CHAPTER 4

Performing Communality

Thinking about Europe entails taking an interest in what is occurring in neighbouring states and elsewhere in Europe. Gazes are directed more towards some and less towards others; some countries are more in focus on certain occasions, and others tend to be of interest thanks to their cited advantages or disadvantages. Contacts across borders are a well-known phenomenon, cultivated through travelling and exchanges as well as through institutionalised channels. Countries are compared as news travels from one place to the next. Modern European states are built, and national traditions and values formed, by comparing and imitating. New ideas, arrangements and opportunities, as well as arguments over controversial issues, are often found by looking towards other European states. Transnational research in intellectual history emphasises the impact of cultural transfer.[1] It is possible to see a kind of unity when ideas, concepts, models and theories move across borders, which differs from presenting political, economic or cultural unity.

Europeanisation is often seen as pertaining only to the post-war era, not least in the historical narrative of European integration. Such a presentation can only be justified by considering the development of common European institutions and policies. However, it is inaccurate to assume that the experience of Europeanisation is a solely post-war phenomenon, as is the case in much social science literature. For example, in Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande's *Das kosmopolitische Europa* – an admirable work in many respects – Europeanisation is treated as an institutionalised process. Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford point out in *Rethinking Europe* that, in the social sciences,

Notes for this section begin on page 128.

Europeanisation is elaborated on using either institutional or comparative approaches to studying the European Union and the resulting integration processes.[2] Looking at where and when Europeanisation is taking place does not entail identifying the pros and cons of the European Union. One should not forget the Europeanisation that was actually taking place long before the Second World War. Medievalist Robert Bartlett has stressed the Europeanisation occurring in the 950–1350 period, which included the dissemination of unifying linguistic elements such as names, the establishment of a religious order across the continent, and a new university system that gave bureaucrats common experience. Compared with earlier periods, communication was distinctly faster and cultural exchange ran more smoothly.[3]

Clearly, there has long been an exchange of community values guiding the countries of Europe in constructing their societies. The German historian Karl Schlögel emphasises that there is a long history in Europe of crossing borders and Europeanisation, which he associates with mutual learning.[4] In Europeanisation, which was a historical phenomenon existing prior to post-war integration, European countries had similar institutional settings, and often largely modelled themselves on one another. This chapter treats Europeanisation as a matter of mutual intellectual inspiration between countries, and of countries adopting similar values and taking similar directions to each other. This kind of Europeanisation is of special interest when exploring the idea of Europe.

When ideas and models move from one part of Europe to another – likely from the centre of Europe to areas on the periphery – it is not a simple transfer. When concepts cross political and cultural borders, they move from one historically specific context to another. It is obvious that cultural transfers are conducted in the hopes of influencing environments and changing them in certain respects, and the Europeanisation concept entails a 'stagist theory of history' (which in this volume applies to divisions and hierarchies within Europe) stating that some countries are the role models for the rest, enabling those countries to have a dominant role in the European mindset. However, we must acknowledge that concepts and models adapt to their new contexts through a process of translation. Sometimes this translation occurs in the open and is easy to observe, but often it requires detailed study, supported by a solid knowledge of the concept (or idea, or model, or theory) and its origins, as well as a good understanding of the new context and how the introduction was staged. This chapter examines the transfer of concepts of community that have taken place throughout Europe, and includes certain cases about which I have special expertise. In earlier case studies on the introduction of the concept of local self-government, I learned that these translations are political and ideological, with implications for the social order.

As a final introductory observation, I note that intellectual Europeanisation is not a result of the idea of European unity, and should not be reduced to a simple device for administrative integration. It occurs in a broader sense and in the context of interaction between centre and margins within Europe, emphasising both Europe's unity as well as its internal borders and divisions. Still, when communal values and standards are implemented and established, they can be taken as necessary prerequisites by countries that are on the verge of entering into multilateral cooperation, in that they produce a common ground for understanding and for shared ideas on how to organise society, as well as for future collaboration. However, that is not the focus of this chapter.

The Quest for Legitimacy: Citizenship and Local Self-Government

An appropriate starting point for examining the Europeanisation of concepts of community is the French Revolution, or rather the period and changes it represents. Starting in the late eighteenth century, some of the most urgent political questions were those related to the state and nation. The responsibilities of the state grew as it expanded and became more centralised. More workers were required and their duties became more complex. To ensure capable officials, forward-thinking regents supported special university programmes, making cadres of workers into professionals. Meanwhile, the people and the nation became important political concepts of the time, with the idea that all forms of government need the approval of the governed. The state was transformed into a nation state whose governance was legitimised when its citizens acquiesced to it. After the French Revolution, it seemed impossible to uphold an autocracy purportedly based on the grace of God. The decisive questions that arose when shaping government concerned how it should be organised and what kind of popular support the exercise of power would garner.

Issues of constitutional and representative government became connected with the political agenda in Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century, as did certain key political concepts that have continued to be of utmost importance since then, namely, democracy, citizenship and legitimacy. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen is indicative of this, and illustrates the merging of citizenship and nationalism; the sovereignty of the French nation was thus vindicated, as was the rule of its people and citizens. Citizenship became closely tied to the state and the elaboration of a national identity, including the attribution of a national community. The events in France were closely followed throughout Europe; associated ideas spread rapidly, and soon the citizenship–state–nation

triad became institutionalised in one country after another. The process occurred more quickly in Western than Central Europe, with its multinational states. This triad was the cause of conflicts over which nations were deemed independent, and which were to be subsumed in other nationalities. This was quite often solved by the suppression of minority languages and other cultural expressions. Furthermore, conflicts over citizenship were rampant in Europe, with exclusions being made on the basis of sex and/or an individual's lack of resources.

The extent and scope of citizenship has been discussed throughout Europe, with demands for citizenship to encompass wider swathes of the population in the state. At the same time, a key issue has been the setting of limits regarding who should be included and who excluded. Participation could be broadened among the aspiring elites in trade and industry, but also extended to additional segments of the population. While the elite demanded that only they should possess the resources and wisdom needed to take part in political governance, the extension of participation was often interwoven with the struggle for individual freedom and equality. It was common to include different degrees of citizenship. Kant distinguished between passive citizens, who enjoyed the rights and protection of the state, and active citizens who, in addition to this, were given the opportunity to participate in state activities and design its tasks. Full citizenship was usually based on the ownership of property. When property was understood broadly, as when Kant included in it the capacities of craftsmen, artists and scientists, more people were attributed full citizenship.[5] The issue of participation was particularly controversial at the beginning of the French Revolution. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, proclaimed by the National Assembly in Paris in 1791, states that each and every person is born free and that equal rights are guaranteed for all citizens. It does distinguish between passive and active citizens: only the latter, who pay a certain amount of tax, are given the right to vote for political assemblies. Distinguishing between bad and good citizens was also a common theme: the bad being revolutionaries, and the good having respect for the order and conventions that have long regulated societies.[6]

In her famous tract, Mary Wollstonecraft challenged some of these exclusions, arguing that citizenship ought to be extended to allow women's participation in political life. She was anxious about the economic and social subjugation of women, and argued for equality in public life. Comparing the political rights of women to those of slaves, she said that one way out of this was to provide the same education for both men and women. Only then, she concluded, would it be possible for women to find their place in working life and secure their own income, ending their dependence on men and allowing them to act as enlightened and responsible citizens.[7]

These examples illustrate that participation was central to the concept of citizenship after the French Revolution. It became important to take part in political discussions and decision making, and those who did not share these privileges and duties were excluded. The concept of local government was another answer to the agenda-setting questions of the political discussion in the first half of the nineteenth century, though often neglected in the history books. This concept, which was based on the cities and their bourgeoisie, arose in reaction to the autocracy of the kings and the absolutist state. It was not a plea for the self-rule or independence of the towns, but a modern idea of self-government that assumed the presence of a strong and centrally organised state. The argument for local self-government was its ability to strengthen the state and relieve its bureaucracy by transferring some of its tasks to local property owners. That was the context in which the possibility of local government and its design were drafted, making local government stand out as a promising political idea. In fact, some examples were put forward before the revolution, both in Great Britain and by French physiocrats. The English concept of 'local government' by the gentry was invoked as exemplary in Germany and Scandinavia during the nineteenth century.

