

CHAPTER 4

BUREAUCRATIC LOGIC

Author's Note

I began to think more formally about the logic of much bureaucratic endeavor some years after fieldwork in Newfoundland on welfare bureaucracy. I was dissatisfied with Weber's paradigm of bureaucracy as institution which was and continues to be dominant in the social sciences. In my view, missing from this paradigm is what I would call today the logic of the forming of form that bureaucracy creates. In 1981 I co-edited (with Jeff Collmann) a special issue of *Social Analysis* entitled "Administrative Frameworks and Clients." In thinking about the special issue, Michel Foucault's *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*, was a blessing. Foucault understood profoundly how the creation of taxonomies and their organization was critical to the emergence of modernity in Europe and elsewhere.

I understood that the metier of bureaucracy could be understood in these terms; and I tried out an initial formulation of the idea in the Introduction (Handelman 1981). I suggested that bureaucracy produces and systemically organizes social categories that shape their contents, human and otherwise. Later on, in *Models and Mirrors* (1990: 77–78), I suggested that,

The paradigmatic form of organization of the modern state is that of bureaucracy. The most elementary feature of bureaucracy is that it is a device for the ongoing generation of taxonomies—of ways of classifying aspects of the world, and of relating to these categories. The ideal practice of bureaucracy is that of orthopraxy . . . the metier of bureaucratic organization is the making of controlled change through the creation and manipulation of taxonomy . . . bureaucracy does all of this in the most mundane and routine of ways.

Chapter Four refines and expands these ideas. The chapter comes from my book, *Nationalism and the Israeli State: Bureaucratic Logic in Public Events* (2004). The upshot of my perspective is that the invention and application of systemically organized

taxonomies is the most powerful device for making routine change (destructive and creative) ever invented by Human Being. Indeed, this may be approaching an apex as the digital age gains momentum and systemic depth and strength.



The forming of form through bureaucratic logic is discussed in depth in this chapter. The chapter proposes one trace through which this logic may have developed in Europe during the past few hundred years and follows one route through which the logic reached pre-state Palestine via socialists from Russia, where it was put to work in the building of the Zionist state-in-the-making.

Before continuing, let me remind about the kind of classification that bureaucratic logic generates. This classification is linear, with two intersecting axes, vertical and horizontal. The vertical axis is composed of levels of classification in a hierarchy of levels in which each higher level subsumes the lower, and is itself subsumed by the level above. The horizontal axis—a given level of classification—is composed of n number of categories, each of which contrasts with and excludes all others on the same level. All the categories on a given level of abstraction are the equivalents of one another. This logic does not produce dichotomous distinctions. A scheme of classification can have n number of levels of abstraction, and n number of categories on any given level. The classification does insist, however, that a given item be placed in one and only one of the existing categories on a given level of classification, and therefore that it be excluded from all the rest on that level. This is a highly prevalent mode of ordering, of sorting contents into categories, and of relating these categories and their levels to one another. This is a way of organizing a classification of individuals, groups, or things, grasped for purposes of classification as nuclear entities. The taxonomies produced may interface, interlock, and compete with one another, yet they discourage overlap and permeability among themselves. Bureaucratic logic is not a democratic dynamic, nor an egalitarian one.¹

The development of bureaucratic logic comes fully into being when two conditions are satisfied: one condition is metaphysical, referring to the emergence of the conscious, systematic, classification of information that is made autonomous from the natural, God-given order of things. Through time the doing of classification gains conscious control over the means of classifying. Thus, second, a pragmatic science of classification comes fully into existence; and, this science of classification comes to be organized as a system in the self-correcting sense.

The Monothetic Forming of Form

Bowker and Star (1999: 10) define classification as, “a spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world.” They add that a classification system is “a set of boxes (metaphorical or literal) into which things can be put to then do some kind of work—bureaucratic or knowledge production.” This kind of lineal classifi-

cation scheme is called monothetic and has been traced to Aristotle's *Organon* and to his *Metaphysics* (see Ellen 1979). Sokal (1974: 1116), writing of classification in science, emphasizes "the ordering or arrangement of objects into groups or sets on the basis of their relationships." If, in science, classification is intended to bring forth relationships that do exist in the natural world, but that may not be easy to grasp and delineate, in social life we are referring to invented schemas of categorization (though their invention may be ancient, their arbitrariness hidden in mythistory). Reified, these schemas are put to work to classify and act on phenomena. In monothetic or Aristotelian classification, precision always is preferred to no precision (Bowker and Star 1999: 103), regardless of the validity of the precise distinctions among categories at a given level of abstraction, or between levels of abstraction. This suggests that often it is more important to classify with preciseness for the sake of creating a world of precision, than it is to worry about how accurately this classification reflects the world it is made to act upon.

Invented schemes of lineal classification are intended to create facts; and C. Wright Mills (1959) commented long ago that to the bureaucrat the world is a (self-obvious) world of facts, to be treated according to firm rules. Undoubtedly there are frequent clashes of classifications invented at different times by different agencies for different purposes. Yet ideally these problems are intended to be resolved through monothetic distinctions. Bureaucratic logic is a procrustean practice—it cuts, shapes, and changes phenomena more with regard to its own hermeneutic of closure than in terms of how these phenomena otherwise exist in their worlds.² Though conflicts over particular classifications are continually generated, there is little argumentation over whether this kind of classifying is indeed the way to organize many aspects of public life, including the interface between public and private. Instead this kind of classifying is a self-obvious practicality in a world of facts (e.g., Haines 1990).

Monothetic classification builds closure into its own scheme since it is designed to enclose totally the world it describes, thereby exhausting the possibilities of that world in terms of the scheme. The scheme of classification folds into itself its own contingencies (cultural, social, legal) that are unfolded under various conditions. Both the folding and unfolding are symmetrical. Bureaucratic logic values symmetry in classification, in both its vertical and horizontal dimensions. Symmetry signifies boundedness, formality, order (Weyl 1952: 16). Exhausting a world of its contents through monothetic classification is the exercising of symmetrical order. Symmetry invokes the locating of every thing in its proper place, thereby enabling a monothetic taxonomy to be a simultaneity of all its categories.

Yet the practice of classification is necessarily a sequence of action, and therefore temporal. A form or scheme of classification is then also "the simultaneity of sequentiality" (Luhmann 1999: 19). By totalizing itself in these ways, a scheme of classification may be accorded relative autonomy from its social environment. This is especially so for law courts deciding on how to classify in matters of falsehood and truth, guilt and innocence; but it is also so for the multitudes of administrative de-

cisions about classification, for examinations in education, and for a host of athletic contests and games, all of which are concerned with the classifying and re-classifying of candidates and competitors (Handelman 1998: xxxvii–xli; Hoskin 1996; Hoskin and Macve 1995).³

Monothetic classification is associated closely with counting in its simplest sense of adding and subtracting so that one number is not another, with making these kinds of counts in which an item goes into one category and not another nor in both. Stone (1988: 128) points to the act of this counting as categorizing, as a decision about what to include and exclude. Moreover, to categorize requires boundaries that inform whether something belongs or not. Such numbers, she argues, are like metaphors—they are “about how to count as . . . [so that] to categorize in counting or to analogize in metaphors is to select one feature of something, assert a likeness on the basis of that feature, and ignore all other features. To count is to form a category . . .” by emphasizing a feature of inclusion and excluding all else (*ibid.*: 129). Therefore monothetic classification has analogical qualities that can be rendered as inclusion, exclusion, the making of hierarchies. These qualities are symbolized with every act of counting of this kind. Every monothetic taxonomy not only totalizes itself but practices and symbolizes that very totalization in every act of its classifying. These properties are deeply embedded in bureaucratic logic.

Something of the same is so for the performance of an event of presentation. The performance comes into existence through the taxonomies that are integral to that event. The taxonomies contribute to shaping the performance. The logic of form that shaped the taxonomies shapes the performance.⁴

Tracing Bureaucratic Logic through Classification

Logics of the forming of form that are more linear and relatively autonomous from natural cosmos are ancient (e.g., Handelman 1995; Luhmann 1999: 22), and I will not try to account for their histories. However, in Europe there is one historical vector of the forming of linear classification that contributes to this discussion in two ways. It gives a sense of a bureaucratic logic coming to the fore and shows the broad spectrum of its influence. Through its European peregrination from the German principalities to Russia, this vector later left its traces in the early history of Zionism in pre-state Palestine, and the beginnings there of a highly centralized, bureaucratic proto-state, the precursor of the present State. This vector gathers strength and momentum during the period, roughly of the sixteenth through the eighteenth century, when the formation and practice of lineal taxonomic classification was understood to be under the conscious control and implementation of human agency, and was used deliberately to shape, discipline, and change social order. I break these developments into two overlapping segments: the first discusses changes in the cosmology of classification from which the monothetic emerged dominant; while the second takes up how the monothetic contributed to a sense of proto-bureaucratic

community in central Europe. Toward the close of this discussion I bring out the resonances between bureaucratic logic and that which Deleuze and Guattari call the state-form. In my reading, the state-form is a logic of the forming of form, one that converges in modernity with bureaucratic logic, in a torsion of these logics that en-seams together the dynamic of monothetic classification with those that Deleuze and Guattari call capture, containment, striation, smoothing.

