CHAPTER 8

Claiming European Unity and a Europe of Nations

Unsurprisingly, contemporaries considered the Second World War and its end to be crucial events. In its final year, the war was more devastating than ever, with ruthless fighting on all fronts, heavy bombing, and ongoing extermination in the concentration camps. In the spring of 1945, reports and pictures of their liberation sent shockwaves throughout not only Europe but the rest of the world. After the ceasefire, much of the continent was in ruins, millions fled in search of security, ruthless transfers of minority populations occurred across borders, and former prisoners were trying to return home. Contemporary observers had good reason to wonder whether decline and nihilism had gone so far as to cause the ultimate downfall of Europe and its culture. Added to this was the fear of a new war and the awareness of the atomic bomb, which threatened the survival of Western civilisation.[1]

European Union historiography emphasises the aftermath of the Second World War, especially the 1950s, and the conclusion of certain key politicians and bureaucrats – called the founding fathers of Europe (there were apparently no mothers of Europe in this historiography)[2] – that unification was the road to future peace and prosperity. Among them we find Winston Churchill, along with others from the six founding member states: Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gaspari, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak and Altiero Spinelli. Their idea was appealing: European nation states would need to give up some degree of sovereignty in exchange for lasting peace, economic development, and prosperity benefiting everyone. Considering this narrative is valuable for understanding the political drive towards economic and political unification as a movement for unity, despite some

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hesitance, confusion, and vested interests. However, when we consider the concept of Europe, the situation appears somewhat different. It was instead the First World War that laid the groundwork for the thinking that ultimately led to the negotiations for and finally the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The disintegration of the continental empires was crucial, as was the breakthrough of the ideal of national independence, which set aside the previous dominant idea of the evolution of social communities into ever larger units. It challenged the assumption that viable states, cultures and languages were increasing in size at the cost of smaller nations. Europe was not moving towards fewer and fewer states and nations – quite the opposite. The First World War changed the conception of Europe from being a continent of few empires to one of many nation states, leaving open the question of how best to deal with divisions and disputes.

Attempts to manage this new situation began in the 1920s, when the idea of unifying Europe became energised, as we saw in the previous chapter. After 1945, the arguments for unification were rooted in the same conceptual framework, but with some significant amendments and modifications. First, the idea of cultural unity was launched in the context of the material devastation and human suffering of six years of war. Second, these arguments entailed the development of a conception of the nation that excluded nationalism. This was not a new idea, but one that grew following the fresh insights from the war. It was important to develop the idea of a common European culture that comprised diverse national cultures. This cultural conception charged the notion of European unity with new relevance when several European countries and their citizens celebrated national freedom after years of occupation, while Austria, Italy and Germany had to find their own ways forward as post-fascist states. Third, European unity became married to the notion of integration. This concept slipped into the political language of Europeanists, and developed into a key asset for the economic and political unification process that took place in the 1950s, indicating the direction of the institutional Europeanisation of coming decades, and signifying a tension characterised thus by historian Bo Stråth: 'Long-term dreams about a federal Europe co-existed with short-term operational questions'.[3]

Our history of the beginning of post-war European unification is distinct from the massive, classical work by Walter Lipgens from 1977 to 1985. Lipgens wrote four volumes totalling more than three thousand pages that, apart from introductions and assessments, comprise a huge range of documents – daily newspaper articles, journals, books and archives on plans for a European union – covering the breadth of political ideologies in the years 1939–1950.[4] However, while he focused on the emergence of political groups and parties organised to promote European cooperation, we can also see the issue of European unity from the perspective of the transnationalism

of intellectuals. While Lipgens followed the efforts to implement federalism and overcome the nation-state agenda, I am inspired by Alan Milward who, in 1992, turned much previous historical research on integration upside down by insisting that integration was actually a tool used to strengthen nation states. Milward contended that this approach was a fundamental reaction to fascism and to the suffering of most countries in Europe during the Second World War.[5] Partly in accordance with his view, this chapter considers how the concept of Europe was configured within the context of the early post-war years. The importance of this period in the formation of the cultural and political language of European integration was recently emphasised by Rosario Forlenza, who views the Christian Democrat concept of Europe as a 'process of meaning-formation' occurring in its transnational networks.[6]

Here, we assess the concept of Europe of the late 1940s and early 1950s with a focus on the idea of a shared culture, and the distinction between nation and nationalism with reference to transnational considerations. That is, we identify the entanglement of the idea of unification with the notion of borders within Europe at a time in history when both were being stressed. This chapter also outlines the basic features of the frame of mind supporting European unification, by assessing certain key junctures, and finally explores the concept of European integration itself.

'The Spirit of Europe'

In his opening address to the congress 'The Spirit of Europe', held in Geneva in September 1946, Julien Benda declared his disenchantment: Europe was itself responsible for the war; a spirit of common interests, passions and consciousness had never really been in place; and it had to be acknowledged that divisions had instead increasingly been stressed by fostering the development of nations and making them as independent as possible.[7] The Hungarian Marxist philosopher György Lukács pointed out a crisis that had begun with the French Revolution and grown in strength after the First World War – a crisis concerning democracy, the idea of progress, and the belief in reason and humanity, all of which had been disrupted by fascism. According to the British essayist and poet Stephen Spender, Europe had now realised its smallness, weakness and decline, and he argued that it was impossible to return to the pre-Second World War civilisation of richness and strength.[8] Nihilism was repeatedly mentioned during debate at the congress. Nihilistic literature might have been the cause of pre-war decay, said Benda. Nihilism had married with totalitarianism, declared the Swiss intellectual historian Jean Starobinski. The discovery of nuclear fission embodied the idea that

morals had fallen into a sort of nihilistic crisis, according to the French writer Georges Bernanos. Europe had lost its self-awareness and religious faith, and did not know what to do with its nihilism, according to Karl Jaspers.[9] Apparently, the interwar themes of decline, crisis and nihilism were not only still relevant when interpreting Europe's condition, but the Second World War had even amplified them.

Still, bids for a common European spirit were also being made. 'Gentlemen, we refuse to liquidate Europe', proclaimed Bernanos at the same congress, stressing that the crisis was one faced by all of humanity, not only Europeans. The crisis could be blamed on a lack of tradition and spirit, on reducing civilisation to mere enjoyment and profit, a state that could be found all around the world.[10] Benda returned to the need to inculcate a European spirit through a common language, education on the unifying rather than dividing historical values, and European nations giving up some of their unique qualities and individuality for the sake of a common spirit.[11] The Italian writer Francesco Flora recognised European unification as a moral duty and a way for the civilisation of humanism to continue.[12]

Indeed, claims of a common European culture were evident from the end of the war. They can be interpreted either as attempts to hide differences and conflicts, or as assuming the task of overcoming the war's legacy. However, the fact is that these claims were continuously being made. Some underscored the unity of European culture based on Christianity and its influence on moral issues, art and law, just as T.S. Eliot did when he warned of its complete collapse.[13] Ortega y Gasset also defended the idea of a common culture of Europe, marked by shared customs, practices, opinions, and other common social phenomena. Still convinced of the strength and prominence of European culture, he warned that chaos could ensue if Europe was unable to recuperate from its crisis and once again set itself on top by reclaiming its historical unity and constructing a European nation on the basis of the historical proximities of its national cultures.[14] Attempts to explore possible foundations of a European culture persisted, made up of both nostalgia and utopianism, in addition to much confusion.[15]

Others issued warnings regarding specific aspects of European culture, such as Spender, who was suspicious of its nihilism. European nihilism furthered discussion of a European culture, particularly among German intellectuals. Hermann Rauschning wrote from exile in America that the end of the war meant neither that the crisis was over nor that nihilism would end. Rather, a common goal was necessary to retain the credo of society: a culture of Western ideas and principles, the legacy of antiquity and Christianity, of rationality and humanity.[16] In his contribution to the Geneva conference in 1946, Karl Jaspers responded differently, one might say more philosophically, addressing the potential for human beings to dwell within themselves

and cultivate their own abilities. The alternative to nihilism was not about finding new heroes, prophets or demagogues, but rather would be found in the seemingly trivial events of everyday life, where real changes might occur. In accordance with his 'Existenzphilosophie', he included the meaning of life in his call for freedom and the ability to go beyond oneself to become something more.[17] In this period, he also presented his concept of Europe in a radio speech that was driven by a single thought: nihilism could not be allowed to take over; people should not adopt a nihilistic attitude.[18] He drew upon Christianity, Hegel and history to define Europe as a cultural entity comprising a common spirit expressed by great artists and writers, reflected by towns, monuments, and the culture they carried. Referring to Kant, he said that future European culture should be defined by a few principles, of which freedom of thought was the highest, setting the stage for the spirit of Europe. Jaspers was also careful to note that the terms and conditions of freedom were tied to the eternal flux of history and the contradictory nature of European history, situated between church and state, Catholicism and Protestantism, science and faith, and 'real world' materialism and transcendent idealism. Political freedom entailed restrictions: as the truth was diverse and shifting while science was finite, both liberty and the European enterprise would always fall short of perfection.[19]

While Jaspers was pleading for the dismantling of the colonial empires and granting independence to the nations of Africa and Asia, others lamented such measures. Parisian journalist Louise Weiss regarded this decolonisation as a stunting of Europe caused by 'Third World' nationalism and the weakness of liberal values, leaving Europe behind the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Weiss, who before the war had been an ardent internationalist who believed that decolonisation would cure the dangerous self-interest of nations, and who was critical of German suppression of national independence in Europe during the occupation, now saw the situation differently. The Europeans had brought knowledge and tried to shift the colonies away from their ignorance, despotism and feudalism. For some of them, thousands of years 'of mental evolution separate us – you and me, gentlemen and Europe in general', and they were certainly not ready to have 'our European right to vote, conquered after so many struggles and so many hard-won shifts in public and private consciousness'. The only responsible way to treat them was with paternalism: 'Practiced in many different forms, while these peoples advance step by step from one mental age to another, paternalism has given excellent results from the human point of view'.[20] By 1949, Weiss had moved politically to embrace conservatism, and she sympathised with Gaullism. Nevertheless, her idea of the West's civilising mission reflected widely held opinions from the left to the right, in France and in other parts of Europe.[21]

Connected with this paternalism was the notion of European exceptionalism, often related to claims of European universalism, but varying with different philosophical and political views. Gonzague de Reynold, a Swiss author and radical conservative activist whose political ideal was an authoritarian Christian state, defined Europe as unique, both geopolitically and culturally. Geographically, it stood out from other parts of the world because of its exceptional climate and the development of a shared civilisation with a distinct culture. Now, in disrepair and having lost its high global status, Europe needed to restore its spiritual core of Christian values. Instead of continuing the decline arising from divisive nationalism, de Reynold believed that Europe would need to understand the universal character of its Christian culture. Only Europe had accomplished universality: if Europe could not achieve peace, then the world would be lost.[22] In contrast to de Reynold, enlightenment values were represented by liberal writers on the left. Francesco Flora wanted European culture to focus on a universalistic humanism.[23] Stephen Spender pleaded for the rebirth of Europe as a universal civilisation characterised by an 'unselfish search for truth, love for the beauty, human brotherhood', against the backdrop of the impossibility of conducting war with the new atomic weapons that threatened to extinguish humanity. Europe, he proclaimed, had a unique opportunity because it had been through the most devastating war the world had ever seen; now it understood better than did any other parts of the world the urgent need to establish universal values.[24] A Catholic-inspired approach could also espouse European exceptionalism by referring to the old traditions of Western civilisation. The British economist Barbara Ward began her 1948 book on European unity with the following grandiose assertion: '[No] corner of the world – except perhaps ancient Greece – has contributed as much as Western Europe to the development and enrichment of mankind'. From Europe came the spirit of freedom with the belief in 'a moral order of right and wrong, and good and evil, which transcends every particular interest . . . and is the yardstick by which they are judged'. Ward found this in Greek philosophy, Christian teachings, and medieval ideas of natural law, relating it to individual freedom of choice and responsibility, and to the notion of governments existing for their citizens, rather than the reverse.[25] For Ward, this was not a case for European universalism, but for the supremacy of its civilisation.

