuvenation (of Polish churches, schools, and clubs) and diversification (creation of new forms and types of Polish organizations, clubs, and networks). However, the Polish civil space is, in terms of social ties, characterized by ethnic bonding, which raises questions about the degree to which ethnic bonding may coexist with ethnic hostility or division and a simultaneous lack of ethnic solidarity. Scholars have commented on existing rivalry within and between the various microcosms of Polish civil society previously (Tarkowska and Tarkowski 1991) or argued for the organizational logic of “multiplication by conflict” (Jacobsson 2013), one engine of diversification. The early CRONEM study of Poles by Eade et al. (2006) concluded that “criticism of fellow Poles” was the most “striking feature” of their interviews, combining simultaneously discursive cooperation and hostility. Eade et al. also reported that 60 percent of Poles would not work for a fellow Polish employer, 80 percent felt shame on behalf of other Poles, and 62 percent stated that they were careful about their contact with other co-ethnics (2006: 37).¹² Social tensions and hostility between the generations of Poles are also noted in other significant studies by Burrell (2009) and White (2011), and are described in terms of “Darwinian” life strategies (Garapich 2008) or as mutual evaluation through gossiping (Galasińska 2010). This London-based study reveals discourses of ethnic hostility as a function of “diversity-and-division-within” the Polish civil space and as correlated to different homing desires of the postwar, Cold War–Solidarity, and post-2004 generations. Divided over both associations of and obligations to “home,” internal division demonstrates the degree to which ethnic cooperation takes place as a function of migration clusters. Table 10.1 provides summative table of views held.

The challenges associated with the nexus of ethnic bonding and ethnic solidarity yet seem to stand firm in the face of uncompromising notions of each other with regard to nation, identity, home, homing desires, and social status. Brah argues “processes of homing desires include the construction of the local and the creation of habitual and habitable spaces through

Table 10.1. Critical Solidarity within the Polish Diaspora: generations and attitudes

	Post-war generation and their children on	Cold War/Solidarity Generation on	The EU generation on
Post-war generation and their children	(Emotional narration by children of the post-war generation) parents not being able to go back. Hard lives, discrimination in the UK.	They used to ignore me; I had to prove myself. They were clearly distant and worried that we wanted to get married to one of them.	They never paid me any attention to me until I dated one of their sons – then a whole new network opened up to me.
Cold War and Solidarity generation	They were communists but learned to be Poles here We used to be suspicious of them.	Staying on in the UK sometimes illegally. We couldn't go back to Poland, not really.	They integrated very well in the UK The old ones were very suspicious of them – they could be communists.
The EU generation	They did not have to leave Poland but did for material gain. The new generation has no interest in helping out. Poland an “absolute home”.	They don't understand what the old generation did for us here. Some give Poles a bad name They expect to be served – we had to work so hard.	I don't always say that I am Polish; Polish people always want something or expect help or money. Many do not want or need to integrate – they settle among other Poles.

collective memory, tradition and ritual” (1996: 176). The collective memory spaces of the Polish diaspora are indeed created with a variety of homing desires that exist in relation to what we may call *homing categories* created along a continuum of *imagined, real, or absolute home*. For the children of the postwar generations Poland constitutes an “imagined home” known through the experiences of their parents whereas the national attachments of the post-EU generations are described as a “real home” or “absolute home,” the latter used in derogatory terms for the alleged lack of integration.

The “imagined home” turns home into a nostalgic attachment, as desires remain unrealized: “My home is in London. I’m a Polish person living in London, that’s how I would describe myself. I would never describe my-

self as English. That would just be impossible" (child of postwar generation, Trustee PSS). The "feeling a deep connection with Poland" has materialized through a long-term commitment to various Polish organizations: "Maybe it is a romantic notion because I've never lived in Poland. But I really ... those traditions ... I love Polish singing, I have done Polish dancing almost whole my life, I am interested in Polish history ... maybe feeling home is a bit too strong but you feel you belong to" (vice-chair of PSS, trustee, postwar child). Associations of the "imagined home" in view of the nexus of leaving-arriving-settling-(not)returning is articulated by all generations: "I miss Poland all the time in a sense, you know. You know, it is my home country. I miss Poland, I would love to go there one day" (construction business owner, arrived 1992).

