

Conceptions of Racism

Supporters of the US Civil Rights movement of the 1960s brought concerns over black-white relations in that country to the centre of public attention. In 1967, two proponents of 'Black Power', Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, highlighted the exercise of power in the naming of social categories by recalling an often-quoted passage in Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*. In it Humpty Dumpty declares, 'When I use a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean.' Because they lacked this power, 'black people have been saddled with epithets'. In *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*, the authors described racism as 'the predication of decisions and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group'.¹ They combined ideology, attitude and social relationships in a description that suited their political objectives. It was designed to illuminate the way that blacks were subordinated in the US political system.

According to Carmichael and Hamilton, racism took two forms, individual and institutional. They may have thought that, for their purposes, no definition of the second form was needed, for they observed only that it 'originates in the operation of established and respected forces in the society'. Over thirty years later, when a British judge was charged to conduct the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, he sought a practical definition of institutional racism. He wanted to characterize the deficiencies he had uncovered in his inquiry into the investigation by the (London) Metropolitan Police of a racially motivated murder.² To this end, he wrote:

'Institutional Racism' consists of the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through

unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping which disadvantage ethnic minority people.

This was a later elaboration, one intended to serve a purpose different from Carmichael and Hamilton's. Many of the arguments brought forward by them and other supporters of the Civil Rights movement were cogent; they inspired political reforms in the United States and changes in the political vocabulary of English-speaking countries.

The word 'racism' (which had its own history³) came to designate the contemporary attitudes, beliefs and practices that the Civil Rights movement sought to change. It entered ordinary, everyday language, and the Carmichael and Hamilton description was taken as a definition. 'Racist' was no longer simply an adjective used by scholars to identify an abstract doctrine; instead, it became a word in popular use employed as a moral accusation that could be thrown against political opponents. Its value as an epithet contributed to an inflation in its use, so that its meaning may no longer depend upon any belief about race. The nature of racism is often treated as self-evident. Its presence, persistence and effect are the things to be explained (the explananda).

Writing History

In chapter 1 it was claimed that sometimes a commentator wants a realist definition that seeks to grasp the most essential quality of the thing in question; at other times he or she wants a nominalist definition that distinguishes the thing from other things with which it might be confused. Any review of the definitions of racism in the academic literature has to conclude that most of them are of political inspiration and of a realist character. Thus, some historians have searched for the origins of racism in earlier centuries. They have assumed that there is a thing that corresponds to the word. That was no problem for Carmichael and Hamilton, for there was no doubt about the thing or things their movement sought to change. For a historian, though, there is a philosophical problem.

To look for the origins of something recognized only in the present is to read the past in the light of later ideas. The interpretation of historical periods in terms of the concepts, values and understanding of the author's own generation is known as presentism. It is a form of anachronism that has been a continuing weakness in many histori-

cal studies of human origins and human divisions. One illustration is to the fore in a book by a respected historian, George L. Mosse. He began with the declaration: 'Any book concerned with the European experience of race must start with the end and not the beginning: 6 million Jews killed by the heirs of European civilization, by a bureaucracy which took time out from efficiently running the state to exterminate the Jews equally efficiently and impersonally. How could this come to pass?'⁴

To start with an end is to presume that there could have been no other conclusion. It is as if Sir Isaac Newton were to be held in part responsible for the atom bombs that in 1945 were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All too easily, a history that starts from the present overestimates the power of ideas and underestimates the responsibility of the people who have made use of those ideas.

Other examples merit the more attention because they can be found in the works of leading scholars. Thus, in *The Forging of Races*, Colin Kidd maintained that the historian has to explain 'the intellectual universe which justified slavery, segregation and imperialism.'⁵ His point of departure was a summary of some modern findings in genetics, intended to inform his examination of 'the ways in which scripture has been mobilised in the pursuit of certain theories of race' and 'the ways in which the apparent "facts" of race threatened the intellectual authority of Christian scripture'. No one then knew what genetics would later discover, and since no new determinant of thought on such matters had been discovered, the intellectual universe that justified slavery had to be explained by reference to contemporary assumptions.

