CHAPTER 3

Looking for Common Ground

Calls for European unity came from more than one direction, as appeals for political unity were bolstered by appeals invoking cultural and civilisational unity. This chapter expands on the ways in which Europe was defined as a unity beyond politics, while being divided by certain hierarchies. One was an act of demarcation, contrasting Europe with other parts of the world by emphasising its differences. Another defined Europe as a unified culture and civilisation, and entailed looking beyond its internal political and cultural borders. Civilisation was a crucial concept here because it unambiguously represented the tendency to consider Europe a universal model. Even so, it was defined as a unity with internal borders between states and nations, as well as with religious and linguistic divides. The ideas of both European culture and civilisation included what Dipesh Chakrabarty has called 'the stagist theory of history, on which the European ideas of modernity were based'. For Chakrabarty, this 'historicism' was a means to enable Europe's domination of other parts of the world. This was an important aspect. However, we should also be aware of how this historicism enabled a mindset within Europe that saw England and France as the first nations, followed by Germany, to be sites 'of the first occurrence of capitalism, modernity, or Enlightenment'.[1] In the master story of European progress, other nations lagged behind. The concepts of European culture and civilisation also indicated hierarchies within Europe.

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Defining Europe by Contrasts

When looking for Europe, it is crucial to draw lines that define other parts of the world. Consequently, Europe is contrasted with the outside world. This definitional act, resting on what philosophers call binary opposition, has changed through history and various contexts but has always remained, defining Europe and giving it meaning.[2] Let us begin by taking a very broad perspective, and look back to the Frankish leaders and their quests for power. They understood the concept of Europe in the context of their struggle with the Roman popes. For the latter, Europe was nothing more than a geographical continent, like Africa or Asia, whereas the Frankish Europe comprised either provinces of the emperor's dominion or the Christian lands.[3] In both cases, it was something to guard and, if necessary, defend. As such, the concept of Europe could be used as propaganda. An eighth-century Frankish chronicler applied the term 'Europeenses' to Charles Martel's forces fighting the Saracens, and the court of Charlemagne established an imagination of him as the king of Europe, naming Christianity the religion of the European empire, which was under foreign threat from the Muslims. The people around Charlemagne often spoke of Islamic incursions as dangerous foreign threats to the cohesion of the Frankish kingdom. His grandfather had defeated the Muslims at the Battle of Tours in 732, which was an enormous achievement according to the official historiography. Regarding the battle, the truth is more likely to be found in the historiography of the other side, which hardly mentions it. Obviously, the external threats from the Muslims were real, but they were also evoked to create unity and legitimise a certain form of governance in the kingdom.[4]

A second essential period for defining Europe is the passage from medieval to early modern times, from the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the conquests of the Inca and Aztec empires in the newly discovered Americas. From the outside, Europeans were viewed in a negative light. The Byzantines looked upon the European crusaders' ravages and barbaric customs with disgust. The Aztecs condemned the conquistadors' hunger for wealth, which made them act more like apes than human beings: their chattering and their insensitivity to traditional rites and social customs were intolerable. But the Europeans possessed a military strength that gave them authority and self-esteem. The Byzantines were hoping to call on the Western rulers' military strength during their last decades of declining power. The Aztecs were astonished by the God-like men on horses and amazed by their metallic skin, but they were also terrified by their weapons.

During this period, the term 'Europe' began to be used more frequently than before. Byzantine historians mentioned a Europe that included the Latin kingdoms, England and Iceland, as well as northern cities such as Bergen and

Stockholm, countries populated with Livonians, Lithuanians, Poles and Bohemians, and a Russia described as the largest kingdom in Europe. It is with this Europe that these scholars hoped the remaining parts of the Byzantine Empire would be associated.[5]

When Pope Pius II acted to close the ranks of Christendom in 1460 and mount a joint campaign against the Muslims, he spoke of Europe and the Europeans. This occurred several years after the Fall of Constantinople and in conjunction with the Turkish conquests of the last remaining Christian areas in Greece.

The third period, which is critical for defining Europe in sharp contrast to something else, is the Enlightenment. Charles Louis Montesquieu emphasised that Asians were not rational, but controlled by their emotions rather than logic. In Asia, the states were ruled by despots, characterised by inertia and a lack of initiative. In contrast to Europe, Asia was completely uncivilised. Montesquieu's explanation of Europe's superiority invoked a kind of balance that was simply unknown in Asia. The various populations in Europe were more or less equally strong, while those in Asia were either strong or weak. According to Montesquieu's climate theory, the temperate zones were widespread and extended in Europe, whereas in Asia, there were substantial borders between zones of coldness and warmth.[6] Johann Gottfried Herder illustrated a new self-confidence when he claimed that Europe was a 'wonderful continent', in contrast to the isolated Asian states that did not compare themselves with others but instead concentrated their energies on keeping out anything foreign. Their politics were despotic and their inhabitants resigned and unwilling to change the order. It was habit that ruled these kingdoms. At the same time, he noted, there was competition between the states in Europe, which constantly gave them the experience of either peaceful trade or military action. The continuous contact among the European states had been a breeding ground for science. Scholars therefore had a certain degree of independence vis-à-vis the state, and formed an association that transcended borders. In Europe the states exploited scientific knowledge but did not possess it. Herder did not find these essential incentives among Asian scholars who, if they could be found at all, acquiesced to their rulers.[7]

This Eurocentrism was often used as a framework and was included in the theory of world history, which emphasised that the leading powers and peoples had previously been Asian, but were now European. This approach can also be found in Herder's works, but it was Hegel who refined it, declaring that world history began in Asia and would end in Europe. As far as Hegel was concerned, history through the ages revolved around the development of freedom and reason. In its early stages, society was best developed in the Orient, in kingdoms characterised by obedience and fidelity towards

the ruler. The free will of individuals developed only in Europe – namely, in the Greek world and the Roman Empire. For Hegel, it was with the arrival of Christian culture that Europe started to lead the world, and world history reached its full potential. This was especially true of the Prussian kingdom of Hegel's days, where he saw reconciliation and unity between the individual and the state, fulfilling the goal of history to realise a generally prevailing freedom of reason.[8] Although the view of a special historical mission for the Prussian state should be seen in light of his position in Berlin, Hegel's concept of Europe as a place where the free will of individuals evolved, in contrast to the Orient, was widely upheld.[9]

With his work *Orientalism*, which had an enormous impact after its publication over four decades ago, Edward Said brought awareness to how European concepts may have very little to do with the people and societies they purport to describe.[10] His perspective has been groundbreaking for postcolonial studies, and reaffirmed by other studies.[11] Yet, it has also been demonstrated that the European image of Islam and Arabic cultures cannot be assessed as one-dimensionally negative. The picture of Islam and Islamic culture that developed in the early modern age was less negative than it became after 1800, when the differences became exaggerated. The Arabic language was always highly esteemed, and the comparative study of languages was based on familiarity with both the Indo-European and Semitic languages, and among the latter Arabic was defined as closely related to both Hebrew and Aramaic – both essential Biblical languages.[12] Arabic culture could even be thanked for the progress and superiority of Europe well into the nineteenth century. A few examples include Europe's culture of knighthood, tournament games, poetry, architecture, the technical uses of chemistry, mathematics, medicine and economics – and even the introduction of artichokes, saffron, coffee and sugar.[13]

