CHAPTER 1

Dreaming of Unity

Time for Europe

> Those were fine, magnificent times when Europe was a Christian country, when one Christendom inhabited this civilized continent and one great common interest linked the most distant provinces of this vast spiritual empire.
>
> —Novalis, 'Die Christenheit oder Europa'[1]

The beginning of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of a more visionary concept of Europe.[2] It was time to talk about Europe. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the idea of European unity existed in many variations remarkable in their mutability and how they were bound to the situation in which they were formulated. Still, some main themes recurred, and this is where we begin. We will ask what the dreams of European unity consisted of in the context of an order with continued monarchical rule and in which the strength of the major empires was defended. At the same time, Europe was evoked in opposing visions of constitutional rule and the people ruling through parliament. Ideas of European unification thus reflected the hierarchical order of society and its contestations. This first chapter examines Europe as a unifying idea in political discourses between 1800 and 1914. It mainly examines how the concept of Europe was entangled with various political ideas, representing different visions, while Chapter 2 will shift focus to examine how Europe's internal borders are an indispensable component of the concept of Europe.

Notes for this section begin on page 42.

Previous philosophical and scholarly discussion during the Enlightenment had enhanced the concept of Europe. The Enlightenment was associated with an impressive expansion of trade and knowledge, with the cultivation of humanism and science that spread reason and rational thinking. It represented both increased wealth and the liberation of the individual. Europe was seen as a place for democracy and tolerance, which also included a substantial amount of public discussion. Europe was modern and, as such, it represented an era superior to previous periods of European history, even better than ancient Greece and Rome. 'Progress, teleology, and manifest destinies – these are the key terms of the history of universalised Europe that only begins in the eighteenth century', rightly laid down by Roberto Dainotto in his genealogy of early Eurocentrism.[3]

The epigraph of this chapter is from the beginning of *Die Christenheit oder Europa* by Friedrich von Hardenberg, the author commonly known as 'Novalis'. It was written in 1799 but not published until 1826, long after his death.[4] It is no coincidence that Novalis mentions European unity, as the idea, which was first established in the late seventeenth century, achieved widespread currency soon after. He shared the notion of a common medieval idea of a European nation with other contemporary German romantic writers such as August Wilhelm Schlegel: 'Europe was destined to be one large nation, and the prerequisites existed during the Middle Ages'.[5] Although Christianity was to a steadily lessening degree viewed as defining the European during this period, it was still referred to as a basic value, though not the only unifying characteristic. In truth, Novalis had revived an older and medieval usage of the word 'Europe'. For many centuries, and throughout the Middle Ages, the word Europe was seldom used, but when it did occur it connoted Christianity or the 'Christian community'.[6] Starting from the late fifteenth century, however, it gradually became more common and was used more regularly, as by Erasmus.[7] This coincided with the economic and commercial centre of gravity moving north from the Mediterranean to England, France and Germany.[8] In the age of the great discoveries and the imposition of strengthening European power on the world, the ancient myth of Europe as a Phoenician princess violated by Zeus was revived. Moreover, Europe was frequently portrayed on maps and paintings as the world's queen.[9] Europe could be characterised by industry, arts, government, and the activity of scholars. Some have suggested that the context for the emergence of the concept of Europe may have been the threat from the Turks and overseas expansion, as well as contact with both new territories and new peoples.[10] Besides this, there were also internal strides: when the ambitions of France, the Habsburg Empire and Spain were expanding, threatened rulers took to the idea of a European order of peace and freedom from foreign powers. At the beginning in the

sixteenth century, the concept of Europe was already spelled out in the canonical literature, be it by Cervantes, Rabelais or Shakespeare, or by John Donne, Erasmus of Rotterdam, or Ludivico Ariosto.[11] Starting from the seventeenth century, Europe began to be used as a noun and an adjective encountered in the titles of books, journals, and even a ballet, in political circles and in ballads sung in the streets, as well as in political and satirical pamphlets. It is worth noting that the British historian Peter Burke mentions that this does not indicate a common European consciousness, as people in all parts of society still mainly described themselves as belonging to particular local sites or regions.[12]

When Novalis refers to Europe as the community of Christendom, it is one of the advocates of German Romanticism who is speaking, and here he is at odds with counter-revolutionary thinkers in both France and Britain.[13] Yet, some of the Enlightenment heritage was kept in mind, because he mentioned both scientific progress and the burgeoning European trade. Yet, the author's statement is a rejection of Enlightenment ideals and a lamentation that love has been eliminated from trade and business – no longer do greedy people have time for 'the soul slowly collected'. Novalis is talking about the spiritual, the conscience of human beings, and argues that knowledge should be reunited with faith.[14]

Thus Novalis's concept of Europe differs from that formulated in the circles around the new French regime in the same era. When Napoleon returned from the Egyptian campaign in 1799, he stated his belief that Europe was a civilisation that had developed into being vastly superior to others. He considered the European ability to organise societies the key factor, and he talked about the need to have an armed Europe in case of Eastern attacks. In his Europe, Paris was obviously the capital, France was the most important nation, and other countries were either allies or future conquests. In the years that followed, the notion of establishing a continent-wide empire grew in Napoleon's mind, and he cultivated the myth of himself as the successor to Charlemagne. He argued that the differences between European countries were not significant: the European peoples really constituted one people and one single nation with one religion and tradition, and the only thing missing was a strong power to unite them in one system.[15] Still, that power was France and his Europe was very much a French one, just as it had been for the French Enlightenment philosophers – Montesquieu, for example, considered France the leading power of Europe.[16]

Napoleon's thoughts were supported not only by his French audience but also by many in other parts of Europe. Those who supported the view of France and its revolution as a role model against the previous autocracies often acknowledged Napoleon's armies as liberators. Publishers and authors in the south-western parts of the German states often expressed similar

thoughts with regard to the creation of a new Europe owing to Napoleon. France was seen by many as the most mature country in Europe. During the revolution, the French had rejected previous prejudices and the old order of society, so it was natural that they should be the leaders of the new Europe that was to be built.[17]

In addition, Novalis's Europe differed from the concept of a European republic, a concept very much current at the turn of the eighteenth century. Both Napoleon's advocates and his opponents claimed that the European states had much in common. The former said that Napoleon wanted to establish a French republic within a European republic consisting of sovereign states.[18] The British and German critics claimed that the European republic should not be dominated by one power, but should rather find a balance that would protect one state from being conquered by another, as was the intent of the Westphalian Peace Treaty.[19]

In the Napoleonic Wars, both French and British fought for a better Europe. Before the Battle of Trafalgar, Nelson invoked the blessing of the Lord for his country, but he also included Europe in his prayer: 'May the great God, whom I worship, grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory'.[20]

It has been suggested that the 1806–13 British continental blockade of France and her allies was important in establishing a more focused perception of Europe as a unity, as the continental powers were fenced off from their colonies and economically and politically forced to integrate.[21] It was at this time that modern perceptions of a new Europe were definitively established. The word 'Europe' was now widespread, as it had become a highly attractive concept. This is an important explanation as to why Napoleon and others promoted France as the country that represented Europe. This is a recurring feature of the concept of Europe that can be characterised in terms of particularism and universalism, with some parts of Europe being commonly seen as more European than others. At the same time, Novalis was able to point out that specific European traits had developed in Germany. Other Germans had described their country as the heart of Europe, and the Germans as its blood. According to them, Germany was the site of the most revolutionary European achievements, such as the invention of the European system of balances between the main powers, printing, and the Reformation, and thereby it had had an immense political and cultural impact on Europe.[22]

