

Chapter 3

Planning, Service Provision, and Development in Segev Shalom

We [bedouin who live in town] like to think we are the same as our relatives out there [pointing toward the spontaneous settlements off in the distance]. But we're not the same. Look at this shiq [Arabic: traditional guest area of the tent centered around the fire pit, but in this case, a small room constructed of cinder blocks]. This is nostalgia, trying to hold onto the past. How do you measure the strength of a bedouin character? By the height of the pile of ashes in his shiq. We have this shiq, but it isn't like what we had out there. I remember what we had, and so I try to recreate it here. My children who are growing up in the town—they don't even have this to remember.

The shiq should be open to the outside, so that people can come one after another. The tent is open; when the dogs bark, you can look out and see what's going on around you. Here, we go home from this shiq, we close our doors to our villas, and we are cut off from the world and the people around us. So we like to think that we are the same as they are [out there], but we're not.

We have lost something by coming here. But of course, you can see what we've gained.

—Muhammad (Abu-Tarek) Hamamdi, Segev Shalom, Israel,
11 November 1992

As suggested in Chapter 2, population growth in Segev Shalom has been steady, taking off roughly at the point when this study was initiated in the early 1990s. It is apparent as well that a great deal of growth, both in population as well as in the early beginnings of economic activity, also has begun to occur in the town, most especially since the year 2000.

While state planners are quick to point out this growth (and to take credit for it), I noted in the previous chapter that bedouin residents often perceive that much of what has occurred has not necessarily happened *because of*

the government's planning efforts, but perhaps, in spite of them. Moreover, what is also quite clear is that resident attitudes toward the provisions offered by the local governing agencies, in particular, the *Moatzah*, remain mixed. While on the one hand, several indices suggest an improving quality of life for Segev Shalom residents, overall satisfaction in the town does not appear to correlate directly in every instance with this change.

Measuring Growth and Development in Segev Shalom

The state and the local bedouin community, including the Local Councils, often appear to be at odds when it comes to their views of the growth, development, and ultimate success of the planned Negev bedouin communities. This is, in fact, a common dynamic in planning, often referred to as a choice between "planning for people, or planning for place." While this binary is itself suspect, as one would reasonably posit that both are required planning goals and need not be viewed in opposition to one another, what is certain is that measuring in a quantitative or qualitative manner the success of Segev Shalom must go beyond an analysis of the trajectory of population growth, successive political leadership or competent financial management style.

As a planned new town for an ethnic and religious minority community, which, prior to resettlement, had never previously lived in an agglomerated environment concentrated upon a small area of land, Segev Shalom and the other bedouin towns was (and is) an experiment not only for its bedouin residents, but for its planners as well. While the academic and popular literature, blogs, and news media are rife with condemnations of the towns for being utter failures, a scientific examination and evaluation of the town, addressing where and how it is succeeding, where and how it is failing, and why, will shed further light on the issue.

As noted, the growth and development of Segev Shalom since the early 1990s has been considerable, and is based almost solely upon resettlement from the *pezurah*. In order to quantify this growth and quality of life improvements that the various planning and governing agencies have implemented during this period, I undertook four independent, scientific household surveys over a fifteen-year period (1993, 1996, 2000, and 2007), with the intent of tracing this change in a systematic, organized fashion.

In undertaking this analysis, I held certain methodological ideals and provisos in mind concerning measuring the successes and failures of the resettlement initiative in general, and the success of Segev Shalom, in particular, in serving the interests of its resettled residents. First, I turned to the World Bank Department of Social Policy's resettlement policies and

evaluation techniques made popular throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Cernea 1988; 1990; 1993), as I believed that these offered an objective standard for resettlement project analysis. They were particularly ideal methods and procedures for quantitatively and qualitatively monitoring post-relocation planning projects, and for measuring the socioeconomic effects and transformations resulting from resettlement of minorities, including indigenous peoples.

The contention of these models was, in effect, that through an emphasis upon adaptive technologies, specialization, appropriate methods, and the anticipated displacement and social alteration resulting from the introduction of planned change, a less-developed community can be transformed from underdeveloped to developing given adequate time, cultural sensitivity, and appropriate planning techniques (see also Rondinelli 1985; 1990). The approach I sought to adopt in order to measure and analyze this change centered upon the premise that “concentrating investments in services and infrastructure in settlements that serve, or could serve, a large population from surrounding rural areas [is] more efficient and effective than scattering services and facilities widely over the landscape” (Rondinelli 1990: 242). This, of course, is the state’s bedouin resettlement argument in a nutshell, and was planned on the assumption that there would be particular functions, linkages, and accessibility of spatially concentrated services to neighboring urban populations.

The resettlement/development literature also argues that the functional integration of place-specific services can contribute to the development of an urban hierarchy, network or system to overcome urban-rural polarization (Belsky & Karaska 1990: 227). It is this *dispersion* of services throughout an urbanizing rural network that, it is contended, will help to further modernization and development.

Such an integration of economic and social services is viewed as a means of moving out of the low productivity cycle typifying rural societies, and as an agent for countering the cultural resistance for change. The provision of services that are required to complete a settlement system hierarchy acts as a further catalyst to economic development.

Overall, the supply and placement of urban functions in order to promote a balanced central place hierarchy is the primary component of this approach (Belsky & Karaska 1990: 227). This goal is seen as more pro-active than a demand-oriented, market-driven approach (Rondinelli 1990: 244). It is the contention of the resettlement planner that “instead of maximizing access to specific facilities based on questionable interpretations of demand, the urban functions method helps planners make locational decisions that can contribute to creating conditions in rural regions that allow market trade to develop” (Rondinelli 1990: 244).

It is significant here to note that Israel's Jewish new town development program, initiated in the early 1950s, was also designed using an urban hierarchy pattern based upon Christaller's Theory of Central Places, which parallels the bedouin new town agenda. The program sought to create an integrated system of large urban areas, medium sized towns, small towns, and hamlets, which would together comprise Israel's emerging urban system. The new development towns were to serve as intermediate settlements between large towns and hamlets (*kibbutzim/moshavim*). Rural centers were planned to support regional needs, such as primary schools, infant clinics, health centers, post offices, service stations, stores, and general goods. Regional towns were designed to serve as centers of production, storage, and export of the agricultural products (Efrat 1984), and to serve as the "super-ordinate" center of a few of these rural centers, providing administrative and supply capacity.

Israel's state planners hoped that regions around the central new towns would develop simultaneously with urban growth. Ultimately, however, this approach proved not very suitable to Israel's existing geographic and social conditions. Planning was rarely done within the regional context, and the physical planning for the new towns was not developed in coordination with social and economic planning (Efrat 1984). Thus, it is both possible to say that these planners were quite familiar with the concepts they sought to apply to the bedouin new towns as they and their predecessors had used them previously in the Jewish sector. It is also possible to say that the results of that initiative were, and remain in the twenty-first century, at best, mixed.