After a few years, optimism regarding European culture re-emerged. The concepts of European decline and crisis were interwoven with new possibilities arising from the power and beauty of Europe's culture: something new could grow or was already growing. Ortega y Gasset declared in 1949 that, despite all the lamentable death and agony, Europe had demonstrated that 'a new form of civilization is germinating in us; that therefore under the apparent catastrophes . . . a new form of human existence is being born'.[26]

Salvador de Madariaga emphasised the common European spirit, as well as the privileges of some nations over others, and concluded his *Portrait of Europe* in 1952 by saying:

> From the Mediterranean, the spirit of Europe gathers to itself the divine light of Greece and Italy; from the Baltic and the North Sea, the colder and quieter light of the North; from Flanders and The Netherlands, the light of homes and families, shining with human warmth in dining rooms and kitchens – and so, rich and flavoured with its many lights of forest and cornfield, vineyard and pasture, the spirit of Europe ever more and more precise, reaches the West and branching into its three best defined peoples – of action, England, of thought, France, of passion, Spain – flows now earthless and magnetic, as through three electric points – to quicken America beyond the seas.[27]

The change was indeed remarkable. Optimism had returned, and occasionally without reservations, such as when the Swiss author Denis de Rougemont discussed the fascist and communist threats to freedom, writing that 'Europe is the great hope'.[28] Those who had previously preached of European unification found new hope. The president of the Pan-European League, Coudenhove-Kalergi, alleged that the rebirth of Europe as a nation was on the agenda, along with a new awareness that it was a community of culture and destiny. However, his nationhood was not one of blood, geography, or even of language and history, but one of a patriotism that defended values of freedom, brotherhood and chivalry. Remarkably, he averred that such nationhood was already in place.[29]

After the Second World War, the proposition of cultural unity in Europe was once again used as an argument for political unity: with cultural unity already in place, Europe should use it as the foundation on which to build a political union. This was the view of traditionalists who turned to history to support their position. From de Rougemont's perspective, Europe had existed before the nations, whose development was nothing but a backdrop to history and had to be amended by creating a super nationality within the frame of political unity; only by doing this could Europe's common culture survive.[30] He shared this view with T.S. Eliot, who saw a common European heritage in Christianity and the ancient cultures of Greece, Rome and Israel, with many shared components that constituted 'the true bond between us'. From this common ground, Eliot reasoned, diverse specific national and cultural elements had developed over the centuries, resulting in different national loyalties, but not erasing the common European tradition.[31] Parisian sociologist Raymond Aron contended that the European nations had common traditions and shared values to an extent that merited 'recognition as one and the same historical civilization'; now Europe would need to unify economically and politically, effectively melting the nation states into a larger, superior political form.[32]

The views of Guizot, Ortega y Gasset, and other nineteenth-century and interbellum intellectuals on the diversity of this shared culture were essential for post-war writers who sought to clarify Europe's new situation. They found encouragement in Ortega y Gasset's post-war declarations that Europeans had always lived simultaneously in two societies – one extensive and one narrow, one Europe and the other the nation, province, or local society.[33]

In discussing Europe, the pairing of cultural unity and diversity had different meanings, implications and motives. Ernst Jünger charged the issue of unity and diversity by following an anti-statist branch of nineteenth-century German conservatism. He called for a unity of organisation with a diversity of national cultures; he believed that Europe should also have a global empire, alongside the other major players in the world, but that it should retain its diversity. He used the expression 'unity and diversity', whereas de Rougemont spoke of 'unity in diversity'. They both contended that, despite its national cultures, Europe did possess cultural unity. Jünger pleaded for 'territorial and political unity while preserving historical diversity', distinguishing between technical achievements that applied to 'industry, commerce, communications, trade weights and measures, and defence', and the organic world of men with 'their history, their speech and race . . . their customs and habits, their art and religion', where there 'cannot be too many colours on the palette'. Jünger distinguished between the suppressing technocracy of the modern state and the freedom and diversity of national cultures. However, while the distinction had previously been drawn in criticising Bismarck's unifying of the German states and the Prussian conformity of modern life, for Jünger it made sense to have a European constitution and state that took responsibility for the technical achievements of society, while culture should be left to the diversity of the nations.[34]

As a critic from the socialist left, Jean-Paul Sartre denied that there was a cultural unity at all, adding that the national cultures were under the threat of extinction. If the continent were to unify itself, then perhaps these cultures could be saved, and he conceived of cultural unity as 'the only one capable of saving what is valid in each country's culture'. For the national cultures to survive, 'they must be integrated within the framework of one great European culture'. However, cultural unity could not survive on its own, but needed economic and political unity as well. Sartre thus believed that it was disunity that threatened Europe and its nations, including his own France, while the unifying of culture and of politics had to go hand in hand.[35]

Europeanists repeatedly described the unity and diversity of Europe, as when Salvador Madariaga addressed 'the play between unity and diversity which is typical of Europe'. Europeanists referred to the French–German

cultural border, in particular. For Madariaga it signified two different spirits and ways of understanding life. In essence, this border divided a Latin way, also including Italy and Spain, from a Germanic one, also including Austria and Scandinavia. The French spirit was like a crystal, and the German like a stream. The French referred to a text as an authority conveying holy dictums that invoked differences of space, whereas for the Germans, the very same text signified the passing of time through specific historical moments. On one side of the Rhine the focus was on space, and on the other it was on time. Britain and the small nations on the banks of the Rhine shared the gifts of both, and the small nations had additional features of their own. Altogether, Madariaga concluded that the Rhine was 'the chief feature of Europe, her very backbone'.[36] His exposition was significant to the concept of Europe, and when Europeanists drew on the French–German borderlands as representing the European spirit, they were focusing on the West; behind the Iron Curtain, Central and Eastern Europe were downgraded as less important when the Rhine was identified as the central cultural border.

The Romanian professor of religion at the Sorbonne, Mircea Eliade, saw things differently and considered the Danube to be the quintessential European river. Opposing the tendency to identify European culture with the areas west of the Iron Curtain, he demonstrated that there was also significant diversity in both Central and Eastern Europe, with a variety of churches, languages, philosophies, poetries and historical influences. These cultures also belonged to the larger European culture. Eastern Europe was Europe as well, and Europe was unified by its cultural exchanges with the Middle East and the unifying role played by Christianity, and supported by its defence against Islam.[37] Thus, the focus on Western Europe was contested. However, both definitions of Europe rested on the notion of a common enemy, either communism or Islam.

It is no coincidence that the formula 'unity in diversity' is a cornerstone of the political language of European integration. Although the motto 'unity in diversity' has only been used in official EU rhetoric since the 1980s,[38] it has been on the agenda ever since those heated discussions after the Second World War. Intellectuals of different nationalities and ideologies defended the richness of the national cultures, and stressed the advantages of their variety. This call to blend unity with the actual diversity of national cultures was common, and was something that pleas for peaceful cooperation or unification would have to address, sooner or later. This illustrated the tension that came along with the dreams and plans of unity in a diversified context.

Europe with Nations, Europe without Nationalism

The Britain-based Spanish writer Salvador Madariaga described the two world wars as the 'birth pangs of Europe' – the continent was now creating itself.[39] He and many others were fully aware of the collapse of the idea of a European federation in the early 1930s, and took that time's lack of cooperation and abundance of explosive nationalism to be the main causes of the war and the disaster it had inflicted on Europe. For many intellectuals, the main question of the day was what to do about nations and nationalism. On one hand, the pre-war notion of a shared European culture had been reclaimed; on the other hand, it was obviously important to both disarm and demarcate nationalism. The issue now became how to align European culture with the individual nations and their national cultures.

This section and the one that follows examine a group of liberal-minded intellectuals and their search for a concept of Europe that included nations but excluded nationalism, beginning in 1945 and continuing into the early 1950s. The focus is on the idea that a Europe of nations must be a Europe without nationalism. This group of intellectuals represents the direction that mainstream Europeanist thinking took in the post-war era – that is, that unification must build on the nations and nation states rather than erase them, that the nations should not cease to exist within a shared community, that nationhood and national culture could and should be separated from nationalism. This is the thinking that underpinned the European Commission's slogan 'unity in diversity', which was launched in the 1980s.[40] However, the group we will examine represents this mindset without using the concept European integration, as this concept had not yet been established in the political language, which is something we will return to in the last section of this chapter.

To investigate a mindset that defends national culture while rejecting nationalism, I have chosen four writers to illustrate the transnational context. Born in the late nineteenth century or first decades of the 1900s, they became established writers in the interbellum and experienced the rise of Nazi Germany. Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) was an academic philosopher in Germany who was forced to leave his professorship at Heidelberg when he refused to pledge allegiance to Hitler. He refused to divorce his wife, who had Jewish ancestry, and the couple only managed to avoid deportation to Ravensbrück concentration camp because the American forces entered Heidelberg in March 1944.[41] Salvador Madariaga (1886–1978) was a novelist, critic and historian with a long history of activism for international cooperation in various bodies of the League of Nations. He was a diplomat who was appointed minister of the Spanish republican government, and later its ambassador in Washington and Paris. From the late 1930s, he lived and taught

in Oxford. Denis de Rougemont (1906–1985) was a Swiss historian and cultural critic who began his efforts to organise a movement for the federation of Europe in 1930.[42] Stephen Spender (1909–1995) was a British poet, novelist and essayist. In the 1930s he was known to sympathise with the socialists, and for a very short while he was even a member of the Communist Party, which he left after criticising the Soviets and Stalin. These four, as we will soon see, were loosely associated with one another in a transnational community of intellectuals. Using one of Karl Mannheim's classical devices for the sociology of knowledge, we can say that this group existed based on their conscious and rational will. They represent two generations, Jaspers and Madariaga being in their sixties in 1945, while de Rougemont and Spender were in their late thirties. Madariaga and de Rougemont had been Europeanists before the war. The group thus illustrates both transmission and fusion between the generations, making it impossible to define their viewpoints regarding Europe as phenomena connected with a single generation. The formative experiences of both generations were the two world wars triggered by conflicts between European states.[43]

In examining their views, I will first turn to the transnational context that brought together Jaspers, Madariaga, de Rougemont and Spender. Then we will look at how they situated Europe in the post-war era and in history, their quest for a European spirit, and how they believed the European nations could cooperate within a political federation, while leaving nationalism behind.

The entanglement of Europe with nations in the writings of Jaspers, Madariaga, de Rougemont and Spender illustrates the transnational discourse on Europe in the years immediately following the Second World War. These writers were themselves translated into multiple languages: Jaspers' many books and pamphlets were quickly presented to English, French, Italian and Spanish readers; De Rougemont wrote in French and was translated into German and English; while Madariaga wrote in Spanish, English and French, and was published in German and Italian as well. In terms of other languages, they were all translated into Swedish, for example, and all except Spender into Dutch.[44] We can see that many of their publications on the European issue were disseminated in several of these languages, such as Jaspers' *The European Spirit*, Madariaga's *Victors, Beware*, de Rougemont's *Freedoms We May Lose*, and Spender's *European Witness*.