Although the introductory phrases in Novalis's writings seem to express nostalgia for a bygone era, he was not reactionary in wishing for the re-establishment of an older order of society. When he considered previous eras, it was to establish standards for future development, referring to history to find arguments and using them as legitimising sources. Novalis's general

thesis was that both Christianity and the Catholic Church had played a vital role in the Middle Ages, while the German and French varieties of Protestantism and the Enlightenment could be seen as representative of new eras. His hope was that religion would create comprehensive and continent-wide mutual interests. This was no trivial past idea being inserted in place of the new. He viewed both medieval Catholicism and later Protestantism as 'indestructible forces in the heart of humans'. The old strength was depicted in terms of respect for the old, including faith in the absolute hierarchical order. The new strength could be seen as delightful freedom, new opportunities, and general human rights that allowed people to socialise freely. Religion became a third force, making the old and new walk together in harmonious unity, and it was only by combining these strengths that Europe could be rejuvenated.[23] This was a plea for Europe to be a Christian continent, for a Christianity going beyond the divide between Catholics and Protestants, and for a new church of unity. It is a vision moving towards universalism and beyond the particularism of European divisions.[24]

Europe of the Monarchs or Europe of the People

The European dream of Novalis was set against the political struggles of his time. He criticised the existing state systems and their deficiencies and paucities. In the place of strife, he saw the possibility of closer contact and cooperation between European states, and even indicated that a common super state could be created, but that for this to happen, unity would have to be aroused from its slumber.[25] For Novalis this was nothing that worldly powers could achieve. Only a Christianity that transcended national borders and embraced the nations, making them realise the need to end bloodshed and conclude peace, could bring rebirth to Europe.

When Novalis invoked the dream of European unity, he was adopting a well-used theme. The idea of European political cooperation was already quite old. A few examples show Europe as an organised association. After the Turkish conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Spanish and Italian humanists raised their voices to call for a Europe united against the Turkish threat. Pope Pius II aimed to unite Western Christendom and the Europeans under his flag. European leaders drafted a plan to achieve peace among the European states so that they could fight the common enemy. The King of Bohemia, George von Podebrad, tried to create a union within Christendom in which the Pope's role was secondary, but the aim was nevertheless to overcome the Turks.[26] Dreams and sometimes plans of European unity have repeatedly been launched during the nearly half a millennium that has elapsed since then.

The word 'unity' is partly misleading as the aim has never been to create a completely homogenised Europe; beginning with the early pleading, it was instead cooperation among princes that was called for. The idea was that their diplomats would hold a congress and negotiate a treaty, which the princes would then sign. From then on, they would form a shared leadership. They would all benefit from avoiding expensive and devastating wars, instead gaining the opportunity to enrich their countries. The most famous of these schemes was the Grand Design of the French minister the Duke of Sully, who worked closely with Henry IV. It was published in his memoirs in 1640 and was a political dream of a reorganised Europe consisting of Christian countries (but excluding the Orthodox ones), with a balance between states and supra-state institutions, and with a senate that wielded the ultimate power and safeguarded peace and security.[27] It was inspirational for the English Quaker William Penn, who published a widely read pamphlet in 1693 asserting the need for a shared parliament of the European princes, which would institute a common law. It would strengthen Christianity and facilitate protection against the Turks, save blood and money, and improve security as well as friendship between the peoples and their rulers.[28] The pleas for a treaty were revived in the next century by the French political philosopher Abbé de Saint Pierre, who included Russia but not Turkey. He called for a federation in which the states and monarchs could guarantee one another mutual security, ruling through a common senate with a rotating presidency.[29]

What was called for was unity in the sense of a federation consisting of a number of states, each of which should continue to exist, but within a larger framework. However, to be taken seriously, something still needed to be added. Jean-Jacques Rousseau had high regard for the confederations of the Helvetic League and the German Reich, and saw them as models for building a European confederation. However, he had great doubts about such an order for Europe, believing it would be naive to think that monarchs would voluntarily give up any of their power, as they were mostly interested in extending their territories. Monarchs' pleas for a European federation in the name of peace easily gave rise to the repression of other nationalities, such as when Austria, Prussia and Russia suppressed Polish aspirations for independence, a suppression of which he had been highly critical.[30] Frederick the Great of Prussia wrote ironically when he commented upon Saint-Pierre's proposal, that it was a fine piece on the method to obtain perpetual peace, very useful indeed, 'if not only for the lack of acceptance of the European Monarchs and some other small things of the same kind'. These early proposals depended on the good will of the princes and did not garner mainstream support.[31]

The evolution of the idea of European unity also mirrored the pervasive changes in political thought that took place during the Enlightenment,

especially after the American and French revolutions, in favour of the people and the *demos* as principles of governance. From then on, modern perceptions of legitimacy and citizenship became central to political theory. To be considered legitimate, governance needed to be based on a legal constitution and legal representation.[32]

Although the concept of political unity had been launched by Novalis's contemporaries, their focus had shifted and they often sided with demands for constitutional rule, which continued to be controversial in many European countries.[33] For example, the Comte de Saint-Simon pleaded for a federal Europe with a common constitution and parliament, which would represent the people rather than the emperors and the states. Simultaneously as Novalis was writing his pamphlet, and once again when it was time to set the terms for peace after the Napoleonic Wars, Saint-Simon demanded a new organisation of the political system of Europe: parliaments should rule the countries with a supreme European parliament reigning above them all. Rule by the people would lead to European unification, and when the peoples of Europe had established parliamentary regimes, the establishment of a European parliament would follow.[34] This sounds like modern democracy, but the electorate he had in mind was still delimited by income and literacy to only a thin layer of the population.[35] Still, Saint-Simon trusted that a new society was emerging, with a new and larger scale of production, much more international trade, and new modes of communication and transport. These were forces that he expected would bring about the unification not only of European economies and societies, but also of the political order.

Another example is that of philosopher Karl Krause, who in 1814 presented a plan for a federation of states that would unite the peoples of Europe in an alliance of free and independent states and avoid despotic rulers. Change was in the air in terms of political thought. As a Kantian philosopher, he argued that any European federation should be based upon law, and that the grounds for legality should not be sought in history, but in reason. He stated that the federation should be headed by a Bundesrat consisting of one leader from each state, and that all treaties, laws and decisions should be ratified in all the languages of the federation.[36]

It says something of the new importance of the idea of Europe that, when Napoleon's hope for a new continent-wide order was dashed in 1814 and, once again, at Waterloo in 1815, his defeats were taken as an incentive to proclaim a new European order that kept to the idea of unity. While exiled on Saint Helena, Napoleon claimed that his ambition was to introduce a European association for overall prosperity, with the same laws and one European court of appeal, with one currency and one system for weights and measures;[37] his opponents, the men of the Holy Alliance, also pleaded

for a new Europe. The tsar proposed a federation of Christian peoples acting as one nation, signifying a new Pax Europaea. The Russian party shared the sentiment of Novalis, whom they had not read, with the addition of Christian morals as the antidote to the horrors of the French Revolution. Austrians, Prussians and the British did not share these sentiments, but nevertheless joined the movement to organise Europe anew. Metternich aimed to reconstruct the balance of power when he proposed the conservative vision of the unity of the thrones.[38]

An altered mindset was in place when the victors convened in Vienna. In 1714, when the signers of the Treaty of Utrecht discussed a Christian Republic of which the states were part, the change in terms of diplomacy was already underway. Then phrases like the 'principal powers of Europe', 'the general well-being of Europe', and 'the balance of Europe' entered the vernacular.[39] In Vienna in 1814, the notion of Europe was definitely taking hold. The hosts in Vienna presented the Congress as the very moment for the making of European unity. A cantata composed for the opening of the Congress by Ludwig van Beethoven, commissioned by the Austrian emperor to brighten the festivities, expressed much of the excitement. The text was written by Alois Weissenbach, a poet and professor of medicine at Salzburg University, who was rewarded with titles and a new position in the Habsburg capital. *Der Glorreiche Augenblick* (The glorious moment) begins with the chorus emphasising the historical moment that was about to take place:

Chorus
Europe stands!
And the times
that ever move forward,
the chorus of peoples
and the old centuries
look on in wonder.