The activities of the Polish diaspora are also intimately connected to the "ideology of return." Sobków (2014) argued for Polish A-levels and the significant role of the supplementary schools teaching language skills opening up new vistas for students' "prosperity" and making it possible for them to return to Poland. However, the Polish schools also constitute memory places of diverse homing desires with reference to imagined and real home. The harsh assessments of the 2004 generation (Table 10.1 above), for instance, lay bare the complexities associated with home and identity as with the critique against those who have left Poland voluntarily, those who wish to return or make Poland an "absolute home" or fail to integrate: "In my generation we had Polish friends in Polish school, Polish scouts and so on, but it wasn't so divided. We mixed more I think. I observe some, not everybody, but some Polish people here do nothing [to integrate]. My family was telling me that in the Polish children theatre ... a teenage girl was saying that at home the only language was Polish, she only listened to Polish pop music. As a teenager, who is living in England and goes to school in England: Poland is absolutely home! To me it's quite strange" (top official, trustee POSK, postwar child). The discourses visible in the narrations above bring to the fore processes through which groups become situated and tied both to origin and place of settlement as suggested by Brah (1996: 182–199) or to a time before arrival and the time of arrival. Apparently, the 2004 generation is criticized for leaving and for returning, both actions seemingly indicating disloyalty to Poland as well as Britain. Narrating "loyalty to Poland" is articulated in opposing terms too, as "having to leave" versus "wanting to leave," positioning the political migrants on top of a moral pyramid as they were being forced to leave, whereas the economic migrants left voluntarily or "deserted" their homeland. "The old people would typically say that the new migrants deserted Poland for personal material gain and that they think about themselves instead of thinking of what is best for Poland" (trustee of

a PSS, postwar child). Thus, labor migration is portrayed as morally dubious with connotations of “vulgarity” in the distinction-driven sense of the term.

Significantly, debates in Poland also tap into similar discourses of betrayal of those leaving and changing their Polish names, thus failing the main task of migration, which is to “represent Poland and Poles abroad” (Kania-Lundholm 2012: 177). Marciniak and Turowski even conclude that migration is presented as incompatible with loyalty to the homeland and patriotic sentiments “to leave Poland and to establish a niche for oneself in another nation, means to lose one’s ‘Slavonic soul’, to betray the Polish ‘core’, atrophy the personal ‘authenticity’” (2010: 157).

It is through such discourses that the political migrants of the postwar period assume the moral high ground over the EU generation (see Galasińska 2010; Lacroix 2012). The moral superiority that follows these discursive patterns also constructs ideal types for the advancement of “the Polish good” and “acceptable forms of voluntarism” involving “the protection of Polish culture” and the preservation of authentic “Polishness.” With regard to variations in levels of voluntarism, the difference between migrants who contribute and “do the actual work” and a lack of commitment among others is explained along the lines of a postcolonial discourse and as the ultimate sign of the “backwardness” of the communist system corrupting authentic forms of “Polishness.” Volunteers of the first two generations will typically mention that the EU generation is “not as involved,” “does not contribute,” and that “the spirit of volunteering is simply not there,” whereas the EU migrants explains that they “have to prove themselves” or feel “kept out.” In consideration of the 25 percent of Polish organizations that were created after 2004, volunteering obviously takes place within separate clusters of homing desires and within existing organizations or new ones.

Unity Narration, Elevation vs. Devaluation

The Polish civil space has developed as a space for attaining recognition after loss of status. Intergenerational tensions within Polish London are related to perennial forms of “resource-driven” conflicts between old-timers and newcomers (see Ballard 1999); to the loss of socioeconomic status within unequal structures of the economic system but also to the system of “rights” associated with British citizenship, permanent residency, or the lack thereof. The Polish civil space absorbs and negotiates all these forms of resource-generated conflicts, with the rejuvenation or diversification of organizations—within and toward the British majority—supported by the national framework stipulating the need for Polish-specific civil society organizations.