In geographical presentations of a more popular kind, European advantages were underscored. Humankind had 'made the most decisive advancements' in Europe, 'in science, in useful and ornamental arts, and in general civilization', as claimed by Mary-Ann Venning in the 1820s. Her book was intended for youths, who read that the 'European is generally strong, active and intelligent'. The success of the continent was greatly contrasted with the lack of success of its neighbours. Although maps showed a partly Turkish Europe, and Istanbul was said to be located on the European shore of the Bosporus, Venning wrote that 'the chief employment of the Turk is smoking and drinking coffee'.[14] The ineptitude of the Ottoman Empire was a popular theme among Europeans who hailed their own modernity. The liberal free-trade propagandist, Richard Cobden, railed against an empire that had been in contact with Europe for hundreds of years without learning from its modern discoveries and technical improvements. If one could

find a printing press in the land it would surely be run by a foreigner, and the 'steam engine, gas, the mariner's compass, paper money, vaccination, canals, the spinning jenny, and rail-roads, are mysteries not yet dreamed about by Ottoman philosophers'. He believed that neither science nor literature would take hold among the Turkish people.[15] The Europeans were simply more advanced, and their individual free will was more evolved. Their ability to reach perfection was pre-eminent, and they constituted a refined part of humanity. In the eyes of Schmidt-Phiseldeck, Europe was nothing less than the role model for the rest of the Earth.[16]

In comparing itself with other continents, Europe did not necessarily always understand itself as superior, and certain Enlightenment opinions testified to another point of view. Herder said that the people of Europe did not rise to culture by themselves, but thanks to eastern influences and foreign religions. Asia and Egypt were innovators of crafts, trade and science.[17] Among Romantic philosophers, an idea of Europe developed that also included negative aspects; sometimes it was even claimed that Asia and America served as correctives for Europe. The mechanical knowledge of Native Americans, which they used to develop roads and vehicles, was deemed inferior, but their crafts were seen as superior. The Native Americans were lacking in some virtues but superior to Europeans in others, possessing overpowering strength, passion and courage that could be likened to those of the ancient Greeks. In Asia and among the Native Americans, the individual person had not been as emancipated as in Europe, but a more primeval humanity remained – something essential that Europe lacked. Often this understanding was prompted by a profound nostalgia for religious sentiment and the wisdom lost in a Europe ruled by reason.[18]

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, comparisons between Europe, Asia and America – mainly the United States – were common. Even in the last instance, positive and negative views were presented. Regarding freedom, democracy and equality, the United States was mostly viewed with admiration. This large country to the West was regarded as a better and more modern Europe, and was often cited as a role model. It was considered a society based on freedom of speech and thought. Instead of feudal oppression and autocratic monarchies, there were civil rights and a democratic representative system of governance. America was also seen as a role model because it had been created by Europeans acting as free men, so it was implicitly or explicitly argued that the example of the New World should be followed by the old.[19] There were exceptions to this positive view of America, however: as long as the slave trade existed, it was condemned as a token of incomplete development, and it had a lack of empathy, compared with Europe. The British author Harriet Martineau applauded the principles of equality evident in American society, but was quick to say that the country did not live up

to its own high ideals: 'the civilisation and morals of the Americans fall far below their own principles'. She wrote that although five states had abolished slavery, it was still practised by many others. She also wrote that the 'principle of the equal rights of both halves of the human race' was obligatory for a functional democratic society, and that that principle regarding women's political and economic freedoms was lacking in American society of the 1830s.[20] Moreover, it was claimed that some forms of progress had gone too far in America, as illustrated by its perfectly straight streets, precise sense of purpose, and overly intense modernity. Europe was seen as the opposite, with its traditions and slowness. This contrast was assessed in both positive and negative terms.

The arts of music, theatre and literature reflected these contrasts. Alexandre Dumas, son of the novelist of the same name, wrote a play about a disgraceful and unpolished stranger who came from America.[21] In a novel by the American writer Henry James, who actually lived mostly in England, an American businessman finds art, knowledge and honesty, but also ugliness, evil and passivity when visiting Europe, and France in particular. He detests Europe but ultimately realises that it has made him question his more utilitarian American way of life. Another of James's novels inverts this notion, contrasting the European guests with their hosts and siblings in New England. The former have had cosmopolitan lives, living in various countries and cities around Europe, being accustomed to a formal daily life. They realise that, in America, individual freedom is more evident; for example, women are less dependent on their fathers or husbands than they are in Europe. Americans are less formal and more spontaneous, looking for practical and effective ways of doing things; their feelings are more outspoken, while their respect for morals and tradition is stronger.[22]

As a consequence of contrasting Europe and the Europeans with other continents and peoples, the perception of the superiority of the white race began to expand. The idea of race became popular during the Enlightenment, and was fully fledged by the nineteenth century, serving as a template for most Eurocentrism of the age. It was often said that Europe conquered the world due to the emergence of the white race. The Europeans were long considered to belong to a single white race. For one author, it differed from other races in its ability to adapt and build civilisations, and though divided into Slavic, Germanic and Romance peoples, these main groups were still to be considered one and the same race.[23] A popular textbook said that the 'European race, to which we belong, is distinguished from all the rest by a natural complexion of white, mingled with red. . . . They usually have straight hair, an oval face, an expanded forehead, a rounded full chin, and generally the most regular and beautiful features'. Almost all of the peoples living in Europe were included, but also some others: 'It also embraces the

nations of Western Asia, as far as the river Oby, the Belur Tag, and the Himmaleh Mountains, with the people of Barbary, Egypt and Abyssinia, and the Moors of Northern Africa'. Obviously, these were former civilisations and high cultures, connected by the same white race.[24]

The notion of a dominant European white race changed, especially when it became common to highlight the diversity of Europe's races at the end of the nineteenth century. By then the Romance, Germanic and Slavic peoples were considered the three European, or Aryan, races. Moreover, some groups of people were distinguished as non-Aryan: Magyars, Turks, Jews, Finns and Lapps, Latvians, Albanians and Romani.[25] In this period, eugenics had become institutionalised as a science. Charles Darwin's cousin Francis Galton presented the English term 'eugenics' in 1883. The German term '*Rassenhygiene*' was introduced several years later to refer to the doctrine of preventing the degeneration of the population.[26] Because of the popularity of the notion of race, it was not surprising that it was occasionally brought into the discourse of a United States of Europe. By this token, unity was not something that only concerned political relations between France, Germany, Great Britain, and the other states; it was not limited to the cultural dimension, but could also imply that the white race should be brought together into one community to resist the threat of the yellow race.[27]

The notion of the 'scientific' superiority of the white race was most apparent in the theories of the racial hygienists. At universities and dedicated institutions, research on racial hygiene was supported, and groups were founded to spread its teachings. Moreover, Eurocentrism made its mark on theories in other sciences. With the first publication of *Black Athena* in 1987, Martin Bernal challenged the dominant historiography of the European heritage of antiquity. He claimed that an 'Aryan model' of history had been established by a large number of German philosophers in the nineteenth century in order to cast ancient Greek culture as more European than it actually was. The Aryan model claimed that Greek culture was the result of Indo-Germanic tribes conquering the Greek peninsula; this model replaced an older model that emphasised connections between different cultures around the Mediterranean. Bernal himself has shown great interest in the value of the latter theory, and has noted that ancient Greek culture did not have exclusively European roots, but was multicultural, with Egypt playing a significant role.[28]

