Introduction

Like most Europeans in the early 1900s, my grandmother lived in a multinational empire. She grew up, as many others did, in an area with more than one language. To communicate with people on the Baltic island of Hiumaa, one would need to know Estonian, which was spoken by most of the farmers, Russian, to communicate with the administration, and German, to talk to the estate owners – and there were also some Swedish-speaking farmers. By the time she married, she was a citizen of the Republic of Estonia, one of many new states that had emerged in Europe after the First World War. She lived in a proclaimed nation state that comprised several ethnic minorities. During the Second World War, my grandmother, like many Europeans, experienced her country's loss of independence, and she fled with her husband and children. She settled in Sweden and died only months before the re-emergence of Estonia as a sovereign state in 1991. Her life not only spanned national borders but the shifting of the international border between Eastern and Western Europe.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw a range of upheavals that changed people's lives in Europe, during which notions of a new Europe were present: for Napoleon as well as for the victors in Vienna in 1815; in the revolutionary year of 1848; during the two world wars and their aftermaths; and, finally, after the fall of communism in 1991. A 'new Europe' connoted unity, peace and fairness, but could also insinuate the dominance of one or more powers. Often, it became associated with European superiority – more for some, less for others. Students of European history are well aware that these periods also encompassed surges of nations and nationalism: 'the spring

Notes for this section begin on page 13.

of nations' in 1848; an avalanche of declarations of national independence marking the final year of the First World War; and nationalism emerging after the dismantling of communism in Central Europe. Evidently, the visions of a new Europe and the ventures to establish borders came in pairs.

This leads to the central argument of my book, which is that the concept of Europe is intrinsically associated with unity and borders within Europe. For well over two centuries, calls for unification have met arguments for national borders, triggering entanglements and contestations. In the early 1800s, not only were the dreams of Europe becoming 'one large nation', as it was put by August Wilhelm Schlegel,[1] of interest, but so were hopes voiced by Germaine de Staël 'to give birth to those great existences of mankind, which we call nations'.[2] In the late 1910s and early 1920s, Tomáš Masaryk's call for a 'New Europe' of democratic and independent nation states and H.G. Wells's talk of the dawning age of nationalities met with critical discussions concerning Europe's many borders, e.g. by Julien Benda and José Ortega y Gasset.[3]

The first objective of this book is to examine and recount the intellectual paths that feed into the concept of Europe. The book offers a comprehensive approach, beginning with the emergence of a more visionary concept of Europe in the political turmoil and intellectual crossroads of the early nineteenth century, and continuing to the present. I illustrate these conflicting political visions and diverging interests, as well as distinctions between perceptions emerging from different parts of Europe. The second objective is to explain the post-war concept of Europe and its contemporary meanings. This is only possible if we view the historical understanding of Europe that takes into account not only unity, but borders. A grasp of the relevant intellectual history is essential to understanding the processes that took place before the 1950s, and how they shaped the mind of the post-war period, as well as to assessing how historical perceptions and representations define contemporary Europe and affect current issues. A longer historical perspective is also necessary for considering the public discourse, illuminating the civic debate and supporting the effectiveness of decision making to avoid past mistakes and assimilate past achievements.

Currently, although Europe is considered a unity, it is simultaneously comprehended in terms of its borders and divisions – a potentially explosive combination, if not carefully managed. In fact, Europe is unifying and dividing at the same time. The twentieth century saw a doubling of the number of sovereign European nation states. Add to this the territories with extensive self-governance, such as the former Danish colony of Greenland, as well as regional self-rule in Belgium, Great Britain and Spain, and it is difficult to avoid acknowledging a genuine state-making tendency related to national sentiments. In other contributions, I have emphasised that previous

decades have seen an increasing emphasis on cultural borders.[4] This is also a question of quantity when we consider the upswing in Europe's minority languages and cultures such as Gaelic and Sápmi, the substantial numbers of Europeans who belong to non-Christian religions, and those who speak languages of non-European origin. Contemporary European states face a variety of cultural borders within existing political borders. On the other hand, while the number of members of the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) has risen from six in 1958 to twenty-seven at the beginning of the 2020s, we may acknowledge the integration tendency, as well. Moreover, the deepening of integration further indicates a tendency towards unity, apart from the recognition of nation states and national sentiments.