For several months, Vienna was seen as the very centre of diplomacy and the heart of negotiations. The six emperors present included the tsar of Russia, the Prussian king, and other German princes, as well as high-ranking delegates from all European states, including the victor of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington. The city became Europe:

Chorus
Vienna!
Adorned with crowns,
favoured by gods,
the city whose citizens serve monarchs,
accepts the greetings
of all peoples from all times
who may pass your way,

for now you are the queen of cities.
Vienna! Vienna!
Vienna
Oh heaven! What delight!
What drama I see before my eyes!
What only Earth has, lofty and sublime,
is gathered together within my walls.
My breast throbs! My tongue stutters!
I am Europe – no more a mere city.

Nothing less than the creation of unity by establishing eternal ties was to be accomplished in Vienna. What was once divided should be joined together, just as Europe would create a union and build itself anew:

Vienna
The highest event I see happening
and my people will bear witness,
when a shattered continent
comes together in a circle again,
and brothers at peace together
embrace mankind set free.
Chorus
World! Your glorious moment!
Vienna
And to my Emperor's right hand
all the sovereign hands reach out,
to bind together an eternal union.
And on my shattered walls
Europe is rebuilding itself.[40]

Indeed, the victors of the Napoleonic Wars initiated a system of summit meetings in Vienna that were designed to deal with common issues in order to reach compromises and avoid further war. This system did not rest on international law but was essentially a device put in place for the allies to dominate the continent, and an indication of the reaction to liberal reforms. The allied political leaders had 'adopted the practice of acting in the name of "Europe" rather than simply for themselves', according to historian Mark Jarret. The Congress System was a novel way of organising Europe that relied on diplomacy but lacked a foundation in international law, and was a method of continuing monarchical rule.[41] The alliance issued a widely read announcement:

> The intimate union established among the monarchs, who are joint parties to this system, by their own principles, no less than by the interests of the people, offers to Europe the most sacred pledge of its future tranquillity . . . The Sovereigns, in forming this august union, have regarded as its fundamental basis their invariable resolution never to depart, either among themselves, or in relations with other states, from the strictest observation of the principles of the right of nations; principles, which, in their application to a state of permanent peace,

> can alone effectually guarantee the independence of each government, and the stability of the general association. . .[42]

This system of European cooperation was to achieve some initial success. The new way of organising Germany as a federation of states was considered instrumental in establishing peaceful relations. It was stated that they were giving up the right to go to war with one another, without giving up their sovereignty.[43] When the Elbe Navigation Act of 1821 allowed all ten countries along the banks of Elbe to utilise the waterway, connecting south-eastern Europe with the Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic Sea through the German ports of Hamburg and Lübeck, this was seen as an important development for international trade.[44]

In any case, while the original Congress System lasted only a few years, it was followed by several proposals for a Europe ruled by one government during the nineteenth century. Although some hailed the Holy Alliance as successful in the aftermath of the Congress, in time, it would lose much of its lustre and symbolic importance. Pleas for a European Union or a United States of Europe offered the possibility to voice democratic ideas, when these were gaining new force. In the revolts of 1848, critiques of the old regimes often criticised the Vienna Agreement, dismissing it as a Holy Alliance of the princes that left little space for nationalistic or democratic movements, instead propagating 'the holy alliance of the people' as expressed by Giuseppe Mazzini. The buzzword 'nationalities' implied a new order with a democratic basis. Through nationalities, the people's voice was heard, breaking with empires and the reign of the aristocracy. Revolutionaries added the social question of eliminating poverty and bringing progress to millions of people.[45] In the aftermath of the revolts and the failure of attempts at democratic reform, the Italian nationalist leader Mazzini campaigned continuously for a Europe with free and democratic nations that represented the people and not its monarchs. Still, this would not be enough: 'We do not simply strive to create Europe; our goal is to create the United States of Europe'.[46] To cite just two more examples, the exiled German liberal democrat Julius Fröbel claimed that a federation between the West European states was the sole way of solving Europe's problems.[47] The French revolutionary Victor Constant did the same from his American exile, denouncing the existing political system as outdated. The development of social forces and the economy were beginning to bypass monarchical control, and it was only a matter of time until the modern world would set limits on the power of kings. The United States of Europe and its republican institutions would, according to Constant, eventually replace them.[48]

Europa in the World

Following the Congress of Vienna, it became possible to discern the main dimensions of the idea of European unity in the nineteenth century. This was expressed in detail in the writings of a largely forgotten Danish official who was widely read for a period. Konrad George von Schmidt-Phiseldeck, who held doctorates in both theology and philosophy, developed his views of a European federation in a retrospective view of the Holy Alliance, which he held in high regard, seeing the accomplishments of the monarchs as providing a new principle for managing internal conflicts and new prerequisites for Europe. However, even though Schmidt-Phiseldeck saluted the Vienna Agreement, we may not reduce his claim for European unity to the actions of the princes and their diplomats; it also included the people, whose spirit was to permeate the governance. This remained a key theme in the idea of European unity in the nineteenth century. For Schmidt-Phiseldeck, the best way to accomplish the well-established governance of states was through representative constitutions and a balance between monarchy and democracy. The European federation should include a permanent congress with representatives of the states. The acts of the federation should have a legal basis in a European court that oversees compliance with treaties. Moreover, he shared the view of the declarations from Vienna as well as many previous tracts that European unity was the way to ensure peace and security for the states that would allow them to reduce the large costs of keeping troops and making war with their neighbours. As he was writing shortly after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, he was mindful of discussing the great debts of the European states, which had begun to limit their resources. Even Great Britain, which had led the coalition against France and enlarged its power, had started to suffer the economic consequences of the war.[49] Giving up the right to wage war against one another was also of the utmost importance for future welfare, he wrote, and added that a European federation would not be easily established, as the legacy of mutual antipathy among states was persistent. Regardless, this quest for peace stood out as one of the key themes in the discussion of European unity in the decades that followed.

Schmidt-Phiseldeck became known among his contemporaries for his 1820 book *Europa und Amerika*. Its popularity spread quickly, and it was published in both English and French within the same year, as well as in the more minor languages Dutch and Swedish. The next year he wrote a new book focusing on the importance of creating a European federation, *Der europäische Bund*.

Defining Europe by comparing it with something else was nothing new; in fact, this had been done from the very beginning. The Europe

of ancient Greek culture – the word 'Europa' was used as a synonym for Hellas – possessed an excellence of geography, governance, and the quality of its population.[50] For Charlemagne, Europe was a Christian Empire threatened by Muslims making their way through the Pyrenees. During the Siege of Vienna, Europe was Christianity challenged by Turks. However, Schmidt-Phiseldeck was the first to look at European unity from the perspective of global politics and economic relations.[51] For him Europe had to face changes outside the continent with new tools in view of the independence of the United States and the striving of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America for freedom. Some of them were already free states; others had recently declared their independence and he anticipated that the rest would follow. A spirit of independence had taken hold of the American continents, and that had consequences for the world economy. A new era had begun, he explained, on 4 July 1776 when 'independence was declared by the United States of America'.[52] The liberated America became a new hub in the world economy that challenged earlier European trade routes. Europe had a new and strong rival on the other side of the Atlantic, one that would grow even more powerful when it could connect its trade routes to other independent states in America and with a population growing from the influx of European immigrants. This was a new era with a new dynamic, wrote Schmidt-Phiseldeck, with the United States in a central position, which would change the basic conditions for Europe, a region that would now become poorer after its loss of people and possessions to America. He raised the question of whether Europe should resign from being the 'king of the world'.[53]

The consequences of the decrease in trade could be grave, with resignation throughout the continent and a decline in social order.[54] One possibility would be to expand existing links with those colonies that remained, and to conquer new ones. However, Schmidt-Phiseldeck feared that the essential tools for doing this were not available, contending that the European states would be incapable of maintaining their monopolies on trade – Europe would have to look for another path. This implied a turn inwards for Europe, with a focus on the development of internal trade and economic life on our continent proper, in order to replace what was lacking in external trade. There was need for concerted action within the frame of a federation: like the United States of America, Europe would have to view itself as a federation of states reaching from the Urals to the Atlantic, from Lapland to the southernmost points of Sicily and Crete.[55]

This led to the creation of the name 'the European Union', perhaps in a work he presented in Copenhagen in 1821.[56] A European Union would be 'a hope of rescue for Europe', a continent that is amply supplied with the riches of nature and an 'ennobled humankind'. However, trade and industry

were hampered by privileges and monopolies, tariffs and proscription, when Europe's borders should have instead 'been open and inviting' as they were in the American confederation.[57] Schmidt-Phiseldeck underscored common interests regarding trade both within the continent and overseas, and explained the need for a common European monetary standard and credit funds. Overall, this was also an endorsement of free trade (within the borders of Europe) in the tradition of Adam Smith and in opposition to mercantilist economic doctrines.[58] Free trade, it would turn out, was also one of the themes that appeared in the calls for European unity during the nineteenth century.