In the following decades, local or municipal self-government was manifested in European countries in answer to the questions of the time, in political discussion and in concrete institutions created by the state and established by law. Examples of the latter are numerous. France made the commune the smallest administrative entity in 1790 (and again in 1800). Prussia was also early with its law of municipal self-government in 1808; other German states followed the Prussian example, as did the Netherlands in 1824. A decade of great importance is the 1830s, with its wave of laws establishing local government. The UK, which had a tradition of estate owners settling public concerns, passed the Municipal Corporation Act in 1835. The Belgian constitution of 1830 advocated local government. The Swiss cantons passed laws on local government on various occasions throughout the 1830s. Denmark passed laws in favour of local government in 1837 and 1841; Norway's corresponding laws (*formandskapslovene*) were enacted in 1837, while Sweden's were enacted somewhat later, in 1862.

The new interest in local administrative bodies and their capacity to conduct their own affairs failed to generate a common European terminology, however. In the UK, the terms were 'local government' and 'self-government', whereas the Germans talked of *Selbsverwaltung*, which means only administration on behalf of the state. The French used the expression *libre administration*, stressing the autonomy of administration. Other terms had also come into use. Since the Middle Ages, *Gemeinde* had been used in Germanic languages, while in the Romance languages, a place

could be communal like *Terra di commune* (Genoa, 1359) and *Communidades de Villa y Tierra* (Castile, fourteenth century). The French word *commune* connoted a city administered by the burghers. The French Revolution was also decisive for the modern history of the word. The revolutionaries of Paris used *commune* to designate the council of 1789 as well as the most militant revolutionaries of 1792–94. *Commune* was understood as the smallest body of the state, ruled by a mayor and a council, this being legally established by the reform of 1801. At this point, the word '*commune*' had already spread to other countries, such as Denmark and Sweden.

This was a Europeanisation that drew upon a shared concept, which was then recast in various forms. The new laws installed local administrative bodies with varying degrees of autonomy. These local bodies were detached from the administration of the state, and their installation was a way of delegating to the local level in order to promote efficiency and the satisfaction of the local population. More importantly, the delegation provided a new platform for an increasingly active bourgeoisie, which, as opposed to the aristocracy or church, took the lead in introducing local bodies. The old power structure was forced to give way.

From the very beginning, arguments for local government included pleas for active citizen participation. An early and illustrative argument can be found in the works of Karl von Stein, the Prussian prime minister who carried out the municipal self-government reform in 1808. Beginning with proprietors, whom he also called citizens, he specifically referred to artisans and industrialists, arguing that they should help to manage local administration, binding them to the state. Stein believed that the connection between the state and its citizens would need to be created in local administration. This would be where the citizen was connected to the fatherland. By the same token, it would also be where the state could obtain the counsel and active assistance of its citizens, receiving suggestions for improvements and complaints about irregularities.[8]

Stein was horrified that state officials were ruling on local matters while proprietors were being deprived of influence – a right had been taken away from them. It is not clear whether this right should be understood as a natural Lockean right or a traditional one. According to Stein, the problem was that the officials of the provinces were appointed and dispatched by the state, and lacked their own connections to the situations in which they were placed. This echoes a critique of centralised administration and its officials that Stein was neither the first nor the last to articulate. The central thesis of this critique was that the common spirit of society would be seriously harmed by the absence of proprietors in administration. Stein also pointed out that a higher cost was associated with state officials than with local citizens. Of utmost importance, however, was 'the experience of common spirit

and citizen spirit', a concept that spread throughout Europe together with the new institutions of self-government.[9]

The concepts of both citizenship and local government feature in discourses on European unity. They hold a prominent position as early as 1821 in the writings of the Danish official Schmidt-Phiseldeck. Among other matters, he presented contemporary examples of representative constitutions and local self-government: the former strengthens the governance and reduces abuses, while the latter relieves the state of commitments and administrative costs through local undertakings by citizens in towns and municipalities.[10] However, he also broke new ground by making a plea for European citizenship, providing citizens of another European state with the privileges and responsibilities of their country of residence. He was likely the first to assign a legal meaning to the idea of European citizenship, and might very well have been the one to coin the expression.[11]

The expression 'Europäisches bürgerrecht' later became established in German. It was mainly used to describe something that belonged to Europe, being used rather oddly by botanists when describing butterflies, insects and birds, and somewhat more naturally by human and social scientists when describing European perspectives. One linguist who referred to the European family of languages said that Hungarians were part of the European family and should thus be accepted as a European nation: they have 'Europäisches bürgerrecht' and should also be included in a future European Federation.[12] Another linguist believed the Turks also had this European citizenship, although their language should definitely not be recognised as European.[13]

The Quest for Modernisation

According to a common nineteenth-century notion, improvements to the social structure were passed down from the more advanced countries in Europe. Those interested in modernisation looked towards other European countries for models to follow, while they considered the knowledge that could be obtained at home to be old-fashioned. One aspect of Europeanisation 'of the mind' was the belief that good examples could not be found at home. When József Eötvös and other Hungarian nationalists attempted to reform the constitutional institutions in Hungary, they noted that, compared with Europe, Hungary was lacking in development. Unsurprisingly, Europe was the standard against which many nationalists in Central Europe measured themselves. When the Czech nationalist František Palacký wrote in 1837 about 'the new European science' and 'the need for new European knowledge', he mainly intended to criticise the limiting and reactionary Habsburg state.[14]

France, Germany and Great Britain often stood out as role models for the rest of Europe, not least due to their higher education institutions and impressive research. They were admired for their technical high schools, social and human sciences, and philosophy. Academic careers took flight after scholars from the rest of Europe attending their universities translated and spread the ideas of French, German and British scholars. There was a belief that French, German and English cultures were advantageous; their art and literature were looked upon as exemplary, so authors and artists made their way to Paris, Berlin and London.