Another striking example can be seen in the work of Robert Bernasconi. Having assumed that there is 'a scientific concept of race', he asked, 'who invented it?' As an answer he pointed his finger at the philosopher Immanuel Kant, a man who wrote in the latter part of the eighteenth century when no 'scientific concept of race' existed. Kant nevertheless worked in a crucial period in which several scholars were wondering whether such a concept might open a path to the explanation of human differences.⁶

Some historians have ranged much further back than Kidd and Bernasconi, searching the records of classical antiquity for evidence of antipathies evoked by differences in physical appearance. Three have found little or nothing.⁷ Their work may be contrasted with a fourth study that defined racism as an attitude that posits a direct and linear

connection between physical and mental qualities; an account of the evidence found when using this definition enabled the author to fill over five hundred pages.⁸

Most histories of racism start not from a definition of racism, but from a description of racism as conceived in the historian's own time and circumstances. If there were an etic definition of racism it might be possible to investigate its causes and the results of the investigation might have policy value. Without any such definition, there is trouble. Thus a leading US historian, George M. Fredrickson, at one time avoided using the word 'racism' because he sought a 'usable past' and 'racism' was 'too ambiguous and loaded a term to describe my subject effectively'. He was looking for an alternative conception that embodied the values to which he felt committed, and later found it in the expanded meaning given to the word as a result of the Civil Rights movement. This satisfied him that the word 'racism' remained politically 'relevant' to scholars and activists.⁹ His endorsement of a popular usage was an attempt to appropriate it for a political cause.

Fredrickson identified 'the two main forms of modern racism – the color-coded white supremacist variety and the essentialist version of anti-Semitism'. The earlier account of the 1975 UN discussion about Zionism should have drawn attention to some of the difficulties in referring to 'forms' of things that have been defined in essentialist terms. Fredrickson maintained that 'the responsibility of the historian or sociologist who studies racism is not to moralize and condemn but to understand this malignancy so that it can be more effectively treated'.¹⁰ Some sociologists would agree with Oliver Cox that hostility towards Jews and the oppression of blacks serve different social functions and therefore are not the same 'malignancy'. Much has been changed by the creation of the state of Israel. For many people, anti-Semitism may no longer be part of what they understand by racism.

Fredrickson concluded that racism was 'a historical construction' that had existed in at least a prototypical form since the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Even if the word 'race' was not used, there could be 'equivalents' of biological determinism. Fredrickson treated racism as a thing that 'expresses itself', that 'sustains or proposes' and produces 'manifestations'. He observed that 'to achieve its full potential as an ideology, racism had to be emancipated from Christian universalism'. It is unlikely that Fredrickson would have believed that, over the centuries, events 'had to' develop as they did, but his choice of words bore such an implication.¹¹

Mosse wanted to account for the Holocaust and identified racial ideas as exerting a causal influence. Fredrickson held that American institutions do not operate in the way they are supposed to operate and that ideologies were partly responsible. A very different interpretation of the motivation behind his and some other histories of racism sees it as springing from the whites' drive to redeem their sense of racial guilt. It is said that whereas racial slavery and segregation were built upon the stigmatization of blacks, the Civil Rights movement gave blacks the power to stigmatize whites for historical injustices. The shame was the greater because the notion of a distinctive American identity was founded upon a commitment to shared principles and political ideas. Corporate America is said to feel particularly vulnerable to accusations of racism.¹²

While the political functions of definitions of racism should be open for examination, it will be objected that any examination will also express some political position. This is true insofar as every statement can, in the last analysis, embody a political view even if it is a decision to disregard political struggles. The last analysis can be a long way off. Many mainstream sociologists sympathize with Weber's view that while 'it is the investigator and the prevailing ideas of the time that determine what becomes the object of investigation,' once the research has started there is a standard to be met. A methodologically correct form of proof has to be logically correct. To point up the requirement that the explanation be culture-free, Weber insisted that it must hold true in the eyes of a Chinese scholar as well.¹³ It must have the quality of cogency, such that even those who are opposed to it recognize that it has to be taken seriously on its own terms.¹⁴

In many quarters, the distinctions between racism and racial discrimination, ethnocentrism and xenophobia have been disregarded. Some sociologists currently describe people as 'experiencing racism' when they could more usefully identify the specific forms of discrimination and disadvantage from which the people may have suffered.