Schmidt-Phiseldeck concluded that there were obvious internal benefits of constructing a European federation, although these were not enough to make it a reality. For the European states to overcome internal conflicts and antipathies, a pressure or even a threat from the outside would be needed. He found this in the new world order of broken European dominance, in which the discord of Europe worked to the advantage of its competitors. Europe's war increased the other side's trade and brought it new territories. The conclusion was that 'a bit at a time we will lose what could only be saved by the greatest efforts of the combined forces of the whole of Europe, which could at least obtain useful conditions for trade, . . . even more could be saved if they were guided by the joint draft of a foresighted wisdom'. According to Schmidt-Phiseldeck, only when Europe stood united would it be possible to withstand the external pressure. Challenged by another continent, Europe would have to act as one continent.[59]

In those days, the changing relations of the world were not only a concern to Europe and America, but were also instrumental in deciding the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Once the mightiest power in the world, it had besieged Vienna as recently as 1683. Austria had afterwards conquered Hungary, but in the south-east the Ottoman Empire was still powerful, and Sarajevo still one of its strongholds. It was not yet 'the sick man of Europe', but for many it was obvious that the Ottomans were losing strength and even declining. If Europe had once been threatened by an expanding Turkish Empire, while conquering new territories on the Iberian Peninsula and across the Atlantic, it now was the other way around. In the west, it had a new rival, but in the east, the possibility of expansion arose. Well aware of this decay, Schmidt-Phiseldeck looked towards the south-east to replace the loss of colonies overseas by expanding Europe in that direction. Europe would have to gather itself against Turkey as the common enemy with the aim of expanding civilisation and Christianity. After conquering new lands, this would be a new opportunity for immigrants to move to the south-east, meaning that Europe could avoid losing great swaths of its population to the Americas.[60]

Over only a few years, Schmidt-Phiseldeck wrote three books that explored how to create a united Europe with its many virtues. His works illustrate how the idea of European unity of that time created a dynamic that inspired some authors to develop rich and various plans for how future societies could be created, often including statements about living in society and explorations of the human preconditions for peaceful coexistence.[61] Schmidt-Phiseldeck presented vivid descriptions of Europe, its challenges and potentials. Among other things, he emphasised the significance of education, the place of the church, and the importance of public sentiment. He indicated that, to bring about enough consistency and momentum for Europe to assert itself within the new world order, it would be insufficient to create a federation of the states and take all sorts of political measures, or to institute various legal and economic reforms. It would be necessary to harness the spirit and consciousness that Europe's people belonged to a community that went beyond the individual nation states. Schmidt-Phiseldeck understood the differences between the nationalities as inextinguishable, as they were rooted in tradition and historical circumstances. They could, however, be transcended by human reason and willpower. It would be necessary to suppress the egotism of the states in favour of the common good. Knowledge would have to be disseminated about the European family and Christian nation, with its shared morals and civilisation. A greater understanding of the common ground between the familiar and the foreign would have to be promulgated. Knowledge of European geography and history would be important, as well as the establishment of European associations. Foremost, travel throughout the continent would need to be facilitated to create the desired spirit of familiarity and affinity, so more 'wandering years' would be needed for apprentices, as well as more scholarly journeys. In short, the exchange of ideas, knowledge and resources would forge a stronger European political unity.[62]

Schmidt-Phiseldeck stands out as an early promoter of a concept of European unity, using America as a template, along with Harriet Martineau's *Society in America* of 1837, and Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, also published in the late 1830s. The United States was considered the future of Europe, both as something positive to imitate and as something negative to avoid. Not least did this genre emphasise the development of the North American states as a case from which Europe could learn. Fascination came together with fear. America was expanding in all respects: its growing population was taking new lands under its command all the way across the continent to the Pacific, driven by a broad economy based on both agrarian and industrial livelihoods. Europe, on the other hand, had reached its borders, lacked the same dynamic, and was challenged by its own offspring. Europe needed to stand strong in order to face the competition from North America.[63]

As the nineteenth century continued, Schmidt-Phiseldeck's vision of Europe's future turned out to be both right and wrong. The competition for trade routes remained an issue.[64] However, he badly misjudged the opportunities for further development of European trade and interests in Africa and Asia. African colonisation featured largely on the agenda throughout the century that followed and, together with further expansion in Asia, European strength continued to increase. He was correct, however, in his belief that America would grow more powerful: the rising star of America was indeed a challenge for the old world, he cautioned repeatedly.

By the end of the nineteenth century, this challenge was more apparent than ever, recognised by large parts of Europe's populations. Migrants wrote home to parents and siblings left behind, boasting of their new wealth and privileges. Wealthy Americans took long trips to Europe. The very richest Americans – such as the Carnegies and the Rockefellers – spent large sums in Europe buying art and antiquities.[65] The American view of the changing balance of power between Europe and America was quite frank: Europe was divided by internal competition, while the United States was growing in population and capacity, destined to be a leading global power. As stated by a member of the House of Representatives in 1870: 'The mighty republic of the United States, which sprang into existence less than a century ago, will be the acknowledged law-giver and arbiter of the world'.[66]

The growing economic strength of the United States challenged European trade and industry, which in turn furthered the dream of a European federation. Proposals soon followed that copied some of America's economic arrangements, including a customs barrier around Europe and the reduction of internal customs duties in order to withstand American competition. More suggestions of that kind were heard in France and Germany than in Great Britain, where worries about losing industrial supremacy were considerable but were less often followed by a plea for European unity.[67]

Design of the Federation and Its Bodies

The need for a federal political order in connection with an international legal order was often brought up. For instance, the draft of a European federation by Krause contained a plan to form a federation in accordance with international law, the prospect being to establish lasting peace and order for Europe.[68] Schmidt-Phiseldeck considered the voluntary agreements within the frame of the Congress System a step in this direction, the next of which would be to establish European law.[69]

Not every plea was as concrete regarding just how to achieve a federation. Strong faith in historical development together with a strong command

of rhetoric could be as persuasive, as one can see in the following lines by Saint-Simon:

> There will undoubtedly come a time when all the people of Europe will feel that questions of common interest must be dealt with before coming down to national interests. Then evils will begin to lessen, troubles abate, wars die out. That is the goal towards which we are ceaselessly moving, towards which the advance of the human mind is carrying us![70]

Mazzini also had a strong belief in progress that would inevitably lead towards the reconstitution of Europe into nations forming democratic states. Up to then, he proclaimed, they had been divided and hostile to one another, because each was represented by a caste or dynasty. Democracy would change this and associate the nations with one another, amicably. They would then view one another as sisters, and 'gradually unite in a common faith and a common pact, in every way that regarded their international life. The Europe of the people would be one, avoiding alike the anarchy of absolute independence and the centralisation of conquest'.[71]

We should remember that the idea of a United States of Europe or a European federation permeated political thinking throughout Europe. It popped up in all kinds of political camps, and leftists, liberals and conservatives alike adopted it. Mazzini considered it important to form an alliance of the people as an alternative to the Holy Alliance of the emperors. On the other hand, those who wished to retain the European order of the Congress System wanted a central European body with legal authority and military force in order to be able to intervene in case of any revolutions among the states.[72] Propagandists of the federal state promoted the European federation in prolonging their efforts to convince the public of the good of federalism.[73] The idea of a European Union or federation was upheld by many regardless of political ideology, without much notice or further exploration. However, some issues were repetitive, and there were a fair number of examples of more thorough analysis, to which we now turn.

