

INTRODUCTION

WELFARE DICTATORSHIPS, THE WORKING CLASS AND SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY

A Theoretical and Methodological Outline

In the Hungarian ‘hot’ summer of 1989, when the newly formed parties had already agreed with the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt* [MSZMP]), the ruling Communist Party of the country about the transformation of the political regime from the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ to parliamentary democracy and the holding of democratic parliamentary elections, many people in the countryside were still unaware of the forthcoming sweeping political and social changes.¹ Although the Hungarian democratic opposition was concentrated in the capital, there were, however, several signs across the country that displayed the crumbling legitimacy of the ruling communist regime. In the industrial town of Győr the recently launched oppositionist journal entitled *Tér-kép* (Map) put forward a provocative question to its audience: ‘Would you call the capitalists back?’ In an important industrial town and after many years of communist propaganda, it is less of a surprise that most of the respondents analysed the question from the perspective of the workers. The conclusion is, however, more surprising or at least detrimental to official socialism, which was the dominant legitimizing ideology of the regime,² because the majority of the respondents argued that workers would benefit more from a capitalist regime than they did from socialism:

If one provides for the workers the same way as Zwack promised on TV, he can come tomorrow. Many Hungarians have been in the West and everybody can see the standard of living and social security there even if there is unemployment. I have read somewhere that the labour movement achieved real results precisely in the capitalist countries. And I don’t think that the defence of the workers’ interests would be only demagoguery on behalf of the capitalists.³

That the above opinion was indeed widespread in the county of Győr-Sopron, whose centre was Győr, had been confirmed in an interview with Ede Horváth, the chief manager of Rába Hungarian Wagon and Machine Factory (*Rába Magyar Vagon-és Gépgyár*, Rába MVG), the largest factory in the county, which he gave to the same journal. In many aspects Horváth was an emblematic figure of the attacked regime. A former Stakhanovite, who started working in Rába as a turner, Horváth's life followed an exemplary communist career: after serving in different managerial positions in the 1950s, in 1963 he was appointed the chief manager of the Wagon Factory. Later he was also elected onto the Central Committee of MSZMP, a position that he held from 1970 until 1989.⁴ He was also nicknamed the 'Red Baron': this was a reference not to his lifestyle – because contrary to the image of the 'idle and corrupt' cadre, which was widely criticized not only by the hardliners ('dogmatic' or 'orthodox' communists)⁵ but also by the leftist critics of actually existing socialism, Horváth was a workaholic, who led a disciplined and modest life – but to his high power position in the party and the county. At the time of the interview he was increasingly attacked for his prominent political role. Horváth agreed to give an interview to the oppositionist journal with the purpose of defending himself against the charge that he held to be the most unjust and undeserved: he was accused of pursuing an 'anti-worker' policy. In the interview Horváth, who never denied his working-class origins and background, protested not only against this charge but he also sought to find an explanation for the 'pro-capitalist' feelings of the workers of his factory:

At one time we tried to motivate the people with the slogan that the factory is yours, you are building it for yourself. This did not prove true. People are interested in two things: that they have honest work and they receive fair wages. If these two are fulfilled, they will regard their workplace, if not the factory, as their own. And then they will be satisfied and their political attitudes will reflect their content. We could not provide this, and we continuously darkened the political climate. This partly holds also for Rába. Despite the fact that we pay honest money in comparison to the national wages, we could not solve this problem completely. I said for a long time that we would pay a very heavy price for cheap labour. But I am not to blame for the fact that today there is a bad political climate for the regime in every Hungarian factory.⁶

The local drama was not yet finished. The trade union supported the workers' strike in the Mosonmagyaróvár Tractor Factory, which belonged to Rába – a protest act which would have been unthinkable at the heyday of communism, when the party held the trade unions under its firm control. The conflict eventually led to the resignation of the charismatic

leader of the factory, who had been elected ‘man of the year’ in 1986, in acknowledgement of his managerial success: the enterprise council asked him to retire, to which he agreed on 18 December 1989.⁷ In the political atmosphere of 1989 it was unlikely that he would have ever kept his position.⁸

The above documented local conflict was indicative of the crisis of actually existing socialism, which unfolded on a significantly larger scale in other East European countries, where the change of regimes was triggered not by parliamentary negotiations like in Hungary but by mass demonstrations and large, widespread and sometimes violent protests like in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and Romania.⁹ The history of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has been narrated several times, from different disciplinary and methodological perspectives. The history of the workers under late socialism is, however, either underrepresented or, as in the Hungarian case, is outright missing from the otherwise vast literature on the demise of the East European socialist regimes.¹⁰ The contention of this book is that a careful examination of the micro histories of two large factories, one located in Jena, East Germany (Zeiss) and the other in Győr, Hungary (Rába) offers novel insights into the nature and politics of these regimes as well as the causes of their rapid and apparently unexpected collapse – which has been confirmed by many contemporary observers and Western scholars of the former communist bloc.¹¹ In what follows I will elaborate three main themes, which are directly connected with the design and presentation of my research based on the two aforementioned factory case studies. Firstly, I will introduce and explain the terms ‘welfare dictatorship’ and the ‘party’s policy towards labour’ in a historical context. Secondly, an attempt will be made to elaborate the claim of there being a relative lack of literature on the workers in the examined period as well as to designate the key themes of inquiry. Thirdly, I will justify the comparison of the two countries under examination – East Germany and Hungary – as well as reflect on the applied methodology.

After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 when the ‘impossible became possible’ many people for a long time continued to believe that the new, socialist society would be capable of changing the basic needs of human beings, or at least the ways of satisfying these basic needs.¹² In an illuminating study Somlai shows how over-zealous party functionaries sought to realize the model of an ideal ‘socialist family’ and force people to a large, common household, where workers have their meals at their workplaces and they send their linen and dirty clothes to the socialist laundries (‘where more clothes were spoilt and more were stolen than what were washed’ – as Trotsky later ironically commented).¹³ Kotkin depicts with a similar insight how the State attempted to raise ‘the socialist man’ in

Magnitogorsk, who has different, higher cultural and educational needs than an exploited wage worker, and he is motivated not by material incentives but he works unselfishly for the new, socialist regime.¹⁴

The pioneers could still believe in this naïve ideology; but time shortly showed that the universal liberation and emancipation of the working class, which the Marxist programme envisaged, was not realized in the Stalinist regime. A theoretically influential answer to Stalinism was given by Trotsky in his famous critique, *The Revolution Betrayed* (1937) that he wrote in exile.¹⁵ The work was not only meant to be a fierce polemic against his victorious political rival, but the author had the more ambitious goal to understand the social roots of Stalinism which he linked with the ‘degeneration’ of the revolution. Trotsky concentrated on the issue of property, arguing that, contrary to the original Marxist programme, it was not the working class which took control of the means of production, but the Stalinist *nomenklatura*. The bureaucrats themselves were not proprietors, but their control of redistribution enabled them to appropriate surplus and reproduce social inequalities. Even though Trotsky used the term ‘state capitalism’, he claimed that the *nomenklatura* has not yet reached the stage to be called a new class. Only if they restored the old forms of private property relations could they be called proper capitalists, which, unless prevented by the Soviet people, would have meant the betrayal of the October revolution.¹⁶

Stalin, however, had a major advantage over his theoretically more trained and respected rival: he succeeded in finding an answer to the question of how to implement socialism in one country after the world revolution, in which Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders believed, had failed to materialize. Being conscious of the economic backwardness of Soviet Russia, Stalin gave priority to ‘catching-up’ development (the task of catching up economically with the advanced Western capitalist countries) over the original emancipating goals of Marxism.¹⁷ The ‘revolution from above’, which Stalin led from 1929, combined a radical change of property relations (the prohibition of the private ownership of the means of production and labour) with a gigantic programme of extensive industrialization and collectivization, which demanded enormous social and human sacrifices but it quickly and drastically transformed a backward, predominantly agrarian country into a nation, which in the Second World War triumphed over the leading industrial and military power of Europe.¹⁸ Some Western authors called the Great Patriotic War the ‘acid test’ of Stalinism.¹⁹

The victory over Nazi Germany enabled Stalin and the Soviet Union the export of the Stalinist regime, albeit it was only with the outbreak of the Cold War that Stalin demanded an exclusive communist influence within the East European bloc. The Stalinist programme of extensive in-

dustrialization and collectivization was adopted in all socialist countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia, which Stalin solemnly excommunicated from the communist bloc. The Stalinist experiment in Eastern Europe undoubtedly had important emancipatory achievements. The Hungarian sociologist Ferge wrote:

We have done an honest survey of social inequalities in Hungary and at the end of the 1960s we could even state that poverty continued to exist in socialist Hungary. We, however, did not put another question, which at that time would have been viewed as flattering to the ruling regime: *why and how social inequalities – and with them, poverty – could have been decreasing so radically in comparison with prewar Hungary?* Even today we have no valid answer to this question.²⁰

There were, however, important social differences among the working classes of Soviet Russia, East Germany and Hungary, who had to build a socialist regime, where the working class is the ruling class – as was widely propagated by the official Marxist–Leninist doctrine. In the political sphere, the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was not attained by the working classes in East Germany or Hungary but it was forced upon them by their communist dictators, who enjoyed the confidence and support of the Soviet Union. Whatever myths the local party leaders created about the ‘new socialist man’, the Berlin working-class demonstration in 1953 and, even more radically, the Hungarian revolution and freedom fight of 1956 where the majority of freedom fighters came from the working class,²¹ clearly demonstrated that many workers thought they had lived better in the past regime than under socialism. The widespread working-class protests in the East European countries proved the opposite of the communist propaganda, which celebrated the birth of a ‘new, socialist hero’: that people had the same needs in the socialist countries as under capitalism, and they wanted to consume not differently but in the same way as their counterparts in the Western, capitalist countries. After the Hungarian revolution of 1956, slogans such as ‘socialist lifestyle’ and ‘socialist family’ could only occur in the vocabulary of agit-prop²² and in political jokes.²³

János Kádár, the Hungarian party secretary, who reorganized the Communist Party after 1956 and changed its name to MSZMP,²⁴ was fully conscious of the political mood of the working class. After the violent suppression of the revolution, Kádár quickly became one of the most – if not the most – hated leaders in Eastern Europe.²⁵ He, however, succeeded in rebuilding the party as the main instrument of power and, more importantly, he won popularity by consolidating the economy and satisfying the most important material demands of the working class. This

was reflected in the 1958 resolution on the working class, which determined the party's new policy towards labour. Workers' wages significantly increased, and further pay increases and a continuous improvement in the standard of living was promised to the population – with the condition that the working class would be the main beneficiary of the government's new standard-of-living policy.²⁶ An ambitious state housing construction programme started, with the main focus on Budapest, the capital city, where workers' living conditions were particularly poor and inadequate, and many lived in real misery in overcrowded cellar dwellings, which lacked basic comfort (bathrooms and heating), or in workers' hostels where conditions were often 'intolerable and unworthy of human beings' – even in the wording of contemporary party reports.²⁷ The resolution also put a great emphasis on the development and support of working-class culture, community building and education: the education of a new intelligentsia, who had working-class roots, was supported through the provision of free and extra classes for working-class children and means of positive discrimination (at the universities and colleges special quotas were set for working-class children). The high leadership of the party was determined to put the resolution into practice: national surveys had to be conducted at regular intervals in order to ensure the implementation of the policy towards labour.²⁸

The term 'welfare dictatorship' derives from this new, consumption-oriented policy of the party towards the working class, as well as from the recognition that the workers' needs under socialism failed to develop differently than under capitalism. Rainer argues that Kádár sought to win over *all* segments of the population (at least those social strata who were not directly opposed to socialism);²⁹ I, however, attempt to show that the 'workerist' ideology³⁰ that the party advocated was not only an integral element of socialist propaganda (at least until the end of the 1970s) but it reflected a social reality. The party held the large industrial working class to be the main social basis of the regime; therefore, it concentrated its welfare policy on this group. Having failed with the project of creating a new, socialist man and building a classless society as envisaged in the Marxist programme, the party sought to offer material concessions to the working class in exchange for their political support, or at least quiescence.