Teaching Philosophy

In 1689, John Locke prefaced his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* with the observation that great work in the advancement of knowledge was made possible by the preparations of the 'underlabourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the

rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge'. Peter Winch referred to this doctrine when contending that it was a mistake to believe that the role of the philosopher was limited to ground-clearing. He maintained that, while a main component of the philosopher's task was indeed the clearing up of linguistic confusions, that clearing up was relevant only insofar as it threw light 'on the question how far reality is intelligible'.¹⁵ Without examining what social scientists actually do, he asserted that their mission was that of understanding, not explanation.

As Locke himself found, questions about language are central to the study of knowledge. In the search for understanding, and for its communication, ordinary language is usually more effective than technical language. In the search for explanation, and its communication, technical language opens paths to new and more profound knowledge, and to its possible applications.

Winch's little book had a particular importance because, as Ernest Gellner observed, it was the working out of the implications for the social sciences of Ludwig Wittgenstein's mature philosophy.¹⁶ Moreover, according to Gellner, it constituted 'the best, most elegant and forceful, if quite unintended, refutation of Wittgenstein – one far more forceful than any stated by a deliberate critic'. It was condemned by its anthropomorphism, idealism and relativism.

Some teachers of philosophy, particularly in the United States, have recently approached these questions by starting from the meaning given to the word 'race' in the minds of their students, instead of from the intellectual problems in the field. Thus the editor of the volume *Race and Racism* in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy series starts his introduction with, 'Racial classification today is commonplace.' He goes on to argue that 'Europeans invented the idea of race for what appeared to them to be sound scientific reasons'; that 'the races, as we know them, are ... social constructions ... but it does not follow that biological races do not exist'.¹⁷ As a result of the approach adopted, in his introduction the notion of an 'idea of race' is made to carry much too heavy a weight. The word is used in too many senses and, for US readers it will usually be infected by the assumptions behind the one-drop rule (for example, the reference to changes that enabled 'Jews and Arabs to become white' relies on a white/non-white distinction extending this rule).¹⁸ The approach leads to a search to find who was responsible for inventing an idea that has done so much damage in the United States. It looks as if such teaching responds, probably unconsciously, to a sense of white guilt

prevalent among the students attending classes on the philosophy of race.

The entry of the philosophers into this field may help correct the inability of many sociologists to perceive and examine the epistemological assumptions that underlie their reasoning. In stating the case for an approach from the perspective of critical rationalism, this book hopes to draw attention to some of those assumptions. It has tried to break up the problem as perceived in the Oxford Readings into a series of smaller problems to the solution of which philosophers might well contribute.

Teaching Sociology

In 1980, UNESCO extended its earlier programme by publishing a volume of essays, *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism*, that was in some respects a successor to the volume *Race Relations in World Perspective* of 1956. Many of the essays were characterized by what to the undergraduate student would appear abstract theorizing.

Several contributions reflected a move to formulate, within the tradition of historical materialism, a less deterministic model of racial discrimination than that which had been pioneered by Oliver Cox. They continued the work of Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, known as ‘structural Marxism’.¹⁹ One of them, Stuart Hall, warned against ‘extrapolating a common and universal structure to racism’ as if this remained ‘essentially the same, outside of its specific historical location.’ He went on to state, ‘It is only as the different racisms are historically specified – in their difference – that they can be properly understood as “a product of historical relations and possess ... full validity only for and within those relations”’.²⁰