The first segment of the historical vector traces the consequences of classifying knowledge of the world totally and quite monothetically. In *The Order of Things* (1973) Foucault provides an insightful, historicized perspective on the crystallization of monothetic classification in Europe.⁵ He tells us that the sciences of the seventeenth century were informed by ways of seeing the world that can be glossed as “rationalism.” Through these perceptions, “comparison became a function of order . . . progressing naturally from the simple to the complex The activity of the mind . . . will therefore no longer consist in drawing things together [through similarities] . . . but, on the contrary, in discriminating” (1973: 54). Rationalism used the idea of taxonomy to make monothetic order: to distinguish, to divide, to locate, to name, and to connect things living and dead according to their natural characteristics, in order to make these things clearly visible. The phenomenal world surrendered and made explicit what was thought to be its essences. Foucault (1973: 131–32, my emphasis) comments that:

What came surreptitiously into being between the age of the theatre [the Renaissance] and that of the catalogue [the seventeenth century] was not the desire for knowledge, but *a new way of connecting things* both to the eye and to discourse The ever more complete preservation of what was written, the establishment of archives, then of filing systems for them, the reorganization of libraries, the drawing up of catalogues, indexes, and inventories, all these things represent . . . an order of the same type as that which was being established between living creatures.

Linnaeus began his new way of connecting things taxonomically by modifying but hardly rejecting the Great Chain of Being, the cosmos of God the Creator (Tillyard n.d.), which he enhanced through the precision of monothetic classification. Yet scientific taxonomies helped to shift classification further from the God-given toward the humanly constructed (Weinstock 1985; Frangsmyr 1994; Gould 1987). As an idea of science, the forming of monothetic taxonomy shaped perceptions of the physical world by opening time/space to the capture and containment of all things, living and inert, through their naming, itemization, placement. All things were classified exclusively and inclusively on vertical axes and horizontal planes in concordance with explicit rules that enabled the classified to enter the discourse of the classifier.

To construct a taxonomic scheme there had to be explicit rules for the delineation of categories, and for the inclusion of items within them; for the aggregation of categories at higher and lower planes, and for the resolution of anomalies when an

item fit more than one category on the same plane of abstraction. Therefore there had to be rules also for the creation of new categories, through division and addition. The decision-rules of scientific, monothetic taxonomies were understood as conscious and secular constructions, without divine inspiration, yet mirroring its precision. This conception of classification resembled that of a static, monothetic form, rule-governed yet empty of content. More accurately, this dynamic of the forming of form moved relatively slowly, though with definitiveness and the need to assimilate new items uncovered in faraway places in this age of discovery. This slow dynamic was closer to movement in the divinely created and regulated natural cosmos. Yet, to the extent that the decision-rules of a taxonomic scheme did their work of comparison, contrast, attribution, and distribution, one could also speak of the “rationality” and “efficiency” of the taxonomy.

This idea of taxonomy as a totality of information was hardly restricted to science. Mapping and placing, naming and classifying, became pervasive to the practices of the period. Yet because the taxonomy was a slow-moving dynamic, to render social life visibly taxonomic required the application of considerable force. Force often took the form of power through presentation. In one of Foucault’s striking examples, instructions to control an outbreak of plague in seventeenth-century France, the taxonomic map is the territory.

In response to the tendrils of infection, of disorder, death, chaos, the town is sealed. Within, it is divided into sections and streets, each under the authority of an official. Dwellers are locked within their homes, bread and wine reach their doorsteps via small wooden canals that branch out from more central ones. The only people to move between houses are the higher officials and the non-persons who carry the corpses and the sick from place to place, from category to category. The boundaries of this “frozen space” (Foucault 1979: 195) are controlled by officials, themselves fixed in place. Surveillance within the town is pervasive. Every day each of the inhabitants of a house appears before his allocated window, to answer the roll call of officials: name, age, sex, death, illness, irregularity, all are inscribed and recorded. In this way the totalization of information is emended. “The relation of each individual to his disease and to his death passes through representatives of power, the registration they make of it, the decisions they take on it” (ibid.: 197).

The application of such social taxonomies is proto-bureaucratic. The minute, visible, forceful application of classification is living presentational evidence of its validity: the town has become “[t]his enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which events are recorded . . .” (ibid.: 197). The vision is that of the perfectly governed polity in which: “power is mobilized; it makes itself everywhere present and visible . . . it separates, it immobilizes, it partitions; it constructs for a time what is both a counter-city and the perfect society . . .” (Foucault 1979: 205; Eliav-Feldon 1982: 45). The perfectly governed society is one in which every person is classified and catalogued, and, therefore, in principle is regulated.

The age of the theater and that of the catalogue collided and intersected in numerous public venues, as the following instance from Bologna indicates. There, for one hundred and fifty years during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, taxonomizing science was linked intimately to events of presentation. During this period a public anatomy course—the dissection of an entire human body with accompanying scholarly exegesis and learned debate—was held annually for ten to fifteen days during the carnival period (Ferrari 1987). The dissection was an exercise in monothetic precision and rigor in the naming and classifying of body parts, their functioning and function—a disciplined exercise of taking apart an individual whole, but under the total control of science. The public dissection was a spectacle infused with the scientific (and proto-bureaucratic) de-forming of form.

Of especial fascination here is how this monothetic de-formation emerges from the discourse of science and takes the form of spectacle, of a presentation of parts held up for inspection, one by one. And, that the anatomy course was held during carnival, and was attended also by anonymous masked revelers. Carnival de-formed the monothetic by raucously playing with the body, exposing hidden social innards, upending and jumbling social order, blurring boundaries among distinct categories and torquing them into one another. As this occurred, the dissection and presentation of body parts simultaneously began to make monothetic order in this world of carnival, an order that formed scientific classification out of the de-formation of a human whole that concealed most of its body parts within itself. Here science took the aesthetic form of a proto-bureaucratic spectacle that laid out for didactic inspection that which was usually hidden within the body.

During the eighteenth century, Western perceptions turned the interior integration of the scientific taxonomy—the archive, the table, the catalogue—into one of organic relationships. Foucault (1973: 218) puts this shift in the following way: “the general area of knowledge is no longer that of identities and differences . . . of a general *taxonomia* . . . but an area made up of organic structures, that is, of internal relations between elements whose totality performs a function . . . the link between one organic structure and another . . . can no longer be the identity [in and of itself] of one or several elements, but must be the identity of the relation between the elements and of the function they perform . . .” Rendered as components in organic relationships, classified items practiced functions for entire classifications. This more complex division of labor within and among monothetic taxonomies began to shift into that which we recognize as a functional system: a hierarchic assemblage of levels and categories, that are thought to belong more together than apart; each of which contribute specialized functions to the existence of the whole assemblage. The entire assemblage is dependent on the functions of each of its parts, as they are on one another.

Relationships of interdependence informed the taxonomy with a quicker dynamic of purpose and direction, and so provided social life with more proficient fulcrums of power: the ratio of force to social control changed, so that less force could achieve more powerful effects. The premises of monothetic classification were not disposed

of; instead its forming was in-formed by a more “systemic” organization. Systemic taxonomizing enabled one to influence in monothetic, totalistic ways whatever was reorganized. Should a part (and its specialized function) be altered, the repercussions would be felt throughout the entire system. As a depiction of organization, the table of contents was to be replaced by the flow chart, while the theorizing of Spencer and Maine, Tönnies and Durkheim, waited at the threshold.

The forming logic that shaped scientific and other taxonomies valued the visual above all other senses. The scientific gaze can be called “attestive,” following Ezrahi (1990: 72–87), the gaze of knowledge that dispassionately uncovers, dissects, classifies, and displays the facts of phenomena. The attestive eye is no less integral to the bureaucratic ethos. Science and bureaucracy produce, preserve, and use texts without number. Classification commonly depends on the eye. Therefore, bureaucratic work is also hermeneutical; its practices and explanations follow from its own premises. Bureaucratic logic moves toward the self-exegetical and the contemplative. Nonetheless this hermeneutic continually implicates the gaze (Jay 1992).