As the 1956 revolution showed, workers had not only economic but also political demands. The demand for national independence and national self-determination was completed with the demand for a change of political structure and enterprise management. As recent studies concluded, the revolutionary intelligentsia and the majority of the working class did not want capitalism back; they supported a reformed, democratic socialism.³¹ The role of the workers' councils in the revolution gave a fresh

impetus to the theoretical debates about workers' self-management.³² In many places workers' councils continued to maintain control of the factories even after the defeat of the revolution, and the Kádár regime could consolidate its power only by satisfying a significant number of working-class demands.³³

After the official dissolution of the workers' councils in 1957,³⁴ there were at least formal attempts to increase enterprise democracy. These councils had been formed as revolutionary organs to replace the so called 'shop triangle', which effectively secured the state and party control of the factories. The 'shop triangle' consisted of the state management, the party secretary and the secretary of the trade union committee. The secretary of the newly established communist youth organization (*Kommunista Ifjúsági Szövetség*, KISZ) was added to form the 'shop quadrangle', and instead of the workers' councils, enterprise councils were formed to increase the participation of the employees in management. Employees elected one-third of the members of the council and the trade union delegated the other two-thirds. The managers, the party secretary and the secretary of the KISZ were officially members of the council. The chairperson was the secretary of the trade union committee. The enterprise council had the right of oversight over issues of economic efficiency, it received reports on the management of the enterprise and decided the distribution of bonuses and the social and cultural funds. The managers were accountable to the enterprise council.

The reality of enterprise councils was, of course, distant from ideas of workers' self-management, and they were soon reduced to a formal role. Since they were regarded as institutions parallel to the trade union, they were eventually placed under the direct control of the trade union committees. The appointment (or replacement) of the managers was decided




Figure 0.1 Two models of enterprise management

by the central authorities³⁵ and not the trade union; thus, the criticism of the managers was often a theoretical right that few people exercised.³⁶ Although in the 1970s there was an academic debate about the scope and nature of enterprise democracy, state – and thus party – control of the factories remained unchallenged.³⁷

After the revolution of 1956, the concept of workers' self-management was discussed only in narrow intellectual circles, and there is no evidence that these debates reached the workers themselves, nor did they become well known at the shop floor. The programmatic essay of George Lukács, *Demokratisierung heute und morgen* (1968)³⁸, in which he argued that the direct control of producers could establish a more democratic society without returning to capitalism, was published in Hungary only in 1988, when the restoration of private property relations was already on the political agenda. Socialist alternatives to Stalinist society were widely discussed and partly experimented with in Poland and Yugoslavia, but since they had even less influence on the two examined cases than the tradition of the workers' councils, the present chapter omits the introduction of these debates. While in Hungary the improvement of enterprise democracy appeared at least among the political slogans and was discussed even in the executive committee of the county, in the GDR there is no evidence of any criticism of the existing structure of enterprise management in the official discourse or on the shop floor. While dissident intellectuals voiced their criticism of 'actually existing' socialism, the party in both countries succeeded in confining any critical discussion to the academy (in 'liberal' periods), or critical intellectuals were silenced, persecuted, imprisoned or forced to emigrate.³⁹ In both cases it can be argued that even though there was an intellectual tradition of criticism of Stalinist society, the idea of self-management could not be embedded in the consciousness of the workers because the political regimes effectively prevented any public discussion of left-wing alternatives to their system.⁴⁰

From the 1970s, Erich Honecker implemented the East German variant of the standard-of-living policy. Immediately after his takeover he increased the rate of growth of consumption. The new draft of the Five-Year Plan put increases in consumption at the head of the national tasks; this was the first time that a Five-Year Plan had put the rate of increase of consumption above that of investment. In 1971 Honecker announced that the main task of the Five-Year Plan was 'the further improvement of the material and cultural standard of living of the population on the basis of the rapid development of the socialist production, the increase of efficiency, the scientific-technical advance and the increase of labour productivity'.⁴¹ In 1976 he felt confident enough to announce the ambitious programme of the 'unity of economic and social policy' (*die Einheit von*

Wirtschafts-und Sozialpolitik), which aimed to implement a socialist welfare programme suitable to beat the GDR's West German rival. Honecker promised 'a constant improvement of working and living conditions' to his people, which, according to his later critics, largely contributed to the growing indebtedness of the GDR. Even in the 1980s, when the GDR faced a deteriorating balance of foreign trade, Honecker consistently refused to increase the prices of consumer goods with the argument that the 'counter-revolutionary attempts' in the other socialist countries such as Poland all started with the increase of the prices.⁴² The most important elements of his programme to which he remained loyal until the collapse of his regime were wage policy, state housing construction and support for families, with a special emphasis on working women.⁴³

The term 'welfare dictatorship' is therefore appropriate to describe both regimes, which pursued a similar policy towards the working class. In order to pacify the workers and preserve the status quo in the power structure, both regimes were willing to give concessions to consumerism; and, moreover, they were constantly worried that left-wing critics would destroy the consensus, which they held to be the basis of their political rule. There is evidence from both countries that repression was used against left-wing critics of the system, which was occasionally harsher than the retribution they handed out for 'Western revisionism'. In Hungary for example, Miklós Haraszti, the author of *A Worker in a Workers' State* (1977), was also held to be a left-wing dissident and prosecuted on that basis.⁴⁴ In the GDR there was the case of Matthias Domaschk, a young worker from Jena, who joined a commune at the beginning of the 1980s. Because of his alternative looks, dress and political views he was placed under police supervision. After travelling to Berlin by train to visit his friends at the time of a party conference, he was arrested and subsequently he committed suicide in custody. There is an archive in Jena, which bears his name (*Thüringer Archiv für Zeitgeschichte, Matthias Domaschk*).

The thesis that the present book will demonstrate through an in-depth analysis of the party's policy towards labour and the local implementation and reception of this policy is that the welfare dictatorships were open to the right (towards consumerism) while they remained closed to the left, effectively blocking the public discussion of any leftism other than the official legitimizing ideology. Official socialism was, however, increasingly undermined by the wide gap between the practice of welfare dictatorships and the egalitarian socialist project.⁴⁵ It well describes the extent to which people became disappointed with 'actually existing' socialism in Hungary, and many workers thought that there was more social justice and a better life for them in a capitalist society than in a socialist one (as is shown by the answers to the question 'Would you call the capitalists back?'). East

German interview partners would repeatedly tell me that it was only after they started to live in capitalism that they believed the Marxist critique that they had learnt at school. Burawoy, who conducted fieldwork in Hungarian factories, among others the Lenin Steel Works, recorded that the workers persistently asked the American professor how much money a worker earns in the United States, while they forgot even to mention the proud achievements of the socialist regime such as free health care, education and highly subsidized cultural products (theatre, concerts, books, cinema), let alone the scale of social mobility after the Second World War, which was unparalleled in Hungary.⁴⁶ While welfare dictatorships did establish social peace, in the long run they paved the way for capitalism because they essentially failed to demonstrate a viable socialist alternative. After they could no longer increase the standard of living of the people, they lost popular support. As a result, by the time the authority of the communist parties collapsed, the majority of the workers did not see capitalism as a major enemy; and many expected that they would be better treated under capitalism than under socialism because they saw that the standard of living of the workers was higher in West Germany and Austria than in the GDR or Hungary. Western shops and supermarkets, which were full of goods, were better at convincing people of capitalism's apparent superiority over the bankrupt socialist economies.⁴⁷

By turning the attention to the experience of the socialist working class, the book seeks to raise new questions, which examine the history of labour in the region from novel perspectives. In Hungary, like in other socialist countries, working-class histories were characterized by an ideological approach both under state socialism and after the collapse of communist regimes. The East European Communist parties everywhere claimed that the working class was the ruling class; the thesis that the struggle of the working class against capital triumphed under the leadership of the party became part and parcel of the official legitimizing ideology of the regime, and it became a recurring slogan of the official communist agitation and propaganda.⁴⁸ Thus, any researcher who came to a conclusion which contradicted this official socialism risked his or her academic career, at least behind the iron curtain. Even in the face of repression, however, internationally recognized studies were written on class and socialism in the 'merriest barrack' as Kádár's Hungary was nicknamed at the time. The Hungarian sociologist Kemény conducted fieldwork in various working-class communities. His research led him to the conclusion that the Hungarian working class, which was formed as a result of the extensive communist modernization project, was recruited predominantly from the peasantry, and many of them continued to preserve the original peasant culture and lifestyle. He also identified impor-

tant factors in the stratification of the working class (origin, living place, skills, education, family size and the nature of work).⁴⁹ Kemény eventually came into conflict with the regime because of his research on poverty; his claim that poverty continued to exist in socialist Hungary triggered sharp political responses, and he was forced into emigration.

Ferge was one of the most distinguished scholars of the Marxist structuralist school, which obtained international reputation after the reinstitutionalization of Hungarian sociology.⁵⁰ Her research showed that the orthodox communist class distinction (two classes: workers and peasantry, and one stratum: intelligentsia) was not adequate for the structural description of socialist society. She distinguished between hierarchical occupation groups, which replaced the old and useless model.⁵¹ One of her main achievements was the study of educational inequalities: she showed that after a brief postwar period characterized by educational mobility, cultural capital became again inheritable, and the children of intellectuals were more likely to enter higher education than the children of less educated social strata.⁵²

The third school was that of industrial sociology. Rába was the focus of sociological research as a model factory under socialism. Makó and Héthy conducted a pioneering study of the plant in the early 1970s, which led to official discussions on the informal bargaining power of groups of workers who were highly skilled or who occupied other key positions in production. Makó and Héthy published their first report of the research in English in 1972. Héthy later studied other groups of workers in the construction industry to prove the thesis that workers who were indispensable for production because of their skills or their advantageous position in the production process could successfully represent their interests in wage disputes even against the enterprise management.⁵³

The ideologically more rigid GDR tolerated far less deviance in this respect than Hungary. After a brief period of cultural liberalization, Honecker tightened the ideological grip of the party over the intellectual life of the GDR: the surveys of the Institute for Public Opinion Poll (*Institut für Meinungsforschung*) bear the label of 'strictly confidential' although the authors of the reports did their best to demonstrate the development of socialist consciousness in the GDR: in 1968, 65 per cent of the respondents thought that the GDR was more developed socially than West Germany, while in 1973, this ratio grew to 72 per cent. We have to add, though, that 20 per cent of the workers chose not to give an answer to the question of whether socialism would dominate future development.⁵⁴ The ideologically repressive climate continued to dominate Honecker's state: Eberhard Nemitz conducted a survey among East German trainees, in which he found that the majority of the respondents had a positive at-

titude towards socialism. The picture was not, however, altogether positive: the trainees criticized the supply of consumer goods, the prohibition of watching West German television channels and the propaganda campaign of their government against West Germany. Nemitz eventually published his study in West Germany, after his emigration.⁵⁵

The Hungarian developments, however, indicated the beginning of a reorientation from the legitimizing discourse, in which the working class was constructed one-sidedly either as an oppressed or as a ruling class towards new questions, which pointed beyond the Cold War ideologies heavily propagated on both sides of the iron curtain. How did political power function in the factory? How were party policies implemented at local level and how did the workers respond to the party's policy towards labour? How did they use official socialism to negotiate concessions with the managers and the party? These questions could be best studied within the realm of the factories.⁵⁶

Inspired by Haraszti's ethnographic study of the everyday life of a socialist factory from the perspective of a worker, Michael Burawoy undertook similar fieldwork in the Hungarian Lenin Steel Works. From his comparative studies in capitalist and postcolonialist countries he concluded that the despotism of early capitalism was replaced by hegemonic despotism, where workers gave concessions to capital to preserve their factories and workplace. His Hungarian fieldwork experience led him to the conclusion that the socialist factory regimes also developed into hegemonic despotism. He distinguished between core and peripheral workers. The older, male, experienced and skilled workers constituted the first group, who occupied key positions in the production process. They were given better-paid jobs, and they were overrepresented among party and trade union officials in comparison to other workers. Among the peripheral workers one could find the young and unskilled 'whose only hope is to leave in search of a better job or to seek promotion to the core'.⁵⁷ Burawoy was, however, optimistic at the time: he argued that once the socialist workers get rid of the tutelage of the Communist Party, they would be more likely to regain socialist consciousness and establish a self-governing, socialist democracy than their capitalist counterparts.