Moreover, they fervently exchanged ideas with one another as well as with other intellectuals at congresses. With the exception of Madariaga, the other three met at the congress organised by Julien Benda in Geneva in 1946 to discuss the European spirit. Madariaga was one of the chairmen of the Congress of Europe in The Hague in 1948, in which de Rougemont also took part, and both were central figures in the newly established

European Movement. When the movement launched a cultural committee, it was chaired by Madariaga. In The Hague in 1948, plans were made for a European Centre for Culture, with de Rougemont leading the way. They all belonged to an organisation named the Congress for Cultural Freedom, initiated in Berlin in 1950 with activities throughout the 1950s and until 1967, when it collapsed after it was revealed that its financial support from American foundations had originated from the CIA. De Rougemont knew about this and Jaspers had at least some information, but no misgivings: 'Truth also needs propaganda', he is quoted as saying.[45] Jaspers and Madariaga became two of the honorary chairmen, with Denis de Rougemont serving as president of its executive committee and Stephen Spender the editor (with Irving Kristol) of its main journal *The Encounter*.[46] All four published in the organisation's five journals in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. It is clear that these men had become interconnected within the same transnational network. Moreover, this community shared some fundamental traits of political thinking. The Congress of Cultural Freedom was an organisation with an explicit anti-communist bias, though its magazines were equally characterised by their criticism of McCarthyism; Peter Coleman concludes that they mainly represented the non-communist left, including liberals and social democrats with the views of the British Labour and French Socialist parties. One of the main ideas of the organisation was that Europe's unification would be the best way to counter communism.[47]

When a range of prominent intellectuals met for the congress L'esprit européen in Geneva in 1946, Julien Benda framed the discussion by insisting on the divisions of Europe. Certainly, although the differences within Europe were also underscored by the other speakers, the divisions among the nationalities were essential when considering the European spirit, which he also acclaimed. Benda was unclear how to depict the duality between a unified European spirit and a diversity of nations.[48] When he had called for a united Europe in the 1930s, it had taken the form of a French nation.[49] For the participants of the congress, it became clear that the nations would somehow have to acquiesce to a common European spirit. It was one of the main themes not only of the congress, but also of the Europeanist project and of the discourse on European unity for years to come.

As we have seen, the pre-Second World War concept of Europe evoked crisis, decline and nihilism, often alluding to a weakened position for Europe, a lack of capabilities, and general dismay at declining morals and Christianity. However, it also included progress and civilisation, together with a general Eurocentric attitude of rightfully dominating the world because of European superiority. This was the backdrop against which Jaspers, Madariaga, de Rougemont and Spender considered Europe and nationalism in the

early post-war years. In turning to some of their key texts, the first step is to illustrate their concept of Europe.

During his journey in the British-occupied zone of Germany in the summer and autumn of 1945, Stephen Spender meditated on the 'corpse towns' that had emerged as a result of the deliberate efforts of civilisation and of cooperation between the victorious nations. The organic life of the old cities, with architecture and life forms that fused past and present, that connected the present with the Middle Ages, had been killed. A city such as Cologne had been like a waiting room for its inhabitants while they were journeying through their time on Earth. Now it was all ruins. In these dead cities, the 'citizens go on existing with a base mechanical kind of life like that of insects . . . The destruction of the city itself, with all its past as well as its present, is like a reproach to the people who go on living there. The sermons in the stones of Germany preach nihilism'.[50] Thus, Spender described not only the destruction of Europe but also the common representation of the war as a nihilism that was intimately related to civilisation. First, it was a climax of technological development and cooperation that destroyed these cities and, in the end, brought the atomic bomb to the world. To this was added the nihilistic regimes of fascism, especially Hitler's, and the war that resulted in the severing of European civilisation.[51]

De Rougemont emphasised that Western civilisation tends towards technocracy and science, both of which are problematic in their own ways. Technocracy entails the danger of confusing means with ends, as it tends to 'overlook the final ends of the human venture' and aligns us with nihilism, which can be illustrated by the threat of the atomic bomb. Overall, progress was wholly negative when it came to the wars of the first half of the twentieth century, which killed more people than ever before; however, progress also ensured a level of material well-being previously unknown. On one hand, there was an ever-increasing number of inventions that could be applied to achieve social ends; on the other, there was the emerging production and refinement of atomic bombs. Thus, de Rougement conceded that the idea of progress was contradictory, and added that it was Europe that originated it: 'Let it be admitted that Europe, in forming it, "infected" the whole world; the world will never recover'. Typically for de Rougemont, he added European responsibility to the European quest: 'Europe, being responsible for the idea of Progress, is also responsible for correcting it aright'.[52]

Madariaga criticised the subjection of man to machine: 'men degenerate to the status and function of pegs in a huge kind of factory that tends to supersede the State and Society itself'. Quantitative considerations dictate societal life, including organisations that have been set up to coordinate on the international level. Democracy tends to be reduced to a market fair, a vulgar thing, humiliating candidates and promising material benefits that

turn elections into auctions. Moreover, this development brings a threat of moral decline and even destruction.[53] Finally, Jaspers declared his mistrust in modern civilisation with its science, technology, and idea of progress, all of which he included when defining Europe. It was the time, he claimed, to look for a new European consciousness: after years of desperate yearning through nihilism, it was time to evoke new creativity, and to set out in a new direction.[54]

Clearly, the experiences of war and the development of weapons caused these writers to deliver a critique of progress, conceptualising it as nihilism. For them, Europe was seriously wounded and could never be the same as it had been before the two world wars. All four gave history a prominent place when they traced the decline of Europe in the twentieth century and described the contemporary situation. In this, they treated Europe's demise and ultimate downfall as the outcome of a lack of unity, with internal divisions between the nations and the loss of shared beliefs and principles. Madariaga viewed the first half of the twentieth century as unstable, in sharp contrast to the relative stability of the nineteenth century. He mentioned not only that century-long period of relative peace within Europe, but also the general increase in wealth, the trust in reason and liberty as guiding principles, and the belief in the idea of progress: 'On the whole, the men of 1900 could look forward with confidence to an era of ever-ascending progress under the guidance of reason in a world of liberty'.[55] De Rougemont described how Europe had dominated the world for centuries through its culture, trade and weapons, with its machinery and capital. The previous thirty years and the two world wars had left Europe compromised and weakened by the pressure of America and Russia (typically, they vacillated between using the official name 'the Soviet Union' and Russia, the latter indicating a threat and otherness predating communist rule), dispossessed of its powers, demoralised and emptied of dreams, divided and lost. Yet, until the last war, the name of Europe had still radiated across the globe. Now, Europeans were in shock, ruined, and living in the shadows of the two great powers.[56] For Spender, Europe was at the end of a long period of dominating the world. It had been corrupted by both war and fascism, ruined and divided. It had become small and weak, and had reached a decisive turning point, facing the possibility of meeting the end of its existence. At this juncture, Europe had to learn from the past and understand its history, to revive some past values and completely transform others.[57] Jaspers stated that there was something to keep and to protect in Europe, not least a historical mind that offered the possibility of learning from the past. However, the European mind would need to face its contemporary context, look towards the future, and represent itself in the present course of events. Europe had become small, while the new masters of the world now came from America and Asia. With the potential

of China, and the energy and growing strength of the United States and Russia, Europe was stuck between two politically superior powers. Europe was shrinking and losing self-confidence, which caused 'waning, suffering and humiliation'. He concluded that Europe had to accept its loss of world power and find new ways to define itself, adding that there was a chance to accomplish this in the present situation; it was still possible to set Europe on a course that would lead to new greatness.[58]

In their reflections, Europe of the early post-war years stands out as characterised by dismay and decline. De Rougemont noted that the idea of progress had migrated from Europe, its birthplace, to America and Russia. Spender, like Madariaga, stressed that the machine had enslaved men to the degree that they had become trained to support the needs of machinery, leading to overwhelming feelings of helplessness. The clearest result of the machine age was the atomic bomb; with this in mind, Spender warned that machinery could destroy civilisation and kill us all through its capacity for annihilation. He was utterly clear on the responsibility this bestowed on Europe. The evils that happened to Europe were chosen by the Europeans. They were responsible for the methods and for inventing the devices of mechanised society. Therefore, they also had the responsibility for mitigating its outcome.[59] De Rougemont also warned of the threat of total destruction, and added that the atomic bomb was linked to the notion of totalitarian dictatorship.[60] Jaspers – who later wrote the most extensive philosophical tract on the atomic bomb[61] – argued that Europe had a particular responsibility, and was guilty of many shameful acts: 'What Europe has brought forth, European spirit itself must overcome'. As Europe was the origin and inventor of science and technology, which have the capacity for great destruction, Europe also had the responsibility to set itself on a new future course. Moreover, as Europe had spread Janus-faced science and technology throughout the world, its present task would be to expand European humanism and the European idea of freedom.[62] Apparently, these writers shared the idea of European responsibility.

It is against the background of a European catastrophe that these four writers depicted the European spirit as a force for salvation, and even specified that intellectuals were the ones who should represent this spirit, stressing themselves as a force going beyond nationalistic endeavours. At the 1946 congress in Geneva, de Rougemont declared that the mind was the only thing left to hope for, and Spender professed that when material achievements and institutions could no longer be relied on, then the mind would have to be called upon; a spiritual rebirth was needed.[63]

So, we may ask, where did they find the European spirit? De Rougemont stated that while the bourgeoisie had resigned itself to decadence and the working class was inching towards communism, the European spirit,

which could span the continent, was left to the intellectuals, who were most inclined to think independently. In 1946, he also included the farmers as free thinkers, but later dropped them, seeing only the intellectuals as capable of restoring or reinventing the common principles of thinking and acting.[64] Spender agreed, saying that the artists and thinkers had kept the idea of freedom alive through the dark years that Europe had undergone. He turned to the 'spiritual values' of seeking the truth, loving the beautiful, and longing for human fraternity, all represented in culture, in architecture and art, in literature, and by brilliant minds.[65] He gave the intellectuals a central role in reintegrating Germany, and wrote of their duty to seek out and encourage their German colleagues. He believed that intellectuals of various nationalities should work together to encourage and demonstrate international understanding through joint conferences, exhibitions and concerts, leading to the spiritual rebirth of Europe. It would not come down to establishing new organisations, but rather to changing the minds of individuals. If elite prophets could envision where Europe was and what steps it needed to take, then many others would follow.[66] Madariaga seemed to agree on the special place of the intellectuals when he identified the main characteristic of the European individual as the desire to know and to practise Socratic doubt as a method to expand knowledge.[67]

Above all, they praised the individual. In accordance with thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill from the preceding century, Madariaga, Jaspers and Spender called for exceptional individuals. Madariaga echoed Mill in claiming that such individuals were 'the salt of the earth', and he repeated much of Ortega y Gassett's criticism of mass society and mass movements from the interbellum period.[68] Jaspers said that, on the one hand, each individual is potential unto himself, neither solely material nor part of a machine; on the other, he assigned importance to the greatness of a few exceptional individuals.[69] De Rougemont regarded self-realisation as a basic individual freedom.[70] He viewed the individual through the lens of his philosophical conviction of personalism when conforming to a shared quest for Europe and the wider circle of Western civilisation, which included identifying the individual as an autonomous and freely acting person. From this, he developed the idea of the European as a man who aims for consciousness and meaning in life going beyond mere production and consumption; as someone who seeks the truth, is sceptical, and practises critical thinking and civic morality.[71]

Their praise of the individual arose from the idea of human nature and social life as complicated and not reducible to economic terms. Utilitarianism reduced 'spontaneous forms of social nature' and every inequality to a matter of income, and deprived society of differences that were the very flavour of its many constituent communities.[72] Modern man must be aware,

using his senses to experience his world and be more spiritually alive. The triumph of life is to be found in culture.[73] This group was thus far from the economic utilitarianism and materialism that we associate with individualism today, and they called for cultivation of the spirit to be the task of intellectuals. Today, some would find that elitist, while others – including myself – would view it as a call for current intellectuals to take stronger stands in public debate.