Second, in seeking mechanisms through which adequately to address the success of Segev Shalom and the neighboring bedouin towns, I also sought to use a Social Impact Analysis (SIA) model (see Freeman et al. 1979), as I believe it offers further guidance in measuring the social impact of development projects, including resettlement projects, upon less-developed communities. SIA introduces the contention that social costs and benefits are as important to project success as are economic costs and benefits, and that both must be weighed in determining successful modernization and development planning. In addition to the World Bank's notions of what is *needed and desirable* in a successful resettlement/development project, SIAs help to determine seemingly counterintuitive or previously *unanticipated* development project results. SIAs reveal that "common sense" measures do not always live up to their name (Freeman et al. 1979: 47), and that projects may fail socially or economically to transform a population in the manner initially intended.

In undertaking an SIA-style approach, I assumed in the 1992–1993 study and the analyses thereafter that resettlement and development in Segev

Shalom must, like similar programs, have measurable objectives, a plausible way of achieving them, and personnel able to pursue them (Freeman et al. 1979: 49). By clearly defining specific project goals and by limiting project objectives that can otherwise become contradictory, planners may ensure that project successes or failures can be predetermined and later measured. Setting time limits or schedules delineating specific, realistic objectives (say, increasing school attendance for girls by a certain percentage by a certain date) also helps to direct a project, and to further its progress.

In the final analysis, one of the most important goals I sought to quantify were the impacts (desired and not desired) of the resettlement initiative, particularly though not solely as they have manifested in this bedouin town. The implied impact of state-provided urban services to post-nomads is social and economic development and communal modernization—that is, an improved “quality of life” for those who relocate from their original place of residence to an area designated by the state. But such an improvement is not easily measured, nor is its definition even fully agreed upon (Cutter 1985: 7). It is for this reason that I use a combination of indicators—spatial, functional, and social—in discussing the success of Segev Shalom. What residents think and what the state perceives are, as one might imagine, often two entirely different things.

As Cutter notes, it is the perceptual aspect of one’s comfort level in a given geographic location that, though difficult to measure quantitatively, is a key indicator of individual (and ultimately, communal) satisfaction with one’s place of residence. Psychological well being, satisfaction with one’s lot, and how fully one’s aspirations are being met, is the essence of quality of life attitudes (Cutter 1985: 16). While not always easily summarized, the basic question, “Is life better in town than in the *pezurah*?” provides the essence of quality of life measures in this post-nomadic community.

One final consideration also is necessary in this analysis. In communities such as that of the Negev bedouin, *communal* quality of life factors and *individual* quality of life factors must be distinguished. There is some argument, for example, over whether individual quality of life benefits may conflict with communal quality of life benefits, and that as individualism rises, these improvements may come at a cost to the community as a whole (Cutter 1985: 66).¹ For, while certain changes in the bedouin community may be perceived as improvements over the previous individual lifestyle, they may at the same time be perceived as harmful to the community as a whole (Ben-David 1993: 113).

I kept these various ideas and concepts in mind when I began the process of attempting to measure the growth and success of Segev Shalom from a multifaceted perspective that took quality of life and similar issues into account. I initiated the data gathering for the study by first designing

a survey instrument in the summer of 1992, to be used in the first of four household surveys that was to be conducted in the town in the early spring of 1993. Implementation of the first survey was supported in part by the *Masos* Regional Council (*Moatzah Masos*). I was paid a small stipend, and in return committed myself to writing an analysis for the *Moatzah* about my findings in the town. In addition to the financial assistance, I received office/secretarial support (which I received for all four surveys from the *Moatzah*), as well as the commitment of bedouin students located by the *Moatzah*, who agreed to undertake the actual door-to-door survey process in the town. In this and subsequent surveys, I personally carried out the completion of several of the questionnaires as well, which numbered approximately 10 percent of all questionnaires administered.

The number of surveyors, the number of households visited, and the number of questionnaires successfully completed by necessity increased with each iteration of the survey, a reflection of the growing population of the town, as well as the growth in its geographic size. While, for example, I received assistance from four students in the surveying process in 1993, I required twelve in 2007. In every instance, I divided up the town by neighborhood (*Shekhuna*) and, using maps provided by the Council designating where families actually lived (as opposed to lots sold or housing starts initiated), randomly selected households by lot number (there are no addresses in town) for inclusion in the survey.

As for the sampling frame for the surveys, this was defined as the number of occupied lots in the town, regardless of the whether the dwelling(s) utilized were permanent stone homes, shacks, tents, or other types of residences. In each survey, every effort was made to access a representative sample from each individual neighborhood based upon population (i.e., a clustered sampling approach was used), especially due to the fact that the *Abid* bedouin do not live throughout the town, but only in certain geographic areas. *Shekhunot Alef* and *Bet* are the most densely populated neighborhoods, with the most families residing there, and thus are especially represented in all four sets of the survey findings (as is *Shekhuna Hey* in the 2007 findings, which, since 2000, has become home to a number of diverse groups, including *fellahi* bedouin and Palestinian “collaborators”).

The number of households included in the surveys increased each survey, although the representative nature of the sample remained consistent. The Council assisted in the early iterations of the survey in publicizing that the survey would take place, though word of mouth between residents proved a far more effective “marketing tool” in gaining access to residents’ homes than were the efforts of the government. As a result, in the 1993 and subsequent surveys, the “refusal/no one home” rate was quite low, averaging about 20 percent and declining with each subsequent survey; as town

residents became increasingly familiar with the research project, awareness of its purposes and intentions rose and suspicions dwindled.

This rate is well in line with other household research conducted in developing world environments (see, for example, Thomas et al. 2001: 5; "Household Sample Surveys..." 2005). A greater problem than refusal to cooperate or to answer the door to the surveyor was the number of residents who, as time went on and word spread that a survey was under way, *sought out* surveyors, seeking to voice their views to anyone who, they believed, was willing to listen to their concerns. Other researchers working in poor, less developed environments have had similar experiences, noting that "once the field worker cuts through the initial fear and suspicion, the favorable attitudes come to the fore and result in *greater* cooperation than might be expected in less stratified societies" (Stycos 1993: 56). Still, achieving trust in the Negev bedouin community is an ongoing challenge, largely though not wholly overcome through the use of a team of bedouin student surveyors.

In March 1993, 81 household questionnaires were completed, reflecting more than a third (38 percent) of the occupied households that existed in the town at the time. In July 1996, 102 questionnaires were completed, reflecting approximately the same percentage (36 percent) of all households in the town. In July 2000, the bedouin student surveyors employed for the project were able to gather 150 completed questionnaires. Although the town had doubled in size since 1993 (480 households in 2000 compared to 215 in 1993), this still amounted to 31 percent of the households in the town.

The 1993 survey took a little over a week to complete. The 2007 survey took nearly a month, beginning 4th of March and concluding on the 30th of March. Two hundred thirty-six questionnaires were completed during this period, which amounted to 21 percent of all existing, officially recognized households. The process had by this point become more complex and cumbersome than ever before. In cooperation with JITLI coordinator and elementary school headmaster Abdullah Jirjawi, students were recruited from the Segev Shalom High School to participate in the project. All of the students had facility in Arabic, Hebrew, and even a little English. Having participated in JITLI for some years, all were senior honor students who had made brief visits to the US, Mexico, and Europe. Thus, they came to the study with a level of maturity, sophistication, and understanding that fostered the collection of an incredibly deep and rich data set from what had by 2007 become a town of 6,248 residents living in 1,124 households. It is to this data, and the wealth of information that can be mined from it, that I now turn.