The eventual and rapid collapse of communist regimes across the region in 1989 discredited the legitimizing narratives of official working-class histories; the events of the year disproved notions of a simple equivalence between class position and class consciousness characterized of dominant trends in Marxist thought. While, in 1989, there were some East European intellectuals who still argued for a democratic socialism based on workers control, other groups, including many of the MSZMP reformers, were calling for a 'third way' between capitalism and socialism, and

some for the creation of a social democracy based on a mixed economy and strong trade unions, even though it was also widely expected that the working class would either resist any attempt to restore capitalism or even support a reformist collectivist alternative.⁵⁸ Of course, this expectation proved to be wrong, and there was little effective working-class resistance to the introduction of a capitalist economy. There was no country in Eastern Europe where workers supported any kind of democratic socialist alternative to the existing system.⁵⁹ Nor was the East European political and intellectual climate favourable for revisiting working-class histories after the change of regimes: all forms of class theory were regarded as utterly discredited, and the working class was often uncritically associated with the state socialist past, as intellectual elites invested in futures based on ‘*embourgeoisement*’, which downplayed the social and political roles of industrial workers.

In recent years there has been a renewed interest in East European working-class histories but attention has focused on the era of early socialism during the 1940s and 1950s⁶⁰ – there is, consequently, almost no literature on the topic for the late Kádár era in Hungary, and there is relatively little for East Germany, and these studies rarely address the issue of how the workers related to the socialist state.⁶¹ The present book is engaged with revisiting working-class histories from a perspective that has been largely ignored in the national literatures of both countries. It argues for a revisiting of issues of class, after these have been largely ignored for the past two decades. Since in the East European literature the concept of class itself developed ideologically, and with politically overloaded connotations in the later socialist years being associated almost exclusively with the legitimization of the party state, it is all the more difficult to bring it back in, however much the concept has been reworked.⁶² Yet, the party-states’ class-based legitimizing ideology concealed from the elites the social weaknesses of their system, for the workers did not defend the ‘workers’ states’ in 1989. In part for this reason, the neglect of the working class carries another danger – that without a critical history of the relationship between the socialist system and industrial workers, the social roots of the rapid collapse of these regimes will remain largely unexplored.

My research uses two case studies, Carl Zeiss Jena in East Germany and Rába MVG in Győr, Hungary, to describe and analyse the party’s policy towards labour in the factories and in the county (in Hungary) or the district (in the GDR) in order to interrogate three main questions: (1) How did the welfare dictatorships succeed in providing for lasting social peace in working-class communities? (2) What were the social roots of their rapid and unexpected collapse? and (3) To what extent could the essentially similar policy of the party towards labour level existing social and cultural dif-

ferences between the East German and Hungarian working classes? The selection of the two factories was motivated by theoretical as well as practical considerations. The party regarded workers in large-scale industry as its central social basis, and it sought to focus labour policy around this group. The reorganization of enterprise management in the 1960s increased the concentration of the means of production. Giant industrial enterprises were formed, which had a monopoly over their given product. Technological improvement and product development also became the responsibility of the enterprise.⁶³ The policy of the party towards the working class was at its strongest in the large enterprises, which could offer cultural, recreational and sport facilities for their employees. In Hungary I selected Rába MVG, which was the largest industrial enterprise in the county of Győr-Sopron located in north-western Hungary, directly neighbouring Austria. I first conducted an interview project in the factory with the research question of how the workers experienced transformation and how they saw the two systems, socialism and capitalism, in comparison. The primary sources were life-history interviews conducted with twenty people who were still employed in the factory and twenty former workers of MVG. The practical consideration was the existence of an archive: Rába MVG had an enterprise party committee with a full-time party secretary, and the materials of the party organization were preserved in the county archives.

The Zeiss enterprise was selected after I had finished working in the Rába factory. It was important to find an ex-socialist-model factory, which had survived the change of regime and had a pre-socialist past. In the period of forced industrialization whole towns were built on heavy industry and cheaply imported fuels from the Soviet Union. Since these towns were obviously hit harder by restructuring, I decided to exclude this distorting factor. I also had to find a factory located outside of the capital in order to match the Hungarian factory. Peter Hübner called my attention to the Zeiss factory, which satisfied all of the above criteria. Apart from the party materials, which were located in the archive of the province, the enterprise maintained a factory archive. In addition, the district of Gera to which the factory belonged (today Thuringia) was one of the most developed parts of the GDR, just like Győr-Sopron county in Hungary. True, the two factories belonged to different industrial branches but my research aim was not to write enterprise histories but to examine the relationship between the workers and the party under late socialism. Since the workers of the Zeiss factory were part of the well-paid core of the industrial working class, their experience of socialism was comparable to that of the Rába employees.

The choice of the factory as the main locus of research links my work to a burgeoning literature, which seeks to revisit working-class histories 'in

the field'.⁶⁴ This endeavour has a special relevance for the socialist working class. Hübner argues that the party concentrated its welfare policies on the factory; thus, it was not only the site of production but in many aspects that of reproduction as well (large enterprises such as Zeiss and Rába had their own polyclinics, nurseries, kindergartens, cultural centres, sport clubs, football teams, etc.).⁶⁵ The factory was thus central for the cultural life and self-identification of the workers as well as the main 'testing field' of the party's policy towards the working class.

While examining the functioning of welfare dictatorships on the shop floor, the present study will connect and explain the findings in a wider historical context by making creative use of what Burawoy called the extensive case method.⁶⁶ The first dimension of the extended case method is participant observation. Even though the book primarily relies on archival sources, it also uses life-history interviews conducted with workers and former workers of both factories. The second dimension is the establishment of a link between the macro and the micro levels. One way to think of the macro–micro link is to view the micro as an expression of the macro, discovering reification within the factory, commodification within the family, bureaucratization within the school. From the perspective of the extended case method, this link is established, however, not as a reference to an 'expressive' totality but to a 'structured' one in which the part is shaped by its relation to the whole, taking the nature of a dialectic relationship. This dimension is particularly important for the research presented in this book, since in order to compare the findings of the factory studies, which are located in different national contexts, it is essential to link the individual case studies to the labour policy of the state in both countries. The third dimension is the extension of the case study in time, a condition that is fulfilled in the research. The last dimension is the extension of theory: by showing workers' alienation from the socialist regime in large factories where state redistribution was at its strongest, the book argues that the social decline of the regime had started well before its political collapse.

Factory case studies enable us to examine the important issue of the party's varying degree of success of building legitimacy among the large industrial working class. Contrary to the totalitarian paradigm, which denied any legitimacy from the East European Communist parties,⁶⁷ Pit-taway argues that the working class should be seen as a political actor, whose interests and demands the party had to take into consideration in order to secure its legitimacy and consolidate its political rule.⁶⁸ The success – and eventual failure – of the party's policy towards the working class can be best evaluated in large factories, which served both as a workplace and a unique social and cultural environment. By studying the

party's policy towards working women in the GDR, Harsch develops the thesis that working women could and did use the egalitarian ideology that the party propagated to gain concessions in the sphere of private life and family.⁶⁹ Following this lead, this book will show how the party accommodated the material demands of industrial workers – or at least part of them – and how workers used socialist ideology to oppose the management and defend their social rights.

By focusing on factory histories, the present study joins critics of 'transition' such as Burawoy, Hann and Verdery, who argued that anthropology could provide a necessary corrective to studies based on notions of 'transition'.⁷⁰ While in the East European mainstream historiographies it became fashionable to identify industrial workers with the socialist regime (and blame them for the failure to 'catch up' with the Western economies and standards-of-living), at the same time communism was also seen as the main reason for the historical economic backwardness of the region. Communist parties were therefore often depicted as if they had never had any welfare policies, or a policy towards the working class. Such claims are easily refutable. For the GDR Steiner⁷¹ and for Hungary Földes⁷² analysed the political history of indebtedness, which largely contributed to the economic collapse of these regimes. Kopstein pointed out the social constraints that led to increasing indebtedness: in order to preserve social peace, the party had to finance a generous welfare policy.⁷³ I go one step further to argue that even in the face of harsh economic realities, the party *had* to secure the political support of the large industrial working class and finance outdated industries in order to preserve a social compromise, which was the price of the consolidation of the regime's political power.⁷⁴ This compromise provided for the political silence of the working class and the 'appearance' of stability in both countries. This legitimacy was, however, essentially fragile because the compromise forced their weakly performing planned economies to compete with the economies of the most advanced capitalist countries, and in spite of all of the regime's socialist slogans, it spread a consumerist culture and materialistic mentality among the working class. Therefore, in the long run the compromise paved the way for 'more market' rather than a reformed socialist democracy.

This book is built on the assumption that the dynamic interplay between the party and the working class can only be understood in a concrete historical context and in a concrete setting – in our case, the factory. Apart from labour historians, who propose a novel approach to working-class histories, critics of the traditional 'heroic' narrative of working-class histories likewise argued that the factory should be taken more seriously as a social environment where labour relations are formulated.⁷⁵ While there are several examples of the comparison of big structures, it is less

common to compare local case studies. I argue that in-depth case studies can offer better insights into the everyday life and thinking of working people than the grand narratives that tend to assume a pre-given pattern of the formation of class consciousness. Without being related to a bigger structure, there is, however, a danger that analysis is lost in a mass of description, and local case studies discover specificity in institutions that were not specific to the interrogated national variant of socialism.⁷⁶ Since comparison requires the case studies to be more *relational*, it can offer novel insights into national working-class histories. The second aspect where comparison can ‘extend’ the extended case method lies precisely in the establishment of a macro–micro link.⁷⁷ Cross-national comparisons inevitably call for a more systematic and structural approach to local case studies in order to make them comparable. They can therefore help to reinforce the second dimension of the extended case method, and extend the scope of generalization – which seems to be a common problem of single case studies.

The two countries – the GDR and Hungary – offer the best examples of a welfare dictatorship in the East European socialist region, which for a while succeeded in winning over the political support of the ‘masses’. The Polish Communist Party was less successful in this respect; the rise of Solidarity can be explained precisely through the failure of the party to establish a similar compromise with the working class.⁷⁸ After the violent suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, Hušák also implemented a form of ‘welfare dictatorship’ to ensure the quiescence of workers; the rapid ‘normalization’ in Czechoslovakia and the lack of a movement similar to Solidarity can be partly explained through the relative success of this policy. In Romania, Ceaușescu introduced a national Stalinism and a neo-Stalinist export-oriented economic model in the 1980s that depressed workers’ standards of living.