Robert Miles, though starting from similar premises, could not accept this conclusion. He objected that if there were such ‘historically-specific racisms’, they must also have ‘certain common attributes which identify them as different forms of racism. ... Hall does not specify what the many different racisms have in common qua racism.’ Miles’s view was simpler: that class interests structure and stratify the labour market, encouraging the development of ideologies supportive of the ruling class. Racism is such an ideology, one that moulds popular conceptions of race, racism and racial relations. In Marx’s terms, these exemplify ‘phenomenal form’ and are not part of ‘essential rela-

tions'. Since both race and race relations are ideological notions used in ordinary language, sociologists are advised to focus instead on the study of racism.²¹

Yet Miles found definition of racism a far from simple task. His proposed solution was to draw upon the functionalist element in Marxist theory so as to hold that when biological differences are given social significance, this initiates a process of racialization. A popular belief in inherited differences associated with phenotype enabled a ruling class in a capitalist society to advance its interests by dividing the opposition. When ideas about cultural differences served the same function they could be treated as equivalent to ideas of 'racial' difference. There could be 'racism' even when no reference had been made to biological notions of 'race'.

I use the concept of racism to refer to a particular form of (evaluative) representation which is a specific instance of a (wider) descriptive process of racialization. As a representational phenomenon, it is analytically distinguishable from exclusionary practices. Such a distinction is essential to the task of explanation because it does not foreclose the identification of the reasons why racialized populations occupy disadvantaged positions in contemporary or past social formations.²²

Within the conceptual framework of historical materialism, this extension of the use of racialization can be justified, though there are serious difficulties if evidence of discrimination in Europe against Gypsies (Roma), against the Burakumin in Japan or between persons classed as Catholic and Protestant in Northern Ireland is to be regarded as evidence of racism. Perhaps for this reason, Miles and a co-author have since qualified this argument, in order to hold that when cultural characteristics lead to group formation and reproduction, the process is one of ethnicization.²³ This change undermines Miles's original use of the argument from functional equivalence. What should be very clear, however, is that the injunction 'do not study race relations, study racism!' is not an endorsement of study based on ordinary language conceptions of racism. Posing as a solution to one problem, it creates another.

If racism is based on beliefs about racial differences, and ethnocentrism on beliefs about ethnic differences, then an '-ism' based on beliefs about cultural differences would be better identified as culturism. However, current language usage sometimes takes a different course.

References to ‘cultural racism’ appear to be attempts to trade on the negative associations of racism.

The best way to resolve these conceptual problems would be to examine the purpose for which words like ‘racialization’ and ‘racism’ are used and see whether any other words can do the job more effectively. This is rarely done. Instead, some authors have tried to distinguish different explananda. With the expansion in the meaning of racism to include practices and actions, use of the word ‘racialism’ has been revived to denote theories or doctrines of racial inequality.²⁴ In France, *racisme* may be used to denote behaviour, and *racialisme* to denote doctrines of biological difference; doctrines of cultural difference may be called differentialist.²⁵

Sociological Textbooks

Though the difference between racial discrimination and the expanded definition of racism is of the greatest importance for the formulation of social policy, it receives little attention in many US textbooks of sociology. It is even more notable that many authors, instead of offering a definition of the racism that is so central to what they have to say, provide instead examples of what they intend when they use the word. Or they describe things they consider racist.

For example, in a popular textbook, Joe Feagin has written:

We will examine briefly some key aspects of systemic racism, including: (1) the patterns of unjust impoverishment and unjust enrichment and their transmission over time; (2) the resulting vested group interests and the alienating racist relations; (3) the costs and burdens of racism; (4) the important role of white elites; (5) the rationalization of racial oppression in a white-racist framing; and (6) the continuing resistance to racism.²⁶

No criteria are provided by which it might be possible to determine whether a pattern of unjust impoverishment was racist or not. ‘Systemic racism theory’ is a body of theoretical writing built around a model of certain related practices in one country alone; it does not itself constitute a theory.