Planning and Development in Segev Shalom—2007: Quantifying Resident Socioeconomic Status and Satisfaction

A detailed accounting of the descriptive statistics that comprise the data sets for the 1993, 1996, and 2000 studies has already been undertaken (see Dinero 1996; 2000; 2004), and need not be repeated here. What follows, then, is a compilation and compression of material from these studies as it meshes with and compares to data from the fourth and final survey, undertaken in Segev Shalom in 2007. It is this data that, by being the most recent and comprehensive, provides an inclusive rendering of the state of planning and its outcomes in the town in the early part of the twenty-first century.

The data set gathered in 2007 (see Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) is quite comparable to those gathered in previous years. A better gender balance was achieved than ever before, but statistics concerning marriage and age are comparable, if not identical, with similar studies. As in previous studies, Chi-square analysis was used ($p < \text{or} = .05$) due to the small N , the nature of the population, and the data set gathered.

Also as in previous studies, age correlated with a variety of significant social and economic indicators in Segev Shalom. For example, younger bedouin residents were found to be more educated than older residents ($p=.00$), more literate ($p=.00$), and less likely to live in a polygynous household ($p=.00$; see Chapter 6).

Economically, the young were more likely to be employed ($p=.04$), and less likely to carry out a “traditional” behavior, such as growing fruits, olives, or vegetables ($p=.05$). They were more likely to own material goods, however, such as phones ($p=.00$), VCR/DVD players, ($p=.00$), cars ($p=.02$), and personal computers ($p=.03$). Significantly too, those aged 40 years and under were *more* likely to use the social welfare services offered in the town ($p=.05$; see Chapter 4); they were, conversely, *less* likely to have voted in the last election than older bedouin town residents ($p=.01$).

In general and quite logically, younger residents also tended to have lived less time in Segev Shalom than the “old timers” ($p=.02$). One of the major differences between the 2007 data set and previous data sets is, of course, the length of time living in the town. In the 1993 survey, for example, 58 percent of respondents lived in the town five years or less, most of these having relocated fewer than 3 years prior to survey implementation (Dinero 1995). In 2007, approximately this same percentage, 60 percent, had lived in the town at least 11 years; nearly half the respondents had lived in the town for 16 or more years. Quite clearly, the town could no longer be viewed as “new” or recently established.

And yet, there are notable differences between those who could be deemed the “old timers”—that is, the founders of the town who have lived there now for over a decade—and those newcomers who are yet finding settled life in the new town environment a novel experience. Several statistically significant correlations were found between the length of time one lived in the town of Segev Shalom and other economic and social development indices. While this is, of course, logical, there are a number of other correlations that further reveal the differences between these “newcomers” and the town’s “old timers.”

Table 3.1. 2007 Segev Shalom Survey Respondents—Descriptive Statistics

<i>Gender:</i>	M	49%	F	51%
<i>Age:</i>	40 or under	77%	Over 40	23%
<i>Marital:</i>	Married	68%	Single	23%
	Divorced	6%	Widowed	3%
	Polygynous family	32%		
<i>Tribe:</i>	Azazmeh	58%	Tarabeen	32%
	Other	10%		
<i>Years Living in Segev Shalom:</i>				
	1–3	11%	4–6	9%
	7–10	20%	11–15	20%
	16+	40%		

Source: Segev Shalom Survey, 2007.

For example, more recent arrivals were found to be more educated than the old timers ($p=.00$), most especially members of the Azazmeh tribe ($p=.00$), those under the age of 40 ($p=.02$), and those in the town who for the most part have lower household incomes (i.e., under 10,000 NIS/month; $p=.00$). Further, newer arrivals were found to be more literate than the others ($p=.01$); again, this was especially found to be true among the Azazmeh, ($p=.01$), men ($p=.01$), and those with low household incomes ($p=.01$).

As a result, newer arrivals had a slightly better chance of accessing employment than the old timers ($p=.05$). This was especially true of women laborers ($p=.01$) and those coming from lower income families ($p=.00$). Indeed, overall, these new arrivals remain more likely to reside in lower income households than those bedouin residents who had lived in the town for a decade or more ($p=.00$). This was especially true of the young resettlers

($p=.00$), particularly members of the Azazmeh tribe ($p=.01$). Previously (see, for example, Dinero 1995), I noted that continued pastoral and agricultural activities in the town have economic, as well as social functions.

Although this dynamic still distinguishes the tribes in town (see below), it does not appear to be impacted by the time spent living there. Newer arrivals to Segev Shalom are *less* likely than old timers to raise flocks or other animals ($p=.01$), particularly the young ($p=.02$) and those with low household incomes ($p=.00$). Similarly, newcomers are significantly less likely to raise olives, vegetables, or other crops ($p=.00$). Once again, this is particularly true of Azazmeh members ($p=.00$) and those families with lower household incomes ($p=.00$).

Table 3.2. 2007 Social and Economic Indicators: Education and Employment

<i>Education</i> (M/F)	None	15%	Some elementary	10%
	Post elementary	26%	HS grad	54%
	Post HS	5%		
	Literate (Arabic/Hebrew/both)	88%		
<i>Employment</i> (M/F)	Employed	53%		
	Household Income under 10,000 NIS/month (approx. U.S.\$2,500)			78%
<i>Job location</i>	Bedouin area	7%	Jewish area/town	45%
	Moshav/kibbutz	8%	Segev Shalom	40%
<i>Agrarian</i>	Raise Animals	37%	Raise Crops	45%

Source: Segev Shalom Survey, 2007.

The length of time living in the town similarly plays a role in other economic aspects of the bedouin resettlers' lives. On the one hand, recent resettlers are less likely to own a TV ($p=.03$), especially Azazmeh families ($p=.03$) and those with low incomes ($p=.03$). And yet, newcomers are *more likely* to own a VCR/DVD than town veterans ($p=.04$), even if they are low income ($p=.00$); they are also more likely to own a personal computer ($p=.00$), especially if they are young families ($p=.00$), or members of the Azazmeh tribe ($p=.01$). Young newcomer families were also more likely to own a Nintendo/Playstation gaming system ($p=.04$)—an item with which many veteran bedouin respondents were entirely unfamiliar.

As for the extent or degree to which town living serves as an agent for modernization and political moderation, the correlations found in 2007

that suggested any significant relationships offer mixed results. What can be said is that those living in town longer have a more favorable view of the national government ($p=.03$). This was found to be true especially of women ($p=.01$), low income residents ($p=.04$), and respondents under 40 years of age ($p=.05$; see Chapter 5).

Table 3.3. 2007 Housing, Utilities, and Reasons for Relocation

<i>Housing</i>	Permanent house	80%	Temporary Dwelling(s)*	44%
<i>Electricity source</i>	Public Utility	80%	Wire/neighbor	17%
<i>Water source</i>	Utility	96%		
<i>Why did you locate to Segev Shalom?</i>				
	Family reasons	47%	Government force	27%
	Services in town/ quality of life	20%	Born here/other	6%

Note: * More than one dwelling—permanent, temporary, or both—are typically built on a single lot.

Source: Segev Shalom Survey, 2007.