The comparison of two case studies cannot, of course, give a fully fledged typology of workers in all of the East European socialist systems, but it can provide us with useful insights into the relationship between the labour policies of the party and the absence of open working-class protest. The history of the welfare dictatorships follows common patterns – this *periodization* serves as the basis of the structure of the book. In the first part, I examine the reform era of the 1960s, which indicated the last time when the party entered into a real dialogue with the working class. The period of economic reform witnessed a real social debate, which divided the party in both countries, and increased its willingness to listen to workers’ opinions. This was particularly remarkable in the GDR – in comparison with the later disappearance of criticism under Honecker. Workers voiced their dissatisfaction not only with the increas-

ing social inequalities – a consequence of the economic reform – but also with the existing power structure in the factory and the effective exclusion of workers from decisions that concerned production. The first part will introduce workers' responses to the economic reform and in so doing reveal unexplored contradictions of the socialist system as well as demonstrate that the economic reforms in both countries were accompanied by a broader social dialogue. What rendered the reform period above all interesting in both countries was that it was the last time when elements of a real dialogue could be documented between the workers and the party. More importantly, workers accepted the party as a conversation partner and believed that it would be able to accomplish reform.

The reform period ended with the failure of dialogue in both countries: the party decided to buy the support – or at least the silence – of the people through the standard-of-living policy and the promise of catching up with Western levels of consumption. In the Hungarian case, the reform period ended with a retreat in economy (more radical reforms were planned to expand private or the so-called second economy) and a Pyrrhic victory of the hardliners or dogmatic communists in the field of ideology. In the GDR, Honecker came to power in 1971 after Ulbricht's economic reform failed, which forced the resignation of the first secretary. Ulbricht experimented with a different type of economic reform from that in Hungary, based on decentralization and the development of strategic sectors. His new economic system led, however, to mounting social discontent because of the increasing shortage of consumer goods. Honecker promised to 'correct' this policy and – in a marked parallel with the Hungarian standard-of-living policy – continuously to increase the welfare of his people. The second part focuses on the everyday functioning of this policy: housing policy, the building of working-class communities, education, culture, working women, the relationship between workers and managers, and workers' use of socialist ideology in defence of their social rights.

The consolidation of welfare dictatorships that is documented in the second part of the book was accompanied in both countries by the consequent suppression of any *leftist* attempt to reform socialism: the direct ownership of workers did not even come up in reform discussions. While in Poland an independent workers' movement started to develop in the late 1970s and blossomed during the sixteen months of Solidarity, in the GDR and Hungary 1953 and 1956 were the last moments of large-scale working-class resistance when workers articulated an alternative to the regime. Discussions of leftist alternatives were also suppressed on an everyday level; workers' self-management was never mentioned in information reports, or in other materials. True, the party's policy towards the working class promoted non-materialist values including community

building and support for workers' culture and education in both countries. These initiatives – including the socialist brigade movement – were not, however, intended to increase worker control over the factories; in actual fact, socialist collectivism of this kind was meant to compensate the workers for their effective exclusion from political power.

The third part of the book is directly engaged with the relationship between the party and the working class as well as with the limits of the party's policy towards labour and the crisis of welfare dictatorships. The orientation towards consumption was paralleled with a gradual change in the rhetoric of the party: while the speeches of the East German party leaders abounded in quotations from Marx and Lenin, real workers increasingly disappeared from the party documents. With the adoption of the consumption-oriented policy the 'workerist' ideology of the party increasingly lost its social content, which left people disillusioned.

The limits of this policy became visible in Hungary earlier than in the GDR. This had an important impact on the relationship between the workers and the party, which is documented at length in the third part of the book that discusses issues of party-building, methods of recruitment, agitation, party life and the party's evaluation on the shop floor. In Hungary the economic crisis of the late 1970s forced the government to seek the financial support of the International Monetary Fund. In exchange for credits, concessions had to be given: in the economy, liberalization meant the expansion of the private (or informal) sector, which became adjacent to state industry,⁷⁹ and in political life, a gradual softening of the dictatorship (travelling, mitigation of censorship), which rendered Hungary one of the most 'Western' socialist countries – also known as 'goulash communism' or 'the happiest barrack in the camp'. While many workers used the opportunities of the private – or, as it was called, the second economy – people's dissatisfaction increased because of widening social inequalities.⁸⁰ Increasing interest in consumption and the increased working hours, whether in the formal or informal economies, that were needed to achieve a higher standard of living contributed to the decline of socialist collectivism, and the increasing individualization of society.⁸¹

The GDR, by contrast, was always regarded as a socialist stronghold on the border of the Eastern bloc where the Soviet military presence and ideological control was much stronger than in Hungary. There was also a more marked need to compete with the capitalist West directly. After the collapse of Ulbricht's reform, Honecker combined central planning with a significant extension of the welfare state. As the gap between the East and West German standards of living continued to grow, repression was used to a greater extent than in Hungary to prevent open criticism that allowed the states publicly to maintain the fiction of the superiority

of the socialist system. Criticism was therefore targeted at the shortage of consumer goods – shortages that were generated more by the collectivist model prevalent in the GDR than by the reformist one found in Kádár's Hungary – and the economic gap between the GDR and West Germany. Even though the intelligentsia was believed to be privileged in comparison to the working class,⁸² we cannot speak of widening social inequality in the GDR prior to 1989.⁸³ The comparison of party life in the third part shows how different models of socialist rule – one collectivist, the other reformist – influenced the workers' relationship with the party state.

One difference between the two models is clearly visible: even though the political crisis of the Kádár regime came in 1989, signs of decline were visible much earlier in Hungary. The failure of the standard-of-living policy meant, in essence, the exhaustion of the party's policy towards the working class. On the basis of the regularly collected information reports concerning the public mood of employees in Győr-Sopron county and Rába MVG, people became increasingly critical of the economic situation of the country and the standard-of-living policy from the second half of the 1970s. In the late Kádár era, mounting economic discontent gradually developed into overt criticism of the party and the political system.

In particular the second and third parts of the book make use of an in-depth archival research to depict the process of workers' alienation from the party at a local level. In the 1980s, the workers' alienation from the party could be documented in Hungary whereas the grass-roots members were silenced in the GDR: the party materials of the Honecker era are documents produced under the influence of official propaganda, and they tell us very little of workers' political ideas.⁸⁴ On the basis of the Hungarian materials it is, however, possible to trace growing awareness on an everyday level of the limits – and eventually the failure – of the standard-of-living policy, even among the party membership. The failure of the party's policy towards the working class also became evident in the GDR, where large-scale ideological control under Honecker – which was much stronger than in Hungary – prevented the open expression of mounting discontent among the population. It was only the mass flight of GDR citizens to the West in 1989 with the opening of the Hungarian borders that rendered the crisis of the welfare dictatorship in the GDR visible. In this respect, the more 'visible' social decline of the system in Hungary complements the picture of an East Germany engulfed in enforced silence about the tensions that lay under the surface.

After the failure of the state socialist project, the East European countries hoped to 'catch up' with the developed capitalist countries by adopting Western-style political institutions and market economies. The adoption of Western institutions facilitated new 'expectations of moder-

nity'.⁸⁵ These expectations, as Bryant and Mokrzycki rightly argued, combined the aspiration to achieve Western levels of consumption with the maintenance of full employment, and some of the other social 'gains' of the state socialist years.⁸⁶ As it became clear that combining the market economy with the socialist welfare state was an illusion, the legitimacy of the 'transition' was called into question. This generated a search for new paradigms both at theoretical and at methodological levels.⁸⁷ The experience of transformation was economically less painful in East Germany than in Hungary because the former adopted the welfare system of West Germany, which mitigated the social costs of industrial restructuring. In Hungary the socialist welfare system was dismantled outright.⁸⁸ While it is recognized that collective memory of the previous regimes has been shaped by the experiences of postsocialist economic and social transformation, in the fourth part of the book the working-class memory of the Kádár and Honecker regimes is examined.

The fourth part directly confronts us with the question of how successful the welfare dictatorships were in levelling existing social and cultural differences between the East German and Hungarian working classes. Prior to the establishment of communist rule, Germany and Hungary stood at different stages of industrial development, the former being a leading industrial nation and the latter belonging to the East European semi-periphery of the European economy.⁸⁹ Despite different working-class traditions in the two countries,⁹⁰ socialist rule produced certain social responses that were common to both cases; near identical socialist institutions provided for similar experiences and sometimes even attitudes. The socialist brigade movement was, for instance, well remembered in both the East German and Hungarian interviews: workers would typically argue that 'back then' (under socialism) they had a more intensive community life than in the new, capitalist regime and the socialist brigades provided for a social space that they understood to be free of state control. In order to compare the memories of the Kádár and Honecker regime, we should, however, bear in mind that after the change of regimes, Hungary had a different experience of postsocialist transformation from East Germany, which was united with one of the most advanced capitalist economies. It is worth citing here a telling data, which should have warned the politicians and economists of the country of the illusory nature of 'catching-up development', which was heavily advocated after 1989: in 1974, only 6 per cent of the male workers of Zeiss did not finish a training school (three-year training after the compulsory primary school), while in 1975, a quarter of the total workforce of Rába did not finish primary school. Albeit the Communist Party in Hungary implemented several programmes to raise the educational level of the people,

the (still) existing differences forecasted inevitable difficulties in the transition to a knowledge-based economy. While we can trace several similar patterns in the policies of welfare dictatorships, in particular in their policy towards labour, I use the East German and Hungarian case studies to identify differences in the formation and historical development of their working classes that determined both the possibilities and limits of the East European socialist regimes.

Notes

1. The change of regime in Hungary has been referred to as ‘negotiated revolution’ or ‘constitutional revolution’. On the political history of the roundtable discussions (the negotiations among MSZMP and the new parties) see A. Bozóki (ed.). 2000. *A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve: kerekasztal-tárgyalások 1989-ben: alkotmányos forradalom: tanulmányok*, Budapest: Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó. For a study of the historical roots of the peaceful transition see R.L. Tökés. 1996. *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957–1990*, New York: Cambridge University Press. For a study on the democratic opposition in Hungary see: E. Csizmadia (ed.). 1995. *A magyar demokratikus ellenzék 1968–1988*, Budapest: TTwins.
2. In the era of Cold War it was a common practice in both the socialist and capitalist blocs to equate Marxism as a theory with the so called Marxism-Leninism, which – after Stalin’s political victory and with his active assistance – became the official legitimizing ideology of the Communist Party. Krausz attempts to reconstruct the theoretical roots of the Stalinist reinterpretation of Marxist ideology: T. Krausz. 1996. *Szovjet thermidor: A sztálini fordulat szellemi előzményei 1917–1928*, Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó.
3. ‘Visszahívna a kapitalistákat?’, *Tér-kép*, 1 June 1989.
4. On the history of Rába see: Z. Tabiczky. 1977. *A Magyar Vagon- és Gépgyár története*, 2 vols, Győr: Rába; K. Bossányi. 1978. ‘A versenyképesség stratégiája: Beszélgetés Horváth Edével, a Rába vezérigazgatójával’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 33(11); K. Bossányi. 1986. ‘Made in Rába’, in I. Matkó (ed.), *Ipari közelmépek*, Budapest: Ipari és Kereskedelmi Minisztérium Kiadása; L. Héthy and Cs. Makó. 1975. *Az automatizáció és a munkástudat*, Budapest: MTA Szociológiai Kutató Intézet Kiadványa. On the life of Horváth see: E. Horváth. 1990. *Én volnék a Vörös Báró?*, Pécs: Szikra Nyomda; A. Dusza. 2003. *A birodalom végnapjai: Így láttam Horváth Edét*, Győr: X-Meditor Kft.
5. For a discussion of the internal division within the Hungarian Communist Party see Gy. Földes. 1989. *Hatalom és mozgalom 1956–1989*. Budapest: Reform Könyvkiadó-Kossuth Könyvkiadó. Földes distinguishes between the ‘orthodox’ or ‘dogmatic’ communists, who were opposed to pro-market reforms and they wanted to maintain the status quo and the ‘reformers’, who called for the expansion of the market. For a study of the role of luxury in the Hungarian ruling elite see: Gy. Majtényi. 2009. *K-vonal. Uralmi elit és luxus a szocializmusban*, Budapest: Nyitott Könyvműhely.
6. ‘Beszélgetés Horváth Edével, a Rába MVG vezérigazgatójával’, *Tér-kép*, 1 June 1989.
7. Horváth tells the story from his perspective in Horváth, *Én volnék a Vörös Báró?*, 130–50. He argued that the managers sacrificed him in order to save themselves. The story of Horváth’s removal is told from another perspective by András Dusza, the communication manager of the enterprise in Dusza, *A birodalom végnapjai*.
8. The evaluation of Ede Horváth is even today controversial. On 24 November 2003 the Rába sold its centrally located estate of 6.5 hectares to ECE-Einkaufs-Center-Győr. On this occasion many people recommended that Horváth should get a statute from the town (readers’ letters were published in the local daily *Kisalföld*). In a public meeting of the

town on 9 January 2004 the mayor declared that because of the controversial judgment of his person, the town would rather consider a commemorative tablet. The overwhelming majority of the Rába workers and managers, who I interviewed between 2002 and 2004, recognized and respected Horváth's commitment to Rába and his work for the factory. His autocratic leadership style arose more controversies.