One could view Western Europe either as decadent and outdated, or as a symbol of essential progress via industrialisation and economic development. Both these views were heavily influenced by French and British authors such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and James Macpherson. They celebrated life in the countryside unspoiled by civilisation, comprehending it as the exact opposite of life in the decadent Western metropolises. Others wished to develop their societies in the direction of the European centres. People spoke of 'the new Europe' that was growing. The Western way was worth following.[15]

Europe was primarily viewed as a role model, but its deficiencies were also often discussed, which could lead to the rejection of Western Europe as a leader worth emulating. One of the most extreme repudiations was that of Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz, who saw Western culture as in crisis due to the epidemic of causal reasoning, the progress of industrialisation, and the beginning of general bureaucratisation. With rationalism, he thought, comes the loss of morals and the Holy Spirit, and the proper governance of the nation would then be impossible. While the West declined, the Slavs, especially the Poles, had a grand mission to fulfil: being unaffected by rationalism and industrialisation, they would have to step up and save the world.[16]

This mirroring also took place farther east. The images of Europe that were cherished on Europe's peripheries or by its neighbours prompted both imitation and repudiation. In the Middle East, Europe's art of war, modern science, and technology were early objects of interest, and some influence could also be seen in architecture and the decorative arts, but otherwise the influence was limited until the late eighteenth century.[17] With its growing success and power, Western Europe increasingly stood out as a role model. Some proposed the Europeanisation of Iran and Turkey, for example, where programmes were implemented to create new manners, new ways of thinking and new ways of life. Europe was considered the progressive centre of the world, and an example for the periphery to follow as far as possible.[18]

The concept of Europeanisation was originally meant to indicate the process by which the leading European powers transformed other regions, be it provinces on the European continent or colonies across the oceans. It turns up in German publications referring to the good effect of German

migration into Siebenbürgen in terms of cultivating the Magyar natives. The claim was that the Germans represented European culture, and had long been vital for Europeanising Hungary.[19] The agents of Europeanisation also included other leading nations, and the concept broadened to encompass other continents. Whether or not the natives appreciated it, as one observer put it, they were becoming more European just by being in contact with and becoming colonial subjects of European powers.[20] Istanbul was being Europeanised by new customs from the West, as were the Russians, the Jews, and many 'barbarians'. This was how 'Europeanisation' began to define Europe's place in the world. The earliest examples of this dynamic were found in Germany, and soon thereafter in France; somewhat later we see it in English publications, referring to the civilising value for India of having become part of the British Empire.

The debate continued in the European fringes, where it was disputed whether or not certain countries even belonged to Europe. Finnish nationalists looked westwards, taking for granted that Finns belonged to Europe and did not originate from what they considered the Russian Mongol tradition. They emphasised that Swedish traditions were upheld in Finland and that Sweden had brought civilisation into the country.[21]

In Russia, the discussion concerned whether the country should align itself with Western Europe or claim its own specific culture. When George Brandes gave lectures in St Petersburg and Moscow in 1887, he was seen as a European by the Russian press. The papers did not agree, however, when judging him: the conservative press claimed that Brandes had no feeling for Russian literature, and moreover had not mastered the Russian language. It was said that Russians ought to trust themselves instead of inviting literary critics from the West. Liberal papers stated that Brandes brought European culture to Russia, so it was crucial that he should present his European views.

These opinions were typical of the nineteenth-century Russian discussion of the character of the country. Everyone could agree on one point: there were clear differences between Russia and the Western states. Some aimed to make Russia significantly more European through promoting individualism and rationalism, while others preferred an emphasis on the unique Russian character.

In many respects, the opposition to Western influence in Russia derived its intellectual foundation from German romantic philosophy – in fact, also a kind of Europeanisation – which affected Slavophiles who were hoping for a genuine Russian national culture. Along with Schelling, they claimed that the nation was a kind of organism with its own legislation and ruled by its own logic. They rejected laissez-faire doctrines and the superiority of Western capitalism.[22] One of the first Russian Slavophiles was Ivan Kireyevsky, who listened to Schelling's lectures in Munich in 1830 and eventually became the

ideologue of the Russian aristocracy.[23] He stressed that the Western tradition had consisted of rationalism and individualism ever since the Roman Empire, which led Europeans to become independent, isolated, owners of property, and intrinsically bound to their societies. Russians were different, defined by their shared goals and spirit in a society of organic bonds. Their traditions and the significance of the Orthodox Church had been maintained, and their laws were based on customs. There was originally no private property in Russia as the tsar possessed all the land, which meant that it belonged to the entire nation. Russia was substantially a community of faith, land, and nationwide customs.[24] Another assessment of Europe was presented by the Westerniser Pyotr Yakovlevich Chaadayev (at least until 1835–36, when he shifted to a more pro-tsarist stance). His position was distinct, however, as he did not uphold an atheistic standpoint like most Westernisers; rather, his idea was to bring religion into European civilisation. Russia was understood as a country lacking in what was typical of the civilised West: traditions of law and order, ideas of duty and justice, knowledge and reason. His vision was of a future united Europe that included Russia, where religious feelings would be engendered in the West, and Russia would be civilised by West European knowledge.[25]

As we move farther south to Spain, we can see that the loss of its colonies – and other signs that it was no longer an imperial power – prompted debate on the notion of Spain and its future. The modernists desired a turn towards Europe and the shaping of a national identity modelled on those of Britain, Germany, and especially its northern Latin neighbour France. Intellectuals and artists of the so-called generation of 1898 sought an opportunity to create a new image of Spain, and promoted the feasibility and desirability of Europeanisation. The writer Miguel de Unamuno objected to this, insisting that the European spirit and the accommodating modern life were not meant for Spaniards, and he admitted his repugnance at Europeanisation in an essay from 1906. He mentioned that Europeans seek happiness, and believe this to be their ultimate goal. He opposed science and its methods with wisdom: 'Science robs men of wisdom and usually converts them into phantom beings loaded up with facts'. Science, logic and reason are only preparations for more profound wisdom. In conclusion, said Unamuno, Spaniards are incapable of absorbing civilisation.[26] The modernists, on the other hand, wanted a revival of Spain, moving away from its inquisitorial and premodern heritage. Ortega y Gasset was deeply concerned with the need for Europeanisation, and repeatedly returned to the issue in pleas to reform education and make scientific progress, opposing the misconduct of Spanish governance and proclaiming that German culture was the most advanced in contemporary Europe.[27] He published some of his articles in the magazine he started entitled *Europe*.[28] He answered Unamuno, saying that a Spanish revival was

impossible without a rebirth and a turn towards Europe: 'Regeneration is our desire; Europeanisation is the means to satisfy it. It is really clear from the outset that Spain is the problem and Europe the solution'.[29]

A similar kind of Europeanisation was illustrated by Swedish modernizers whose gaze was directed towards Britain, France and Germany, as well as towards Belgium and the Netherlands. They wrote about the successful management of harbours and cities abroad, about the evolution of democracy, and the way that local self-government prospered. For example, a conservative member of the Swedish parliament, Magnus Björnstjerna, invoked what had occurred in these countries and the views of their statesmen, philosophers and political writers in order to criticise and offer alternatives to the deficiencies of the Swedish system of governance.[30] In his writings, the liberal Carl Forsell took inspiration from Europe in seeking ways to improve Sweden: in 1820, his focus was on establishing a new transportation route between Sweden's two main cities using steamships to cross large lakes; in 1830, his focus was on associations that promoted sobriety; and a few years later it was on the importance of elementary school. Forsell mainly looked to England, to which he had travelled. There was trade and industry there, and important inventions such as the steam engine and the mechanical loom, as well as the development of economic thought. While Sweden remained a country with inferior transportation, England had hundreds of steamships and even a railway, reported by Forsell as the first of its kind, which ran between Manchester and Liverpool. He had the opportunity to ride it, and, although initially worried that the high speed might cause breathing problems, he reluctantly admitted afterwards how pleasant it was to travel at thirty kilometres per hour, and emphasised the necessity of building railways to improve transportation in Sweden.[31] In his final book, written in 1843, the European perspective was stressed with reference to the common European issues of crime and poverty. He argued for local self-government as a way to deal with such things, and cited continental examples. England was seen as the most advanced example, where the locals dealt with problems instead of leaving them to the officials of the state. Local self-government enhanced community spirit and a common responsibility for pauperism, morality, and economic issues of general interest.[32]