A temporal difference underpinned many of the contrasts established during the Enlightenment between Europe and white Europeans, on the one hand, and non-Western lands, cultures and peoples on the other. The more developed and progressive Western cultures were considered temporally ahead of the others: they were more advanced and the others were

lagging behind. In some cases, these non-Western lands had reached only the very early stages of development, while others were on their way, but had not yet advanced as far as the cultures of Europe. The Europeans, therefore, assumed 'the white man's burden', as Rudyard Kipling famously put it, to guide the others out of their backwardness, lifting them up to higher culture and better standards. Making contrasts by propounding differences in temporality bestowed legitimacy on Eurocentric worldviews and colonial dominance.[29]

Towards a Notion of European Civilisation

Johann Gottfried Herder warned that a united Europe would soon become a despotic state that deprived its constituent nations of their individuality. Nevertheless, he described Europe as an enlightened continent with a shared specific culture characterised by diligence, invention, science, and joint efforts.[30] Jean-Jacques Rousseau rejected the idea of European political unity as well as existing centralised and absolutist states in favour of smaller political units and looser confederations. He presented a kind of unity that was not formally ratified in a confederation but silently brought together the politically divided Europe by means of other ties, such as common interests, common principles, and a certain 'conformity of habits and customs'. The different states of Europe were united, whether or not they strove to be, and they 'constituted a kind of whole, united by identity of religion, of moral standard, of international law: by letters, by commerce and finally by a species of balance which is the inevitable result of all these ties'.[31] There were similar elements of thinking, for instance, in the writings of Edmund Burke, the conservative advocate of the English Enlightenment, and harsh critic of the French Revolution. He claimed that there were shared customs and traditions in Europe that originated from common sources. They had evolved over the centuries and were recurrent in religion, political economy, science, and educational institutions.[32]

The pleas for political unity all considered the formal and legal aspects of a possible European union or federation. They were of a practical nature, aiming at overcoming the physical warfare among European states by establishing another institutional and political level. However, the dreams of Europe were also about other kinds of unity that did not necessarily imply economic, legal or political unification. Europe was also about looking for common ground that would go beyond both political and mental borders.

The idea of an existing European unity was planted in the soil of Enlightenment philosophy. One might wonder about the extent to which the kind of unity that Herder, Rousseau and Burke posited was already in

existence. Apparently, Novalis did not see it this way, as he emphasised the many religious divides and political conflicts. Today we know that some degree of unity existed among the elites in terms of customs, morals, and ability to communicate with one another (mostly in French). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the integration of high culture took place, and the 'Republic of Letters' was established among the intellectual elites.[33] On the other hand, there was linguistic heterogeneity among the lower classes, and Europe was a conflict-ridden continent with a multitude of contradictory interests, not least regarding religion. Although Rousseau and others were in search of a common European culture or civilisation, this was almost non-existent, and where it did exist, it was overshadowed by internal strife and warfare.

The search for common ground was evident in texts from the first half of the nineteenth century that defined various features regarded as typically European. There were mentions of such things as European states, countries, nations, peoples, and even a European world. These features were responsible for giving rise to European industry, commerce, communication and education, which in turn produced European goods and wealth. The inhabitants of Europe had European manners, customs, ideas, governments and religions; they also had European art, literature, schools and universities. All of these existed thanks to European thought and the European mind. There was a European spirit of enterprise and a European spirit of experimental research. There was a movement to establish the idea of common ground within the area that, more than anything else, defined the cultural distinctiveness of Europe; comparative studies of linguistics even contended that European languages had a shared origin. Early on, the Edinburgh professor Alexander Murray distinguished five groups of Europeans – the Celts, Teutones (Germans), Slavs, Greeks and Romans, and Finns (including Hungarians) – and declared that he could 'ascertain the general affinities of the European nations by examining the origin and progress of their languages'.[34] The theory was that the main European languages had shared the same beginnings.[35] Not only were there European languages, but also a European (that is, Latin) alphabet. The importance of this was emphasised with Eurocentric overtones: civilised languages had established writing, and the world under European dominion would benefit if it adopted its alphabet. How simple it would be if the British rulers of India could impose their own language and writing. How advantageous it would be if the European alphabet could be implemented in China, supplanting the use of Chinese characters.[36]

In the search for common ground going beyond political borders, we can identify two concepts that were especially important and much relied upon: culture and civilisation. Others were invoked, but not nearly as often.

Take, for instance, 'European spirit'. This was occasionally referred to in English, but was not developed as a theme or stressed as a specific feature, as opposed to the way both culture and civilisation were mentioned, and hardly any books from that period refer to the notion of a European spirit in their titles. A search of digital libraries gives a tentative measure of the impact of these notions. Looking at the frequency of mentions in titles between 1800 and 1914, the English term 'European civilisation' is used twenty-eight times more often than is 'European spirit'. The difference is even greater in French, in which 'civilisation européenne' results in forty-eight times more hits than does 'esprit européenne', while in Spanish 'civilisacion europea' is fourteen times more frequent than 'espiritu europeo' and in German 'Europäische Civilisation' is seven times more common than 'Europäische Geist'. We can also compare the relative frequencies of mentions of 'European culture' and 'European civilisation' by searching in digital libraries. Searching for 'European civilisation' results in about three times more hits than for 'European culture'. In Spanish and French, the ratios are 4:1 and 6:1 respectively, whereas in German the relationship is reversed, such that 'European culture' gives slightly more than twice as many hits.[37]

'European culture' was a catchphrase used by German writers in the nineteenth century to relate a shared history and refer to common cultural features. These writers discussed how European culture influenced the peripheries, and how it should be imposed on newly conquered territories, such as Bosnia after the Habsburgs took control of it from the Ottomans. Textbooks proclaimed the advanced state of European culture: 'The state of Culture has in most of the European states reached a height, which we have previously not seen in any other parts of the world'.[38] In the English-speaking world, the concept of European culture was used more rarely and mainly with reference to intellectual life – for example, belles-lettres and philosophy, the world of learning, progress in science, and technological improvements.[39]

The notion of culture could refer to Europe and to common experiences, ways of life, and traditions, regardless of whether they were Danish, Swiss or Greek. This was more common in Germany than in other countries. However, deciding what constituted Europe's distinguishing traits was no simple task, so culture was not on the mark when it came to defining the common basis of Europe.

Culture was, however, equipped to deal with the divisions of Europe, because already by the late Enlightenment the concept was useful in capturing the distinct differences and unique qualities of the various European nations. Compared with other countries, Germany encountered more of this, at least in part thanks to the influence of Herder, who was one of its

main propagators, inspiring many to look at national cultures in a positive light. Yes, the notion of a European culture was in place, but so was that of a German, French and British culture, and soon of a Czech, Finnish and Estonian culture, and so on. Drawing upon the history of ideas, we can conclude that culture has been strongly associated with nationalism. In fact, there was another way to express the dream of continent-wide unity that went beyond political borders.[40] The concept of civilisation differs from that of culture because it can more readily connote a unity that goes beyond a single nation. When the term civilisation was used in nationalism and national ventures, it was to indicate that one nation had or should take the leading role in European civilisation.

The idea of a shared European civilisation became increasingly common in the early nineteenth century. It is well worth looking further into how it is defined. To address a shared community across borders, the attraction of referring to civilisation starts from the assumption of a community of the mind with shared experiences, prerequisites and objectives. This was done from an early stage, without any implication of creating a single political entity.