Different aspects of precisely how such a federation could be implemented and how it could function circulated throughout Europe. The decisive initiative would come when two of the main republican countries ruled by the people decided to form a federation. Saint-Simon singled out England and France, while Considerant hoped for France and Germany. If two began, others would join, said Charles Lemonnier, who steered one of the peace movements half a century later.[74] A French philanthropist said that, to avoid further military rivalry or new wars, a permanent congress representing all the states of Europe should be established to preside over cases of conflict that might arise between them. The possibility of instituting free communication and exchange of goods would lead to further cooperation, he added.[75] Ernest Renan, the French historian and republican publicist who,

after the Franco–Prussian War of 1870, pleaded for a European community, upheld the need for a higher authority to coordinate the nations. Europe should intervene when two nations could not agree on their relations. The United States of Europe ought to have a congress that could judge nations, 'imposing justice on them, and correcting the principle of nationalities in the light of the principle of federation'.[76]

Experts on international law outlined detailed proposals for constitutional arrangements. James Lorimer, an Edinburgh professor, was in favour of a union like the one in the United States. Johann Caspar Bluntschli, a professor in Heidelberg, wanted to safeguard the sovereignty of the states within a federation, saying that the cultural differences and historical legacies were of much greater importance in Europe than in North America: an American people existed, but a European people did not. In addition, history had shown that a universal monarchy would fail, just as the ambitions of the Habsburgs and Napoleon had been dashed when they attempted to assert their power over Europe. Therefore, the federation should monitor the legal systems of its members as much as possible; the members should maintain their own governments and armies, and not be governed by one universal monarch or one European parliament – thus cooperating, but not forming a unified state. The tasks of the federation would be limited to international law, keeping the peace, international administration, and the administration of justice. Bluntschli's proposal was a modest one, in which a federal council would not threaten the sovereignty of the individual states if it kept to the management of issues that concerned them, such as the organisation of cross-border transportation, communications, and trade treaties. Hence, the cooperating states would be less inclined to have large military forces and could gradually achieve disarmament.[77]

Both Lorimer and Bluntschli touched on one issue that had so far received little attention, but that would eventually be on the agenda of the organisation of European bodies. William Penn had already mentioned the language issue: 'I will say little of the *Language* in which the *Session of the Sovereign Estates should be held*, but to be sure it must be held in *Latin* or *French*; the first would be very well for *Civilians*, but the last most easie for *Men* of Quality'.[78] His conclusion aligned with a world where these languages were the lingua francas of the elite. One hundred years later, Schmidt-Phiseldeck was still confident in the role of French, but Karl Krause believed a new awareness of the people had emerged, when he called for all treaties, laws and decisions to be ratified in all the federation's languages.[79]

Lorimer's idea was to keep to one language, just as the United States kept to English. It had to be a living and relevant language, which disqualified Latin. The best option was French, with the benefits of 'clearness and perspicacity' and the fact that it was already well established in the diplomatic

corps.[80] To make it possible for the delegates of the federal council to communicate, Bluntschli's advice was to adopt a multilingual model. He proposed to make English, French and German the official languages, in addition to making all the documents further available by translating them into the other languages of the federation.[81]

Calls for a 'United States of Europe' first peaked in 1870 when France lost a short war against Germany. Open letters distributed on the streets of Paris and sent to both the French and German governments pleaded for France and Germany to melt down their cannons and unite. However, the many French demands for a united Europe were partly an attempt to curb the new Reich of Bismarck, and one open letter begged the German soldiers to bring back home fresh ideas of republican rule.[82] Victor Hugo made the case for imposing French in the European parliament: 'The United States of Europe speaking German would mean a delay of three hundred years. A delay, that is to say, a step backwards'.[83] Some British observers of the American continent also believed that a federation of European states would be the best means of avoiding further war. A representative of The Peace Society recalled the European congresses that gathered after the Napoleonic Wars to establish a peace treaty as 'the germ of a common authority', adding dryly that it would have been better if they could have taken place before the wars had broken out.[84]

The last decade of the nineteenth century saw much agitation for a European federation and the United States of Europe. Writers from several countries showed interest in the ideas being discussed. Sociologists, historians and economists supported this interest, and politicians and royalty of the highest rank, such as the prime ministers of Britain, Germany and Italy, were heard from, as was the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary, the German emperor, and the Russian tsar.[85] Moreover, it was argued that the Concert of Europe was an embryonic federation, or even that the federation was already in existence, although only as a loose concept.[86]

Among those pleading for European unification there were some like Bluntschli, who took a modest stand, claiming that it would take time to establish a federation like the United States of America. Nevertheless, a federation brought new hope and, according to a French voice, there was 'a slow development of the federative idea. Unfortunately, we are only at the beginning of this development; the fruit of federation is not yet ripe, but it exists and grows unnoticed each day'.[87] The novelist and peace activist Bertha von Suttner recognised tendencies towards a federation beginning at the time of the Concert of Europe, with the formation of a European code of law and a European tribunal. The necessity of having only one army was obvious, 'but the development into a strong, healthy, living thing is yet to be'.[88]

One goal was to create better political and economic relations, so it was suggested that the European federation should set up a customs union, which would lead to other forms of future cooperation.[89] Such a suggestion was complemented by the French historian Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu with one that left out Russia, Turkey and Great Britain, as they were seen as lacking a common European history and thus the prerequisites to develop a sense of European solidarity. Leroy-Beaulieu's European federation was not one of an expansive empire or huge maritime forces. His recipe for success was to include fewer states, be less ambitious, call it a European federation, and definitely avoid using the United States of America as a blueprint. This would respect the nationalities and the independence of the member states. The realisation of the federation was to take place over the course of a series of minor steps in both political and economic matters, including meetings and conferences, conventions regarding sanitary matters and monetary issues, and treaties on trade and jurisdiction. This would encourage the growth of a European sentiment. The top priority, however, would be to set up a customs union.[90]

Typical of the more cautious Bluntschli and Leroy-Beaulieu was their preoccupation with the design of the institutions of the federation, which entailed not only detailing exactly what states were to join, but designing the federal bodies and their responsibilities. The plan offered by the French lawyer Gaston Isambert included no more and no fewer than nineteen states, including among them both Great Britain and Russia. Notably, none of the plans took account of Turkey. Isambert proposed four bodies – a legislative council, a high court, a congress and an executive directory – each with an exact number of representatives, and a note on how and by whom they were to be nominated.[91]

Progressing in a conservative manner was also kept in mind when the pan-American movement was paid attention for its attempt to draft a federation framework. Pan-Americanism represented a future in which states would be connected by moral power and common interests, said the Austrian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Alfred Fried. While Europe battled with cannons and diplomatic intrigues, America could focus on the production of necessities and trade. In addition, when Fried stated that Europe should aim for a similar kind of expansion of internal relations instead of mustering for war, he already sounded like a proponent of post-war European integration:

> [T]he states of Europe must go ahead balancing their bodies, facilitating their transport, internationalising their management, and establishing security through mutual protection agreements. By adaptation and order in their living conditions, they will change the spiteful outlines of their political relations and achieve a policy of understanding and mutual compensation. With all the greater chance of success will they then be able to stand up to global competition.[92]

The pleas for unity concerned the arguments that Europe needed cooperation to hold on to its top position and to avoid new wars, as was discussed at the international conferences in Berlin in 1892 and in The Hague in 1899 and 1907. Although the confrontations between the main powers of Europe were minor during the nineteenth century, at least compared with those of the previous years and those that followed, there was much concern about the increasing arms build-up.