The EU addresses this duality concerning European integration with its slogan 'Unity in Diversity'. Clearly, although European unity and nations may seem contradictory, these are the conditions necessary for integration. European integration, which would not be needed if not for the existence of nation states and borders (be they cultural or territorial), takes place under the guise of a conceived community. To understand the implications of this, we have to find the reasons for this way of thinking in history. Indeed, long before the EU, European integration occurred through transnational ideas, associations, and even movements, as well as exchanges and learning from each other across both territorial and administrative borders.

Attempting to explain nationalism and integration as different phases of European history would be a mistake. In such a narrative, nationalism came first, followed by integration and an evolution towards unification. To present integration as only parenthetical would also be a mistake. Both perspectives are incorrect. The first fails to acknowledge the long intersection of European integration and nation building, of Europeanness and national identity. It represents what Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia calls 'a false sacralization of Europe'. Bo Stråth rejects it as a 'teleological understanding of Europe as a self-propelling project on a steady advance towards a predetermined goal'. The second narrative fails to pay homage to the advances achieved through integration, and evokes a fear of new wars on the continent. For D'Appollonia, it is another 'false sacralization', this time of the nation. Thus, Bo Stråth underscores 'a need for a new narrative about Europe'. By offering a thorough examination of the intellectual history of the concept of Europe, my book provides the necessary input for a new narrative.

This intellectual history can explain our present hopes, fears and concerns regarding Europe. Recently, we have seen much confusion and discontent, with the ideal of European unification clashing with the interests of some nation states. In the 2010s, this was demonstrated by a seemingly

unending list of divergences, mostly regarding issues of immigration and financial regulations connected with the Euro. In the public debate, calls for a stronger union stand against the protection of national sovereignty, and the drive towards a European super state is encountering emerging nationalisms. Importantly, historical perceptions and representations of Europe are of the utmost importance in order to understand the mindset that paved the way for contemporary Europe. Robert M. Dainotto gives a timely argument for this: 'It is what has been said and written for around three centuries about and around Europe that still determines what we think and do about it; what our dailies report; and what our policy makers decide'.[5] It is striking – and rather uncomfortable – that, with very few exceptions, the vast majority of literary publications on EU crises over the last decade have hardly taken note of the historical legacy of the ideas that are in use.

Thinking Europe: The History of a Concept

Since around 1800, the notion of Europe has posed as a new attraction for Europeans – or, to put it more bluntly, it has occupied our minds and framed how we conceive the world. For many centuries before, the concept of Europe connoted a geographical continent and was only occasionally invoked in political contexts. Since 1800, the concept has become crucial to political thinking in Europe, spreading widely and becoming affixed to other concepts, such as civilisation and individualism, thereby redefining previous contexts. Not only was there a civilisation but there was a European civilisation; not only individualism but a European individualism. The magnetism of the concept was felt far and wide, with implications for both culture and politics. Europe became associated with claims to preserve existing society as well as to transform it, with national ambitions and with ideas regarding relationships between European neighbours and the rest of the world. Yet, Europe has never been easy to define: does it exist, is it lost, or is Europe something that ought to be built? Is it characterised by shared traits or by dividing borders? By history or by values? By Christianity or by thriving trade and innovative individuals? By success and victories or by threats from the outside? By progress or by steady decline and acute crisis?

No doubt, Europe is not only a historical but also a political concept. Europe may appear to be a geographical description, but when seeking its exact connotation, an essentially normative concept emerges. Even in terms of geographical definition, it is impossible to separate ideological meanings from the concept of Europe. Is Russia a European country or not? What about Turkey? In the present, Europe often signifies the EU, which highlights the association with normative values. In a similar vein,

key contemporary contestations concern the issue of European values, what they imply, and whether member states adopt them. Hence, the linguistic classification of the word 'Europe' as a noun is insufficient. Europe is also seen as a verb, indicating the contestations surrounding normative values in combination with performative claims of how to manage disputes and diverging interests.