Further, employed Azazmeh residents living in the town longer had a greater likelihood of working in the non-bedouin, Jewish sector ($p=.01$), as what could be viewed as a sign of further integration into the mainstream of Israeli society. Related to this issue, the Azazmeh living in town longer had higher incomes ($p=.01$). Similarly, *Abid* Tarabeen living in town longer were found to be more likely than other *Abid* Tarabeen newcomers to own a stone house, rather than just a temporary dwelling ($p=.04$).

Other differences between the two tribes are also notable. The Azazmeh continue to come to the town in more recent years relative to the Tarabeen. A correlation is found between tribe and time of arrival, where the Azazmeh are more likely to have come more recently to town, while the Tarabeen ceased relocating for the most part over a decade ago ($p=.02$); this is especially so of young households ($p=.00$). In many ways, however, this is only a small difference between these two groups. As noted in previous study outcomes stemming from research conducted in Segev Shalom (see, for example, Dinero 2006; Groode & Dreiherr 2007), there are numerous distinctions between those residents in the town who are of “True” bedouin Arab origins (that is, the Azazmeh tribe), and those who are of African origin. These differences may appear minor, but when viewed on the aggregate, they reveal a vast social and economic disparity between the

two groups that has long defied any planning efforts to achieve uniformity across the town's thin socioeconomic veneer.

The Azazmeh, for example, are less likely than the *Abid* bedouin to raise any sort of animals in Segev Shalom ($p=.01$). This is especially prevalent among the town's poorer residents ($p=.05$), a clear sign that holding flocks and other animal resources is not for "nostalgic" purposes, but rather serves as an economic supplement to household income. The same can be said for agricultural activity in the town: the Azazmeh are less likely than the Tarabeen to raise any sort of crop ($p=.00$), most especially the lower income households ($p=.01$).

Not only does this fact say a great deal about the economic status of many of the black bedouin of Segev Shalom, but more than this, it impacts the town environment as well. *Shekhuna Bet* is physically different from the rest of the town, filled with animal corrals, gardens, small orchards, noises, and smells of all kinds—a bit of chaos and cacophony amidst what is slowly evolving into an otherwise "modern" town. Although such are found throughout the town, the degree of difference between this neighborhood and the others is not lost on the town residents, who bear various resentments against either the *Moatzah*, the *Abid* themselves, or both, for this questionable state of affairs. Survey respondents representing lower income households were generally more critical of the town's cleanliness than were more wealthy respondents ($p=.00$), in particular the members of the Azazmeh tribe ($p=.00$). That is, overall, the Azazmeh were more critical of the town's cleanliness than were the Tarabeen ($p=.03$).

Wealth disparity between the two communities is also expressed in terms of material goods ownership. For example, the Azazmeh are more likely to own a Nintendo/Playstation gaming system ($p=.03$). Significantly, even the lower income Azazmeh are more likely than the Tarabeen to own a Nintendo/Playstation ($p=.03$). Other luxury/high end items that the Azazmeh are more likely to own include the personal computer ($p=.00$), and most especially those households with higher incomes ($p=.03$). The Azazmeh are also more likely to own VCR/DVD players ($p=.02$). The higher incomes Azazmeh are also more likely to have a satellite dish for their television service ($p=.01$).

As for the Tarabeen households, they too are more likely to own certain consumer products, but these statistics only further the contention that Segev Shalom is highly socially stratified. Tarabeen households, for example, are more likely to own a clothes washing machine than the Azazmeh ($p=.04$). Moreover, this was found to be especially true among the *lower income* Tarabeen families ($p=.02$). The lower income Tarabeen were also found to be *more* likely to own a TV than lower income Azazmeh

households ($p=.01$), who were also *more* likely to own a refrigerator than Azazmeh families ($p=.02$).

In general, of course, consumption by these lower income households is not an indicator of family prosperity as it is for the wealthy Azazmeh, but rather, it suggests that these items (the TV, washing machine, and refrigerator), unlike the high end items consumed by the more well-off town residents, are viewed by these Tarabeen consumers as essential components of post-nomadic life. These are viewed as items for *survival*, not items of leisure (the TV included).

On the whole, however, the bedouin families of Segev Shalom are slowly but surely showing an increasing ability and desire to purchase consumer goods as wage labor engagement and overall household incomes rise (Figures 3.1a, 3.1b). In comparing Segev Shalom residents' levels of consumption with the Israeli national averages for consumer product ownership (Figure 3.2) one finds the following: refrigerator, 99.9 percent; washing machine, 94.7 percent; TV, 91.7 percent; telephone, 86.8 percent; Cable/Dish TV, 70.1 percent; VCR, 64.9 percent; personal computer, 59.2 percent; and, car, 57.3 percent (CBS 2004). While the bedouin ownership rates fall below these rates in most instances, on average, Segev Shalom residents have a *higher* rate of ownership of TVs and automobiles than the Israeli national average.

Predictably, it is found that income correlates strongly with the educational levels of the survey respondents in the town, though this was found




Figure 3.1a. Percentage of Employed Segev Shalom Residents Who Are Working in the Town Itself, Men & Women, 1993–2007. Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.




Figure 3.1b. Percent Employed Outside the Home, Segev Shalom Survey Respondents (Male/Female).

Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.

to be true for the Tarabeen households and was not necessarily the case with the Azazmeh households ($p=.01$). What was also found, however, was that the Azazmeh who were employed in wage labor were more likely to work in Jewish areas, making higher salaries than Tarabeen respondents ($p=.05$). Respondents over 40 years of age who lived in households with higher incomes also were more likely to work in the Jewish sector ($p=.05$).




Figure 3.2. Segev Shalom Ownership of Material Goods (%), Listed Most to Least), 1993–2007.

Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.

Those households in Segev Shalom with higher incomes were also more likely to own a permanent stone home rather than just a temporary dwelling ($p=.03$), a telephone ($p=.03$), a VCR/DVD player ($p=.01$), and a car ($p=.01$). Higher income households were more likely to be connected to the public utility in order to access their electricity ($p=.01$), particularly among young ($p=.01$) and Azazmeh ($p=.03$) households.

It should be noted here that, as discussed at length in Chapter 2, there is limited employment opportunity in Segev Shalom. And yet the employment rate within the town itself has risen sharply during the 15-year study period (Figure 3.1a). This rising job rate is somewhat misleading, as it includes the increasing employment of women in the town (see Chapter 6). According to the 2007 statistics, only 22 percent of the employed male population work in the town of Segev Shalom, compared to 76 percent of the employed women.

Employment opportunity inside the town is but one way of measuring the level and degree to which Segev Shalom can be considered a “town” in the fullest extent of the word, and not merely a bedroom community designed to service the local Jewish cities, towns, *kibbutzim*, and *moshavim*. This is the perception and fear of many Negev bedouin, who increasingly view the bedouin towns as what amount to economically empty peripheral proletarian spaces lacking employment opportunities, and designed to service the bourgeoisie needs of Israel’s Jewish urban cores.




Figure 3.3. Segev Shalom Residents Raising Livestock, Fruits and Vegetables (%), 1993–2007.

Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.