'Civilisation' was a new word that had entered the European consciousness in the late eighteenth century, preceding 'European civilisation' by only a few decades. We know that 'civilisation' was used in English in the second half of the eighteenth century in the context of assimilating the barbaric Scottish Highlanders to civil manners, civil law, and the demands of the economy.[41] In an authoritative account of the word in French, the historian Lucien Febvre dates its first use to 1766. The noun 'civilisation' was constructed and originally used in the vocabulary of political economy and soon spread among the well-educated. It was constructed from the much older verb 'civiliser' (to civilise) and from the participle 'civilisé' (civilised). It soon became a landmark of the great aspirations of progress that we can detect in the urge to investigate humanity and nature, in the trust in scientific knowledge, and in the hopes of being able to design a better society. Civilisation was initially a universalist idea, an ideal that society should strive for. With such great hopes attached to the word, one would perhaps not be surprised that the daughter of a deputy to the National Assembly in Paris was reportedly baptised 'Civilisation' in 1792. However, only a few decades later, it was considered to be the existing reality of Europe.[42]

In nineteenth-century literature on European civilisation, 'civilisation' was often used synonymously with 'culture', indicating an ever-closer union between the concepts of Europe and progress.[43] Civilisation could simply mean the distinction between living in a society versus life as a savage. In this instance, civilisation was not seen as the result of a specific kind of

government, but rather how one could become a social being through education: 'civilisation is the present product of that education'.[44] Added to this was the increase in knowledge, the production of goods, and the enjoyment of conveniences.[45] As civilisation implied that Europeans were more educated and their riches were greater, it also established a starker contrast and superiority to other continents.

Civilisation could invoke a shared monarchical system, resemblances in public life, a basically shared Christian religion, a common lifestyle, and shared cultural practices.[46] Others professed that civilisation was a modern and liberal society as opposed to authoritarian rule and conservative norms – if not yet in place, it was in the making.[47] One could also say that civilisation described all of Europe because there was some understanding of science and knowledge in all of them, including in countries still considered barbaric, such as Russia and Portugal. As a consequence, some parts of Europe were said to have enlightened nations

> in which knowledge is more general, and sciences and arts are found in the greatest perfection . . . All the branches of art and manufacture are carried on in a more skilful, productive and useful manner, with the aid of machinery, and minute division of labour. Commerce is extended to every quarter of the globe. The political institutions are also such as to give greater liberty and more safety than in other countries.[48]

In all its varieties, the concept of a 'European civilisation' was intended to inculcate a feeling of unity. This is obvious in how historians addressed the concept. European nations were defined by particular histories, by being predominantly Catholic or Protestant, and often by one shared language, whereas the history of European civilisation was defined by Christianity, a communal history, and forgotten language issues. François Guizot, whose *The History of Civilization in Europe* of 1828 became greatly influential throughout Europe, took up the tradition from certain Enlightenment historians of writing a general European history, giving the genre a new vigour by taking country-level differences into account.[49] He wrote

> that a certain unity pervades the civilization of the European states; that, notwithstanding infinite diversities of time, place, and circumstance, this civilization takes its first rise in facts almost wholly similar, proceeds everywhere upon the same principles, and tends to produce well nigh everywhere analogous results. There is, then, an European civilization.[50]

His main argument is that diversity is what distinguishes Europe from earlier civilisations, in which one single principle dominated and led to monotony in all aspects of social life. Be it Greek, Roman, Indian or Jewish civilisation, all lacked the endless variety of modern Europeans, who did not accept any limitations or artificial standards but were free to grow and shape their own lives. Guizot found progress to be central to civilisation, and the peoples

of Europe were advancing and improving their conditions. Social relations were becoming better organised. Not only was each nation's prosperity improving but wealth was becoming more equally distributed. In addition, individual progress was occurring. The human mind was developing, which affected intellectual life, intelligence and morals. Guizot argued that both social and moral development were needed: 'they reciprocally produce one another' such that civilisation is not possible with only one or the other, and can only move forward with the cooperation of both society and its individual members. Societies advance with the help of rational refinement, and individuals strive for perfection as rational beings. Guizot hoped to prove this by looking to history, by better understanding how civilisation had progressed in times of both success and crisis.[51]

Although Guizot's view of Europe was generally accepted, he considered France its centre and leader, stressing its sociability and greatness, arguing that he did not find a single idea that was not of French origin.[52] Thus, his very exposition of European civilisation included borders within Europe as well as a view of France as the most civilised country. Guizot had widespread influence, not least in Great Britain,[53] where, however, there was less willingness to view France as the centre of civilisation – there it was rather that England was in the lead.[54]

A major voice in the British discussion of a European civilisation was that of historian Henry Thomas Buckle. He believed that a European civilisation was one in which humankind's might would elevate it above nature, transcending non-European civilisations. It had a spirit that was secular and sceptical, based on proven abilities and radical scientific discoveries, freeing political subjects and bringing more tolerance to religion. Europe was created using the power of the human mind and the progress of human knowledge, which had already civilised a number of European countries: 'the growth of European civilization is solely due to the progress of knowledge'. According to Buckle, European civilisation would bring progress and liberty, and like Guizot, he also believed that it would go hand in hand with division: 'The national progress, in connection with popular liberty, could have originated in no other part of the world except in Europe; where, therefore the rise of real civilization . . . [is] alone to be studied'.[55] England, America, Germany, France and Spain were proudly held up as the most prized examples of European civilisation. Europe was one, yet also divided.

Buckle and Guizot were the prime exponents of a new theory of history that emphasised Europe and had its roots in the Enlightenment. It was understood that history should no longer be confined to themes and ideas from antiquity, as Europe was superior to the Greeks and Romans. This was a theory that focused on what made Europe European, both by definition and in contrast to others.[56]

Shared versus Divided Christianity

Throughout the nineteenth century, the shared civilisation of Europe was repeatedly mentioned as a fact, but with an understanding of the political and religious divides of the continent. Christianity's role as a common foundation was emphasised, as was its support for the progress of civilisation, the ultimate proof being the advance of Europe into a leading position.[57] On the other hand, much attention was paid to the impact of the Reformation and the divide between Catholicism and Protestantism.[58] Guizot mentioned, for instance, the special importance of Christianity to European civilisation in the development of the human intellect, noting the significance of the Reformation when the Church of Rome had become static, and he upheld the importance of advancing the principles of 'justice, legality, publicity, liberty'.[59]

The criticisms of Catholicism, especially the inquisition, were based on the social restrictions imposed by the church. A visceral indictment from Dutch-ruled Brussels in 1828 attacked Catholicism and the Catholic monarchs of Austria, France, Italy and Spain for opposing civilisation. Only Protestant countries with rulers who were in touch with the progress of civilisation could save Europe; earlier it was Prussia that had defended it, but now it was primarily England and secondarily the Netherlands.[60] Others settled for a more modest argument about the importance of the Reformation for European progress, and might have conceded that some reforms of the Catholic Church were also important in this respect.[61] The division between the North moving quickly forward and the South moving at a slower pace became clear when progress was presented as a prerogative of Protestantism. Christianity thus became essential for European civilisation, with the Protestant spirit of the North as its powerful engine.[62]

The Spanish theologian Jaime Luciano Balmes earned a reputation around Europe for his defence of Catholicism as establishing the foundations of European civilisation. Lutheranism brought incredulity, religious indifference, and an incapacity for morality and happiness to the people, whereas Europe under the influence of Catholicism went from disorder to order, such that 'civilisation advanced at a firm and steady pace'.[63] Protestantism did not favour civilisation, but was instead an obstacle and destroyer that further divided sixteenth-century Europe. Quite opposite to Guizot's view is a telling passage by Balmes, insisting that certain evils were because of Protestantism: 'There is no middle path: either civilised nations must remain Catholic, or they must run through all the forms of error'.[64] However, he found a general trend of increasingly close relationships in modern Europe: it had been three hundred years since anything had been 'isolated, everything is general and acquires by expansion a terrible force', and all 'nations are connected, objects are assimilated, relations increase'.[65] Protestantism had spread as a

consequence of this, but had not caused the general trend. Only Catholicism could claim to have played the principal part and to have the most intimate relationship with civilisation, whereas 'Protestantism has prevented civilization from becoming homogeneous, in spite of a strong tendency urging all the nations of Europe to homogeneity'.[66]