9. There is a very extensive literature on the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe. The comparative and historical aspects are, however, often neglected. For a good comparative study see: M. Pittaway. 2004. *Eastern Europe 1939–2000*, London: Hodder Arnold.
10. For a detailed discussion of the literature on workers in East-Central Europe after the change of regimes see: P. Heumos. 2010. 'Workers under Communist Rule: Research in the Former Socialist Countries of Eastern-Central and South-Eastern Europe and in the Federal Republic of Germany', *International Review of Social History* 55.
11. That the collapse of state socialism was unexpected has been confirmed by scholars such as Klaus von Beyme, who called 1989 a 'black Friday' for social sciences because of their failure to forecast this event. K. Beyme. 1996. *Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe*, Houndmills: Macmillan. To be sure, convergence theory did predict that industrialization would bring about a gradual homogenization of social structures, leading to the overthrow of political regimes in the socialist countries. These regimes collapsed, however, not because they succeeded to catch up with the advanced capitalist countries but quite the contrary, because they failed to do so. For a detailed discussion of the main paradigms of the change of regimes see: E. Bartha. 2010. 'Transition, Transformation, "Postsocialism": Theorizing Systemic Change in Eastern Europe', in: K. Csaplár-Degovics, M. Mitrovits and Cs. Zahorán (eds), *After Twenty Years: Reasons and Consequences of the Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe*, Berlin: Osteuropa-Zentrum and Terra Cognita Foundation.
12. I cite here Stephen Kotkin, one of the best-known experts on Stalinism, who said at a conference organized at the Central European University, Budapest that after many years of research and the deatiled study of many Soviet archives, one can conclude that communists were indeed communists. See: S. Kotkin. 1995. *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
13. Cited in P. Somlai. 2008. *Társas és társadalmi. Válogatott tanulmányok*, Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 116.
14. The famous Soviet co-authors, Ilf and Petrov frequently made fun of this idealized socialist hero who, after working full time in the factory, volunteers for all kinds of social and cultural activities that the party propagates (studying in party school, working for the factory and wall newspapers, singing in choir and working in the trade union). The 'man of the movement' was a grateful source of contemporary Soviet humour.
15. The Trotskyist critique was, of course, not a single response to Stalinism. For a theoretical discussion of the internal division of the left see M. Linden. 2007. *Western Marxism and the Soviet Union: A Survey of Critical Theory and Debates since 1917*, Leiden: Brill.
16. Trotsky already predicted that the nomenklatura would not hesitate to privatize state property if they felt that their political power would be at risk. Krausz argues that this was exactly the case under perestroika, and this was the main reason why the Soviet economic elite abandoned Gorbachev, who represented this political programme and the reform of socialism, and committed itself to Yeltsin and the restoration of capitalism. T. Krausz. 2007. 'Perestroika and the Redistribution of Property in the Soviet Union: Political Perspectives and Historical Evidence', *Contemporary Politics* 13(1).
17. For a discussion of what this political change meant for the content of the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine, see T. Krausz. 1991. *Pártviták és történettudomány: Viták 'az orosz fejlődés' sajátosságairól, különös tekintettel az 1920-as évekre*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó; Krausz, *Szovjet thermidor*.
18. See Deutscher's classical biography of Stalin: I. Deutscher. 1949. *Stalin: A Political Biography*, New York: Oxford University Press. See also Moshe Lewin's influential work on the

- social history of Stalinism: M. Lewin. 1985. *The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia*, London: Methuen.
19. Geoffrey Roberts shows that contrary to the fabrication of the myth of the ‘preventive war’ (that Stalin sought to attack Nazi Germany – which was a recurring element in Goebbels’ propaganda), in reality the Soviet dictator was conscious of the enormous risk of attacking the leading industrial and military power of Europe. He was therefore determined to preserve the peace with Hitler even though he knew his deeply rooted anti-communism. See: G. Roberts. 2006. *Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953*, New Haven: Yale University Press. Roberts also shows that in the era of the Cold War there was a conscious attempt on behalf of the former Western allies to diminish the role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazi Germany although it was the Red Army which defeated the Wehrmacht on land. See also: M. Geyer and S. Fitzpatrick. 2009. *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared*, New York: Cambridge University Press. For the discussion of the Russian roots of the myth of the ‘preventive war’ see E. Bartha and T. Krausz (eds). 2011. *Háborús és nemzeti önismeret: 70 éve támadta meg a náci Németország a Szovjetuniót*, Budapest: Komáromi Nyomda és Kiadó. Robert Thurston called the Second World War the ‘acid test’ of Stalinism. See: R. Thurston. 1996. *Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
 20. Zs. Ferge. 2010. *Társadalmi áramlatok és egyéni szerepek*, Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 71. Stress is mine.
 21. M. Pittaway. 2006. ‘A magyar forradalom új megközelítésben: az ipari munkásság, a szocializmus szét hullása és rekonstrukciója, 1953–1958’, *Eszmélet* 72.
 22. Shortened form of agitation-propaganda.
 23. Dissident intellectuals argued that ‘socialist’ functioned as a privative prefix: socialist market meant that there was no market, and socialist democracy meant that there was no democracy.
 24. After the fusion of the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party in 1948, the party was named Hungarian Workers’ Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja). It was dissolved in 1956.
 25. István Feitl documents what political preparations preceded the celebration of 1 May 1957 in Budapest because the party was still afraid of working-class protests and riots: I. Feitl. 2009. ‘Új Budapest-politika felé’, in I. Feitl (ed.). *Budapest az 1960-as években*, Budapest: Napvilág. Feitl also depicts how harsh measures were taken to secure the capital on 23 October 1957. Kádár expressed his surprise at the stillness of the city: ‘Was this all that our enemies could do against us? Have they run out of strength?’ he asked contemptuously the Central Committee. The political atmosphere of fear is also documented by Horváth, who recalls that the high party leaders in Győr-Sopron county carried guns even in 1957. Horváth, *Én volnék a Vörös Báró?*
 26. On the 1958 resouction see Á. Pető. 1992. *A munkások életkörülményei Magyarországon az 1950-es években*, Budapest: Eötvös University, manuscript. Földes gives a good analysis of the political background of the change of the party’s policy towards labour. See: Földes, Gy. 1989. *Hatalom és mozgalom 1956–1989*, Budapest: Reform Könyvkiadó and Kossuth Könyvkiadó; Földes. 1993. ‘A Kádár-rendszer és a munkásság’, *Eszmélet* 19.
 27. Kohut vividly depicts the misery of the workers’ hostels in the light of contemporary documents: for instance, he recalls cases when people refused to use the common baths because their clothes were stolen while they were washing themselves. T. Kohut. 2008. “‘Erkölcsei téren ma már a szállókon rend van’”. Mindennapi élet a szocialista korszak munkásszállásain’, *Korall* 32(9). On the conditions of workers’ hostels see also S. Horváth. 2012. *Két emelet boldogság. Mindennapi szociálpolitika Budapesten a Kádár-korszakban*, Budapest: Napvilág,
 28. The reports on the conditions of the working class bore the designation of ‘strictly confidential’. The national reports were prepared only in a couple of copies. Even in reports, which only Kádár and some top leaders could read, we can find sentences that in some large factories of Budapest workers said that their situation greatly improved but that they owed this to [the revolution of] 1956.

29. M.J. Rainer. 2011. *Bevezetés a kádárizmusba*, Budapest: L'Harmattan.
30. The term is used in M. Pittaway. 1998. 'Industrial Workers, Socialist Industrialisation and the State in Hungary, 1948–1958', Ph.D., University of Liverpool. Pittaway argues that the 'workerist ideology' of the party was central to the legitimization of the ruling communist regimes. In his book (Pittaway. 2012. *The Workers' State: Industrial Labour and the Making of Socialist Hungary, 1944–1958*, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press) he uses three case studies of different working-class environments to show how this legitimacy was undermined by the harsh measures that the Hungarian government took against the working class in the early 1950s to realize the military programme triggered by the Cold War and Stalin's fear of a Third World War.
31. See in particular: Pittaway, 'A magyar forradalom új megközelítésben'; C. Gati. 2006. *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
32. Bill Lomax was one of the chief Western advocates of the theory that the workers' councils represented the seeds of a new, democratic socialism. See: I. Kemény and B. Lomax (eds). 1986. *Magyar munkástanácsok 1956-ban: Dokumentumok*, Paris: Magyar Füzetek; B. Lomax. 1989. *Magyarország 1956*, Budapest: Aura. Recent authors, however, argue that the leadership of the workers' councils was dominated by intellectuals. For the debate see: E. Zs. Tóth. 1999. 'A Csepel Vas- és Fémművek munkástanácsainak története 1956–1957', *Múltunk* 4; I. Feitl. 2005. 'Parlamentarizmus és öngazgatás az 1956-os forradalomban', *Múltunk* 2; I. Feitl. 1989. 'A magyar munkástanácsok és az öngazgatás 1956-ban', *Eszmélet* 2; T. Krausz. 2006. 'Az 1956-os munkástanácsokról', *Eszmélet* 72; L. Tütő. 2006. '1956 mint nyelvi probléma', *Eszmélet* 72.
33. Pittaway argues that the revolution found its social basis in the working class, which protested not only against their material pauperization but also against collectivization in the province since the overwhelming majority of the newly recruited workforce came from the peasantry. In addition, the wage policy of the early 1950s overthrew the traditional hierarchies based on skill, age and gender in the factories, and turned the more experienced, skilled core of the working class against the Stalinist regime. The author concludes that the consolidation of the Kádár regime was possible through the satisfaction of the most important working-class demands. Pittaway, 'A magyar forradalom új megközelítésben'.
34. Many leaders of the workers' councils were imprisoned or suffered other forms of persecution.
35. Officially, the managers were appointed by the relevant ministries, but the leading party organs had to approve of the appointments.
36. The formal role of the trade union in the enterprise management was criticized even in the executive committee of Győr-Sopron county (Győr Megyei Jogú Város Levéltára, GYML, X. 415/134/1, MSZMP Győr-Sopron Megyei Bizottsága. Pártbizottsági ülés jegyzőkönyve, napirendi anyagai. Az üzemi demokrácia helyzete, az egyszemélyi vezetés érvényesülése és a továbbfejlesztés feladatai. 1974. március 29).
37. In Hungary, Lajos Héthy and Csaba Makó wrote several studies on the functioning of interest representation and the often informal ways of successful bargaining. See: L. Héthy and Cs. Makó. 1972. *Munkásmagatartások és a gazdasági szervezet*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó; L. Héthy and Cs. Makó. 1976. 'A munkások perspektívái és a szocialista vállalat', *Társadalmi Szemle* 31(1); L. Héthy and Cs. Makó. 1978. *Munkások, érdekek, érdekegyeztetés*, Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó; L. Héthy and Cs. Makó. 1972. 'Work Performance, Interests, Powers and Environment (The Case of Cyclical Slowdowns in a Hungarian Factory)', *The Sociological Review Monograph* 17; L. Héthy. 1977 'Bérvita az építkezésen (Az érdekvérvényesítési képesség problémája)', *Valóság* 20(11). Concerning enterprise democracy see in particular: L. Héthy. 1980. *Az üzemi demokrácia és a munkások*, Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó; L. Héthy. 1983. *Vállalatirányítás és demokrácia. Az üzemi demokrácia szociológiai koncepciója és fejlesztésének lehetőségei szervezeti-társadalmi viszonyainkban*, Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó; Cs. Makó. 1979. 'Részvétel: a feladat átalakítása vagy a