The synthesis of the visual, the taxonomic, and the systemic was exemplified by innovative topological designs like that of Jeremy Bentham’s late-eighteenth-century Panopticon, intended as a site for punishment and work. The Panopticon was a design of taxonomy as spectacle, made systemic. The name reflects Greek roots, meaning “all-seeing.” The panopticon: a circular, tiered building composed of individual cells whose inmates cannot see one another, but all of whom are visible to supervisors in a central tower who, in turn, are hidden from the inmates. The supervisors themselves are visible to the director, who is hidden from everyone. Exterminated from the panoptic sort is sociality, the interconnectedness and interchange of human beings, their seeing and feeling one another as subjects. Present are the “clients” of the organization, each individual reduced to a body controlled by abstraction, by the geometric: separated, numbered, supervised, put to productive tasks, each within the isolation of his cell—and on continuous display. Who exercises power and why is of no immediate relevance: whoever occupies the tower, the center, the office, the apex of hierarchy, operates the classifying gaze of perfect taxonomy and its systemic control. Indeed, the Panopticon has been called a “materialized classification” (Jacques-Alain Miller, cited in Bozovic 1995: 24). The Panopticon is the dynamic of the bureaucratic forming of form gazing at the forming of its product, the client, who is enacting the ways in which he has come to be taxonomized. Here this forming logic gives shape and life to a living taxonomy that is in the ongoing performance of presentation.⁶

In the Panopticon, Bentham intended to create a perfectly symmetric cosmology of scopic supervision, its hierarchy analogous to that of God, angels, and humans; yet a secular microcosmos, one consciously invented, synthesizing surveillance, control, and the changing of individuals. In the entry of the prisoner into the Panopticon, Bentham joined bureaucratic logic to an event of presentation, to a show decidedly didactic in content, one to be staged by the “manager of a theatre” (Bentham 1995: 101). In this entry (Bentham called it a “masquerade.”) the prisoner performed and

attested to his own guilt and sentencing in order to persuade others not to transgress (Bozovic 1995: 5). The prisoner performed himself as a confession through which his hidden feelings were exteriorized, so that both his interior and exterior fit perfectly within the taxonomizing form he was in the process of becoming. This was similar to the anatomy dissection, except that in the Panopticon the corpse came alive. In performing himself, the prisoner embodied his guilt.⁷ As the prisoner performed his entry, he formed himself into a spectacle pervaded by bureaucratic logic; then to be moved deeper into the prison, into his isolated cubicle, to live entirely by this logic of the forming of form, as an ongoing spectacle controlled by bureaucratic logic.⁸

The Panopticon entry contrasts decisively with the behavior of the prisoner in earlier times before his public execution. In Royal France the prisoner performed his own guilt in a great public spectacle of self-fragmentation that reflected and celebrated the holistic power of the King, embodied in the identity of his person and his kingdom (Foucault 1979; Ezrahi 1990: 72–74); while, within the panoptic forming of form, the prisoner performed in seclusion, before a committee of his sorters (including a theater manager), those who executed his shaping. Rather than his own dismemberment through execution, the panoptic prisoner was individuated, torn from his social integument of relationship and exchange, and put to work in a world itself detached, anonymous, autonomous. The panoptic vision brings together the taxonomic and a more modern sense of the systemic, so that the exercise of power could become “lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come” (Foucault 1979: 209). Such a design would require little fiscal expenditure; would be labor intensive; would be politically discreet; would be relatively invisible; would arouse little resistance; and would raise the effects of social power to maximum intensity and specificity.⁹

In the twentieth century, Weber’s conception of rational-legal authority became the cornerstone of much modern thinking on bureaucracy. My concern here is not with the concept’s current status, but with how this concept further developed the dynamics of the bureaucratic forming of form. Weber’s understanding of bureaucracy implicitly depended on the premise of classification. The rational-legal bureaucratic type (Weber 1964: 329–40) has the following characteristics. It requires a classification of “offices.” Offices are defined by “rules” (“a consistent system of abstract rules, intentionally established”). All offices are regulated by a “continuous organization” of rules that inform the overall scheme of classification. Thus the organization of offices can be understood as a taxonomy of categories of office, regulated by general principles of classification. The contents of a category of office are defined by the boundary rules of the taxonomy in relation to the particular category in question. (Such contents concern spheres of authority, competence, technical knowledge, procedures for making decisions, and so forth). Offices as categories are situated within a hierarchy of levels of superordination and subordination. The entire schema is understood as a secular construction, one whose practice is intended to exhaust the phenomenal domain to which it is applied. “Monothetic rationality” is embedded in this idea of

bureaucracy; in its abstract, intentional principles of hierarchical organization and integration, and in its clean-cut definitions of categories (i.e., offices) that are exclusive and inclusive. Weber's conception of modern bureaucracy, which he termed "a power instrument of the first order—for the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus" (Gerth and Mills 1958: 228), depends on premises both of taxonomy and of the systemic.¹⁰

The Weberian paradigm of bureaucracy bears a strong semblance to the organization of taxonomies, social and scientific, of the seventeenth century, yet now informed by systemic premises. The *raison d'être* of the bureaucratic form is systemic taxonomic practice. In the modern age, the shaping of form is purposive, directed, directional. The organization is shaped to intentionally accomplish some goal; and to accomplish this the relationship between means and ends is made explicit and rationalist. The functions of offices are specialized and specific in their complex interdependence. The entire system is infused with a social power whose focused intensity is evident on any of its levels, in any of its parts.

As a generalized system of processing information, this schema is in principle *devoid* of content, just as it is devoid of ethics. The bureaucratic schema can be filled with any content, to be processed in accordance with instructions. This is why it frightened Weber, though he was a German nationalist. This is why Bauman (1989: 106) argues that bureaucracy "is intrinsically capable of genocidal action," since its operators can target, select out, and seal off a social category from a multitude of others. Wyschogrod (1985: 39) contends that this may be done through a "sorting myth," a cosmogonic method of dividing off, excluding, and even destroying certain social categories, so as to remake others as organic, as essence, as foundational, as a purified people, as a united family. The monothetic bureaucratic logic that organizes this exclusion and seclusion of the selected category may become the only frame of reference for its victims, the members of the category (Bauman 1989: 123), and therefore their hope and death of hope.¹¹

Underscored here over and again are the qualities of modern social organization and of the modern state that use bureaucratic logic to invent and modify taxonomies in the most commonsense and routine of ways. These classifications, often systemic, proliferate and flourish in the present as never before, dividing any and all social units—group, community, family, relationship—and fragmenting, classifying, and reshaping the humanity of human beings . . . but also destroying this. The inner vision of bureaucratic logic is that of a hermeneutical gaze of "viewpoints unaffected by standpoints" (Illich 1995: 52). The bureaucratic forming of form is capable of consciously and deliberately creating virtually any reality and of processing its contents.¹²

The development of the Science of Police had profound consequences for moral and social order in the emerging societies of Central and Eastern Europe, and eventually on the proto-bureaucratic state-in-the-making of the socialist Zionists in Palestine. The Science of Police depended on bureaucratic logic but moved this shaping more explicitly and firmly toward the political, toward the dynamics of organizing

and administering community. I turn to discussing bureaucratic logic in the Science of Police.¹³

Bureaucratic Logic in the Science of Police

In Central Europe the religious conflicts of the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) were ended by the peace of Westphalia (1648). This began the end of the dominance of the Holy Roman Empire. In Foucault's (2007: 348) terms, that which then came into being was "a new rationality by . . . carving out the domain of the state in the great cosmo-theological world of medieval and Renaissance thought." The empire was characterized by a multitude of smaller and larger states and principalities whose existence was legitimated by the peace of Westphalia that emerged from "the strong conviction at the time in the virtues of a centralized and unified political authority as a guarantor of virtuous government" (Harding and Harding 2006: 411). Westphalia formally recognized the territorial integrity of the multitude of German-speaking principalities (which for a century many had been exercising in practice). Foucault (2007: 317) comments on these principalities, "We can think of these German states, which were constituted, reorganized, and sometimes even fabricated at the time of the treaty of Westphalia . . . as veritable small, micro-state laboratories that could serve both as models and sites of experiment."

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these principalities practiced ways of ordering the state through a forming of form that has been called "Police," "the well-ordered police state," or "the science of police" (Raeff 1983; see also Oestreich 1982: 155–65). The science of police emerged fully from the domain of the political in the German micro-states. Coming out of the feudal structure of the Holy Roman Empire, these states had no tradition of specialized administrative personnel, though administrative specialization began to be developed and taught in the German universities. Foucault (2007: 318) calls this specialization "something with practically no equivalent in Europe . . . , an absolutely German specialty that spreads throughout Europe and exerts a crucial influence." With the shattering of the occidental Christian cosmos and empire and the rejection of ecclesiastical institutions, it was the secular authorities, the secular political domain, that stepped in with ordinances of the science of police (Raeff 1983: 56).

The science of police was neither the police nor the police state in today's sense of these terms. The practices of the science of police deliberately planned and administered the shape and substance of *Gemeinschaft* (community), such that people would behave as they should for the common good (*res publica*), the good that encompassed and included them all and that in this case specifically included the "set of means that serve the splendor of the entire state and the happiness of all its citizens" (Foucault 2007: 313–14), that is, the desirability of their living fruitful, productive, satisfying lives. This was to be accomplished by "establishing a closer connection between the moral realm and the life-style of the population . . . [the] acceptance of the duties of

earthly existence for its own sake. It was imperative that the *same* norms and values inform every activity of the individual and group” (Raeff 1983: 88, my emphasis). In this the beliefs and teachings of the churches had a vital role; yet the churches were under the protection of the state, and in the Protestant states the ordinances of police regulated the proper performance of all aspects of church life, and amongst these, first and foremost, ritual (ibid.: 59).