Unite for Peace

> How many wars must be waged, how many covenants must be tied, torn and tied again, in order to finally bring Europe to the principle of peace, which alone is of benefit for the states and citizens, to focus their attention on themselves, and to gather their forces for a sensible purpose![93]

In 1789, Friedrich Schiller asked for peace between the states in order to direct all energy towards more reasonable goals. It should be strongly emphasised that dreams of European unity are often presented as peace projects and against the background of warfare on the continent. Saint-Pierre and Saint-Simon, Penn and Krause, all promised that their designs would give Europe enduring peace. Schiller was in good company; a few years later Immanuel Kant presented his famous booklet *Zum ewigen Frieden*, a title that acknowledged a pub in the Netherlands. With a satirical wink, he argued that no perpetual peace would come from mere toasting. It was not enough to dream of peace, as the philosophers had done, as heads of state would never tire of war. Kant's idea was that a lasting peace for Europe could only be achieved under two conditions: a legally founded federation would have to be established to change the conditions for international relations; and the federation would have to be created between states that are not considered their rulers' personal property, but rather constitute republican societies.[94] Still, the requests of Schiller and Kant were followed by a new wave of unrest and the Napoleonic Wars, ending only with the Vienna Congress.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Victor Hugo stepped forward as a populariser of the concept of a United States of Europe that would do away with borders throughout the continent.[95] He actively supported the series of peace congresses held in Brussels, Frankfurt, Paris, London, and other British cities between 1848 and 1853, which had been assembled on behalf of various groups that together formed a peace movement.[96] In an often-cited inaugural speech, he announced that 'a day will come' when the nation states will merge and we will see a European brotherhood, 'when the bullets and the bombs will be replaced by votes, by the universal suffrage by the people'.[97]

One might ask whether Schiller, Kant and Hugo were heeded. New wars were waged in Europe during the nineteenth century, but they were fewer and more limited than they had been before. The period between 1815 and 1914 was comparatively peaceful. However, colonial military forces ruled with an oppressive power outside the continent, and inside its borders, military force upheld authoritarian power.[98] Once again, we can see that monarchs claimed to be fostering European cooperation when they intervened to help one another to suppress rebellions, while insurgents simultaneously rallied support from citizens of other states, and for a future European Union governed by the people.[99] When one considers the combined armies marching through the continent, and all the military force and threats of war, it is not very surprising that calls for European unity became connected to pleas for peace. The declaration of the Vienna Congress and the calls for a United States of Europe all indicated that peace would be vital to the future of Europe.

Moreover, the unity appeals were fuelled by peace proposals that sought closer cooperation between the European states to limit the increasing expenses of post-war reconstruction and prevent the eruption of new wars. Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister and for many years leader of the Conservatives, voiced grave worries about the accumulation of new weapons, of numerous instruments of death that improved with each passing year, and of the arms race that each nation had to take part in for its own safety. He declared in the House of Lords that a federation with a common government was the way to avoid a large-scale war in Europe and 'the only hope we have'.[100]

The peace movement and the peace congresses continued to propose the notion of a federation with a pan-European parliament. Tracts and manifestos were presented, and an initiative was undertaken to publish a bilingual monthly entitled *Les Etats Unis d'Europe – Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa*. The European federation was a frequent theme and at times treated extensively by representatives of the various peace groups.[101] The businessman and sociologist Jacques Novicow lived much of his life in France and wrote in French, but was also seen as influential in both the German and British peace movements.[102] The main problem facing Europe, according to his diagnosis, was the right of each state to its sovereignty, which the states saw largely as their right to rob and invade their neighbours through the means of war. The federation would guarantee peace, freedom and security for the member states, and it would make it possible for them to reduce military production.[103] Leading peace activists Alfred Fried and Bertha von Suttner, both winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, agreed that a united Europe was the only possible option to avoid a devastating war. Von Suttner supported pan-Europeanism as opposed to the militant movements that were

marching through Europe, mentioning the pan-Slavism of Russia, the pan-Germans, and the Camelots in France.[104] In addition, they pleaded for a Europe distinct from the one of the Congress System of the monarchs. In Suttner's words:

> It is the might of the mighty, not the rights of the weak, that they want to support. Much stress is laid on the consideration that is due the will represented by the great powers, not on the consideration that should be given the cause of the weak. Compassion, righteousness, and liberty; that is the triad that must lie at the basis of a genuine peace concert![105]

Peace activists turned to the concept of Europe when searching for ways to avoid war. The most commonly cited path to unification was the one proposed by Saint-Simon and Monnier: to begin with a federation between the main powers, especially between France and Germany, which would ease the tensions from the previous war and the issue over Alsace-Lorraine.[106] Additionally, the notion of a customs union had been in place from the very beginning.[107] Others believed that it was more important to install a universal monarchy on the continent. Even though many expected the federation to be realised shortly, such suggestions did not lead to tangible measures apart from explicit wishes and statements at conferences. One might ask – as Monika Grucza did in a recent dissertation – whether the proposals were really taken seriously by the statesmen, or whether they were only of interest as means to strengthen the positions of their own countries.[108] This was obviously the case when Russian tsar Nicholas II initiated the peace conference in The Hague in 1899 with a call for disarmament, evoking joy and cheering but also strong doubts. The call was considered the beginning of a new historical era as well as unrealistic, utopian and fraudulent. In fact, the proposal originated from his minister of war, who realised that Russia would not be able to afford an arms race with Western countries. Strong public opinion and a range of internal factors led to the realisation of the conferences, which ultimately produced some conventions, even though certain groups disliked the ventures and were pessimistic about the prospects. In fact, it was not only peace on the agenda, but also the conduct of warfare.[109]

In addition, the notion of peace through the establishment of a United States of Europe had begun to gain ground in popular culture. Bertha von Suttner mentioned the idea in her international bestselling novel *Die Waffen Nieder* (from 1889), in which she noted that the reasons for militarism and warfare are found on the European rather than national scale. Ideas about a European federation are presented, if not yet really elaborated upon in the way she would after the peace congresses in the 1890s. In a later novel, she wrote of her desire to establish various friendly alliances that would ultimately result in a European Union.[110]

The French astronomer and novelist Camille Flammarion borrowed the idea of the United States of Europe, and applied it to early science fiction in 1894. In his vision of the future of humankind, the only reasonable course for Europeans was to stop engaging in new wars and ongoing nationalist conflicts. Nation states had lost their relevance, and in due time had ceased to exist altogether. This future vision indeed showed a distinct interest in the idea that reached beyond political discussions. However, Flammarion placed the unification in the twenty-fourth century, adding extra centuries for the nation states to finally give up. In other words, he placed the United States of Europe in the far distant and utopian future, leaving little hope for an immediate breakthrough.[111]

In a notable 1907 novel by Robert Hugh Benson, which is set in England at the end of the twentieth century, Europe has indeed united but is threatened by an Eastern Empire that stretches throughout Asia and Australia. This story is far from utopian, describing the downfall of Christian culture and the reign of the anti-Christ.[112] Another novel by Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt from 1907 placed the United States of Europe even closer in time. After growing awareness that peace was the only way to ensure prosperity and continuing progress, following the German invention of a master weapon used in a short war against Russia and after a generous peace offer from the Germans, a treaty was signed in London in 1938. This vision was called a fantasy by its author, understanding its plot as distant from reality. The German author ended his utopian contemplation with the inauguration of a common parliament of the European states that had some degree of supra-national power to uphold peace. It was labelled a 'cultural parliament', with the task of making decisions regarding joint cultural tasks. This was apparently not a narrow concept of culture, but rather one that took into account broad aspects of life in society.[113]