- hatalmi viszonyok átalakítása’, *Valóság* 22(4). In the periodical *Társadalmi Szemle* there was also an extensive debate on how to realize enterprise democracy. See: A. Mód. 1974. ‘Munkásismeretek, munkástörekvések, üzemi demokrácia (Kutatási tapasztalatok)’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 29(11); I. Katona. 1976. ‘Eszmecsere a párttagokkal’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 31(2); L. Héthy. 1977. ‘Hogyan látjuk ma az üzemi demokráciát?’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(9); L. Héthy. 1979. ‘A gazdasági munka pártirányítása és az érdekegyeztetés’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 34(2); L. Héthy. 1978. ‘Az üzemi demokrácia fejlesztésének útján (Az eszmecsere befejezéséhez)’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 33(6); E. Sötér. 1977. ‘Gondolatok a szocialista brigádmozgalmról’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(4); Cs. Makó. 1977. ‘Az érdekegyeztetés és a cselekvési egység az üzemben. Az üzemi demokrácia fejlesztésének kérdéséhez’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(5); L. Horváth. 1977. ‘Üzemi demokrácia és vállalati stratégia’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(9); Cs. Egerszegi. 1977. ‘Termelési tanácskozás és üzemi demokrácia’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(9); Gy. Akszentievics. 1977. ‘Ki hogyan érdekelt az üzemi demokrácia gyakorlásában?’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(10); Á. Simonyi. 1977. ‘Munkásrészvétel üzemi bevezetési döntésekben (Kutatói tapasztalatok a Magyar Vagon és Gépgyárban)’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(10); Á. Simonyi. 1978. ‘Munkahelyi demokrácia és nyilvánosság’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 33(1); M. Búza. 1977. ‘Az üzemi demokrácia érvényesítése: a gazdasági vezetők kötelessége’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(9); J. Marosi. 1977. ‘Nem csak a gazdasági vezetők dolga ...’ *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(12); J. Fehér. 1977. ‘Diósgyőri munkások az üzemi demokráciáról’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(11); I. Ferenczi. 1977. ‘Az üzemi demokrácia: fokozott társadalmi ellenőrzés’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 32(12); P. Vitkovics. 1978. ‘Az üzemi demokrácia és a pártszervezet munkája’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 33(1); Gy. Marle. 1978. ‘Az üzemi demokrácia és a termelés’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 33(3); T. Folkmayer. 1978. ‘Üzemi demokrácia és tervezés’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 33(4); J. Andics and T. Rozgonyi. 1979. ‘A vállalati konfliktusok és a hatékonyság’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 34(5); Gy. Gergely. 1979. ‘Hogyan látják a munkások üzemi gondjainkat és tennivalóinkat?’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 34(9); J. Rózsa. 1978. ‘Napjaink kérdése: az üzemi demokrácia’, *Társadalmi Szemle* 33(2). It should be noted that Lajos Héthy and Csaba Makó conducted a study in Rába MVG about how automation influenced working-class consciousness. The research is discussed in: L. Héthy and Cs. Makó. 1972. ‘Az automatizáció és az ipari munkások. Beszámoló egy nemzetközi kutatási program menetéről’, *Szociológia* 2.
38. He wrote this work in 1968, but it was only published in 1985.
39. In the Hungarian case see: M. Haraszi. 1977. *A Worker in a Workers' State*, New York: Penguin; Gy. Bence and J. Kis [Mark Rakovski]. 1983. *A szovjet típusú társadalom marxista szemmel*, Paris: Magyar Füzetek; Gy. Bence, J. Kis and Gy. Márkus. 1992. *Hogyan lehetséges kritikai gazdaságtan?*, Budapest: T-Twins; Gy. Konrád and I. Szelényi. 1979. *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Gy. Lukács. 1985. *Demokratisierung heute und morgen*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. In the German case see: R. Bahro. 1977. *Die Alternative: zur Kritik des realexistierenden Sozialismus*, Cologne: Europäische Verlaganstalt. It is worth pointing out that the East European intellectuals, who grew disappointed with ‘actually existing’ socialism, used the Marxist method to demonstrate that the regime had nothing to do with the socialism that Marx envisaged because the reproduction of inequalities and exploitation were central themes of their criticism of socialism. Thus, the oppositionist intellectuals formulated an essentially leftist criticism of ‘actually existing’ socialism. But I can also mention the example of Szelényi and Konrád’s book *Az új lakótelepek szociológiai problémái* (The sociological problems of the new housing estates), which sharply criticizes the ‘unjust’ privileges of white-collar workers and the intelligentsia in the central allocation of flats – namely, that the latter could use string-pulling to obtain a flat quicker than the ‘officially’ positively discriminated workers (I. Szelényi and Gy. Konrád. 1969. *Az új lakótelepek szociológiai problémái*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó). This research became the basis of the authors’ famous book (*The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*) in which they develop the thesis that under mature socialism the ruling class

- is not the bureaucracy but the intellectuals. Later, however, Szélényi self-critically revised this thesis and he argued that the resistance of the bureaucracy and the expansion of the second (private) economy prevented the formation of this new class: I. Szélényi. 1990. 'A kelet európai újosztály stratégia távlatai és korlátai: Az értelmiség útja az osztályhatalomhoz önkritikus felülvizsgálata', in I. Szélényi, *Új osztály, állam, politika*, Budapest: Európa. For other, influential left-wing criticisms of state socialism see: Casals [Pavel Campenau]. 1980. *The Syncretic Society*, White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe; M. Djilas. 1983. *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. See also: F. Parlin (ed.). 1974. *The Social Analysis of Class Structure*, London: Tavistock.
40. Workers' self-management as a possible alternative was not even mentioned in the interviews that I conducted with 40-40 workers in both factories between 2002 and 2004. When asked directly, the majority of the interview partners were unfamiliar with the concept.
 41. Direktive des VIII. Parteitages der SED zum Fünfjahrplan für die Entwicklung der Volkswirtschaft der DDR 1971 bis 1975, in: Protokoll des VIII. Parteitages der SED, 2. volume, 322–27 and 380–91.
 42. A. Steiner. 2004. *Von Plan zu Plan: eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR*, Munich: Dt. Vrl.-Anst., 190.
 43. On Honecker's social policy see: B. Bouvier. 2002. *Die DDR- ein Sozialstaat? Sozialpolitik in der Ära Honecker*, Bonn: Dietz. For contemporary studies on the Honecker era see R. Hürtgen and T. Reichel (eds). 2001. *Der Schein der Stabilität: DDR-Betriebsalltag in der Ära Honecker*, Berlin: Metropol-Verlag; Gert-Joachim Glaefner (ed.). 1988. *Die DDR in der Ära Honecker*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag; W. Weidenfeld and H. Zimmermann (eds). 1989. *Deutschland-Handbuch. Eine doppelte Bilanz 1949–1989*, Bonn: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung.
 44. A further example, of a trial of left dissidents as early as 1971, is provided by L. Tütő. 1993. 'A szocialista ellenzékiesség történetéből – az 1971-es Kemény-per', *Eszmélet* 5(3).
 45. The existence of this gap is confirmed by M. Burawoy and J. Lukács. 1992. *The Radiant Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary's Road to Capitalism*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press; and E. Szalai. 1986. *Beszélgétek a gazdasági reformról*, Budapest: Pénzügykutató Intézet Kiadványai.
 46. Burawoy, *The Radiant Past*.
 47. There is an impressive literature on the demise of Honecker's state; see, for instance: J. Kopstein. 1997. *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany 1945–1989*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press; M. Fulbrook. 1995. *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949–1989*, New York: Oxford University Press; C. Maier. 1997. *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany*, Princeton: Princeton University Press; T. Lindenberger (ed.). 1990. *Herrschaft und Eigensinn in der Diktatur. Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR*, Cologne: Böhlau; K. Jarausch and M. Sabrow (eds). 1999. *Der Weg in den Untergang. Der innere Zerfall der DDR*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht; H. Joas and M. Kohli (eds). 1993. *Der Zusammenbruch der DDR. Soziologische Analyse*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. The working-class history of late socialism is, however, missing from the otherwise impressive literature. Fuller offers a sociological analysis of the lack of working-class action. She develops the thesis that the East German working class refrained from class action after the collapse of communist rule because they did not want to get involved in a struggle between the rival groups of intelligentsia as they viewed the change of regimes. My argument is different. See L. Fuller. 1999. *Where Was the Working Class?: Revolution in Eastern Germany*, Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
 48. The party itself was divided on the issue of how the ruling role of the working class could be realized with the 'advancement of the scientific-technological development'. Officially, however, the doctrine was not revised.
 49. I. Kemény. 1972. 'A magyar munkásság rétegződése', *Szociológia* 1; I. Kemény. 1990. *Veliünk nevelkedett a gép: Magyar munkások a betvenes évek elején*, Budapest: Művelődéskutató In-