Towards Unity without Nationalism

In the early post-Second World War period, the burning question of national sovereignty and its limits was evoked in the frequent calls for a world authority, and in the intense discourse on European unification. With the nation state assumed to be of ongoing relevance to the world order, and nationalism seen as evoking the possibility of states launching wars on their neighbours, sovereignty was a key issue. Madariaga solved the problem by asserting that no nation could be absolutely sovereign, as it would have to voluntarily engage in various foreign relations. Jaspers mistrusted the ability of sovereign nations to find a working political balance, and concluded that, in a coming world order, all nations would need to give up some of their sovereignty in exchange for negotiated decisions on shared issues. Nations would need to accept being subjects under international law, and abide by it when attempting to make changes. They would need to protect the rights of minorities and uphold the rule of law. For a new world order, this implied that no culture should rule others, and that 'people [should] set one another free and engage in mutual concern for one another'.[74]

The distinction between nationalism and nations was crucial to this group of thinkers. Spender condemned the former as outdated, based on its record of violence and political aggression. Still, there could be greatness and a sense of true glory when people came together and expressed national culture.[75] De Rougemont conceived of nationalism as coinciding with total war and anarchical individualism – both European inventions. Moreover, total war was the outcome of nationalism in conjunction with centralist states, propaganda, and industrial technology. However, he found that Europe had also devised pacifism, federalism and a communal spirit.[76] Madariaga argued that it was impossible to erase nations or their cultures, as Germany had attempted to do in previous years.[77] They implored Europeans to make a choice, to move away from nationalism. The way to do this was to unify Europe.

Spender believed that the world was on the brink, and that nations would have to make a choice between two diverging directions. They could

continue with destruction and hatred, represented by the bombed-out towns of Germany, or opt for cooperation. The choice was either a 'new chaos' or a 'new pattern of unity'. At the time, Spender argued, civilisation 'may recreate everything or destroy everything'. The contemporary situation demanded worldwide unity, 'with consent of all nations', in which peace was more important than national interests, and priority was given to 'the whole human interest in front of the existing power-and-wealth interests'.[78]

More specifically, the issue of unity concerned Europe. Spender observed the hatred against the Germans, that they were no longer considered human beings, but seen as reprehensible. Still, he contended that there was no German problem but only a European one. France felt disgraced, as did Germany. Not only had many Germans failed when being tried, but so had many French – and the higher in society, the more people were compromised. France had its aftershocks following 'five years of war, bitterness and corruption'. Spender called for Europe to form a unity based on sympathy for other nationalities, a unity in which the people and nations accepted their responsibility for the whole continent. Only through cooperation among France, Germany, and the rest of Europe would it be possible to repair the damage. Europe's unification was presented as the only sensible way forward.[79]

De Rougemont considered nationalism to be a romantic disease that had vanished from Europe, relating it to fascism, imperialism and the totalitarian spirit. At one point, he differentiated between bad and good notions of the nation. One referred to absolute sovereignty demarcated by well-defined borders, defended by armies that always ended up in wars, while the other described 'centres of radiance and . . . communities of peoples allied, by their traditions or by their ideals – in other words, by destiny or by choice'. Categorically, he wanted to maintain the nation state. The problem emerged when nation states became the supreme forces in the international order, because states tended to destroy cultural uniqueness. De Rougemont doubted that representatives of nation states would be able to lead international affairs. In general, he saw salvation in what he defined as a European virtue, which is the quest for a balance between extremes. This European quest opposes both the totalitarian state and unrepentant individualism. Europe should therefore not eliminate nation states altogether, but instead endeavour to balance them by creating a federation, while respecting the diversity of the continent. As a federation, the countries would be able to demonstrate a new degree of confidence, opening themselves to one another, weakening borders and the requirement for visas, and opening Europe to the rest of the world.[80]

De Rougemont, like Spender, observed a contemporary political ambivalence: 'The disunity of European nations has reached the height of

absurdity; and their move towards union grows at the same time'. Europe was in crisis, and faced two options: the first was to unite and the second to disappear into the catacombs of history. The continent was fractured, other powers were taking over, and a definitive decline was a real possibility for Europe unless it discovered its vocation. He found this in the movement towards uniting Europe: 'In saving itself by federation . . . it can offer the world the recipe and the most fruitful transcendence of the national framework'.[81] This could only happen if the Europeans realised that they belonged to one common nation and the same culture, and managed to revitalise the European spirit. This did not imply that they should subjugate national differences, argued de Rougemont; instead, the federation would act as a device guarding against anarchy while still guaranteeing diversity.[82]

In sum, Jaspers, Spender and de Rougemont emphasised the need to overcome the disunity of the European nations. When asked what would come out of this kind of unity, they answered European cooperation and a political federation. Madariaga shared this conviction, but believed that unification would come whether or not it was wanted; rather, the European nations would need to choose how the unification should be designed. At the end of the war in Europe, he stated that Germany had tried to create a new Europe in which the nations were subjugated to the Nazis. Their project had failed because it was impossible to erase Europe's national feelings and consciousness; but even so, the Nazis had played a role in the longer process of European unification. Although their reign was a nightmare, it contributed to fostering a spirit of unity: 'The spirit of unity is in the air of our epoch'. Madariaga drew parallels to the centralised states that were formed centuries ago, when increasing communication and exchange made regions increasingly interdependent and the monarchs built the centralised power of nations. He stressed the ongoing process towards European unification and defined it as the birth of the European nation.[83]

We can see a distinct split between nations and nationalism. The claim that there could be such a thing as good national culture recalled the idea of the 'spring of nations' in 1848, as advocated by the Italian leader of Young Europe, Giuseppe Mazzini. Young Europe included national movements freeing people from the yokes of the old regimes of European states, and promoted the creation of a European federation of the people. However, a hundred years later, pleas for European unity coincided with the renunciation of nationalism. Moreover, it is also possible to see the difference between Madariaga, who argued that unity was a sign of the times, and the other three thinkers, who stressed that unification was a matter of choice. This can be interpreted, using Isaiah Berlin's distinction, as a difference between facts and values. For Madariaga, the coming unity was presented as a matter of fact, while for the other three it was a matter of value.[84]

With Madariaga stressing the unity of Europe and hailing the dawn of a European nation, we have now arrived at another question for those who advocated European unification post-Second World War. How do a shared European spirit, conscience and culture come together with national cultures? After the first reactions to this question, and to the notions of a Europe without nationalism as well as European unification, further support was needed. Madariaga offered a more extensive discussion of this. He contended that the existing nations would not dissolve in a unified Europe, but would continue to exist: 'Nations, big or small, are facts of nature, and it is not in our power to destroy them'. All nations, even small ones, should be appreciated for their cultures. With a Herderian approach, Madariaga insisted that it is through local national cultures that 'universal culture reaches the consciousness of most men' and that this 'is the only way in which they can assimilate it'. For Madariaga just as for Herder, universalism is only reachable through the national cultures. Moreover, in his mind, the European nation was something different from most European nations. It would not be founded on a shared language but, like Switzerland, would have to be 'built over several languages'. Its main enemy would not come from outside, but rather from the risk of wars between fellow European nations. A permanent European peace would be achieved through establishing a European commonwealth and by implementing European standards. Everything came down to the European spirit, as practical arrangements and institutions 'will avail nothing if the spirit is not there'. However, the old spirit dies hard, and new habits have to be fostered by wise statesmanship: 'What is needed is the habit of thinking and feeling in European terms'. Concretely, he asked for a European board to examine practical issues that extended across borders and had a truly European character. He offered a few examples, such as rail and air transportation as well as physical and moral health. The idea was to create a board that would consider the issues 'only from the standpoint of a nation called Europe'.[85]

Moving into the 1950s, Madariaga dwelt on the question of how a European spirit could be combined with national cultures. He further developed his conception of Europe and its spirit, emphasising more than before the material interconnectedness of Europe, conceived as a single physical entity. He contrasted this interconnectedness to the essential lack of moral solidarity between the European peoples and nations, by which he meant that Europe was not 'one consciousness' as, for example, Italy was. It was necessary to reconsider national histories as parts of European history, to appreciate the works of Dante, Shakespeare and Goethe as works of European art. Europeans would need to understand and appreciate one another, including all their cultural differences. These differences caused tension, but instead of prompting warlike fantasies, they should be kept in perspective.

The tension between different cultures and nations could 'be integrated into the common life of Europe, which they ought to quicken and stimulate'. In Madariaga's view, such life and strife belonged to Europe.[86]

Madariaga's intention in the book *Portrait of Europe* is to reveal the unity behind the variety of European nations. Although one can identify the purported national characteristics of the peoples of Europe, such as the slow Swede or aesthetic Italian, they are all Europeans. Although the continent has many beloved and distinct cities, the unity of their underlying style and configuration leaves a lasting impression. Madariaga referred to Montesquieu's claim as to the European physical environment's optimal temperature, conferred by the Gulf Stream and other geographical conditions: 'Unity comes from the relatively short limits of climate and the configuration within which the life of Europe has to flow'. Similarly, Europe's inhabitants are a mixed lot, so no nation can declare itself a pure race; instead, this mixture 'is perhaps the true cause of European unity'. On this basis, Madariaga declared the national types to have specific historical flair and spirits of their own: Europe is rich in national characters, and they 'are the true components of the European spirit'.[87] In conclusion, it is Madariaga who propagated the idea of diversity in unity. For him, the cause of Europe's wars was not national diversity, which was not a necessary evil Europe had to live with. Instead, diversity was sharply distinguished from nationalism and was the very essence of a shared European culture. Madariaga was the one of the four thinkers who promoted cultural diversity, making it the definitive feature of the cultural and spiritual unity of Europe.

Karl Jaspers, Salvador Madariaga, Denis de Rougemont, and Stephen Spender took part in the transnational discourse and intellectual exchange among writers, critics and scholars concerning Europe's future. Beginning with the Geneva congress L'esprit européen, they were primarily addressing the dreadful consequences of Europe's ill-fated politics. A Europe in ruins conflicted with the European spirit and its possibilities. In the years that followed, they adapted their values to the new situation that had gradually begun to constitute the post-war order. Examining their standpoints on European issues in the early post-war years, we can see that they were struggling to come to terms with the entanglement of nations, nation states and Europeanness. They depicted Europe as a continent in crisis because of nationalism. Their critique concerned fundamental aspects of European growth and expansion, such as the idea of progress and technological development without limits. We should not underestimate the experience of representing countries that had lost much of their influence in the world, nor the influence of the Cold War that squeezed Europe between the superpowers. Jaspers, Madariaga, de Rougemont and Spenders were strongly aligned

with the liberal and economic ideologies of the West, stressing individual freedom.