This lack of economic opportunity, it is believed, only serves to fester internal problems (violence, petty crime, delinquency, and the like). The perpetuation of agrarian activity in the town, both the raising of crops as well as livestock (Figure 3.3), clearly suggests that the economic situation in the town requires these ongoing supplements, however impractical undertaking agricultural activity or animal husbandry may be within a small, densely designed urban environment. Moreover, in Segev Shalom, it appears clear that both forms of activity are on the gradual rise.

The percentage of those bedouin who state that they relocated to the town due to the force of the state as compared to those who have relocated seeking development and opportunity have changed considerably over the years as well (Figure 3.4). While early on in the study, government force appears to have played a significant role in one's decision making, over time it can be seen that this factor became less significant as the attraction of accessing a higher living standard and quality of life began to draw resettlers into the town. What is also increasingly evident is that by 2007, this attraction had begun to fade; newcomers, it appears, had lowered their expectations somewhat, with the recognition that the promises of the 1980s and 1990s had not been delivered.

And yet, many appear to believe that town living will offer them something better—the category “family decision” implies that the bedouins' decision to resettle is increasingly being based upon a constellation of factors, some developmental, some political—than remaining in the *pezurah* (see below), and so they move. Access and use of the town's utilities and publicly planned services (see Figures 3.5, 3.6) further suggest that resettlers are using these provisions in increasing numbers, and view them relatively favorably.




Figure 3.4. Primary Reasons for Resettling Cited by Segev Shalom Residents (%), 1993–2007.

Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.

In order to try to isolate the motivations of resettlers, I removed the “Family decision” responses from the data, and tested just two categories, namely, “Moved by Government Force” and “Moved for an Improved Quality of Life/Access to Town Services.” Some significant correlations can be found that distinguish these two groups. Those stating that they relocated seeking development or a better quality of life (QOL) were found to be more likely to own one material item, the refrigerator ($p=.03$). While this might appear on the surface to be a curious distinction, it is less so when one considers that in the *pezurah*, where electrical service is not provided as a public utility, privately-owned generators are used and then, only during evening hours. It is common to sit in the dark as the daylight hours wane, waiting for a timer to turn the generator on; it is common too for leftover food to be thrown out or offered to the local dogs, given that refrigeration is impractical and non-existent in environments where electricity is only on four or five hours per day. It is perhaps understandable as well that the correlation between refrigerator ownership and motivation for relocating to the town for QOL purposes was especially strong among women respondents ($p=.02$).

Other material goods and services provide some draw into the town as well. Older residents who stated that they relocated seeking a higher QOL, for example, were found to be more likely to have satellite dish TV than those who stated that they relocated due to government force ($p=.01$). Those seeking a higher QOL also stated a higher likelihood of utilizing the town’s social welfare services ($p=.01$), most especially the young ($p=.01$), men ($p=.03$), and Tarabeen respondents ($p=.01$). Azazmeh and women respondents, stating that they were seeking a higher QOL, also tended to rate the town’s medical services higher than those who moved by force ($p=.05$,

.05 respectively). The women's response is particularly telling; as most bedouin women still do not drive and yet are responsible for healthcare concerns for their children (see Chapter 4), the convenience of Segev Shalom's clinics, like owning a regularly functioning refrigerator, are clear QOL improvements for Negev bedouin women when compared to their lives in the *pezurah* (see Chapter 6).

That said, not all women are more satisfied with the new town environment, or moved there of their own accord. More educated women were more likely than those without high school educations to state that they relocated by force ($p=.01$). Further, those respondents, both male and female, stating that they relocated to Segev Shalom primarily due to government force were significantly more likely to live in polygynous Azazmeh households ($p=.05$).

Those stating that they moved by force also stated that they do not feel equal with other Israelis (see Figure 3.7). While, in general, this was not found to be statistically significant for the general sample ($p=.06$), the correlation was statistically significant for young respondents ($p=.05$), and members of the Azazmeh tribe in particular ($p=.01$). In addition, the Azazmeh who stated that they came by force were more likely to say that they did not feel that the present Israeli government was able/willing to serve the socioeconomic needs of the bedouin community ($p=.04$).

The planning and services offered in the new town environment are, of course, what distinguish Segev Shalom and the other officially recognized towns from the communities of the *pezurah*. If the goal and purpose of resettlement is to offer these resettlers a modern, clean, developed living environment and standard that is deemed unachievable in the *pezurah* environment, one may reasonably seek to assess the extent to which the state




Figure 3.5. Percentage of Households Connected to the Local Utilities, 1993–2007.

Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.

is succeeding in this endeavor. The answer, as these statistics suggest, is mixed, and, once again, is influenced by a constellation of factors, including income, gender, tribe, and age.

Younger, lower incomes residents, for example, were more critical of the town’s cleanliness than older residents in the same income category ($p=.02$). These older, lower income residents, however, were more critical of the electrical service in town than the younger low income respondents ($p=.05$). And yet overall, those from higher income households rated the electrical service higher than those with lower incomes ($p=.01$), especially members of the Azazmeh tribe ($p=.01$). Put simply, those who can afford these services tend over all to be more satisfied; many feel they are paying a great deal for these services, and are getting very little for their money.




Figure 3.6. Segev Shalom Residents Rating the Town Services Highly (%), 1993–2007.

Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.

Much of the data seems to reflect what can best be described as “unmet expectations” among some, while others are clearly pleased to accept what little they now have relative to what they once had when living in the *pezurah*. This is clearly seen when comparing the Azazmeh with the Tarabeen. As noted above, the Tarabeen rate the overall cleanliness of the town higher than the Azazmeh. They also rate the water service higher than the Azazme ($p=.02$), particularly those coming from lower income households ($p=.01$). But further, the Tarabeen women rate electricity service higher ($p=.01$), water service higher ($p=.02$), and town healthcare services higher ($p=.02$) than Azazmeh women. In general, it can be said that among the lower income households of Segev Shalom, the Tarabeen are generally more satisfied with the new town environment, as they rate the overall town services and planning higher as compared to the past than do the Azazmeh ($p=.03$).

Qualitative Data: The Voice of the People

From these quantitative data, a picture of general satisfaction begins to form, but it is incomplete, as it does not fully reflect what many bedouin residents say about their lives and their feelings of living in the new town environment. In 2000, a new question was introduced into the survey: “Is life in Segev Shalom better than it was 10–15 years ago, worse, or about the same?” In 2000, 66 percent said better, only 4 percent said worse, while 25 percent said things were about the same. In 2007, while the figure for people believing things were better had risen to 74 percent, those believing things were worse rose to 25 percent. Still, this question also does not fully allow the bedouin residents of Segev Shalom to voice their views or concerns about the resettlement initiative, or about urban living.

In part, this is due to the culture and language of the bedouin of the Negev. When asked to “rate” a given service or situation, the first reaction is to request further explanation. “Rating” is a malleable concept, and somewhat novel to the culture in question. So, while here I may wish to distinguish between those who are “more satisfied” from those who are “less satisfied,” such distinctions may mean little amongst the bedouin themselves. Rarely does one receive an initial answer beyond “*kweis*” or “*b’seder*,” the Arabic and Hebrew equivalents, respectively, of “OK,” when asked to judge or rate a particular service, government office, and the like. Often, it is only upon further discussion that some bedouin respondents will feel comfortable enough fully to elaborate upon their true attitudes and feelings (which may indeed be negative), despite an initial response to the contrary.