In another widely used textbook, Michael Omi and Howard Winant regretted that, since the mid-1960s, ‘clarity about what racism means has been eroding’, so that there is ‘an overall crisis of meaning for the

concept today.²⁷ This is a comment on the way the word is used in ordinary language; it does not address the question of whether it has explanatory value in sociology. For that, the authors propose a concept of a 'racial project' and state that such a project 'can be defined as racist if and only if it creates or reproduces structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race'. They add, 'There is nothing inherently white about racism.' The authors' concerns are with the current state of black-white relations in the United States rather than with the growth of sociological knowledge as here described.

Some sociologists, while starting from ordinary language usage, attempt to give it greater precision and make it fit into their interpretive schemes. To their commitment to the advance of knowledge they add a competing commitment to the advancement of those forms of knowledge that are compatible with their political objectives. Assuming that their readers share with them a post-1967 ordinary language conception of racism, they offer a description of what it does instead of a definition. Thus, one author who criticizes 'common sense' conceptions, asserted: 'Because racism changes and develops, because it is simultaneously a vast phenomenon framed by epochal historical developments, and a moment-to-moment experiential reality, we can never expect fully to capture it theoretically. Nor can we expect that it will ever be fully overcome.'²⁸ If this claims any more than that societies change, and social practices with them, then there should be an indication of what defines racist practice. Another sociological authority has similarly stated: 'I reserve the term racism (racial ideology) for the segment of the ideological structure of a social system that crystallizes racial notions and stereotypes.'²⁹ These statements conceive of racism as something defined by its political functions. They run the risk of reifying racism. Moreover, on this line of reasoning, it might be expected that every distinct political position would have its own definition of racism.

A volume titled *Anatomy of Racism* assembled nineteen essays. In the editor's words, 'Each is committed in its own fashion to cutting up the body of racist discursive practices and expressions, stripping them to reveal the underlying presuppositions, embodiments of interests, aims and projections of exclusion and subjection. Each engages in short in the practices of what in the title to this collection I call "anatomy".'³⁰ None of them defines the body in question. That so many authors, elsewhere as well as in this collection, advance no definition, suggests an awareness that their arguments would be damaged

were they to attempt to do so. Similarly, the Oxford University Press commissioned a little book on racism for its Very Short Introductions series. Unsurprisingly, this job-definition encouraged the author to start from the word itself instead of from the purpose that the word has to serve. He sought to provide an ‘understanding’, assuming that anti-Semitism and ‘anti-Irish sentiments’ were part of what had to be understood.³¹

That it may be impossible to formulate a nominalist definition is suggested by the difficulties encountered by the sociologist who set out to distinguish ‘everyday racism’ from racism. ‘Everyday racism’ is said to involve ‘only systematic, recurrent familiar practices’ (like those of a hotel receptionist registering a guest). The author thought that a working definition of racism, had, however, to combine the macro with the micro: ‘Racism then is defined in terms of cognitions, actions, and procedures that contribute to the development and perpetuation of a system in which Whites dominate Blacks.’³² To say that something is defined in terms of a, b and c is no definition when the relations between the various terms are not specified. A nominalist definition takes the form ‘X is ...’, and not ‘X includes ...’ or ‘X refers to ...’

Nor is a realist definition of help in the analysis of discrimination by whites against minorities other than blacks, or of racial discrimination by blacks. That these forms of discrimination share certain features of white discrimination against blacks in the United States encourages use of the expression ‘racisms’, in the plural. The legitimacy of any such extension must depend upon a demonstration of functional equivalence; current practice in the use of the plural conception often depends upon a politically contentious conception of the nature of the social system of which it forms a part. Yet a reputable publishing house can publish an introductory textbook titled *Racisms* that fails even to indicate that there are problems in the use of the plural.³³

Arguments about ‘racism’ have continued, some under the rubric of Critical Theory and others within Cultural Studies. Critical Theory assembles criticisms of writing about ‘late modern social and political life’ that pay insufficient attention to ‘racial conditions and racist expressions’.³⁴ The Cultural Studies perspective is sceptical of claims to objective knowledge about social affairs, attempting to uncover, and criticize, any political assumptions underlying such claims. Thus it starts from the criticism of popular ideas rather than from the identi-

fictionation of sociological problems, which is why many of its exponents find ordinary language concepts sufficient for their purposes.³⁵ This approach prioritizes the reporting and interpretation of personal experience and seeks understanding rather than explanation.