These writers focused on the immediate context within Europe. This is to say that, in their concept of Europe, we find little about the colonies or about the future of the persistent ambitions to maintain the British or French empires. In their opinion, Europe had fallen apart during the First World War and became victim to nationalism because it lacked a common worldview or thought system, and this confusion had been amplified by the most recent war. The intellectuals had to undertake the task of awakening the European spirit and of making people aware of their shared European culture. Clearly, the crisis they acknowledged included the threat of a new war, this time with the possibility of the atomic bomb, as well as the threat of communists taking over Western Europe, either through Soviet troops or internal groups.

Nevertheless, the crisis could be interpreted as an opportunity to create a new Europe with a stronger sense of common culture and shared institutional bodies, which would stop internal nationalistic conflicts by limiting national sovereignty. This brings us back to European unification and how it was launched in these years.

Organising for Europe, Taking on a New World Mission

After the Second World War, some Europeanists were inclined to look to Switzerland as a model for the new Europe, where unity could transcend linguistic barriers in the name of common sense and intelligent progress.[88] Although the comparison was sometimes criticised, the message remained, that there was a need to limit absolute state sovereignty and hamper nationalism: 'A United States of Europe will be of necessity far more loosely knit, and the elements of exclusive nationalism will need to be guided into more fruitful channels if the experiment is ever to succeed'.[89] The Swiss capital of Zurich was the site of Winston Churchill's well-known and often-cited speech on the 'Tragedy of Europe', given on 22 September 1946, in his new role as leader of the Conservative opposition in the British Parliament. He explicitly asked for a United States of Europe, where France would take Germany by the hand, paying respect to Coudenhove-Kalergi and Aristide Briand as forerunners in substantiating the design, and then acknowledging the movement for unity in European countries.[90]

Churchill's speech in Zurich is often cited as the moment when serious discussions of and movements towards unification began. However, by then Europeanist organisations were already active. In Britain, Churchill founded the 'United European Movement' to campaign for the cause, but

such groups had already been in existence during the war, as mentioned in the previous chapter. In France, the president of the National Assembly and former prime minister Édouard Herriot chaired the French Council for a United Europe, a group founded by Albert Camus, among others, in 1944. Similar organisations had begun to spring up in Belgium and the Netherlands, some with branches in most Western European countries. The European Parliamentary Union was founded on Coudenhove-Kalergi's initiative to provide a platform for parliamentarians of different nationalities, whereas the Economic League for European Cooperation was to promote cooperation in economic life, and the European Union of Federalists aimed for a federal Europe. In comparison with the organisations of the interwar period, these were less elitist in pursuit of a mass movement towards unification. Still, they directed their message towards politicians and were certainly, by no coincidence, chaired by people of prominence, mostly former ministers or prime ministers. While the ambition was to attract people across political divides, some organisations attracted more conservatives and others more liberals. In addition, the Christian Democrat Party had its 'Nouvelles Equipes Internationales', while the 'Movement for the Socialist States of Europe' appealed to the anti-Stalinist left.

No doubt, the call for European unity had considerable appeal; it was supported by broad public interest in rebuilding Europe along more peaceful lines with the purpose of facilitating life on the continent. The message was clear enough, but the design of its implementation less so. Obvious questions concerned the extent of the cooperation – or more bluntly, how much power the European bodies could claim and how much sovereignty the nation states would relinquish. Some urged a federal state while others wanted a looser union. The way forward would be to focus on attractive proposals, or at least on compromises that could be deemed acceptable from both standpoints. In all this, the concept of integration was critical, and we will return to this in the concluding section of this chapter.

The Congress of Europe in May 1948 presents us with a snapshot of the call for European unification. It was only one of many meetings and congresses held by Europeanist groups in those years, but it was the largest one and was framed as a way of building momentum and symbolically beginning a process towards unification: 'Isn't our ambition the highest? To build a world of peace, freedom, and social justice, and, in doing so, cement the first stones in making Europe!'[91] An organising committee was formed by most of the organisations mentioned above, but without the participation of the Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe. Former prime ministers and foreign secretaries as well as up-and-coming state leaders attended the unofficial gathering in The Hague. Both Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan attended from the UK, Altiero Spinelli from Italy, Valéry

Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterrand from France, Konrad Adenauer and Walter Hallstein (who was to become the first president of the European Commission) from the Bundesrepublik Germany, and Hendrik Brugmans from Belgium. Apart from these, there were many intellectuals and others interested in initiating European action and setting up committees, representatives from the industrial sector and trade unions, as well as people from diverse professions. Churchill told the congress that it 'may fairly claim to be the voice of Europe'.[92] Among the most notable in attendance were Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Salvador de Madariaga, Denis de Rougement, the French scholar Raymond Aron, the Polish writer Joseph H. Retinger, and the British philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell. The Dutch Parliament buildings were the venue of the congress, which was supported by the Dutch government. In his opening address, Winston Churchill recalled a unity to be found in 'the glorious treasures of literature, of romance, of ethics, of thought and toleration belonging to all, which is the true inheritance of Europe, the expression of its genius and honour', which goes beyond frontiers and barriers. By celebrating these resources, he suggested, Europe would erase its divisions.[93] At that time, only three years after the war in Europe had ended, the search for higher purposes and spiritual values was underway. Churchill called for 'the larger hope for humanity', and Coudenhove-Kalergi for 'the dignity of the human person', which he found in Greek individualism, and for 'generous help for those in need'. The Dutch socialist Hendrik Brugmans declared Europe to be 'a sense of freedom'.[94]

Churchill and his inaugural addresses invoked a European unity that contrasted with the contemporary threats of communism and the Iron Curtain posed by the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as with the wreckage of a devastating war. The desire was to learn from the mistakes after the First World War, 'when the slogan of the right of self-determination of the smaller nations was greatly in vogue in the whole of Europe', which if left unchecked, 'could only lead to the suicidal tendencies of military and economic autarky, which we have known indeed'.[95] It is not surprising that peace and a better standard of living were held up as objectives for a more united Europe, along with the security that comes with rule of law. We can recognise similarities to the interwar period, with reference to Ortega y Gasset, Huizinga and Rauschning, and themes such as nihilism, decline and crisis. Unification was seen as the one option that could rescue European civilisation.[96]

The event was widely recognised, being called 'a monumental moment for public opinion', according to an editorial in *The Times* on 10 May 1948.[97] In attendance were 250 journalists, reporting on the nearly 750 delegates from sixteen countries with various political views – conservative, liberal and socialist – including representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and

trade unions. Half of the delegates came from France and Great Britain, and none came from the Central and East European countries behind the Iron Curtain. An additional forty observers came from ten countries, most from Central and Eastern Europe, but also four from the United States and two from Canada; there were no delegates from Spain (but four observers who lived in exile), and no Portuguese at all. The symbolism of the congress was obvious, especially when Churchill welcomed a large German delegation in his opening speech, given in a former occupied country and in the same town as the peace conferences that occurred between 1899 and 1907. The negotiations reportedly lasted until after midnight, taking dramatic turns, but in the end managing to overcome disputes. One witness reported to a British journal that 'indeed agreement was not reached without difficulty, without late sessions, and without considerable concessions being made'.[98] In the journal *Merkur*, Germans could read about 'contradictory conceptions that clashed several times', before common ground was finally attained.[99]

Looking at the list of inaugural speakers, we see only men, and few women spoke in committee sessions. In fact, under 4 per cent of the delegates and observers were women. Most of these came from political parties and Europeanist organisations, but some represented women's organisations. They did take part in certain discussions, especially bringing up issues related to displaced war refugees and youth education.[100] One of the very few to be heard in the cultural committee negotiations was Claire Saunier, who raised the issue of women being half of the European population in relation to youth education and the role of mothers – matters addressed in the final resolution.[101] In the final plenary session, and on behalf of the female delegates at the congress, she declared that they were not feminists, and stressed that women were part of the European family, together with their husbands and children.[102] Another delegate, Hilda Vermeij-Jonker, who was the first Dutch woman to present a dissertation in sociology and a leading socialist, raised the issue of displaced intellectuals, but she was seen as radical when demanding economic and social equality between the sexes.[103] Regardless, Europeanism mainly came together under the traditional view that a woman's place and role was in the family.

There were mentions of a 'United States of Europe', similar to the United States, a 'United Europe', and a 'European Union', and discussion of the extent and meaning of these notions. However, arguments for a European nation or a European state were rejected in the discussion, and another option was proposed: a federation of existing states that, although they differed in character, had in common that they were democracies and abided by the rule of law. A witness concluded that perhaps 'we have got to work out some new form of association which will neither conform to the patterns of previous Federations or Confederations – something [that] is

suited to the special condition of Europe'.[104] In the end, the delegates sent a 'Message to Europeans' about the dangers of being divided: 'Alone, no one of our countries can hope seriously to defend its independence. Alone, no one of our countries can solve the economic problems of today'.[105] The delegates agreed on adopting resolutions that called for common political and economic action by transferring and merging some sovereignty from the independent states. Obviously, the understanding of European unification as creating something beyond historical and existing orders was already in the air.

The Congress of Europe had some immediate outcomes: one was the formation that autumn of the European Movement to gather all relevant groups, and another was to establish a European Centre for Culture in Geneva, led by de Rougemont. To some surprise, the declarations had more to offer than expected. Although he came to The Hague with low expectations, the conservative economist Arthur Salter concluded that the declarations had 'more substance in them than I should have thought possible in the circumstances'.[106] Perhaps the resolution with the most direct political bearing was the call for a European Assembly. Two years later, this resulted in the creation of the Council of Europe.[107] Moreover, the final resolutions addressed important issues in ways that foreshadowed later developments: the union would be open to all European democratic states and, perhaps most important, that 'the sole solution of the economic and political problems of Germany is its integration in a federated Europe'. We can see tensions familiar to us today in how the resolutions were worded then: independent states versus an energetic European political body, cultural unity versus diversity and national cultures, a European conscience versus the writing of national history and the educational systems of the states. The discussion of how to design the necessary institutions was also familiar, concerning, for example, what steps should be taken, and the speed at which it would be possible to realise European unity.