In order to address this concern, a series of open-ended questions at the conclusion of each questionnaire allowed the Segev Shalom residents to speak about those issues that most concerned *them*. In addition to several concerns expressed regarding healthcare services in town (see Chapter 4), for example, several respondents to the 2007 survey called for “cleaner streets, public gardens, and promenades to walk on” in the town. In fact, nearly every respondent made note of how dirty the town was, and how much this concerned them.

In addition, several respondents, mostly women in their 20s and 30s, called for the opening of a *matnas* (Hebrew: town activity center/club found in virtually every community in Israel), and courses including “music, computers, [and] Hebrew classes.” Said one: “We want trips for the children, day camps, projects for children, a course for kids to learn to swim. They need summer programs for when the kids aren’t doing anything.” Many others repeated several items from this list, and the concern that the town youth tend to wander around after school with nothing to do and “nowhere to play.”

For many in town, especially those under 40 years of age, Segev Shalom provides the services and provisions that they need. States one 32-year-old male: “The changes over the past 10–15 years are for the better. We didn’t have streets, schools, or houses like these in the past. Things are better. We have everything here now, the *Kupat Holim* (Hebrew: public clinic), things we never had before. Everything is for the better now.” Added another 19-year-old male: “We have progressed, it’s better. We have electricity. It used to be that we only had it at night. Now we have a local *Kupat Holim* instead of having to go to Be’er Sheva. We have a school nearby. We have a post office. It’s like a bank, you can cash checks, you can get money there.”

Such sentiment, however, is typically tempered by a list of frustrations and perceived injustices that impact Segev Shalom residents’ daily lives. These attitudes are expressed amongst nearly all of the qualitative information provided on the 236 questionnaires completed that year. The same 19-year-old continues, “we need a bus from here to Be’er Sheva. We need medicine from the pharmacy in Be’er Sheva and we can’t even get there. [When we get there], security checks us more than the Jews as we enter the supermarket or the bank. And they give the Jews more money for their kids for school. They help them more than us. They give the kids in the Jewish *gans* (Hebrew: kindergartens) food assistance, but not ours. You could fill your page.”

Many offered responses that suggest fears of prejudice, racism, and worse. One 35-year-old female respondent said: “The State should care about the Arab citizens and help us with money and the construction of a house. This is very difficult. They should do it the way they help the Jews that want to live in this country. There should be equality. We are citizens in this country and it should help us because it belongs to us too. We live here.” Offered a male respondent: “This State is racist when it comes to the bedouin. I don’t recommend to anyone to move to Segev Shalom.” A 42-year-old male put it differently: “We go to the hospital in pain and they tell us ‘you’re fine.’ I was upset and they kept saying I was OK when I had a problem. If you are a Jew, they’ll look at you even when you’re fine but a bedouin, no. A bedouin woman gets kicked out [of the hospital] right after having a baby but a Jew can stay as long as she wants.”

This theme of inequality, as it is perceived to exist both within Segev Shalom and throughout life in Israel in general, was found repeatedly in the open-ended responses to the 2007 survey. Many of the responses are also similar insofar as they refer to service in the Israel Defense Forces. A 51-year-old male Segev Shalom resident who owns five houses in the town, is married to four wives, and is father to 22 children, states: “The Jews get far more than we do. We have no money in the towns to do anything. They are all the same. Nothing changes for us. I was in the Army. I remember, a Jew will do the same as you, but he gets more ... Economically, things

were better 15 years ago. Everything is more expensive now. You have to pay for water, electricity, taxes. Fifteen years ago I got value for my money but today no. Everything's gone up in price." When asked why he opted to relocate to the town, his answer, without further elaboration, was that he moved "by mistake."

Many respondents also conclude that, given the opportunity, they would leave the town at once and go back to the *pezurah*. While making such statements may simply be out of frustration, nostalgia or sheer hyperbole, what it does seem to suggest is that for many, town living is not and has not met their expectations. And so I provide Table 3.4, in order that the respondents² may, in their own lightly edited words, offer the essence of the concerns and issues of what it means to them to live in the planned bedouin town of Segev Shalom in 2007:

Table 3.4. Segev Shalom Residents' Perspectives, 2007

Resident 1. 41, Male—There are no bedouin—the real bedouin are not here. In the past the women cared for the babies. Today, look at me! [He holds up his infant son, his wife has gone out for the evening].

My brother is in the Army. If you do the same thing you should get the same thing. Arab blood and Jewish blood is both red.

But things have gotten worse here. I didn't come [to Segev Shalom] for me, I came for my kids. Our lives are concentrated here, we need all these services. But in another 20 years, there just won't be any bedouin left at all. Here we are modern people. But outside town, they are still bedouin ... We can teach our kids that "your father is a bedouin, but you can be an engineer or a lawyer!"

I came here for my kids' education, for them to learn Arabic, Arab culture. My brother in the Army is getting an education. But there they teach you the Jewish language and how to be a Jew. Here [in Segev] they can learn how to be Arabs.

Resident 2. 36, Male—We have problems here with high blood pressure and diabetes and obesity. We need exercise especially for our women. Segev especially has this problem. We have to pay for water, electricity, taxes, TV, the house. We have to pay to live. My wife and I both work, that's all we do, so we can pay for all of this.

I miss the camel, the tent, the food ... now we have no time, all we do is work to pay the bills. When I was a kid I didn't learn how to ride a bike until I was in 12th grade, but today my kid in first grade wants one. He doesn't know the history, the culture. If that happens, the bedouin are finished, we're gone. When the bedouin has to make a zoo and put a camel in it to teach his kid what a camel is, that's the end. The bedouin ate only natural foods. Now they are eating hot dogs, salami, these things aren't nature. This isn't 'bedouin.'

I get money for my kids, but I have the *Moatzah*. I have to pay *arnonah* [Hebrew: Municipal tax], water, and electric bills ... We can study in the university so we have equality.

There's a lot of development in the town. Also the society has developed. If bedouin women are educated, her children will be. And if the children are, the society will progress.

Resident 3. 26, Male—The town is dirty. There is trash here. There are no police here. The place is a mess. Work is available [in Israel], but it is just for the Jews. I worked at Ramat Hovav. I worked there longer, I was a better worker, but some Jews came along and they were given promotions ahead of me and in my place.

The town is better [than in the past] for studying and learning. But I think things for our society are getting worse all the time, because I think the Jews hate us more every day. When

I go to Be'er Sheva, I'm stopped 15 times between here and there. Am I not a citizen? But this is how it is.

I have 3 sisters. They married guys from Gaza. They got no *teudot zehut* [Hebrew: Israeli I.D.s]. Anywhere in the world when you marry you get citizenship, but here, my sisters' husbands were taken by the Government and sent back to Gaza.

Resident 4. 28, Male—I pay *arnonah*—for what? I am in my own house, and I have to pay rent! We initially moved here because the Government forced us. Over time, we have seen that Segev is a good place. But there are those who just wish to leave. You can use solar [energy] in the *pezurah* so you don't need a generator. Outside, there's water too.