Although Germany and Prussia could be regarded as models for Scandinavia, Europe could also be seen as a model for Germany, especially before unification in 1871 and the economic boom during the final decades of the century. This is the case in the writings of Friedrich List, who around 1820 described national German interests in terms of a shared economy based on free trade and the abolition of domestic customs tariffs. Trade routes should be open from the North and Baltic seas to the Adriatic, from the Vistula River in the east to the Rhine River in the west. His argument was based

on what other European states had already claimed and done. Following their example was not only a way to increase wealth, but would also lead to a stronger sense of belonging to one nation when all Germans were politically united. Spiritual culture would blossom and Germany would be reborn.[33] As the years passed he became more pessimistic: Germany continued on a path of fragmentation that had led it away from the might and glory it had possessed five hundred years previously, while England and France had gone from being relatively insignificant to become rich and powerful by constantly striving for national unity.[34] According to List, only large and well-organised countries operating at the highest cultural levels could control their futures and, as such, he recognised only England, France and the United States. Germany was ranked alongside Russia and Spain as states that had some of the prerequisites necessary to attain that higher level. While Russia only possessed strong military power, Spain lagged behind due to weak political organisation. He concluded that one could sense the disappointment of contemporary German liberal modernizers, as their country possessed both resources and culture, but it lacked not only the essential political institutions but also the economic organisation. He seemed to imply that time was running out for the Germans, that it was now or never if they wanted to find future success.[35]

The political backwardness of Germany was also a theme of Heinrich Heine's *Deutschland: Ein Wintermärchen*, in which Europe was compared with Prussia. In Europe there was innocence, freedom and enjoyment, while Prussia could show nothing more than oppression and foolishness. The attempt to unite the country through a customs union and censorship, to shape an economy in order to achieve a spiritual unity, was described with irony by Heine. Despite these powerful aspirations for unity, German souls existed only in the country of dreams.

> The Land belongs to the French and the Russians
> The Seas belong to the British,
> But we own in the airy empire of dreams
> A sovereignty that is uncontested.[36]

The Books

In 1719, an enduring figure was introduced to the public when Daniel Defoe published the novel *Robinson Crusoe*. We all know the story of Crusoe, who survived a shipwreck and then lived his life on a deserted island; how he built, cultivated and created, and how he carefully calculated how to make the best use of his limited resources. Robinson Crusoe is an excellent example of a hero of modern times: he is a man not a woman, he is white,

and Man Friday is enslaved. Crusoe toiled to expand his riches. By his hands, the island off the coast of South America was colonised and civilised. We can infer that he longed for safety and feared the unknown, as he built walls to protect himself from any potential enemies. His virtues were marked by bourgeois ethics: he had a strong awareness of duty, and he read the Bible.

Defoe's novel continues to be published widely to this day. He was not the first to use the theme of shipwreck and survival, but his version of it was emulated by many others who followed, making Crusoe a famous literary figure. It is worth noting that the novel was already assigned reading for children and youths during the eighteenth century, which says something about its importance. Crusoe was looked upon as a good example for the young, as the novel clarified the norms of society.

This is only one example of how books have been vital for the spreading of community values in Europe. The elites were happy to read French, German and English, while considerable work went into translation, primarily managed by publishers. In the absence of copyright treaties, they were the ones searching Europe for new, potentially lucrative books for their national publics. Changing community values were often appropriated from books in the late eighteenth century. *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784–91) by Johann Gottfried Herder not only influenced the architects of nationality in Central Europe, but also attracted nationalists in England, France, Russia and the Scandinavian countries, with its message of a national culture based on language as a natural and dynamic community.[37] There are many examples of such books being central to community discourses in several countries, such as *De l'esprit des lois* (1748) by Charles Louis Montesquieu, and *Du contrat social* (1762) by Jean-Jacque Rousseau.

The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, which laid the foundation for political economy around Europe, was published in 1776 and was soon thereafter cited in France. It was a significant influence on moderate reformists at the beginning of the revolution, and later inspired minds such as Say, Constant and Sismondi. Translations were many, and in Germany, for example, one after another was published. Academics and reformist-minded officials in the bureaucracy assimilated its messages that individual self-interest is a blessing and that a free market is needed within a state's borders.

Smith's work became a centrepiece of political economy, a discipline cultivated in several countries where its practitioners read, quoted and criticised one another, all the while interested in a single common problem – wealth. From its inception in the seventeenth century, the discipline had focused on the wealth of the public and of nations, always keeping in mind that the countries studied belonged to Europe.[38] Adam Smith's perspective was very European, and he wrote about Europe's wealth and present state. He even distinguished between those nations belonging to 'Europe' and

those belonging to 'modern Europe', the former being mostly concerned with agriculture and the latter favouring manufacturing and foreign trade.[39] The European view of political economy was being stressed by 1800, as evidenced by increased usage of the word 'Europe',[40] and by how the sources of wealth were considered to be the object of the 'solitary and combined efforts of the most distinguished writers among the most celebrated nations of Europe'.[41] The French economist Charles Ganilh cited authors from England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Scotland. He discussed what brought wealth to Europe and stated that the keys to growing wealth were the same for all Europe's nations, even claiming that there was a common 'fate of Europe'. Various steps taken by specific nations could be judged by how much they succeeded in bringing wealth and prosperity to 'the system of modern Europe'.[42]

New books and authors came forward after the French Revolution and after the upheavals in Europe settled. Socialists across the continent were reading Charles Fourier, Joseph Proudhon and Karl Marx. Among the works of early English liberals, those by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill were much discussed on the continent. Stockholm liberals established a centre for Swedish Benthamism, and scheduled plenary debates on Bentham in parliament. Meanwhile in Barcelona, Bentham was extensively published in the journal *La civilización*, which was founded by Europe-oriented writers.[43] The conservative liberal-minded historian and statesman François Guizot presented *Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe*, which would hold great sway with its many editions, not only in French and English, but also in further translations into German, Italian, Russian and Spanish as well as more minor languages such as Swedish and Danish. One of his British admirers exclaimed that this eminent historian had written 'a book every student of history should read'.[44] A full list of books with pan-European readership would be long. However, regarding concepts such as democracy, citizenship and local self-government, one book stands out in the first half of the nineteenth century. French discussions of how the future mode of government should be realised resulted in the most widely read and quoted book on this issue in Europe in the 1830s and 1840s.[45] By the time Alexis de Tocqueville had published the first part of *De la démocratie en Amérique* in 1835 (the second part appeared in 1840), local government was already an established institution in several European states and the subject of political discussion. The book was still a bombshell, given its proposals for free, self-governed communes with activities shaped and implemented by active citizens. Tocqueville described innovative approaches and presented new perspectives on local government. His book was soon translated into other languages and was constantly cited by anyone with views on local government. The book's examples of local government in North America were frequently cited, and

its arguments supported or dismissed. In Austria it was referred to as a critique of the autocracy. In Germany it was promoted by Jacob Burckhardt, and in Great Britain by John Stuart Mill and Nassau William Senior, for whom it was 'one of the most remarkable books of our age'. It was referred to by conservatives and by liberals, by those who were for democracy and by those who were against; it was certainly never ignored.[46]

According to Tocqueville, there was a special future risk in Europe, where local authorities had been disappearing. The state controlled the 'smallest citizens' and their 'smallest matters' in a way that left no room for links between the state and the individual. A national parliament mitigated the drawbacks of strong state power, but could not eliminate them. For Tocqueville, the democratic institutions generated by a powerful central form of government were not enough; rather, the remedy for despotism consisted of the links that were forged in the freedom of the communes.