In principle, every wave of Polish migrants seemingly feels undervalued: the postwar migrants by the British, the Solidarity by the postwar, and the post-2004 by the British, the postwar, and the Solidarity generations.

The postwar generation and their children testify to disadvantage and discrimination in the following terms: “Although many of these émigrés were educated professionals, they were obliged to accept menial jobs in England, because their qualifications were not accepted by the British” (postwar child). The engagement of postwar Polish migrants in the creation of exile organizations corresponds to a need for distinction within such “menial realities” and also lays the foundation for the nationalist narratives first united against Nazi Germany, later against communism, and thereafter increasingly in relation to Polish loyalty to Britain during the Second World War. Mythical narratives of courage and sacrifice in the face of adversity, aiding Britain by helping to crush the war enemy, also appeal to the recent Polish migrants, which has led to the rejuvenation of war-related associations (such as PECA). Narratives of pride, loyalty, service, and sacrifice have thus become available to all as ways of renegotiating status in the migrant space.

“Resource-driven criticism” and “criticism-as-defense” is also accounted for by the Solidarity and post-2004 migrants with their experiences of discrimination as a minority, coping with stereotypes, and prejudice: “Maybe we will be more than a nation of waitresses and builders one day” argues a self-employed construction worker who arrived post-EU expansion. “I don’t understand,” said another interviewee in a lowered voice, “the Poles contribute so much to society by paying taxes—and they helped the Allies during the war and so forth—why is the press writing these things about us?” (self-employed construction worker, 2004 generation). The discourses of group recognition provide an overall uniting narrative for Polish London, but the loss of status also divides the generations of Polish migration. Interviewees from *all* generations speak of *shame* when the “new generation” challenges the reputation of all Poles and they mention that they are careful in contact with other Poles (Table 10.1): “Sometimes I feel ashamed of being Polish. Some of the new ones are really awful. They drink and swear on the street.” (volunteer, PSS, Child of Solidarity generation). The post-EU generation is also described as scrounging the system and taking it for granted: “They come here and they know that they can claim benefits; they have the right to have a Council house . . . We worked so hard and now it’s the European Union that has to give me this, has to help me with that. This is why I think they can’t appreciate the postwar generation and what they did for us here” (trustee, PSS, Solidarity generation). Similar forms of social stigmatization are fought on behalf of the highly educated migrants within the 2004 generation itself as they oppose stereotypes of the “Polish builder” who want to “make a career and have a higher standard of living” (Fomina and Frelak 2008: 20): “We

have so much to offer: Polish people are clever and professional. I don't want them to think that we are all builders or manual workers" (banker, Board of Polish City Club). The diversification of organizations has generated a string of new professional associations providing the younger strata professional platforms from which to act. Previously mentioned are relatively new associations—such as the Polish Professionals, the Polish City Club, City Poles, Polish Writers, Polish Poets, and Polish Artists—that capitalize on occupational belonging as a measure of differentiation within the diverse 2004 generation. Clearly, many of these have experienced devaluation as labels of "Polish" turn "migrant" with derogatory connotations: "I used to get so frustrated because people would be like oh yeah, so you're *Polish*, and like yeah, we've got *Polish* nanny. I'm like I don't care about your *Polish* nanny quite frankly . . . I don't want to know about your *Polish* family who fought in the Second World War. My family fought in the Second World War too, but so fucking what? That's not the conversation, but suddenly, that became the conversation, because you mentioned "*Polish*". But I used to get really angry, and I think I still do" (director and artist, 2004 generation).

In contexts such as these, identification with voluntary organizations of the postwar and Solidarity generations or with professional groups within the post-EU generation constitute tools for *elevation*, revaluation, self-preservation, and collective retrieval of status loss that despite articulated prejudice in the majority press are facilitated by the "Polish-specific" framework. Ethnonational narrations hereby transcend class divisions and hierarchies, they penetrate the community which becomes united in reference to the majority in the process of status recovery. Overall, the Poles have suffered devaluation as a group—in comparison to the heroic perception of them and their contributions after the Second World War and with increased numbers post-EU expansion. It is in such contexts that the Second World War offers a buffer and platform for unity narration and it still figures as a prominent diaspora narrative in recent political campaigns in the Polish civil space.