To practice, and so to create the good of all—the state and its citizens—required the deliberate, rational, standardization and exactness in specifying similarity and difference in order to introduce uniform classifications; thereby to compare and to control persons in the most specific of ways (Kharkhordin 2001: 227). So, statistical information was collected, bearing on the capacities and resources of populations and their territories (rates of birth and death appeared; covert denunciation of neighbors was commended). New taxonomies based on age, sex, occupation, and health were invented, intended to increase wealth and population, but also to enable intervention in and to alleviate a wide variety of social problems. People would be enabled to live happier lives, as individuals and as groups, within the nexus of concerned regulation. Through correct practices, people were *naturalized*, one could say, into perceiving these ways of living *as best for the well-being of one and all*. These practices of togetherness effected the group-centered character of social order, the sense that good ways of living were integral to social relationships. Though the beginnings of the science of police had powerful qualities of imposition and coercion, with time these ways of living, and living together, came to be felt as naturally right for the interiority of collectivity, perhaps even as sprouting from values of *Gemeinschaft* and likely undergirded by values of holism.

Through what I call bureaucratic logic, the science of police was practiced by promulgating and applying standardized administrative ordinances and rules for behavior within very broad domains of intervention, yet in highly specific detail. So, in various places the science of police set rules for the use of the personal pronoun between parents and children, for the dimensions of saddles, for the enumeration of what should be drunk and consumed during wedding feasts, for the number of people permitted to attend a christening, and so forth. A rational science of endless, detailed listings of classification in the interests of the “good order of public matters” (Pasquino 1991: 111) in the interests of the forming and shaping of collectivity as a community of hardworking, industrious people for the good of the state (Raeff 1983: 87–88). Police regulations tried to organize everything that went unregulated, that lacked clear form in a society of the three estates—this was “a great effort of formation of the social body,” one that demanded degrees of order that reached beyond law and encroached on domains new to becoming occupied by public ordering (Pasquino 1991: 111).¹⁴ In terms of its institutions, the science of police in the German principalities was more proto-bureaucratic than bureaucratic, yet it established a “gridwork of order” (Gordon 1991: 20) that paid close, regulating attention to the itemization, movement, and flow of persons and goods.

Above all, the patterning of this gridwork of order and its taxonomies was symmetrical in its control of variance, variation, idiosyncrasy. Simmel ([1896] 1968: 72–73) argues that the “tendency to organize all of society symmetrically . . . according to general principles is shared by all despotic forms of social organization Symmetrical organizations facilitate the ruling of many from a single point. Norms can be imposed from above with less resistance and greater effectiveness in a symmetrical organization than in a system whose inner structure is irregular and fluctuating.” This was so for the science of police, and more generally is so for all social forms shaped through bureaucratic logic. Bureaucratic logic generates the symmetries of monothetic taxonomizing. The science of police totalized the control of sameness and difference through taking responsibility for society and sociality (Foucault 2007: 326). Central to the ethos of living that was to be more than just living was the linking of the state’s strength to the felicity of the individual, such that men’s happiness was turned into the utility of the state, indeed into the very strength of the state (Foucault 2007: 327).

The same kind of link held for communities. Raeff points out that through compartmentalization (like the number of people permitted to attend a christening) the family was made more private, separated more from extended kin and social networks. The person was individualized (and expected to become a more productive and efficient worker) and individuated (and, so, accentuated as a unit of counting and governance). Yet together with this the community became solidary through its self-managing and self-policing, all for the common good; and persons felt the significance of the organizing community in their lives, as individuals and as group members. Thus the public sphere penetrated deeply within the private, so that the emergence of the private sphere (the family, the individual) incorporated powerful visions of the public good as a collective endeavor, one that contributed to making the private domain reliant on that of the public and its governance. Governance had opened points of entry into the private sphere, and the private sphere was imbued with values of the public.¹⁵ Individuation in my usage refers to the categorical separation of person from person, making each into an individuate through administrative forces external to the person. Bureaucratic logic individuates when it generates taxonomies within which the person is made a member of an aggregate in a particular social category and is isolated in this way for administrative purposes. Individualization refers to the person perceived as a unique being in terms of psychologicistic qualities. As Lemke (2001: 191) puts it, “Foucault endeavors to show how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence.” The modern state shaped individual agency to fit the spread of pastoral power through bureaucratic institutions (Foucault 1982: 783–85). These institutions individuated the person and tended to the person so individuated. The individual exercised agency within the range of possibilities extended by individuating bureaucracies.

The powerful sense of solidary, organic groupness that came into existence in the German principalities emerged together with the power of this groupness to shape

and discipline the person as an individual, yet as the exercise of power integral to the happiness of both community and individual. In Foucault's terms, the pastoral care of the state was joined to the care of selfhood. Thus in Foucault's view, individual agency is a modern, bureaucratic conception of that which I am calling both the individualization and the individuation of the person, in terms of which the individual participates in his or her own self-formation (Foucault 1980; Rose 1998).¹⁶ Articulated together were the welfare of the group and the well-being of the individual who was managed in the first instance from outside himself, leading him to value his membership in and feelings for groupness and community, and his creative independence within groupness. Most intriguing, the enabling of both division (through classification) and unification eventually came to grow from the deeply organic sense of groupness, bottom-up, as it were—out of the well-being and happiness of community and not simply from the coercion of authority. The German sociologist, Ferdinand Tönnies, called this adhesion to the holism of *Gemeinschaft*, the “spontaneous will” (*Naturwille*), in our terms the utter naturalization of the individual into the social whole. Therefore this enablement did not alienate levels of social order from one another, for culturally they came to grow out of one another—their relationship was continuous with one another, with the individual and individualism firmly embedded within and integral to community. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the German philosopher, Johan Gottlieb Fichte, could say that the goal of social order was “the complete unity and unanimity of all its members” (quoted in Hartman 1997: 123). In the Prussian state, which unified Germany politically in the nineteenth century, the top-down formation of absolutist statehood met the more bottom-up values of holistic community, the long-term effects of the Science of Police.¹⁷

The tsars of Russia, beginning with Peter I, brought ideas of the well-ordered police state into the very different grounds of eighteenth-century Russia. Unlike the more interior forming of community in the German principalities, Peter imposed the science of police top-down on Russian social and moral order. His project was to wrench into existence an abstract conception of the state, one that conceived of its policy in terms of rational efficiency in ordering and changing society through didactics, regulation, and prescription (Raeff 1983: 205). Instead of an incompact empire governed loosely from its center but with high degrees of local autonomy, he introduced centralized and centralizing administration, and built a new capital, Saint Petersburg, as the exemplar of rectilinear hierarchy and functional planning (Scott 1998: 194). The bureaucratic forming of form took shape through top-down coercion and compulsion, discipline, and regimentation (Raeff 1983: 237; Stites 1989: 19–24). Peter introduced bureaucratic institutions that formally separated government from other domains of life, that required written records, and that paid attention to the minutiae of office (inkwells, furniture, office hours) (Raeff 1983: 203). The terminology of the state, as an apparatus of government independent of ruler and ruled, appeared in Russian in the eighteenth century. The state—the bureaucracy and legal apparatus—was brought into existence in between ruler and ruled in the name

of the common good but imposed from above as coercive form (Kharkhordin 2001). Catherine the Great made the administrative system introduced by Peter more efficient, in trying to shape a society that would reflect the practices of the well-ordered police state, and that would help rather than hinder the modernizing efforts of the state. Her reforms rationalized administration on lower levels of state organization, and effected ways of life on local levels. Nonetheless, Russian statutes continued to stress the repressive and punitive dimensions of police law (Raeff 1983: 224–54).

The science of police worked well in the closely-knit German principalities because the logic of its forming of form had resonated deeply and harmonically among groups, individuals, and moral order. By contrast, the Russian version of police continued to be imposed from above to hold together the vastness, heterogeneity, and locality of Russia as empire and as frontier state. One could argue that the top-down imposition of order in Russia continued to be a major force for societal control until the fall of the Soviet empire in 1989. Unlike the German case, the Russian case has continuously generated profound discontinuities and a lack of organic integration between different levels of social order.

The socialist Zionist leaders who rose to prominence in Palestine came there from Russia after 1905 and then again after the October Revolution. They were well inculcated in top-down social and moral order, but they were also deeply concerned that this turn into a powerful sense of organic community, one that would be felt to grow from the bottom up. They brought with them the shaping force and power of Russian (and then Soviet) bureaucratic organization, but also the more distant resonance of German organic groupness with its interior force of shaping moral and social order categorically, yet nonetheless felt to grow from within itself.¹⁸

The science of police is close to what Foucault (1991: 103) calls governmentality. The sensibilities of governmentality are important here because they relate directly to forms that constitute the state, and to public events that reflect what is felt to be significant in this state of being. Governmentality should be read as govern-mentality, or simply as government—the perceptions that the State should intervene systemically, however loosely articulated the systems, in the lives, relationships, networks, and enterprises of its own citizens, for its own good and for their well-being. Therefore governmentality can be understood as forms of activity that shape, guide, and affect the conduct of persons (Gordon 1991: 2). Paralleling my claim that bureaucratic logic is a logic of practice, the practice of forming in certain ways and not in others, Foucault (1991: 97) argues that governmentality is the practice of forming acts of governing—the reality of governmentality is its doing. Thus the shift into the Jewish nation-in-arms through national public events is a practice of governmentality through which distinctions between state and nation are erased, the heads of state become the heads of the nation, and the symmetrics of inclusion and exclusion are practiced to a high degree.¹⁹

Governmentality in Foucault's usage is much more than the formal apparatus of state administration—it is closer to a composite reality put together by institutions, procedures, myths, analyses, reflections, strategies, and tactics that enable the shap-

ing, effecting and affecting of populations (Foucault 1991: 102–3). The practices of governmentality may be totalistic, top-down, and all-embracing, or, as Rose (1996b: 57, 61) argues for advanced liberal democracies, these practices may exist at the “molecular level” of social orders, in relation to “micro-moral domains.” Trouillot (2001: 130), echoing Foucault, points out that, “statelike processes and practices also obtain increasingly in nongovernmental sites such as NGOs or trans-state institutions such as the World Bank. These practices, in turn, produce effects as powerful as those of national governments.”²⁰ Their effects are state-like. Public events of presentation in the modern state are no less the products of this governmental ensemble of the state and the state-like.