He also called attention to a problematic aspect of democracy – that it had characteristics of both freedom and obedience. It required citizens who were willing and able to act independently, as well as to be obedient to laws and decrees. Democracy also created an ideal, and a requirement for moderation that made Tocqueville fear a new kind of despotism characterised by equality and moderation, in which the state guaranteed its citizens security, employing power that is 'without limits, detailed, regular, foreseeing and soft'. Democracy could be seen as a form of government in which individuals would not grow up as citizens, in which freedom could become less and less important. The state could turn into the shepherd of a frightened flock, whose wills would become increasingly weak and passive. Tocqueville therefore stressed the need to clarify the limits of state power, and also the rights of individuals in order to safeguard their 'power and peculiarity'.

Tocqueville wanted a communal spirit in Europe like that in New England, which had been kept alive and was still energising local communities. He concluded that a strong and independent commune was a prerequisite for a society of citizens, and that political life originated in the communes. His book and how it was received illustrates the different perspectives evident within the Europeanised concepts of democracy, citizenship and local self-government. Tocqueville himself represents a kind of bottom–up perspective, beginning with the local community and its citizens, understanding the communes and towns as the foundation of political life and legitimate state building. At the same time, he was read and used by those who held a statist perspective, looking at the local community as an efficient tool for implementing projects and gaining legitimacy for the state government.

Tocqueville accorded clear precedence to local bodies: the political life of the nation, in which active citizenship limits autocracy and unhealthy

centralisation, rests on the freedom of the communes. This perspective would change somewhat when his ideas were related to specific contexts – for instance, in Sweden, where Tocqueville was much read and both liberal and monarchist papers cited him. The senior historian Erik Gustaf Geijer regarded Tocqueville as an 'excellent thinker' who 'thinks better than everybody we know'; he saw his book as vitally important, 'one of the best books I have read and anybody could read'. Geijer's pupil and friend Pehr Erik Bergfalk, professor of law, read Tocqueville carefully, evidenced when, in the late 1830s, he presented a rather elaborate plea for local government in Sweden. Bergfalk was a liberal, and favourably disposed to local government and the idea of citizenship. He was a member of the law-drafting committee in the 1840s, and president of the constitutional committee in 1859–68. Considering that the Swedish laws on local government were passed in 1862 and followed by a new constitution in 1865, Bergfalk can be considered a key figure in the creation of local Swedish government.[47]

Bergfalk argued that the state defines the local community and gives it status. The commune is a legal institution of its own, just as the state is. Both are legal entities, but the commune is a simpler institution at a subordinate level. The state defines the commune, identifies its properties, gives it certain rights, and makes sure that it does not misuse its freedom. In a logical sequence, the state has first priority, with the local administration deriving its authority from the state by allocation (to use today's technical concept). Bergfalk was inspired by Tocqueville when it came to the amount of activity, development and efficiency generated by self-government. Directly referring to Tocqueville, he asserted that state power was a threat to communal freedom, but he did not share Tocqueville's basic idea of the state's historical and logical precedence. Yet Bergfalk agreed with Tocqueville that local government teaches its inhabitants to look beyond private interests when considering their common matters. His statist perspective, not inspired by Tocqueville, can also be seen when he describes the commune as a tool of the state for producing civic competence.[48] Unsurprisingly, the statist perspective was the one that was realised in practice. Local self-government then became a kind of moderate decentralism administered by, and integral to, the centralised modern state. This perspective emphasised how the local context produces a relationship between citizens and the state. The arguments of Bergfalk and others for local government connect citizens to the state through local administration, while the state safeguards knowledge of local conditions and the deeds of citizens. Civic spirit is thus able to grow. Local self-government is constituted as the foundation of the state. The idea of self-government positions individuals in relation to both the local community and the state. The ideas of Tocqueville can therefore be applied to the Swedish context, with certain adjustments. This case

illustrates both the Europeanisation of a concept, whereby intellectuals and reformers were inspired by foreign authors, as well as its adaptations to specific contexts.

European Individualism

Concepts spread in many ways. Individualism is considered a truly European value of old and sometimes even ancient origin, a unique historical feature of Europe.[49] One argument is that the preconditions for fostering capitalism and creating industrial production only arose in Europe.[50] This argument is mentioned when explaining differences between the various parts of Europe – for example, that the lower impact of individualism in Eastern Europe and Russia meant a delay in their development.[51] Furthermore, it has been claimed that the different social structures in Northern and Southern Europe have been generated by different varieties of individualism.[52] This book is not the place to write the history of individualism or discuss its explanatory value. Instead, we will consider how the word 'individualism' entered several discourses, finally being defined as 'European individualism', constituting a further example of conceptual Europeanisation.

Tocqueville declared that individualism was a new word. He was right, even though the idea that the individual was the basic unit of society had already been adopted in some branches of philosophy. The new word 'individualism' was initially used pejoratively to connote something that should be rejected. It was introduced by Restoration thinkers in France around 1820, and viewed as a threat to traditional values such as obedience and duty. As such, individualism represented the consequences of the French Revolution as well as the ideas of natural rights and individual freedom. The idea was later picked up by the disciples of Henri Saint-Simon, who associated individualism with disorder, atheism and egoism, viewing it as incompatible with their idea of a modern industrial society based on religious community. It was soon used by a range of French authors who wrote about the '*l'odieux individualisme*' of society, which was corrupting social life. They associated individualism with the economic doctrine of laissez-faire, and liberal ideas of coherence between individual interests and those of society.[53] Meanwhile in England, Robert Owen was criticising the 'competition of interests' as irrational and to blame for causing the 'individualising' of men, regardless of whether they resided in cottages or palaces.[54] This illustrates that the attractiveness of this kind of argument extended outside of France and, unsurprisingly, the word spread quickly throughout Germany, Great Britain and other European countries, as well as America. At that point, individualism became a main theme on both sides of the Atlantic when comparing

Europe and North America, and it was always said to have gone further in America than in Europe.