So most are just saying "So what was the reason, why did I come here?" Here is an example, this guy here [sitting to his left], his family, they left their 2-story house and just went back. If it weren't so difficult, there are many others like him who would follow. Out there [in the *pezurah*], there are no walls—just freedom!

Fifteen years ago, we were freer. Yes, today, due to political changes, we have El-Jazeera, El-Arabiyya, the Internet. [But] it's like we were "primitive" and the government had to come and help us "progress." In my opinion this is not true.

Resident 5. 31, Male—Going to the *Kupat Holim* is a waste of time. It's like sitting at the airport just waiting. The doctors don't speak Arabic. They treat you like children, like we are foreign or strange. They don't really care. They built this new building, but is it for us, or is it from somewhere else built for someone else?

Regarding education, the Jews get far more than we do. The kids here are studying in caravans. It costs 1,400 NIS [approx. U.S.\$350] each day per bus to transport the kids. If they would take all this money they could build a new school from one month's worth of this expense for these busses. Ten elementary schools feed into one high school. Then the girls drop out because of the far distances they have to travel.

Given the chance, I think 90% of the people living here in Segev Shalom would just leave. We'd give up electricity and TV—who needs it, it just gives you a headache. We'd go back if we could. The town is just getting worse—it's a trash bin. They are bringing [Palestinian collaborators] here. They are not opening up new areas for development. We have lots of children, so the town is getting more dense, there's lots of pressure. Further, there is no work, no industry, and no opportunity ...

Resident 6. 32, Male—Everything here [in Segev Shalom] is done half way. They waste money, do things a little at a time. It makes no sense. A lot of it is the *Moatzah*, but this also comes from the [National] Government. They build schools that are too small from the beginning. They want a longer school day. Who is this good for? Not for the bedouin. There is no equality here. You want me to be here but you won't give me equality. They force us to be here but then we can't manage to even build a house!

If I could I would just have stayed outside [in the *pezurah*]. I would have more money now, I would be better off with just a generator. I wouldn't have to pay *arnonah*. I don't need a villa. If I have to live here, I need the money to do it. To live here, to study, it costs a lot of money. If you don't work [as I do], you haven't got a chance.

Ten years ago I was able to earn less but my money paid for more. I make more money now but get less for it. So my life has worsened. Everything you see around you is from ten years ago. I can't finish building my house, or I take food out of the mouths of my kids. Everything has gone up in price, taxes, *arnonah*. The economic situation is really bad. And I think 10 years from now it will be worse. Anyone who is living in a shack now [i.e., does not yet have a permanent stone house built] is in trouble. They'll never live in a house.

Arnonah is 3,000 NIS [approx. U.S.\$750] per year. There are a lot of people who aren't paying and it adds up. So [the Government] will start repossessing their belongings, leading to thefts and chaos. They'll feel like they have nothing to lose.

Source: Segev Shalom Survey, 2007.

To reiterate, these views should not be considered as in any way exceptional. One hears these kinds of attitudes expressed repeatedly, not only in Segev Shalom, but in other planned bedouin towns as well. Still, it must also be emphasized that they provide only a part of the picture, for, of course, the quantitative data above suggests some positive developmental trajectory in the town as well. Perhaps the best way to summarize these ambivalent findings comes from a 50-year-old bedouin woman 2007 survey respondent, who suggested, “We have progressed a little, but then we’ve moved backwards and things are worse today than in the past. We didn’t have a good *Moatzah* in the past, but now we do. But people have changed. Everyone thinks only about himself now, and about what is for his own good. Not about anyone else.”

This sort of nostalgia is common among many of the bedouin respondents, whose memories of living in the *pezurah* and whose claims about their experiences there at times are reminiscent of the Israelites’ memories of living in Egypt under Pharaoh when they are wandering in the Sinai after the Exodus. That is to say, the Promised Land of Segev Shalom has hardly met their expectations—expectations that were designed and built up by a government that sought to relocate them at any cost, but that has provided little since their arrival. But was life in the *pezurah* as good as they remember it?

In an attempt to answer this question, I initiated a small comparative survey in the neighboring communities of the *pezurah* not far from Segev Shalom from 3–13 May 2007. Eight surveyors, teaching staff from one of the Segev Shalom elementary schools and JITLI students from the Segev Shalom High School, randomly sampled 45 households in order to make some comparisons with residents in the planned town. Given that there are several thousand households in the *pezurah*, this survey was considered a small, non-representative sample, too small really to be considered as anything other than a snapshot that might allow some comparisons with those bedouin living in the planned town. When combined with the 236 households in the town, they comprise 16 percent of the total 281 households in the entire study. Still, despite the small *N*, some relevant material can be culled from the data, which offers a further understanding of the relationship today between the planned town and the *pezurah*.

Some Perspective: A Comparison with the “Pezurah”

Several statistical differences can be noted between the respondents of the 2007 Segev Shalom survey and the *pezurah* survey. Most, though certainly not all, of these statistics bear out the contention by the state that living in the new town environment offers development opportunities that are far

less available in the *pezurah*. What one might reasonably ask, however, is whether, like any migration, those living in the town were more open and amenable to certain developmental behaviors and attitudes to begin with than are those who resist resettlement in the urban environment.

For example, a substantially higher rate of polygyny, 48 percent, was found among the *pezurah* households, as compared to those in town, 32 percent ($p=.04$). This statistic bears out Kressel's contention that polygyny rates are higher in the *pezurah* than in the planned towns (2003: 96). Moreover, respondents in the *pezurah* were also more likely to identify as bedouin ($p=.01$; see Chapter 5), 47 percent compared to 19 percent in the *pezurah*. Under the age of 40, the difference was even greater. A trade-off between bedouinness and Muslim identity clearly can be identified; in the town, 50 percent identified as Muslims and 16 percent as bedouin; in the *pezurah*, 30 percent identified as Muslims and 48 percent identified as bedouin ($p=.01$). In both environments, however, an expression of Palestinian and Arab identities was virtually identical.

Still, *pezurah* residents were more likely to raise animals ($p=.00$), raise crops ($p=.02$), and live in temporary housing ($p=.00$). These distinctions, of course, provide the very definitions of what it means to live in the *pezurah* in 2007. In addition, those in the *pezurah* households were less likely to own a VCR/DVD player ($p=.02$), a refrigerator ($p=.00$), a Nintendo/Playstation ($p=.00$), or a personal computer ($p=.00$). None of this was unexpected, but what must be noted here is that no difference was found between the two environments in terms of the ownership of satellite dishes, TVs, washing machines, or telephones. Car ownership and access was no different between the men in the two environments; women in town, however, had more access to cars than women in the *pezurah* ($p=.03$).

Pezurah residents do not have electric service ($p=.00$) or water service ($p=.00$). They predictably rated their electricity lower than town residents




Figure 3.7. Political Indices, Segev Shalom 1996–2007 and the *Pezurah* 2007. Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.

($p=.00$), as well as their water service ($p=.00$). *Pezurah* residents also access a private doctor less than town residents ($p=.00$), most especially men ($p=.01$) and those under the age of 40 ($p=.01$). Residents of both areas use Soroka Hospital with similar regularity, however.