Yet much of the complexity in coordinating the mentalities of a governing ensemble depends on the use of the flexibility of bureaucratic logic in inventing and altering linear classification. Bureaucratic logic enables the tailoring of classification to the sorting and organizing of micro- and macro-levels, and to a wide variety of social units of heterogeneous composition. Bureaucratic logic gives to strategies of governmentality a tremendous range of adaptation in the face of complex, rapidly shifting social, political, and economic conditions.²¹

Bureaucratic Logic and the State-Form

Logics of the forming of form address the imagining and formation of phenomenal worlds. The forming of phenomenal worlds is ongoing, never-ending. In the case of bureaucratic logic, the *métier* of the forms of organization that this logic informs is that of change, acting on and altering phenomenal worlds continuously, by adding, subtracting, dividing, and re-dividing levels and categories of classification through which these worlds are put together and taken apart. Yet bureaucratic logic is hardly the sole logic of the forming of form we can identify. Most likely there is a vast field of logics of the forming of form—not universals for the shaping of particular social forms, but a fuzzy reservoir of human imaginaries, of potentials of logics of forming.

My reading of Deleuze and Guattari (1988) suggests that their concept of the state-form is a logic of forming. The logic of the state-form complements bureaucratic logic, and this relationship is discussed here. Deleuze and Guattari ask us to imagine how logics of form inevitably emerge from one another, changing themselves as they do. This is especially significant here because the forming logic of the state-form opens toward the state. Bureaucratic logic and the state-form share dynamics that enable them to interact synergistically, to provide together certain crucial attributes of the state in modernity.

The forming logic of the state-form is arboreal and spatial: the shaping is tree-like, deeply rooted, in-place, a fundament of origins and ancestry reaching unbroken from the distant past into the far future, centered stably around an *axis mundi* that opens in all directions and planes, unmoving, vertical, tall, hierarchical, protective under the cover of its shading; branching and reproducing clearly, exactly. This logic of forming

expands by capture, by taking space, by reproducing its form in additional spaces, by making over these spaces into places. The state-form extends itself lineally, a design for quantitative growth of space and population (Patton 2000). The state-form gives especial attention to shaping and controlling its own interiority, as distinct from exteriority. Deleuze and Guattari (1986: 15) write that: “the law of the State is . . . that of interior and exterior. The State is sovereignty. But sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally.” Space is striated-smooth. The state-form striates the space it contains (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 385). Striated space “closes a surface, divides it up at determinate intervals, establishes breaks . . .” (ibid.: 481). This is the lineal forming of measurable spaces, and of standardized measures to determine all similarities and differences within these spaces.

Deleuze and Guattari relate the state-form to (in my terms) the logic of forming that they call the rhizome. Each of these logics is interior to the other, such that in particular social, historical conditions, each generates the other, each emerging from the other; just as, under other conditions, each meets the other through the interface of exteriors that clash. The rhizome grows open-ended networks of indeterminate nexuses that are shifting, incompact, without centers, without hierarchy, so that any point of a rhizome can connect to any other without going through another. The rhizome is a multiplicity of dimensions, not of bounded linear categories. The lines of the rhizome are flat (not vertical) because these lines continually fill all of their dimensionality. Rhizomes that are broken, shattered, scattered, activate one or another line of movement and growth. The rhizomic has no deep structure, no foundational axis, nor the capacity to grow anything except itself, yet without knowing precisely what it is. So the rhizomic cannot trace itself: it has no capacity for self-organization through memory; no capacity to account, to locate, to specify, to count; and therefore no capacity to capture (even itself) (ibid.: 7–20). The rhizome is smooth space, the space of a patchwork of continuous variation without unity of direction (ibid.: 481). Yet where the rhizome shows nodes of massification, the logic of the state-form is emerging.

The Israeli state, Israeli-Jewish nationalism, the project of shaping Jews as national in their citizenship, have always been at war with the rhizomic logic of forming. From the perspective of governmentality, any felt fragmentation (ideological, ethnic, religious) among Israeli Jews is the subversive appearance of the rhizomic. In these terms, Palestinian citizens of Israel, perceived as the enemy from the founding of the state, should be excluded from the arboreal unity that characterizes the community of Israeli Jews. Jews should relate organically toward one another within their community-state; whereas, Palestinians are perceived by so many Jews as threatening, as a fifth-column.

Deleuze and Guattari take for granted that the state-form generates its own apparatus of self-regulation. Yet I am arguing that bureaucratic logic exists in its own right, and that it shapes without necessary reference to whatever forms of organization emerge from shaping by the state-form. Like the state-form, bureaucratic logic shapes and controls the social surfaces of its expanding space through the capture of

new territory for the deployment of power. A classification creates space that simultaneously is captured, bounded, contained. Yet whatever lies beyond the boundary of this captured space becomes the basis for further extension. New classifications create their own *raison d'être* for expansion and self-totalization.²²

The classifications invented through bureaucratic logic also open space within their containment by making new divisions within existing ones. Complementing the arboreal logic of the state-form, bureaucratic logic enables bureaucratic form to expand through a kind of cellular division of difference yet sameness—the adding of more units of organization to itself (a new title, a new office, a new subcommittee). Bureaucratic logic enables bureaucratic form to attend to finer and ever-increasing details (Lefort 1986: 95). Thus, Lefort (1986: 108) comments that, “it is essential to grasp the movement by which bureaucracy creates its order. The more that activities are fragmented, departments are diversified, specialized, and compartmentalized . . . the more instances of coordination and supervision proliferate, by virtue of this very dispersion, and the more bureaucracy flourishes Bureaucracy loves bureaucrats, just as much as bureaucrats love bureaucracy.”

Given the powerful affinity between bureaucratic logic and monothetic classification, the former is continually implicated in the kind of counting that, as noted, is symbolic of inclusion, exclusion, hierarchy. Stone (1988: 128) points out that this language of counting sounds highly political. Inclusion and exclusion are terms that suggest community, boundaries, allies, enemies; selection implicates privilege and discrimination (and social triage and genocide); while the characteristics that define a class of categories or the category itself connote value judgement and hierarchy. Both bureaucratic logic and the state-form symbolize acts of counting and the arbitrary fragmentation or augmentation of numbers into yet other numbers. Every act of counting practices and regenerates this logic.

The dynamic of capture, containment, and taxonomic division within classification has the formidable impetus and coercion of law in modern society. King (1993: 223) argues that,

in the legal system social events derive their meaning through the law's unique binary code of lawful/unlawful, legal/illegal. An event in the social environment cannot be interpreted simultaneously as lawful and unlawful or as falling both within and outside the scope of the law. These categories are mutually exclusive Any act or utterance that codes social acts according to this binary code of lawful unlawful may be regarded as part of the legal system, no matter where it was made and no matter who made it.

King is saying that in modern social orders the implementation of division and contrast in terms of absolute categories of inclusion and exclusion has something of the feel, force, and aesthetic qualities of legal mandate (see also Gray 1978: 141). In my terms, the phenomenal forms generated by bureaucratic logic have imbedded in them the feeling of the force impact, and aesthetics of the symmetries of law. These

distinctions need not be binary, in the sense of a choice between two and only two possibilities. The crucial point is the maintenance of the logic of form, the symmetrical distinction between inclusion and exclusion. In monothetic terms, truth is necessarily a singularity, not a multiplicity.

Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that the relationship between the state-form and the rhizome is not dialectical, given that each of these imaginaries exists within the other. Their relationship to one another is that of the continual emergence of each within the other, while this process exteriorizes them into near-absolute distinctiveness only under extraordinary conditions. Bureaucratic logic, however, drives toward a perfect fit between the borders of categories, smoothing the interface between a subject to be counted and a category of classification, so that the category wholly contains the subject. This meeting is procrustean, territorializing the subject as a space of subjection, yet also smoothing, shaping the subject to the category, while smoothing each category to others of the taxonomy. As it striates form, bureaucratic logic simultaneously smooths form.

Bureaucratic logic de-territorializes, in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, since its formings have the capacity to amputate any and all social relationships (whether of family, kin, community, friendship), thereby severing and separating persons from one another, from their locations in space (thus, imprisonment, transfer, ethnic cleansing, exile), from their usual trajectories of living, and even from their pasts (thus, social erasure and lobotomy) (Bogard 2000: 270). The social surface of the individual can be separated from any organic conception of the “person,” amputating the social from the personal, making the social surfaces of individuals placed within the same category homogeneous with one another.