- tézet. Kemény continued the work of Julius Rézler, who in the interwar period elaborated a strictly scientific method for the study of the large industrial working class. Rézler's survey includes the main characteristics of the settlements and the factories, the working-class society of manufacturing industry, working conditions, the social policy of the factories, the representation of labour interests, the scale and type of workers' organizations, housing conditions, family types and size, and the economic and cultural conditions of the working class. Rézler used this method to investigate the conditions of the working class of the brickyards, the sugar mills, the ironworks and the textile industry. His important work of this period bears the title *A magyar nagyipari munkásság kialakulása 1867–1914* (The formation of the large industrial working class in Hungary 1867–1914), and it belongs to the lasting achievements of the Hungarian sociology of the interwar period. Rézler, however, could not continue his work in Hungary: his friends warned him that he would be arrested and charged with espionage for his brother, who taught at Harvard University. After his immigration he lived and taught in the United States.
50. András Hegedüs, who was Prime Minister in 1956, played an important role in the re-establishment of sociological institutions. On the relationship between party policy and sociology see his memoirs: A. Hegedüs. 1989. *Élet egy eszme árnyékában*, Budapest: Bethlen Gábor Könyvkiadó. The education of Hungarian sociology owes much to the efforts of Tibor Huszár and his colleagues. Public opinion polls were considered to be a 'bourgeois' discipline. The 1960s, and the Western recognition of Kádár's Hungary (the United Nations decided to remove the retaliations from the agenda following the Hungarian amnesty for political prisoners of 1956) indicated a change in this respect: the first cohort of Hungarian academics travelled to the United States to learn how to conduct an opinion poll.
 51. Zs. Ferge. 1979. *A Society in the Making: Hungarian Social and Societal Policy, 1945–1975*, Harmondsworth: Penguin. See also: Zs. Ferge. 1969. *Társadalmuk rétegződése: Elvek és tények*. Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.
 52. Zs. Ferge. 1976. *Az iskolarendszer és az iskolai tudás társadalmi meghatározottsága*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
 53. L. Héthy, 'Bérvita az építkezésen'.
 54. Bundesarchiv (Archive of the Federal Republic of Germany), Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR, DY 30/IV/2.2.033, Institut für Meinungsforschung, 8 Januar 1976. On the relationship between the party and sociology in the GDR see: H. Laatz. 1990. *Klassenstruktur und soziales Verhalten. Zur Entstehung der empirischen Sozialstrukturforschung in der DDR*, Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik.
 55. E. Nemitz. 1988. *Junge Produktionsarbeiter und Lehrlinge in der DDR. Eine empirische Untersuchung über Jugendliche in volkseigenen Betrieben des Bauwesens*, Koblenz: Verlag Siegfried Bublies.
 56. Conducting fieldwork in a factory was, of course, not easy. Burawoy negotiated his entry to Hungarian factories through well-connected sociologists. In the GDR, Lutz Niethammer and his colleagues conducted the first fieldwork – the results were published after the collapse of Honecker's regime: L. Niethammer, A. von Plato and D. Wierling. 1991. *Die volkseigene Erfahrung: eine Archäologie des Lebens in der Industriezone der DDR*, Berlin: Rowohlt-Berlin-Verlag.
 57. M. Burawoy. 1985. *The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism*, London: Verso, 189.
 58. In Hungary the idea of democratic socialism without the MSZMP was represented most completely by the Leftist Alternative Union (*Baloldali Alternatíva Egyesület*). After the political failure of its project, the intellectual heritage of this school was continued by the journal *Eszmélet* (Consciousness) launched in 1989. The internationally best-known intellectual of this circle is Tamás Krausz.
 59. This concept had particularly strong theoretical roots in Hungary because of the work of George Lukács. Disappointed with Stalinist society and refusing to accept a capitalist res-

toration, Lukács wrote a famous essay (*Demokratisierung heute und morgen*) in the 1960s in which he sought to outline a third road. There is a sad irony in the fact that by the time this book was published in Hungary (1985), the reformers pressed for more rather than less capitalism.

60. For the GDR see: C. Kleßmann. 2007. *Arbeiter im Arbeiterstaat im "Arbeiterstaat" DDR: Deutsche Traditionen, sowjetisches Modell, westdeutsches Magnetfeld 1945 bis 1971*, Bonn: Dietz; P. Hübner. 1995. *Konsens, Konflikt und Kompromiß: Soziale Arbeiterinteressen und Sozialpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1970*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag. For other, more ethnographically oriented studies see: R. Bittner. 1998. *Kolonien des Eigensinns. Ethnographie einer ostdeutschen Industrieregion*, Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag; R. Bittner. 2000. 'Rund um die Uhr – ostdeutscher Arbeiteralltag im Kraftwerk Elbe', *Zeitschrift für Volkskunde* 96; R. Bittner. 2001. 'Der kleine Mann – Paradoxien und Ambivalenzen einer ostdeutschen Arbeiterfigur vor und nach der Wende' in Hürtgen, *Der Schein der Stabilität*; J. Richter, H. Förster and U. Lakemann. 1997. *Stalinstadt-Eisenhüttenstadt: von der Utopie zur Gegenwart: Wandel industrieller, regionaler und sozialer Strukturen in Eisenhüttenstadt*, Marburg: Schüren. There is also an orientation towards regional studies, see e.g. M. Vester, M. Hofmann and I. Zierke (eds). 1995. *Soziale Milieus in Ostdeutschland. Gesellschaftliche Strukturen zwischen Zerfall und Neubildung*, Cologne: Bund-Verlag; and on the study of gender, see D. Harsch. 2007. *Revenge of the Domestic: Women, the Family, and Communism in the German Democratic Republic*, Princeton: Princeton University Press; L. Ansorg. 1999. "'Ich hab immer von unten Druck gekriegt und von oben": Weibliche Leitungskader und Arbeiterinnen in einem DDR-Textilbetrieb. Eine Studie zum Innenleben der DDR-Industrie', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 39; I. Merkel. 1990. ... und Du, *Frau an der Werkbank: die DDR in der 50er Jahren*, Berlin: Elefant Press; A. Schüler. 2001. "'Die Spinne": die Erfahrungsgeschichte weiblicher Industriearbeit im VEB Leipziger Baumwollspinnerei', Leipzig: Leipziger-Univ.-Verlag; F. Weil. 2000. *Herrschaftsanspruch und soziale Wirklichkeit: zwei sächsische Betriebe in der DDR während der Honecker Ära*, Cologne: Böhlau. Literature on the Honecker era mainly addresses particular aspects such as welfare policy (Bouvier, *Die DDR- ein Sozialstaat?*), consumption (I. Merkel. 1999. *Utopie und Bedürfnis: die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR*, Cologne: Böhlau) and historical consciousness (B. Faulenbach, A. Leo and K. Weberskirch. 1994. 'Die "Wende" 1989/90 aus der Sicht von Stahlarbeitern in Henningsdorf und Dortmund', *Jahrbuch Arbeit, Bildung, Kultur* 12; B. Faulenbach, A. Leo and K. Weberskirch. 2000. *Zweierlei Geschichte. Lebensgeschichte und Geschichtsbewusstsein von Arbeitnehmern in West- und Ostdeutschland*, Essen: Klartext-Verlag). For collected volumes see: R. Bessel and R. Jessen (eds). 1996. *Die Grenzen der Diktatur: Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; P. Hübner and K. Tenfelde (eds). 1999. *Arbeiter in der SBZ – DDR*, Essen: Klartext-Verlag; P. Hübner, C. Kleßmann and K. Tenfelde (eds). 2005. *Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus: ideologischer Anspruch und soziale Wirklichkeit*, Cologne: Böhlau; Hürtgen, *Der Schein der Stabilität*; H. Kaelble, J. Kocka and H. Zwahr (eds). 1994. *Sozialgeschichte der DDR*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. In the Hungarian case Mark Pittaway studied the relationship between the workers and the state in the era of Soviet-type industrialization, see: M. Pittaway, 'Industrial Workers'; M. Pittaway. 2002. 'The Reproduction of Hierarchy: Skill, Working-class Culture and the State in Early Socialist Hungary', *The Journal of Modern History* 74; M. Pittaway, *The Workers' State*. For a study of working-class youth, see: L. Kürti. 2002. *Youth and the State in Hungary: Capitalism, Communism and Class*, London: Pluto Press. The building of a socialist city is described in S. Horváth. 2004. *A kapu és a batár: mindennapi Sztálinváros*, Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézet. See also: S. Horváth. 2005. 'Remaking Working-class Life in Hungary's First Socialist City', *Journal of International Labor and Working-class History* 68. For studies of socialism and gender see: Éva Fodor. 2003. *Working Difference: Women's Working Lives in Hungary and Austria 1945–1995*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press;

- E. Zs. Tóth. 2007. *'Puszi Kádár Jánosnak': Munkásnők élete a Kádár-korszakban mikro-történeti megközelítésben*, Budapest: Napvilág; E. Zs. Tóth. 2010. *Kádár leányai: Nők a szocialista időszakban*, Budapest: Nyitott Könyvműhely. For a collected volume on working-class history see: S. Horváth, L. Pethő and E. Zs. Tóth (eds). 2003. *Munkástörténet – munkásantropológia*, Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó; S. Horváth (ed.). 2008. *Mindennapok Rákosi és Kádár korában*. Budapest: Nyitott Könyvműhely; Judit Sas studies the experience of the change of regime in the light of narrative interviews conducted at different time intervals: H. Sas Judit. 1995. *Szubjektív történelem 1980–1994*, Budapest: MTA Szociológiai Intézet. For a study of how the change of regimes impacted on her interviewees' lives see: H. Sas Judit. 2003. *Közelmúlt. Rendszerváltások, család-történetek*, Budapest: Új Mandátum Kiadó.
61. For a thorough review of the East European literature see: Heumos, 'Workers under Communist Rule'. Class analysis is almost utterly missing from the post-1989 Hungarian literature on the workers, with the exception of Pittaway and Kürti. The East German literature is more critical; however, issues of class also remain largely unexplored, and emphasis is given to special areas (welfare policy, the party's policy towards women, historical consciousness and consumption). The problem with this approach is that the point of reference is West Germany and such – often unintended – comparisons often reproduce the East–West rivalry characteristic of the era of the Cold War.
 62. For a challenging analysis see: D. Kalb. 1997. *Expanding Class: Power and Everyday Politics in Industrial Communities, the Netherlands, 1850–1950*, Durham and London: Duke University Press.
 63. For a good summary on the changes of the enterprise structure in Hungary see: I. Schweitzer. 1982. *A vállalatnagyság*, Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 36–61. For the discussion of the bargaining power of the large enterprises see: T. Laky. 1982. *Érdekvizonyok a vállalati döntésekben*, Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó; and E. Szalai. 1989. *Gazdasági mechanizmus, reformtörekvések és nagyvállalati érdekek*, Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.
 64. See, for instance, Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*; K.J. Murphy. 2005. *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Class Struggle in a Moscow Metal Factory*, New York: Berghahn Books; G. Akgöz. 2012. *Many Voices of a Turkish State Factory: Working at Bakırköy Cloth Factory, 1932–1950*, Ph.D., University of Amsterdam.
 65. Hübner, *Konsens, Konflikt*.
 66. The extensive case method is described in M. Burawoy (ed.). 2000. *Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1–38. The extensive case method heavily draws on the tradition of the Manchester School of Anthropology. On the latter see: T.M.S. Evans and D. Handelman (eds). 2006. *The Manchester School: Practice and Ethnographic Praxis in Anthropology*, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.
 67. For a good study of the close contacts between American governmental institutions and academic departments for Soviet and East European Studies see A. Gleason. 1995. *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press. For a discussion of the Renaissance of totalitarian theory in postsocialist Eastern Europe see: E. Bartha: 'A preventív háború és a totalitarizmus összefüggései: néhány megjegyzés a vitához az angolszász szakirodalom alapján', in: E. Bartha and T. Krausz (eds), *Háború és nemzeti önismeret*.
 68. Pittaway, *The Workers' State*.
 69. Harsch, *Revenge of the Domestic*.
 70. See: M. Burawoy and K. Verdery (eds). 1999. *Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; C. Hann (ed.). 2002. *Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practice in Eurasia*, London: Routledge.
 71. Steiner, *Von Plan zu Plan*.