Ethnic tension is seemingly enforced by a primordial or perennial stance on national identity and belonging, which is in need of more exploration, as it appears to narrate nationality by linking family to nation via bloodlines: "Being Polish is in my blood" (post-2004 generation). Contexts that turn co-ethnics into extended family are certain to lead to failed expectations, conflicts, or internal critique of fellow co-ethnics, in turn providing fuel for the diversification of the Polish space as a function of the organizational logic and multiplication by conflict mentioned previously. However, internal tension and uneasy coexistence must also be contextualized with reference to home, homing desires, and the loss of social status as a minority in a majority-defined space. Now, division and tension would have extinguished

the Polish-specific space had it not been for the voluntary associations sustained by and linked to the ideology of homeland pride, nurtured and aided by the myth of the Catholic nation (Porter 2001: 289). This was concretely translated to “a Catholic elite migration” (Lacroix 2012: 194) as the elite solidified and religious boundaries merged with political ambitions and the foundation of the original exile organizations (Garapich et al. 2010) that have formed a blueprint for Polish London. Moreover, these boundary-making processes shed light on the constant status renegotiation and the unchallenged position of the uniting postwar narratives. The divided London-based Polish civil space has come to rely on the uniting framework that merges Polish identity and nationalism with related identity symbols of Polish martyrdom and Catholicism (e.g., Burrell 2006; Chojnacki 2012; Elgenius 2011a; Graff 2009) in view of devaluation. The vision of the émigrés was to cultivate and transmit Polish identity to younger generations as “heroic, martyrological and Catholic” (Chojnacki 2012: 281) – visions that survived the period of post-enlargement as a buffer against the devaluation faced without and within.

The influence of Catholicism over the Polish civil space has had significant effects with regard to diversity and gender. As a result, Polish groups with other religious affiliations, such as Jews and Orthodox Christians, are seemingly invisible within the Polish community. Other groups, such as the Polish Rainbow, formed for LGBT Polish migrants in the U.K., challenge traditional notions of home and tradition within the Polish civil space (2011–2012, Figure 1) (see also Mole 2017 on “Queer Diaspora”). Arguably, the Polish diasporas formulated alongside a gendered nationalist discourse as a response to the dramatic changes following EU accession (Graff 2009). The propensities of such discourse are beyond the scope of this chapter, yet unity narration and authentication of boundaries in the Polish civil space in London clearly involve the ceremonial forms of the church, enacted around Polish martyrdom and male sacrifice in war, in similar fashion to other cults of this kind (cf. cult of Unknown Soldiers in Britain, Belgium, and France). However, recognition in the present is negotiated with help of sacrifices of the past. In consideration of the historically significant role played by religion and sacrifice in strategies of nation-building, it is not an unusual combination (e.g., Elgenius 2011ab, 2015; Elgenius and Heath 2014). Eade et al. (2006) therefore highlight Polish ethnicity as an ambivalent resource and as a source of vulnerability. However, being Polish also provides social resources via the access to diaspora and civil society structures that help negotiate vulnerabilities through a network that generates information about opportunities and social capital alike. Eade et al. described the Polish network as “well functioning” and “interdependent and interconnected” in 2006 and this study has pointed toward the amplification and diversification of Polish

organizations in recent years, with public debates about access to power and lack of representation championed by recent campaigns. Such developments stand in sharp contrast to tangible ethnic divisions and internal mistrust that constitute a crucial driver of civil society and organizational development, aspects in need of further research.

The referendum over EU membership in June 2016, its campaign and the win for “Leave” (Brexit) brought anti-Polish sentiment to the public sphere as Polish organizations were targeted with slogans taking on new meanings of “leave.” The aftermath of the referendum generates questions about the degree to which divisions will be reinforced within the already heterogeneous community that is the Polish diaspora, stratified in terms of ethnicity and homing desires, class, and social status but also according to the rights associated with being British citizens of Polish descent born in the U.K. or in Poland or Polish migrants with or without permanent residency.