Previous research has typically paid special attention to common traits of the idea of European unity, such as peace, prosperity and cooperation against common enemies. Often, this research traces a certain logic through the centuries, which is similar to that of post-war European integration: a certain degree of national sovereignty must be ceded to common institutions in exchange for peace, welfare and the common good.[6] Research has reflected the new interest in the idea of Europe since 1990, citing the proximity of the European integration political project to 'the idea of Europe', 'the idea of European unity', 'the European idea', and 'European identity'. A contribution often referred to is Gerard Delanty's *Inventing Europe*, which typically interprets the idea of Europe as 'a universalising idea under the perpetual threat of fragmentation within European society', and 'a unifying theme in a cultural framework of values as opposed to a mere political norm or name for a geo-political region'. He connects the European idea with common 'cultural frames of reference', and associates it with post-war integration.[7] In the anthology *The Idea of Europe*, Anthony Pagden makes a similar connection in defining the idea of Europe as 'determining features of . . . a political and cultural domain', relating it to the contemporary hope and possibility of developing a European identity and a sense of belonging to a shared community.[8] In the same volume, Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia contends that 'the European Union must become a visual and compelling identity'.[9] These partisan approaches share the variability of and continuous ongoing debate about the meaning of the idea of Europe. Recently, we have found more attention to the association of the concept of Europe with division, and some research stresses the history of manifold borders within Europe, noting that recent decades have presented us with both unification and an increased emphasis on borders, especially cultural ones.[10] However, much recent research keeps a focus on Europe as a unifying idea, but engages with it through new perspectives, forgotten voices, and neglected materials. These contributors are well aware of the risk that comes with formulating a linear history of an idea that is growing into maturity. To escape such a trap, they criticise Eurocentric ideas and include views that previous histories tended to omit. For instance, Patrick Pasture's *Imagining European Unity*, which concentrates on the idea of peace and on ideas concerning the institutional organisation of Europe, extends the historical list of plans of unification.[11] Consequently, we need to take precautions to avoid presenting

European unity and European integration as old notions that finally broke through in the 1950s, and since then have been further refined and won the recognition of most European nations, or as representations of society's natural development into ever greater units.

When we look at the history of the concept of Europe, the focus is not on the EU, its institutions, policies or treaties. Certainly, it is vital to note that the EU is an existing institution that has central functions to fulfil for contemporary European society. It is the main framework for shared legal, economic and political actions. As such, it is also an arena for political struggles, legal disputes and economic competition. European integration redefines key societal concepts such as state and sovereignty, it struggles to find legitimacy by addressing democracy and citizenship, and it aims to encompass the diversity of national identities. Still, since around the 2010s we have seen divisions that fuel a legacy of hierarchies within the EU – between north and south, and east and west. As of the early 2020s, illiberalism and right-wing extremism have established themselves all around Europe. Britain, one of Europe's major countries, has left the EU, initially bringing the member states together but leaving the question of whether others will follow. The Covid-19 pandemic has effectively highlighted the temptation to maintain national borders. Accordingly, the EU has become an arena and an object for ideological struggles. In these, the concept of Europe plays an essential role, and today it is often represented in terms of European integration and European identity. Implemented in phases, we have no definite answer as to what integration will look like in the future. At stake are questions about Europe's past and future, its structure and place in the world, and the various meanings of Europe. My approach is to critically examine the different meanings of the concept of Europe, with respect to how it has changed over time, how it has been controversial, and how it has been the object of different opinions.

In presenting a historical narrative of the concept of Europe, this book also addresses the idea of European unification in the post-war period. Historians have long discussed whether European integration began as a scheme to overcome the nation state and establish a federal European system, or as a measure to strengthen the nation state. After thirty years, Alan Milward's groundbreaking historical study continues to be inspirational, revealing the national interests in the making of the European Community. The supranational institutions were seen as paving the way for strengthening the nation state: when sovereignty was transferred to the European Commission, it was because the national benefits were deemed rather significant. Not only the legislators but also the citizens of the member states accepted in practice or passively, with enthusiasm or in silence, that the construction of the nation state and the creation of the EEC/EC went hand in hand. Some

'national policies aiming at national reassertions had to be internationalised in order to make them viable'; consequentially, 'the reinvigorated nation-state had to choose the surrender of a degree of national sovereignty to sustain its reassertion'.[12] Still, Milward leaves a question without a convincing answer: How could this combination meet with such approval? Milward's answer is the Second World War, and my study confirms that changes did indeed take place in the concept of Europe that facilitated post-war integration. However, he does not take into account the long-term causes. His thesis of the collapse of the nation state in the 1940s omits that the mindset was already somewhat prepared, and that the concept of Europe had contrasting aspects long before the post-war period began. New states that favoured the ideal of national sovereignty emerged during the interbellum period. Yet, this same period saw an increase in the discourse on European cooperation and unification, as recently demonstrated by researchers. However, we should also take the long-term history into account. Concepts, narratives, practices of cooperation, and even integration were at hand throughout the nineteenth century.