The participants had in mind a European unity beyond state borders. On the political committee, Countess Jean de Suzannet contended that the unification was fundamental to protecting 'our civilisation' and 'our moral and democratic values' with their freedoms and rights.[108] R.W.G. Mackay, a Labour MP who chaired a cross-party group of British parliamentarians in favour of European unity, eloquently asked the nation states to sacrifice some of their sovereignty and transfer it in favour of a 'larger sovereignty which can alone protect their diverse and distinctive customs and characteristics, and their national traditions'.[109] For Jo Josephy, chair of a Europeanist committee in Britain, it was important that there be an elected federal authority representing the European people, not the states, with the principle of one person one vote.[110] On the economic and social committee,

Arthur Salter took an approach that foreshadowed the strategy later used by the European Community and then the European Economic Community, by beginning with some financial and economic bodies to meet immediate challenges. These could gradually develop, 'acquiring by delegation of sovereignty and authority from the constituent members so much power as will, without any sudden break, enable international authorities to be constituted'.[111] Salter's personal history is telling. During and after the First World War he worked with Jean Monnet in the coordinating administration of the Allies, and during the Second World War he tried to convince the Allies to establish a supranational European government, again with Monnet.[112]

In the speeches and discussions in the cultural committee, the delegates disavowed nationalism but aligned themselves with the nations and peoples of Europe. They found unity in a legacy of cultural values grounded mainly in Christianity and humanism, as well as in a common belief in the inalienable rights of man. The role of Christianity was much debated on the cultural committee when the original draft of the resolution was criticised for not including it. We should remember that the congress included delegates from churches, the Holy See, and leaders of the emerging Christian Democratic parties, such as Adenauer and Robert Schuman, who used their Europeanness in defence of Western civilisation, embracing the notion of a Western Christianity of medieval origin that represented a higher spiritual community beyond materialism and nationalism, which juxtaposed fascism and communism.[113] Eventually, the accepted resolution referred to 'the common heritage of Christian and other spiritual and cultural values'.[114] The discussion illustrated how close the concept of Europe was to that of European exceptionalism – illustrated, for example, by the German delegate Christine Teusch's claim that human dignity and freedom were established in Europe by Christianity.[115] Indeed, the French professor of medieval philosophy Étienne Gilson was wary of letting Christianity define Europe, as it did not originate in Europe and was widespread outside Europe. Instead he turned to universalism: 'I think we should remember . . . that if there is a Western tradition of culture, its secret lies in its desire for universality, not in the desire to make the world believe that what is European is ipso jure universal, but on the contrary in the desire to affirm the world and to vigorously maintain that all that is universal is European ipso jure'.[116] It was possible for Europe and its culture to represent the interests of everyone in the world, and this could be a source of universality, but Gilson was careful not to confuse this with supremacy: 'We don't want to flatter ourselves with a European culture that would be superior to non-European cultures', but on the other hand, 'we have no intention of decreeing the universality of European culture'. Still, European culture became connected with universalism

because in 'this desire for universalism, open to all to give and to receive, resides our only peculiarity'.[117]

Recently, research has confirmed that a certain relationship between the concept of Europe and colonialism prevailed during the period, influencing programmes for economic cooperation and negotiations on unification, even up to the Treaty of Rome. At the Congress of Europe in The Hague, there was no discussion of national independence for the European colonies. Instead, the close connections with Europe's 'overseas territories' were recognised as important reasons to unify, not least in order to maintain control of resources and economic development.[118] The renowned economist Arthur Salter saw Europe's colonies as opportunities for investment and a way to balance the power of the United States.[119] Furthermore, the call for unification came with Eurocentrism. Speakers such as the resistance fighter and Gaullist politician Raymond Triboulet proclaimed that Europe was a model for the rest of the world, so it was up to Europe to address the malaise that had caused the war and to find a way to overcome the crisis.[120] The congress adopted a 'Message to Europeans' that claimed a new global mission: namely, to set an example, establish world peace, and ensure individual rights and obligations. Europe was crucial for human dignity and freedom in the world, and a union would have to happen 'not only for the salvation of liberties we have won, but also for the extension of their benefits to all mankind. Europe's destiny and the world's peace depend on this union'.[121] Thus, by uniting itself, Europe would be taking on a new mission of civilising the world.

However, claims of European exceptionalism and superiority were not in the mind of every delegate. Bertrand Russell argued that the Europeans were not at all exceptional regarding freedom and tolerance. Quite the opposite: 'We have learned tolerance only with very great difficulty, whereas in other parts of the world – in China, India, among Mahometans – you find a much greater readiness for tolerance'. Russell encouraged the delegates to stop stressing the superiority of Europe in envisaging unity.[122] The Swiss delegate Ernest von Schenk, a leading member of the European Union of Federalists, told the cultural committee that if one looked at what European heritage had accomplished, it was nothing to be proud of, adding that Christianity could still be the basis for a new crusade and that the main issue would be to 'overcome militarism and totalitarianism in Europe'. Indeed, he cautioned the congress to take care when talking about Europe as representing humanitarian interests.[123]

In general, Europeanism entailed controversies concerning both European exceptionalism and supremacy. At the Congress of Europe, colonialism was not a focus of the discussions, mainly because the radical socialists were absent. Initially, some Europeanist leftists from Labour and the continental

socialist and social democratic parties stood against what they considered to be Churchill's capitalist unification of Europe. Even before Churchill's Zurich speech, the economist André Philip, who also served briefly as the minister of finance in the French socialist government, took the initiative to gather anti-imperialistic and anti-Stalinist Europeanists in the Movement for the Socialist United States of Europe.[124] Historian Anne-Isabelle Richard has recognised this as the main group of Europeanists who supported decolonisation.[125] With its aim of uniting Europe to create a third power in world politics, the Movement for the Socialist United States of Europe called for meetings and conferences starting in 1946 until they also joined the European Movement several months after the Congress of Europe. Their conferences included representatives from the resistance movements, the European Union of Federalists, and colonial independence movements. Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were core themes, although the debates revealed a certain patronising sensibility vis-à-vis the colonies. The national independence of the colonies was frequently paired with the European need for their raw materials, the advances made by European civilisation that the colonies had yet to reach, and discussions of the 'primitive races of Africa' and feudal nations in the East. Anne-Isabelle Richard has concluded that joining the other Europeanist organisations was a sign that they prioritised European unification at the expense of anti-colonialism and their previous efforts to establish a socialist Europe.[126] Moreover, it confirmed the sense of European exceptionalism and a European prerogative in the world; it also confirmed the tensions within the European movement regarding imperialism, the independence of the colonies, and European supremacy.

European Unification and Integration

The fundamental distinction that developed in the early post-Second World War period meant that Europeanism encompassed both the conception of a European culture and that of European nations. As we have seen, this way of looking at Europe was made possible by opposing nationalism while maintaining confidence in the nation state. It became widespread among Europeanists and in reflecting on Europe's future. Nevertheless, this distinction was not enough to make European unity suitable for the post-war period, as Europeanists had to balance unity with national interests. The question of what this balance should be like remained.

As we saw in the previous section, decline and nihilism were concepts continuously referred to in discourses on European unity in order to gain an understanding of the political and economic situation. Colonialism and economic progress could be rescued by halting the decline. The Belgian

socialist Paul-Henri Spaak wrote that Europe was threatened by decline and that it could only be salvaged by uniting.[127] At the Congress of Europe, inaugural speeches and committee discussions referred to the threat of nihilism and stressed that European civilisation was doomed if its self-destructive tendencies were not controlled.[128] It was in the context of crisis, decline and nihilism that the concept of integration entered the discourse. In due time, it would advance to become a central tenet of the political language of European unification, and would come to characterise the European unification of the post-war decades. In fact, during the initial introduction of the integration concept, it was already possible to discern the central place it would eventually inhabit.

In Germany, the theme of Europe was brought up by some influential professors who had been dismissed from their universities during the reign of the National Socialists and then been reinstalled. Among these academics, a United States of Europe that included both the Central and West European countries was declared as the only alternative to nihilism.[129] The economist Alfred Weber regarded nihilism as the fundamental reason behind the catastrophe, and considered it to be a European way of thinking and attitude that had since spread worldwide.[130] Of crucial importance to the post-war concept of European unity, Weber prescribed integration as the cure for nihilism.

Although Weber seemed to be the first person after the war to talk about integration, it was already being considered in the interwar intellectual debate. The idea of the economy as a means to tie the European countries together was already on the agenda by 1930, although the main postulated means was cooperation. However, economists soon used the concept of economic integration to depict the prerequisites for the European economy to connect its industries, concentrated in a few countries, with the vast areas that provided the raw materials.[131] Economists argued that with the establishment of new state borders, along with continuing interdependence and the need to trade across these borders, there was a great need for economic integration to address the situation.[132] In 1945, the integration concept was launched by Weber as an item on the agenda for rebuilding Europe and, in particular, for establishing a civilised order in Germany. The argument was that Germany would need raw materials from other countries for its industry, and that it would be in the best interest of other countries in Europe to sell raw materials to Germany.[133]

Alfred Weber should be seen as a representative of the resistance to Nazi unity who upheld the idea of European unity. From early in his career, he noted a cultural decline of the West. During the Weimar Republic, he publicly criticised antisemitism and fascism, not least the latter's celebration of expansionism and heroism. He condemned those who advocated

nationalism, considered Europe to be organically culturally united, and served as the vice president of the European Cultural League, where intellectuals strove to establish 'a common European consciousness'. In a speech given in November 1932 entitled 'The Crisis of the European Man', he begged for a radical change of values to avoid militarism and war, and to provide the groundwork for a united Europe. Still living in Germany, he was not publicly outspoken after 1933, but he did invite former students to his home for political discussions in which he was frank enough about the Nazi regime to frighten them. During the war he belonged to a local resistance group and passed on news he picked up from British radio broadcasts to fellow resisters. At the age of 77, he entered politics following the downfall of the Nazi regime in Germany. By the spring of 1945, he had already begun to help the Americans to assemble regional authorities. He then produced several memoranda on economic recovery for the Allied authorities. He founded civil initiatives for a new democratic order, fought for political reform, and wrote articles demanding a new German character: German citizens had previously been characterised by their loyalty, lack of civil courage, and ruthlessness, but now they would be asked to commit to freedom, responsibility, humanity, and an ability to make good judgements. As one of the new deans, he made sure that no one formerly affiliated with the National Socialists could hold a position at the University of Heidelberg. He saw Germany's economic integration in Europe and European unification as the best means to overcome the devastating aftermath of nationalism. However, this was not enough: Europe had experienced its worst crisis ever and was still in danger of seeing integrated social life replaced with nihilism and chaos. The war was over but the threat of nihilism remained rooted in technological civilisation and bureaucratisation, which could only be cured by cultural revitalisation and the advent of a novel democratic citizenry.[134] Certainly, Weber wanted a new Germany and a new Europe, and this kind of conceptual framing placed him in company with other Europeanists who had also begun to talk about integration.

The dramatic decline of Europe was also a main theme for Barbara Ward, economist and journalist for *The Economist*. In her extensive 1948 article on a Western European Union, *The West at Bay*, she observed: 'It is either association or decadence'. When considering what was at stake economically, she observed the 'experiments in integration' in the branches of steel, electricity and transport – for example, a European transport commission that began to operate in 1945 with the purpose of pooling transport facilities in the chaos after the breakdown of Germany. From such examples she concluded that 'integration in certain fields of Western European activity was not as distant as is sometimes supposed'. Ward helped to apply the integration concept to technical cooperation, which promised to achieve 'the

integration of . . . different branches on an international basis'. This would serve 'the purpose of widening the basis of Western European economy', to counter the decline by following the example of the United States with only one currency, no barriers to trade, and freedom of movement for both people and money within its borders.[135]

After the war, the concept of integration was applied with different meanings to different situations. The initial steps taken at the Congress of Europe in 1948 can serve as an example. At this event, 'European unity' was the key phrase, while the word 'integration' was only occasionally used. To begin with, the congress addressed the advantage of sharing resources. A suggestion was made in the morning session on the first day of political committee negotiations to alter the paragraph on the political resolution regarding the urgency of the European nations 'jointly exercis[ing] some part of the sovereign rights . . . so as to secure a common political and economic action for the integration and proper development of their common resources'.[136] This motion was passed and included in the English version of the congress's political resolution. In the afternoon session from the same day, the term 'integration' was mentioned in passing by three British delegates when discussing the need for an emergency council that 'should plan the subsequent stages of the political and economic integration of Europe'.[137] Clearly, they wanted to address a development that had already experienced coordination efforts, such as the American-controlled Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC, 1946), and the Economic Recovery Plan known best as the Marshall Plan (presented in June 1947 and established in April 1948), which at the time included sixteen countries for the purpose of economic recovery. Discussions took place between France and Italy regarding a customs union, the founding of the Benelux Customs Union, and the Brussels Treaty (which in March 1948 created the Western Union for Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Defence). However, the delegates also wanted to move on to further initiatives, envisaging a process of integration. In the session starting late on Sunday at 10.30 PM, the committee used the word 'integration' once again, now closely related to the issue of Germany. How could Germany's large production capacity be directed towards something other than military campaigns against its neighbours, and how could democratic development inside Germany be monitored and fostered? Some delegates, not least the German and French ones, reasoned that '*l'intégration de l'Allemagne dans la Fédération européenne est une necessité*' (the integration of Germany into the European Federation is a necessity), following the reasoning of Weber, who was cited by name.[138] In the English version of the final resolution, it was rephrased as 'the integration of Germany in a United or Federated Europe alone provides a solution to both the economic and political aspects of the

German problem'.[139] Obviously, the term 'integration' had a minor role in the political language of the Congress of Europe, underscored by the French version of the resolution, which used the word '*coordonner*' in one paragraph and omitted it altogether in the other. When used, integration connoted a rational economic order, a solution to the problem posed by Germany, and referred to a process leading towards European unity. Integration was not proposed as a goal, although it was presented along with many other similar suggestions. Weber, Ward, and the Congress of Europe saw integration not as a concept encompassing the lofty visions of unity, union and federation, but rather as something that addressed the practical questions and contested issues at hand.