In Israel, this smoothing of social surfaces operates in the bringing together of nationality, ethnicity, and minority. The classification of nationality contributes to the taxonomy of Jewish ethnicity and Palestinian minority, a taxonomy organized so that minority is made inferior to ethnicity. In terms of this taxonomy, superior Jewish ethnicity should show the value of national feeling on its social surface, while this is forbidden to the Palestinian minority.

Through bureaucratic logic, taxonomized space is the smooth depending from the striated, the striated depending from the smooth. The space within taxonomy is made smooth, standardized, homogeneous, every category symmetrically comparable to and relating neatly to every other on the same level of abstraction, and between levels. Simultaneously, the very creation of the entire scheme of social classification depends on its internal borders between exclusive categories. Bureaucratic classification is striating; it is simultaneously smoothing. Bureaucratic classification is smoothing; it is simultaneously striating. The interface between categories in a classification schema is smoothed, so that their “edges” fit together; while the fitting together of categories is itself striating.

Bureaucratic logic re-territorializes, in that it generates taxonomies of containment, so that within a taxonomy each category is put into its proper place. Bureau-

cratic logic joins smoothing to classifying, enabling and enhancing the fit among surfaces. Yet in its capacity to generate form as de-territorialized, as striated and lineal, bureaucratic logic is itself highly mobile without the need for deep roots of the arboreal state-form. Thus, bureaucratic logic can be practiced as its own metaphysics. Unlike the state-form, bureaucratic logic easily shifts its coordinates to shape containment in any terrain. No less, this logic is infinitely expandable, unless ordered to stop. Bureaucratic logic is a near-perfect “machine” of capture, forming interiority that is always exterior to itself, preparing always to capture exteriorly and to interiorize whatever it grasps and contains. Given its lack of essentialism in forming classification, bureaucratic logic opens time-space for new phenomena, like hybrids, that combine or transgress categories. The hybrid is simply another phenomenon, one that in accordance with this logic requires classification, as hybrid, or as appendage to a taxonomy.²³

Two examples from the early years of the Israeli state will give a sense of the arbitrary power of the directed use of bureaucratic logic, and of the flexibility of this apparatus of capture and containment. (This reasoning is ongoing, has not changed to this day, and is perhaps the most potent weapon in the ongoing confiscation of Palestinian lands in the occupied territories). The Absentee Property Law placed property abandoned by Palestinians during the 1948 War under the control of the Custodian of Absentee Property. Yet some thirty thousand Palestinians had fled from one place to another within Israel, and so had not left and were not refugees. Government bureaucracy applied the Absentee Property Law. To wit, any person who may have traveled to Beirut, Bethlehem, or elsewhere, even for a one-day visit, but outside borders that had not existed during the British Mandate, was classified as a “present absentee.” Such a person, one who was absent in his very presence, a non-person in terms of his property rights, indeed had his property confiscated (Peretz 1991). Through this and other legislation, the State gained a goodly portion of agricultural land that had belonged to Palestinians who became Israeli citizens.

Under emergency regulations promulgated by the British Mandate, the military governor could declare any area closed for national security reasons. After the 1948 War the population of twelve Arab villages were not permitted to return to areas that had been closed, though they had not left the country. Under an ordinance of the Ministry of Agriculture, the land was classified as uncultivated. The owners were notified that if they did not immediately cultivate these lands, the areas would be confiscated. However, the villagers could not enter these lands because the area was closed by military order. So the lands were expropriated and leased to Jewish farmers; and the villagers were left homeless (Rouhana 1997: 61; see also, Drury and Winn 1992; Benvenisti 1990).²⁴

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari are steadfast in their ahistoricism, resolute in their commitment to imagining and exploring dynamics of space, the skins of the imaginary. Yet, no less, the shaping of time—its smoothing and striating—is most relevant for the forms of the modern state, and for its public events of

nationhood and nationalism. Many scholars have commented on the importance for governmentality of controlling a people's sense of time, of shaping or of adopting shapes of time within which people know themselves and others as historical beings (or as people without history, in Eric Wolf's phrasing) through national imaginings of duration and periodization (Gross 1985; Verdery 1996: 39–57).

In my terms, the smoothing of time refers to metaphysics of the temporal, within which time is made to flow continuously, such that any markers of time embedded in the flow do not impede its movement, but are integral to its continuity.²⁵ Smoothing does not mean that time is necessarily lineal, in the sense of having a flat temporal trajectory. Jewish time imparts its significance through rhythmic pulsation, as I argue in Part II of the Epilogue. The smoothing and planning of time, indeed the very capture of time, enables the modern state to have a national history—either an unbroken past through time or a past that strives through national activity in the present to mend hiatus and to reshape gaps of discontinuity. The senses of national pastness, upon which so-called “collective memory” often depends, themselves depend from some shaping of national history or mythistory. A paramount device for the smoothing of time in the modern state is the event of presentation, since such events show themselves as fact, without questions, without conundra. These qualities of presentation show the joining and smoothing of present to past as unbroken duration (without showing the joints of their joining).

Yet events of presentation (see, for example, Chapter Five), even as they smooth, also striate time. Most simply the striation of time is its division, especially its classification into intervals in a taxonomy of time, so that any phenomenon within this containment is locatable exactly in its time. Conversely, any group or individual is divisible into its own history as a sequence of time-parts, synchronized temporally yet detachable from one another, like the slices of a salami. State and person are composed of time-parts, whereby any of their durations—often reckoned in years—can be sliced off the salami for purposes of classification. Clock time striates however it is counted, as do schedules, timetables, and the like. So, too, their synchronizations with one another are themselves classifications whose function is to enable surfaces of categories to juxtapose smoothly with one another through time. Just as mythistorical time is smoothed, so, too, this time must be striated—divided, dated, made lineal and sequential—since our understanding of history requires its mapping, its capture and containment, made interior as national history (see Gell 1992). Generally, the smoothing of national time, national history, also generates its striation, its markings of prominent times; for these, like body markings and incisions of initiation, make a difference in the perception of national and biographical selves.

The Bureaucratization of Politics in Jewish Palestine

The dominant ideological narratives in pre-state Jewish society in Palestine and later in Israel have given primacy to one or another idealistic vision of a Jewish collectivity,

equating individualism with the breakdown of their dreams (Ezrahi 1997: 81–89). All have diminished the individual as a person with agency. Zionist socialism, the dominant organizing force in Jewish Palestine, held a utopian vision of Jewish autonomy and Jewish statehood, to be attained through social engineering. As noted, virtually all of the founders of socialist Zionism in Palestine came from Russia between 1905 and 1926, the last group experiencing the first years of Soviet rule. They perceived themselves as socialists and nationalists, and where they came from influenced how they built Zionist presence in Palestine (Shapiro 1993: 66). Unlike western Europeans' concerns with liberal democracy and civil rights, the founders of Zionist socialism stressed the relationship between nation and nationalism, placing issues of rights squarely within the purview of the collectivity (Shapiro 1993: 79; Yanai 1996).

The vision of the Russian state as an administrative utopia lasted well into the nineteenth century. The few who held power arranged the lives of the others, to organize them for production, combat, or detention, through hierarchy, discipline, regimentation, rational planning, welfare planning, and a geometrical environment (Stites 1989: 19). Yet even as ideas of utopia declined, “the dream of state power refashioning the land and the people was too alluring to die, and it appealed even to the most radical social dreamers who hated the tsarist state and whose ultimate vision was a stateless society” (ibid.: 23). The October Revolution augmented obsessions with top-down reform and control, with increasing efficiency and machine-like systemic visions of social and economic production, with Taylorism and Fordism (ibid.: 146–49)—in other words, with the forming of form through capture, containment, striation. It is from this milieu of planned, administrative, systemic collectivism, with its Russian echoes of Police and the totalistic encompassment of the individual by the social order, that the founders of socialist Zionism arrived in Palestine.

So much attention has been given to the ideological dreams of these leaders, and so much less to the elementary fact that first and foremost they were attending to the building of bureaucratic infrastructure as the bedrock for their political and economic vision of a future state. Erecting bureaucracy was basic to their efforts, and this shaping had immense impact on their political and economic organization during the period of the *Yishuv*, the Zionist settler “community” of pre-state Palestine (Yuval-Davis 1987: 77), and then on forms of organization after statehood. These people were imbued with Russian political culture—tsarist absolutism and government intervention in all spheres of living, dominated by a collectivist orientation (Shapiro 1976: 2). The *Histadrut* (General Federation of Labor) umbrella trade-union organization, was established in 1920, and by 1925, David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the major political party of the *Yishuv*, Akhdut Ha'avodah (and later the first prime minister of the State), claimed that, “The Histadrut has been built like a quasi-state with self-rule for the working class . . .” (Shapiro 1993: 70; see also Yanai 1996: 139; Shalev 1992). This quasi-state included trade unions, labor exchanges, workers' kitchens, schools, public works bureaus, settlement departments, and so forth.