The findings brought together about civil society in the Polish diaspora illuminate some of the multifaceted dimensions associated with diverging notions of homing desires and show that divisions hold consequences for civil society activity and may produce unique trajectories. As a space of migrant activism, it is appropriately identified as highly stratified along clusters of social status linked to homing desires, where the former is intimately connected to the latter. The imagined horizontal ties of the nation are seemingly contested with the construction of new organizations and associations (occupational niches) that, due to direct competition (about jobs, for recognition and organizational affiliation), generate internal divisions as defense or defiance against devaluation. Interviewees refer to the “Polish community” in terms as a stratified space of uneasy interaction. Significantly, internal critique, diverging or even dividing “homing desires” do not undermine the existence of co-ethnic organizations. On the contrary, (re)building the civil society of the Polish diaspora is made possible by overall arching nationalist narrations of Poland the homeland. The findings presented here thus acknowledge the dynamism of the migrant civil space.

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Notes

1. This research is related to two projects: "To What Extent Does Homeland Matter? Diaspora in the UK" (funded by the British Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences and the John Fell Foundation, University of Oxford), and "Institutional Constraints and Creative Solutions: Polish Civil Society in Comparative Perspective" (funded by the Swedish Research Council, University of Gothenburg).
2. Organizations include: the Polish Mission, various Polish churches, the Polish Educational Trust (PES) and various Polish Saturday schools, the Polish Heart Club (*Ogni-sko*) and various Polish clubs, and the Polish Social and Cultural Association (*POSK*), home to several organizations, e.g., the Federation of Poles, the Polish Library, the Polish Jazz Club, the Polish Café, the Polish University Abroad, the Polish theatre (and on occasion the Polish Embassy), the Polish Landowning Association, the Polish Press, Polish Professionals, City Poles, and Polish Artists London, which includes various cultural and recreational organizations. Representative campaigns that were interviewed include "Red Card against Racism," "Hurricane of Hearts" (fundraising for Polish hospitals), "Save Polish A-levels," the "British Poles Initiative" and the "Polish Blood Campaign."
3. Patterns of ethnic bonding and bridging of social capital vary for Britain's minorities. Ethnic bonding may decrease social trust and increase ethnic tensions although high levels of ethnic bonding are also shown to perform important positive functions for members of ethnic communities.
4. A number of bridging associations are noted, e.g., the recreational/youth association "Red Card against Racism," with the specific aim of building links between different ethnic groups.
5. In 2014 the total number of EU Accession 8 (EU8) immigrants was estimated to be 1,242,000 (arriving from Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, including U.K.-born residents) (Office for National Statistics 2015ab).
6. One of many *Daily Mail* headlines on the subject read: "Polish population in the UK soars from 75,000 to more than half a million in eight years" (26 May 2011).
7. Ekiert et al. (2013) argue that in the last two decades civil society in contemporary Poland has transformed into a "robust," dense, and diverse sphere that is less contentious with flourishing voluntarism. The authors find an increase in registered organizations and a "spectacular growth in the NGO sector." The rise of volunteerism counts 20 percent of all adults agreeing to do unpaid work in 2008 and 58 percent admit to volunteering in the past. Simultaneously, the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey rank Poland among the lowest on protest actions and membership in *nonpolitical* organizations and associations (World Value Survey; European Value Survey).
8. See the Polish Catholic Mission, <http://www.pcmew.org>.
9. The Polish Educational Society (PES) is a registered charity. It was established in 1953 and has been supporting Polish supplementary schools in England and Wales for over sixty years. (Interview, Official Representative of PES 2015). See <http://www.polskamacierz.org/en/parents/find-your-nearest-school/>.
10. Sredynska-Abou Eid's (2011) study identifies a number of significant online portals such as Poland Street, Ania's Poland, "Wielka Brytania," "Strefa," "Gadatka," "Moja Brytania," "Moja Wyspa," "Polacy."

11. "British Poles: Want to know where your MPs stand on Polish issues?" Retrieved from <http://britishpoles.uk/>.
12. The in-group relationship (between Poles) is analyzed by Eade et al. (2006) as "opportunistic and individualistic" and as opposing collective forms of ethnic solidarity. Jacobsson picks up on related characteristics within civil society in Poland developed with the concept of "civic privatism" (this volume).

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