My book aims to shed light on post-war European integration by interrogating the intellectual history of the discourse on Europe. In sharp opposition to Andrew Moravcsik, whose famous book, *Choice for Europe*, explicitly downgrades the impact of ideas, I say we cannot understand the history of Europe without taking into account how people were thinking about Europe.[13] For institutional arrangements of European integration to be possible, and to define much of post-war political history, the integration must be in accordance with overall thinking about how we can accommodate Europe and all of its components.

We need to be cautious when examining the concept of Europe, and its traditional associations with progress and a higher standard of European development. Seminal works on European history demonstrate the existence of authoritarian models of governance and political thinking throughout the previous two centuries – besides exclusionary nationalism, which has sometimes veered towards racism and notions of ethnic cleansing. These works reinforce the fact that post-Enlightenment European history should not be recounted as a simple progression towards freedom and democracy.[14] In addition, Luisa Passerini has forcefully stressed the need to examine the cultural legacy of Europe: 'We can no longer share the type of Europeanism that existed in the past. Eurocentric and male-centred, we must find new forms of Europeanness that allow the full respect of differences. This means we cannot avoid passing through a critique of Europe's cultural legacy'.[15] In recognising differences, Passerini urges us to acknowledge and criticise the fact that 'European identity has long included hierarchies and exclusions – a "Europe-Europe" and a "lesser Europe"'.[16]

Thinking Europe: An Intellectual History

To present a new history of the concept of Europe, I make use of crucial advances in intellectual history. First, in reading the ideas in the context of each period, I have unearthed disputed meanings and values with respect to changing opinions. Second, in conceiving the concept as essentially open to competing definitions marked by different spaces of experience and horizons of expectation, I understand the concept of Europe as situated between remembrances of the past and anticipations of the future. Third, I frame and interpret the case as a transnational piece of history. Together, I rely on the three main advances utilised within intellectual history: the contextual, the conceptual, and transnational turns.[17]

To a significant extent, my book applies the lessons of transnational history. Gerard Delanty recently inquired into a transnational approach to the idea of Europe, saying 'that a more explicitly developed transnational approach to the European heritage might reveal a different and more compelling account of the past that would give substance to the European cultural heritage as a unity in diversity'.[18] I consider my book to offer such an account from the field of intellectual history. Beginning with Europe as a distinct theme in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the book examines debates and discourses that transcend borders. It combines Europeanising procedures with the history of mutual learning processes.[19] European history reveals an exchange of shared values that has helped to guide European countries in the construction of their societies. Europeanisation took place long before it was institutionalised through the EU, and can be seen in both the similarity of common institutional settings and how European countries mirror each other. They largely imitate each other in an overarching quest for modernisation, and a more distinct quest for approximation, which begins with increased trade and new means of communication.[20] For intellectual history, the learning processes concern the dissemination of key concepts (e.g. Europe), theories, ways of thinking, and values (e.g. nationalism), as well as the comprehension of them all as European. This is a Europeanisation that concerns common intellectual inspirations to argue for changes in particular communities. It entails adopting similar values, learning from others, and taking the same direction. Moreover, it is about imposing on others: it justifies European supremacy abroad and defends the dominance of the main powers within Europe. Consequently, the international turn in history and, more specifically, its transnational approaches within intellectual history, influence my research.[21] I recognise the many academic articles in recent years that have drawn on transnational history and accompanying concepts, not least concerning the interwar period.