The nascent bureaucracy was taken over by the dominant political party, using methods reflecting how the Communist Party in the Soviet Union had gained control of the state by establishing party cells in all important centers of power, leading to control by a powerful, centralized party machine. In Palestine the socialist Zionist leadership built a strong party machine with cells in all Histadrut organizations, and by 1927 their party received an absolute majority in Histadrut elections. The founders of the party became the heads of the Histadrut, while the members of the inner council of the party were mostly bureaucrats in the Histadrut. In the Soviet Union the political leadership that created the bureaucracy became the product of “an apotheosis of bureaucratic institutions, an ultra-bureaucracy” (Pintner and Rowney 1980: 11). Bruno Rizzi (1985) called this “bureaucratic collectivism,” “the ascent of a new, bureaucratic ruling class and the conversion of the means of production into a new form of property, owned through the state in a nationalized . . . form” (Westoby 1985: 2). Something similar occurred in Palestine.

Ben-Gurion’s desire to shape his political forces as a disciplined, obedient “army of labor” (a version of the nation-in-arms, modeled perhaps on Trotsky’s idea of labor armies) was rejected by his party. Yet there was no disagreement that the issue was how to build a total organization, materially and spiritually, one that included party and Histadrut (Shapiro 1976: 60). One major Zionist figure called the Histadrut an “administrative democracy” (*ibid.*: 67)—a bureaucracy manned by politicians who used political practices to run organizations and bureaucratic practices to organize politics. Huntington and Brzezinski (cited in Shapiro 1976) called these leaders in Soviet Russia “bureaucratic-politicians,” in that only those who were prepared to head the bureaucracy could hold onto political leadership. The Soviet bureaucrat first had to demonstrate his mastery over the operation of systems of bureaucratic classification, thereby passing “tests” of his expertise, before he moved into the role of politician. These features of the bureaucrat-politician seem to have been the case also in the Yishuv (and later in the State). Bureaucratic-political practices in Palestine, argues Shapiro, were closer to the bureaucratic politics of Soviet Russia than they were to the electoral politics of democratic states.

The dominant party, becoming Mapai in 1930 (and then the Labor Party in 1969), set out to persuade the other Zionist parties of the Yishuv to reorganize themselves as copies of itself. Mapai supplied these parties with resources—financial, material, territorial—in exchange for coalition support; and also encouraged them to develop their own bureaucratic infrastructures, which led to close ties between these apparatuses across party lines (Shapiro 1993: 74). Major private enterprises accommodated their practices to Zionist socialist and nationalist rhetoric, arguing that industry, too, was integral to the armature of Jewish nation-building (Frenkel, Shenhav, and Herzog 1997). The success of the Jewish national in Palestine depended to a high degree on the development of bureaucratic infrastructures. Though limited and embryonic in their resources, these infrastructures did their utmost to organize, control,

plan, and totalize numerous spheres of living (including that of public events, largely planned and organized by committee). Though the scale of these activities (like the population) was relatively small, the solution to problems demanded greater centralization of activists, officials, and offices. As activities expanded and the structuring of living became more complex, new taxonomies and standards of classification had to be invented continually.²⁶

There also were the distant resonances of Police, with its powerful stress on the embrace of collectivity by the community, in that whatever was demanded by its regulations should resonate deeply with the desires of its members. Ben-Eliezer (1998b) contends that even as their elders in the Yishuv were intent on shaping a societal infrastructure through bureaucratization, among the younger native-born generation of socialist-Zionists the distinction between coercion and consent often blurred, and the will of the collectivity (of its leaders) was intended to be identical with the desire of individual members. He quotes a youth movement speaker: “We have no state, we are a Yishuv and a movement that counts on volunteering, and we have no regime . . . [but] the movement can declare a regime of volunteering, with anyone who does not volunteer being removed from the group. Today this council should declare that we are a movement of collective volunteering” (Ben-Eliezer 1998b: 378). Ben-Eliezer maintains that these people were creating a system of domination through the practice of certain kinds of organization over a broad range of interpersonal relations.

On the other hand, the Jewish proto-state was thoroughly pervaded by bureaucratic logic, which organized numerous domains of living, connecting officials and clients through rules, regulations, their bending and breaking. Every act that applied a regulation, that categorized a person, population, or thing, and that argued over proper classification, necessarily practiced and regenerated the bureaucratic logic of the forming of form.

Nonetheless, in the Yishuv, persons had degrees of choice as to national affiliation, as to whether to join a political party, as to what sources of aid to turn to, as to which friends to associate with (especially across the Jewish/Arab interface). This proto-state still was closer to a “civil society,” in the sense of a “free association, not under the tutelage of state power” (Taylor 1990: 98). During much of that period it was easier for individual Jews and Arabs to develop social relationships with one another.²⁷ After statehood, choices were narrowed, even pinched off. Bureaucratic logic was related indelibly to the laws of the land and to regulating its infrastructure.²⁸ This was a country in which ideas of liberal democracy, espousing the rights of the individual and of “minorities” against encroachment by the state, did not have and have not had much success. More and more strongly present is the use of the Holocaust as the foundational catastrophe that empowers nationalism and the nation-under-arms.²⁹ The ways in which these presences are formed depend to a high degree on bureaucratic logic.

Notes

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1. That bureaucratic logic is used endlessly in social orders that are to organize social life raises questions about the influence of the logic on democratic setups.
2. Bowker and Star (1999: 98) write of how the virus is dealt with through biological classification: “there has been a deliberate effort to create something that looks and feels like other biological classifications, even though the virus itself transgresses basic categories (it jumps across hosts of different kinds, steals from its host, mutates rapidly, and so forth) . . . Even in this most phenomenologically difficult of cases, the world must still be cut up into recognizable temporal and spatial units.” The virus of course is unaffected by scientific classifications.
3. Fuzzier forms of classification are also integral to the routine grounds of everyday living. These include polythetic classification (Sokal 1974; Needham 1975), Wittgenstein’s (1953) idea of “family resemblance,” and Kosko’s (1993) notion of multivalence. In these fuzzy classifications, items are brought together through that which psychologists have called “complexive classes,” or “chain complexes” (Vygotsky 1962). That is, members of a class of items are connected to one another by attributes not shared by all members of that class. Vygotsky described a child beginning with a small yellow triangle, then adding a red triangle, then a red circle, and so forth. When children used this kind of associative classification in school—classing a chair with a pencil because both are yellow, the pencil with a pointer because both are long and thin, and then regarding all three objects as constituting a class of objects, they were corrected by the teacher, who insisted on the recognition of a feature common to all members of the class: thus, pencil was classified with pen (as writing instruments), and so forth. In a series of pioneering experiments, Rosch (1975; Rosch et al. 1976) argued that family resemblances, a form of complexive groupings, are integral to how adults compose more abstract levels of classification, so that, for example, the class or level of “furniture” is arrived at by using complexive groupings of attributes. Note the close association between monothetic classification, racism, and eugenics, in official thinking, and the likely association between fuzzy classification, multiculturalism, and ideas of hybrid and cyborg. In anthropology, attention should be drawn to Strathern’s (1988) studies of gender in Melanesia, and to gender’s fluid character, such that female is an accentuated version of male, male of female, and which is which may quite depend on context. See also Roy Wagner’s recent formulation of a holographic worldview; Handelman and Shulman (1997: 194–97) on the Hindu deity, Siva, as a holographic god; and Handelman (1995b). Yet note Atran’s (1996) argument that all biological taxonomies of living kinds seem to have universal properties that accord more or less with monothetic classification.
4. Yet, too, those who put a classification to work also feed their own values into the scheme, and this needs to be taken into account in how classification impacts on that which it classifies. So, the bureaucratic innocence in census-taking can be turned easily to horrendous purpose. The Nazis used the Dutch comprehensive population registration system, set up to enable more accurate social science research, to identify Jews and Gypsies in The Netherlands (Seltzer and Anderson 2001). In 1988 the Iraqi war against the Kurds used the 1987 national census to define the target group of Kurds against whom to practice extermination (Salih 1996).
5. I use Foucault here, despite critiques of his historicism (e.g., Patey 1984: 266–69), given that his formulations offer a useful point of start for tracing this vector of bureaucratic logic.
6. The panopticon is a distant modification of the earlier *Kunstkammer*, the form of museum that in the interests of science brought together greatly disparate objects, natural and artifactual, ahistorical and historical, encouraging the playful forging of metaphoric relationships between unlike objects. Connectivity through metaphor illuminated the ongoing creation and creative potential of the world (Bredenkamp 1995: 69ff.). Unlike the Panopticon world, the holism

of the *Kunstkammer* world was predicated on degrees of asymmetry. Utilitarian thought later broke down the playful asymmetries of the *Kunstkammer* world into units that were combinable through monothetic logic, valuing the resulting symmetries in classification, whether in science or bureaucracy. On symmetries in modern science see Wechsler (1988) and McAllister (1996: 39–44).