Balmes differed from Guizot in the privileged position given to Catholicism, but also in downgrading diversity to an obstacle to European civilisation: through commerce, printing and the arts, a perfect state of homogeneity could have been created were it not for Protestantism, which divided the European community into two parts and sowed 'mortal hatred' between them. This understanding of the Reformation was vital to Balmes, as he expounded on how the division spread. In the absence of spiritual unity based on religion, a schism had become present in all parts of societal life:

> Civil and political institutions, and all the branches of learning, had appeared and prospered in Europe under the influence of religion; the schism was religious; it affected even the root, and extended to the branches. Thus arose among the various nations those brazen walls which kept them separate; the spirit of suspicions and mistrust was everywhere spread, things which before would have been innocent and without importance, from that time were looked upon as eminently dangerous.[67]

Some did not see the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism as essential to the progress of civilisation. Gustav Diezel, a radical revolutionary in 1848 and later a journalist, argued that individual economic freedoms were the source of European civilisation, and said that some Catholic states defended them while they were not allowed in others. Referring to England and France as the two most civilised states, and noting one to be Catholic and the other Protestant, he attempted to downplay the religious disputes. However, he recognised England as having greater success in industry and trade, but this he attributed to its economic freedom, as opposed to the absolute state-imposed economy of France, insisting that it had nothing to do with religion.[68]

This is how the notion of a common European civilisation was born, with a shared destiny beyond the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, who had a culture in common and were citizens of a community of states. The Protestant jurist Johann Caspar Bluntschli mentioned a feeling of shared belonging and kinship that united the European states, in spite of the divides caused by the Reformation. Demarcated from Asia, a unique European civilisation existed. A system of states and community rights was built upon this, as was the foundation for both past and future cooperation: 'The Holy Alliance, that was joined by almost all European states, was . . . a religiously motivated expression of the same basic idea, that the Christian European states should be continuously connected to one another in an

organised community of rights'. From these starting points, he expounded his proposal for a European federation.[69]

Civilisation on Everybody's Lips

By the mid-nineteenth century, civilisation was on everybody's lips: 'Civilisation! Surely has no era talked more about civilisation than ours; it is also certain that no other spoken word is more futile and hypocritical'.[70] These words capture the popularity of the concept, which had split and begun to point in two directions: it was used both in a general and abstract sense, and it was applied more narrowly and concretely to policy issues. Apart from European civilisation, other civilisations had also begun to be represented. A work published in Madrid portrayed the Incas not only as people who ruled an empire, but also as a civilisation.[71] An English Quaker called for the recognition of the Native Americans of North America as a civilisation.[72] There were discussions of a Muhammadan civilisation, and of a Central African civilisation.[73] All of these civilisations, however, were left behind by the forward progress of Europe. Accordingly, the notion of civilisation served the purpose of putting Europe in a binary position – Europe was a modern civilisation versus an ancient one, an occidental civilisation versus an Arabic one – and ageing civilisations were compared with newer ones, with some civilisations being better or worse, and some being in between.[74] Europe was a Western civilisation, set against the backwardness of Russia.[75] Civilisation was the opposite of barbarism, the former being active and energetic with members who could mobilise endless resources.[76]

One would expect that in the mightier states of Europe, with their empires that stretched across the oceans, there would be suggestions that these states might represent their own specific civilisations. It was definitely so in Spain, where it was as common to refer to a specific Spanish civilisation as to a shared European one.[77] The idea of an English civilisation had taken root both in Britain and across the Atlantic, although it was not as pervasive as in the case of Spain.[78] Guizot used the notion 'la civilization française' very rarely in his book, and only slightly more 'la civilization romaine'. Buckle rarely referred to an 'English civilisation', and never wrote about a 'British civilisation'. Overall, both French and British authors seemed more prone to talk about the civilisation *in* Britain/England and *in* France than about specific civilisations of their own. In doing so, they claimed that their country was at the centre of European civilisation and at the zenith of its achievements.[79]

It was possible to imagine the existence of a national civilisation, just as it was possible to imagine the existence of a common European nation that included the English, German, Italian and Swedish. These were, however,

exceptions that failed to change the general configuration. In the same way that nations signified a community that was separate from other nations and seen as unique, so did its civilisation distinguish Europe as separate from Africa and Asia, with common features shared by its people. The concepts of nation and civilisation form a binary in that they are opposites that are dependent upon each other when their meanings are defined; for example, European civilisation includes several nations, while these nations are separate entities that at the same time are part of the larger civilisation.

There was more to it than that, however, as the strong connection to Europe was also a commitment. A country that was truly civilised and mighty would have a responsibility to spread this civilisation to new lands. Hence, when the Crimean War ended and some parts of the Ottoman Empire were transferred to the Habsburg Empire, a government adviser said that Austria should undertake a 'mission, to be the bearer of civilisation in the lands newly won for Europe'.[80]

It says something about the peculiar intersection of nations and European civilisation that this civilisation's origin was a matter of opinion. European civilisation was often believed to be three thousand five hundred years old, beginning in Ancient Hellas, with classical culture playing an important role.[81] Others saw the beginning in Christianity, and still others turned to the modern world and stressed the importance of the British, French or German nation. It was common to regard the current civilisation as predated by others. Guizot mentioned Greek, Roman, Indian and Jewish civilisations, and other historians further elaborated upon the theme. All of them took care to discuss the supremacy of the civilisation of Europe: although the Greek and Roman civilisations had accomplished great things, neither of them could be compared to the contemporary one, and although there were other civilisations one could set against Europe's, it was the European civilisation that reigned supreme.

Moreover, the beginning of European civilisation was an issue that involved the status of European states relative to one another. Writing during the era of Italian unification, Bertrando Spaventa discussed modern philosophy as shared between the European people, just as European nations had a shared life and civilisation. At the same time, he explicitly attested to an Italian philosophy that underpinned the efforts to define the idea of Italian nationality. This blending of European unity and nationality was done using 'Italian intellect' – the value of bringing all parts of European thinking into a harmonious unity. 'Italy opened the door to modern civilisation', he concluded, referring to a range of philosophers – among them Bruno, Campanella and Vico.[82]

There were those who clung to the idea of a European civilisation, although arguing about its origins in either classical Greece or Rome, and

disagreeing as to whether Britain, France or Germany was the key country influencing its development. The Spanish Jesuit Juan Andrés, who had been expelled from his homeland together with his order, presented a remarkable Arabic theory of the origin of civilisation. He was not alone in discussing Arabic influences. In England, France and Italy, representatives of the well-educated world discussed Arabic influences on poetry. Frederick II and his court were acknowledged as a hub of Arabic learning in the thirteenth century. However, Andrés had a farther-reaching interpretation of this, saying that Europe should pay tribute to Arabic teachings for many of its traditions, including literature, medicine, jurisprudence, astronomy and mathematics. In these areas, Europe had learned quite a lot from Arabic culture, and it was only thanks to this that Europe had eventually become culturally and intellectually superior. It was from this perspective – which has recently been emphasised by Roberto M. Dainotto – that Andrés placed the origin of European civilisation in Southern Europe. He especially emphasised the way European culture had learned from Spain and not from France. Following a similar line of thought, the Italian Orientalist Michele Amari stated that the Mediterranean – in particular, Sicily – was the origin of European civilisation, as it was where freedom, solidarity and equality had first taken hold on the continent, long before the French Revolution and even before the Enlightenment. With a radical turn of historical perspective, Amari argued that Europe was living in darkness when the Muslims introduced such ideals in Sicily.[83]