As the word spread, it gained more positive connotations, first in America where the freedom of individualism explained its attractiveness to European migrants. In Europe it was only cautiously accepted as a positive description or value. When Robert Owen later talked about individualism, it was understood as a bad practice and an irrational way of organising society, although he did uphold the individuality of man. Still, the 1840s liberals in Britain, France and Germany openly advocated individualism, mostly influenced by German Romantic writers who raved over individuality. Individualism was favoured by some socialists, and even Proudhon declared himself an individualist.[55]

While individualism was apparently a popular notion, it was also occupied by nationalistic discourses. The historian Guizot claimed that it was a German virtue that should have been taken over by the French.[56] Some sources confidently claimed that individualism was a special British virtue: 'the height of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, of initiative and individualism, upon which commerce is based, and which constitute England's . . . mercantile strength' (*The Eclectic Magazine*, 1844);[57] in German, the word individualism was introduced in 1842 by the liberal Karl Brüggemann, who contrasted economic individualism with a specific 'German infinite [*unendlichen*] individualism based on an infinite individual self-confidence to be personally free in morals and truth'. When French liberals used the concept of individualism with more positive connotations, they were condemning the lack of the thriving spirit of individualism that they acknowledged in England and Germany.[58]

National discourses continuously influenced the idea of individualism after the turn of the century. Miguel de Unamuno saw a traditional Spanish individualism that had its origin in the tendency to disrupt community life and separate into different tribes, whereas he hoped that the progress of commercial competition, together with civilised, urban and industrial life, would modify this tendency.[59] The philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel addressed an 'old individualism' marked by economic ideals and the free individuals of modern times. Against this, he specified a new and qualitative individualism from the German tradition of Goethe, Fichte, and the other Romantics up to Nietzsche, that focuses on the distinctiveness of individuals and their will to develop their own individuality. Thomas Mann underlined the distinction between a Western individualism imprinted with liberalism, and the Enlightenment and a German individualism aligned with community and social thinking.[60]

Individualism apparently had several meanings. Critiques of modernity interpreted individualism as simple egoism that threatened society with

anarchy. Many socialists condemned it as an expression of capitalism and the freedom of the market. Yet socialists could also argue, as Oscar Wilde did, that only individualism could offer the fulfilment of human potential. With economic liberalism, on the other hand, individualism was considered a way of defending property rights. Other liberals, such as Leonard Hobhouse, defended individualism as a social freedom and as embodying the ideal equality of human rights, concluding that freedom and equity demanded a social control that was beyond the scope of economic liberalism.[61] There were two basic themes running through the different interpretations of the word: one was that the individual constitutes the fundamental part of society (as opposed to the family, clan, parish, nation, or other community); the other highlighted the ability of human beings to articulate their own truth about what is right or wrong, and how they should act in different situations. These themes have a long history, so even though the word only began to be used after 1820, individualism as a concept has a history that dates back even further. It has been argued that individualism was specifically developed by philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottfried Herder.[62]

Neither the longer history of the themes of individualism nor the frequent use of the word and its apparent popularity throughout Europe initially defined it as a European phenomenon or value. This changed when individualism was made into an object of historical arguments and historical writing. One example – possibly the first – is from America in 1840, and invoked a thousand-year-old history of individualism as strongly influenced by Christianity, and especially by the Reformation. Individualism, it was claimed, was the hallmark of European civilisation, from which it had spread via migration to America and other continents: 'The great feature of this Type [of civilisation] was and is, as I shall call it, individualism; in Government, Religion, Science, Art, Literature, and social life, this long has been and now is, I believe, the great idea'.[63]

The intimate relationship between individualism and European civilisation is recurrently invoked, and it is a main theme of Jacob Burckhardt's *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, which is a broad treatment of life and society, covering state and governance, literature and poetry, culture, religion and customs. In this work, Florence, Venice, and the other city-states of Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are envisioned as the birthplaces of modern man – specifically, contemporary Europeans – as these were the sources of individualism. Burckhardt claimed that this was the historical period when the shackles of the Middle Ages were thrown off, initiating the transition from humans seen as members of a community, to being defined as individuals. This transition had to do with the absence of

an all-powerful state and the division between worldly and religious power, permitting growing opportunities for private aspirations that could be directed towards amassing riches and individual education (*Bildung*). In these cities, the ideal was that of a comprehensive education that would bring about a versatile individuality.

By 1900, the term 'European individualism' stood on its own as a fully fledged concept with distinctive features. It was frequently used in distinguishing European philosophy, society and religion from their Indian, Japanese and Chinese counterparts, respectively. Russian Slavophiles cited individualism when criticising the West. Moreover, in the emerging social sciences, individualism occupied a key position in determining how society should be treated, especially by economists. The leading economists discussed theories that started from the notion of the rational 'economic man', assuming that the study of society should begin with the economic desires and needs of the abstract individual. Their structuring idea was that man's individual activities shaped the economy. The man they considered was an abstraction who acted out of self-interest. Some of these economists even produced 'Robinsonades' to illustrate their theories. Individualism became a European feature of such self-evidence that its Europeanness no longer had to be made explicit. Robinson Crusoe had become a manifest symbol of this individualism, being used not only in novels but also in sustaining both economic thought and social science.[64]

Approaching Standards and Unification

Throughout the nineteenth century there was a striving to create common standards for the good of commerce and prosperity of society. This was in response to the societal values of efficiency and equal conditions that were associated with the European state model after the French Revolution and the examples laid out by Napoleon. It was certainly important to establish common standards within the state regarding, for instance, weight and measurement systems. However, there was also a drive for uniformity of standards between the countries, underpinning the thesis of Europeanisation and taking place at a far more practical level than the lofty visions and calls for a European federation.

As early as Schmidt-Phiseldeck we see the idea of free trade depicted as a way to knit the world together, bringing mutual dependence and wealth, and to be facilitated by a common monetary standard and credit fund. Throughout the century, calls for free trade across borders had made themselves heard together with pleas for convergence of standards and practices. Industrialisation and improved communications would be facilitated by equalising not

only rules of trade but also technological standards. Common standards were driven by industrialisation, which, in turn, brought more trade and further expansion of transport and information exchange. There was a technocratic internationalism fuelled by liberal ideals and discourses of free trade, as well as by the building of new infrastructures.[65] Infrastructure projects were mostly set up to ease trade and communications within states, and with territories abroad in the case of colonial states, strengthening the building of states and empires. The aim was also to expand trade to international markets, leading to international cooperation. Recent research in the history of science has identified a technocratic internationalism among experts, cartels and international organisations that were striving to set technical standards at the continental level. Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot have traced the beginning of this technocratic internationalism to the mid-nineteenth century, a period of intensified free-trade agitation and the opening of new arenas for technological transfer, as illustrated by the Crystal Palace Exhibition. At this time the first regional telegraph unions were founded in order to connect national systems, followed in 1865 by an initiative of the French government that led to the creation of the International Telegraph Union. By 1900, a practice was in place for establishing working rules for international cooperation, with the Telegraph Union and Postal Union as the main prototypes cited by experts.[66]

It did not take long for this trend of the convergence of communication standards to be connected to visions of European unification. Bluntschli, the jurist who argued for a federation of sovereign states, said that one of the main tasks of a European 'Staatenbund' would be to manage such special bureaus for post, telegraph and transport between the European countries. He added that further arrangements to facilitate cooperation, such as treaties regarding shipping via international waters, would bring the European states closer to one another.[67] The value of such an arrangement can be illustrated by these words from William Thomas Stead: 'There is a steady approximation to unity throughout the continent'. Stead, hailed as the most important newspaperman of his age when he died in the sinking of the *Titanic* in 1912, campaigned among other things for the peace movement and peace initiatives. Writing in 1898, he greeted the extent to which Europe was moving towards unity, and he had great hopes for the peace conference that was about to take place in The Hague in 1899 for the purpose of preventing war in Europe and giving relief from the burdens of reconstruction.[68]