Political Ends

The introduction of this book proposed, when assessing the controversies over race and ethnicity, to judge them by their value in leading to better explanations. This chapter must reach the conclusion that current conceptions of racism have been fashioned to serve political ends. Within the political sphere, the expanded conception of racism has highlighted popular consciousness of the legal and moral dimensions of behaviour, and has often been used as an epithet. However, the failure to differentiate the theoretical from the ordinary language vocabulary has spread confusion. The tendency for so many academic writers to rely on their own favoured conceptions, ignoring the philosophical issues, has led to extravagances. In the view of one critic: ‘Few concepts in social science have been as diluted in content through overuse, as contaminated by the political agenda of the users, and as befuddled by multiple, indeed, sometimes contradictory, meanings as the term “racism”.’³⁶ Critics object, for example, to the assumption that racism is a majority characteristic, so that, by definition, a victim of racism can never be considered a racist.

The introduction maintained that the growth of knowledge about phenotypical variation in humans had been made possible by the development of a theoretical knowledge distinct from practical knowledge. This chapter has to conclude that the recent popularity of racism in sociology books has contributed nothing to any growth of knowledge about the causes of social differentiation because it has refused to recognize any distinction between research directed to political ends and the kind of research that seeks explanations so cogent that they have to be accepted by persons with different political commitments.

The presentation of racism as a general cause of discrimination has distracted attention from the case for examining evidence of racial inequalities to see if they are the product of discrimination. When the sources of discrimination can be identified, it may be possible to rectify them by legal action. These considerations may help explain why the 2002 ASA statement ‘On The Importance of Collecting Data

and Doing Social Scientific Research on Race' nowhere uses the word 'racism'; nor does this word feature in the titles of any of the forty-four references cited in support of that statement.

Notes

1. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969 [New York, 1967]).
2. Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry*, vol. 1 (London: Home Office, 1999 CM 4262-1), 213–214.
3. By 1954 the word 'racism' was coming into use. In its French form, *raciste* was first used in 1894. Then, in 1933–34, the German sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld wrote articles about *Rassismus* that were later translated and published in 1938 under the title *Racism*. For sociologists, the first author to make important use of this concept was Ruth Benedict. Her book *Race: Science and Politics* (New York: Modern Age, 1940) was given the title *Race and Racism* in its London edition in 1942. As she was primarily concerned to correct misleading notions of the anthropology of race, she wrote that 'racism is the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority'.
4. George L. Mosse, *Towards the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (London: Dent, 1978), xxv.
5. Colin Kidd, *The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–2, 81.
6. Robert Bernasconi, 'Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant's Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race', in Robert Bernasconi (ed.), *Race* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 11.
7. Frank M. Snowden, Jr., *Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1883); Lloyd A. Thompson, *Romans and Blacks* (London: Routledge, 1989); Ivan Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
8. Benjamin Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
9. George M. Fredrickson, *The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 6, 80, and *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 46, 47.
10. Fredrickson, *Racism*, 6, 158.
11. *Ibid.*, 151.
12. Shelby Steele, *A Dream Deferred: The Second Betrayal of Black Freedom in America* (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 119, 148. Note also the author's comments (121–122) on a bestselling book of an earlier generation: John Howard Griffin, *Black Like Me* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1961). This gave an account of the experiences of a white man who, having had his skin

chemically darkened, travelled the South passing for black. Steele says that the book put off many blacks because ‘its very premise tended to mistake the black stigma for the entire black experience ... white America was invited not to see black life but to be aghast at it. However, the book’s greater sin was to suggest that even if whites were morally obligated to support equality, race was still a problem that affected others.’