There is an obvious risk that studies of the concept of Europe may offer homogenising interpretations, especially when the object is European unity. Therefore, it is of certain interest to expose hierarchical orders in the comprehension of Europe. In this, I am inspired by Robert Dainotto's demonstration of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europeanism in *Europe (in Theory)*, which contrasts some well-known French philosophers with less recognised Spanish and Italian ones, emphasising historical sources that question 'Eurocentrism not from the outside but from the marginal inside of Europe itself'.[22] His approach presents a lesson from the historiography of Dipesh Chakrabarty, Walter Mignolo, Edward Said, and others. Recently, subaltern and postcolonial theory has been applied in studies of the idea of European unity, with ambivalent results. On the upside, we are presented with materials previously less considered or freshly examined in new ways, stressing the effects and legacies of Eurocentrism and the need to stay cautious about partisan EU narratives. On the downside, such studies risk interpreting the idea of European unity as mainly the confirmation of a colonial mindset, without giving other motives much consideration.[23] These studies leave much of the complexity of the concept of Europe behind, as they disguise differences and hierarchies within Europe. Dainotto warns of another risk. Referring to the concept of Eurocentrism, he remarks that applying it tends to contrast Europe to the rest of the world, especially former colonies, petrifying Europe's outer borders. He writes that the 'homogenizing assumptions of the term, in fact, run the perpetual risk of obliterating the interior borders and fractures of European hegemony; they hide from view Europe's own subaltern areas'.[24] This brings us back to the margins within Europe. Dainotto's cases are from the south of Europe, but his thought is certainly relevant to the other European margins as well. Hence, Dainotto's approach inspires my examinations in the following chapters of the concept of Europe, in recognising how the concept of Europe addresses the centre and margin within Europe, and how it creates divisions within Europe.

Consequentially, another precaution is to desist from reiterating a common master narrative that focuses solely on the British, French and German discourses on Europe. For a historian of Europe, it is tempting to follow the paths of the core West European countries. Certainly, these countries are of great importance, and this book offers a thorough demonstration of the concept of Europe among British, French and German intellectuals. However, to uncover differences, hierarchies and divisions in the comprehension of Europe, this book includes a variety of voices and perspectives from Southern Europe, Central Europe, and Scandinavia, from large, small and middle-sized countries, recognising similarities and dissimilarities between various parts of the continent.

This is a study of Europe as perceived by intellectuals. Narratives of intellectual history typically focus on one field, such as the history of philosophy or the history of political ideas or historiography, often depending on the academic locating of intellectual history in the historical, political or philosophical disciplines. Coming from the history of ideas in Sweden, long a discipline in its own right, it comes naturally to keep the study's focus on the idea and concept of Europe, rather than on Europe's colonial, diplomatic, economic, legal, political or social history. Recently, there have been several valuable publications in this field.[25] However, in my approach, I look for intellectuals operating in several fields – as writers and public intellectuals; as scholars of, for example, law, history and philosophy; and sometimes as politicians. I am interested in those who have been considerably quoted and translated, who represent different political ideas, and, most importantly, who have demonstrated significant and developed views of Europe and its future. Coming from different parts of Europe and being of different nationalities, they illustrate a transnational discourse on the concept of Europe that also includes exchanges, meetings, and mutual actions. Generally, they have published books, often many, but they have also written for newspapers and given public lectures, helping them to become well known. My research examines concepts, intellectual changes, and performances. It is based on a number of cases and engages in discussion with the research in this broad field, offering a fresh historical narrative. The material comprises written documents, primarily books, but also articles, targeted journals, and proceedings of Europeanist conferences. Expanding Internet archives provide new materials that enrich the picture, bringing out a deeper complexity. This means that I operate with an exceptionally wide-ranging selection of primary sources. I balance reading large bodies of material against the careful analysis of key texts. This book examines a varied array of examples from well-known figures such as Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), Germaine de Staël, José Ortega y Gasset, Tomáš Masaryk, Julien Benda, Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove, Salvador de Madariaga, Regis de Rougemont, Edgar Morin, José Saramago, Agnes Heller, and many more. My working model also enables the acknowledgement of largely forgotten contributions to the historiography of the European idea. These include the calls made around 1820 by the Danish official, George von Schmidt-Phiseldeck, for a 'European Union' and a 'European citizenship' to respond to the debate about decolonising the Americas, and the plan drafted by Hilde Meisel in 1942 for a socialist European unity to avoid subjugation to the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, assessment of the concept of Europe makes it possible to recognise well-known intellectuals who are rarely included in this research field. These include the Austrian Nobel Peace Prize winner Bertha Suttner, the Italian writer and historian Ferrero Guglielmo, the Swedish suffragist and

peace activist Elin Wägner, the British poet and essayist Stephen Spender, and the Czech philosopher and dissident Jan Patocka, to mention but a few.