Through Stead we can observe how the ideas of unity and Europeanisation were given a further dimension, as he was clearly outlining how a versatile unification, or what we would now call integration, was actually taking place at the very moment he was writing. This stands in sharp contrast to the calls for a unified Europe that begin by observing the loss of a former

unity. Novalis did this with sadness. Mazzini, on the other hand, heralded an opportunity for democracy when he observed the loss of 'unity of faith' in Europe and of the privileges of the royals and aristocracy, in 'the perpetual inheritance of virtue, intelligence, and honour'.[69]

Stead was neither alone nor the first in claiming that social or even political unification was already taking place. For instance, Schmidt-Phiseldeck noted that travelling brought more unity to lifestyle and culture, also contributing to the growing uniformity of public administration across Europe. Even warfare could have this effect, as armies settled in foreign cities: Danish troops had been in Paris, Germans in Spain, Spaniards in the Netherlands, Italians in Russia, Poles in Italy, and so on. To this, he added, were trade and the scholarly exchange within science. As early as 1821, he claimed that each European capital had been exposed to the entire continent.[70] In an inaugural speech, Victor Hugo addressed the international peace congress of 1869: 'Fellow citizens of the United States of Europe, allow me to give you this name, for the European Federal Republic is established in right and is waiting to be established in fact. You exist, therefore it exists. You confirm it by the union from which unity is taking shape. You are the beginning of a great future'.[71] The ardent peace activist Jacques Novicow was even more eloquent by the turn of the century when he recognised the intensification of travel, economic exchange, and communication following the impact of technical progress. The steam engine and the railway had lowered the cost of trade and facilitated a division of labour that had led to mutual dependence between countries that were no longer self-sufficient. Just as economic interdependence spread, so did intellectual, scientific and cultural exchanges and influences cross borders: 'There has long been a unifying sympathy among Europeans, despite their political divisions'.[72]

In addition, Stead declared that ongoing unification began with the observation that Europeans were becoming more and more conscious of the alleged unity of the continent. Three of the reasons for this consciousness that Stead mentioned should be noted: royalty, diplomacy and communication. The royalty were already forming an international family group on a European scale, offering a kind of forerunner and model for the close unity that the European states were heading towards. For example, the British royalty had connections all over Europe: they attended weddings, mourned the dead, paid attention to one another's affairs, and kept up a careful correspondence with their relatives among Europe's various royal courts – just as relations should have been between the European states. Diplomacy had established a basis for their actions through the system of the Concert of Europe, which Stead looked upon as an embryonic federal European commonwealth. He pointed out that cooperation between the European powers had recently been successful in dealing with the Ottoman Empire, forcing

the Turks to leave Greece without having to use heavy military force. His conclusion was that these actions made Europe more accustomed to acting as a unit, and 'will in time bring about the United States of Europe'.

The expansion of means of communication was cited by Stead to exemplify how Europe was able to draw closer to unity. Thanks to the telegraph, news could spread across the continent within hours: social and political gossip could spread rapidly, contributing to a common sentiment in all European nations. The railways made travelling between Europe's countries quick and easy, and large distances could be efficiently traversed via rivers and canals. These links acted like nerves crossing national borders, and there was furthermore a strong tendency to set up international organisations in association with them and other such links: '[E]ach of them may be regarded as an embodied prophecy of the coming of the United States of Europe'.[73] He mentioned such existing 'embodied prophec[ies]' as the Telegraph Union from 1865, the International Postal Union from 1874, the Patents, Copyrights and Trade Marks Bureau and the International Railway Bureau from 1890. Stead's main point in mentioning these institutions was to show that they were recognised as sovereign in their affairs, worked for common interests, and above all, had managed to function in a way that all Europe's states were happy with. We can see that he was demonstrating the Europeanisation of standards – which was necessary when constructing the accessories of modern societies – throughout the European countries. He had great hopes for this idea.

Several discourses advanced the creation of standards – the international organisations that Stead mentioned constituting one example. Stead also stressed the importance of managing international waterways, to protect transportation on the Danube River and between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. He recognised the commissions overseeing these waterways both as outcomes of the principles of the Concert of Europe as well as examples of how common European interests could be protected.[74] One achievement of the Congress of Vienna was that the victors promised regulation to protect the international interest of movement and trade on waterways that were shared or that ran through several states. For the Danube River and the Black Sea, this promise was realised in the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which lifted restrictions on trade and opened these waterways to international trade. For Lorenz von Stein, a close advisor to liberal-minded ministers in Vienna, who mentioned this matter in 1856, it meant the establishment of the 'European principle of free trade', which would bring the states together into healthy and peaceful competition, establish a truly European way of trading, and contribute to the free development of Europe's commerce. It would benefit all of Europe without causing damage to anyone.[75]

Cross-border arrangements and transnational organisations, such as railway projects, are examples of Europeanisation in practice, which was all about building a Europe that spanned national borders and involved not only cooperation but also regulation. Often such projects were facilitated by a focus on apolitical aims. These projects were not associated with visions of one state taking over another, but simply with prospects of mutual benefit. They were gathered around the warm light of the shared idea of economic progress and the advancement of society. As stressed by Kaiser and Schot, these projects gave experts the task of improving society with the blessing of heads of state and governments.[76]

It has been suggested that, by the nineteenth century, there were certain common experiences that provided a common ground for talking about Europe. In enumerating these experiences, the British historian James Joll referred to the Roman Empire, Christianity, the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution, and the increased international trade due to railways and the experience of imperialism since the nineteenth century.[77] To this list should be added the process of unifying community perspectives and values – a cultural exchange – that took place in a very concrete sense throughout the nineteenth century, separate from the more gripping intellectual idea of establishing political unity on a diverse continent. This was a kind of practical integration that occurred without a master plan or organised intentions. It was implemented by reformers and statesmen who took examples for action from neighbouring states or other parts of Europe. It was driven by pressing needs arising from similar challenges and by the simple insight into the advantages of facilitating progress in other European countries. Still, we should not pretend that such Europeanisation implied learning on equal terms, as it was very much a centralising business. It implied that the margins of Europe were the pupils of English, German and French teachers.

In the nineteenth century, Europeanisation was not logically followed by unification, as it took place on a continent crossed by state borders. The aim was usually not to create a real federation, nor to set up a loose alliance, nor to promote the idea of European unity. Rather, the aims were often national: to establish shared community values and strengthen the orderliness of a proper society, to change the direction of development, and often simply to find models for building very concrete public functions. Europeanisation as such did not entail transcending borders but accepting them, and even making them more viable and less likely to disappear. Identifying the Europeanisation of community values can be characterised as a transnational writing of history, a topic that has recently attracted much attention.[78] In the same way that Europeanisation does, transnational research postulates that there are nations, and it studies objects or phenomena that cross borders.

Notes

1. Secord, 'Knowledge in Transit'; Armitage, 'International Turn'.

2. Beck and Grande, *Das kosmopolitische Europa*, 15; Delanty and Rumford, *Rethinking Europe*, 7.

3. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 269–91, quotation from 269: 'The Europeanization of Europe, in so far as it was indeed the spread of a particular culture through conquest and influence, had its core areas in one part of the continent, namely in France, Germany west of the Elbe and north Italy, regions which had a common history as part of Charlemagne's Frankish empire'.