7. In Kafka's short story, "In the penal colony," the prisoner learns of his guilt and punishment as they are inscribed on (and in) his body by a writing machine, thereby forming him into a bureaucratic text—the human being as the embodied, sensuous spectacle of bureaucratic order, not unlike the tattooed arm number invented for prisoners in Auschwitz, one that soon developed its own taxonomic distinctions (numbers for women on the inside of the forearm, for men on the outside).
8. Through the monothetic forming of form, surveillance of the individual comes decisively to the fore through total access to his isolation and display. A century earlier, Leibniz, in his, "An Odd Thought Concerning a New Sort of Exhibition (or rather, an Academy of Sciences)," written in September 1675, had proposed a series of "academies" for the public exhibition of scientific inventions, as well as "academies" of games and pleasures. Surveillance was important to the covert functioning of the latter, yet here the scopic still was hidden: "These [. . .] [academies of pleasure] would be built in such a way that the director of the house could hear and see everything said and done without any one perceiving him, by means of mirrors and openings, something that would be very important for the state [. . .]" (The translation of this passage is in Wiener 1957: 465.)
9. Such renditions are the visionary forerunners of the organizational forms we know today as total institutions, service organizations, people-processing organizations, and so forth. Such administrative frameworks use techniques of social, psychologicistic, educational, and bureaucratic intervention in the lives of persons defined as their "clients" (see, among others, Scott 1969; Dandekar 1990; Rose 1998; Bogard 1996; Handelman 1976, 1978).
10. Weber, however, never used the metaphor of the "iron cage," but rather the "shell as hard as steel," which has quite different connotations; nor did he metaphorize bureaucracy as this "shell" (Baehr 2001).
11. Bourdieu (1998: 52) maintains that through its "molding power" the modern state "wields a genuinely creative quasi-divine power" (see also Calhoun 1997: 76). Yet the logic of this creativity is that of the bureaucratic, the quasi-divine power emanating from the capacity of this logic to change social worlds by altering their classifications.
12. For example, though the powerful connections during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries among science, statistics, eugenics, and racism are well documented, ideas like that of bureaucratic logic, as the forming of form, are rarely if ever referred to. Thus Evans (1997: 295), writing on the Department of Native Affairs in mid-twentieth-century South Africa, clearly joins together science and racism to that which I am calling bureaucratic logic, but his approach goes no deeper than the study of institutions as such.
13. The forming of bureaucratic logic received impetus from other developments: from European colonialism and colonial administration (Arendt 1958), from the science of statistics, literally, the science of the state (Desrosieres 1998; Gigerenzer et al. 1989), from the embracing of numeration (Cohen 1982), and from individualism and its freedoms inherent in ideas of social contract, but also from the revolutionary reorganization of the military, and from shifts of education toward more universal criteria.
14. Foucault (2007: 338) thus likens police to a "permanent *coup d'Etat*," one that "is exercised and functions in the name of and in terms of the principles of its own rationality, without having to mold or model itself on the otherwise given rules of justice." In this formulation, Foucault comes close to those of Carl Schmitt, and then Agamben in "the state of exception." Yet, in certain ways, Foucault's formulation is the more profound because he is referring to a state of *permanent* exception concerned with endless self-regulation and, so, continuously renewing itself.

15. Rose (1998: 99–115) argues that in liberal, democratic societies the intention of governmentality is to produce, shape, and regulate the moral order within the psychological individual, rather than to suppress individuality, as is the case under totalitarian regimes.
16. This self-formation may take the shape of the “individual as enterprise,” the management of personal identity through which one is employed in this enterprise of living throughout one’s lifetime (Gordon 1991: 44). This perspective on self-identity dovetails well with the individual internalization of bureaucratic logic, and with the current emphasis on the importance of psychologies of self-actualization, self-autonomy, and the performance of self, raising the issue of how these psychologies contribute to the grounding of bureaucratic logic within the individual. See also Rieff (1966).
17. Here I do not follow developments in Prussia and the shaping of the bureaucratic-military absolutist state, this attempt to construct “a huge human automaton” (Rosenberg 1958: 38). To no small degree, the model here for bureaucratic absolutism was military (Anderson 1996: 243–46). According to Oestreich (1982: 258–72), in Germany the formation of the absolutist state, of top-down bureaucratic and military order met the more localized, more bottom-up “science of police” in what became their common goal of shaping and disciplining social and moral order. The developments in the principalities likely have had very long-term effects through German idealism, linking, for example, with the ethnographic insight that German individualism develops best within organic groups (Norman 1991).
18. That group formation not only be imposed top-down but also, quite mysteriously, emerge from within the group has been an ongoing concern of Israeli Jews. In Hebrew this process is often called “crystallization” (*gibush*), and a group of people brought or thrown together does not have groupness, this sense of belonging together naturally, until they feel this crystallization of sentiment (see Katriel 1991a). I emphasize “feel,” for there are no conscious, objective, social indices of how and when this sense of groupness comes into existence. People just feel when it has. In the Israeli case this crystallization is related to the coming into being of the nation-in-arms and the family-in-arms, and its existence has powerful commonsensical aesthetic qualities for many Israeli Jews.
19. The nation-in-arms is invoked with every declaration that Israel is “a Jewish and democratic state”—a sequence that privileges and empowers Jewish over democratic (see Kimmerling 2002). So, too, with the declaration that the character of Israeli society, and the future of the state, will be decided on only by Israeli Jews—a pronouncement of inclusion and exclusion, evoking an embattled people who must stand alone, together, otherwise they will lose their knowledge of who they are. Every such declaration is also a commemoration and a celebration of every other occasion when this was the case, or when it will be so.
20. Walby (1999) argues that the European Union is a new kind of state, a “regulatory state.” A state in which the law, a most powerful generator and applier of linear classification, plays a central role. She argues that it is “the ability to deploy power through a regulatory framework, rather than through the monopolization of violence or the provision of welfare, which is the key to the distinctive nature of the regulatory state” (1999: 123).
21. Laumann and Knoke (1987: 382), in a large-scale study of American government bureaucracies, understand the state as “a complex entity spanning multiple policy domains, comprising both government organizations and those core private sector participants whose interests must be taken into account.” They found that many of the classifications generated by government bureaucracies, which have major effects on the worlds beyond these organizations, are intended first and foremost for the internal purposes of these bureaucracies, in particular to conserve their own existence.
22. So, a Californian without a driver’s license would not be able to use a credit card or cash a check. Such persons are issued with “non-driver” driving licenses (Herzfeld 1992: 46), thereby capturing them within the taxonomy through whose practice they are enabled to live like others.
23. Ironically, bureaucratic logic also reflects aspects of the rhizomic. For all their linearity, the trajectories of bureaucratic logic are often tangential, without set direction or set sequence of

- movement in capturing, containing, and de-territorializing space and time. Because bureaucratic logic is arbitrary in its construction and motion, it moves easily, in any direction, through any vectors, in making over space/time as its own.
24. Since 1948, Israeli governments and the IDF have nurtured (in career terms) generations of military colonial bureaucrats. Military bureaucrats ruled Palestinian citizens of Israel from 1950 until 1966 in areas of concentrated Arab population (see Lustick 1980; Shammass 1991); and they rule, from 1967 through the present, all or part of the occupied territories. Military rule is by administrative order, and judicial proceedings are autarchic and often draconian. Human rights are irrelevant to making order through containment and classification. Estimates are that since 1967 (as of 7 April 2002) the military bureaucracy in the West Bank has issued 1500 administrative orders (as of 7 April 2002), each with the binding force of law, and together embracing virtually all domains of living and livelihood. The orders set in place a complex system of permits, through which permissions are required in order to carry out a very long list of activities. The granting and withholding of permits function to reward and punish applicants. Military government is the extreme shaping of form through bureaucratic logic. On the ambivalence of the Israeli Supreme Court toward the military government and its rulings in the occupied territories, see Kretzmer (2002), who argues strongly that the Court consistently finds in favor of the authorities because, in part, Israel is defined as the State of the Jewish People, and therefore that any action perceived as contrary to the interests of this national collectivity is regarded as a threat to the security of the state (Kretzmer 2002: 193).
 25. However prevalent, this is but one metaphysics of temporal movement. See, for example, Briggs (1992) on Inuit, and Rosaldo (1980) on Ilongot.
 26. Arguments over whether the people who did these tasks were “bureaucrats,” or whether they were “functionaries” who behaved as bureaucrats (Carmi and Rosenfeld 1991), seem misplaced. First and foremost, they were people who invented and applied a wide range of taxonomies of classification, and who used bureaucratic logic to do so. After 1948 they moved without difficulty into new and renamed offices and positions within the state infrastructures.
 27. Thus, an “Oriental” identity, one that sought common cause between Jews and Palestinians, may have been viable in the pre-state period, at least among some intellectuals (see Eyal 1996; Cordoba 1980). After 1948, governmental taxonomies and their practices made such alliances difficult and costly.
 28. Carmi and Rosenfeld (1989) argue that there were limited parallels between the socialist organization of the Yishuv and the state bureaucracy after 1948; so that the State’s total bureaucratization of the Arab national and refugee problems constituted a radical transformation in the organization of the social order. Though the scale of things changed drastically with statehood, bureaucratic logic clearly antedates formal statehood.
 29. The first Israeli astronaut, who died in the disintegration of the space shuttle, Columbia, took with him into space a small Torah scroll that had survived the Holocaust and a drawing of the earth as seen from the moon, made by a small boy in Theresienstadt (*Ha’aretz*, 2 February 2003, English Edition). Echoing the author, Ka-tzetnik (Yehiel De-Nur), the Holocaust was becoming another planet.

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