Here, we should consider a historically significant genre: travel tales published as books or in popular journals, in which Europeans are confronted with natives on other continents. Here exoticism plays a part, and fascination with the unknown goes hand in hand with the blessings of European civilisation, its organisation of society, level of learning, ways of life, and prosperity. Locations where Europeans were operating were emphasised, be it a trade station, church, or small colonial setting. Aspects of this can also be seen in travel tales from provincial parts of Europe – in the Balkans, for example, some behaviours are seen as European while others are not, and some institutions as influenced by European civilisation and others as not.[84]

However, we can also observe that referring to the concept of civilisation can be a means to gain legitimacy for actual policies. In the decades around the mid-eighteenth century, we can find examples of authors examining the policies of economic free trade, education, and external relations towards Russia. Richard Cobden, among the most ardent apostles of free trade in Britain, argued that it was a blessing for Europe. It was for the good of its people and for the good of its civilisation, because it extended European trade to new areas and cities – for example, Odessa on the Black Sea. Commerce greatly benefited civilisation, which 'is the grand panacea

which, like a beneficent medical discovery, will serve to inoculate with the healthy and saving taste for civilization all the nations of the world'.[85]

Professor Karl Hermann Scheidler claimed that a deficiency in educational institutions threatened not only the healthy development of the state and the democratic principle that all classes of society needed good education, but also the continued progress of European civilisation. He argued especially for the preservation of the agricultural institute of Hofwyhl, and referred to notable figures from many European states who had visited or mentioned it, making it a role model for other institutions in Europe: royalty, professors, and representatives of higher bureaucracies were mentioned, most notably Tsar Alexander, who not only paid a visit but even made sure that sons of the leading Russian aristocratic families were educated there. Scheidler emphasised that education was the main factor in cultivating civilisation, because human beings attained a human life only by interacting with others, learning from others, and using reason. Consciousness and intellectual life were developed by learning, so good institutions for education were necessary. Existing civilisations were seen as resulting from societal education. As Europe was the leading civilisation, it was necessary to maintain a high level of education there. From this perspective, Scheidler criticised the tendencies of Europe's societies to weaken their position, decrying pauperism as well as education that excluded many. Instead, a true and good civilisation should agree that humans yearn for 'happiness, perfection, and morality' for all the population. Scheidler believed that education was the chief means to overcome destructive tendencies. Hofwyhl's importance was based on its founder's pedagogy, which inspired the better-known Pestalozzi to turn to all classes of society and combine education in practical economic issues with that in intellectual and spiritual matters of learning.[86]

Policies targeting Russia reinforced the notion that the country was not part of European civilisation. In Germany, it was said that Russia was not of German, Roman or Latin origin, having a non-European kind of Christianity, and lacking freedom and law. It had not adapted to innovations and had not risen to the high standards of European civilisation.[87] The Crimean War of 1853–56 provided more reasons to raise the banner against Russia, when France and the United Kingdom, with some support from Sardinia-Piedmont and Austria, supported the Ottoman Empire in defending its provinces across the Black Sea from Russian occupation. Richard Cobden, always ready to comment on major affairs, called upon the British government to negotiate with Austria and the German Federation, as these countries were 'completely identified' with the cause of Britain and France: '[T]here are grounds for believing, that, for the *future*, Germany may be reckoned upon, by Western Europe, as the bulwark against Russian aggression'. He conceived the threat from Russia as a European question, a matter of

Europe's safety, and concluded that it would be good if a treaty were settled, but even better if the states of Western Europe would enter into a federation to stand against Russia.[88] Another example was that of Emil von Qvanten, from a wealthy Swedish-speaking family in Finland, who pleaded for Sweden to take an active part in the conflict against Russia during the Crimean War. His background played a role in his standpoint, as the Swedish king and aristocracy had ruled Finland for six hundred years, and the pain from that division of the state could still be felt, though more so west of the Baltic Sea. Qvanten's argument was that Finland had its heart in European civilisation and should be welcomed in, while Russia should recognise its duty to turn east, not west, and towards the adolescent and undeveloped countries of the Orient by sharing the European mission to 'advance civilisation'. If Russia did this, it would find support and praise from 'West European civilisation' – but it would have to be forced to take this drastic action, he added from his exile in Stockholm.[89]

In this context of a perceived threat, the mention of civilisation was frequent. 'L'Europe aux Européens' was proposed as a motto by a French historian when he saw the modern European civilisation as inevitably threatened by Tatarian Russia. The two could not coexist: a battle was bound to take place, and one party would lose. The best bet would be to create a European federation to build strength for what was to come.[90] Thus, when policy makers appealed to European civilisation, it was to spur on the unification of Europe for the sake of defending that civilisation.

Discontent with Civilisation

> We find ourselves to-day in the midst of a somewhat peculiar state of society, which we call Civilisation, but that even among the most optimistic among us does not seem altogether desirable.[91]

With these lines, the socialist poet Edward Carpenter began his 1891 critique of civilisation. His words should be read in light of the concept of civilisation, embedded as it was in developments regarding commerce, technical innovation, means of communication, and the production of material wealth. Industrialisation and new modes of production led not only to increasing wealth, but also to harsher working conditions and the marginalisation of older businesses, to the point that these tendencies met with criticism throughout the century. Not only were there revolts against the installation of new machines, and protests against capitalist modes of production, but much was also written about such issues. The social question was a constant, leading to investigations of working-class conditions and criticism of the inhumanity prevalent in the growing centres of industrialisation. This

was connected to spreading industrialisation and growing markets, so much so that by the turn of the century all European countries had been affected.

We should not be surprised, then, to learn that not everyone was happy with civilisation. As European civilisation had spread to most European countries it had brought with it poverty, one early critic said. One effect of it was the unequal division of property, to the extent that the bulk of humankind was deprived of basic comforts, which destroyed both body and mind.[92] Carpenter, inspired by this, wrote about the conditions of civilised man. Physically, he said, the dispersal of civilisation had spread illness, and wherever it arrived, inhabitants had begun to suffer from disease. Not only individual people but also the very societies themselves had begun to suffer from disease, which could be blamed on their lack of unity. The effects of this were actual warfare between classes and among individuals, along with mental unrest and an ever-present sense of sin among the population. Carpenter confessed to holding a Communist view and an ideal vision of society, seeing the root of the problem as private property and class government. His solution for the illness of civilisation was more communal unity: 'There is more true social unity, less of disease'. Communities should be established that have mutual respect among their inhabitants, and no division into rich and poor. Although he was not a Marxist, he was rather close to William Morris in developing his cure for civilisation. He outlined the divinity within every human as a general starting point from which to subordinate one's own greed and longing for personal fame, in favour of naturally endowed unity. Beyond civilisation, he saw the new Eden of a simpler life, advocating vegetarianism and more time spent outdoors. A new kind of architecture should try to construct buildings that would preserve the given landscape, with houses 'built for the use of free men and women', not for private lives, but for community life.[93]

Such criticism did not worry the defenders of European civilisation. Though it might have its weaknesses and even be associated with disease, that did not make their civilisation a burden: its positives greatly outweighed its negatives, and it had to be defended. As one defender said, 'the stronger the light is, the more glaring the shadow'.[94]

In Germany, Friedrich Nietzsche merged the concept of civilisation with a call for unity. He was one of the most outspoken critics of the present civilisation in the West, condemning it as decadent, and putting his hope in the future unity of Europe. A new way to consider the concept of civilisation, which would prove to be of importance after the First World War, was instituted. It was then that the unification of Europe was established as a way out of the decay of European civilisation and its inner strife.