In 1913, a contemporary observer – Suttner – wrote that the unifying of Europe was an old postulate of the peace movement that now more than ever had become its key argument. The movement's main representatives pleaded for it in Italy, France and Germany; they presented articles on the issue and even entitled one of their journals *Les Etats Unis d'Europe*. For Suttner, Europe had evolved from being something merely geographical, to the embodiment of peace. The idea of Europe calls for disarmament, incarnates all efforts to avoid war, acts in this one direction – only it does not exist, she sadly concluded.[114]

In the arguments for peace there were few indications of nostalgia or anything that would recall a former European unity; instead, they were forward-looking. 'The golden age of the human race is not behind us; it lies before us, in the perfection of the social order. Our fathers did not see it; our children will arrive there one day; it is up to us to clear the way', Saint-Simon

wrote.[115] The seminal Kantian suggestion is echoed, that there is no peaceful state of nature to look back to and restore. Instead, peace should be achieved by looking forward and using human reason: it has to be installed, and that can only take place through cooperation between republican states within the frame of a federation.[116]

Visions of Europe

Looking back on the period from the late eighteenth century to the First World War, we can learn a great deal from the different political visions connected to the idea of European unity. From early on, it is possible to discern a market-oriented liberal vision guided by the desire to install a free trade bloc, beginning with Schmidt-Phiseldeck and Richard Cobden. Perry Anderson suggests three others: the conservative vision, which pays particular attention to the balance of power and distinguishes Europe as a specific unit; the leftist vision, which connects European unity to revolutionary objectives of changing the social order; and the technocratic vision, which begins with the recognition of the role of experts and later suggests the use of technical measures regarding economic and legal institutions, focusing on an 'inter-governmental, as distinct from federal, conception of European unity'. Of the adherents to the conservative vision mentioned by Anderson, we have already met Novalis, Schlegel, and the upholders of the Vienna Treaty and the Congress System. Anderson also mentions other representatives of the Romantic Period, besides the historians Leopold von Ranke and Jacob Burckhardt's marrying of unity and variety, harmony and self-development, into a narrative of European uniqueness. In terms of the leftist vision, we have seen, among others, the utopian socialist Henri Saint-Simon. The energetic insurgent Guiseppe Mazzini is not easy to label, but his insistence on women's emancipation, workers' rights, and social justice makes it reasonable to place him within a general leftist vision.[117] Anderson also includes in this camp the politician and journalist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, whose ideas of reorganising society led to his being designated the father of anarchism, his follower Mikhail Bakunin, and the leaders of the pre-war social democracy. In the technocratic camp, Anderson includes the authors of moderate but detailed proposals for the European federation: the long-time editor of the peace journal *Le États Unis d'Europe* Charles Lemonnier, the Kantian-inspired jurist Johann Caspar Bluntschli, the historian Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, and the lawyer Gaston Isambert, all from the late decades of the nineteenth century.[118]

It is definitely appropriate to distinguish the different visions of European unity that emerged from different political ideologies, highlighting that the

concept of Europe is both contested and central to political thinking of the period. However, apart from the liberal, conservative and leftist visions, the technocratic vision also deserves acknowledgement. Anderson cites examples from both sides of the Rhine that share a drive to investigate and clarify in detailed, concrete terms a potential federal system, with its institutional arrangements and necessary institutions of constitutional law. These texts intend neither to rally the people to rebel against the princes nor to make them accept the existing order. They have nothing of the vigour or inciting power found in many of the demands for peace. Instead, they are rather dry presentations of technicalities, implying that a federation would be possible if the experts were equipped to deal with the required procedures.[119] Bluntschli, who comes from the tradition of Sully and Saint-Pierre in his calls for constitutional law of a European federation with both a parliament and commission, is an example of this vision, emphasising the need for arrangements for cross-border transportation, communications, and trade treaties as the sole way to unify. He claimed that unity would not erode national sovereignty, but that it would help states to disarm and thereby make them wealthier.[120]

Despite how these authors' visions of Europe differ, many of them have two things in common: they see threats to Europe's wealth, and they see risks arising from European military conflict. Therefore, they turn to other fields of human action and exchange to evoke the dream of European unity. Peace and welfare are recurring objectives that have motivated appeals to European unity.

In fact, dreams and visions have always seen Europe in temporal terms. In the Romantic vision of Novalis, there was once a unity when Europe consisted of a single Christian doctrine. This nostalgic view implied that it was possible to revive spiritual unity, which could pave the way for political unification. This was a characteristic conservative vision, which hearkened back to an imagined memory of more harmonious times to envision the idea of a shared future. Liberals and leftists were instead forward looking, concentrating on establishing a new legal and political order. In their vision, time's imperative demanded unification. One can look to Schmidt-Phiseldeck, who understood the growing importance of trade and industry, the need for markets, and the competition from America. Still, leftists were also sometimes guilty of nostalgic, Romantic thought. Mazzini, who was anxious to create a new order in Europe, exemplifies this. On celebrating the beauty, dignity, and historical importance of the city of Rome, he presented the city as the temple of humanity, from which 'will one day spring the religious transformation destined for the third time to bestow moral unity'.[121]

Notes

1. Quotation from Drace-Francis, *European Identity*, 90.
2. Thompson, 'Ideas of Europe', 57–58.
3. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 50–51.
4. For the reasons for the postponement, see O'Brien, *Novalis*, 227.
5. Schlegel, 'Ueber Litteratur', 77: 'Europa, bestimmt nur eine einzige grosse Nation auszumachen, wozu auch die Anlage im Mittelalter da war'.
6. Leyser, 'Concepts of Europe'.
7. Erasmus, *Praise of Folly*, 78, 101.
8. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 34–41.
9. Wintle, *Image of Europe*, 219–81.
10. Yapp, 'Construction of Europe'.
11. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 42–45.
12. Burke, 'Did Europe Exist before 1700?'.
13. In England with Edmund Burke, in France with Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald, and later in Spain with Juan Donoso Cortéz; see Perkins, *Christendom and European Identity*, 24–28.
14. Novalis, 'Die Christenheit oder Europa'.
15. Thompson, 'Ideas of Europe'.
16. Verga, 'European Civilization'; Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 67.
17. Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke*; Thompson, 'Ideas of Europe'.
18. Périer, *A Speculative Sketch*, 11, 14, 26, 119. Du Périer also talks of a 'European Union' and a 'European society', further indicating the strong idea of unity, in spite of the war between the European states; see 18, 23.
19. Andrews, *The Present Relations*, 157–58; Heber, *Lines on the Present War*; Vogt, *System des Gleichgewichts*, vi.
20. Quoted from Barrow, *Auto-Biographical Memoir*, 283.
21. Woolf, 'European World-View'.
22. Krause, 'Entwurf'; Vogt, *System des Gleichgewichts*, vi.
23. Novalis, 'Die Christenheit oder Europa'.
24. Svennungsson, 'Christian Europe', 121–27.
25. Novalis, 'Die Christenheit oder Europa'.
26. Heater, *European Unity*, 13–14; Mikkeli, *Europe as an Idea*, 33ff.
27. Sully, *Grand Design of Henry IV*.
28. Penn, *Present and Future Peace*; Heater, *European Unity*, 32–33, 66–76.
29. Heater, *European Unity*, 70–84.
30. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 134–37.
31. Bluntschli, 'Die Organisation', 288: 'wenn nur nicht die Zustimmung der europäischen Fürsten und noch einige ähnliche Kleinigkeiten dazu fehlen würden'. Lorimer, *The Institutions*, 223–26.
32. See, e.g., Heater, *Citizenship*, and Würtenberg, 'Legitimität, Legalität', 712–15.
33. Heater, *European Unity*, 111.
34. Saint-Simon, *Selected Writings*, 135. See also Heater, *European Unity*, 103–4.
35. Woytinsky, *Tatsachen und Zahlen*, 7–10.
36. Krause, 'Entwurf', 195–208.
37. Thompson, 'Ideas of Europe'.
38. Jarret, *Congress of Vienna*, 174–76.
39. Yapp, 'Construction of Europe', 142–45.
40. Beethoven and Weissenbach, 'The Glorious Moment'.
41. Jarret, *Congress of Vienna*, 70, 359.