4. Schlögel, 'Europe and the Culture of Borders'.

5. Kant, *Schriften zu Anthropologie,* 151–53.

6. For examples from the history of the idea of citizenship, see Clarke, *Citizenship*; Heater, *Citizenship*.

7. Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication*.

8. Stein, *Briefe und amtliche Schriften*, 389–90.

9. Ibid., 390–94.

10. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Europa und Amerika*, 185–90.

11. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der Europäische Bund*: he speaks of 'Europäische Bürger' on 201 and of 'Europäisches Bürgerrecht' and 'Europäisches Staatsbürger' on 269–72.

12. Semmig, *Geschichte der französischen Literatur*, 3.

13. Arndt, *Ueber den Ursprung*, 148.

14. Palacký, 'Předmluwa ke wlastenskému čtenářstwu'. Regarding Hungary, see Bödy, *Joseph Eötvös*, 37–41; Eötvös, *Die Reform in Ungarn*, 13–14, 38, 67–68.

15. See Sziklay, 'Die Anfänge des "nationalen Erwachsen"', 34–38, regarding this phenomenon in Eastern Central Europe. This dichotomy of the European versus the domestic was found not only among Slavic intellectuals, but also in Romania; see Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism*, 31–35.

16. Walicki, 'Russia, Poland and France', 38–41.

17. Hourani, *Islam in European Thought*, 136–47.

18. Fazlhashemi, *Exemplets makt*, 20–21, 34, 130–35.

19. Schlözer, *Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, VII, 177, 181, 191.

20. *Göttingisches Taschenbuch 1802*, 83–85; Heeren, *Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems*, 400.

21. Svedelius, *Studier i Sveriges statskunskap*, 282; Sohlmann, *Det unga Finland*, 16.

22. Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy*, 464–70.

23. Ibid., 62–68, 513.

24. Ibid., 134–48.

25. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, 13–39.

26. Unamuno, 'Reflections upon Europeanization', 54–57, quotation from 55.

27. See his articles from 1902–11 that are published in Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas I*.

28. Gray, *The Imperative of Modernity*, 85.

29. Ortega y Gasset, 'La pedagogía social', 521: 'Regeneración es el deseo; europeización es el medio de satisfacerlo. Verdaderamente se vio claro desde un principio que España era el problema y Europa la solución'.

30. Björnstjerna, *Grunder för Representationens*.

31. Andrén, *Den europeiska blicken*, 76–79: Forsell, *Plan till Transport-inrättning*; Forsell, *Underrättelse om Temperance-societies*; Forsell, *Anteckningar i anledning av*; Forsell, *Om småbarnskolor*; Forsell, *Utkast till handbok*.

32. Forsell, *Om kommunal-nämnder*.

33. List, *Gesammelte Schriften II*, 16–20, 22–34.

34. Ibid., 367.

35. Ibid., 414–17.

36. Heine, *Deutschland: Ein Wintermärchen*, 9–12, quotation from 24: 'Franzosen und Russen gehört das Land,/ Das Meer gehört den Briten,/ Wir aber besitzen im Luftreich des Traums/ Die Herrschaft unbestritten'.

37. Arnold, Kloocke and Menze, 'Herder's Reception and Influence'; Tronchon, *La Fortune Intellectuelle de Herder*.

38. Petty, 'A Treatise of Taxes', 22–23.

39. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, e.g., 43, 274, 426–29, 449.

40. Adam Smith (1776) used the word twice as frequently as William Petty (1662), and then James Maitland Lauderdale (*Origin of Public Wealth*, 1804) used it twice as frequently as Smith.

41. Ganilh, *Systems of Political Economy*, 2.

42. Ibid., e.g., 55, 146–52, 173, 309, 377.

43. Swensson, *Den kommmunala självstyrelsen*, 135–38, 360; Roca y Cornet, 'Bentham: Escuela utilitaria', 18–20, 289–305.

44. MacLeod, *European Life*, 6.

45. The rest of this paragraph is a condensation of an in-house report by the author: Andrén, 'Local Government and Local Citizens'.

46. Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, 1835–1840; Andrian-Werburg, *Österreich und dessen Zukunft*, 36, 147–48, 190–205. See the two reviews by John Stuart Mill, 'Tocqueville on Democracy in America'. Quotation from Nassau in Simpson, *Correspondence of Tocqueville with Senior*, 3. My presentation of Tocqueville follows that in my earlier book on local self-government in Sweden: Andrén, *Den europeiska blicken*, 28–33.

47. Swensson, *Den kommunala självstyrelsen*, 97–107; Geijer, 'Litteratur-Bladet', 227–28. My presentation of Bergfalk follows Andrén, *Den europeiska blicken*, 45–51.

48. Bergfalk, *Städernas Författning och Förvaltning*, 9, 93–112.

49. Gurevich, *Origins of European Individualism*.

50. See, e.g., Crotty, *When Histories Collide*.

51. Longworth, *The Making of Eastern Europe*.

52. Harskamp and Musschenga, *Faces of Individualism*.

53. Swart, '"Individualism" 1826–1860', 77–90.

54. Cited from Claeys, 'Conceptual Formation, 1800–1850'.

55. For British and French examples, see Swart, '"Individualism" 1826–1860', and Claeys, 'Conceptual Formation, 1800–1850'. For a German example, see Fröbel, *Die deutsche Auswanderung*, 17–18.

56. Guizot, *History of Civilization in Europe*, 77.

57. Anonymous, 'Triumph of Russian Autocracy'.

58. Quotation from Swart, '"Individualism" 1826–1860', 90. See also Claeys, 'Conceptual Formation, 1800–1850'.

59. Unamuno, 'Spanish Individualism'.

60. Simmel, 'Formen des Individualismus'; Mann, *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, 291–94.

61. Wilde, *The Soul of Man*; Hobhouse, *Liberalism*.

62. See, e.g., Taylor, *Sources of the Self*; Shanahan, *Genealogy of Individualism*.

63. Perkins, *Christian Civilisation*.

64. Andrén, 'Robinson Crusoe och ekonomerna'.

65. Kaiser and Schot, *Writing the Rules for Europe*; Högselius, Kaijser and Vleuten, *Europe's Infrastructure Transition*.

66. Kaiser and Schot, *Writing the Rules for Europe*, 21–36.

67. Bluntschli, 'Die Organisation'.

68. Kaiser and Schot, *Writing Rules for Europe*, drew my attention to William Thomas Stead, *United States of Europe*.

69. Mazzini, 'Europe: Its Condition and Prospects'.

70. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der Europäische Bund*, 49–59, 115–16.

71. Quoted from 'Victor Hugo Central', retrieved 10 April 2022 from http://www.gavroche.org/vhugo/peacecongress.shtml.

72. Novicow, *Die Föderation Europas*, 468–515, quotation from 515: 'So einigen seit langer Zeit zahlreicher Band eder Sympathie die Europäer trotz ihrer politischen Trennung'.

73. Stead, *United States of Europe*, 20.

74. Ibid., 15–38.

75. Stein, *Oesterreich und der Frieden*, 85–115.

76. Kaiser and Schot, *Writing the Rules for Europe*, 25, 53.

77. Joll, 'Europe: An Historian's View'.

78. See, e.g., Werner and Zimmermann, 'Beyond Comparison'; Neunsinger, 'Cross-over!'.