Integration was a concept that meshed with the ambitions of political leaders hoping to find a path towards unification. It had reached the OEEC by October 1949, when the American director of Marshall Plan aid called for 'an integration of the Western European Economy' with 'the formation of a single market within which quantitative restriction on the movements of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments and, eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept away'.[140] Although not explicitly mentioned, the idea worked well for politicians who were ready to relinquish some of the sovereignty of their countries. Integration was a concept that suited such aims, but it did not dominate the rhetoric in the 1950s and had no significant place in the Treaty of Rome, which was signed in 1957. Yet, a description of the venture as 'European integration' was accepted, starting in the early 1950s.[141] The term found a place in political language, where it would eventually become emblematic, and was significantly illustrative of the post-war mindset. It signified practical issues and pragmatic solutions, while still upholding far-reaching visions. When Konrad Adenauer associated 'European integration' with the cooperation between the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe and an extended understanding between France and Germany, he explained 'that this integration of Europe must be achieved if we want to rescue the Occidental culture and European Christianity'.[142] Robert Schuman talked about integration as a functional method that prioritised technical sectors without being at the centre of political controversies. Thus, he considered 'the coal and steel plan . . . a symbol of European political unity' that 'created an atmosphere in which integration can develop further'.[143] Another important aspect of the concept of integration was that it treated national particularism as a precondition, while still complying with the idea of keeping the European countries close to one another, both to prevent war and to overcome the obstacles facing the economy. Surprisingly, integration was seen as signifying the acceptance of nation states and even as a pledge to retain them, while it was also a way to remedy the conceived nihilism of an international order that set no limits on the nation states.

In a speech given by one of Germany's new leaders at the University of Bonn in 1951, the Christian Democrat Karl Arnold once again defined Hitler as 'a phenomenon of modern nihilism', with no sense of ethics, and whose only ideal was retaining power. Based on this and other previous failures of the German national project to bring peace and freedom to its citizens, Arnold declared that the classical notion of nation-state sovereignty was outdated; the time had come to acknowledge Europe as a fatherland, and to transfer the rights of state and interstate facilities to a European body. Declarations like Arnold's were also heard from politicians in Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, and they were made in response to economic decline and political crisis. The idea was to give up national sovereignty in certain areas, such as defence and the economy, but not in others. Federalists went further and demanded a European political community, for example, when the Italian government of de Gasperi argued that the renunciation of national sovereignty should be followed by the creation of a European Assembly, or when Hendrik Brugmans suggested that a federal Europe could be a coherent alternative when nation states were 'becoming increasingly bureaucratic and centralised'.[144] But going this far was strongly rejected by the French leaders, and the focus turned to economic integration.[145] The history of the integration is well known, but it should be noted that it all took place against the background of perceived threats of decline, crisis and nihilism. Some of the leading politicians were outspoken, while others mentioned integration as one of the costs of internal progress and the price that Europe had to pay to prevent the recurring wars between Germany and France. It was also mentioned that Europe had lost its leading position in the world as a consequence of its divisions and conflicts, the new threat of communism in Eastern Europe, and nationalism in the colonies. However, this pessimistic background was countered by a new sense of optimism, hope, and a belief in European values.

In sum, the concept of integration advanced the political language so as to facilitate further advances of unification. Clearly, integration was more obscure a notion than that of a union or federation. It called for negotiation and would not be easily attained, once and for all. Europeanists married the concept of integration with the concept of European, which was crucial. The concept of integration emphasised the continuity with historical exchanges between states, organisations and people across European borders. It applied to sentiments of cultural unity as well as to national feelings, to the quest to establish shared standards and administrative measures, but also to the development of the nation state. Integration reinforced the closeness between the construction of the EC and the will to strengthen the nation state. Federal aspects were legitimated by national self-interest: Germany was not a threat to its neighbours, and small states found better conditions for their

existence. The fear of decline was met with prospects of economic progress, and French hopes of regaining former glory intermingled with German efforts to re-enter Europe.[146] All of this was made possible by the distinction between nation and nationalism, the connected issue of sovereignty, and the concept of integration.

Simultaneously, the concept of European integration served to hide internal divisions between nations as well as aims that were not included, or were even contrary, to the Council of Europe's Declaration of Human Rights and to the values proclaimed in the Treaty of Rome. The approach to integration concealed the persistent colonialism and lingering ambitions to revive old imperialism or make Europe a world power. Throughout the 1950s, the overseas territories were mostly included in unification policies, as was the shameless assertion of cultural superiority.

In the context of unification, we find many international cooperation initiatives. Political parties established networks and set up international bureaus, some even reaching behind the Iron Curtain.[147] Hundreds of organisations were introduced as forums for cooperation in Western Europe. The United States formed some, including NATO, OECD, GATT, and the Bretton Woods bodies, which included non-governmental players such as the Ford Foundation. Others were set up for experts such as the Union for the Coordination of the Production and Transport of Electricity (UCPTE) beginning in 1951, and the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) to coordinate transportation, formed in 1953 by sixteen countries and without supranational aspirations. With a transnational approach, recent research on the wide range of cooperation initiatives in Europe in the late 1940s and 1950s rejects the view that the EC was a unique venture, instead viewing it as one of many transnational ventures. A parallel technological Europeanisation took place with the standardisation and interconnection of networks.[148] It is worth noting that such cooperation would not infringe on national control. In the electricity sector, the aim was to create the Western European Pool.[149] Reflecting different notions of European unification, sixteen states founded the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) in 1959, establishing an organisation independent of its members with the aim of establishing a supranational status. Such technological Europeanisation indicates the need to distance historical writing from the standard EC/EU approach, and to apply contextual dimensions and longer historical perspectives. Obviously, historian Kiran Klaus Patel's conclusion makes considerable sense, in that what made the EC stand out in contrast to other coordination enterprises was the way it held itself to a higher standard and represented a new option for Europe, not least by endorsing itself as a guarantor of peace and prosperity.[150]

These were the days of combining visions of European unity with the founding of European institutions. Pamphlets were distributed and appeals were published in newspapers and journals. There was the Stikker Plan and the Schuman Declaration. At the regional scale were the Benelux Union and the Nordic Council. There was the Council of Europe, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OECD), and the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. While West European leaders were clearly in favour of unification, they remained divided and unclear as to what kind of unity they wanted. British politicians fostered hopes of being a third global superpower and, starting around 1950, made it clear that they wished to keep their full sovereignty, which put them on track for intergovernmental cooperation. The British media had signalled their wish to be separate from the rest of Europe since the late 1940s, associating the continent with wars and chaos, in contrast to the tolerance, civility and stability of Great Britain.[151] Instead, the French, German and Italian political leaders and parties generally thought it necessary to relinquish some of their sovereignty but differed as to which parts and how much to let go.

With the formation of the Council of Europe in 1949, which included most of the European states, one piece was finally in place, but it could not solve the immediate problems that demanded the relinquishment of sovereignty. However, a deep crisis in the coal and steel industry had begun, which led to the establishment of the more exclusive European Coal and Steel Community in the Paris Treaty of 1951 with its High Authority, which was a supranational executive mechanism, as well as the European Court of Justice. These proved to be the initial pieces that were needed. Meanwhile, the Benelux countries had already created a union, and de Gaspari's Italian government suggested the European Political Community. However, stumbling blocks were in the way. In Germany, formation of a European community was questioned, in fear that it might prevent reunification with its Eastern part; and the Soviet Union opposed a Western European Union, which they conceived as a military threat. The quest for a European Defence Community failed to pass the French National Assembly by a small margin in 1954, with the opposition afraid the French would not retain control of their military forces. Military cooperation emerged in its place, along with the Western European Union, but remained quite insignificant. The European Atomic Community was more successful. Behind all these efforts lay the history of Europe's crisis and decline, and the fear of a new wave of German nationalism, together with the potential economic and military opportunities presented by unification. As NATO came into being in 1955, the focus of European unity turned towards the economy. Germany strove for economic recovery, and its Western partners needed a strong German economy to push their own

economies out of their trajectories of decline.[152] It is important to note that the focus on the economy had widespread appeal, as the Christian Democratic Italian prime minister de Gasperi noted in a speech: a European Union's 'ecclesiastical frontiers and frontiers of thought and culture raise no barriers, as may be seen at these international meetings where we find ourselves side by side with socialists, free thinkers, and – oddly enough – trade union representatives. Why? Because the necessity of obtaining an expanded market and the free circulation of labour, of overcoming economic frontiers, impels us all irresistibly'.[153] Indeed, the economic motivation offered a way forward.

In 1957, the six founding states signed the Treaty of Rome and formed the European Economic Community (EEC) with a common market, while in 1960, Austria, Great Britain, Portugal, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries chose the more modest track of economic coordination with lower trade tariffs on certain products. At the time, sentiments were lukewarm in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries towards European unification, but this would gradually change. The EEC developed into the European Community, and the European Union developed the integration project and attracted new members. The 1950s have been seen as a decisive period in European history, and this view is justifiable with regard to the launching of the EEC and EC, and subsequently the EU; finally, after dreaming of European unity for so long, something of that kind was about to materialise.

In this book and this chapter, the focus has been on the concept of Europe. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the idea of European cultural unity remained strong and was connected to the possibility of economic and political unification. The notions of European crisis, decline and nihilism were stressed, together with the view that Europe had lost its position as a world leader to the United States and the Soviet Union, while the concept of Europe and European ideas still embraced colonial sentiments and paternalistic attitudes towards overseas European subjects. The perceived threat of the Soviet Union coincided with a general fear of communism. America was the stronghold, though Europe was distinct from both superpowers. There was considerable fear of nationalism, and pressure to resolve the German question. The distinction between nation and nationalism, which supported retreating from the promise of nation-state sovereignty, also facilitated fusing demands for European unification with the concept of integration. If a country abstained from nationalism, it was then possible to focus on the development and welfare of one's own nation using European integration, allowing European unification to happen organically through nations coming together. As a result, visionary ideals were combined with practical

action. Outspoken idealism was connected with pragmatism in practice. Importantly, the concept of Europe associated itself with both unity *and* borders within Europe.