When Nietzsche was discussing 'the moral sentiment in Europe', he famously described Europe as a small peninsula that set itself above Asia as

representing humankind's progress. Unlike Carpenter, Nietzsche talked distinctly of a *European* civilisation and addressed the issue of European unity. He envisioned European civilisation as marked by moral hypocrisy and nihilism. Nietzsche said that the modern European man was strongly dissatisfied with himself, and largely practised an ugly kind of self-contempt. Progress might appear to help, but it did nothing but add distractions that concealed the true illness. High ideals of civilisation, humanitarianism and democracy were nothing more than seductive costumes disguising the fact that Europe was very sick. In his diagnosis, the free will of Europeans had been cast aside in the pursuit of scientific objectivity and a paralysing scepticism. Modern European man was no longer able to make independent decisions. Some of this fundamental moral capability was still seen in Germany and especially its northern parts, as well as in England, Spain and Corsica, though less so in Italy. Nietzsche remarked that perhaps a growing threat from the Russians would force Europe to wake up and unite to take a stand against its eastern neighbour and share a single common will.[95]

He believed that Europe should be one, and he condemned the severe divisions that had led to violent national struggles, viewing such strife as madness. The estrangement that followed was further enabled by politicians who only managed to see the short term, putting aside the idea that 'Europe wishes to be one'. He saw one Europe – that existed despite its many fatherlands – expressed by great men such as Napoleon, Goethe, Heine, Schopenhauer and, among his own contemporaries, Wagner and Delacroix. These men embodied the European soul. He called for an end to petty politics and renounced the obsession with 'petty stateism'. A new ruling class would need to take over for the sake of Europe's future. When he said that the time of dynasties had passed, it was obvious that dynasties should be replaced by the notion of a united Europe. When he stated that the era of democracies, with its struggles between the wills of the many, belonged to the past, he added fuel to the political philosophy fire, which persists to the present.[96]

Although critics such as Nietzsche existed, the idea that Europe was privileged because of its history, geography and human resources was a strong and inspirational framework. European civilisation ruled the world, bringing order, culture, moral guidance, and progress. The dawn of European civilisation was to be found in Greek and Roman antiquity. European civilisation had brought humankind its greatest achievements. European science was constantly achieving brilliant breakthroughs. Its military forces and military advances had conquered the world, while its celebrated arts had captivated the senses. A certain spirit imbued Europeans with a particular momentum, and during all of this, Europe was considered a single unified entity.

Some progressivists, who believed that Europe was of its time, also depicted Europe as nothing less than an expression of time itself. This was the case with the Swedish author Carl Johan Almqvist, who embodied much of the discontent of the late 1840s. In a novel, he pleaded for more freedom, and claimed that every man and woman should be free to realise their true character. Against inner composure, the truly human, righteousness, and God's voice, he placed external wretchedness and bewilderment. His novel was set in a Swedish mansion but his ambition was to convey something more universal, that the human being was essentially caught in a battle between real human nature and the curses of life as it was. He wrote that everyone had an indisputable right to lead life according to his or her own desires and personality. A departure from societal conventions would therefore kindle the European revolution. Almqvist invoked not only the demands of the people but 'the spirit of the time', 'the words of the time', and the 'European spirit' that could lead all the people on Earth.[97] In truth, it was the future that Europe would introduce us to, would bring into our lives and dwellings, whether we wanted it or not:

> Europe has no issues more important than these . . . no heart in our part of the world is now beating for anything else, no head is thinking about anything else. . . . The European future is standing by us all in the entrance hall and it wants to come in. The one who will not open his door to the knocker will have his door staved in.[98]

One conclusion of this chapter is that the dream of European unity not only had a political dimension, as manifested in the pleas for a treaty, but many other dimensions, including tradition, religion and culture. Aside from the political language of European unity, we also find the cultural language of unity: one language that sets the terms of treaties and federations, and another language of unity that concerns cultural traditions and shared customs. Both can be future oriented, but both can still take inspiration from history. They can be separate and intertwined. Furthermore, in emphasising cultural aspects, the concept of Europe is associated with divisions, between Catholicism, Lutheranism and Orthodoxy, between Russia and Western Europe, between Northern and Southern Europe. Furthermore, the cultural language of Europe privileges one or several nations against the others.

Notes

1. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 7–9.
2. Miettinen, 'The Particular Universal', 66.
3. Fischer, *Oriens – Occidens – Europa*, 78–79.
4. Hay, *Europe: The Emergence*, 25, 51–52.

5. Todorov, *The Morals of History*; Ivanka, *Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber*, 32–35, 103–5, 85.

6. Montesquieu, *Om lagarnas anda*, 161–64.

7. Herder, *Ideen* I, 40–44.

8. Hegel, *Vorlesungen*.

9. Koschorke, *Hegel und wir*.

10. Said, *Orientalism*.

11. E.g., by Hourani, *Islam in European Thought*, 63–64.

12. Ibid., 10–16, 24–27, 136–39.

13. Schön, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, 58–61; cf. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)* for examples from Italy (in the first instance) and France.

14. Venning, *A Geographical Present*, 2, 9, 51–52.

15. Cobden, *Political Writings*, 270–71.

16. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der Europäische Bund*, 69–74.

17. Herder, *Ideen* I, 393–95; II, 291.

18. Todorov, *The Morals of History*.

19. Philippi, *Geschichte der vereinigten Freistaaten*, 1–2; De Gurowski, *America and Europe*, 410.

20. Martineau, *Society in America* I, 199–207; quotation from III, 207.

21. Dumas, *L'Étrangère*.

22. James, *The Europeans*; James, *The American*.

23. E.g., Schön, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, 136.

24. Woodbridge, *Universal Geography*, 166; published in America, it was edited several times in Great Britain. Another popular American textbook that propagated the idea of a white race dominating Europe and its dominions was Pickering, *The Races of Man*.

25. Bluntschli, *Politik als Wissenschaft*, 160–63.

26. The idea of race is discussed in Hannaford, *Race*. Racism is discussed in depth by Malik, *The Meaning of Race*. The term *Rassenhygiene* was invented by Alfred Ploets.

27. E.g., Stein, *Die Vereinigte Staaten von Europa*, 19–22.

28. Bernal, *Black Athena*.

29. Cf. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 7–10.

30. Herder, *Ideen* II, 338, 484.

31. Heater, *European Unity*, 8–11, quotation from 81; Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 136–37.

32. Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution*; the argument is explored in Thompson, 'Ideas of Europe'.

33. Rietbergen, *Europe*, 259–300.

34. Murray, *History of European Languages*, 3.

35. See, e.g., Arndt, *Über den Ursprung*, 3.

36. Lepsius, *Das allgemeine linguistische Alphabet*, 4–7.

37. This search was conducted at the Hathi Trust Digital Library on 8 May 2017.

38. Hoffmann, *Europa und seine Bewohner*, 377: 'Der Kulturzustand hat in den meisten europäischen Staaten eine Höhe ereicht, wie wir ihn in keinem anderen Welttheile sehen'.