13. Max Weber, ‘The “objectivity” of knowledge in social science and social policy’, in Sam Whimster (ed.), *The Essential Weber: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 2004), 383, 365, 389.
14. This is the standard employed in those courts in which judges have to decide whether to allow an appeal against a court decision. The case for a rehearing has to be ‘arguable’.
15. Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1958), 3–11.
16. Ernest Gellner, *Cause and Meaning in the Social Sciences*, edited by I. C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi (London: Routledge, 1973), 47–77.
17. Bernard Boxill (ed.), *Race and Racism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1–2. Another collection of essays – Andrew Valls (ed.), *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005) – is primarily concerned with establishing whether various eminent philosophers were racists. A related study is fatally limited by its concentration on practical knowledge and the contemporary US ordinary language idea of race: Joshua Glasgow, *A Theory of Race* (New York: Routledge, 2009).
18. Michael O. Hardimon, ‘The Ordinary Concept of Race’, *The Journal of Philosophy* 2003 100(9): 437–455, maintains that ‘the ordinary concept of race and the ordinary conception of race are two different things’ and presents what he regards as ‘the concept’s logical core’ (439, 442). To the contrary, this book contends that practical knowledge about race has no logical core. Different strands within it may have historical cores.
19. Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991), 37–67.
20. Stuart Hall, ‘Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance’, in *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), 331. Robert Miles, *Racism* (London: Routledge, 1989), 65, 84. Hall observes that ‘one cannot explain racism in abstraction from other social relations’ (337) – a clear statement of racism as explanandum. In this book, to the contrary, explanation is regarded as a process of deduction. Historical sequences may be interpreted, but not explained; interpersonal relations are usually multi-dimensional, and it is necessary to abstract an explanandum from them.
21. Robert Miles, *Racism and Migrant Labour* (London: Routledge, 1982), 31.
22. Miles, *Racism*, 84. The first use of ‘racialization’ in English was in 1977, when it was held that ‘there was a social process, which can be called racialization, whereby a mode of classification was developed, applied tentatively in European historical writing, and then, more confidently, to the populations of the world’; see Michael Banton, *The Idea of Race* (London: Tavistock, 1977), 18–19. See also Karim Murji and John Solomos (eds.), *Racialization: Studies in Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Miles has

- said ‘there is no question that I “hijacked” [Banton’s] concept of racialization’ – Stephen D. Ashe and Brendan F. McGeever, ‘Marxism, racism and the construction of “race” as a social and political relation: An interview with Professor Robert Miles’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2009 34(12): 2009–2026, at 2011.
23. Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown, *Racism*, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2003), 96–99. Some contemporary authors fail to establish functional equivalence when they extend their use of ‘racialization’ to circumstances in which there has been no use of any racial idiom. Others write loosely of ‘racism’ in the plural, showing no awareness of the conceptual difficulties.
 24. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (London: Methuen, 1992), 18–19.
 25. Pierre-André Taguieff, *Le racisme* (Paris: Flammarion, 1997), 11, 115–116. Tsvetan Tororov, ‘Race and Racism’, in Les Back and John Solomos (eds.), *Theories of Race and Racism* (London: Routledge, 2000), 64–70, at 64.
 26. Joe R. Feagin, *Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2010), 11.
 27. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 1994), 69–76.
 28. Howard Winant, ‘Racism today: A perspective from international politics’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1998 21(4): 765.
 29. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, ‘Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation’, *American Sociological Review* 1996 62(3): 474.
 30. David Theo Goldberg (ed.), *Anatomy of Racism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), xiii.
 31. Ali Rattansi, *Racism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.
 32. Philomena Essed, ‘Everyday Racism: A New Approach to the Study of Racism’, in Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (eds.), *Race Critical Theories: Text and Context* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 176–194, esp. 177, 181.
 33. Steve Garner, *Racisms: An Introduction* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2010).
 34. Essed and Goldberg (eds.), *Race Critical Theories*, 4.
 35. Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies’, in Nelson Grossberg, Cary Lawrence and Paulo A. Treichler (eds.), *Cultural Studies* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
 36. Pierre L. van den Berghe, ‘Racism’, in David Levinson and Melvin Ember (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1996), 1054–1055.