42. Ibid., 194.
43. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der europäische Bund*, 85.
44. Hinsch, 'The River Elbe'.
45. Mazzini, 'Europe: Its Condition', 277–80.
46. Mazzini, *Cosmopolitanism of Nations*, 135; the quotation is from an article of 1850.
47. Fröbel, 'Die europäischen Ereignisse', 56.
48. Beecher, *Victor Considerant*, 374–77, 388.
49. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Europa und Amerika*; Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der europäische Bund*; Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Die politik*.
50. Pagden, 'Conceptualizing a Continent', 36–37.
51. Schulze and Helm, 'Schmidt-Phiseldeck'.
52. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Europa und Amerika*, 15.
53. Ibid., 127, 227.
54. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der europäische Bund*, 79–85.
55. Ibid., 154–60.
56. Ibid., 279.
57. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Europa und Amerika*, 154–60.
58. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der europäische Bund*, 177–80, 269.
59. Ibid., 106–9, 14–17, 153–54. Original quote from 148: 'Stück vor Stück werden wir verlieren, was nur die höchste Anstrengung der vereinten Kräfte der gesammten Europa, wenn diese nach gemeinsamen Entwürfen einer vorschauenden Klugheit geleitet würden, noch zu retten, oder wenigstens, . . . in einem für die Zwecke des gesellschaftlichen Verkehres Erspriesslichen Verhältnisse zu erahlten vermöchte'.
60. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Europa und Amerika*, 166–69.
61. See, e.g., Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der europäische Bund*, 110–12.
62. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Politiken*, 41–72, 111–12.
63. See also Fröbel, 'Die Zukunft Europa'.
64. Britain also made concerted efforts to find the Northwest Passage above the North American mainland; see Beattie and Geiger, *Frozen in Time*.
65. Rietbergen, *Europe*, 377–86.
66. Appleton, *Europe and America*, 22.
67. See, e.g., the Austrian Julius Wolf, *Das Deutsche Reich*, 31–37, 47–48, and *Materialien*, VII.
68. Krause, 'Entwurf', 194–208.
69. Schmidt-Phiseldeck, *Der europäische Bund*, 39–42.
70. Saint-Simon, *Selected Writings*, 135.
71. Mazzini, 'The Holy Alliances', 275.
72. E.g., Adler, *Der Krieg, die Congressidee*, 46–48.
73. E.g., Carlo Cattaneo, Joseph Proudhon and Constantin Franz.
74. Lemonnier, *Les Etats Unis d'Europe*, 189–90; Beecher, *Victor Considerant*, 403–4.
75. Jean-Baptiste André Godin, who is cited in Herriot, *Europe*, 36–40.
76. Renan, 'Open Letter to David Strauss', 141–42.
77. Bluntschli, 'Die Organisation', 291–312.
78. Penn, *Present and Future Peace*. Emphasis in original.
79. Krause, 'Entwurf', 195–208.
80. Lorimer, *The Institutions*, 223–25.
81. Bluntschli, 'Die Organisation', 291–312.
82. Beecher, *Victor Considerant*, 400–407.
83. Hugo, 'Letter to M. D'Alton Shee'.
84. Amberley, 'Can War Be Avoided?', 618.
85. Grucza, 'Bedrohtes Europa', 103–17.

86. Salisbury, 'Europeisk Federation'.

87. Novicow, *Die Föderation Europas*, 639; in the German original: 'die langsame Entwicklung der Föderalistischen Idee. Leider sind wir noch am Beginn dieser Entwicklung; die föderative Frucht ist noch nicht reif, aber sie besteht und wächst unbemerkt alle Tage'.

88. Suttner, *Memoirs*, 154.

89. See, e.g., Leroy-Beaulieu, 'Les États-Unis D'Europé', 455; Waechter, 'For United Europe'.

90. Leroy-Beaulieu, 'Report General', 9: 'L'union de peuples européennes ne doit donc pas être l'oeuvre d'un internationalisme niveleur, supprimaut l'existence ou l'independence profit d'une unite plus vaste qui les absorberoit et les engloutirait dans son sein'.

91. Isambert, 'Projet d'organisation politique'.

92. Fried, *Pan-Amerika*, 292–97; quotation from 296–97: 'müssen die Staaten Europas daran gehen, ihre Einrichtungen auszugleichen, ihren verkehr zu erleichtern, ihre Verwaltung zu internationalisieren und die Sicherheit durch auf Gegenseitigkeit errichtete Schutzverträge herzustellen. Durch eine Anpassung und Ordnung ihrer Lebensverhältnisse werden sie die gehässigen Grundzüge ihrer politischen Verhältnisse ändern und zu einer Politik der Verständigung und des gegenseitigen Ausgleiches gelangen. Mit um so grösserer Aussicht auf Erfolg werden sie alsdann in den mondialen Wettbewerb eintreten können'.

93. Schiller, 'Was heisst Universalgeschichte', 250: 'Wie viele Kriege mussten geführt, wie viele Bündnisse geknüpft, zerrissen und aufs neue geknüpft werden, um endlich Europa zu dem Friedensgrundsatz zu bringen, welcher allein den Staaten wie den Bürgern vergönnt, ihre aufmerksamkeit auf sich selbst zu richten, und ihre Kräfte zu einen verständigen Zwecke zu versammeln!'

94. Kant, 'Zum ewigen Frieden'.

95. Heater, *European Unity*, 114.

96. Tyrrell, 'Making the Millennium', 75; Nicholls, 'Richard Cobden', 362.

97. Recently cited by Laqueur, *After the Fall*, 10. See also Metzidakis, *Victor Hugo and the Idea*.

98. This period was not as peaceful as some have claimed, with 14 wars between states on the European continent, 58 wars outside of Europe, and 540 'violent domestic social and interstate military conflicts'; see Stråth, *Europe's Utopias of Peace*, 21, who refers to Halperin, *War and Social Change*.

99. See, e.g., the report 'Politiska nyheter' in *Dagens Nyheter*.

100. Grucza, 'Bedrohtes Europa', 103–17; for other examples, see Palmstierna, 'Europas förenta stater', and Fried, *Der Kaiser*, 1–41. On Salisbury, see https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Robert_Gascoyne-Cecil,_3rd_Marquess_of_Salisbury, retrieved 5 November 2020.

101. Grucza, 'Bedrohtes Europa', 103–17.

102. Crook, *Darwinism, War and History*, 116.

103. Novicow, *Die Föderation Europas*, 20–38.

104. Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*, 255–56.

105. Suttner, *Memoirs*, 154.

106. E.g., Stein, *Vereinigten Staaten von Europa*, 17.

107. E.g., Réveillère, *L'europe Uni*; Suttner, *Memoirs*, 62–65.

108. Grucza, 'Bedrohtes Europa', 103–17.

109. Tuchman, *The Proud Tower*, 229–88, especially 229–37.

110. Suttner in Vegeseck, 'Der Frieden in 100 Jahren', 68–69.

111. Flammarion, *Omega*.

112. Benson, *Lord of the World*.

113. Lehmann-Russbüldt, *Die Schöpfung*.

114. Suttner in Vegeseck, *Vermeidung des Weltkrieges*, 481–82, 518.

115. Saint-Simon, *Selected Writings*, 135.

116. Kant, 'Zum ewigen Frieden', 197.
117. Falchi, 'Democracy, Women, Mazzini', 15–30; Urbinati, 'Mazzini and Republican Ideology', 183–204.
118. Anderson, *The New Old World*, 475–504.
119. Ibid.
120. Bluntschli, 'Die Organisation', 291–312.
121. Mazzini, *Joseph Mazzini*, 316.