As a final note regarding my approach, I do not find it meaningful to distinguish between the idea and the concept of Europe, and therefore use both terms synonymously. Both signify references to Europe, whatever their associated meanings. Today we often hear about European identity and awareness; accordingly, my approach is to examine what meanings intellectuals are attributing to them.

Thinking Europe: The Book

The following chapters do not ask what directly led up to and resulted in the treaties forming the EC; they do not scour the archives of the 1950s, which economic, diplomatic, legal and political historians have already examined using a fine-tooth comb, nor do they accept the 1950s as the beginning of European integration.[26] The chapters acknowledge the importance of changing moments, presenting explorations of specific upheavals, events and debates that triggered discourses on Europe, while insisting upon the long-term effects these have had on intellectual history.

The book is divided into three parts and nine chapters. Each chapter introduces a main theme and associated sub-themes that relate to the concept of Europe during a specific period, and tend to remain associated with the concept in later periods. The reader will find relevant theoretical considerations embedded in the chapters. The first part addresses the themes of unity and borders in the 1800–1914 period. Its four chapters examine the main aspects of unity and borders: (1) the idea of European unity, (2) the understanding of borders, (3) definitions of Europe, and (4) the adoption of shared concepts, values and standards. Chapter 1 examines visions of unity concerned with international relations, trade, constitutional rule, peace, and federation design, and how these visions emerged together with many of the political ideas of the nineteenth century. European unity was seen as related to monarchical rule, but also to the voicing of anti-autocratic opposition, illustrating hierarchies within European societies. Next, to examine how unity and borders are entangled, Chapter 2 focuses on the emerging calls for cultural and political borders between nations, and on the many statements of cultural, political and religious divisions between Northern and Southern, and Eastern and Western Europe. Nationalists legitimised exceptionalism to confer essential features not only on their own nations but also on Europe. The concepts of Southern, Northern, and Eastern Europe were associated with political divisions and cultural hierarchies, whereas Central Europe connoted national strivings and imperial interests that were often in

conflict with each other. In Chapter 3, we turn to definitions of European exceptionalism, which concerns distinctions between Europe and, primarily, Asia and America. Examining the concept of European unity of culture and civilisation, the chapter reveals how Europe became associated with religious divides between Catholicism, Lutheranism and Orthodoxy, and with political divides between the competing main powers of Europe. Definitions of Europe as one culture or civilisation were entangled with a master story of England, France and Germany as the primary nations while the others lagged behind. Chapter 4 looks at the exchange and dissemination of ideas and values, with citizenship, local self-government, and individualism cited as examples often subject to adaptation and translation. Quests for modernisation and the approximation of standards illustrate the interplay between centre and margins, and how intellectuals have urged their countries to follow the models of England, France, and later Germany.

The three chapters in the second part treat the themes of crisis and decline, revealing how the mindset of crisis accelerated the dynamic of unity and divisions from 1914 to 1945. These chapters highlight: (5) how the concept of the nation state advanced because of the First World War; (6) the concepts of European crisis and decline; and (7) the manifold plans and initiatives for unifying Europe during the interbellum, and the idea of European unity during the Second World War. The theme of Chapter 5 is how the Great War affected the concept of Europe. Certainly, divisions were high on the agenda, but calls for European unity retained some attraction, and the conception of a large German-led 'Mitteleuropa' spread widely in Germanic countries. Significantly, the idea of independent nation states in Europe seriously challenged the trust in ever-growing empires. Intellectuals, primarily from the margins of Central European empires, launched visions of a new Europe based on the nationality principle, which finally achieved a political breakthrough and marked the passing to the interwar period. The chapter acknowledges this as a profound change of view that fundamentally redefined the concept of Europe. Chapter 6 emphasises the impact of the redefined concept of Europe that focused on its many national borders. The main theme is the multiple conceptions of crisis in the cultural language of European unity, with their references to hard factors such as the new national borders after the downfall of continental empires and the economic consequences of the war, and to soft factors such as moral and ethical decline, nihilism, and a lack of self-confidence among Europeans. The examinations illustrate divisions and arguments for moral and cultural unity, besides the conception of European exceptionalism. An astonishing aspect of the concept of Europe from the beginning of the interwar period up to the end of the Second World War was the many attempts to organise for the sake of creating political cooperation and a European federation. Chapter 7