Notes

1. See, e.g., Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*; Meinecke, *Die deutsche Katastrophe*.
2. Cf. Ighe, 'Never Mind Patriarchy'.
3. Stråth, *Europe's Utopias of Peace*, 363.
4. Lipgens, *Documents on European Integration*.
5. Milward, *Rescue of the Nation-State*.
6. Forlenza, 'Politics of the Abendland', 261–86.
7. Benda, 'Conférence du 2 septembre', 5–9.
8. Spender, 'Conférence du 11 septembre', 267–69.
9. Benda, *L'esprit européen*, 162, 298, 347, 383.
10. Bernanos, 'Conférence du 12 septembre 1946', 351.
11. Benda, 'Conférence du 2 septembre', 36–38.
12. Flora, 'Conférence du 2 septembre', 39–45, 65.
13. Eliot, *Definition of Culture*, 120–22.
14. Ortega y Gasset, 'De Europa meditatio quaedam'; Ortega y Gasset, 'Gibt es ein europäisches Kulturbewusstsein?'; Gray, *The Imperative of Modernity*, 339–42; Berlanga, 'Europa hora cero'.
15. Hewitson, 'Inventing Europe', 65.
16. Rauschning, *Time of Delirium*, 355.
17. Jaspers, *Der philosophische Glaube*, 103.
18. Jaspers, *Europa der Gegenwart*, 38–40.
19. Ibid., 8–28.
20. Bess, *Realism, Utopia, Mushroom Cloud*, 4–21, quotation from 17.
21. Schmale, 'Before Self-Reflexivity'.
22. Reynold, *La Formation*.
23. Flora, 'Conférence du 2 septembre', 40.
24. Spender, 'Conférence du 11 septembre', 267–72, 289–90.
25. Ward, *The West at Bay*.
26. Ortega y Gasset, 'De Europa meditatio quaedam', quoted from Gray, *The Imperative of Modernity*, 339–41.
27. Madariaga, *Portrait of Europe*, 204.
28. Rougemont, *Man's Western Quest*.
29. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Die europäische Nation*, 9–10, 145.
30. Rougemont, 'Conférence du 8 septembre', 172–97.
31. From Rougemont's quotations of Eliot: Rougemont, *Idea of Europe*, 429–31.
32. Aron, 'Old Nations, New Europe', 53.
33. Ortega y Gasset, 'Gibt es europäisches Kulturbewusstsein?'
34. From Rougemont's quotations of Ernst Jünger: Rougemont, *Idea of Europe*, 427–29.
35. From Rougemont's quotations of Jean-Paul Sartre: Rougemont, *Idea of Europe*, 433–34.
36. Madariaga, 'That European River'.
37. Eliade, 'Von der Unteilberheit Europas'.
38. Fornäs, *Signifying Europe*, 105.
39. Madariaga, *Victors, Beware*, 158–59.

40. Delanty, 'Europe and "Unity in Diversity"'.
41. Carr, *Jaspers as Intellectual Critic*, 71–72.
42. Dubreuil, 'Personalism of Denis Rougemont', 205.
43. Mannheim, *Sociology of Knowledge*, 276–320.
44. See WorldCat: www.worldcat.org. In, e.g. Swedish, we find Jaspers with his discussion of German guilt in 1947, Madariaga's six titles between 1938 and 1951, including one novel, literary criticism, and political writings, de Rougemont with his critique of fascism and communism in 1952, and Stephen Spender only in 1957 with his autobiography.
45. Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper?*, 92–97, 115–20, 142, 329, 394–95.
46. The other honorary chairs were Jacques Maritain, Reinhold Niebuhr and Bertrand Russell; the secretary-general was Nicolas Nabokov.
47. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, 9, 31, 53, 95.
48. Llobera, 'Visions of Europe'.
49. Benda, *Discourse à la nation européenne*.
50. Spender, *European Witness*, 23–24.
51. Ibid., 94–97.
52. Rougemont, *Man's Western Quest*, 148–66, quotation from 166.
53. Madariaga, *Essays with a Purpose*, 12–15.
54. Jaspers, *Europa der Gegenwart*, 17–18, 35–36.
55. Madariaga, *Essays with a Purpose*, 3–5.
56. De Rougemont, 'Denis de Rougemont, 8 septembre 1946', 179–84.
57. Spender, 'Conférence du 11 septembre'.
58. Jaspers, *Europa der Gegenwart*, 1–56.
59. Spender, 'Conférence du 11 septembre', 271, 287–89.
60. Rougemont, *The Last Trump*, 128.
61. Jaspers, *Die Atombombe*.
62. Jaspers, *Europa der Gegenwart*, 34–36, 56.
63. Rougemont, 'Conférence du 8 septembre', 181–83; Spender, 'Conférence du 11 septembre', 269, 276.
64. Rougemont, 'Conférence du 8 septembre', 181–83; de Rougemont, 'Die Krankheit'.
65. Spender, 'Conférence du 11 septembre', 267–72, 279.
66. Ibid., 283–87.
67. Madariaga, *Portrait of Europe*, 17–25.
68. Madariaga, *Essays with a Purpose*, 12–15.
69. Jaspers, *Europa der Gegenwart*, 37. On Jaspers' view of greatness, see especially his extensive introduction, 'Über Grossheit', to Jaspers, *Die grossen Philosophen*.
70. Rougemont, *The Last Trump*, 90–91.
71. Rougemont, 'Conférence du 8 septembre', 185–93.
72. Madariaga, *Democracy versus Liberty?*, 4–13. The book is a translation of the second part of Madariaga's *De l'angoisse á la liberté* from 1954.
73. Spender, 'Conférence du 11 septembre', 279.
74. Jaspers, *Europa der Gegenwart*, 34–42, quotation from 38: 'Menschen sich gegenseitig freilassen und in gegenseitigen Betroffenheit aneinander teilnehmen'.
75. Spender, 'Conférence du 11 septembre', 279–81.
76. Rougemont, 'Conférence du 8 septembre'; Rougemont, 'Die Krankheit'.
77. Madariaga, *Victors, Beware*, 152–59.
78. Spender, *European Witness*, 93.
79. Spender, 'Conférence du 11 septembre', 281–82.
80. Rougemont, 'Conférence du 8 septembre', 189–92, 197; Rougemont, *The Last Trump*, 104–15, quotation from 110.
81. Rougemont, *Man's Western Quest*, 157, 177–79.

82. Rougemont, 'Die Krankheit'.
83. Madariaga, *Victors, Beware*, 152–59.
84. Berlin, *Sense of Reality*.
85. Madariaga, *Victors, Beware*, 152–59.
86. Madariaga, *Portrait of Europe*, 1–6.
87. Madariaga, *Portrait of Europe*, 9–16.
88. Madariaga, *Portrait of Europe*, 156. See also Madariaga, *The World's Design*.
89. Daniels, 'Europe and the Swiss System'.
90. Churchill, 'The Tragedy of Europe'.
91. *Congress of Europe*, 31: 'Notre ambition n'est-elle pas la plus haute? Construire un monde de paix, de liberté et de justice sociale, et, pour cela, cimenter les premiéres pierras en faisant l'Europe!'
92. Ibid., 8.
93. Ibid., 5.
94. Ibid., 11, 16.
95. Ibid., 5.
96. Ibid., 16.
97. Quoted from Walton, 'The Hague "Congress of Europe"'.
98. Roberts, 'Towards European Unity'.
99. Grewe, 'Europa-Kongress in Haag'.
100. E.g., Tory MP Lady Grant; see *Congress of Europe*, 215–16.
101. *Congress of Europe*, 334.
102. Ibid., 31.
103. Ibid., 203–4.
104. Roberts, 'Towards European Unity', 174–77.
105. *Europe Unites*, 94.
106. Quotation from Aster, *Power, Policy and Personality*, 524.
107. Guerrieri, 'From the Hague Congress'.
108. *Congress of Europe*, 87.
109. Ibid., 50–51. Regarding Mackay and the contestations within Labour on the European idea and the Congress of Europe, see Grantham, 'Labour and "Congress of Europe"'.
110. *Congress of Europe*, 74.
111. Ibid., 176.
112. Aster, *Power, Policy and Personality*, 501.
113. Forlenza, 'The Politics of the Abendland'.
114. *European Unites*, 88.
115. *Congress of Europe*, 397–98.
116. Ibid., 249–50: 'Je crois que nous devrions nous souvenir . . . que s'il y a une tradition occidentale de la culture, son secret réside dans sa volonte d'universalite, non pas dans la volonté do faire croire au mondo que ce qui est européen est universel de plein droit, mais au contraire dans la volonté d'affirmer su monde et de maintenir énergiquement que tout ce qui est universel est européen de plein droit'.
117. *Congress of Europe*, 401: 'Nous ne voulons pas nous flatter d'une culture européenne qui serait supérieure á des cultures non-européennes; nos no voulons pas inventar une culture qui seirat bonne parce qu'elle sera européenne. Nous voulons, au contraire, que notre culture soit europeenne parce qu'elle sera bonne. Nous n'avone aucunement l'intention de décréter l'universalité de la culture européenne, mais nous considérerons comme faisant partie de la culture de l'urope tout ce qui est universel et nous dirons que tout ce qui est universel est notre, et que, dans cette volonté d'universalisme, ouvert á tous pour donner et pour recevoir, réside notre seule particularité'.
118. Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 108–11.

119. *Congress of Europe*, 176.
120. Ibid., 361–64.
121. *Europe Unites*, 94.
122. *Congress of Europe*, 332–33.
123. Ibid., 336, 360, 402–3.
124. Grantham, 'British Labour and The Hague'.
125. Richard, 'The Limits of Solidarity'.
126. Ibid.
127. Schmale, 'Before Self-Reflexivity', 194–96.
128. *Congress of Europe*, 3–5.
129. Meinecke, *Die deutsche Katastrophe*, 161. See also Jaspers, *Europa der Gegenwart*.
130. Weber, *Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte*, 13–14 (in English *Farewell to European History*). On Weber, see Heberle, 'In Memoriam: Alfred Weber'.
131. E.g., Herriot, *Europe*, 98.
132. Gaedicke and Eynern, *Die produktionswirtschaftliche Integration*. See also Machlup, *A History of Integration*, 4–6.
133. Weber, *Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte*, 234–36.
134. Demm, 'Alfred Weber und die Nationalsozialisten', 223–31. Quotation from Loader, *Weber and Crisis of Culture*, 112, see also 61–63, 159–61.
135. Ward, *The West at Bay*, 186–95.
136. *Congress of Europe*, 73.
137. Ibid., 107.
138. Ibid., 112–26, quotation from 220.
139. *Europe Unites*, 38.
140. Stråth, *Europe's Utopias of Peace*, 353–54.
141. See, e.g., how it is used in the journal *Foreign Affairs* by Mansholt, 'Toward European Integration', or by Hallstein, 'Germany's Dual Aim'.
142. Adenauer, '14 September 1951'.
143. Schuman, 'France and Europe'.
144. Brugmans, *Towards a European Government*, 28; Gasperi, 'Extract from a Speech 1952'.
145. Hewitson, 'Europe and the Fate of the World', 47.
146. Bruneteau, 'The Construction of Europe'.
147. See, e.g., Kosnicki, 'The Soviet Bloc's Answer'.
148. Patel, 'Provincialising European Union'.
149. Lagendijk, 'Ideas, Individuals and Institutions'.
150. Patel, 'Provincialising European Union'.
151. Webster, 'From Nazi Legacy'.
152. For historians' perspectives on the European idea and the initial post-war integration, see Hewitson, 'Europe and the Fate of the World'; Pasture, *Imagining European Unity*, 165–84.
153. Gasperi, 'Extract from a Speech 1952', 199.