Educational levels also varied between the two environments, although all respondents in both environments were similarly literate. However, men ($p=.05$) and those under 40 ($p=.00$) in Segev Shalom were more educated than their counterparts in the *pezurah*. Such a distinction is yet another reinforcement of the strength of the resettlement initiative's social development accomplishments (see Chapter 4). Although children from the *pezurah* attend school in the towns, these statistics suggest that living in the town itself simply makes education that much more accessible. While no correlation was found on the basis of gender as might be anticipated, what was found was that there was a statistical difference between a survey respondent's mother's highest grade achieved between the town and the *pezurah*; the mothers of those living in the town were in general more educated than those living in the *pezurah* ($p=.03$).

The bedouin who are employed in wage labor work in similar job locations, regardless of where they reside. Household income is not significantly different between the two environments. Further, the male level of employment is not statistically any different for town residents than for *pezurah* residents. The women of Segev Shalom, conversely, are considerably more likely to be employed in wage labor than women in the *pezurah* ($p=.02$). Nonetheless, the male statistic is extremely significant, insofar as it furthers the contention noted above that the towns offer little economic opportunity (certainly no more than the *pezurah*), and yet provide less in terms of allowing the bedouin to sustain themselves through their "traditional" agrarian activities of crop production and pastoral nomadism/animal husbandry. Those living in the *pezurah*, on the other hand, are able to carry out any economic activity that those in town are employed in and, *in addition*, engage in agrarian activity if they wish—that is, if they are willing to continually combat the constraining mechanisms imposed by the state against these interests (see Chapter 1).

Resettling or refusing to move is, in part, a political act. Several differences can also be discerned between the respondents in terms of their political attitudes and behaviors. For example, men voted at similar levels in both environments, though women in Segev Shalom were more likely to have voted than women in the *pezurah* ($p=.05$). Those living in the *pezurah* were more likely to state more positive attitudes toward the Israeli government than those living in the town ($p=.01$), though these tended to be older ($p=.03$) male ($p=.01$) respondents.

Residents of the *pezurah* ($p=.00$), especially the young ($p=.00$) and male ($p=.01$) respondents, were more likely to agree, on the other hand, with the statement that the Islamic parties are their preferred replacement for the present government. Those living in the *pezurah* were also more likely to offer either the Islamic or the Arab parties (Bilad, etc.) as better options than the present Kadima party, as opposed to respondents from Segev Shalom who offered these, as well as Jewish/Zionist parties (or, in most case, stated that *no* party could help the bedouin at this point in furthering their social and economic development needs, see Chapter 5; $p=.00$). This sentiment was not necessarily solely based upon the “religiosity” of the respondents per se. While those living in the town do state overall more frequent mosque attendance than those in the *pezurah* ($p=.05$), a behavior especially stated by the men for obvious cultural reasons ($p=.02$), no statistical difference could be found between the two environments in terms of the degree to which respondents stated that they attend the mosque on a general basis (see Chapter 5).

Perhaps the greatest difference noted between the two environments comes down to feelings of being treated equally with Jewish Israelis. While the percentage of Segev Shalom respondents in 2007 who stated that they feel that they *are not* treated equally is quite high, 77 percent, this figure has dropped steadily throughout the study period (Figure 3.7). As for the *pezurah*, 97 percent stated that they *do not* feel they are treated equally with Jewish Israelis ($p=.00$).

Conclusions

The social and economic development results of planning in Segev Shalom manifested over the fifteen years of this study noted in this chapter suggest that a number of observations and conclusions may be put forward. First, it would be disingenuous not to note the overall positive change that has generally occurred in the town, as measured in such areas as access to wage labor employment (including employment within the town itself), material wealth (including the most difficult item for many to access in the past, the permanent stone house), connectivity to the public utilities, and attitudes toward these service provisions. In these and other areas, the bedouin of Segev Shalom have shown slow but steady improvement during the period in question as measured by these socioeconomic indices that can be used to measure the Quality of Life (QOL) of these resettlers.

Second, when compared with those bedouin who remain in the *pezurah*, the differences in the life experiences of the resettled bedouin of Segev Sha-

lom comes into even sharper focus. This is most especially true for bedouin women (see Chapter 6), whose QOL clearly can be differentiated as seen through the lens of the resettlement initiative. Bedouin men may have similar life experiences regardless of where they live, but for bedouin women, resettlement in the planned town appears to have had a substantially positive impact, which is undeniable.

Lastly, despite these improvements, the bedouin do not necessarily express the sentiment or belief that they are better off than they were in the past. Rather, a sense of loss permeates much of their daily discussions—much of it bordering on anger. Residents who spoke with me, including some of those quoted in Table 3.4, are highly educated and employed. Still, most bedouin town dwellers living in Segev Shalom twenty-five years after its creation expected more when they relocated than what they have.

Indeed, the more affluent and educated are often the *most* disillusioned of town residents. Today's bedouin is not an illiterate herder holding onto flocks and wishing to live in a tent; rather, he (and increasingly, nowadays, she) is often a savvy, educated, knowledgeable professional or businessperson who is well traveled, and is quite familiar with Jewish Israel. One 39-year-old female survey respondent stated that it was her wish that someday, "Segev Shalom will be like Tel Aviv or Jerusalem."

And yet, of course, the town is nothing of the kind. Most residents view it as cramped, dirty, and neglected. Many state that they relocated not because the government forced them, as was once the case, but because nowadays, urban life is simply a more viable lifestyle in the global economy, something in which they are very much a part. And yet, as disappointment builds upon disappointment and unmet expectations are commonplace, the sense of disenfranchisement grows. As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5, voting rates are dropping, and those who are voting increasingly are throwing their support to the Islamic parties, not because they are "religious" per se, but because they are seeking an alternative to a government and public at large, which they perceive, perhaps with good reason, treats them as less than equal citizens.

They believe that they are being told to settle for less than what they deserve as full citizens of the State of Israel, to take the "bone" that is being thrown to them and quietly, obediently, willingly accept their fate. As will be seen in the following chapter, the gap between the state's perceptions and the bedouin's views is, therefore, incredibly wide. For, like the other services provided, none have shown greater promise—and greater success from the state's perspective—than the provision of healthcare and education services. And yet, from the bedouin community's perspective, no two areas of service provision are more controversial, more dysfunctional, or, ironically, more inadequate.

NOTES

1. In Native Alaska, this dynamic has been referred to as the 'crab-pot' syndrome. As certain innovative, risk-taking individual 'crabs' strive to get ahead and exit the 'cooking pot' (i.e., seeking formal education, wage labor or other ways to progress or better themselves), others who are less resourceful, capable or entrepreneurial 'reach' up with their large claws and pull the culprits back in—out of jealousy, envy, resentment, and so on. I have yet to find a culturally appropriate equivalent term to be applied in the desert, where crabs are few and far between, but the dynamic appears to be similar in any case.
2. It is not coincidental that these extensive comments are all provided by men. Bedouin women remain largely quiescent in the Negev, especially when men are present (which is, by design, almost all of the time). It is for this reason that I created the Bedouin Women's Focus Group (see Chapter 6); women have a great deal to say and contribute, but many, especially those over age 40, remain reluctant to speak up in mixed environments.