39. Allen, *History of Civilization*; Carlyle, *Lectures on the History*.

40. Verga, 'European Civilization'.

41. Caffentzis, 'Scottish Origin of "Civilization"'.

42. Febvre, 'Civilization'. See also Bowden, *The Empire of Civilization*, 26–34, who claimed that the concept first arose in France in the 1750s, and in Britain only a few years afterwards.

43. We find the following in a geography textbook by an American geographer and education reformer: 'Europe is the smallest of the great divisions of the world, and least

distinguished for the grandeur of its natural features; but in science, arts and improvements it surpasses all the rest. In modern times it has been the central point from which civilisation and knowledge have extended to other nations, and its emigrants have peopled all the civilized countries on the globe'; from Woodbridge, *Universal Geography*, 289.

44. Schön, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, 4: 'ist die civilisation das vorhandene product jener Erziehung'.

45. Hall, *The Effects of Civilisation*, 2.

46. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der Europäische Bund*, 48–55.

47. Mazzini, *De l'Italie*, 353.

48. Woodbridge, *Universal Geography*, 175–76.

49. Verga, 'European Civilization'.

50. Guizot, *History of Civilization in Europe*, 3.

51. Ibid., 3–24.

52. Ibid., 10.

53. See, e.g., the exposition on Guizot by MacLeod, *European Life*, 7–10.

54. E.g., D'Erbigny, *Future Destinies of Europe*, Section V.

55. Buckle, *History of Civilization* I: 210, 225; II: 1, 29, 45, quotation from I: 225. Published in French as *Histoire de la civilization en Angleterre* (Vols I–V), Paris: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven, 1865; published in German as *Geschichte der Civilisation in England*, Leipzig: C.F. Winter'schen Verlagshandlung, 1860–1861.

56. See Hazard, *Crisis of the European Mind*, 50–51; Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 30, 38, 50.

57. A Spanish writer and a Spanish theologian presented this idea with all possible conviction. See Roca y Cornet, 'La civilización', 19: La religion considerada como la base de la civilizacion' [Religion is understood as the basis of the civilisation]. See als Rodrígues Pridall, *Influencia del cristianismo*, 20.

58. E.g., the Reformation plays an important role in the regeneration of European civilisation in Schön, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, 85–95.

59. Guizot, *History of Civilization in Europe*, 3–24, quotations from 17, 24.

60. D'Erbigny, *Future Destinies of Europe*, 56, 84, 106, 130–43.

61. Schön, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, 85–88.

62. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 149–50.

63. Balmes, *European Civilization*, 50, quotation from 337; also published in French and German.

64. Balmes, *European Civilization*, 30.

65. Ibid., 37.

66. Ibid., quotation from 375.

67. Ibid., 376.

68. Diezel, *Die Frage der deutschen Zukunft*, 10–51.

69. Bluntschli, 'Die Organisation', 279–80, quotation from 280: 'Die heilige Allianz, dia fast alle europäische Staten beigetragen waren, war . . . ein religiös motivirter Ausdruck derselben Grundgedankens, dass die christlichen Statens Europas dauernd miteinander zu einer wohlgeordneten Rechtsgemeinschaft verbunden seien'.

70. Diezel, *Die Frage der deutschen Zukunft*, 10: 'Civilisation! Sicherlich hat man zu keiner Zeit mehr von Civilisation gesprochen, als in unsern Tagen, gewiss aber auch ist nie ein Wort vergeblicher und heuchlericher in Mund geführt worden als dieses'.

71. Prescott, *Historia de la conquista*; Pumphrey, *Indian Civilization*.

72. Pumphrey, *Indian Civilization*.

73. Schön, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, 58–60; Peyré, *Civilisation*.

74. These binaries are used by Littré, *Études sur les barbares*.

75. Weir, *Modern Europe (1760–1815)*, 28.

76. Cobden, *Speeches on Public Policy*, 21.

77. E.g., Tapa, *Historia de la civilizacion Española*; Ferrer y Suberana, 'La nacionalidad', 68; Martins, *Historia de la civilización Ibérica*; Altamira, *Historia de España*.

78. Scadding, *English Civilization Undemonstrative*.

79. The argument of the leading British commercial firm, the East India Company, when it wanted support to expand further into India was that '[e]very one out of England is now ready to acknowledge that the whole of Asia, from the Indus to the Sea of Ochotsk, is destined to become the patrimony of that race which the Normans thought, six centuries ago, they had finally crushed, but which now stands at the head of European civilization. We are placed, it is said, by the mysterious but unmistakable designs of Providence, in command of Asia; and the people of England must not lay the flattering unction to their souls, that they can escape from the responsibility of this lofty and important position, by simply denouncing the means by which England has attained it'; quoted from Cobden, *Speeches on Public Policy*, 386.

80. Stein, *Oesterreich und der Frieden*, 42: 'Mission, der Träger der Civilisation in dem für Europea neugewonnenen Lande zu werden'.

81. Schön, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, 6.

82. Spaventa, *La filosofia Italiana*, 8–11, 21, 30f, quotation from 31: 'L'Italia apre le porte della civilitá moderna'.

83. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 102–8, 128–33, 205–11.

84. Ibid., 46.

85. Quoted from Gowing, *Richard Cobden*, 24.

86. Scheidler, *Die Lebensfrage der europäische Zivilisation*, 1–50, quotation from 25.

87. Gaertner, *Ueber die Provinzial-Rechte*, 79–81. De Gurowski may be quoted from *Russland und die Civilisation*, 2: 'Die europäische oder christliche Civilisation lässt sich von ihren Ausgangspunkte bis zu unseren Tagen durch die Namen von zwei historischen Existenzen Ausdrucken. Die lateinische und die Germanische, welche seit unserer Zeitrechnung die Beherrscherinnen des Occidentes von Europa gewesen sind' [The European or Christian civilisation from its starting point to our present can be expressed through the names of two historic existences: the Latin and the Germanic existence, which have been the rulers of Europe's Occident since our calendar began]. See also Diezel, *Russland, Deutschland*, 18, 29.

88. Cobden, *What Next and Next?*, 48–49.

89. Qvanten, *Fennomani och skandinavism*, 10, 30, 61.

90. Martin, *Russland und Europe*, 119, 289; also published in Swedish in 1870. Another Frenchman concluded for the same reasons that there was a need for a European federation; Talbot, *Europa den Europäern*, 253–56. A similar message outlining a long-term Russian political plan to conquer Europe was published in Switzerland and Germany in 1866: Anonymous, *Europa: wird es republikanisch oder kosakisch?*

91. Carpenter, *Civilisation*.

92. Hall, *The Effects of Civilisation*, 170; published in German as *Die Wirkungen der Zivilisation auf der Massen*, Leipzig: C.L. Hirschfeld, 1905.

93. Carpenter, *Civilisation*, 1–50, quotations from 9 and 41.

94. 'Je stärker das Licht, desto greller die Schatten'.

95. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good or Evil*, 59, 94, 129–30, 147.

96. Ibid., 130, 186–94.

97. Almkvist, 'Det europeiska missnöjets grunder', 29–30, 35, 54–57.

98. Ibid., 26: 'Europa ha inga vigtigare ämnen än dessa;. . . . men intet hjerta klappar i vår verldsdel nu för annat än detta, intet hufvud tenker på annat. . . . Europas framtid stå hos oss alla i förstugan, och vill in. Den, som ej låser upp sin dörr för den klappande, får dörren inslagen'.