highlights the many organisations put forward in a context of sharp tensions, not only struggling to overcome divides but also reflecting divides and hierarchical views of Europe.

The two chapters in the third part – on integration and identity – explore the concept of Europe during the era of integration. Chapter 8 treats the crucial decade following the Second World War, and Chapter 9 examines the notions of European awareness and European identity, bringing the story up to the present. Chapter 8 presents a post-war concept of Europe that includes criticism of nationalism and war technology but continues to be associated with unity and borders. The early post-war mindset favouring European unification included adherence to nations and nation states, but it drew a red line against communism, stressing the post-war divide of the Iron Curtain. Europeanists retained a sentiment of exceptionalism and of having a world mission, even when they recognised that the United States was now the world leader. From the outset, the EEC/EC/EU understood their task as representing Europe, even 'being' Europe. Chapter 9 outlines the thematic awareness of Europe among historians in the 1950s and 1960s, Central European dissidents in 1970s and 1980s, and finally the many intellectuals discussing European identity well into the 2010s. Calls for stronger European identity have met with criticism concerning the divisions and makings of hierarchies within Europe. During the 2010s, discussions of Europe, what it was and what it should be, its divisions and hierarchies, were sparked by a series of crises. The conclusion underlines the discourse as a sign of continuing and growing interest in advancing European awareness.

Notes

1. Schlegel, 'Ueber Litteratur', 77.
2. De Staël, Germany, 18.
3. Masaryk, *Das neue Europa*; Wells, *What Is Coming?*, 192; Benda, *Discours à la nation Européenne*; Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*.
4. Andrén and Söhrman, 'Introduction', 9–10 (2009); Andrén and Söhrman, 'Introduction' (2017); Andrén, 'Controversial Concept', 159–70; Andrén, 'Entanglements'.
5. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 8.
6. E.g. Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, 181–82.
7. Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, 3–4.
8. Pagden, 'Introduction', 1, 23.
9. D'Appollonia, 'European Nationalism', 190.
10. Andrén et al., *Cultural Borders of Europe*; Delanty, *European Heritage*.
11. See, e.g., Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*; Gosewinkel, *Anti-liberal Europe*; Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*; Pasture, *Imagining European Unity*, viii–xi; Wintle, *The Image of Europe*.
12. Milward, *The Rescue*, 45.
13. Moravcsik, *Choice of Europe*, 477, 488.

14. Evans, *The Pursuit of Power*; Mazower, *Dark Continent*; Stråth, *Europe's Utopias of Peace*.

15. Passerini, *Love and the Idea of Europe*, 19.

16. Passerini, 'Ironies of Identity', 205.

17. Connolly, *Political Discourse*; McMahon, 'Return of the History of Ideas?'; Müller, 'On Conceptual History'; Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*; Armitage, 'The International Turn'.

18. Delanty, 'Legacies, Histories, Ideas'.

19. Berger and Tekin, '"Europeanized" European History'; Schlögel, 'Europe and the Culture of Borders'.

20. Thorough studies include Högselius, Kaijser and Vleuten, *Europe's Infrastructure Transition*; Kaiser and Schot, *Writing the Rules*.

21. Armitage, *Foundations*; Armitage, 'The International Turn'; Lacqua, *Internationalism Reconfigured*; Leonhard, 'Conceptual History'; Marjanen, 'Transnational Conceptual History': Reijnen and Rensen, 'European Encounters'.

22. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 4–5.

23. We can see this, for instance, in Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*.

24. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)*, 4–5.

25. Buettner, *Europe after Empire*; Evans, *The Pursuit of Power*; Stråth, *Europe's Utopias of Peace*.

26. A well-read and recent example of a narrative of post-war integration is Middelaar's *The Passage to Europe*.