72. Gy. Földes. 1995. *Az eladósodás politikai története, 1957–1986*, Budapest: Gondolat.
73. Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline*.
74. There is evidence that the Soviet leadership was informed of the slackening economic development: in 1979 governmental analysts conducted an extensive study of the state and perspectives of the Soviet economy under the leadership of V.A. Kirilin, the Deputy Prime Minister. The study concluded that with respect to the most important parameters there was an increasing gap between the Soviet Union and the countries using modern technology. The Kirilin report did not meet with the approval of the political leadership, and Kirilin was relieved of his post. Sz. Bíró argues that it was not the recognition of the economic problems that was missing from the central leadership but the political will to initiate structural reforms. See: Sz. Z. Bíró. 2003. 'Politikatörténeti vázlat a késői Szovjetunióról', in T. Krausz and Sz. Z. Bíró (eds), *Peresztrojka és tulajdonát helyezés. Tanulmányok és dokumentumok a rendszerváltás történetéből a Szovjetunióban 1985–1991*, Budapest: Magyar Ruzsisztikai Intézet.
75. While labour history in the East European countries was influenced directly by the political and ideological requirements, this 'traditional' paradigm – that Thomas Welskopp called the 'failed heroic history of the proletariat' – was present in the Western historiography as well. According to Welskopp's argument, in this traditional narrative the complex relationship between class position and class consciousness has been simplified to the triangle 'situation – consciousness – behaviour'. See: T. Welskopp. 1993. 'Von der verhinderten Heldengeschichte des Proletariats zur vergleichenden Sozialgeschichte der Arbeiterschaft – Perspektiven der Arbeitergeschichtsschreibung in den 1990er Jahren', *1999 Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts* 3. See also: T. Welskopp. 1996. 'Der Betrieb als soziales Handlungsfeld. Neuere Forschungsansätze in der Industrie- und Arbeitergeschichte', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22. For a social history of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 see: Pittaway, *The Workers' State*.
76. This criticism is particularly valid for the East German literature, where the main point of reference is most frequently West Germany. While socialist institutions undoubtedly differed from those of West Germany, this alone does not prove the specificity of the Honecker regime. Further, this kind of comparison usually means a 'definition of absences' for the GDR since, when referred to West Germany, its institutions seem to be incomplete or they deviate from the structures understood as normative. It cannot be the intention here to reflect on the debates about the writing of the history of East Germany; from the extensive literature on the topic see: K.H. Jarausch. 1999. 'Die gescheiterte Gesellschaft. Überlegungen zu einer Sozialgeschichte der DDR', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 39; C. Kleßmann (ed.). 2001. *The Divided Past: Rewriting Post-War German History*, New York: Berg Press; J. Kocka (ed.). 1993. *Historische DDR-Forschung: Aufsätze und Studien*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag; J. Kocka and M. Sabrow (eds). 1994. *Die DDR als Geschichte: Fragen-Hypothese-Perspektive*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag; S. Meuschel. 1993. 'Überlegungen zu einer Herrschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 19(1).
77. In his programmatic work Marcel van der Linden seeks to outline a new methodology for writing labour histories beyond borders. See: M. Linden. 2008. *Workers of the World: Essays toward a Global Labor History*, Leiden and Boston: Brill.
78. In addition, the party also lost the trust of the intelligentsia, which effectively prevented the creation of a compromise. From the rich literature on Solidarity see: D. Ost. 1990. *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press; R. Laba. 1991. *The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-class Democratization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. For a contemporary study see: Alain Touraine et al. 1983. *Solidarity: The Analysis of a Social Movement, Poland 1980–1981*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
79. Swain offers a thought-provoking analysis of the Hungarian attempt to integrate the private sector into the structure of planned economy. See: N. Swain. 1992. *Hungary: The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism*, London and New York: Verso.

80. Many economists believed at the time that the second economy contained the seeds of a new, capitalistic society and the small businesses that were set up in Hungary after 1982 could function well in a 'proper' market economy. Nonetheless, this assumption was much debated in the literature. See, for instance: Á. Róna-Tas. 1997. *The Great Surprise of the Small Transformation: The Demise of Communism and the Rise of the Private Sector in Hungary*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan; R.I. Gábor and P. Galasi. 1981. *A „második” gazdaság: Tények és hipotézisek*, Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó; R.I. Gábor. 1994. 'Modernity or a New Kind of Duality? Second Thoughts about the Second Economy', in J.M. Kovács (ed.), *Transition to Capitalism? The Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe*, London: Transaction Publishers. According to the argument of Martha Lampland, capitalist relations in agriculture were established under socialism in Hungary. See: Martha Lampland. 1995. *The Object of Labor: Commodification in Socialist Hungary*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
81. For a similar argument see E. Szalai. 2004. 'Tulajdonviszonyok, társadalomszerkezet és munkásság', *Kritika* 33(9). Pittaway speaks of the privatization of the working class. See: M. Pittaway. 2005. 'Accommodation and the Limits of Economic Reform: Industrial Workers during the Making and Unmaking of Kádár's Hungary', in: Hübner, *Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus*.
82. For a discussion of the role of the intelligentsia in the East German society see: K. Belwe. 1989. 'Sozialstruktur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der DDR', in Weidenfeld, *Deutschland-Handbuch*; K. Belwe. 1990. *Entwicklung der Intelligenz innerhalb der Sozialstruktur der DDR in den Jahren 1978 bis 1989 – eine Literaturanalyse*, Bonn: Gesamtdeutsches Institut. For a counter-argument see G. Erbe. 1982. *Arbeiterklasse und Intelligenz in der DDR. Soziale Annäherung von Produktionsarbeiterschaft und wissenschaftlich-technischer Intelligenz im Industriebetrieb?*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
83. J. Krejci. 1976. *Social Structure in Divided Germany*, London: Croom Helm. In his essay Johannes Weiß distinguishes between the high party leadership, the mid-level cadres, members of the old intelligentsia and Christian opposition, and the masses of workers and peasants. See: J. Weiß. 2003. 'Die namenlose Gesellschaft. Identitätsprobleme der Bevölkerung Ostdeutschlands', in: S. Beetz, U. Jacob and A. Sterbling (eds), *Soziologie über die Grenzen. Festschrift für Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Bálint Balla zum 75. Geburtstag*, Hamburg: Krämer. For a sociological analysis see also D. Pollack. 1998. 'Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der DDR oder war die DDR-Gesellschaft homogen?' *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 24(1); Joas, *Der Zusammenbruch der DDR*.
84. The 'liberalism' of the Hungarian Communist Party was observed by the SED functionaries as well. In 1964 an East German delegation visited Hungary, and in the report they criticized the lax and too familiar working style of the Hungarian base party organizations, that 'there are not enough resolutions at the meetings', and that 'they had not seen enough posters and other forms of visual agitation in the factories and at the universities'. Bundesarchiv, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR, DDR DY 30/IV A 2/5.
85. James Ferguson argued that what he called the expectations of modernity (see: J. Ferguson. 1999. *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press) – myths related to industrial development, and the expectation to catch up with the material welfare and levels of consumption of the developed capitalist 'core' countries (see Wallerstein's classical work, *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Press, 1974) – persist longer in the periphery than in countries that are closer to the core.
86. C.G.A. Bryant and E. Mokrzycki. 1994. *The New Great Transformation? Change and Continuity in East Central Europe*, London: Routledge.
87. For an 'early' economic criticism of the neoliberal programme in Eastern Europe see: A.H. Amsden, J. Kochanowicz and L. Taylor. 1994. *The Market Meets its Match: Restructuring*

- the Economies of Eastern Europe*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; P. Gowan. 1995. 'Neo-liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe', *New Left Review* 213; J. Pickles and A. Smith. 1998. *Theorising Transition: The Political Economy of Postcommunist Transformations*, London and New York: Routledge; J. Adam. 1999. *Social Costs of Transformation to a Market Economy in Postsocialist Countries*, London: Macmillan; H. Radice. 1998. 'A feltámadt kapitalizmus: Kelet-Közép-Európa a "globalizáció" fényében' in T. Krausz (ed.), *Rendszerváltás és társadalomkritika*, Budapest: Napvilág. For Hungary see also: L. Andor. 2010. *Eltévedt éllovas: Siker és kudarc a rendszerváltó gazdaságpolitikában*, Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó. Transitoology has been widely criticized by authors with diverse theoretical backgrounds, from David Stark and László Bruszt to Michael Burawoy and Chris Hann.
88. To be more precise, while important elements of the socialist welfare system such as universal employment and the subsidization of food prices and utilities disappeared after 1989, social security provisions such as unemployment benefit were severely cut back after the Hungarian government accepted the Bokros-package (named after the Minister of Finance, Lajos Bokros) in 1995 in order to stabilize the state budget. For a discussion of the Polish case to which Hungary shows some similarity between 1990 and 1994 see: J. Kochanowicz. 1997. 'Incomplete Demise: Reflections on the Welfare State in Poland after Communism', *Social Research* 64(4). On welfare policy in postsocialist Hungary see: L. Haney. 2002. *Inventing the Needy: Gender and the Politics of Welfare in Hungary*, Berkeley: University of California Press. For a critical evaluation of the economic policy of the Hungarian Socialist Party see Andor, *Eltévedt éllovas*.
89. On the peripheral development of the Hungarian economy see I.T. Berend and Gy. Ránki. 1974. *Gazdaság és társadalom. Tanulmányok hazánk és Kelet-Európa XIX-XX. századi történetéről*, Budapest: Magvető; I.T. Berend and Gy. Ránki. 1985. *The Hungarian Economy in the 20th Century*, London: Croom Helm; Gy. Ránki. 1983. *Mozgásterek, kényszerpályák. Válogatott tanulmányok*, Budapest: Magvető.
90. The working-class formation and political mobilization of labour substantially differed in the two countries. In a challenging analysis Kenney shows how the rural background of the newly formed Polish working class influenced their class activity under communist rule. See: P. Kenney. 1997. *Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists 1945–1950*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. On the working-class formation in Hungary see: Rézler, *A magyar nagyipari munkásosztály kialakulása*. See also: P.P. Tóth. 2011. *Válogatás Rézler Gyula 1932 és 1999 között megjelent írásaiból*, Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó. For a study on the political mobilization of labour in the interwar period see: P. Sipos. 1988. *Legális és illegális munkásmozgalom, 1919–1944*, Budapest: Gondolat. A collection of pre-war working-class ethnographies was published by Gy. Litván (ed.). 1974. *Magyar munkásszociográfiák 1888–1945*, Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó. There is much more extensive literature on working-class formation and political activity in Germany, see: J. Kocka. 1979. 'Stand – Klasse – Organisation. Strukturen sozialer Ungleichheit in Deutschland vom späten 18. bis zum frühen 20. Jahrhundert im Aufriß', in H.U. Wehler (ed.), *Klassen in der europäischen Sozialgeschichte*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; J. Kocka. 1983. *Loharbeit und Klassenbildung. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland 1800–1875*, Berlin and Bonn: Dietz Verlag; J. Kocka (ed.). 1983. *Europäische Arbeiterbewegungen im 19. Jahrhundert: Deutschland, Österreich, England, und Frankreich im Vergleich*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; J. Kocka (ed.). 1994. *Von der Arbeiterbewegung zum modernen Sozialstaat: Festschrift für Gerhard A. Ritter zum 65. Geburtstag*, Munich: Saur; G.A. Ritter. 1976. *Arbeiterbewegung, Parteien und Parlamentarismus: Aufsätze zur Deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; G.A. Ritter. 1989. *Der Sozialstaat: Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich*, Munich: Oldenbourg; G.A. Ritter (ed.). 1990. *Der Aufstieg der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung: Sozialdemokratie und Freie Gewerkschaften im Parteiensystem und Sozialmilieu des Kaiserreichs*,

Munich: Oldenbourg; G.A. Ritter and K. Tenfelde. 1992. *Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871 bis 1914*, Bonn: Dietz; K. Tenfelde (ed.). 1991. *Arbeiter im 20. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta; T. Welskopp. 1994. *Arbeit und Macht im Hüttenwerk. Arbeits- und industrielle Beziehungen in der deutschen und amerikanischen Eisen- und Stahlindustrie von den 1860er bis zu den 1930er Jahren*, Bonn: Dietz. See also: I. Katznelson and A.R. Zolberg (eds). 1986. *Working-class Formation: Nineteenth-century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. From the literature of the GDR see: J. Kuczynski. 1967. *Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter unter dem Kapitalismus*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag. For a discussion of the German historiography see also: R.J. Evans. 1990. *Proletarians and Politics: Socialism, Protest and the Working Class in Germany before the First World War*, New York: St. Martin's Press. The working-class formation and political mobilization of workers substantially differed in the two counties. As Kemény pointed out, the Hungarian socialist working class had rural origins and many preserved the lifestyle and living place of the peasantry. Kemény, *Veliünk nevelkedett a gép.*